Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 7th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I echo the eloquent tributes to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, from the noble and learned Lords, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers. He will be greatly missed not only by those in this House who have had the privilege of hearing him over recent years, but by the wider legal public and the public in general.

It is with great pleasure that I join others in praising the excellent maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Nichols, particularly, if I may say so, the very personal account she included in it. It was also a great pleasure to hear from the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, the Yorkshire perspective on the noble Baroness’s contribution to public life.

Nothing I have heard today has persuaded me that this Bill is either necessary or sensible. We on these Benches regard it as an overreaction to a difference, little more than a misunderstanding at the outset, between the Lord Chancellor and the Sentencing Council. What is more, it is a misunderstanding that could and should have been sorted out informally, by discussion and compromise, without resort to emergency legislation, as the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said.

We believe that this Bill proceeds from a false premise—a fallacy, indeed—that that the Sentencing Council has produced guidelines that depart from the principle that everyone is equal before the law. We in this House all believe in equality before the law. The argument advanced for the Bill is that if PSRs are obtained more readily for particular cohorts of offenders, those offenders are less likely to go to prison, which, so the argument goes, amounts to two-tier justice. But as my noble friend Lord Beith pointed out, this Bill is about the provision of pre-sentence reports, not sentencing offenders differentially. PSRs are written to assist judges in making the right sentencing decisions.

I suggest that the two-tier justice argument misrepresents what equality before the law means. What it means is the courts treating everyone alike, with neither fear nor favour. That is the significance of the saying that justice is blind and of the iconic statue that tops the Old Bailey. It is about applying the law even-handedly.

It does not mean ignoring the evidence—still less skewing the evidence by depriving the court of the ability to do justice on the basis of all the available evidence and information, and so weakening the ability of the court to dispense justice. The underlying reality, which this Bill ignores, is the glaring inequality of outcomes in our criminal justice system, whereby offenders from ethnic minorities have historically been far more harshly treated by sentencing courts. They are far more likely to go to prison than their white counterparts, and, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, pointed out, for longer.

For the evidence of that, one has only to read the well-researched and well-argued 2017 final report of the Lammy Review, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Mattinson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, was among many who reinforced this important point. The Bill does nothing to address that reality—far from it. It ignores three very real truths.

The first is that PSRs are the only reliable way that judges can obtain a full and true account of the individual circumstances of the offenders they are called upon to sentence. These reports are a vital source for judges of independently collated information about those individual circumstances, which they need to take into account when deciding between imprisonment or a community sentence. They cannot get such information from speeches in mitigation, however well-constructed and presented by defence counsel, because they are made on defendants’ instructions and cannot be verified.

The second truth is that, as the Minister reminded us, while PSRs ought to be before judges in every case before sentencing—certainly in every case where a prison sentence is possible but not inevitable—their availability in practice has substantially declined in recent years. The reason for that is uncontroversial. Resources for the Probation Service have been progressively reduced and mismanaged by government over the years. The Minister reminded us that the number of PSRs has reduced by 44% over 10 years.

The third truth is that the quality of the reports that have been produced has declined as the time allowed to probation officers to produce individual reports has been reduced, allegedly to save money. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Bach, spoke in some detail of the present weaknesses of many reports. We thoroughly welcome the Government’s commitment to increasing resources for the Probation Service generally and for the provision of more detailed and thorough PSRs in individual cases in particular.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Nichols, that we should be making thorough pre-sentence reports available for all offenders where the options are custody or a community sentence, to enable the court to have the fullest material about individual circumstances of offenders when sentencing. Where I part company with the Government and the noble Baroness, Lady Nichols, is that it neither logical nor defensible to say, “Well if we can’t afford reports for all those at risk of prison, we will forbid the judges to prioritise the most vulnerable groups in the interests of an artificial equality”. Yet that is what this Bill proposes. I agree with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester that it is plain wrong to forbid prioritising pre-sentence reports in the face of a lack of resources.

That is not to uphold equality before the law in the face of a misguided guideline. It is to prevent the Sentencing Council performing its function in the most helpful way possible by addressing the inequality of outcomes that bedevils the system as it operates at present. It is all very well for the Minister to say that the causes of unequal outcomes are presently unknown, but there is a mass of evidence to the contrary.

Even the proposition that doing without PSRs saves money is deeply flawed. If, following the logic of the two-tier justice argument, more PSRs lead to fewer custodial sentences, then PSRs do not increase public costs; they save the public money. No one denies that prison is far more expensive than community sentences. That is true on all the evidence, even leaving out of account the knock-on effects of imprisonment on prisoners’ families, housing, employment and dependence on the state, and the effects of all that on the public finances.

Then there is the clear evidence that community sentences are far more effective than prison at reducing reoffending. Reoffending costs the public purse on the average estimate about £18 billion a year. If PSRs are more widely available, then that may contribute to a reduction in reoffending and so a saving of resources.

The Bill raises two constitutional issues. The Constitution Committee has considered this Bill and has prepared a report, which has technically been published today, but of course no one has had time to read or consider the report. That rush is relevant to the first constitutional issue, which is an issue on which the committee criticised this Bill—the use of fast-track emergency legislation once any emergency has passed.

As we know, the Sentencing Council paused implementation of the guidelines, specifically to give this Parliament time to take a view. This Bill has no place being treated as emergency legislation. It has been rushed at every stage. The rules about time lapse between stages are designed to allow time for reflection and consultation between stages, not just in Parliament but outside. This Bill has suffered from a lack of both.

The second constitutional issue is this: while I accept that Parliament has the power and right to legislate to alter the powers or functions of the Sentencing Council, the council is itself a creature of statute and that power ought to be exercised with great caution. The Sentencing Council was established by the Coroners and Justice Act as an independent body to give advice to judges. Its purpose is to assist the judges in the conduct of their sentencing decisions and to help them to achieve the appropriate level of consistency in sentencing approaches and outcomes. That is a judicial function. It is not sensible for the Executive to interfere. Parliament sets out maximum sentences and a set of rules. But it is dangerous for the Executive to interfere, through introducing an Act of Parliament, with the way the sentencing guidelines are then produced, and to set out what they should or should not contain. That runs some risk of an unwarranted and unhelpful interference by the Executive in the working of the judiciary.

In the House of Commons, Robert Jenrick, the Conservative justice spokesperson, proposed an amendment proposing what was in effect a veto over sentencing guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council. In this House, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, proposed much the same thing. That is inappropriate.

In addition, the Bill is incoherent in its drafting—what the Constitution Committee politely calls “legislative uncertainty”. I do not wish to go into detail because the points made throughout the House by my noble friend Lady Hamwee, the noble and learned Lords, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Hope, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, and the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord Verdirame, on personal characteristics are surely right. Are not pregnancy, being transgender and sexual orientation all personal characteristics? They are also circumstances that a sentencing court might want to take into account, as well as ethnicity, particularly where those characteristics give rise to persecution, abuse and psychological and mental health issues. Those are just the kind of factors that might be considered and explained in PSRs. Why should sentencing guidelines not indicate that some of these characteristics are important and make a PSR more valuable to judges?

For my part, I find any distinction between personal characteristics and personal circumstances ill-defined and unhelpful, and I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and my noble friend Lord Beith that the wording of the prohibition is profoundly unhelpful. I shall not take up the invitation of my noble friend Lady Hamwee to foreshadow at Second Reading amendments that might later be considered. We have heard a number of suggestions for Committee. I would also consider the insertion of the words “without good cause” into the prohibition, to allow for some assessment of what may or may not be sensible. But that is for the next stage of these proceedings, so I shall leave it there.