Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th May 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Amendment 14 in this group, like all the others, seeks to probe and challenge the uncertainty surrounding the definition on which the whole Bill depends. I welcome the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in that respect. I am particularly attracted by Amendment 5, which goes to the fundamentals of the problem. I hope that will get discussed in the course of our proceedings.

I am a member of the Constitution Committee, like several noble Lords present today, and I share the committee’s concerns about the legislative uncertainty and unhelpful precedent set by the inclusion and non-definition of personal characteristics. The committee said that this clause was insufficiently clear and introduced legislative uncertainty. The list of personal characteristics is, as the Government indicate in their Explanatory Note, non-exhaustive, which leaves a legislative hole. The Sentencing Council is placed under a prohibition: it must not frame guidelines by reference to different personal characteristics. But because the list is non-exhaustive, the council has no way of knowing what other personal characteristics fall within the prohibition.

It is a pretty basic principle of the rule of law that, in order that people should obey the law, they should be able to find out what the law is—but there is no way to find out what are acceptable other personal characteristics, and correspondence with Select Committees is in no way definitive in that respect. You create a body, in the form of the Sentencing Council, that is placed under a prohibition and cannot know the full extent of that prohibition. It is pretty weird—and, I think, very bad—legislative practice.

In his letter to the committee, the Minister indicates a number of things that, in his view, are not personal characteristics, including being a sole or primary carer or a victim of domestic violence. Where is the authority in the Bill to exclude those characteristics but not others, such as autism, neurodiversity or having a background of being brought up in local authority care? There is a whole number of things that might be considered personal characteristics or might not. What is the council intended to do about that?

My Amendment 14 addresses an even more confusing aspect of the personal characteristics problem. Several cases taken to appeal have set out where circumstances or characteristics should have been taken into account in deciding whether to seek a pre-sentence report: pregnancy in Thompson, 2024; modern slavery in Kurmekaj, 2024; and young offenders in Meanley, 2022—I think. A sentencing judge is expected to take account of those cases when deciding whether to seek a pre-sentence report. Of course, as the Minister will point out, the Bill does not directly impact on the court, or on the judge who is passing sentence. In any formal sense it does not change the criteria that the judge will consider while sentencing. But that is a very formal view of that matter—it is difficult to escape the conclusion that this discussion and the passing of this legislation might not have some influence on how judges view their freedom to seek pre-sentencing reports.

What can the Sentencing Council do about this? It appears to me that the effect of the Bill is that the Sentencing Council would be in trouble if it drew attention to the cases to which I have referred and sought to make judges aware that they are relevant to those particular circumstances—autism, a background of local authority care, and all sorts of other circumstances, such as being brought up on a particularly rough estate where there is known to be gangland activity and much likelihood of falling under the influence of violence if they had not carried out the offence. There are all sorts of circumstances like that which might be treated as personal characteristics, but to refer to existing cases that define circumstances in which pre-sentence reports should be used appears to be something that the Sentencing Council is precluded from doing. That does not make any sense to me at all, which is why I have drafted the amendment in that form.

I believe that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, damage has been done to the authority of the Sentencing Council, particularly if we do not amend the Bill to make it legally coherent. The Sentencing Council sought to address a recognised and widely admitted problem about the disproportionate levels of custody sentences imposed on some sections of the community from particular backgrounds. In doing so, it unintentionally created what turned out to be a political problem, and the consequence of that is a disproportionate response from the Government and legislation, which, frankly, does not make sense and will result in legal confusion.

We ought to remember that the sentencing legislation already in existence, the Sentencing Act 2020, makes pre-sentence reports something courts should seek unless they deem it unnecessary to do so. Here we are, creating an aura of doubt around what judges should do when those very circumstances arise, which may be contributing to the disproportionate presence in our jails of people from certain backgrounds. That is careless and shows a lack of awareness of the unintended effects legislation can have. Therefore, we should amend the Bill, make it clearer and try to avoid some of those consequences.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, before I come to the substance of the debate, may I make one more plea to the Government? I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and others in their trenchant criticisms of the Bill. I conclude—and I invite the Government now, even at this late stage, to conclude—that the Bill ought not to proceed before the publication of David Gauke’s Independent Sentencing Review, expected as early as this week. It could and should be withdrawn, or at least paused, to await that report and to allow time for reflection, both on the report and on the Bill in the light of it.

The Government’s own website, in describing the terms of reference for the Gauke review, says:

“The review will provide long term solutions for our justice system by”,


and then the sixth bullet point says,

“considering whether the sentencing framework should be amended to take into account the specific needs or vulnerabilities of specific cohorts, such as young adult offenders, older offenders, and women”,

which is precisely what the in-position guideline, approved by the Sentencing Council and now largely to be prohibited by the Bill, concluded should happen.

The Bill contains a number of difficulties which are addressed in a number of the amendments proposed by noble Lords from around the Committee, all of which are well within the terms of reference of the Gauke review. The first is highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and is presented by the shortage of resources, about which we all know, which has resulted in a failure to meet the clear and uncontroversial need for judges to have the benefit of full and well-prepared pre-sentence reports for all defendants—certainly for all defendants at risk of custodial sentences. Then there is the central difficulty of the Bill’s ruling out prioritising pre-sentence reports for particular cohorts, such as black defendants, in the face of very strong evidence—cited by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—such as that produced by the Lammy review, that black defendants are more likely to be sent to prison than their white counterparts, and more likely to be sentenced to longer terms.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I have spoken at length on my amendment in the last group. My amendment here is to suggest, as I believe is completely uncontroversial, that sentencing guidelines about sentencing reports must promote greater use of such reports as part of sentencing. Whether that is a matter for the sentencing guidelines or for sentencers generally, the need for more and better pre-sentence reports is of extreme importance. I believe that everything the Minister has said on this subject since his appointment shows that the Government agree with that position. So I propose to say nothing more about that.

Amendments 3 and 8, to which my noble friend Lady Hamwee has spoken, are non-controversial. Whether they are treated as probing amendments at this stage perhaps matters little, but we are trying here to get across the principles. I do not think there is any need for me to say more on this group.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I will first deal with the two amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. We believe that Amendment 2 is unnecessary; probation officers should be left to get on with their jobs. The Bill does not prevent them addressing matters likely to reduce offending and we should have some confidence that they will share this view when it is necessary and appropriate. Why would they wish not to go down that route? That, after all, is what their job is about: preventing reoffending.

We do not believe that Amendment 8 is necessary, but we are sympathetic to where it goes. Again, this is on the basis that our amendments in group 3, which will bring the guidelines before Parliament, are accepted and acted on, so that Parliament gets to look at what is actually happening in the guidelines themselves.

Again, we are sympathetic to the aims of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, but, although reports are necessary in appropriate cases, they are not necessary in every case. It is the probation officer who is best placed to alert the court in cases where a report is not proposed. A probation officer will be in court and can speak to defendants before sentencing in court.

In my experience, having sat in the court myself as a recorder for many years—and even, many years before that, having appeared in Crown Courts on quite a number of occasions—a probation officer is best placed to alert the court to the benefit of obtaining a report, or saying that they actually do not need one in a given case. However, that can be left to Parliament when it looks at the guidelines, if it gets the chance to do so.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this group of amendments raises some interesting and quite difficult points. Amendments 9, 10 and 17 were introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and also proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar. On first reading, they appear to set out, albeit in a more elegant form—as one would expect, I suppose I should say—the effect of an amendment introduced in the other place by the Conservative shadow Secretary of State Robert Jenrick. Mr Jenrick’s amendment sought to give the Secretary of State—that, is the Executive—a complete veto over the guidelines proposed by the Sentencing Council. His language—I abbreviate it slightly—was that the council must

“obtain the consent of the Secretary of State before issuing sentencing guidelines as definitive guidelines”.

That is what appeared in the amendment paper for the House of Commons, to which Mr Jenrick spoke.

That ran entirely across and counter to what we say is the proper constitutional position. The starting point is that the Sentencing Council is an independent body created by statute, with the job of advising judges on sentencing and the functions that I outlined in the debate on group 1. The judges are and must remain independent, and the judicial function is an independent function that must be, and always has been, independent of the Executive and Parliament. That is not to say that there should or should not be parliamentary oversight. Parliament sets the rules; it sets the maxima for sentences, it sometimes sets the minima for sentences, and it sets the political context. But the way in which the relationship between the judiciary, the Sentencing Council and Parliament functions has been explained by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, and his explanation demonstrates the subtle interrelationship between Parliament and the judiciary in this process. It is carefully drawn, and it is very important that that careful distinction is maintained.

The language in Amendment 9 is rather different from the language in the amendment of Robert Jenrick in the other place. But it is strange and it has a strangeness built into it that my noble friend Lord Beith picked out, because Amendment 9 would provide that sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports “must be submitted” to the Secretary of State by the Sentencing Council, and the Secretary of State

“must give effect to those guidelines by regulations”.

The point that my noble friend Lord Beith made was that it is not a matter for the Secretary of State to give effect to any guidelines by regulations, or indeed to do anything else by regulations. It is we in Parliament who make regulations. Certainly, they must be laid by the Secretary of State, but then Parliament has the decision-making power. Indeed, in the further amendments laid by the noble Lords, Lord Sandhurst and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, this is subject to the affirmative resolution. As it stands, I do not understand how the Secretary of State can be required by statute to give effect to those guidelines by regulations when it is for Parliament to accept or deny approval to such regulations.

Furthermore, it seems to me that the overall burden of the first part of Amendment 9—when it says

“must be submitted to the Secretary of State”,

followed by the implication that the Secretary of State has no option but to give effect to those guidelines—gives to the Secretary of State a power that he does not have and denies any function in the approval or the denial of the guidelines to the Sentencing Council, beyond simply proposing them to the Secretary of State.

So it is our position that Amendment 9 is in fact unconstitutional and does not work. It is for the noble Lords who have proposed it to consider how they want to proceed, but I would suggest for now that they withdraw it and come back on Report with something that at least makes constitutional sense before they go any further with this.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

Amendments 9, 10 and 17 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, would require the Sentencing Council to submit sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports to the Secretary of State, who would then be responsible for placing these guidelines before Parliament for approval.

As noble Lords will be well aware, the Lord Chancellor has been clear that this situation has highlighted that there is potentially a democratic deficit here. The Government are therefore currently reviewing the role of the Sentencing Council and its powers for developing sentencing guidelines. In doing so, we are fully mindful of the recent developments on the imposition guideline, which have brought us to debating today’s Bill.

I acknowledge and thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, for his comments. In conducting the review, the Government are particularly mindful of the special role that the council plays in bridging Parliament and the judiciary on sentencing policy and practice. There are of course significant policy and constitutional matters to carefully consider, alongside considering what recommendations arise from the wider independent sentencing review.

While I acknowledge the noble Lord’s rationale for tabling these amendments, I am not convinced that it would be proper to legislate on this in a piecemeal way, recognising that the amendments capture only sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports. I am also not convinced that using this fast-track legislation is the best way of going about this. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw this amendment, but I hope I can offer some reassurance that the Government are keeping all options on the table. Once the review of the council is complete, the Lord Chancellor and I are clear that we are willing to further legislate on this in a more comprehensive way if necessary.

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Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

15: Clause 1, page 1, line 15, at end insert—
“(13) Nothing in this section shall require the Council to issue guidance about pre-sentence reports that is not consistent with its duties under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to probe the impact of this Act on any of the Sentencing Council’s duties under the public sector equality duty.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, my two amendments in this group, Amendments 15 and 18, cover two separate topics. The first relates to the public sector equality duty and seeks to provide that:

“Nothing in this section shall require the Council to issue guidance about pre-sentence reports that is not consistent with its duties under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010”.


As your Lordships will be aware, that section provides for the public sector equality duty, which is a duty to work towards eliminating discrimination based on protected characteristics, to advance equality of opportunity and to foster good relations between those with protected characteristics and others who do not have such characteristics.

I raise this issue in Committee because it has been suggested in some quarters that the public sector equality duty might have been compromised or broken by the Sentencing Council’s proposed imposition guideline, which has now been paused. This is a probing amendment to explore what the Government consider to be the position. Our understanding is that paragraph 3 of Schedule 18 to the Equality Act disapplies the equality duty from those exercising a judicial function, or citing on behalf of someone exercising a judicial function, which would apply to the Sentencing Council, so the public sector equality duty is not engaged at all in the sentencing exercise or in the ordering or commissioning of pre-sentence reports—which is, of course, a judicial function, because it is the judge who makes the order.

It would be helpful to ensure that these discussions are not conducted in the shadow of the misunderstanding of where the public sector equality duty applies and where it does not. On the substantive point, which is independent of the jurisdictional point that I have just raised, as to whether the paused imposition guideline would have been in breach of the public sector equality duty if it applied, we would argue that a guideline that had as its plain aim the elimination of inequality in sentencing could itself be found to be discriminatory—and we would not accept that it could.

Amendment 18 is the second amendment in my name in this group. It calls for an independent review of the operation of this Bill, if it becomes an Act, within two years of its passing. In calling for this review, I suggest that it is important to keep the work of the Sentencing Council generally under review, in the light of any applicable legislation. That is particularly so if this Bill becomes law because it is likely to be overtaken, or at least supplemented, in large part by reforms to be introduced both as a result of the Gauke review that is to report extremely soon and, no doubt later, as a result of the Leveson review into the criminal courts and their wider working. There will therefore be a constant need for review to ensure that contradictions do not arise or that any such potential contradictions are eliminated between this legislation and further reforms.

On a broader basis, it is important to monitor the success or failure of the attempt to address inequality of outcomes in the sentencing process. I know that the Minister is aware of and alive to the inequality of outcomes and determined to address it. I know that he regards our objections to this Bill on the basis that it does not do so as perhaps ill founded; nevertheless, it is important to keep under review whether the Bill actually hampers the addressing of inequality of outcomes.

On the second point as to why it is important to monitor progress, the Government are dedicated and committed to ensuring that pre-sentence reports are more widely available and in future more thoroughly prepared, and the resources being applied to the Probation Service are dedicated in part to that end. Therefore, it is important to monitor the effect of any such improvement in the availability and quality of pre-sentencing reports on reducing reoffending and, ultimately, reducing the number of people in custody. That justifies having a review after two years of the operation of this Act.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I can be brief. On the noble Lord’s first Amendment, Amendment 15, we would not for our part want the Sentencing Council to go down the road of issuing guidance inconsistent with its duties under the Equality Act.

As for Amendment 18 and the review, we do not have a view on this matter. I note that with practically every Bill that comes before this House there is a call for a review at some point, whether it is one year, two years or five years down the road. The Sentencing Council must by now be well aware of public concerns and the concerns of legislators, and it would itself want to know how things are going. It is quite likely to call for a review if so minded. We are neutral on that topic.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

Amendment 15, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, seeks to ensure that any guidelines about pre-sentence reports issued by the Sentencing Council are fully compliant with the public sector equality duty under Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.

I am not persuaded that this amendment is necessary, given the Bill’s key aim is to protect the principle of equal treatment before the law. It does this by removing the effect of the changes the Sentencing Council introduced in its revised imposition guideline, which provides that a pre-sentence report will “normally be considered necessary” for certain offenders, with reference to their personal characteristics, and prevents the council from reissuing guidance to the same effect.

Furthermore, nothing in the Bill impacts the Sentencing Council’s obligations to comply with the public sector equality duty in developing sentencing guidelines. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Amendment 18, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would require an independent review to be arranged by the Secretary of State into the changes made by Clause 1 of the Bill to sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports. I am mindful that a very similar amendment was tabled during the Bill’s consideration in the other place, and I do not want to repeat in full the debate there, but I hope it may be helpful if I briefly summarise the Government’s position.

While I recognise it is of course important to carefully ponder the Bill’s effects, I stress that the direct changes it makes are limited in nature. All this is about is ensuring that offenders do not receive preferential treatment regarding pre-sentence reports based on their personal characteristics. This gets to the heart of ensuring equality before the law, which is a principle which does not need to be reviewed.

To be clear, nothing in the Bill will prevent judges from requesting pre-sentence reports in cases where they ordinarily would, including in appropriate cases involving domestic abuse, young people or pregnant women.

While I therefore urge the noble Lord, Lord Marks, to withdraw this amendment, I hope that I can reassure him that there will be ample opportunity in this House to discuss matters with regard to the Sentencing Council in future, once the Lord Chancellor’s review into the wider role and powers of the Sentencing Council is complete.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am content to withdraw the amendment at this stage and will consider further developments before Report.

Amendment 15 withdrawn.