Lord Pannick
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(1 day, 9 hours ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, this is an exceptionally difficult issue because of the conflicting interests, which cannot, in my view, be balanced.
The first is that under existing law, many women who have recently suffered miscarriages are subject to distressing and intrusive investigations when they have not acted unlawfully. However sensitive the investigation carried out by the police, it will inevitably be intrusive and distressing to the woman concerned. That is the first interest. On the other hand, we have to recognise that there will be women who terminate their pregnancies at a late stage for impermissible reasons, such as was mentioned by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. We have to recognise that, if Clause 191 is enacted, there may well be more such cases. These are two conflicting interests, and I am very doubtful that either of the proposed compromises is a solution to this problem—that is, the identification by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, of further defences, or the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, of a requirement for the consent of the Attorney-General.
The reason why neither of these compromises works is that they will not prevent the investigations of women who have recently suffered the loss of their child. No view can be taken on whether the defences identified by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, apply or whether it is right and proper for the Attorney-General to give his consent to a prosecution, unless the facts and circumstances of the case are known; so the investigation has to take place, and it will inevitably be distressing to the woman concerned.
Therefore, it seems to me that we simply have to make a policy choice here, and it is a choice between two evils: the evil of the investigation of many, many women in very distressing and sensitive circumstances when they have acted perfectly lawfully, or the evil of allowing the women who have acted improperly not to be prosecuted. We will each have our own view on which is the greater evil.
There is a further consideration that the noble Lord should perhaps address, and that is the value that Parliament should place on human life.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Of course Parliament should place a value on human life, but it should also, should it not, place a value on the interests of the unfortunate women who have, in the most distressing of circumstances, lost the child they are carrying. Therefore, to talk about the value of human life does not answer the profound dilemma which Parliament faces in addressing Clause 191. There are two evils here and the question is how we best address the problem.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, is the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggesting that where sensitive matters are investigated, we should change the law? Let me refer to the case of a coroner investigating a death at home. I can cite an example only last Saturday of a friend of mine who died at home of natural causes, but his wife and family had an investigation and understood it was par for the course. They were very upset at the death of their father and their husband; none the less, the law is required to investigate suspicious deaths even in the most sensitive circumstances.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I take the noble Baroness’s point, and I very much sympathise with those who have been bereaved and who face such an investigation. However, there is a profound difference in what we are considering here, which is an investigation of a woman who has just lost the child she is carrying and who is being investigated with a view to the real possibility of a criminal prosecution of her. We have to recognise that a woman in those circumstances is particularly vulnerable and sensitive. We have to weigh that interest against what I accept is the real concern that there will be women who have acted improperly and unlawfully who will get away with their criminality.
I wonder if what the noble Lord describes, with which I have a great deal of sympathy—I say this as a signatory to Amendment 456—would be ameliorated in terms of the distress of the investigation if the Attorney-General were to adopt guidance, and that guidance set out strict criteria that would at least remove or ameliorate the risk of the distress these investigations can cause. The Attorney-General can define very narrowly the circumstances in which the police would be entitled to do that, can he not?
Lord Pannick (CB)
He can, but as I have already said, the difficulty is that, however sympathetic the guidance, the circumstances of the woman concerned have to be investigated in order to identify whether her case falls within those criteria. Therefore, the damage he has done to the woman who has recently lost the child is caused, however sensitive the investigation and whatever the criteria. That is the problem.
The noble Lord says that there is a profound difference. However, there are circumstances—maybe others are aware—where parents lose a very young child in the home to sudden infant death syndrome. In certain of those circumstances, the police have to come through the door. There is no profound difference there: unfortunately, we need to investigate sensitive things, and that is not a reason to not change the law.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I entirely understand and accept that the police will investigate many alleged possible offences in highly sensitive circumstances, but the issue that arises for Parliament, and your Lordships’ House in particular today, is whether we should adopt special criteria where the sensitivity and the distress relate to a woman who has recently lost the child that she is carrying. It is very difficult, in my view—I am obviously not an expert on this; women in the Committee will have a stronger view than I do—but I can understand the real, particular and damaging concern that arises where a woman who has carried her child for however many months loses that child and is then the subject of a criminal investigation. It is difficult to imagine anything that is more distressing to the woman concerned in those circumstances. The Committee therefore has to take a view on this. My current view—
The noble Lord makes a very reasonable case, but is it not really an issue of proportionality and balance? He talks about the level of distress but did not really answer the points made by my noble friends Lady Lawlor and Lady Berridge. The fact is that this has affected approximately 100 women in terms of criminal investigations, as against 1.5 million abortions since 2020. That is an important point to make in terms of informing the argument that he is making.
Lord Pannick (CB)
The Committee will take its own view on whether I have answered the questions that have been put to me. I do not think that a reference to 1.5 million abortions really takes the argument any further forward.
I recognise the difficulties of this, and each Member of the Committee will have their own view, but my current view is that the nature of the investigations, the distress that they cause and the unlikelihood that they would lead to a prosecution is the paramount consideration. I therefore see great force in Clause 191.
Baroness Hazarika (Lab)
My Lords, I want to speak to Amendment 459C, to which my name is attached. I very much support Clause 191, which I believe would modernise our society, but Amendment 459C would halt ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions for repealed abortion offences, no matter when committed. This would tighten up Clause 191 on technical grounds. It would stop ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions for repealed offences, no matter when they were committed; currently, Clause 191 applies only to actions after the Bill becomes law.
We are aware of multiple women who have been reported to the police by medical professionals in the months since the House of Commons voted in support of Clause 191. There was a clear signal from that vote—it passed by 397 votes to 137 votes—that Members of Parliament wanted women to stop being targeted. Existing guidance obtained from FoI requests indicates that Parliament cannot rely on police and prosecutors to make the decision to discontinue ongoing cases without a clear legislative process. This amendment would provide clarity for everyone.
I also want to lend my support to Amendment 461J, which my noble friend spoke about. This is about pardoning women with criminal records for abortion offences, in line with the Turing pardon. It also chimes with the scandal of young women who were the victims of the Pakistani grooming gangs, many of whom ended up with criminal records, which I am sure we will all agree was unforgivable.
Many of us in this House have spoken up bravely and passionately about the grooming gang scandal and talked about the plight of those young women and girls, and how vulnerable and alone they were. Well, let me tell you: many of the women who seek an abortion outside the law are often the same girls, and young women who face very similar circumstances. They are desperate. They have often been groomed, abused, violently attacked and raped, and they find themselves in very isolated situations. They do not have a loving partner or a lovely, warm family, and they do not trust the state at this point.
Then I am not terribly attracted by the amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I am rather more attracted by that of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, although I have heard the criticisms of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about that.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Can I assist the noble Baroness? Clause 191 is perfectly clear in that no offence is committed by a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy. It simply does not affect the criminal offences that are committed by any person, whether a doctor or otherwise, who assists a woman. There are precedents for that distinction in the Suicide Act 1961. The act of suicide is lawful, but it is unlawful to assist.
I do grasp that point, although I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for assisting me. In a broader sense, can it be relied on that Clause 191 would not have a wash effect over the Abortion Act 1967, which has been subjected to various attempts at amendment but has largely held the course since 1967? I understand all the very good reasons for it, but how we can be sure that this decriminalisation of the woman concerned would not ultimately lead to an amendment of the Abortion Act 1967.
My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Verdirame has explained, my noble friend Lady Wolf cannot be here today, so I will pick up some of her points in this intervention as she is not here to make them herself. If we want to change the law, many say that Clause 191 will improve the situation for women’s bodily autonomy. I am all for that, but only after a considered debate, which we had in the past when we amended the Abortion Act 1967 to bring it into conformity with changing medical science and social attitudes. It is not as though we are stuck in aspic. This Bill is not the place to do so, as the breadth of amendments that this clause has attracted demonstrates.
I will concentrate mainly on the Covid-era regulations which permitted the obtaining of pills by post at any point of gestation, whereas previously, later stages required face-to-face consultation between the pregnant woman and doctors under the Abortion Act. This may have been necessary during lockdown, and it is a failure on the part of the then Government not to have contemplated a review after lockdown ended. As things stand, Clause 191 will facilitate changes where decriminalisation of late-stage and full-term abortions may well create additional dangers to women’s health, as pointed out at Second Reading by numerous noble Lords. It will also open the door to coerce women to seek late-term abortions against their own wishes. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is not in her seat, but I think that is the point that she was trying to get to in her intervention.
If there is no sanction in law, what reason can one give a controlling partner who insists that it is perfectly permissible in law? Decriminalisation suggests that there is nothing to prevent the woman from aborting late-term through the convenience of pills by post, virtually no questions asked. So you have the perverse effect that, alongside the certainty of greater autonomy for women, we may well see the risk of coercive control and deception. I am sure that is not what the movers of this amendment in the other place sought.
My noble friend Lady Wolf made the point that while home-based abortions have become common, they normally use two drugs in the form of pills: mifepristone, which blocks progesterone, needed in pregnancy, but does not kill the foetus; and misoprostol, which basically causes cramping, bleeding and the emptying of the uterus. If taken early in pregnancy, the result is the same as an early miscarriage, in effect, and in England and Wales it is allowable for abortions up to 10 weeks of gestation.
The pills are advertised as simple to use and as creating early miscarriages with bleeding and perhaps some bits of tissue. So the descriptions are reassuring and encouraging. However, the reality may be very different and life-threatening to the woman, who, whatever her reasons for wishing to terminate the pregnancy, may not appreciate the complications. Pills by post do not require further safeguards than those put into place by the 1967 Act other than a phone or virtual call, which is the least satisfactory method of ascertaining stress, emotional distress or, indeed, coercive pressure.
I want to share with the Committee some examples of emotional pressure. Noble Lords may be aware of the case of Stuart Worby in December 2024. I am grateful to the prosecuting counsel, Edmund Vickers KC of Red Lion Chambers, for giving me some background information to this case. I should add, before I say anything further, that the victim is subject to lifelong anonymity.
In December 2024 the judge summed up the details of the case. A central aspect was that the victim married the defendant after the commencement of the pregnancy. He wished to terminate the pregnancy, but she wished to keep her baby, with or without him. He set about securing the termination without her knowledge and used a female friend to obtain abortive drugs from an online private clinic. The judge pointed out that he must have known that this was dangerous for his wife, as he knew she was many weeks past the time limit to use the drugs safely.
When Mr Worby received the drugs, he first added mifepristone to food and drink. The next day he told the victim that he wanted to try something sexually new in bed, which involved blindfolding her and tying her up. The real purpose was to insert the second type of medication, misoprostol, into her vagina. Shortly after he had done that, she became unwell, and the next day she suffered a miscarriage, losing the baby that she so badly yearned for. The judge’s remarks explained that the offence of administering poison to bring about a miscarriage was made more serious by Mr Worby’s prolonged research and planning over many weeks, by his involving others, by bringing about a miscarriage, and by the devastating effect it had on his then wife’s dream of having a child.
This sorry tale attempts to demonstrate that it is not only, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, the woman who may wish to terminate her pregnancy or the unborn child. There is a further factor here: the partner, the husband or other members of the family who may seek coercion.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. That is a shocking story, but nothing in Clause 191 would affect the criminal liability of the man who behaved in such a disgraceful manner.
I find that very interesting. I am sure it will be a welcome debate among lawyers. I will look into that and take it into consideration when I come back with a renewed amendment on Report.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I am sorry, but this is simply not a controversial issue. Clause 191 says that
“no offence is committed by a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy”.
It simply does not affect the criminal liability of anyone else.
My Lords, we are coming back to the terminally ill debate that we had on Friday. Women may well be—although not in this particular case—coerced by partners to take pills when they would not otherwise have wished to do so. Perhaps noble Lords who have tabled amendments to do with face-to-face consultations have that in their minds, as a face-to-face consultation would require deeper insights on the part of medical professionals—pills by post do not.