Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Polak Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Lords Chamber

As well as the bad orphanages and bad practices, there are also the good ones, and I have been honoured to visit some of them. Yet the bad practice creates a stigma against the whole sector. Therefore, I support this amendment because if we can drive out the exploitative orphanages, maybe then the good orphanages—which do sterling work, often in very difficult circumstances with very limited finances—can get on with doing the job and raising the money they need from around the world to continue their excellent work.

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My Lords, I too support the noble Lord, Lord Randall, on Amendment 247A. I had the fortune of meeting Claire Wright over a year ago, and she explained to me what Hope and Homes for Children was doing as a charity. I too was bowled over by it, because it was an area that I did not have much knowledge of. She and the organisation have done amazing work. While this may be out of scope of the Bill, the one suggestion I make to the Minister is that he could bring together a round table of Ministers from relevant government departments to listen to Claire Wright and Hope and Homes for Children, so that their good work can be shared and built on.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Randall of Uxbridge for bringing forward this important amendment. It would ensure that this House does not overlook emerging and deeply troubling patterns of abuse that fall outside traditional definitions.

The amendment seeks to expand the definition of exploitation under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to include children who are recruited into residential care institutions overseas for the purpose of financial gain, commonly referred to as orphanage trafficking. As my noble friend highlighted, this is a practice that too often disguises itself as humanitarian intervention, while in fact it enables systematic exploitation and harm. Many so-called orphanages operate as profit-making enterprises, intentionally separating children from families and communities to attract funding and donations. The children involved may be subject to physical and emotional abuse, forced labour or trafficking into other forms of exploitation.

It is right that we recognise the growing international call to confront this practice and that we consider whether our legislative framework needs strengthening to support that effort. Ensuring that the Modern Slavery Act accurately reflects contemporary forms of exploitation is a legitimate objective, and I commend my noble friend for shining a spotlight on an issue that has far too long remained in the shadows.

We are sympathetic to the intention of the amendment and welcome the opportunity it provides to examine how the UK can play a stronger role in protecting vulnerable children globally. At the same time, we look forward to hearing from the Minister about the practical implications of such a change and how it might interact with existing powers and international co-operation mechanisms. I hope the Government will engage constructively with the concerns he has raised, and I very much look forward to hearing from the Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Walmsley (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with every word of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and of my noble friend Lady Featherstone. I hope they will forgive me if I say no more about all that, because, if I do not catch my train tonight, I will have to sleep on the street. I will speak to Amendments 280A in the name of my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and Amendments 282 and 285 in his name and mine.

Amendment 280A is straightforward in its intent. It seeks to fully implement recommendation 13 of IICSA’s final report. The current Clause 72 introduces a duty on adults engaged in relevant activity to notify police or local authorities when

“they are given reason to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed”.

The Government propose non-criminal sanctions, such as referral to professional regulators or the DBS. We on these Benches maintain that this approach is insufficient. IICSA was clear: a failure to comply with the duty must be a criminal offence. Amendment 280A would insert proposed new subsections (10A) and (10B) into Clause 72, which would explicitly provide that:

“A person who fails to fulfil the duty under subsection (1) commits an offence”,


and that the person

“is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale”.

This criminal sanction is essential because relying solely on professional sanctions creates institutional loopholes. Professional sanctions apply to only a fraction of the mandated reporters and cannot effectively address failings in settings where professional regulation is absent, such as certain religious settings, where, as we have heard, many grievous failings have occurred. Nor do they cover volunteers in schools or other settings. Furthermore, criminalising non-compliance would align us with international best practice in countries such as France and Australia.

Amendment 280 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, is similar to this one, except that it offers some mitigations that the court could consider. Whether this offers a loophole or a reasonable consideration for the courts is a reasonable discussion point.

Amendment 285 addresses the second vital component of IICSA’s recommendation 13. Incorporating the duty to report when a person recognises the indicators of child sexual abuse, the amendment would expand the trigger for the duty to report beyond direct disclosure by a child or perpetrator, or witnessing child sexual abuse, all of which is vanishingly rare, to include circumstances where a person

“witnesses a child displaying sexualised, sexually harmful or other behaviour, physical signs of abuse or consequences of sexual abuse”.

It has to be remembered that only one in three victims of CSA ever discloses what happened, and often it is many years later.

The fact is that, if the Bill passes as it is without amendment, it will undoubtedly fail in its stated objective. The Government themselves recognise this, as witnessed by the figures in the impact assessment. It says that the number of extra anticipated reports of CSA each year for England and Wales under the existing terms of the Bill is only 310, which is an average of 7.9 extra reports for each of the 43 police forces. The total number of cases estimated to be proceeded against in England is 26—with 15 cases in the Crown Court and nine in the magistrates’ court—and only 11 of those would see the award of custodial sentences. The total estimated increase in CSA referrals to local authority-designated officers is 2% per annum.

It would therefore be nonsense to suggest that widening the scope of the duty to report CSA to something like that which exists in countries that have high-standard mandatory reporting systems that have been functioning well for years, as this amendment proposes, would overwhelm our system. It would not. Neither would it result in some cases being hidden in the mass of reports, as some have suggested. On the other hand, widening the scope, as this and other amendments seek to do, would uncover a lot of evil and save many children from terrible lifelong harm, which has a cost to public services. Not doing so would perpetuate the culture of cover-up that led to the IICSA inquiry in the first place.

However, recognising that assessing such indicators can be subjective, Amendment 285 would maintain proportionality, as recommended by IICSA, by ensuring that failure to comply with the duty based solely on those indicators is not a criminal offence, but compliance should be done by any conscientious professional. This careful balance would ensure that staff and volunteers are encouraged to report any sign of potential harm without the fear of criminal prosecution based on subjective observation. This is crucial to fostering a reporting culture that prioritises the immediate safety and protection of the child, which is what we all want to see. It is vital to remember that the investigation of the report of, or reasonable suspicion of, child sexual abuse is not for the reporter to do; it is for the experts to investigate and the courts to decide—but they cannot do that unless they get the report in the first place.

Amendment 282 is designed to include in the reporting duty a comprehensive range of people who care for children, as defined in Sections 21, 22 and 22A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. To ensure that no relevant person is left out, these sections ensure the inclusion in the duty to report the management of settings where some kind of care is given to children, which is one of the gaping holes in the current wording of the Bill. With that, having just reaffirmed my support for the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and those of my noble friend Lady Featherstone, I will finish.

[Lord Polak (Con)]

I rise to speak to my Amendment 286A, which proposes to fill gaps in Clause 79 so we can hold accountable all those who go out of their way to conceal the horrendous crime of child sexual abuse. This amendment is supported by multiple child protection organisations, including the NSPCC, Barnardo’s, the Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse and the Lucy Faithfull Foundation. I particularly thank Gina Rees from the NSPCC, who has advised me.

Obviously, it can never be acceptable for anyone to turn a blind eye to abuse. Yet across the seven year-long investigation, the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse exposed countless instances where those whose organisations had a responsibility to protect children from harm not only failed to report child sexual abuse but took purposeful actions that actively sought to cover it up. These acts of intentionally concealing child sexual abuse are separate from, and go beyond, just failing to make a report, something which the Government’s mandatory reporting duty proposes to address. It means choosing and acting to prioritise something else, be that community, relationships or company reputation, over the safety of a child. I think we can agree across this House that that is unacceptable.

These acts of concealment are not a thing of the past. Take, for example, this real-life contact at the NSPCC helpline for those with concerns about a child. A special educational needs professional told the NSPCC:

“I’ve seen what happens when people report any concerns, even minor ones. Management bullies you, reduces your shifts, stops giving you what you need to support the kids. You’re expected to buy everything yourself for them instead of it being provided. If you thought you were on track for a permanent job, forget it”.


Bullying, threatening job stability and removing support for the children who are meant to be protected—these are actions, along with intimidation of witnesses and destroying vital evidence, that have happened for many years and still happen, with impunity, across our society. They not only undermine efforts to increase reports of child sexual abuse; they can deny victims their right to justice and hinder their access to vital support services in order to help them begin to recover from what they have suffered. As such, it is vital that our criminal justice system be equipped with new laws to catch these bad actors.

I appreciate that the Government’s current drafting of Clause 79 aims to do this by introducing a new criminal offence of preventing or deterring someone, under the mandatory reporting duty, from making a report. While that is an important part of thwarting the cover-up of child sexual abuse, this provision does not go far enough to cover the multitude of ways that reports of abuse can be concealed and could allow many of those who intentionally conceal this crime to slip through the net. This is because Clause 79 is triggered only when the person acting to conceal abuse does so by blocking or deterring someone, under the new duty, from making a report. This would not, for example, criminalise acts that could prevent abuse being discovered by a mandated reporter in the first place, such as intimidating victims or destroying vital evidence. Indeed, if the professional I referred to in my example earlier did not fall under the new duty to report, there is a strong chance that those who try to bully and intimidate someone in respect of doing the right thing would not be prosecutable under the current offence.

This feels to me like a glaring omission that could undermine the Government’s intentions with this clause. It also does not cover preventing those who are not mandated reporters from reporting, or acts to hinder this investigation of abuse after it has been reported. That is why I call on the Government and the Minister to look again at their current proposal and ensure that it is strengthened, so that those who intentionally act to cover up child sexual abuse, including those who threaten or deter those not under the reporting duty, are caught by this offence. I therefore urge the Government to accept Amendment 286A so that Clause 79 captures all individuals who intentionally cover up child sexual abuse.

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendment 273, which is a very simple amendment that aims to put into action what IICSA recommended: that mandatory reporting of child sexual abuse should happen with no exceptions. The inquiry argued that, even if abuse is disclosed in the context of confession, the person—in this case, the priest—should be legally required to report it. It proposes that failing to report such abuse should itself be a criminal offence.

I am very glad that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester is in his place, because I know he has spent a long time on working parties looking at this issue. In earlier discussions in the House, in response to the right reverend Prelate, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, said that he had received representations from churches on this issue and expressed the hope that this would be further debated as the Crime and Policing Bill went through Parliament. My amendment is simply here to enable that debate to happen.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Polak Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

The point was made in the passage of previous legislation relating to protest, as it has been today, that we defend the right to protest. However, defending the right is not enough. We have to avoid enacting legislation which can give rise to a chilling effect on that right to protest. I would welcome a conversation with my noble friend the Minister on these important issues and will, of course, listen closely to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps I should just begin by agreeing with the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, about the farmers, but I note that they did not call to globalise the intifada.

I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and thank him for the work that he has done and continues to do on counterterrorism. It is deeply appreciated by many, and, from the point of view of the Jewish community, he is a leading non-Jew—a righteous gentile, if I may add—in everything he does.

I have added my name to Amendment 370A and to two or three other amendments in this group. Supporting this amendment would ensure that those creating a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions and the rights of others are curtailed. This can include all sorts of groups, and we know some of them. These groups can pose a clear and tangible threat to public order and public safety, even where their activities may not, in every instance, meet the statutory threshold for terrorism.

The Committee will recall, for example, the incident in November 2023, when Just Stop Oil protesters obstructed an emergency ambulance with its blue lights flashing on Waterloo Bridge—an action that plainly placed lives at risk. An amendment of the nature of Amendment 370A would ensure that such groups, which demonstrably endanger the public and interfere with essential services, could be addressed at an early stage. It would enable more timely and effective intervention where there is a sustained pattern of reckless, disruptive conduct, before serious harm occurs.

On Amendment 370AA, “intifada” is not a neutral expression but one rooted in campaigns of organised violence and terrorism, yet the Government seem to fail to understand, or choose to ignore, what intifada really was and what it truly means, with tragic consequences. I look over at the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and think of Heaton Park synagogue at Yom Kippur. Melvin Cravitz and Adrian Daulby are no longer with us. Sydney might be the other end of the world, but what went on there—15 innocent people murdered—was a massacre that shows the results that antisemitism can lead to. These people are the victims of the so-called global intifada. When this Government and Governments around the world do not heed the warnings about the severe and dangerous impact that these words have, this is what happens. This amendment would help stop Manchester or Bondi Beach happening again and would provide clarity for CPS enforcement, in ensuring that Parliament draws a clear line before more lives are lost rather than afterwards. Waiting until loss of life to act is, quite simply, deeply shameful.

I have added my name to Amendment 380. It cannot be right in a free society that any community feels unable to go about its daily life because of repeated demonstrations, however lawful they may each be. This was starkly illustrated by the protest that took place the day after the Manchester synagogue attack, when a traumatised community was given no space to grieve. In such circumstances, managing or conditioning a protest is not always enough. The police must have clear legal authority to prevent such protest going ahead where the cumulative effect tips into serious disruption and intimidation. This amendment would provide that clarity and ensure that the law properly protects public order and the right of communities to live without fear. I would be very interested in the views of the Minister on that.

Finally, Amendment 486B would address a serious problem in our framework for public funding. This problem was exposed most clearly, I guess, by the debacle surrounding the band Kneecap, which was permitted to retain a grant of £14,250 from the British taxpayer, despite a catalogue of deeply troubling activity. This includes behaviour glorifying terrorism, when one of the band members held up a Hezbollah flag on stage, shouting, “Up Hamas! Up Hezbollah!” Artistic expression must be protected but it must never be allowed to cross the line into incitement—and when it does, public money should certainly not be supporting it. This incident demonstrates how ill equipped our current law is to prevent funds flowing to individuals or organisations whose conduct runs directly counter to our values and our security.

However, the problem is not just Kneecap. An organisation funded by the UK taxpayer, the Collections Trust, issued guidance referring to Hamas, a proscribed terrorist organisation, as “anti-colonial freedom fighters”. That language is not accidental or trivial. It legitimises and sanitises terrorism, and it was disseminated with public funds.

This amendment would make it clear that no organisation should be permitted to receive or retain taxpayer support if it promotes or excuses criminal conduct or narratives that undermine our democratic values. Again, I ask the Minister whether he agrees that public money must never be used, directly or indirectly, to legitimise extremism, and that we here in Parliament have a duty to draw that line clearly and unequivocally.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I have given notice of my opposition to Clause 124 standing part of the Bill. I have done this for two reasons. First, I think it is unnecessary and, secondly, it could be even more repressive than the law that this Labour Government have already passed.

Let me be clear: I support the right to worship and to access places of worship freely and safely. I would go along to anywhere where people are protesting and making life difficult for anybody who wants to worship, as that is unacceptable. However, this clause is not a targeted protection against genuinely threatening behaviour. It is a broad, low-threshold power that risks sweeping up lawful, peaceful protest on the basis of guesswork rather than evidence, exactly the same as was discussed in the previous group.

Clause 124 allows conditions to be imposed where a protest

“may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness”

in “the vicinity” of a place of worship. The word “may” is doing a lot of work here, as is “vicinity”; neither is defined and together they create a power that is open to misuse. This is not about stopping harassment or threats—we already have strong laws for that. If someone is genuinely intimidating worshippers, the police already have plenty of powers to intervene. What does this clause actually add?

The real problem is that the clause allows restrictions to be imposed even where the protest is peaceful, so long as someone claims they might feel intimidated. That is not a hypothetical risk. Almost any protest that touches on controversial issues could be said to intimidate somebody. Pride marches, trade union demos, climate protests and peaceful protests against war or injustice could all be caught by this wording if they happen to be near a place of worship. In many places in our cities, including London—particularly central Westminster, where so many protests happen—it is very difficult not to be near a place of worship. That creates a very real danger of rolling exclusion zones where protest is progressively pushed out of public space altogether, not because of evidence of harm but because of location and perception.