Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 15th April 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to move Motion D1 as an amendment to Motion D. I begin by thanking the Minister for Motions E and F, which are an important step forward for victims. They provide for more time to submit an unduly lenient sentence application and create an exceptional circumstances clause when it is in the interest of justice to do so. Motion F will ensure that the victims’ code is amended to ensure that victims are notified of their right of access to the ULS scheme—an issue that unfortunately has acted as a barrier to the scheme in previous cases.

I must confess I am a little surprised to see Motion E in the name of the Minister. She said in response to my own amendment on Report:

“The victims asked us not to bring forward our amendment extending the time limit to 56 days, and so we have not done so”. —[Official Report, 10/3/26; col. 244.]


I wonder whether that is still the view of the victims now that we have an extension to six months.

Motion D1 in my name concerns the issue of private prosecutions and, while it is not my intention to repeat the debate in Committee and on Report on the importance of private prosecutions for charities or for dealing with the scourge of shoplifting, we on these Benches continue to harbour serious concerns about the manner in which Clause 12 is drafted. It was therefore unfortunate that the Government have not acted on any of the arguments raised by me, my noble friend Lord Sandhurst or the noble Lord, Lord Marks, with regard to these issues.

The Government have stated that, before any rates are set, there will be extensive engagement with stake- holders and a full public consultation, yet Clause 12 as drafted will give the Government the power to cap the amounts payable for prosecutors for their costs prior to any consultation actually taking place. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said on Report,

“that is the wrong way round”.—[Official Report, 10/3/26; col. 224.]

We on these Benches agree with that sentiment entirely.

However, as the Government have cited financial privilege as a reason for opposing our amendment to leave out Clause 12 from the Bill, I have instead tabled Motion D1, which contains two amendments in lieu. The effect of these amendments is threefold and seeks to mitigate the consequences of Clause 12. First, they would ensure that an impact assessment is launched on the potential effect of Clause 12, with particular regard to its consequences for charities and victims regarding access to justice. That need is underlined by the observations that the Minister made about there being some reservation about the way in which private prosecutions are being pursued. It is only appropriate, therefore, that these matters should be addressed. Secondly, my amendments would ensure that the Government publish a response to that impact assessment before they exercise the regulatory-making powers under Clause 12. Thirdly, the amendments would ensure that such regulation is subject to the affirmative procedure of both Houses, which is entirely appropriate in these circumstances. The Government have said that they have no intention of exercising the regulatory powers under Clause 12 until after their own public consultation, so I see no reason why they should oppose these amendments. They have been drafted with transparency and open justice in mind. If it is the Government’s intention to resist these simple amendments, then I will seek to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I turn first to the issue of private prosecutions, which is the contentious area in this group. I say at the outset that we on these Benches agree with Motion D1, and the Amendments 4B and 4C in lieu, proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen.

I start with a brief general point that we have made before. Private prosecutions are important, particularly against a background that police and other prosecuting authorities often have insufficient resources, or in some cases insufficient will, to investigate and prosecute offences themselves. It is wrong that decisions to invoke the criminal law should be exclusively in the hands of the state and its agencies. Private prosecutions offer a way for commercial organisations and for charities and others to bring prosecutions. That is important in the cases of shop theft in particular, but also in cases of fraud against charities and in other criminal matters. It is essential, however, that those who bring such prosecution successfully should be able to recover their reasonable costs. Otherwise, we risk their being deterred from doing so by having to bear the whole cost themselves without the prospect of objectively reasonable reimbursement.

As it stands, Clause 12 looks like an attempt to give the Government power to bring in regulations to limit the costs to be reimbursed. It may be that there are some private prosecutions where lawyers are overcharging for those prosecutions, and if that is the case, and there is evidence to establish that, then there may be some need for further regulation. But as a general rule it is unwise for Parliament to give Ministers the power to make regulations without their first establishing that such regulations are necessary. In this case, there is no hard evidence that we have seen to establish that regulations limiting the recoverable costs of private prosecutions are necessary. Ministers should not be able to bring such regulations into effect to limit recovery of such costs without their first establishing the necessity for such regulations.

Hence, the amendments proposed by the noble and learned Lord are right, I suggest. They are right to insist that an impact assessment, considering the likely effect of the regulations, and a response by the Government to that impact assessment, are made public before any regulations can be brought into effect. That would mean that Parliament can be properly informed of the need for them. The accompanying amendment, requiring an affirmative resolution, is entirely consistent with that principle, so we will support those amendments in lieu.

I turn next to the unduly lenient sentence scheme. We fully support the Government’s amendments in lieu, and we are very grateful to the Minister for meeting my noble friend Lady Brinton and me to consider our concern about the rights of victims and their families to refer sentences for consideration in circumstances where they have not been informed about the detail of the scheme or have not had reasonable time to consider making such a referral, at a time when circumstances for those victims are traumatic in the extreme.