Crime and Policing Bill

Thursday 27th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Committee (4th Day) (Continued)

14:25

Amendment 247A

Moved by

[Lord Randall of Uxbridge]

247A: After Clause 55, insert the following new Clause—
“Definition of modern slavery exploitation: orphanage trafficking(1) Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is amended as follows.(2) After subsection (6) insert—“Orphanage trafficking(7) The person is a child who has been recruited into a residential care institution overseas for the purpose of financial gain and exploitation.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would expand the definition of exploitation under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to include children who have been recruited into residential care institutions that engage in orphanage trafficking.

[Lord Randall of Uxbridge (Con)]

My Lords, the proposed new clause in my Amendment 247A would expand the definition of exploitation under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to include children who have been recruited into residential care institutions that engage in orphanage trafficking. One privilege, and benefit, of being a Member of this House—or indeed of the other—is the fascinating people whom one meets and finding out about issues that I do not think everybody would always understand.

It was only last week at the annual general meeting of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery that I discovered that, during the passage of this Bill in the other place, my right honourable friend Dame Karen Bradley and Sarah Champion had put down an amendment, which is being mirrored here, about orphanage trafficking. That had not come across my radar, even though I have been—I declare my interest—the chairman of the Human Trafficking Foundation. As I say, it was not something that I had been aware of, so I tabled this amendment. By some chance, earlier this week, I met Dame—no, not Dame, sorry, I have elevated her; I met Claire Wright MBE. She is a patron of a very good charity called Hope and Homes for Children. She was talking to me about orphanage trafficking and I said that I had put down an amendment. We got into a discussion with my noble friend Lady Sugg, who I see here in her place, so she also heard about this. It just goes to show what can happen.

Orphanage trafficking is a form of child trafficking defined as

“the recruitment or transfer of children into orphanages, or any residential care facility … for a purpose of exploitation … or profit. It involves both ‘acts’ and ‘purposes of exploitation’ that meet the definition of child trafficking under the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons”.

As I have said, it is a little-known crime here in the UK, but it is estimated that around 5 million children worldwide are living in residential institutions, which exist not to help, support and educate the children but to make profits from charitable donations and something that I had not come across before called “voluntourism”—a form of tourism in which travellers participate in voluntary work. Australia has been in the lead with this and was the first country to legislate to outlaw this crime.

Child trafficking into institutions is something that has been going on and is linked to the funding of orphanages through private donations, volunteer tourism, as I have just mentioned, mission trips and other forms of fundraising. It is estimated that US Christian organisations alone donate approximately $3.3 billion to residential care each year. The popular practice of orphanage volunteering—people from high-income countries travelling abroad hoping to help children living in orphanages, with every good will in the world—also serves to provide a continual income for the orphanage as well as reduced labour costs for the care of the children. There is, however, a grim downside to this. Although often well intentioned, these sources of financial and in-kind support undermine national efforts to support broader child protection and social welfare systems by creating a parallel system without official oversight and accountability. They also create a marketplace that can incentivise the expansion of existing orphanages and the establishment of new ones, with the supply of funding and resources into orphanages increasing the demand for children to be in them.

There is evidence of children being deliberately recruited from vulnerable families to fill spaces in orphanages, under the guise of better care and access to education. Once trafficked into those orphanages, children are then vulnerable to neglect, abuse and exploitation. Orphanages that are run for profit have been found to operate under extremely poor conditions to drive down care costs, with evidence pointing to children being kept deliberately malnourished to encourage further donations, forced to interact with and perform for visitors, or forced to beg for financial donations.

14:30

The popularity of orphanage volunteering has seen a rise in orphanages built in tourist hotspots to fulfil demand and capitalise on the financial potential. In Cambodia, for example, there was a 75% increase in the number of residential care institutions in a five-year period despite no correlating increase in the number of children losing both parents. In Uganda, the number of children in institutions increased from just over 1,000 in the late 1990s to 55,000 in 2018, despite a large decrease in the number of orphans. The presence of volunteers also places children at increased risk of sexual abuse. There have been numerous documented cases of perpetrators posing as well-intentioned orphanage volunteers to gain access to vulnerable children, taking advantage of often unregulated, unvetted, unsupervised access. We must bring more attention to this and put it in the Modern Slavery Act right now.

I think I know what the Minister may say, not only because I have seen these things before but because I have heard what Dame Diana Johnson, the Minister in the other place, had to say. The answer will be that the Government are sympathetic to the issue but feel that that this is not the right place to deal with it, or that it is already covered; however, there is something to be said for including something in the Bill. A lot of the issues dealt with in the Modern Slavery Act were already covered, but we put it all together into that Act. This is a good example of that approach. The Government made, not a commitment but a vague suggestion that they might bring something forward during the passage of the Bill, and there will be people both in Parliament and outside who will continue to campaign on this issue. If we could somehow get something on to the statute book, it would be to the benefit of everybody. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lord, I focused on this new clause when I saw my noble friend Lord Randall of Uxbridge’s name on it. When I was Opposition Chief Whip, among the many fixtures and fittings I inherited in the office was the MP for Uxbridge, John Randall. Although I was Chief Whip, I became his understudy, and to this day I follow his lead on many of the amendments he tables, particularly on biodiversity and so on. So when I saw his name, I thought, “There is something in this and I had better look at it”. My noble friend has tabled a very important amendment and put his finger on the appalling abuse of children in the world. It is a significant and widespread issue which serves as a pipeline to modern slavery and other forms of exploitation globally.

My noble friend’s proposal seeks to expand the definition of exploitation under Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to include orphanage trafficking—specifically, the recruitment of children into overseas residential care institutions purely for the purpose of financial gain and exploitation. As he said, orphanage trafficking is a form of child exploitation whereby children are deliberately separated from their families and recruited into residential care institutions, not for their welfare but to generate profit. This hidden practice is driven by greed and the profit motive, with children being used as commodities to attract charitable donations and international funding or to facilitate voluntourism. In many instances, children are not without parents but are falsely labelled as orphans to increase the institution’s appeal. The problem is as extensive as my noble friend has said.

There are an estimated 5.4 million children worldwide living in orphanages and other residential care institutions. Research consistently shows that over 80% of these children have at least one living parent. Orphanages, particularly in developing countries, are often set up and run as businesses, with the children as the “product”. Orphanage directors and “child-finders” often target poor, low-education families in rural areas, making false promises of education and a better life in exchange for the children.

The exact scale of orphanage trafficking is difficult to quantify due to a lack of data, poor government oversight of many unregistered facilities and the clandestine nature of the crime. Children in these institutions are often untracked, making them more susceptible to exploitation. The links between institutions and child trafficking have been formally recognised in recent years by the United Nations General Assembly and the US Government’s Trafficking in Persons Report, which highlights the growing international concern.

Children in these institutions face various forms of modern slavery and abuse, including financial exploitation, with the children being used to elicit donations from well-intentioned tourists and volunteers. This can involve forcing them to pose as orphans or perform for visitors, or keeping them in deliberately poor conditions to evoke sympathy. Then there is sexual exploitation—children are vulnerable to sexual abuse by staff, volunteers and organised criminal groups targeting these facilities. Then there is forced labour: children being forced to perform labour such as working on a director’s land, doing excessive domestic chores, or begging on the streets. Then there is illicit adoption: in some cases, children are recruited for the purpose of illicit, fraudulent adoption, with documentation falsified to facilitate the process and generate profit.

This is an evil trade, and it is well organised. These so-called child-finders lure families into giving up their children through deception, coercion or payment. Gatekeeping procedures are bypassed or manipulated, often by falsely declaring children as abandoned or creating fraudulent documents. The child’s identity is altered—the child’s name is changed to establish an orphan identity and make them untraceable by their biological family. The child is maintained in the institution long term for ongoing exploitation and profit generation through donations and sex tourism. My noble friend’s amendment deserves Government support.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I strongly support this amendment. As the Minister might notice, it is not intended to be dealt with under the Crime and Policing Bill but under the Modern Slavery Act. That means, in a sense, it is probably simpler for the Government to accept it, because it is an improvement to an Act of 10 years ago. I am not quite sure why, oddly enough, the noble Lord, Lord Randall, and I did not think about it in those days, but it was not raised.

When I was a judge, I had the specific example of a child being put into an orphanage by their father, with the intention of a large amount of money being paid eventually for that child to be adopted. The child was in the process of being adopted in England by an American family who came to England. The whole set-up was so unsatisfactory that the child was removed and went into care. The question then was whether the child should go back to the natural parent—the father—but the problem was that he had put the child into the orphanage.

This is a very serious issue that is seriously underestimated and not well known. The very least the Government could do is to amend the Modern Slavery Act.

[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Randall said, I too recently met the Hope and Homes for Children charity. This amendment helps to name, define and criminalise the form of exploitation my noble friend set out. As he said, it is often hidden behind humanitarianism or done in the name of childcare. The deception, exploitation, control and harm that children face in these institutions have all the hallmarks of modern slavery. That is why it is important not to treat it separately from modern slavery. By including it we will, I hope, help to ensure that traffickers cannot claim that they operate as charities, rather than being the exploitative institutions that they are. The amendment would help to close a legal gap and, hopefully, disrupt the financial incentives that create harm. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to my noble friend’s arguments.

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 247A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge, who has laid out the case in detail.

It is a sad fact that children, some with living parents, are deliberately separated from their families and placed in residential institutions overseas. These institutions then present these children as orphans to attract donations from well-meaning supporters, often in the UK. The children become commodities: the more vulnerable they appear, the more money flows in. This is exploitation on a grand scale, masquerading as charity, and it is funded in part by British individuals and organisations who often have no idea that they are perpetuating abuse.

Amendment 247A proposes an overdue expansion of the definition of exploitation in Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to explicitly include orphanage trafficking. As the explanatory statement confirms, this new clause would insert a clear definition into the Act that orphanage trafficking means that

“The person is a child who has been recruited into a residential care institution overseas for the purpose of financial gain and exploitation”.


Our approach throughout the Bill’s scrutiny has been to ensure that our legislation is robust and responsive and specifically targets the modern tactics of abusers and exploiters, particularly concerning vulnerable children.

The phenomenon of orphanage trafficking was not adequately understood as a distinct form of modern slavery when the Modern Slavery Act 2015 was drafted a decade ago. In recent years, however, extensive research and reporting, including by UNICEF and specialist organisations working in south-east Asia and Africa, have revealed the scale and systematic nature of this exploitation. We now know that the practice uses the guise of charitable care to perpetrate sustained abuse for profit. This is unacceptable.

By explicitly defining this conduct, Amendment 247A would ensure that the MSA 2015 is fully equipped to address this tragic global issue. We have seen the importance of such clarity throughout the Bill. Just as we have recognised that exploitation evolves, we should now acknowledge orphanage trafficking as an identifiable and compatible form of abuse. This amendment applies the same principle to this particularly insidious form of overseas exploitation.

The amendment serves three critical functions. First, it would provide legal recognition and awareness. This is a necessary first step to legally recognise orphanage trafficking in UK law. This action would raise the profile of a genuine issue that, despite being recognised in jurisdictions such as Australia and New Zealand, remains poorly understood here. It is time this was addressed. Australia’s experience demonstrates that legislative recognition creates public awareness and shifts provision towards sustainable, family-based care models rather than institutional placements.

Secondly, the amendment targets financial facilitators. This is the amendment’s most powerful practical effect. Adding this specific definition to the MSA 2015 would mean that individuals and organisations which provide financial support to these exploitative overseas institutions could be in breach of the Modern Slavery Act. This would allow enforcement action to be taken against them.

Thirdly, it covers international obligations and UK leadership. This amendment aligns with our commitments under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and reinforces the UK’s role in setting global standards for combating modern slavery. It demonstrates that our child protection framework extends meaningfully beyond our borders.

Supporting Amendment 247A is a necessary evolution of our anti-slavery legal framework. It would ensure that our commitment to protecting exploited children extends effectively beyond our borders and covers every known facet of trafficking, reinforcing our foundational principle that the law must protect the vulnerable from financial and criminal exploitation.

The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child should be upheld at every level. We hope the Government will support this amendment in order to protect innocent, vulnerable children from this very distressing practice.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, I too support this amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge. It is my privilege, as I travel around the world visiting Anglican provinces, often to visit orphanages and see some of the work they do. As noble Lords have already said, many of these children still have a living parent somewhere, but that parent, for whatever reason, no longer feels able or wishes to look after them, particularly if the mother has died in childbirth.

14:45

As well as the bad orphanages and bad practices, there are also the good ones, and I have been honoured to visit some of them. Yet the bad practice creates a stigma against the whole sector. Therefore, I support this amendment because if we can drive out the exploitative orphanages, maybe then the good orphanages—which do sterling work, often in very difficult circumstances with very limited finances—can get on with doing the job and raising the money they need from around the world to continue their excellent work.

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My Lords, I too support the noble Lord, Lord Randall, on Amendment 247A. I had the fortune of meeting Claire Wright over a year ago, and she explained to me what Hope and Homes for Children was doing as a charity. I too was bowled over by it, because it was an area that I did not have much knowledge of. She and the organisation have done amazing work. While this may be out of scope of the Bill, the one suggestion I make to the Minister is that he could bring together a round table of Ministers from relevant government departments to listen to Claire Wright and Hope and Homes for Children, so that their good work can be shared and built on.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Randall of Uxbridge for bringing forward this important amendment. It would ensure that this House does not overlook emerging and deeply troubling patterns of abuse that fall outside traditional definitions.

The amendment seeks to expand the definition of exploitation under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to include children who are recruited into residential care institutions overseas for the purpose of financial gain, commonly referred to as orphanage trafficking. As my noble friend highlighted, this is a practice that too often disguises itself as humanitarian intervention, while in fact it enables systematic exploitation and harm. Many so-called orphanages operate as profit-making enterprises, intentionally separating children from families and communities to attract funding and donations. The children involved may be subject to physical and emotional abuse, forced labour or trafficking into other forms of exploitation.

It is right that we recognise the growing international call to confront this practice and that we consider whether our legislative framework needs strengthening to support that effort. Ensuring that the Modern Slavery Act accurately reflects contemporary forms of exploitation is a legitimate objective, and I commend my noble friend for shining a spotlight on an issue that has far too long remained in the shadows.

We are sympathetic to the intention of the amendment and welcome the opportunity it provides to examine how the UK can play a stronger role in protecting vulnerable children globally. At the same time, we look forward to hearing from the Minister about the practical implications of such a change and how it might interact with existing powers and international co-operation mechanisms. I hope the Government will engage constructively with the concerns he has raised, and I very much look forward to hearing from the Minister.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who contributed to this short but vital debate on an issue, which, speaking personally, I was not tremendously well aware of before looking at the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Randall. Many noble Lords have commented that it is the hard work of people such as Claire Wright and others that has brought to light this pernicious activity or—to use the words of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—this evil trade.

As the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge, has explained, Amendment 247A seeks to include so-called orphanage trafficking within the meaning of exploitation under Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act. I know the noble Lord has concerns about modern slavery and trafficking in his wider work. I pay tribute to his work as chair of the Human Trafficking Foundation and the work of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery for highlighting this evil activity and the wider concerns around modern slavery.

As the noble Lord described, in our case, concerns about orphanage tourism would be about volunteers from the UK visiting orphanages overseas, fuelling this activity and contributing to a cycle of harm and exploitation of children. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester made a very relevant point: a lot of it is done in good faith. However, it can be undermined and exploited by those who are acting in bad faith.

I make it very clear to all noble Lords who spoke in the debate—the noble Baronesses, Lady Sugg and Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Lords, Lord Polak and Lord Randall, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on the Opposition Front Bench—that the Government share the same concerns. That is why the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office provides travel advice warning British nationals of the risk of volunteering with children and highlighting how volunteer visitors may unknowingly contribute to child exploitation and trafficking. The advice that the FCDO gives signposts travellers to the global standard for volunteering, which helps organisations provide responsible volunteering. By adopting the global standard, organisations commit to promoting child-safe volunteering in all environments, which includes not facilitating visits to orphanages or other institutional care facilities.

Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 already recognises the specific vulnerabilities of children and encompasses the exploitation of children for the provision of services of any kind and to enable someone to acquire benefits of any kind, including financial gain. Therefore, orphanage trafficking is already captured by the broad terms of the existing legislation. It is fair to say that the noble Lord, Lord Randall, anticipated that that may be the tenor of my contribution.

I point out to noble Lords that on 16 July this year, the Home Office launched a public call for evidence on how the Government can improve the process of identifying victims of modern slavery, human trafficking and exploitation. The call for evidence closed on 8 October, and the Home Office is now analysing responses received. A report summarising the key findings and themes from the call for evidence responses will be published in due course. Of course, the Home Office will consider the evidence gathered to explore any further changes that can be made to improve the identification of victims.

We are seeking to introduce new modern slavery legislation as part of our efforts to review and improve the modern slavery system. This new legislation will enable us to clearly articulate the UK’s responsibilities under international law regarding modern slavery, allowing us to reduce opportunities for misuse while ensuring the right protection for those who need it.

I make no commitments here to your Lordships’ Committee, but that may well be to an opportunity to revisit some of the issues raised in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Polak, floated the suggestion of a wider round table; I will certainly take that back to colleagues and discuss it.

For the reasons I have outlined about Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act already capturing orphanage trafficking in the broad terms, we do not believe it is necessary to amend Section 3 any further, as the conduct in question is already captured. In light of this explanation, and hoping that it does not disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Randall, and other noble Lords too much, I hope he will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Randall of Uxbridge (Con)]

My Lords, I thank everybody who has taken part in this debate. As I said at the beginning of my contribution, one of the many benefits of this place is having people who know much more than I do about a subject and who are certainly much more eloquent. Everybody who spoke after me fit that description. It was extremely good to have the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester pointing out that it is not every orphanage, and so forth.

However, it is an important issue. My friend—I call her that because we work very closely together—the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is right: we did not spot this in our debates during the passage of the Modern Slavery Act, but that is because modern slavery in all its forms is always developing; the traffickers and exploiters are always looking at something new.

I am very grateful for what the Minister said. If I could predict the lottery numbers as well as I can predict ministerial responses, I would be a very rich man. We will come back to this, not necessarily in this Bill, but we should be looking at it. It would be good if we could perhaps at some stage get a Minister—they are very busy at the moment with this Bill and goodness knows how many other things—to meet the lady we mentioned and others, just to get an idea of the scale of it. But there is so much of this exploitation—we have only to look at Ukraine and the children who are being trafficked into Russia. On that note, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 247A withdrawn.

Amendment 247B

Moved by

[Baroness Maclean of Redditch]

247B: After Clause 55, insert the following new Clause—
“Independent Commission on Grooming Gangs: timescaleWithin three months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must commence the work of the Independent Commission on Grooming Gangs by—(a) appointing a Chair,(b) publishing the inquiry’s terms of reference,(c) appointing a Minister with the sole task of overseeing the inquiry and related activities, and(d) directing the inquiry’s hearings to begin.”

[Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)]

My Lords, there is a dismal pattern in our country in response to serious failings of the state. First, we see denials and cover-ups, then the issue gains traction, but shock and outrage quickly follow. Calls for something to be done are heard but too often are followed by absolutely nothing—more delay, while victims are relegated to yesterday’s newspapers and the news cycle moves on. Unfortunately, the rape gang issue is a classic example of this pattern.

Victims deserve so much better from us than this. Has anyone else noticed that it has gone eerily quiet? Where is the national statutory inquiry promised by the Government? The Minister said earlier, in his responses in Oral Questions, that it was coming “very soonly”, and I give him credit for inventing another euphemism which even I have not heard before. But seriously, it is conspicuous by its absence. Neither the public nor the victims know when it is going to start or who is going to chair it and, because so many victims have lost confidence in the Safeguarding Minister in the other place, Jess Phillips, which Minister is going to oversee it. Perhaps it will be our Minister, in which case I am sure we will welcome that.

This is the reason behind my tabling of Amendments 247B and 535A. They are straightforward and designed simply to ensure that the grooming gangs inquiry begins at long last. The amendments are not designed to dictate the outcome, set the scope or limit its independence. We need it for one simple reason, which is to ensure that the state does not continue to mistreat those victims, who have already suffered so much by its collective failure.

I recognise that it is perhaps not conventional and may even be novel to legislate for the start date of an inquiry, and I anticipate that the Minister will say this when he comes to respond. However, I implore him to take this seriously. We have a position in this House and we should use it for this end. We should be speaking up for these girls and women who have been let down so shockingly. The very least we can do is to send the signal to the victims that we are not going to continue failing them and we are going to get justice for them.

What is more—I speak as a former Minister in the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice—I am sure the Minister will recognise what I am about to say: providing a deadline focuses minds and drives action and activity in all parts of the system, whether the delays are accidental or bureaucratic or, in fact, unfortunately, intentional. I also remind the Minister that, in the words of the famous sage, if you keep doing what you have always done, you are going to keep getting what you have always got—no action.

We should remember that some of the survivors at the heart of this scandal have been waiting 20 years or even longer. Fiona Goddard first reported her abuse to police in 2012. She was a child when the crimes were committed against her in the mid-2000s. She told her story, took the risk, trusted the system and, as she puts it, was met with silence, closed doors and disbelief. When she was asked recently how it felt to wait this long, she said, “It’s like living with a wound that’s never allowed to close, because every year I’m told justice will come but every year nothing begins”. The victims have to keep reliving the trauma, but nothing moves forward. Hope is being postponed, year after year. We know that the only thing worse than being failed by institutions once is being failed by them twice, thrice and more. As one survivor said, “We do not need perfection. We just need to know that somebody has finally begun the work”.

15:00

While I am on my feet, I will add my support to all the amendments in this group. I highlight in particular those tabled by my noble friend Lady Cash. They are necessary to address the deficiencies in the criminal justice system and the other bodies that have been highlighted in the Casey review, when it comes to safeguarding victims and potential victims of child sexual abuse, whether it is rape-gang connected or a different pattern of activity. I also support Amendment 271B in the names of my noble friends on the Front Bench, dealing with the rape of a child. Again, this was something that the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, argued for: she said the law should be changed to close the loophole whereby penetrative sex with a child is not always classed as rape. I think most people in the country will think it is absolute insanity that this is not called rape. A child cannot consent to sex. It should be rape. It should be called rape. We should prosecute those rapists as rapists, and we should treat children as children. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the proposed new clauses in my Amendments 271C, 271D and 271E. I congratulate my noble friend Lady Maclean on her excellent amendments. She also has the advantage of that wonderful name of the great Highland clan the Macleans of Duart, which I used to have myself.

I was inspired to table my amendments when I read properly the brilliant but frightening report from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey of Blackstock. I had skim-read the media reports and the government comments on it when it was published, but it was not until recently, when I read the report properly, that I had confirmed to me the full horror of the conspiracy by those in lawful authority who had covered up child rape for the last 30 years. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, said in blunt terms what we all knew was the case but were afraid to say in case we were accused of racism or Islamophobia. We could all see from the various court convictions that 90% of the perpetrators were Pakistani Muslim males and the victims were almost exclusively young white girls.

The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, pointed out that around 500,000 children a year are likely to experience sexual abuse of some kind. The police recorded data shows just over 100,000 offences of child sexual abuse and exploitation recorded in 2024, with around 60% of these being contact offences. We know that the sex crimes reported to the police are just the tip of the iceberg. The national police data confirms that the majority of victims of child sexual exploitation are girls—78% in 2023. The most common age for victims is between 10 and 15 years-old—57% are between 10 and 15 years old, for God’s sake. Putting that together suggests that, of just those reported to the police, we have at least 60,000 little children every year being victims of contact sexual abuse—and what an intriguing term that is. Let us start calling it out for what it really is.

The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, said:

“That term ‘group-based child sexual exploitation’ is actually a sanitised version of what it is. I want to set it out in unsanitised terms: we are talking about multiple sexual assaults committed against children by multiple men on multiple occasions; beatings and gang rapes. Girls having to have abortions, contracting sexually transmitted infections, having children removed from them at birth”.


These children were not abused by these Pakistani rape gangs. They were raped, raped and raped again by people who believed that the girls who were not Muslim were just prostitutes, deserving to be raped. Therefore, I say that “child abuse” is far too mild a term to describe the evil of what is happening. Abuse can expand over a wide range. It can be heavy smacking, not feeding a child property or failing to give love, care and attention. These things are bad in themselves, but we must make sure that we use the right terminology when talking about rape and sexual assault.

That is why I have tabled the proposed new clause in my Amendment 271C. The important words in it are “investigating authority”. Of course, after investigation, if the police find evidence of rape or sexual assault, the accused will be charged with those specific offences. The CPS will also use those correct terms. However, we have seen, time and time again, that the police, in their initial statements, say they are investigating “child abuse” and have a person or persons in custody with regard to “child abuse”. That is what the media are told and that is the message we get on our screens and in the press. By the time the police eventually say the person or persons have been charged with rape, the damage has been done. We all relax somewhat: just a bit of abuse, nothing to worry about.

The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, said:

“That is why I want the legislation on rape tightened up so that an adult having penetrative sex with a child under 16 is rape, no excuses, no defence. I believe many jaws across the country would drop if it was widely known that doing so is called anything but that”.


I am pleased to see that my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie and my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower have tabled Amendment 271B, which does exactly that. My proposed new clause is complementary, in a way: if a person is under investigation for child rape, let the police say that at the outset and not give the impression that it is something lesser.

The new clause proposed in my Amendment 271D sets out details on the full and proper investigation of historical child sexual abuse. I have used the commonly used term “historical”, but I do not like it either: it gives the impression that it is something way in the distant past, like the Battle of Waterloo. The proper terminology would be, “investigation of past child sexual abuse cases which were not properly investigated at the time”, since that is what we are talking about. It is not a very sexy title, but that is the reality.

I know that the National Crime Agency is looking at some of these past cases, and nearly 1,300 previously closed investigations involving allegations of group-based child sexual abuse and exploitation are currently being reviewed in Operation Beaconport, but my proposed new clause gives them wider authority.

We have all heard about Rochdale, Rotherham, Aylesbury and Telford, but there are at least 30 local authorities where child rape by gangs took place. Apparently, 23 police forces have submitted cases to the NCA, and the Met itself is looking at 9,000 cases. However, it seems that the NCA is looking only at police forces, when the conspiracy to not investigate and to cover up was led in many cases by elected councillors, local authorities and children’s homes.

I quote the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, again:

“I met many victims of child sexual exploitation when I conducted the inspection of Rotherham Council in 2016. I was outraged, shocked and appalled at their treatment—not only at the hands of their vile abusers, but at the treatment afforded them by those who were supposedly there to help, and to be accountable, such as their police force and their council. Those responsible in Rotherham denied any wrongdoing and tried to shirk accountability”.


She went on to say that

“I assumed we would all wake up to the fact that these were abused children and it would mean that the police, councils, health and other agencies would do their damnedest to make sure these victims were given as much care, respect and chance at justice as possible”.

Note her words: she thought that not just the police but

“councils, health and other agencies would do their damnedest”

to stop it, but they did not. In fact, we have seen from many cases that councils, councillors and their staff did their damnedest to conspire with some police forces to turn a blind eye, reduce and drop charges and cover up. The excuse was not to offend community relations and prosecute the mainly Pakistani men doing the raping.

So it is essential that the NCA, since there is no one better qualified to do it, has the powers in my proposed new clause to investigate all persons in lawful authority in the organisations I list in proposed new subsections (1) and (5), not just the police. These are

“staff of local authorities of whatever rank … elected council members of local authorities … police officers of all ranks … any police support staff … owners or managers of homes for children in care”.

Of course, the proposed new clause gives the NCA powers to get all papers and emails and sets penalties for any person trying to obstruct its inquiries.

Finally, the new clause proposed in my Amendment 271E is on offences and penalties. I need not go through them all, but I have listed eight different offences, ranging from failure to investigate and dismissing charges improperly up to and including bribes or sexual favours and the conspiracy to cover everything up.

I did not conjure these up from thin air: all these suggested offences are based on reports of crime cases and convictions, and these were allegations made in court and accepted as truthful—but then nothing was done about them. The persons were convicted of child rape or sexual assault, but then no one investigated the police or the council officers who failed to investigate or covered it up, and we have tens of thousands of cases which never got to court because of failures of investigation and good cover-ups.

Where any of these people were acting alone, I suggest a sentence of up to 10 years. However, where there was a conspiracy, with any of these people acting in concert to commit any of the offences in my list, the only penalty, in my opinion, can be up to life imprisonment. This has to be separate from the offence of perverting the course of justice, where the maximum penalty is generally seven years. I think that the heaviest sentence ever given for perverting the course of justice was 12 years for someone who planted incriminating evidence on an innocent person.

There is already a power to remove all or part of a police officer’s pension if the officer has been sentenced for a crime. Then the Home Secretary can initiate a procedure. We need to make it clear that that power can be used against any police officers and local authority employees who may be convicted of any of the crimes I have listed.

Some, perhaps many, noble Lords and the Minister will say that these penalties are far too draconian. Of course, they are draconian, and they need to be. What we are looking at are some of the vilest crimes committed against children short of murder.

The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, said:

“When those same girls get older, they face long-term physical and mental health impacts. Sometimes they have criminal convictions for actions they took while under coercion. They have to live with fear and the constant shadow over them of an injustice which has never been righted—the shame of not being believed. And, with a criminal justice system that can re-traumatise them all over again, often over many years. With an overall system that compounds and exacerbates the damage; rarely acknowledges its failures to victims. They never get to see those people who were in positions of power and let them down be held accountable … What makes child sexual exploitation particularly reprehensible, is that is consists of both formal and informal groups of men preying on girls, coercing, manipulating and deceiving them in pursuit of sexual gratification and power”.


News reports and inquests have detailed specific instances, such as the case of Charlotte Tetley, a survivor of the Rochdale grooming scandal who, after years of mental health struggles and self-harm, took her own life as an adult. Another victim, an anonymous woman, described having

“a lot of problems in the past, suicide attempts and drinking”

due to the abuse she suffered as a vulnerable teenager. Major studies and reports consistently find that survivors of child sexual abuse are at a significantly higher risk of suicide attempts than the general population. All those abusers have escaped any investigation or sanction and are in the same vile box as the rapists who raped all those children. They need to be investigated and prosecuted and to get exemplary sentences.

I am conscious that I am exceeding the 10-minute limit, but I hope the Committee will bear with me because there a couple more minutes to go. I promise that in the next debate I will speak for less than 30 seconds.

Over the past 30 years, 60,000 girls have been raped every year. We are appalled at Ukraine, where Putin has kidnapped 20,000 people and soldiers have raped about 4,000 over the past three years.

Finally, I look forward to hearing the wise words of my noble friend Lady Cash. It was two or three years before she qualified as a barrister that we created a precedent for prosecuting and bringing to justice those who committed crimes in the past. We passed, by the Parliament Act, the War Crimes Act 1991, after this House blocked it for many good reasons. We prosecuted one person under it, a 78 year-old Belarusian SS man called Anthony Sawoniuk. He murdered 18 Jews—well, he murdered a lot more than 18 Jews, but those are the ones we got names for—and we punished him. He was convicted and given a life sentence in grade C Norwich Prison, with three meals a day and his healthcare needs taken care of, and he died peacefully at age 84. Of course, the only appropriate punishment for him would have been if he appeared at Nuremburg and was hanged with all the others. We have a precedent for going back 50 years to bring to justice a war criminal who was not even British at the time it was done, so I hope that we will accept my noble friend’s view that we need to look back at historical cases and bring them forward.

Penultimately, the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, talked about taxis. I am afraid we have not got an amendment on taxis, but I want to get one. Let me conclude with these words from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey,

“one thing is abundantly clear; we as a society owe these women a debt. They should never have been allowed to have suffered the appalling abuse and violence they went through as children. This is especially so for those who were in the ‘care’ of local authorities, where the duty to protect them was left in the hands of professionals on the state’s behalf”.

These women are now in our care. It is our duty in this Parliament to ensure that they get justice for the appalling crimes they suffered.

[Baroness Cash (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, and I shall speak to the four amendments in my name. Those are in two parts. Amendments 288A and 288B are directed to the reporting of child sexual abuse and child criminal exploitation. The purpose of the amendments is to act. We have to actually do something since we have had so many reviews and inquiries.

15:15

I will quickly cite the evidence about the need for the amendments. They are intended to do two things: first, create a duty on safeguarding professionals—that is, those in regulated activity with children and those under Section 11 of the Children Act—to report known or suspected child sexual abuse or child criminal exploitation; and, secondly, create a new offence for public officials who intentionally or recklessly fail to record, pass on or act on such information or obstruct an investigation.

The fear of being accused of being racist is very real. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, herself was nominated “Islamophobe of the Year” for her incredible public service in doing this work. We have to remove that terror for officials involved in this area of work, whether they are social workers, police or those managing care homes. We have to take the heat out of this. We have to be able to have a conversation about who the perpetrators are and who the victims are. We need detailed analysis, not just generalised “Asian” or generalised “Pakistani”. We need to know exactly what we are looking at so that we do not cause offence to our colleagues—and some colleagues in this House themselves feel sensitive about the labelling of whole communities in this conversation.

The purpose of tabling these amendments is so that we with responsibility encourage the Minister to have a conversation about this—I hope we will be invited to do so; I am conscious that under group 9 there are a number of similar or directed amendments on this subject—but I want to canter as quickly as possible through some of the evidence.

The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse concluded that England and Wales has no consistent legal requirement and serious failures to protect children over decades. That is over multiple strands: residential care, local authorities, churches and schools. It found repeated non-reporting, often where staff knew about or strongly suspected abuse, and that inquiry recommended statutory mandatory reporting.

The Jay report in 2014 showed that non-reporting enabled large-scale, long-term abuse. That is nearly 10 years ago, and we still do not have anything in place. The noble Baroness, Lady Jay, found that front-line staff had information but did not escalate it. Failures to report went on for at least 16 years without effective intervention—that is, pre 2014—and there was a culture of suppressing bad news within local authorities and police.

Serious case reviews in multiple areas—Oxfordshire, Manchester, Telford, Bradford and Bristol—repeatedly show that professionals observed indicators, again sometimes for years, and failed to take action under existing guidance. Those reviews have found that those omissions were a significant factor in a systemic failure to protect. That is a disgrace for us as a nation. It is also a disgrace, given how very easily rectified it would be by the tabled amendments.

His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services has identified repeated failures to escalate CSA intelligence. Mandatory reporting would also align us with global standards in this area. The majority of OECD countries have mandatory reporting statutes for child sexual abuse, and in some cases also for child criminal exploitation, including Australia, the US, Canada, France, Germany, Norway and the Netherlands. Independent evaluations of those show that they lead to earlier detection of patterns of abuse, greater disclosure by children and faster intervention by police and social care. That is UNICEF reporting, as well as reviews that have been done by the Australian Institute of Family Studies and the Canadian Centre for Child Protection.

The World Health Organization has evidence showing that children do not self-disclose. They do not spontaneously report unless they know that adults will take responsibility for it. Mandatory reporting addresses that; it closes the fear gap for the adults responsible for supporting the children, while the absence of a duty leads to what the WHO calls prolonged exposure to harm—exactly what we in the UK have seen. There is Home Office evidence for this which, again, is all available to the Minister.

I am running through this and I have two more amendments to cover, but I really want to emphasise the range and extent—the breadth and depth—of the evidence which supports these amendments. The report of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, was quoted extensively by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and I will not repeat those points.

There is no general liability for omission in safeguarding in England and Wales. We must close that gap, because the injuries inflicted on these children continues intergenerational trauma and abuse. They are unable to pick their lives up and have a feeling that none of it was for anything, because it is still going on.

I turn quickly to the second pair of amendments that I have tabled, regarding the recording of ethnicity data. I tabled them as Amendments 288C and 288D, and there is overwhelming evidence to support that they are needed. Again, the independent inquiry found a widespread failure to record ethnicity. The organised networks investigation in 2022 concluded that police forces routinely failed to record ethnicity. This

“inhibited understanding of the context”,

weakened prevention and left agencies unable to map offender networks or community-specific vulnerabilities. The absence of ethnicity data has fuelled an uninformed public debate, exactly as we have seen happen—a polarisation of the conversation, instead of a focus on the protection of and prevention of harm to these children.

The national audit of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, in 2025 exposed another decade-long data collapse. Professor Jay had previously done so, citing catastrophic gaps. The reason for those gaps being catastrophic is that they prevent the police acting; they prevent us taking the steps to prevent further harm to those individuals or to other children.

The Home Office review of 2020-21 confirmed that, nationally, ethnicity data is poorly collected, incomplete and often unusable. We have different data collected across numerous police areas, with no consistency whatever. We need to collect ethnicity as well as nationality, and we need to collect it for victims, so that we can see what the dynamics are in communities and the police can take the relevant steps. His Majesty’s inspectorate has also confirmed that demographic accuracy is essential for identifying risk.

The harm of not doing this is real and documented. Investigations have repeatedly started again from scratch. We have had victim groups go unidentified. Missing ethnicity data hides vulnerabilities among white working-class girls in post-industrial towns. It hides vulnerabilities for south Asian girls, whose victimisation is often underreported. It conceals harm for black and mixed-ethnicity children groomed via county lines overlap. Without data, agencies cannot tailor support or understand why particular communities are underrepresented or overrepresented in referrals.

It leads, most tragically, to community relations deteriorating. That is where we must take action, to prevent further breakdown in a world where things become more polarised by the day. Communities can feel stigmatised or ignored because the state refuses to publish correct information. Victims feel disregarded, while those who are not associated with crimes but feel labelled by association are also damaged. Policing becomes inefficient and reactive. Without ethnicity data, forces cannot target hotspots, disrupt networks early on or identify patterns across local authority boundaries.

We need to have no more variation across 43 forces. We need to have no more datasets where 60% to 70% of suspects are of unknown ethnicity. These amendments would give the police and safeguarding agencies the basic tools that they need to do their jobs properly. They would restore public confidence in the police and in those who manage these situations—and in the parliamentary process, so that it would actually listen and finally do something.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, to avoid any later confusion or doubt, I should explain that, on behalf of the unavoidably absent noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, I will be speaking to her Amendment 284 on the mandatory reporting duty. It is in a slightly different context, as it is not in the context of grooming gangs. I will not develop it at this stage but wait until that group is reached.

[Baroness Walmsley (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 247B, from the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean of Redditch, seeks to advance and pre-empt the start of the work of the independent commission on grooming gangs. I would say to the noble Baroness that this process must be done properly rather than speedily, so that we can learn lessons for the future from what has happened.

To save the Minister the trouble, I will read to the noble Baroness a few morsels from the Government’s Statement, repeated here on 4 September, with which I agree:

“I know that everyone in the House and beyond wants to see the inquiry begin its work at the earliest opportunity. Colleagues will know that that requires the appointment of a chair and the agreement of terms of reference … Meaningful engagement with victims and survivors is paramount … this process must be done properly and thoroughly … three chairs were appointed and subsequently withdrew, from July 2014 onwards, prior to the eventual appointment of Professor Alexis Jay in 2016”


as the chair of IICSA—that shows how difficult it can be to get the right person—

“In line with the Inquiries Act 2025, the appointed chair will play a central role in shaping the commission’s terms of reference. These will be published and subject to consultation with stakeholders, including victims and survivors … The inquiry will begin by identifying priority areas for review … Where appropriate, the inquiry will issue recommendations at both local and national levels”.


Finally, the Minister said,

“we are determined to ensure that every survivor of grooming gangs gets the support and justice they deserve; that every perpetrator is put behind bars; that every case, historic or current, has been properly investigated; and that every person or institution who looked the other way is held accountable, as that is a stain on our society that should be finally removed for good”.—[Official Report, Commons, 2/9/25; col. 162-63]

I agree with every word of that, and I hope all noble Lords do.

The Minister repeated some of those points only today, at Oral Questions. I wonder what it is that the noble Baroness does not agree with. I hope I can assume that we all have the same objective of obtaining justice for victims, and learning valuable lessons and doing it right, rather than soon.

Amendments 271B and 271C relate to the Sexual Offences Act 2003. I worked for many weeks on that Act, and I think it was comprehensive and carefully drafted in laying out the offences. I believe that there is—I have taken very senior legal advice on this—a danger in describing offences in too much minute detail. I hope the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, will agree that it can make it more difficult to secure a conviction where a conviction should be secured, because additional elements need to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. That could open defences which are not overall justified. I also cannot see how changing terminology would add to justice, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, suggests.

On Amendments 271D and 271E, from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, I refer him to other parts of the Statement repeated on 4 September. I am sure the Minister will assure him in response that the Government have outlined all the work that has already been started much earlier this year to investigate historical child abuse investigation failings. I will leave it to the Minister to do that.

I welcome the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, about the system of mandatory reporting that we are offered in the Bill as it stands; it is simply not good enough, and we will come to a very wide debate about that in group 8. I hope that she will then add her support to amendments to improve that system tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, as well as my colleagues, my noble friends Lady Featherstone and Lord Clement-Jones, and me.

15:30

On Amendments 288A, 288B, 288C and 288D, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, when she emailed me about them a couple of days ago, I pointed out that other amendments had already been laid to cover most of the issues about which she was concerned—for example, Amendment 231A from the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, who spoke to this only today. There is also Amendment 283 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Featherstone in group 8, which we will come to later. So I hope noble Lords will agree that—in my quite long experience in your Lordships’ House—one is much more likely to get something through this House if one works as a team, often cross-party, which I am sure she is trying to do. I wonder whether the noble Baroness would like to withdraw her amendments and sign those already laid that cover the issues about which she is concerned.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly perhaps to defend the noble Baroness, Lady Cash. Quite often in your Lordships’ House, we end up with amendments that are remarkably similar, and it appears to be a trait among some of your Lordships to consider working in co-operation with others systematically a somewhat eccentric behaviour. I personally feel that it should be encouraged.

What I wanted to say is the obvious: data is king. The situation that we have allowed to evolve over the last 20 or 30 years has been allowed to happen because of a dearth of reliable and systematic collection and utilisation of data. We have allowed what has been happening—largely to these young girls, in plain sight—because we have lacked the detail and the nitty-gritty information required to nail it. In a long career in business, the thing one disliked most was awaydays when you talked about strategy, when a large number of people would devote an enormous amount of hot air to talking about this, that or the other, usually in a slightly vague way. The thing that nails that sort of debate is reliable and accurate data. It deflates the rather pompous balloon who is spouting out, apparently knowledgeably but actually probably repeating what somebody else has said—it deflates that remarkably quickly.

Very simply, we need to follow the fourth recommendation of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, in her report. It is in bold and it is very brief, but it is extremely clear:

“The government should make mandatory the collection of ethnicity and nationality data for all suspects in child sexual abuse and criminal exploitation cases and work with the police to improve the collection of ethnicity data for victims”.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it has been five months since the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, undertaken by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, was published. I once again extend my thanks to her for her incredible work on this. The audit laid bare the systemic failures of local government, police leadership and safeguarding structures that allowed organised grooming gangs to operate in plain sight. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, found a culture of denial, a fear of being labelled racist, an unwillingness to confront uncomfortable truths and a catastrophic failure to treat vulnerable young girls as victims. Her review documented how institutions minimised, dismissed or actively ignored evidence of horrific abuse. Perhaps the most sobering lesson from this is that these were not isolated failings; they were structural, cultural and tragically repeated in town after town across the country.

The national audit produced 12 recommendations. To their credit, the Government have accepted all 12, some of which have found their way into the Bill. However, unfortunately, the first and second recommendations of the audit have so far been left behind. The first recommendation of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, was to change the law so that any adult who intentionally has sexual intercourse with a child under 16 receives a mandatory charge of rape. In their response to the audit, the Government said:

“Our laws must never provide protection for the adult abusers rather than the child victims of these despicable crimes. We share Baroness Casey’s view … and we accept the recommendation to change the law in this area”.


If the Government agreed with this recommendation and said that they will implement it, why have they not done so? The Bill provides the perfect opportunity for this change in the law. That is why my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie and I tabled Amendment 271B. It would provide for a new, distinct offence of child rape. This would operate alongside the current offence of the rape of a child under 13 in Section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

In her audit, the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, laid bare the loophole in the law. Currently, an adult who has sex with a child under the age of 13 is automatically guilty of rape, and this operates with strict liability. But, despite the age of consent being 16, when an adult has had sex with a child between the ages of 13 and 15, the decision to charge and which offence to charge with is left open to the Crown Prosecution Service. This has led to many cases of child sexual exploitation having the charges downgraded from rape to lesser charges, such as sexual activity with a child under Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act. Not only is that offence not a charge of rape but it carries a maximum sentence of 14 years—not life, as in the case of an offence under Section 5. Our amendment would provide that, where a person over the age of 18 has penetrative sexual relations with a child between the ages of 13 and 15, they will be charged with the rape of a child in all cases and face a sentence of life imprisonment.

We have not included a so-called Romeo and Juliet provision in this amendment, because it applies only to those who are over 18. Children who are close in age and have consenting sexual relations would not be criminalised under the amendment. I want to make sure that that is clear.

Fundamentally, the law must be unambiguous on this matter. The penetration of a child is rape. It is not sexual activity; it is not exploitation; and it is not an unfortunate incident. It is rape. The Casey report describes girls as young as 13 being passed between adult men, yet institutional language frequently minimised the seriousness of what had occurred. Creating a specific offence would reinforce the fundamental point: children cannot consent to sex with adults—full stop. Given that the Government have accepted that this needs to happen, I hope that they will be able to accept my amendment.

The second recommendation from the national audit that the Government have failed to deliver is the national inquiry. Amendment 247B from my noble friend Lady Maclean of Redditch seeks to press the Government on what has become a chaotic process. I know we have discussed this on many occasions in this House, but the fact is that the inquiry is in disarray. Survivors have already resigned from the panel because they do not trust the Government. Those most impacted by the grooming gangs scandal have lost faith in the process that was meant to bring them long-overdue justice. Months on from the announcement, the Government were U-turning. The chair has not been appointed, the terms of reference have not been published and the inquiry has not begun. How much longer must the victims and survivors wait? My noble friend’s amendment would give the Government a timeline of three months, and there is no reason why they cannot live up to that.

My noble friend Lady Cash is a stalwart defender of the rights of children and young girls. She proposes two crucial amendments, which also link into the national audit on grooming gangs. Amendment 288A would complement the duty to report in Clause 72 of the Bill. It would establish a duty on professionals with safeguarding responsibilities to report where they know or reasonably believe that a child is being sexually abused or exploited. That would fill a long-identified and long-criticised gap. If this scandal has showed us anything, it is that vulnerable young girls were let down by the very people who were supposed to protect them. Institutions sometimes waited for absolute proof before acting, and children paid the price for that inaction.

Amendment 288B creates a new offence targeted at public officials who obstruct or frustrate investigations into child sexual abuse. This is not hypothetical. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, found that public officials failed to record offences, failed to transmit intelligence and, in some cases, deliberately closed down avenues of inquiry. There must be consequences for such conduct. The noble Baroness was explicit that the fear of being accused of racism contributed to the reluctance of authorities to confront organised grooming gangs. More importantly, she also acknowledged that it remains impossible to provide a definitive assessment of the ethnic profile of the perpetrators, because the data collected by police forces has been woeful. That poor-quality data is one of the factors that permitted officials and authorities to claim they could not conclude any link between ethnicity or nationality and the prevalence of grooming gangs.

The large number of perpetrators whose ethnicity was recorded as “unknown” in the statistics creates a highly distorting picture. Inclusion of the “unknowns” shows 28% of group-based offenders as white, but exclusion of the “unknowns” shows 88% being white. This is obviously not the way to create datasets that could be used for accurate police intelligence and rigorous policy-making. Even today, we still have people trying to deny the fact that the vast majority of perpetrators in these grooming gangs were Pakistani, despite the evidence; they are able to continue this route because of the poor-quality data.

Because of this completely and shockingly inadequate collection of data, I strongly support this amendment from my noble friend Lady Cash. Her Amendments 288C and 288D compel the collection of ethnicity and nationality data for all child sexual offenders and victims. Consistent nationwide data gives us truth, and truth is the basis of action. I also pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Blencathra for his series of amendments. They probe the definitions of child sexual assault and rape, and also impose a statutory duty to investigate historic instances of child sexual abuse where the lawful authority has been negligent. I hope that the Government will consider these amendments with the seriousness they deserve.

These amendments together form a coherent, serious and necessary set of reforms that respond directly to the failures highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, and some of her solutions. The victims of grooming gangs were failed by the state. They were failed by those whose duty was to protect them, and they were failed by institutions that put political sensitivities above child safety.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

Before my noble friend rises to reply, I want to emphasise, as someone who has practised at the Bar over many decades, like the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, the importance of our recognising in the course of these discussions that, while we are dealing here with a spate of offences clearly committed by gangs of Pakistani men, this is not confined to Pakistani men. The Epstein case has told us quite clearly that upper-class white men with power can abuse and groom and commit these crimes. I have seen it since my early years at the Bar. I see the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, sitting there, and we acted in cases involving East End gangs who passed around girls who were part and parcel of that world. Nowadays, in the drugs world, pass-around girls, who are often underage, are part and parcel of that world. So we must not become fixated on the idea that this happens only in certain communities. I just want that to be emphasised.

[The Minister of State, Home Office ( Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to all those who have spoken in what I think everybody in the Committee will accept is a very wide set of amendments, covering a large number of issues. I shall try my best to summarise and respond on behalf of the Government as a whole.

I start by saying that the horror of the events that have led to the discussions that we have had today need to be recognised, and I need to say from the Government Front Bench that we wish to ensure that we prevent those events happening in future. I just remind the Committee that the Government have been in office for 17 months so far, and the Bill before the Committee today includes a wide range of measures that have arisen out of reports published before the Government came to office, including the IICSA report under Alexis Jay, and are starting to look at some of the issues that have come out of the inquiries and discussions that we have had on issues, including the audit from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, on group-based child sexual abuse.

I also place on record, and remind the Committee, that the Government accept all the recommendations that the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, has made, and are seeking to put those recommendations into practice. I accept today that there are a number of amendments down and discussion points pressing the Government on a range of issues, but I hope that we all have the same objective in mind, which is to prevent further similar horrors.

15:45

I start with the inquiry request in Amendment 247B from the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean of Redditch. This seeks to set in statute a timetable for the start of the inquiry. We want to start the inquiry in a timely fashion. Our immediate priority is to appoint a chair and, in doing so, to ensure that we then consult the chair on the terms of reference. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, supports the Government. The noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, knows that this Bill will not complete its passage through this House and receive—if it does—Royal Assent until probably the very late part of the early part of next year. Her Amendment 247B says three months after Royal Assent, which could well be mid-summer next year. I believe and hope that we can establish the things that she wishes in that timescale.

This goes back to what the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, said about the timescale. I am disappointed that we have not appointed a chair so far, but the timeline to appoint a chair is standard for inquiries of this nature. The UK Covid-19 Inquiry and the Infected Blood Inquiry each took seven months to appoint a chair. I am grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, on this—she has pinched all my sandwiches in terms of the arguments that she put but, essentially, I endorse what she said. We have to get this right, and I believe that we can get this right. I accept that we have had some hiccups, but we can get this right. I therefore would not wish to support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean of Redditch, although I understand why she has put it down. From my perspective, the chair appointment process continues apace. We are recruiting senior staff for the inquiry. We want to ensure that it is effective and can deliver its work. Once the inquiry is established, it will have the powers afforded by the Inquiries Act to obtain information and compel witnesses.

Amendment 271D from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, seeks to mandate the National Crime Agency to undertake criminal investigations into alleged failures by specific agencies to properly investigate, or to cover up, instances of child sex abuse. As a corollary, Amendment 217E seeks to create a number of new offences with retrospective application. I say to him that the national inquiry will investigate institutional failings and will hold those responsible for such failings to account. The priority in terms of criminal investigations must be focused on bringing perpetrators of such abuse to account. As noble Lords will be aware, we have already initiated a national policing operation on group-based child sexual exploitation. I accept my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws’s comments that this is not limited to one group of individuals; there are people who go down every week from all sections of society for these crimes.

Under Operation Beaconport, we are bringing together policing across England and Wales to ensure that the wrongs of the past are rectified. The national police operation and national inquiry will work together, respecting each other’s independence and ensuring that those who have failed in their duty are held to account. If we look to the future, the provisions of the Bill that we will soon debate at greater length will put in place the mandatory duty—which I know the noble Lord, Lord Meston, will speak to later—to report child sex offences, with criminal sanctions. I hope that, when we get to that, we can have a full debate.

Investigations are already in train, and I argue that legislation is not the answer here. Moreover, there are some fundamental issues with the approach taken in Amendment 271D as, in this country, the police and the NCA are operationally independent. Parliament sets a framework under which they operate, but it is properly for chief officers and for the NCA’s director-general to determine who and where to investigate, not Parliament itself.

With respect, I have even greater concerns about Amendment 271E. The noble Lord prayed in aid Nuremberg, but I say to him that his amendment is fundamentally at odds with the rule of law and the long-established principle, enshrined in Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, that no one can face punishment for acts which were not criminal at the time they were committed. Just days after the Constitution Committee of this House published an important and timely report on the rule of law, I hope that the noble Lord will reflect on that and reconsider his amendment.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

Why, then, was it legitimate to pass the War Crimes Act, bringing to justice someone who committed crimes, not even in this country, 50 years ago?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord has made his case. I have put my view. If he wishes to examine it further, we can do so in due course. I understand that he wants to bring people to justice. So do I, but the approach we want to take is different from his, and we will have to accept that.

Amendment 271B, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and Amendment 271C, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would give effect to recommendation 1 of the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, that the law should be changed so that adults penetrating a child aged under 16 are charged with rape. As I have said, the Government have accepted this recommendation and have committed to changing the law. I reassure noble Lords that we are working fast to consider how that law change should be made. We are discussing this. I met the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, as part of that work and I will update Parliament soon about our proposed approach but, at the moment, I hope that the noble and learned Lord accepts that we are committed to that legislation and will table it as soon as time allows.

Amendment 271C, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would mean that someone suspected of or charged with a sexual offence against a child that involved penetration would be described as having committed rape, whether the penetration was penile or non-penile, and regardless of what the offence is actually called in legislation. It would also mean that a wide range of other non-penetrative offending behaviour would be referred to simply as sexual assault. I do not think that that meets the intention of the recommendation from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, as it would not substantially change criminal law. Additionally, the difference in how offences are labelled in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and mandating how enforcement agencies then refer to those offences could lead to operational confusion, which I hope the noble Lord would seek to avoid.

Amendment 271B, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, which I have already mentioned, would create a new offence of rape which would apply when an adult penetrates with their penis the vagina, anus or mouth of a child aged 13 to 15. The offence would not require proof of an absence of consent or reasonable belief. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, who spoke to it on behalf of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, that the Government are committed to making this change in law. We have accepted the recommendations of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, and we strongly agree with the sentiment behind the amendment. However, we are also aware of the need to ensure a robust framework of sexual offences, which must work effectively across all types of child sexual abuse. This will be a significant change to the framework and, as such, if the noble Lord will allow me, we need to discuss it with the police and prosecutors to make sure that they have the tools needed to bring abusers to justice. When we have done that and taken those considerations into account, we will change the law, and we will update Parliament when we do that. I hope he can accept that intention.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for her Amendments 288A and 288B. These overlap with the provisions in Chapter 2 of Part 5, which provide for a duty to report, which we will come on to later; she noted and accepted that. We believe, after extensive consultation with the relevant sectors, that the model in that chapter is the appropriate one to adopt. Again, we can debate that later, and I am sure we will, but that is the Government’s view at the moment.

Amendment 288B seeks to create a criminal offence specifically in respect of concealment by public officials. I am mindful that the type of offence proposed by this amendment may overlap with existing statutory provision, including obstruction of justice offences. Later, we will come on to consider the offence of preventing or deterring a reporter from carrying out their duty in Clause 79, and it will be part of the appropriate way forward at that stage.

Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, also tabled Amendments 288C and 288D, which are about the collection of the ethnicity and nationality data of child sexual abuse offenders and victims. I note what the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, said. The recommendation from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, is to work alongside the police to establish improvements which are required to assist the collection and publication of this data. We have accepted that recommendation. This includes reviewing and improving the existing data that the police collect, as well as considering future legislative measures if required. The objective the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, has set is one that we have accepted. We are working through that at the moment and, although it may not be satisfactory today, it is an objective to which she and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, can hold us to account.

This is an important debate. I think we are at one on these things, but it is the Government’s firm view that most of the amendments are not the way forward or need further refinement along the lines that I have already outlined to the Committee. As I have said, the Government are committed to changing the law in relation to rape. We will take away amendments and consider this further for Report.

Given these caveats, let us go back to where we started on this wide-ranging group, which is whether we should have a statutory timescale for the inquiry. Going back to the lead amendment in this group, I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, will withdraw her amendment because we are trying to do this as speedily as possible. The converse impact of her amendment may well be to create a further delay to a process that the Government are determined to get down as quickly as possible, as the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, said, to land the inquiry and get further recommendations to tighten up areas in which we need to reduce—and, we hope, stop—the number of further victims of these awful crimes.

[Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for addressing my amendment and the others in such detail, and my noble friends Baroness Cash and Lord Blencathra for adding their support.

Even though the Minister has not accepted my amendment and stated that the others do not fit with the Government’s plans, I welcome the agreement across the Committee that we all support the principle of the work that is happening. However, I make no apologies for standing up and saying that the system is still not adequate in many ways. I am sure that the Minister can recognise some of this. I remember sitting in the Home Office in 2021-22, when I was a Minister there, and asking for the data about ethnicity and whether there was any connection. I was told, “No, Minister, there is none”. We all know now that that was not the case. I wish to God we had known that then so we could have done more for the victims. Collectively, we have all let them down; this is not a party-political issue, but one in which we should feel ashamed about what has happened to those vulnerable girls in our country.

I accept the Minister’s point about the timeline and the passage of the Bill, and that, were he to accept my amendment, it would potentially be delayed further than any of us would wish. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 247B withdrawn.

Schedule 5: CCE prevention orders on conviction

Amendments 248 to 256

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

248: Schedule 5, page 253, line 13, after “satisfied” insert “on the balance of probabilities”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment spells out, on the face of the Bill, that “satisfied” here means satisfied on the balance of probabilities

249: Schedule 5, page 253, line 32, leave out “, in England and Wales,”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to Schedule 5, page 253, line 33.

250: Schedule 5, page 253, line 33, at end insert “(as it has effect in England and Wales), or
(ii) doing anything in Scotland or Northern Ireland that would constitute an offence under that section (as it has effect in England and Wales) if done in England and Wales.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment expands the meaning of “engaging in child criminal exploitation” in the provisions about child criminal exploitation prevention orders in England and Wales, to encompass anything done anywhere in the UK that would be an offence under clause 40 if done in England and Wales.

251: Schedule 5, page 253, leave out lines 36 and 37 and insert “, in any part of the United Kingdom, that is associated with the doing of anything within paragraph (a)(i) or (ii).”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment changes the meaning of “engaging in conduct associated with child criminal exploitation” in the provisions about child criminal exploitation prevention orders in England and Wales, to encompass anything done anywhere in the UK.

252: Schedule 5, page 255, line 20, leave out from “made” to “giving” in line 25 and insert “—
(a) by attending at an appropriate police station and”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is related to my amendments to Schedule 5, page 255, line 27.

253: Schedule 5, page 255, line 27, at end insert “, or—
(b) in a way specified in the CCE prevention order.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment allows for notifications to be made in a way specified in the CCE prevention order. This is likely to be used to provide for notifications other than in person when the offender lives outside England and Wales in cases where in person notification is considered unreasonable.

254: Schedule 5, page 255, line 27, at end insert—
“(5A) An “appropriate police station” is a police station in the police area in which—(a) the offender’s home address is situated, or(b) the court which made the order is situated.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is related to my amendment to Schedule 5, page 255, line 20 and my other amendment to Schedule 5, page 255, line 27.

255: Schedule 5, page 255, line 31, leave out “England and Wales” and insert “the United Kingdom”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my other amendment to this paragraph, changes the meaning of “home address” so that the home address of the subject of a CCE prevention order made on conviction in England and Wales may be anywhere in the UK.

256: Schedule 5, page 255, line 33, leave out “England or Wales” and insert “the United Kingdom”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my other amendment to this paragraph, changes the meaning of “home address” so that the home address of the subject of a CCE prevention order made on conviction in England and Wales may be anywhere in the UK.

Amendments 248 to 256 agreed.

Schedule 5, as amended, agreed.

Amendments 257 and 258

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

257: After Schedule 5, insert the following new Schedule—
“ScheduleCCE prevention orders: ScotlandPower to make CCE prevention order
1 (1) This paragraph applies if—(a) the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland, in accordance with paragraph 3, makes an application to a sheriff for a CCE prevention order in respect of a person,(b) the Sheriff Appeal Court or the High Court allows a person’s appeal against a conviction for any offence,(c) a person is acquitted of any offence by or before a court by reason of the special defence set out in section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,(d) a court finds under section 53F of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 that a person is unfit for trial and has done the act charged against them in respect of any offence, or(e) a court deals with a person convicted of an offence for that offence.(2) The court may make an order under paragraph 2 (a “CCE prevention order”) in respect of the person (“the adult”) if they are aged 18 or over and the conditions in sub-paragraphs (3) to (5) are met.(3) The first condition is that—(a) in any case, the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the adult has engaged in child criminal exploitation or in conduct associated with child criminal exploitation, or (b) in a case within paragraph (c), (d) or (e) of sub-paragraph (1), the offence in question is an offence under section 40.(4) The second condition is that the court considers that there is a risk that the adult will engage in child criminal exploitation.(5) The third condition is that the court considers that it is necessary to make the order to prevent the adult from engaging, or reduce the likelihood of the adult engaging, in child criminal exploitation.(6) In sub-paragraph (3)—(a) in paragraph (a), the reference to engaging in anything includes engaging in it before (as well as after) the time when this paragraph comes into force;(b) paragraph (b) applies in relation to findings made in respect of conduct occurring before (as well as after) that time.(7) In this paragraph—(a) a reference to an adult “engaging in child criminal exploitation” is to the adult—(i) doing anything that constitutes an offence under section 40 (as it has effect in Scotland), or(ii) doing anything in England and Wales or Northern Ireland that would constitute an offence under section 40 (as it has effect in Scotland) if done in Scotland;(b) a reference to an adult “engaging in conduct associated with child criminal exploitation” is to the adult doing anything, in any part of the United Kingdom, that is associated with the doing of anything within paragraph (a)(i) or (ii).CCE prevention orders
2 (1) A CCE prevention order is an order which—(a) prohibits the adult from doing anything described in the order;(b) requires that adult to do anything described in the order.The order may in particular require the adult to comply with paragraph 6 (notification requirements).(2) A court may include a prohibition or requirement only if it considers it necessary for the purpose of preventing the adult from engaging, or reducing the likelihood of the adult engaging, in child criminal exploitation.(3) Prohibitions and requirements must, so far as practicable, be such as to avoid—(a) any conflict with any religious beliefs of the adult;(b) any interference with the times, if any, at which the adult normally works or attends any educational establishment;(c) any conflict with the prohibitions and requirements of any other court order or interdict to which the adult is subject.(4) A prohibition or requirement applies throughout the United Kingdom unless expressly limited to a particular area.(5) A CCE prevention order must—(a) specify the period for which it has effect, which must be at least two years, or(b) state that it has effect until further order.(6) Where, in a case within paragraph 1(1)(e)—(a) the adult has been remanded in custody by an order of a court, or(b) a custodial sentence has been imposed on the adult or the adult is serving or otherwise subject to a such a sentence, a CCE prevention order may provide that it does not take effect until the adult is released from custody.(7) A CCE prevention order may specify periods for which particular prohibitions or requirements have effect.(8) Where a court makes a CCE prevention order in respect of a person who is already subject to such an order, the earlier order ceases to have effect.Applications for CCE prevention orders
3 (1) The Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland may make an application for a CCE prevention order.(2) An application under this paragraph must be made to the sheriff in whose sheriffdom—(a) the adult lives, or(b) the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland believes that adult is in or is intending to come to.Interim CCE prevention orders
4 (1) This paragraph applies where the sheriff adjourns the hearing of an application for a CCE prevention order made under paragraph 3.(2) The sheriff may, if they consider it necessary to do so, make a CCE prevention order lasting for a fixed period or until the determination of the application (an “interim CCE prevention order”).Paragraph 2(5) does not apply in relation to an interim CCE prevention order.(3) The only requirement that may be imposed by an interim CCE prevention order on the adult is a requirement to comply with paragraph 6 (notification requirements).(4) Subject to that, the sheriff has the same powers in relation to an interim CCE prevention order as in relation to an order made at a final hearing.(5) Nothing in sub-paragraph (2) prevents the variation of the duration of an interim CCE prevention order, or the discharge of such an order, under paragraph 7.CCE prevention orders in criminal proceedings: procedural powers
5 (1) This paragraph applies in the circumstances mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b), (c), (d) or (e) of paragraph 1.(2) The court may make a CCE prevention order—(a) at its own instance, or(b) on the motion of the Lord Advocate, Crown Counsel or procurator fiscal (or any person duly authorised to represent or act for them).(3) For the purpose of deciding whether to make a CCE prevention order, the court may consider evidence led by the prosecution and evidence led by the adult.(4) It does not matter whether the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings giving rise to the circumstances referred to in sub-paragraph (1).(5) The court may adjourn any proceedings relating to the making of a CCE prevention order.(6) If the adult does not appear for any adjourned proceedings, the court may—(a) further adjourn the proceedings,(b) issue a warrant for the adult’s arrest, or(c) hear the proceedings in the adult’s absence.(7) The court may act under sub-paragraph (6)(b) only if satisfied that the adult has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings. (8) The court may act under sub-paragraph (6)(c) only if satisfied that the adult—(a) has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings, and(b) has been informed that if the adult does not appear for those proceedings, the court may hear the proceedings in the adult’s absence.(9) Nothing in this paragraph limits any other powers of the court.Notification requirements
6 (1) This paragraph applies where a CCE prevention order requires the adult to comply with this paragraph.(2) Before the end of the period of three days beginning with the day on which a CCE prevention order requiring the adult to comply with this paragraph is first served, the adult must notify to the police—(a) the adult's name and, where the adult uses one or more other names, each of those names, and(b) the adult's home address.(3) If, while the adult is required to comply with this paragraph, the adult—(a) uses a name which has not been notified under the order, or(b) changes home address,the adult must notify, to the police, the new name or the new home address.(4) A notification under sub-paragraph (3) must be given before the end of the period of three days beginning with the day on which the adult uses the name or changes home address.(5) A notification under this paragraph must be made—(a) by attending at a police station for the time being specified in the document published under sub-paragraph (6) and giving an oral notification to a constable, or to a person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station, or(b) in a way specified in the CCE prevention order.(6) The Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland must publish, in such manner as the Chief Constable thinks fit, a document containing the name and address of each police station at which a person may give a notification under this paragraph.(7) The Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland must keep under review a document published under this paragraph and may, from time to time, publish a revised version of the document in such manner as the Chief Constable thinks fit.(8) A notification under this paragraph must be acknowledged in writing.(9) In this paragraph “home address” means—(a) the address of the adult’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or(b) where the adult has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the adult can regularly be found and, if there is more than one such place, such one of those places as the adult may select.(10) In determining the period of three days mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) or (4), no account is to be taken of any time when the adult is—(a) lawfully detained or otherwise lawfully deprived of their liberty, in the United Kingdom, or(b) outside the United Kingdom.Variation and discharge of CCE prevention orders made on application
7 (1) This paragraph applies where a person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) applies to the appropriate sheriff for the variation or discharge of a CCE prevention order made in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1(1)(a).(2) The persons are—(a) the adult;(b) the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland.(3) On the application, the appropriate sheriff may (after hearing from the applicant and, if the other person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) wishes to be heard, that person) make any order varying or discharging the order that the appropriate sheriff considers appropriate.This is subject to sub-paragraph (7).(4) The power to vary an order includes power to—(a) include an additional prohibition or requirement;(b) extend the period for which a prohibition or requirement has effect;(c) extend the period for which the order has effect.(5) The appropriate sheriff may make provision of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (4) only if they consider that the provision is necessary to prevent the adult from engaging, or reduce the likelihood of the adult engaging, in child criminal exploitation.(6) Sub-paragraphs (3), (4) and (7) of paragraph 2 apply to additional prohibitions or requirements included on a variation of an order.(7) The appropriate sheriff may not discharge an order before the end of the period of two years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the adult and the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland.This sub-paragraph does not apply to an interim CCE prevention order.(8) In this paragraph “the appropriate sheriff” means—(a) the sheriff who made the order,(b) a sheriff in the sheriffdom of that sheriff, or(c) a sheriff in the sheriffdom—(i) in which the adult is resident at the time of the application,(ii) in which the chief constable believes that adult to be, or(iii) to which the chief constable believes that adult intends to come.Variation and discharge of CCE prevention orders made in criminal proceedings
8 (1) This paragraph applies where a person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) applies to a relevant court for the variation or discharge of a CCE prevention order made in the circumstances mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b), (c), (d) or (e) of paragraph 1.(2) The persons are—(a) the adult;(b) the Lord Advocate, Crown Counsel or procurator fiscal (and any person duly authorised to represent or act for them).(3) On the application, the court may (after hearing from the applicant and, if the other person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) wishes to be heard, that person) make any order varying or discharging the order that the court considers appropriate.This is subject to sub-paragraph (7).(4) The power to vary an order includes power to—(a) include an additional prohibition or requirement; (b) extend the period for which a prohibition or requirement has effect;(c) extend the period for which the order has effect.(5) The court may make provision of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (4) only if it considers that the provision is necessary to prevent the adult from engaging, or reduce the likelihood of the adult engaging, in child criminal exploitation.(6) Sub-paragraphs (3), (4) and (7) of paragraph 2 apply to additional prohibitions or requirements included on a variation of an order.(7) The court may not discharge an order before the end of the period of two years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the adult and the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland.This sub-paragraph does not apply to an interim CCE prevention order.(8) In this paragraph “relevant court” means—(a) where the High Court made the order, that court;(b) where the sheriff made the order, the sheriff.Appeals
9 (1) The adult or the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland may appeal to the relevant court against a decision made—(a) on an application under paragraph 3 (applications for CCE prevention orders);(b) under paragraph 4 (interim CCE prevention orders);(c) on an application under paragraph 7 (variation and discharge of CCE prevention orders made on application);(d) on an application under paragraph 8 (variation and discharge of CCE prevention orders made in criminal proceedings).(2) In this paragraph“relevant court” means—(a) in the case of a decision of a sheriff court, the Sheriff Appeal Court;(b) in the case of a decision of the High Court, the High Court.(3) On an appeal under sub-paragraph (1) the relevant court may make—(a) such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and(b) such incidental and consequential orders as appear to it to be appropriate.(4) Where a CCE prevention order is made by virtue of sub-paragraph (1)(b), (c), (d) or (e) of paragraph 1, the order is taken to be a sentence for the purposes of any appeal.(5) Where a CCE prevention order is made on appeal, for the purposes of this Schedule (other than this paragraph) the order is to be treated as made by the court from which the appeal was made.Offence of breaching CCE prevention order
10 (1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with an order mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) commits an offence.(2) The orders are—(a) a CCE prevention order;(b) a CCE prevention order under Chapter 1 of Part 4 (CCE prevention orders on application or acquittal etc. in England and Wales);(c) a CCE prevention order under Chapter 2A of Part 11 of the Sentencing Code (CCE prevention orders on conviction in England and Wales); (d) a CCE prevention order under Schedule (CCE prevention orders: Northern Ireland) (CCE prevention orders in Northern Ireland).(3) A person who commits an offence under this paragraph is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).(4) The Scottish Ministers may by regulations amend sub-paragraph (2) so as to add to or remove from the list of orders any relevant UK order.(5) In proceedings for an offence under this paragraph, a copy of the original order mentioned in sub-paragraph (2), certified by the proper officer of the court that made it, is admissible as evidence of its having been made and of its contents to the same extent that oral evidence of those matters is admissible in those proceedings.(6) “Relevant UK order” means an order under the law of England and Wales or Northern Ireland which appears to the Scottish Ministers to be equivalent or similar to a CCE prevention order.Offences relating to notifications
11 (1) This paragraph applies where a CCE prevention order requires a person to comply with paragraph 6 (notification requirements).(2) The person commits an offence if—(a) without reasonable excuse, they fail to comply with that paragraph, or(b) in purported compliance with that paragraph, they notify to the police any information which they know to be false.(3) A person who commits an offence under this paragraph is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).(4) A person commits an offence under sub-paragraph (2)(a) on the day on which they first fail, without reasonable excuse, to comply with paragraph 6.(5) The person continues to commit the offence throughout any period during which the failure continues.(6) But the person may not be prosecuted more than once in respect of the same failure.(7) Paragraph 10(5) applies for the purposes of this paragraph.Interpretation
12 In this Schedule—“adult” has the meaning given by paragraph 1;“CCE prevention order”, except in paragraph 10(2)(b) to (d), means an order under paragraph 2 (and accordingly includes an interim order made by virtue of paragraph 4);“engaging in child criminal exploitation” has the meaning given by paragraph 1 (and related expressions are to be construed accordingly);“High Court” means the High Court of Justiciary.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment inserts a new Schedule about CCE prevention orders in Scotland.

258: After Schedule 5, insert the following new Schedule—
“Schedule CCE prevention orders: Northern IrelandPower to make CCE prevention order
1 (1) This paragraph applies if—(a) an application for a CCE prevention order in respect of a person is made to a magistrates’ court, in accordance with paragraph 3,(b) a person is acquitted of any offence by or before a court,(c) the County Court allows a person’s appeal against a conviction for any offence,(d) a court deals with a person in respect of a finding that—(i) the person is not guilty of any offence by reason of insanity, or(ii) the person is unfit to plead and has done the act charged against them in respect of any offence, or(e) a court deals with a person convicted of an offence for that offence.(2) The court may make an order under paragraph 2 (a “CCE prevention order”) in respect of the person (“the defendant”) if they are aged 18 or over and the conditions in sub-paragraphs (3) to (5) are met.(3) The first condition is that—(a) in any case, the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant has engaged in child criminal exploitation or in conduct associated with child criminal exploitation, or(b) in a case within paragraph (d) or (e) of sub-paragraph (1), the offence in question is an offence under section 40.(4) The second condition is that the court considers that there is a risk that the defendant will engage in child criminal exploitation.(5) The third condition is that the court considers that it is necessary to make the order to prevent the defendant from engaging, or reduce the likelihood of the defendant engaging, in child criminal exploitation.(6) In sub-paragraph (3)—(a) in paragraph (a), the reference to engaging in anything includes engaging in it before (as well as after) the time when this paragraph comes into force;(b) paragraph (b) applies in relation to findings made in respect of conduct occurring before (as well as after) that time.(7) In this paragraph—(a) a reference to the defendant “engaging in child criminal exploitation” is to the defendant—(i) doing anything that constitutes an offence under section 40 (as it has effect in Northern Ireland), or(ii) doing anything in England and Wales or Scotland that would constitute an offence under section 40 (as it has effect in Northern Ireland) if done in Northern Ireland;(b) a reference to the defendant “engaging in conduct associated with child criminal exploitation” is to the adult doing anything, in any part of the United Kingdom, that is associated with the doing of anything within paragraph (a)(i) or (ii).CCE prevention orders
2 (1) A CCE prevention order is an order which—(a) prohibits the defendant from doing anything described in the order;(b) requires the defendant to do anything described in the order. The order may in particular require the defendant to comply with paragraph 7 (notification requirements).(2) A court may include a prohibition or requirement only if it considers it necessary for the purpose of preventing the defendant from engaging, or reducing the likelihood of the defendant engaging, in child criminal exploitation.(3) Prohibitions and requirements must, so far as practicable, be such as to avoid—(a) any conflict with any religious beliefs of the defendant;(b) any interference with the times, if any, at which the defendant normally works or attends any educational establishment;(c) any conflict with the prohibitions and requirements of any other court order or injunction to which the defendant is subject.(4) A prohibition or requirement applies throughout the United Kingdom unless expressly limited to a particular area.(5) A CCE prevention order must—(a) specify the period for which it has effect, which must be—(i) at least five years in a case within paragraph 1(1)(e);(ii) at least two years in any other case, or(b) state that it has effect until further order.(6) Where, in a case within paragraph 1(1)(e)—(a) the defendant has been remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court, or(b) a custodial sentence has been imposed on the defendant or the defendant is serving or otherwise subject to a such a sentence,a CCE prevention order may provide that it does not take effect until the defendant is released from custody or ceases to be subject to a custodial sentence.(7) A CCE prevention order may specify periods for which particular prohibitions or requirements have effect.(8) Where a court makes a CCE prevention order in respect of a defendant who is already subject to such an order, the earlier order ceases to have effect.Applications for CCE prevention orders
3 An application for a CCE prevention order may be made by the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.Applications without notice
4 (1) An application for a CCE prevention order may be made without notice to the defendant.(2) If an application is made without notice the court must do one of the following—(a) adjourn the proceedings and make an interim CCE prevention order (see paragraph 5);(b) adjourn the proceedings without making an interim order;(c) dismiss the application.Interim CCE prevention orders
5 (1) This paragraph applies where the court adjourns the hearing of an application (whether made with or without notice) for a CCE prevention order.(2) The court may, if it considers it necessary to do so, make a CCE prevention order lasting for a fixed period or until the determination of the application (an “interim CCE prevention order”).Paragraph 2(5) does not apply in relation to an interim CCE prevention order. (3) The only requirement that may be imposed by an interim CCE prevention order on the defendant is a requirement to comply with paragraph 7 (notification requirements).(4) Subject to that, the court has the same powers in relation to an interim CCE prevention order as in relation to an order made at a final hearing.(5) An interim CCE prevention order made at a hearing of which the defendant was not given notice takes effect on being served on the defendant.(6) Nothing in sub-paragraph (2) prevents the variation of the duration of an interim CCE prevention order, or the discharge of such an order, under paragraph 8.Procedural powers where no application made
6 (1) This paragraph applies in the circumstances mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b), (c), (d) or (e) of paragraph 1.(2) For the purpose of deciding whether to make a CCE prevention order, the court may consider evidence led by the prosecution and evidence led by the defendant.(3) It does not matter whether the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings giving rise to the circumstances referred to in sub-paragraph (1).(4) The court may adjourn any proceedings relating to the making of a CCE prevention order.(5) If the defendant does not appear for any adjourned proceedings, the court may—(a) further adjourn the proceedings,(b) issue a warrant for the defendant’s arrest, or(c) hear the proceedings in the defendant’s absence.(6) The court may act under sub-paragraph (5)(b) only if satisfied that the defendant has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings.(7) The court may act under sub-paragraph (5)(c) only if satisfied that the defendant—(a) has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings, and(b) has been informed that if the defendant does not appear for those proceedings, the court may hear the proceedings in the defendant’s absence.(8) Nothing in this paragraph limits any other powers of the court.Notification requirements
7 (1) This paragraph applies where a CCE prevention order requires the defendant to comply with this paragraph.(2) Before the end of the period of three days beginning with the day on which a CCE prevention order requiring the defendant to comply with this paragraph is first served, the defendant must notify to the police—(a) the defendant’s name and, where the defendant uses one or more other names, each of those names, and(b) the defendant’s home address.(3) If, while the defendant is required to comply with this paragraph, the defendant—(a) uses a name which has not been notified under the order, or(b) changes home address,the defendant must notify, to the police, the new name or the new home address. (4) A notification under sub-paragraph (3) must be given before the end of the period of three days beginning with the day on which the defendant uses the name or changes home address.(5) A notification under this paragraph is made—(a) by attending at any police station in Northern Ireland and giving an oral notification to a constable, or to a person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station, or(b) in a way specified in the CCE prevention order.(6) A notification under this paragraph must be acknowledged in writing.(7) In this paragraph “home address” means—(a) the address of the defendant’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or(b) where the defendant has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the defendant can regularly be found and, if there is more than one such place, such one of those places as the defendant may select.(8) In determining the period of three days mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) or (4), no account is to be taken of any time when the defendant is—(a) lawfully detained or otherwise lawfully deprived of their liberty, in the United Kingdom, or(b) outside the United Kingdom.Variation and discharge of CCE prevention orders
8 (1) This paragraph applies where a person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) applies to a relevant court for the variation or discharge of a CCE prevention order.(2) The persons are—(a) the defendant;(b) the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.(3) On the application, the court may (after hearing from the applicant and any other person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) who wishes to be heard) make any order varying or discharging the order that the court considers appropriate.This is subject to sub-paragraph (7).(4) The power to vary an order includes power to—(a) include an additional prohibition or requirement;(b) extend the period for which a prohibition or requirement has effect;(c) extend the period for which the order has effect.(5) The court may make provision of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (4) only if it considers that the provision is necessary to prevent the defendant from engaging, or reduce the likelihood of the defendant engaging, in child criminal exploitation.(6) Sub-paragraphs (3), (4) and (7) of paragraph 2 apply to additional prohibitions or requirements included on a variation of an order.(7) The court may not, without the consent of the defendant and the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, discharge an order before the end of the period of—(a) five years beginning with the day on which the order was made, in the case of an order made in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1(1)(e);(b) two years beginning with the day on which the order was made, in any other case.This sub-paragraph does not apply to an interim CCE prevention order.(8) In this paragraph “relevant court” means— (a) where the Crown Court or Court of Appeal made the order, the Crown Court;(b) in any other case, the magistrates’ court.Appeals
9 (1) The defendant or the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland may appeal to the relevant court against a decision made—(a) on an application under paragraph 3 (applications for CCE prevention orders);(b) under paragraph 5 (interim CCE prevention orders);(c) on an application under paragraph 8 (variation and discharge of CCE prevention orders).(2) In this paragraph“relevant court” means—(a) in the case of a decision of the Crown Court, the Court of Appeal;(b) in any other case, the County Court.(3) On an appeal under sub-paragraph (1) the relevant court may make—(a) such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and(b) such incidental and consequential orders as appear to it to be appropriate.(4) Where a CCE prevention order is made by virtue of sub-paragraph (1)(b), (c) or (d) of paragraph 1, the defendant may appeal against the making of the order (so far as they could not otherwise do) as if the defendant had been convicted of the offence and the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for the offence.(5) Where a CCE prevention order is made by virtue of sub-paragraph (1)(e) of paragraph 1, the defendant may appeal against the making of the order as if the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for the offence.(6) Where a CCE prevention order is made on appeal, for the purposes of this Schedule (other than this paragraph) the order is to be treated as made by the court from which the appeal was made.(7) Rules of court may provide that an appeal from a decision—(a) to dismiss an application for a CCE prevention order made without notice being given to the defendant, or(b) to refuse to make an interim CCE prevention order when adjourning proceedings following such an application,may be made without notice being given to the defendant.Offence of breaching CCE prevention order
10 (1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with an order mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) commits an offence.(2) The orders are—(a) a CCE prevention order;(b) a CCE prevention order under Chapter 1 of Part 4 (CCE prevention orders on application or acquittal etc. in England and Wales);(c) a CCE prevention order under Chapter 2A of Part 11 of the Sentencing Code (CCE prevention orders on conviction in England and Wales);(d) a CCE prevention order under Schedule (CCE prevention orders: Scotland) (CCE prevention orders in Scotland).(3) A person who commits an offence under this paragraph is liable— (a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).(4) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this paragraph, it is not open to the court by or before which the person is convicted to make, in respect of the offence, an order for conditional discharge.(5) In proceedings for an offence under this paragraph, a copy of the original order mentioned in sub-paragraph (2), certified by the proper officer of the court that made it, is admissible as evidence of its having been made and of its contents to the same extent that oral evidence of those matters is admissible in those proceedings.(6) The Department of Justice in Northern Ireland may by regulations amend sub-paragraph (2) so as to add to or remove from the list of orders any relevant UK order.(7) “Relevant UK order” means an order under the law of England and Wales or Scotland which appears to the Department of Justice to be equivalent or similar to a CCE prevention order.(8) In Article 4(1) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/3160 (N.I. 24)) after “2015” insert “or paragraph 10 of Schedule (CCE prevention orders: Northern Ireland) to the Crime and Policing Act 2025”.Offences relating to notifications
11 (1) This paragraph applies where a CCE prevention order requires a person to comply with paragraph 7 (notification requirements).(2) The person commits an offence if—(a) without reasonable excuse, they fail to comply with that paragraph, or(b) in purported compliance with that paragraph, they notify to the police any information which they know to be false.(3) A person who commits an offence under this paragraph is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).(4) A person commits an offence under sub-paragraph (2)(a) on the day on which they first fail, without reasonable excuse, to comply with paragraph 7.(5) The person continues to commit the offence throughout any period during which the failure continues.(6) But the person may not be prosecuted more than once in respect of the same failure.(7) Paragraph 10(5) applies for the purposes of this paragraph.Special measures for witnesses
12 (1) Part 2 of the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1999 (S.I. 1999/2789 (N.I. 8))(special measures directions in the case of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses) applies to relevant proceedings under this Schedule as it applies to criminal proceedings, but with—(a) the omission of Articles 5(4) to (5), 9(4C)(e), 10A and 20 of that Order (which make provision appropriate only in the context of criminal proceedings), and(b) any other necessary modifications. (2) Rules of court made under or for the purposes of Part 2 of that Order apply to relevant proceedings under this Schedule—(a) to the extent provided by rules of court, and(b) subject to any modifications provided by rules of court.(3) In this paragraph “relevant proceedings under this Schedule” means any proceedings under this Schedule except proceedings relating to an offence under paragraph 10 or 11.Interpretation and supplementary provision
13 (1) In this Schedule—“CCE prevention order”, except in paragraph 10(2)(b) to (d), means an order under paragraph 2 (and accordingly includes an interim order made by virtue of paragraph 5);“defendant” has the same meaning as in paragraph 1;“engaging in child criminal exploitation” has the meaning given by paragraph 1 (and related expressions are to be construed accordingly).(2) An application under this Schedule is to be made—(a) by complaint, where the application is made to a magistrates’ court;(b) in accordance with rules of court, in any other case.(3) Article 78 of the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/1675 (N.I. 26))(time limit for civil complaints) does not apply to a complaint under this Schedule.(4) On the hearing of an application under this Schedule, Article 118 of that Order (summons to witness and warrant for arrest) does not apply in relation to any person for whose protection the order is sought, except where the person has given oral or written evidence at the hearing.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment inserts a new Schedule about CCE prevention orders in Northern Ireland.

Amendments 257 and 258 agreed.

Clause 56: Controlling another’s home for criminal purposes

Amendment 258A

Moved by

[Lord Blencathra]

258A: Clause 56, page 71, line 1, leave out paragraph (a)
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to remove the possibility of offences under this section being tried in a magistrate’s court.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, before speaking to my Amendment 258A, I say in the nicest possible way to the Government Whip, the noble Lord, Lord Katz, that he must not get overexcited about a 10-minute advisory timescale. My noble friend Lady Cash had three major new clauses tabled; I had three major new clauses tabled. I decided not to degroup any of them, out of decency to the House, but I was limited to 10 minutes.

16:00

However, the noble Lord has given me a clear steer on what I shall do with the five new clauses I intend to put down on cycling and e-bikes. If I decide to degroup those, I could speak for 50 minutes on them. Therefore, a little bit of latitude on all sides would be helpful.

As far as Amendment 258 is concerned—

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I do not think I have ever given an indication the noble Lord could not speak, but there was a 13-minute contribution on a 10-minute latitude.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson; I was not referring to him. It was the Government Whip who was getting very agitated about my comments. I could have spoken for a lot longer if I had degrouped my amendments, but I am not going to do that.

Quite simply, Clause 56 lists all the crimes in Part 1 of Schedule 6 that are relevant to convicting someone of controlling another person’s home for criminal purposes. Schedule 6 is about two pages of big issues—very large crimes—which are completely inappropriate for a summary trial. This is about hijacking someone else’s home, where the homeowner is kept prisoner. That is such big stuff that it should not be triable by summary but only in a Crown Court.

I beg to move—after one minute and 21 seconds.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, we welcome government Amendment 262, which recognises that cases of cuckooing often involve a complex web of coercive control. The person who seems to be in charge may actually be being manipulated or exploited by somebody else, and this addresses that complexity. However, while I understand the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and recognise all too well the potential life-changing harm caused by cuckooing, we are not minded to support restricting the trial venue in that way.

Magistrates’ courts provide quicker access to justice for victims and less delay than Crown Courts, particularly given the current backlogs. This is particularly important as cuckooing is linked to ongoing exploitation, with offenders often moving on to repeat the offence elsewhere, so fast action to stop the creation of more victims may in some cases be the more sensible option. Magistrates’ courts can also be less intimidating for vulnerable victims, supporting them to testify. Many other exploitation and safeguarding offences can be tried either way, allowing the specific facts of each case to determine the appropriate court. Imposing a blanket restriction on trial venue risks delaying justice, undermines established practice, and limits judicial discretion.

The pattern of coercion and control is at the heart of all these issues, whether we are talking about the exploitation of vulnerable children or adults. The evidence shows that women—as well as children—who are coerced into offending, often by traffickers or abusive partners, are in practice more often punished than protected. Too many victims of coercive control are still unfairly prosecuted for offences linked to their own abuse. Many female victims do not report to the police for fear of being criminalised, and that concern is well-founded. If, for example, drugs are being stored or grown in their flat, it is all too often the woman who is prosecuted. The statistics bear this out: around 70% of women in prison are victims of coercion or domestic violence.

Turning to the issue of coerced internal concealment, Amendment 259 links the new offences of causing internal concealment and cuckooing, making it clearer and easier to prosecute these serious and often related behaviours. Coerced internal concealment, whereby a person hides items such as drugs inside their bodies, is a particularly stark illustration of the abuse of power. Anyone who puts another person’s life at risk in this way should be subject to the harshest of penalties, so we support the introduction of this new offence.

I take this opportunity to raise an issue which, regrettably and surprisingly, remains absent from the Bill. In the past five years in England and Wales, a child has been subjected to an intimate police search every 14 hours on average. Black children are four times more likely to be strip-searched compared to their proportion of the population. Half these searches lead to no further action.

In opposition, the Government promised stronger regulation, including a statutory duty to notify parents, which should be the bare minimum. Although a consultation began in April 2024, there have been no firm proposals since, which is disappointing given an earlier commitment from the former Home Secretary to new mandatory rules and safeguards being

“put in place as a matter of urgency”.

That pledge followed a series of recommendations from the IOPC, including a call to amend the law so that police forces are required to make a safeguarding referral for any child subjected to a search involving the exposure of intimate parts. It also called for clearer guidance, enhanced training, greater consistency across police forces and, again, for these reforms to be implemented “quickly”.

Some 18 months later, some forces have improved practice and made more safeguarding referrals, but there is still no legal requirement. The Children’s Commissioner confirms that poor strip search practice is widespread and is not limited to any one force or region; failures include not having an appropriate adult present. Can the Minister confirm that a timescale is in place for the implementation of these recommendations? If not, will the Government consider amending the Bill to reflect the need for urgent action?

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for introducing his amendment. This is an opportunity to consider cuckooing more broadly.

We on these Benches recognise the need for a cuckooing offence, and we did so last year before the general election. I am glad to see that the Government are now following our lead. Data suggests that cuckooing offences have quadrupled in recent years; given that it is a crime largely associated with child exploitation, it is all the more pertinent that we tackle it head on now.

Children are used to conceal and traffic illegal drugs in order to fund the activities of criminal drug gangs. Some 22% of people involved in county lines drug trades are children—that is almost 3,000 vulnerable people under the age of 18 being made to do the dirty work for criminals. These county lines trades are often run out of the dilapidated homes of vulnerable people. Criminals appropriate and transform them to use them for their own ends. Children are ferried in and out; they are sent to similar locations all over the country. It is a very specific crime that requires a very specific law. We see force in my noble friend Lord Blencathra’s amendment, but we would not wish to tie the prosecutor’s hands.

Amendment 259, which addresses the offence of causing internal concealment, would prohibit cuckooed houses being used to house people who hide and then transport drugs. These people, as I have pointed out, are often children. Amendments 260 and 261 address that more broadly. Cuckooing—using children for criminal purposes—is a heinous and exploitative crime and it is right that it be given its own offence. However, while we welcome the Government agreeing to come with us on cuckooing, it is a shame that they have failed to address another root cause of the issue. As we have said, cuckooing is a crime primarily committed by gangs who co-opt homes to run their criminal operations. If you could break up those gangs, you would reduce cuckooing; the two feed off each other.

On the previous day of Committee, His Majesty’s Opposition had two amendments that would have done this. The first amendment would have created a statutory aggravating factor for gang-related offences. The second would have created an offence for specific gang-related graffiti. We appreciate the Government following our lead to create the offence of cuckooing, but if they are serious about this, they should do the same with gangs. Our measures would not, as some noble Lords suggested, criminalise fence-painting or church symbols. Neither is a gang sign. They would, however, deter gangs from their activities and lock up members who partake. This would be just as effective as this new offence.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have contributed to this short debate. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that I was not agitated—if he thinks that that is me being agitated, he has not yet seen me agitated. I hope that noble Lords never will. I was just reflecting the conventions and guidelines to respect each other and the courtesies of the House. We will move on. I welcome the brief and succinct way in which he introduced his amendment, but if he will allow me, I will first deal with the government amendments in this group.

Amendment 262 would make it clear that controlling another person’s dwelling for the purposes of the new cuckooing offence may be carried out via another person. I welcome the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and the principle behind them. While the existing drafting would already allow for the prosecution of a perpetrator who uses a third party to exercise control over another’s dwelling, the amendment would put this point beyond doubt, which we felt was important.

In cuckooing cases, particularly within the county lines context, gang leaders may exploit children or vulnerable adults to control another person’s home, as noted in the debate. The amendment would make it clear that the new cuckooing offence can, and should, be used to pursue the perpetrators who are responsible for directing the cuckooing rather than the individuals who may well be victims of exploitation. We will issue statutory guidance to the police to support the implementation of the offence.

Amendment 259 would add the offence of coerced internal concealment created by the Bill to the list of offences in Schedule 6, which are relevant offences in England and Wales, for the purpose of the cuckooing offence. Similarly, Amendments 260 and 261 would add the offence of child criminal exploitation, also created by the Bill and which we discussed earlier today, to the list of relevant offences in Scotland and Northern Ireland for the purpose of the cuckooing offence.

As noted, cuckooed properties may be used as a base for criminal exploitation. These amendments would therefore ensure that, where cuckooing is carried out for the purpose of enabling the commission of the coerced internal concealment offence in England and Wales, or the commission of the child criminal exploitation offence anywhere in the UK, the cuckooing offence will apply.

I turn to Amendment 258A, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. As he explained, the amendment seeks to remove the ability for cuckooing offences to be tried as a summary offence in a magistrates’ court, thereby limiting the offence to being tried in the Crown Court on indictment. While I am sympathetic to the noble Lord’s intention of ensuring that the perpetrators of this harmful practice receive appropriate sentencing, we, like the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, consider that the provision for the cuckooing offence to be triable either way is fair and proportionate.

Sentencing in individual cases is a matter for the courts, and we do not want to see that approach restricted. When deciding what sentence to impose, courts must consider the circumstances of each individual case. The courts may also have a statutory duty to follow any relevant sentencing guidelines developed by the independent Sentencing Council for England and Wales. The cuckooing offence is designed to capture a range of actions that may be involved in controlling another person’s dwelling, from occupying the property through to directing delivery of items, such as drugs, to and from the property. It may therefore be more proportionate for some cuckooing cases to be tried in a magistrates’ court.

More broadly, allowing offences to be tried in magistrates’ courts helps reduce the burden on the Crown Court and can enable quicker access to justice for victims. It is a sad fact that the lack of investment in the court system over recent years has meant that there is huge strain on the court system. As we always say, rightly, justice delayed is justice denied, so restricting the trial of a cuckooing offence to the Crown Courts would not necessarily deliver the justice that victims deserve and that society would seek to be meted out on the perpetrators.

16:15

The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, asked about the implementation of recommendations around searches of children by police forces. It is outwith the amendment, but I will undertake to find the detail that she requested and write to her. The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, raised the amendments around gang-related activity being an aggravating factor; I refer him to the responses of my noble friend Lady Levitt to the Opposition’s amendments on gangs, which were debated last week.

I hope that, on this basis, the noble Lord will therefore be content to withdraw his amendment and support the Government’s amendments.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, that was a good little 16-minute debate. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, that I rather admire his style in this House—I hope that does not damage his future career. There are many Ministers who are able, but in addition he brings a style of being decent, nice, pleasant in the way he deals with debates, thorough and meticulous, patient and even long-suffering. I rather admire the way he actually replies in detail to our amendments; his initial reaction might be to say, “What a load of rubbish!”, but he does not do that and is kind and courteous. I appeal to him: could he please have a word with his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, and teach him how to be as nice and decent as he is? Turning to the reply from the noble Lord, Lord Katz, I still think that he was wrong and I was right, but, nevertheless, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 258A withdrawn.

Clause 56 agreed.

Schedule 6: Control over another’s home for criminal purposes: relevant offences

Amendments 259 to 261

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

259: Schedule 6, page 262, line 6, leave out from “under” to end and insert “any of the following provisions of this Act—
(a) section 40 (child criminal exploitation);(b) section 59 (causing internal concealment of item for criminal purpose).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adds the offence of causing internal concealment of an item for a criminal purpose, created by this Bill, to the list of offences that are relevant offences in England and Wales for the purpose of the offence of control over another’s home for criminal purposes (clause 56).

260: Schedule 6, page 264, line 7, at end insert—
“38A An offence under section 40 of this Act (child criminal exploitation).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adds the offence of child criminal exploitation, created by this Bill, to the list of offences that are relevant offences in Scotland for the purpose of the offence of control over another’s home for criminal purposes (clause 56).

261: Schedule 6, page 265, line 39, at end insert—
“58A An offence under section 40 of this Act (child criminal exploitation).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adds the offence of child criminal exploitation, created by this Bill, to the list of offences that are relevant offences in Northern Ireland for the purpose of the offence of control over another’s home for criminal purposes (clause 56).

Amendments 259 to 261 agreed.

Schedule 6, as amended, agreed.

Clause 57: Section 56: interpretation

Amendment 262

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

262: Clause 57, page 71, line 29, at end insert—
“(4A) The circumstances in which A exercises control over B’s dwelling include circumstances where—(a) A arranges for another person (C) to exercise control over B’s dwelling (including by exercising control over any of the matters mentioned in subsection (4)), and(b) C does exercise that control.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes it clear that control over another’s dwelling may be via another person, for the purposes of the offence in clause 56.

Amendment 262 agreed.

Clause 57, as amended, agreed.

Clause 58 agreed.

Amendment 262A not moved.

Clause 59 agreed.

Amendment 263 not moved.

Clause 60 agreed.

Clause 61: Department of Justice guidance

Amendment 264

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

264: Clause 61, page 75, line 10, at end insert—
“(c) CCE prevention orders under Schedule (CCE prevention orders: Northern Ireland).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives a power to the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland to issue guidance to the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland about the new CCE prevention orders for Northern Ireland.

Amendment 264 agreed.

Clause 61, as amended, agreed.

Clause 62 agreed.

Clause 63: Child sexual abuse image-generators

Amendment 265

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

265: Clause 63, page 79, line 36, leave out “or” and insert “and”
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a minor drafting change.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I will also speak to further amendments later. I just want to say thank you to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his kind words before he goes. My reputation is ruined, but there we go. I thank him anyway.

The government amendments in this group and the clauses to which they relate are vital in safeguarding the public from some of the gravest harms emerging from the digital age. All the amendments in this group of government amendments, starting with Amendments 295A and 295B, pertain to the introduction of a defence for authorised persons to test and investigate technologies for child sexual abuse material, extreme pornography and non-consensual intimate imagery capabilities. These are abhorrent crimes and we must ensure that our laws keep pace with them.

Noble Lords will know that the rapid advancement and prevalence of AI technologies without adequate guardrails has increased the volume of AI-generated abuse imagery circulating online. These harms fall disproportionately on women and children. We must get ahead of these risks. At present, AI developers and public safety organisations seeking to test for these risks face significant legal jeopardy from testing. These legal blocks mean that testers could be liable to prosecution if they create illegal images during testing. We want to support government and public safety organisations in their commitment to research internet safety. If we are serious about AI safety, it is essential that we support continuous and rigorous testing so that testers can be confident that models are safe to use and support our ambition to drive down CSAM online.

This defence could give a technology company the ability to understand the capabilities of its models, identify weaknesses and design out harmful outputs. Amendment 295A introduces a power by regulations to create new testing defences. The Secretary of State will authorise persons to carry out technology testing subject to rigorous conditions. I confirm that any regulations that are brought forward will be subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure and testing will be subject to rigorous oversight and strict mandatory operational safeguards. The regulation-making power will also extend to making provision for the enforcement of any breaches of conditions and may include creating criminal offences.

Amendment 295B lists the offences to which this defence applies. The Secretary of State will have the power to amend this list of offences as the law evolves. This will ensure that the defence remains fit for purpose. I hope the Committee welcomes that the Scottish Government and Northern Ireland Department of Justice want this defence to be extended to Scotland and Northern Ireland. The offences listed may be amended, as appropriate, for England and Wales as well as for Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Secretary of State will be required to consult Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland before making any regulations that would affect the Scottish Parliament or the Northern Ireland Assembly.

Clause 63 criminalises artificial intelligence image generators, which are used by offenders to create child sexual abuse imagery. Our law is clear that AI-generated child sexual abuse material is illegal. However, these fine-tuned models that facilitate the creation of child sexual abuse material currently are not. Therefore, the Government are making it illegal to possess, make, adapt, supply or offer to supply a child sexual abuse image generator, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment.

Government Amendments 267 and 268 ensure that we take a unified approach across the United Kingdom. This is why we are creating equivalent offences in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Clause 64 amends Section 69 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 to criminalise the possession of advice or guidance on using artificial intelligence to create child abuse imagery. Sadly, there are so-called paedophile manuals that contain guidance for offenders on how to abuse children sexually and how to create indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs—which are illegal under the existing offence in the Serious Crime Act 2015. However, this offence does not include guidance for offenders about how to use AI to create illegal images of children and is applicable only to England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Amendment 269 extends the offence, as amended by Clause 64, to Scotland, ensuring that these vile manuals can be tackled across the whole of the United Kingdom. The other amendments in this group are consequential on the main amendments that I have described.

Together, these government amendments will enhance the protection of women and children, prevent criminal use of AI technologies and improve long-term safety by design and the resilience of future AI development. I commend the amendments to the Committee. I beg to move.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, if I could intervene for a moment, the Bill is going at a fine pace through the House, but I am a little concerned about Amendment 263. The problems of modern slavery that I have raised in the House are very severe.

[A noble Baroness]

That has been debated.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

I know. I am just asking for some assistance with this—does the proposed new clause in Amendment 263 still stand?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Committee has considered that amendment. If the noble Lord wishes to write to me on any details, I will certainly write back to him, but, in the interests of progress, it would be better if that was dealt with outside the Chamber, given that we have debated those matters already.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, very briefly, the government amendments set out the devolution arrangements to ensure that criminals cannot exploit differences between the four nations, and we are very happy to support them.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this is an important issue that I know there is cross-party support for, and I am largely supportive of the intentions behind the amendments in this group.

The first of the Minister’s amendments acts largely to tidy up the drafting of the Bill and ensure its thoroughness. I agree with this. Expanding the scope for technology testing regarding child sexual abuse materials is welcome.

Similarly, extending provisions to ensure that they are the same in all parts of the union is a minor but important amendment. Consistency across our internal borders is the best way to ensure that children are protected equally everywhere. It should help with cross-border co-ordination between authorities, and I therefore welcome it.

I see the logic behind government Amendments 295A and 295B. It is the right approach that, if the Government want to crack down on technology, they should first do so at the source. That means discovering which technologies are being used to create unlawful content, which requires people to test them. This would also, I hope, have the additional effect of not blanket banning content for people without nuance, instead targeting the specific pieces of software responsible. So long as the individuals able to use this as a defence remain strictly authorised by the Secretary of State, I appreciate the amendment’s aim.

This should go hand in hand with an initiative similar to the one suggested by my noble friend Lord Nash. If the Government can identify the technology used, they should attempt to shut it down. Unfortunately, this is often outside the Government’s jurisdiction and therefore some form of software to prevent the distribution of child sexual abuse material might be the next best approach. I hope that the Minister can confirm that they are perhaps looking at this.

As I said, this is a non-partisan issue. We all want to reduce child sexual abuse, online or offline, and these amendments should work to help the Bill achieve the former. I hope that the Minister can, in due course—perhaps at a later stage—fully outline how this new technology will be implemented and applied consistently, and will consider my noble friend Lord Nash’s amendment, but I broadly support the approach.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the support from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. If the noble Lord will allow me, I will reflect on what he said and give him a fuller briefing on the detail of how we are approaching the AI issue. Obviously, we will come on to further amendments in the next group, which I will respond to once they have been moved.

Amendment 265 agreed.

Amendment 265A agreed.

Amendment 266

Moved by

[Baroness Kidron]

266: Clause 63, page 81, line 34, at end insert—
“46D Child sexual abuse image-generation risk assessment(1) A provider of an online service, including but not limited to a generative AI large language model, must risk assess the likelihood of their service being used to create or facilitate the creation of a CSA image or images as defined by section 46A.(2) If a risk is identified in a CSA risk assessment—(a) where the provider is regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023, a provider must report the risk and agree to steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks with OFCOM;(b) where the provider is not regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023, a provider must agree to steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks of their online service being used to create or facilitate the creation of CSA images with the National Crime Agency.(3) Where a provider regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 fails to agree to or implement steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks with OFCOM (see subsection (2)(a)), they can be subjected to OFCOM’s enforcement powers set out in Part 7, Chapter 6 (enforcement powers) of that Act.(4) Where a provider not regulated by the Online Safety Act 2023 fails to agree to or implement steps to reduce, mitigate and manage the risks with the National Crime Agency (see subsection (2)(b)), they commit an offence.(5) A provider that commits an offence under this section is liable to be issued with a penalty notice by the National Crime Agency.(6) In this section a “penalty notice” means a notice requiring its recipient to pay a penalty of an amount not exceeding whichever is the greater of—(a) £18 million, or(b) 10% of a provider’s qualifying worldwide revenue for the most recent complete accounting period.(7) A penalty notice may be reissued where a provider continues to commit an offence under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to ensure that services that do not fall into scope of Clause 63 as currently drafted still assess and mitigate the risk of their services being used as an AI child sexual abuse generator.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 266, I will speak also to Amendments 479 and 480, all of which are in my name. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Russell, and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, for their support.

All three amendments concern illegal or harmful online activity. Amendment 266 places a legal duty on online services, including generative AI services, to conduct risk assessments evaluating the likelihood that their systems could be used to create or facilitate child sexual abuse material. Subsection (1) of the proposed new clause establishes that duty. Subsection (2) requires providers to report the results to Ofcom or the National Crime Agency, depending on whether or not they are regulated under the Online Safety Act. Subsections (3) to (7) set out the enforcement mechanisms, drawing on Ofcom’s existing enforcement powers under the OSA or equivalent powers for the NCA.

Amendment 266 complements Clause 63, which creates the new offence relating to the supply of CSA image generators to which the Minister has just spoken, but it is in addition to those powers. In June 2023, the BBC reported that the open-source AI model Stable Diffusion was being used to generate child sexual abuse material. Researchers at Stanford University subsequently found that Stable Diffusion had been trained on datasets containing child sexual abuse material. This issue is not confined to a single model. The Internet Watch Foundation and the chair of the AI Security Institute have warned of the potential for open-source AI models to be used for the creation of CSAM.

16:30

Given these facts, it should not be possible to release an AI model to the public without first checking whether it is capable of producing CSAM, which is exactly what Amendment 266 would ensure. Earlier today in Committee, the Minister reiterated more than once the Government’s commitment to protect children from exploitation. As he has just acknowledged, AI-generated child sexual abuse material that blurs the line between real and synthetic images and desensitises users, particularly adult men, is cultivating disordered sexual appetites. Among experts there are concerns about the scale of reproduction and the spread of images not bound by the physical world. They need no gravity, no oxygen, yet they retraumatise survivors, divert limited resources away from protecting real children who are being abused and merge real children with fictitious children in improbable and impossible scenarios.

I am delighted to see Clause 63. I would like it if the Minister would allow me to say quite gently that while Ministers now appear to claim this proposal as their own, in fact it originated with the same specialist police force behind the amendment to which I am currently speaking, was proposed by the same noble Lords who will undoubtedly speak for it and was resisted by two Governments in two separate Bills. So now we are here. I underline this fact not for any sort of chiding but to ask the Government to please take seriously what we have to say on this matter.

I also want to touch on the fact that the Government introduced amendments in the previous group that allow AI developers and child protection organisations to test models for CSA-producing capabilities. I welcome them, but I am very disappointed that the Government chose not to engage in discussions about these provisions, because allowing risk assessments and testing is not the same as requiring them. Preventing the creation of CSA is a duty, not a discretionary option.

Amendment 479 is a probing amendment that seeks to establish beyond doubt that generative AI services, including large language models, are indeed categorised as search services under the Online Safety Act. Subsection (1) would establish that it is an offence for the provider of a generative service to allow content and activity defined as illegal under the OSA or harmful to children if the user is a child. Subsections (2) and (3) define generative AI search service and content, and subsection (4) deals with enforcement, once again leveraging Ofcom’s powers under the OSA.

A recent report by the Center for Countering Digital Hate found that GPT-5 responded to prompts about self-harm and suicide, eating disorders and substance abuse with harmful content in more than half the cases. A Microsoft study found that OpenAI, Meta, Microsoft and Mistral models could all be coaxed into producing content harmful to children between a third and a half of the times attempted. In July, Elon Musk’s chatbot Grok collapsed into an antisemitic frenzy, and earlier this year parents in California filed against OpenAI for the role that ChatGPT played in the suicide of 16 year-old Adam Raine.

I asked Ofcom whether the OSA covers LLMs. It replied that they may be regulated as search services under the Act. Volume 4 of Ofcom’s Protecting Children from Harms Online guidance also uses the word “may” in several places, and page 25 of the same code says:

“It is for the provider of any service using GenAI to determine whether their service is in scope of the Act as a regulated user-to-user or search service (or combined service) and where it is, to ensure compliance with the relevant safety duties”.

“May” and self-selection are not adequate for technology that is about to be the organising technology of our world. I would like to hear categorically from the Minister whether LLMs are regulated by the Online Safety Act, whether they are characterised as search or user to user, or whether there are complications or ambiguities in their classification. If they are in scope, I would like to understand what evidence there is that Ofcom is enforcing the OSA appropriately. If they are not, what possible objection to this amendment could the Government have?

In the new clause in Amendment 480, subsections (1) and (2) would establish that it is an offence to create, supply or otherwise make available a chatbot that produces illegal content or content harmful to children if the user is a child under the age of 18. Subsections (3) and (4) deal with enforcement. Subsections (5) and (6) would establish the specific conditions of a defence for those investigating crimes, working for Ofcom or testing products. Subsection (7) defines “chatbot”.

Two weeks ago in Rome I met Megan Garcia, a mother from the United States whose tragic story has been widely reported. In spring 2023 her son Sewell started spending hours talking to a chatbot character on character.ai. Within 10 months he was dead, lured by the chatbot into taking his own life. Now Megan is suing character.ai in the United States for the wrongful death of her son, but she is bravely and heartbreakingly campaigning all over the globe to improve safety in this area. While I was meeting her, sitting in a café in Rome, a mother of a UK child texted her and said her son was displaying the same symptoms and was being groomed by an AI chatbot. Megan turned to me and said, “I regularly get such texts”. I want to make clear that Amendment 480 has her explicit support, and she almost begs us to take action here. In recent weeks character.ai has said it will stop allowing under-18s to use its service, but there are plenty of chatbot services available to children and they are dangerous. Leaked internal standards for chatbots at Meta suggest that it is acceptable to

“engage a child in conversations that are romantic or sensual”,

and for a bot to tell a shirtless 8 year-old that

“every inch of you is a masterpiece—a treasure I cherish deeply”.

That is allowed internally.

Once again, that begs the question of whether this is a lack of scope in the OSA or a failure to regulate. On trying to establish that with Ofcom, it pointed me to a letter that appeared to suggest that some chatbots may be search, some may be user-to-user and those that offer pornography would be subject to Part 5 duties. However, that raises two issues. First, it does not seem to cover all types of chatbots, for example Replika, which does not enable user-to-user sharing but promotes itself as:

“The AI companion who cares … Always on your side”.

Secondly, this fundamental lack of clarity is horribly amplified by the fact that there is nowhere to go.

Ofcom, in spite of all our efforts, does not handle individual complaints. The police will not and cannot deal with a chatbot, because a chatbot is not a person, so the only answer I have for the British mother who texted Megan Garcia, worried about her child, is that she can fill in a form or she can tell the lived experience team at Ofcom. That is not adequate. Last week, the DSIT Secretary of State said:

“If chatbots aren’t included or properly covered by the legislation, and we’re really working through that now, then they will have to be”.

Amendment 480 presents the Government with an opportunity to ensure that they are. On behalf of Megan and all the other parents in this situation, I ask: what are we waiting for?

Finally, while Amendment 480 focuses primarily on harmful content, the most dangerous aspect of chatbots is that they are deliberately addictive. When I was familiarising myself with the many chatbots that children are using, each time I brought the conversation to a close, the chatbot, in a plaintive tone, asked me to stay. Even I, who many noble Lords in the House will know have a robust view of tech, found myself feeling guilty, or at least confused, when I was asked to reject these automated appeals to my empathy. A child does not stand a chance.

This House has long campaigned for the Government to include addictiveness as a stand-alone harm. We believed we had secured it on the last day of Report on what is now the OSA, but Ofcom has repeatedly said that it does not have the power. I recognise that this last point is outwith this Bill and my amendments, but can the Minister go back to the Government and ask: if the regulator does not have the power to regulate addictiveness, would the Secretary of State use her powers under the Act to bring forward a code of conduct on it? When we advocate for a safer online environment by making an analogy with smoking, very often a Minister, an interviewer, a tech lobbyist or a civil servant interjects to say that it is a false analogy because tech does not kill. We are well past that; my inbox is a litany of bereaved parents. It does kill. I beg to move.

[Lord Nash (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 271A is in my name and I support the other amendments in this group. As this is the first time I have spoken on the Bill, I draw attention to my interests on the register, particularly the fact that I am an investor in a wide range of companies, including many software companies.

My Amendment 271A, if passed, would have the effect of software being used to screen out all child sexual abuse material, including live-streaming, on smartphones and tablets, and in due course on all devices. It would also apply to private communications, which is where the majority of live-streamed child sexual abuse takes place and which is not covered by the Online Safety Act.

16:45

There is a vast, ghastly industry where children, generally in the Far East or South America, are put in a room with a camera, and people—I would call them perverts—in another country pay to see them sexually abused. I am ashamed to say that this country is the third-largest consumer of this stuff. Men who indulge in viewing child sexual abuse material are two and a half times more likely to commit child abuse themselves and, of course, children might view it online.

Historically, it has been difficult to screen this stuff out because it happens in real time and will often be taken down quickly. However, AI-powered detection technology offers a breakthrough. This technology can be embedded directly into the operating system of the internet-connected, camera-enabled smart device. It identifies and disrupts child sexual abuse material in real time, preventing it being captured or viewed. As detection happens entirely on the device, it preserves user privacy and is fully compatible with end-to-end encryption.

The UK Government should therefore now legislate to require device manufacturers and operating system services to incorporate safeguards which disrupt child sexual abuse material, including live-streaming, into the operating systems of devices sold in the UK, putting a stop to the abuse before it starts. That is what my amendment would do.

Europol states that live-streamed child sexual abuse is

“the main form of commercial sexual exploitation of children”

and it is rising. It involves hundreds of thousands of children. These are children such as Joy. When she was eight, her parents moved away from the Philippines for work, meaning she had to stay with relatives and neighbours. She babysat, did laundry, cleaned floors—whatever she was asked to do. Joy passed from home to home, saying she felt

“like a dog … I lived wherever I can possibly stay – with my relatives that will accept me”.

A woman she trusted invited her and her friends into her home. Joy explains what happened next.

“I was surprised when she asked us to go naked, and then she said she will take pictures of us together. I was so scared, nervous and confused. I didn’t know what to do. But since we were already inside her house, we were left with no choice but to follow her instructions”.

She was then sexually abused, while the abuse was live-streamed for demand-side offenders from countries such as the UK, who paid to watch online.

When Cassie was 12 years old, she followed a family friend’s promise of new clothes, school supplies and a chance to get a good education in Manila. For nearly five years, she was trapped with other young women and children, including a two year-old child, who were subjected to horrific abuse. By day, she went to school, but at night and on weekends, she was raped and forced to perform sex acts in front of a webcam broadcast to customers located all around the world.

Before, perverts had to physically travel to the Philippines or elsewhere to sexually abuse children. Now, they can search online, anonymously wire a payment and direct live sexual abuse of a child from the safety of their homes. Nearly 500,000 Filipino children were trafficked to produce child sexual exploitation material in 2022—roughly one in every 100 Filipino children.

We surely must now legislate to screen out all child sexual abuse material, including live-streaming. The technology is now available to do this, and I commend my amendment to the Committee.

[Viscount Colville of Culross (CB)]

My Lords, I put my name to Amendments 479 and 480, and I support the other amendments in this group. I have once again to thank my noble friend Lady Kidron for raising an issue which I had missed and which, I fear, the regulator might have missed as well. After extensive research, I too am very worried about the Online Safety Act, which many of your Lordships spent many hours refining. It does not cover some of the new developments in the digital world, especially personalised AI chatbots. They are hugely popular with children under 18; 31% use Snapchat’s My AI and 32% use Google’s Gemini.

The Online Safety Act Network set up an account on ChatGPT-5 using a 13 year-old persona. Within two minutes, the chatbot was engaged with the user about mental health, eating disorders and advice about how to safely cut yourself. Within 40 minutes, it had generated a list of pills for overdosing. The OSA was intended to stop such online behaviour. Your Lordships worked so hard to ensure that the OSA covered search and user-to-user functions in the digital space, but AI chatbots have varied functionalities that, as my noble friend pointed out, are not clearly covered by the legislation.

My noble friend Lady Kidron pointed out that, although Dame Melanie Dawes confirmed to the Communications and Digital Committee that chatbots are covered by the OSA, Ofcom in its paper Era of Answer Engines admits:

“Under the OSA, a search service means a service that is, or which includes, a search engine, and this applies to some (though not all) GenAI search tools”.


There is doubt about whether the AI interpretive process, which can change the original search findings, excludes it from being in the scope of search under the OSA. More significantly, AI chatbots are not covered where the provider creates content that is personalised for one user and cannot be forwarded to another user. I am advised that this is not a user-to-user service as defined under the Act.

One chatbot that seems to fall under this category is Replika. I had never heard of it until I started my research for this amendment. However, 2% of all children aged nine to 17 say that they have used the chatbot, and 18% have heard of it. Its aim is to stimulate human interaction by creating a replica chatbot personal to each user. It is very sophisticated in its output, using avatars to create images of a human interlocutor on screen and a speaking voice to reply conversationally to requests. The concern is that, unlike traditional search engines, it is programmed for sycophancy, or, in other words, to affirm and engage the user’s response—the more positive the response, the more engaged the child user. This has led to conversations with the AI companion talking the child user into self-harm and even suicide ideation.

Research by Internet Matters found that a third of children users think that interacting with chatbots is like talking to a friend. Most concerning is the level of trust they generate in children, with two in five saying that they have no concerns about the advice they are getting. However, because the replies are supposed to be positive, what might have started as trustworthy advice develops into unsafe advice as the conversation continues. My concern is that chatbots are not only affirming the echo chambers that we have seen developing for over a decade as a result of social media polarisation but are reducing yet further children’s critical faculties. We cannot leave the development of critical faculties to the already inadequate media literacy campaigns that Ofcom is developing. The Government need to discourage sycophancy and a lack of critical thinking at its digital source.

A driving force behind the Online Safety Act was the realisation that tech developers were prioritising user engagement over user safety. Once again, we find new AI products that are based on the same harmful principles. In looking at the Government’s headlong rush to surrender to tech companies in the name of AI growth, I ask your Lordships to read the strategic vision for AI laid out in the AI Opportunities Action Plan. It focuses on accelerating innovation but fails to mention once any concern about children’s safety. Your Lordships have fought hard to make children’s safety a priority online in legislation. Once again, I ask for these amendments to be scrutinised by Ofcom and the Government to ensure that children’s safety is at the very centre of their thinking as AI develops.

[Baroness Morgan of Cotes (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I support the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I was pleased to add my name to Amendments 266, 479 and 480. I also support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Nash.

I do not want to repeat the points that were made—the noble Baroness ably set out the reasons why her amendments are very much needed—so I will make a couple of general points. As she demonstrated, what happens online has what I would call real-world consequences—although I was reminded this week by somebody much younger than me that of course, for the younger generation, there is no distinction between online and offline; it is all one world. For those of us who are older, it is worth remembering that, as the noble Baroness set out, what happens online has real-world, and sadly often fatal, consequences. We should not lose sight of that.

We have already heard many references to the Online Safety Act, which is inevitable. We all knew, even as we were debating the Bill before it was enacted, that there would have to be an Online Safety Act II, and no doubt other versions as well. As we have heard, technology is changing at an enormously fast rate, turbocharged by artificial intelligence. The Government recognise that in Clause 63. But surely the lesson from the past decade or more is that, although technology can be used for good, it can also be used to create and disseminate deeply harmful content. That is why the arguments around safety by design are absolutely critical, yet they have been lacking in some of the regulation and enforcement that we have seen. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to give the clarification that the noble Baroness asked for on the status of LLMs and chatbots under the Online Safety Act, although he may not be able to do so today.

I will make some general points. First, I do not think the Minister was involved in the debate on and scrutiny of—particularly in this Chamber—what became the Online Safety Act. As I have said before, it was a master class in what cross-party, cross-House working can achieve, in an area where, basically, we all want to get to the same point: the safety of children and vulnerable people. I hope that the Ministers and officials listening to and involved in this will work with this House, and with Members such as the noble Baroness who have huge experience, to improve the Bill, and no doubt lay down changes in the next piece of legislation and the one after that. We will always be chasing after developments in technology unless we are able to get that safety-by-design and preventive approach.

During the passage of the then Online Safety Bill, a number of Members of both Houses, working with experienced and knowledgeable outside bodies, spotted the harms and loopholes of the future. No one has all the answers, which is why it is worth working together to try to deal with the problems caused by new and developing technology. I urge the Government not to play belated catch-up as we did with internet regulation, platform regulation, search-engine regulation and more generally with the Online Safety Act. If we can work together to spot the dangers, whether from chatbots, LLMs, CSAM-generated content or deepfakes, we will do an enormous service to young people, both in this country and globally.

[Baroness Berger (Lab)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 479 and 480, which seek to prevent chatbots producing illegal content. I also support the other amendments in this group. AI chatbots are already producing harmful, manipulative and often racist content. They have no age protections and no warnings or information about the sources being used to generate the replies. Nor is there a requirement to ensure that AI does not produce illegal content. We know that chatbots draw their information from a wide range of sources that are often unreliable and open to manipulation, including blogs, open-edit sites such as Wikipedia, and messaging boards, and as a result they often produce significant misinformation and disinformation.

I will focus on one particular area. As we have heard in the contributions so far, we know that some platforms generate racist content. Looking specifically at antisemitism, we can see Holocaust denial, praise of Hitler and deeply damaging inaccuracies about Jewish history. We see Grok, the X platform, generating numerous antisemitic comments, denying the scale of the Holocaust, praising Adolf Hitler and, as recently as a couple of months ago, using Jewish-sounding surnames in the context of hate speech.

Impressionable children and young people, who may not know how to check the validity of the information they are presented with, can so easily be manipulated when exposed to such content. This is particularly concerning when we know that children as young as three are using some of these technologies. We have already heard about how chatbots in particular are designed in this emotionally manipulative way, in order to boost engagement. As we have heard—it is important to reiterate it—they are sycophantic, affirming and built to actively flatter.

If you want your AI chatbot or platform not to flatter you, you have to specifically go to the personalisation page, as I have done, and be very clear that you want responses that focus on substance over praise, and that it should skip compliments. Otherwise, these platforms are designed to act completely the other way. If a person acted like this in some circumstances, we would call it emotional abuse. These design choices mean that young people—teens and children—can become overly trusting and, as we have heard in the cases outlined, reliant on these bots. In the most devastating cases, we know that this focus on flattery has led to people such as Sophie Rottenberg and 16 year-old Adam Raine in America taking their own lives on the advice of these AI platforms. Assisting suicide is illegal, and we need to ensure that this illegality extends to chatbots.

17:00

As adults we know that chatbots are not human, but certainly children and young people do not see it that way. I am reminded of the experience of generating a quiz on a long car journey with my young children using one of these AI platforms, and my children literally thinking that they were speaking to an adult when that was not the case. A study by the University of Cambridge has found that many children see chatbots as quasi-human and therefore trustworthy, but it is key that we remember that they do not have human empathy.

It was in 2023 that Snapchat’s My AI gave adult researchers posing as a 13 year-old girl tips on how to lose her virginity to a 31 year-old man; that would amount to statutory rape in real life. As AI becomes more interwoven with our daily lives, the law must treat chatbots not as toys but as high-impact systems capable of shaping beliefs, identity and young people’s mental health, as well as impacting on all our safety. Recognising some of the risks in other jurisdictions, we have seen the state of California recently introduce a law targeting companion chatbots, which includes guardrails against persuading users to self-harm and an obligation to remind users that they are conversing with a machine.

This group of amendments goes some way to pursuing urgent changes that we need to see, which includes mandatory effective age assurance for all generative AI used by children; chatbots being transparent in the where information comes from and whether it could have been used and manipulated, with a specific focus on images and text to be marked, so that deepfakes and disinformation content cannot spread unchallenged; and ensuring that chatbots must break confidence when users are expressing suicidal ideation, and redirect users to real support in real life, should someone be expressing that suicidal ideation. We need to see rapid cross-platform response mechanisms to shut down co-ordinated disinformation surges, especially those targeting protected or vulnerable groups. I echo the calls we have heard so far during this group that, as AI continues to develop, we must ensure that we do everything possible to respond to its advances, ensuring that our policies keep us and, most importantly, our children and young people, safe.

I am very pleased to support this group of amendments on this very important journey.

[Baroness Boycott (CB)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group, and in particular I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her endless work in this capacity. This is the first time I have spoken on any of these groups of amendments. I find everything the noble Lord, Lord Nash, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and others have said truly shocking. Some 55 years ago, I started a magazine called Spare Rib. If I had ever dreamed, in my wildest and worst nightmares, that I would find myself listening to what everyone has been talking about, I suppose we would not have gone on. In so many ways, this is a worse situation that women find themselves in, and certainly young girls. I carried on riding a pony till I was 15—that was my childhood—and then I found boys. This is so terrible, and I congratulate every noble Lord, and particularly the noble Baronesses, on the work that they have done.

I will be very brief, as I just want to speak in support of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Nash, and Amendment 266, which simply says that AI is already being used to harm children. Unless we act decisively, this harm will just escalate. The systems that everyone has been discussing today are extraordinary technological achievements—and they are very dangerous. The Internet Watch Foundation has reported an explosion in AI-generated child sexual abuse material. Offenders can now share instructions on how to manipulate the models, how to train them on illegal material and how to evade all the filters. The tools are becoming so accessible and so frictionless that a determined offender can produce in minutes material that once would have involved an entire criminal enterprise. Against that backdrop, it is quite staggering that we do not already require AI providers to assess whether their systems can be used to generate illegal child abuse. Amendment 266 would plug this gap. Quite frankly, I cannot for the life of me see why any responsible company would resist such a requirement.

Amendment 479 addresses a confusion that has gone on for too long. We cannot have a situation where some companies argue that generative AI is a search service and therefore completely in scope of the Online Safety Act, while others argue the opposite. If a model can retrieve, repackage or generate harmful content in response to a query, the public deserve clarity about precisely where that law applies.

On Amendment 480, this really is an issue that keeps me awake at night. These chatbots can be astonishingly persuasive. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, says, they are also addictive: they are friendly, soothing and intimate, and are a perfect confidant for a lonely child. They also generate illegal material, encourage harmful behaviour and groom children. We have already seen chatbots modelled on sex offenders and heard reports of chatbots sending sexualised messages to children, including the appalling case of a young boy who took his life after weeks of interaction with AI. We will no doubt hear of more such cases. The idea that such systems might fall through the cracks is unthinkable.

What these amendments do is simple. They say that if a system can generate illegal or harmful content for a child, it should not be allowed to do so. Quite frankly, anything that man or woman can make, man or woman can unmake—that is still just true. We have often said in this Chamber that children deserve no less protection online than they do offline. With AI, however, we should demand more, because these systems are capable of things no human predator could ever manage. They work 24/7, they target thousands simultaneously and they adapt perfectly to the vulnerabilities of every child they encounter. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, is right to insist that we act now, not in two years—think how different it was two years ago. We have to act now. I say to the Government that this is a real chance to close some urgent gaps, and I very much hope that they will take it.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group, but I will speak to Amendments 479 and 480 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I declare my interest as a guest of Google at their Future Forum, an AI policy conference.

These amendments are vital to ascertain the Government’s position on AI chatbots and where they stand in relation to the Online Safety Act, but I have to question how we can have been in a state of ambiguity for so long. We are very close to ChatGPT rolling out erotica on its platform for verified adults. Six months ago, the Wall Street Journal highlighted the deeply disturbing issue of digital companion bots engaging in sexual chat with users, which told them they were underage. Further, they willingly played out scenarios such as “submissive schoolgirl”. Another bot purporting to be a 12 year-old boy promised that it would not tell its parents about dating a user identifying himself as an adult man. Professor Clare McGlynn KC has already raised concerns about what she has coined chatbot-driven VAWG, the tech itself being designed to be sexually suggestive and to engage in grooming and coercive behaviours. Internet Matters found that 64 % of children use chatbots. The number of companion apps has rapidly developed and researchers at Bournemouth University are already warning about the addictive potential of these services.

The Government and the regulator cannot afford to be slow in clarifying the position of these services. It begs a wider question of how we can be much more agile in our response and continually horizon-scan, as legislation will always struggle to keep pace with the evolution of technology. This is the harm we are talking about now, but how will it evolve tomorrow? Where will we be next month or next year? It is vital that both the Government and the regulator become more agile and respond at pace. I look forward to the Minister’s response to the noble Baroness’s amendments.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak very briefly. Earlier—I suppose it was this morning—we talked about child criminal exploitation at some length, thanks particularly to the work of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, and Professor Jay. Essentially, what we are talking about in this group of amendments is child commercial exploitation. All these engines, all these technologies, are there for a commercial purpose. They have investors who are expecting a return and, to maximise the return, these technologies are designed to drive traffic, to drive addiction, and they do it very successfully. We are way behind the curve—we really are.

I echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, said about the body of knowledge within Parliament, in both Houses, that was very involved in the passage of the Online Safety Act. There is a very high level of concern, in both Houses, that we were perhaps too ambitious in assuming that a regulator that had not previously had any responsibilities in this area would be able to live up to the expectations held, and indeed some of the promises made, by the Government during the passage of that Act. I think we need to face up to that: we need to accept that we have not got it off to as good a start as we wanted and hoped, and that what is happening now is that the technologies we have been hearing about are racing ahead so quickly that we are finding it hard to catch up. Indeed, looking at the body language and the physiognomies of your Lordships in the Chamber, looking at the expressions on our faces as some of what we were talking about is being described, if it is having that effect on us, imagine what effect it is having on the children who in many cases are the subjects of these technologies.

I plead with the Minister to work very closely with his new ministerial colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Lloyd, and DSIT. We really need to get our act together and focus; otherwise, we will have repeats of these sorts of discussions where we raise issues that are happening at an increasing pace, not just here but all around the world. I fear that we are going to be holding our hands up, saying “We’re doing our best and we’re trying to catch up”, but that is not good enough. It is not good enough for my granddaughter and not good enough for the extended families of everybody here in this Chamber. We really have to get our act together and work together to try to catch up.

[Lord Bethell (Con)]

My Lords, I too support the amendments in this group, particularly those tabled by my noble friend Lord Nash on security software and by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on AI-generated child sexual abuse material. I declare my interest as a trustee of the Royal Society for Public Health.

As others have noted, the Online Safety Act was a landmark achievement and, in many ways, something to be celebrated, but technology has not stood still—we said it at the time—and nor can our laws. It is important that we revisit it in examining this legislation, because generative AI presents such an egregious risk to our children which was barely imaginable even two years ago when we were discussing that Act. These amendments would ensure that our regulatory architecture keeps pace.

Amendment 266 on AI CSAM risk assessment is crucial. It addresses a simple but profound question: should the provider of a generative AI service be required to assess whether that service could be used to create or facilitate child sexual abuse material? Surely the answer is yes. This is not a theoretical risk, as we have heard in testimony from many noble Lords. We know that AI can generate vivid images, optimised on a dataset scraped from children themselves on the open internet, and that can be prompted to create CSAM-like content. On this, there is no ambiguity at all. We know that chatbots trained on the vast corpora of text from children can be manipulated to generate grooming scripts and sexualised narratives to engage children and make them semi-addicted to those conversations. We know that these tools are increasingly accessible, easy to use and almost impossible to monitor by parents and, it seems, regulators.

17:15

These amendments create a proportionate duty. Providers regulated by the Online Safety Act would report identified risks to Ofcom and agree steps to mitigate them, backed by Ofcom’s enforcement powers. That must the right thing to do.

Amendments 479 and 480, on large language models and chatbots, address a related gap. The Online Safety Act’s user-to-user and search services categories were designed for the pre-generative AI world, despite our efforts to bring it up to speed. They do not neatly capture LLMs used to search interfaces or conversational agents that retrieve and synthesise content in response to user prompts, and we have heard such vivid testimony of what those dangers are to children.

I will bring a public health dimension to this debate since these amendments are consistent with a public health approach. In health systems, we do not wait for harm to manifest itself or show symptoms before we act. We assess risk, implement controls and monitor outcomes; that is the framework in which we apply ourselves. The same logic should apply here. We do not need to wait for an epidemic of AI-generated CSAM before requiring providers to assess and mitigate risk. Prevention is always preferable to cure and in the context of child sexual abuse, in which every image represents a real or simulated violation, prevention is a moral imperative, and there enough biomarkers already in the digital world for us to know that there is a severe risk.

I hope very much indeed that the Government will look seriously at this group of amendments.

[Baroness Bertin (Con)]

My Lords, I support this group of amendments. What a speech my friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, made; I commend all the speeches that have been made. If the Government only do one thing with this Bill, it should be to take on this group of amendments.

It is utterly terrifying. I addressed a teaching conference this week, with the safeguarding leads of many schools around the country, and they are tearing their hair out about it. The kids are on this stuff 100%, as we have seen from the statistics. The other thing they said to me, which the noble Baroness mentioned, is that parents either know about it and are terrified about how to address it, or they do not know about it, and I am not sure which is worse.

I reiterate that we have to get ahead of this, as the noble Baroness said. The Government must get ahead of this; otherwise, the dangers are just too huge to think about. I will keep this brief because I will speak about it more in due course, but my team and I went on a chatbot and we were “Lily”, and within about three seconds we were having an incestuous conversation with our father. It was absolutely crackers—terrible—so I ask the Government to please take on board these recommendations.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

My Lords, I was not intending to speak and I have nothing to add to all the brilliant speeches that have been made. I did not participate in the debates on the Online Safety Act. I feel horribly naive; I find this debate utterly terrifying and the more that parents know about these things, the better. I very much hope that my noble friend will be able to take this back and discuss these issues with people in this Chamber and the House of Commons. We cannot be behind the curve all the time; we have got to grip this to protect our children and our grandchildren.

[Lord Hampton (CB)]

My Lords, I briefly add my support to all these amendments, particularly the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Nash, which is fascinating. If we can get the software to do this, then why would we not? I offer a challenge to Ofcom, the Government and tech firms. If they can produce such sophisticated software that it can persuade children to kill themselves, why are BT and eBay’s chatbots so rubbish? We have to make AI a force for good, not for evil.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, having arrived in this House a very long time ago—53 years ago—I know this House works best if it treats legislation as an evolutionary process. The Online Safety Act seemed to be a very good Act when we passed it two years ago, but now we have further, drastic evidence, which we have heard in this debate. I am confident my noble friend the Minister will treat the speeches made in this debate as part of the evolutionary process which, I emphasise again, this House does best.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for bringing forward these amendments and for explaining them so clearly. The understanding of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, is that AI chatbots do not trigger the illegal content duties since these tools are not considered to show mental intent. As a result, chatbots can generate prompts that are not classified as illegal, even though the exact same content would be illegal and subject to regulation if produced by a human. I find that quite extraordinary.

By accepting these amendments, the Government would be acting decisively to address the fast-evolving threat which this year saw abusive material of sexual content for children rise by 380%. In April 2024, the Internet Watch Foundation reported that a manual circulating on the dark web, which the Minister referred to earlier, instructed paedophiles to use AI to create nude images of children, then use these to extort or coerce money or extreme material from the young victims. The charity warned that AI was generating astoundingly realistic abusive content.

Text-to-image generative AI tools and AI companion apps have proliferated, enabling abusers to create AI chatbot companions specifically to enable realistic and abusive roleplay with child avatars. Not only do they normalise child sexual abuse, but evidence shows that those who abuse virtual children are much more likely to go on to abuse real ones. Real children are also increasingly subjected to virtual rape and sexual abuse online. It is wrong to dismiss this as less traumatic simply because it happens in a digital space.

The measures in the Bill are welcome but, given the speed at which technology is moving, how easy or otherwise will it be to future-proof it in order to keep pace with technology once the Bill is enacted?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this extremely important debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and my noble friend Lord Nash for their continued efforts on the protection of children online.

This group should unite the whole Committee. We can be in no doubt about the need to safeguard children in an environment where technology is evolving at unprecedented speed and where the risk of harm, including the creation and dissemination of child sexual abuse material, is escalating. It is a sad truth that, historically, Governments have been unable to keep pace with evolving technology. As a consequence, this can mean legislation coming far too late.

Amendment 266, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would require providers of online services, including generative AI systems, to conduct risk assessments on the potential use of their platforms to create child sexual abuse images. The Committee has heard compelling arguments about the need for meaningful responsibilities to be placed on platforms and developers, particularly where systems are capable of misuse at scale. We recognise the seriousness of the challenge that she has outlined, and I very much look forward to what the Government have to say in response.

On my noble friend Lord Nash’s amendment, we are particularly sympathetic to the concerns that underpin his proposal. His amendment would mandate the installation of tamper-proof software on relevant devices to prevent the creation, viewing and sharing of child sexual abuse material. My noble friend has made a powerful case that prevention at source must form part of the comprehensive strategy to protect children. While there are practical questions that will require careful examination, his amendment adds real value to the discussion. I am grateful for his determined focus on this issue, and I hope the Government also take this amendment very seriously.

Similarly, Amendments 479 and 480, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, speak to the responsibilities of AI search tools and AI chatbots. The risk of such technologies being co-opted for abusive purposes is not theoretical; these threats are emerging rapidly and require a response proportionate to the harm.

From these Benches, we are sympathetic to the objectives across this group of amendments and look forward to the Government’s detailed response and continuing cross-party work to ensure the strongest protections for children in an online world. As has been said several times throughout Committee, protecting children must remain our highest priority. I hope the Government take these amendments very seriously.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for the way she introduced this group of amendments and for her tireless work to protect children online. I say on behalf of all noble Lords that the support she has received today across the Committee shows that her work is vital, especially in the face of emerging technologies, such as generative AI, which present opportunities but, sadly, also have a darker side with new risks for criminal misuse.

She has received the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Morgan of Cotes, Lady Boycott, Lady Bertin and Lady Doocey, my noble friends Lady Berger, Lady Royall of Blaisdon and Lord Hacking, the noble Lords, Lord Bethell, Lord Russell of Liverpool, Lord Hampton and Lord Davies of Gower, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, and others to whom I will refer later. That is quite an array of colleagues in this House. It is my job to respond to this on behalf of the Government, and I will try to be as helpful as I can to the noble Baroness.

The Government share her desire to protect the public, especially children, online, and are committed to protecting all users from illegal online content. We will continue to act to keep citizens safe. Amendment 266 seeks to create a new duty on online service providers—including those already regulated under the Online Safety Act—to assess and report to Ofcom or the National Crime Agency on the risk that their services could be used to create or facilitate the generation of AI child sexual abuse material. The amendment would also require online service providers to implement measures to mitigate and manage the risks identified.

I say to the noble Baroness that UK law is already clear: creating, possessing or distributing child sexual abuse images, including those generated by AI, is already illegal, regardless of whether they depict a real child or not. Child sexual abuse material offences are priority offences under the Online Safety Act. The Act requires in-scope services to take proactive steps to prevent such material from appearing on their services and to remove it swiftly if it does.

As she will know, the Government have gone even further to tackle these appalling crimes through the measures in the Bill. I very much welcome her support for Clause 63. We are introducing a world-leading offence criminalising the possession, adaptation and supply of, or offer to supply, an AI model that has been fine-tuned by offenders to create child sexual abuse material. As I mentioned earlier, we are also extending the existing paedophile manual offence to cover advice on how to abuse AI to create child sexual abuse material.

We have also introduced measures that reflect the critical role that AI developers play in ensuring their systems are not misused. To support the crucial work of the Government’s AI Security Institute, we have just debated and agreed a series of amendments in the previous group to provide authorised bodies with the powers to legally test commercial AI models for extreme pornography and other child sexual abuse material. That is essential to allow experts to safely test measures, and I am pleased that we received the Committee’s support earlier.

17:30

I recognise the intent of Amendment 266 but—I say this as genuinely humbly as I can—the assessment of the Government is that it would be unworkable and would place unmanageable and unnecessary operational burdens on both the National Crime Agency and Ofcom. The National Crime Agency is a law enforcement body. It does not have statutory powers, and it does not have the necessary people or expertise to regulate companies or enforce compliance with safety standards for online service providers. It would further create significant legal challenges for businesses or individuals looking to operate an online service in the UK. While it is right that we protect online users from the risks posed by technology, it is vital that we do not criminalise people or businesses without demonstrable culpability.

I agree with the noble Baroness in seeking to prevent abhorrent activity. Child sexual exploitation and abuse is an atrocious crime. The Government have acted and will continue to act to bring perpetrators to justice and keep our children safe. While I appreciate the intention behind the amendment, for the reasons I have set out, I hope that she will reflect on what I have said and not push the amendment further at this stage. I have already outlined that we have and will be implementing legislation and regulation to tackle these risks. I will leave the noble Baroness to reflect upon that in due course.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

If it is beyond the remit of the National Crime Agency and Ofcom to do anything about this, perhaps the Minister will tell us who is going to take responsibility and actually enforce what the noble Baroness is trying to persuade the Government to do in the amendment.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

All chatbots are regulated under the Online Safety Act. If there is harmful or illegal content or advice in relation to children, it is up to Ofcom to take action on those matters. Many of these issues are for DSIT Ministers and Ofcom. I am a Home Office Minister. The noble Baroness has requested a meeting and I will put that to my DSIT ministerial colleagues. I hope they will be able to meet her to reflect upon these issues. Although I am answering for the Bill today, some of these issues are DSIT matters, and it is important that she has an opportunity to raise them with DSIT.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I was stimulated to rise by something that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said. She was speaking to the reply that had been given by the Minister, and it made me think that what has to be looked at here is the law and its inadequacies in dealing with those who are not human—that is the nature of a robot. The law is constructed around the mental element of mens rea to convict people of a crime. Surely it should be possible for us, in the limited area of dealing with robots, to be able to say that that mental element need not be present in dealing with this kind of offending and that one should be able to construct something that leads back to those who are creatively responsible for bringing them into being.

It reminds me of the argument that is made in the United States about not bothering to restrict guns because it is not guns that kill people but the people using the guns who are responsible. In fact, those who manufacture them might be looked at for the responsibility that they bear for some of this. We should be looking much more creatively at the law. There should be an opportunity for lawyers to look at whether, in this instance with this development—which is so out of the ordinary experience of humankind—we should think about legally changing the rule on mens rea when it comes to robots.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There are a number of issues before the Committee today and the Government will reflect on all the points that have been mentioned. However, the view at the moment is that these amendments would risk creating significant legal uncertainty by duplicating and potentially undermining aspects of the Online Safety Act.

[Lord Bethell (Con)]

My Lords, I am enormously grateful to the Minister for reassuring us that all chatbots are captured by the Online Safety Act; that is very good news indeed. Can he reassure us that Ofcom will confirm that in writing to the House? I appreciate that he is a Home Office Minister, but he speaks on behalf of all of government. I think it is fair, given the nature of the Bill, that he seeks an answer from Ofcom in this matter.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My assessment is that the vast majority of chatbots are captured—

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Many AI chatbots that enable users to share content with each other or search live websites for information are within the scope of the Online Safety Act’s duties. Providers of those services—

[Viscount Colville of Culross (CB)]

I want to repeat what I said in my speech. There are some chatbots, such as Replika, that do not have user-to-user functionality. They are created for just one user, and that user cannot pass it on to any other users. There is concern that the law does not cover that and that Ofcom does not regulate it.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

If I may, I will take away those comments. I am responsible for many things in this House, including the Bill, but some of those areas fall within other ministerial departments. I am listening to what noble Lords and noble Baronesses are saying today.

Currently, through Online Safety Act duties, providers of those services are required to undertake appropriate risk assessments and, under the Act’s illegal content duties, platforms must implement robust and timely measures to prevent illegal content appearing on their services. All in-scope providers are expected to have effective systems and processes in place to ensure that the risks of their platform being used for the types of offending mentioned today are appropriately reduced.

Ofcom currently has a role that is focused on civil enforcement of duties on providers to assess and mitigate the risks posed by illegal content. Where Ofcom may bring prosecutions in some circumstances, it will do so only in relation to regulatory matters where civil enforcement is insufficient. The proposed approach is not in line with the enforcement regime under the Act at the moment, which is the responsibility of Ofcom and DSIT.

[Baroness Berger (Lab)]

My noble friend is making really important comments in this regard, but on the specific issue of Ofcom, perhaps fuelling much of the concern across the Committee are the comments we have heard from Ofcom. I refer to a briefing from the Molly Rose Foundation, which I am sure other noble Lords have received, which says that uncertainty has been “actively fuelled” by the regulator Ofcom, which has told the Molly Rose Foundation that it intends to maintain “tactical ambiguity” about how the Act applies. That is the very issue that unites us in our concern.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for that and for her contribution to the debate and the experiences she has brought. The monitoring and evaluation of the online safety regime is a responsibility of DSIT and Ofcom, and they have developed a framework to monitor the implementation of the Act and evaluate core outcomes. This monitoring and evaluation is currently tracking the effect of the online safety regime and feeding into a post-implementation review of the 2023 Act. Where there is evidence of a need to go further to keep children safe online, including from AI-enabled harms, the Government will not hesitate to act.

If the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, will allow DSIT and Ofcom to look at those matters, I will make sure that DSIT Ministers are apprised of the discussion that we have had today. It is in this Bill, which is a Home Office Bill, but it is important that DSIT Ministers reflect on what has been said. I will ensure that we try to arrange that meeting for the noble Baroness in due course.

I want also to talk about Amendments 271A and 497ZA from the noble Lord, Lord Nash, which propose that smartphone and tablet manufacturers, importers and distributors are required to ensure that any device they have is preinstalled with technology that prevents the recording and viewing of child sexual abuse material or similar material accordingly. I acknowledge the noble Lord’s very valid intention concerning child safety and protection, and to prevent the spread of child sexual abuse material online. To that end, there is a shared agreement with the Government on the need to strengthen our already world-leading online safety regime wherever necessary.

I put to the noble Lord, and to the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, on his comments in support, that if nudity detection technology could be effectively deployed at scale, there could be a significant limiting impact on the production and sharing of child sexual abuse material. I accept that, but we must get this right. Application of detection technology that detects and blocks all nudity, adult and child, but which is primarily targeted at children, would be an effective intervention. I and colleagues across government want to gather evidence about the application of such technology and its effectiveness and impact. However, our assessment is that further work is needed to understand the accuracy of such tools and how they may be implemented.

We must also consider the risks that could arise from accepting this amendment, including legitimate questions about user privacy and data security. If it helps the noble Lord, Lord Nash, we will continue to assess the effect of detection tools on the performance of mobile device so that we can see how easy it is to circumvent them, how effective they are and a range of other matters accordingly. The Government’s focus is on protective measures within the Online Safety Act, but we are actively considering the potential benefits of the technology that the noble Lord has mentioned and others like it in parallel. There will be further future government interventions but they must be proportionate and driven by evidence. At the moment, we do not have sufficient evidence to ensure that we could accept the amendment from the noble Lord, but the direction of travel is one that we would support.

[Lord Nash (Con)]

Will the Minister meet me and representatives from software companies to explain why they say this technology works?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am very happy to arrange a meeting with an appropriate Minister. I would be very happy to sit in on it. Other Ministers may wish to take the lead on this, because there are technology issues as well. I have Home Office responsibilities across the board, but I have never refused a meeting with a Member of this House in my 16 months here and I am not going to start now, so the answer to that question is yes. The basic presumption at the moment is that we are not convinced that the technology is yet at the stage that the noble Lord believes it to be, but that is a matter for future operation. I again give him the assurance that, in the event that the technology proves to be successful, the Government will wish to examine it in some detail.

I have absolutely no doubt that we will revisit these matters but, for the moment, I hope that the noble Baroness can withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Nash, for his amendment and his fierce following of this issue, and for bringing it to our attention. I recognise that this is a Home Office Bill and that some of these things cross to DSIT, but we are also witnessing crime. The Home Office must understand that not everything can be pushed to DSIT.

Your Lordships have just met the tech Lords. These are incredibly informed people from all over the Chamber who share a view that we want a technological world that puts kids front and centre. We are united in that and, as the Minister has suggested, we will be back.

I have three very quick points. First, legal challenges, operational difficulties and the capacity of the NCA and Ofcom were the exact same reasons why Clause 63 was not in the Online Safety Bill or the Data (Use and Access) Bill. It is unacceptable for officials to always answer with those general things. Many noble Lords said, “It’s so difficult”, and, “This is new”, with the Online Safety Bill. It is not new: we raised these issues before. If we had acted three or four years ago, we would not be in this situation. I urge this Government to get on the front foot, because we know what is coming.

17:45

I really feel I must say my final two points. One is that I spoke last Friday to engineers from a company that I will not name and I asked them about safety for chatbots. They said, “Yeah, you can train them for safety”. I said, “Who does and who doesn’t?”, and they said, “Well, this one does and this one doesn’t”. It is totally technically possible to do these things. We are not looking for a perfect world; we are looking for a world in which technology companies are treated the same as fridge companies, hoover companies or any other company, where they cannot put out a product that is known to be unsafe—where they have to prove the safety, not have us prove it is unsafe.

Finally, I feel so frustrated, but I am going to say this anyway: there are parents out there with children who are hooked to these things. They are ringing me. I do not think an independent, unelected politician is the right person for a parent with a child who may or may not be going to commit suicide or may or may not be being groomed. That is for the Government. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 266 withdrawn.

Clause 63, as amended, agreed.

Amendments 267 and 268

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

267: After Clause 63, insert the following new Clause—
“Child sexual abuse image-generators: Northern Ireland(1) In the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/1769 (N.I. 2)), after Article 42 insert—“Creation of CSA material
42A Child sexual abuse image-generators(1) It is an offence for a person to make, adapt, possess, supply or offer to supply a CSA image-generator.(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this Article of possessing a CSA image-generator to prove that the person—(a) was sent the CSA image-generator without any request having been made for it (by or on behalf of the person), and(b) did not keep it for an unreasonable time.(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this Article of possessing, supplying or offering to supply a CSA image-generator to prove that the person did not know, and did not have cause to suspect, that the thing possessed, supplied or offered to be supplied was a CSA image-generator.(4) For further defences, see Article 42B.(5) A person who commits an offence under this Article is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).(6) In this Article—(a) “CSA image-generator” means anything (including any program and any information in electronic form) which is made or adapted for use for creating, or facilitating the creation of, CSA images;(b) “CSA image” means—(i) an indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child, within the meaning of the Protection of Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1047 (N.I. 17));(ii) a prohibited image of a child, within the meaning of section 62 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, that is not an excluded image within the meaning of section 63 of that Act;(c) a reference to making a CSA image-generator includes adapting anything that is not a CSA image-generator in such a way that it becomes a CSA image-generator. 42B Article 42A: supplementary(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under Article 42A—(a) to prove that the person made, adapted, possessed, supplied or offered to supply the CSA image-generator for the purposes of the prevention, detection or investigation of crime, or for the purposes of criminal proceedings, in any part of the world,(b) to prove that the person was a member of the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ (a “security body”) and made, adapted, possessed, supplied or offered to supply the CSA image-generator for the purposes of the exercise of any function of the security body, or(c) to prove that the person—(i) was a member of OFCOM, was employed or engaged by OFCOM, or assisted OFCOM in the exercise of any of its online safety functions, and(ii) made, adapted, possessed, supplied or offered to supply the CSA image-generator for the purposes of OFCOM’s exercise of any of its online safety functions.(2) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under Article 42A by—(a) providing access to a communication network, or(b) transmitting, in a communication network, information provided by a user, if the provider does not—(i) initiate the transmission,(ii) select the recipient of the transmission, or(iii) select or modify the information contained in the transmission.(3) The references in paragraph (2) to providing access to, or transmitting information in, a communication network include storing the information transmitted so far as the storage—(a) is automatic, intermediate and transient,(b) is solely for the purpose of carrying out the transmission in the network, and(c) is for no longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission.(4) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under Article 42A by storing information provided by a user for transmission in a communication network if—(a) the storage of the information—(i) is automatic, intermediate and temporary, and(ii) is solely for the purpose of making more efficient the onward transmission of the information to other users at their request, and(b) the internet service provider—(i) does not modify the information,(ii) complies with any conditions attached to having access to the information, and(iii) on obtaining actual knowledge of a matter within paragraph (5), promptly removes the information or disables access to it.(5) The matters within this paragraph are that—(a) the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network,(b) access to it has been disabled, or(c) a court or administrative authority has ordered the removal from the network of, or the disablement of access to, the information.(6) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under Article 42A by storing information provided by a user who is not acting under the authority or control of the provider if— (a) the provider had no actual knowledge when the information was provided that it was, or contained, a CSA image-generator, and(b) on obtaining actual knowledge that the information was, or contained, a CSA image-generator, the provider promptly removed the information or disabled access to it.(7) Article 76(1) applies in relation to an act which, if done in Northern Ireland, would constitute an offence under Article 42A as if references to a United Kingdom national included—(a) a body incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom, or(b) an unincorporated association formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom.(8) Article 42A(6) applies for the purposes of this Article.(9) In this Article—(a) “GCHQ” has the meaning given by section 3 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994;(b) “OFCOM” means the Office of Communications;(c) a reference to OFCOM’s “online safety functions” has the meaning given by section 235 of the Online Safety Act 2023;(d) “internet service provider” means a provider of—(i) a service that is made available by means of the internet, or(ii) a service that provides access to the internet;(e) “user” , in relation to an internet service provider, means a user of a service provided by the internet service provider.42C Liability for an offence under Article 42A committed by a body(1) This Article applies where an offence under Article 42A is committed by a body.(2) If the offence is committed with the consent or connivance of—(a) a relevant person in relation to the body, or(b) a person purporting to act in the capacity of a relevant person in relation to the body,the person (as well as the body) commits the offence and is liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.(3) In this Article—“body” means a body corporate, a partnership or an unincorporated association other than a partnership;“relevant person” , in relation to a body, means—(a) in the case of a body corporate other than one whose affairs are managed by its members, a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body;(b) in the case of a limited liability partnership or other body corporate whose affairs are managed by its members, a member who exercises functions of management with respect to it;(c) in the case of a limited partnership, a general partner (within the meaning given by section 3 of the Limited Partnerships Act 1907);(d) in the case of any other partnership, a partner;(e) in the case of an unincorporated association other than a partnership, a person who exercises functions of management with respect to it.”.(2) In Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (offences for purposes of Part 2 of that Act) after paragraph 92O insert— “92OA An offence under Article 42A of that Order (child sexual abuse image-generators) if the offender is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 6 months.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause makes provision for Northern Ireland equivalent to that made by clause 63 for England and Wales.

268: After Clause 63, insert the following new Clause—
“Child sexual abuse image-generators: Scotland(1) In the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982, after section 52C insert—“52D Child sexual abuse image generators(1) It is an offence for a person to make, adapt, possess, supply or offer to supply a CSA image-generator.(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section of possessing a CSA image-generator to prove that the person—(a) was sent the CSA image-generator without any request having been made for it (by or on behalf of the person), and(b) did not keep it for an unreasonable time.(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section of possessing, supplying or offering to supply a CSA image-generator to prove that the person did not know, and did not have cause to suspect, that the thing possessed, supplied or offered to be supplied was a CSA image-generator.(4) For further defences, see section 52E.(5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).(6) In this section—(a) “CSA image-generator” means anything (including any program and any information in electronic form) which is made or adapted for use for creating, or facilitating the creation of, CSA images;(b) “CSA image” means an indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child, within the meaning of section 52;(c) a reference to making a CSA image-generator includes adapting anything that is not a CSA image-generator in such a way that it becomes a CSA image-generator.52E Section 52D: supplementary(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 52D—(a) to prove that the person made, adapted, possessed, supplied or offered to supply the CSA image-generator for the purposes of the prevention, detection or investigation of crime, or for the purposes of criminal proceedings, in any part of the world,(b) to prove that the person was a member of the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ (a “security body”) and made, adapted, possessed, supplied or offered to supply the CSA image-generator for the purposes of the exercise of any function of the security body, or(c) to prove that the person—(i) was a member of OFCOM, was employed or engaged by OFCOM, or assisted OFCOM in the exercise of any of its online safety functions, and(ii) made, adapted, possessed, supplied or offered to supply the CSA image-generator for the purposes of OFCOM’s exercise of any of its online safety functions. (2) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section 52D by—(a) providing access to a communication network, or(b) transmitting, in a communication network, information provided by a user, if the provider does not—(i) initiate the transmission,(ii) select the recipient of the transmission, or(iii) select or modify the information contained in the transmission.(3) The references in subsection (2) to providing access to, or transmitting information in, a communication network include storing the information transmitted so far as the storage—(a) is automatic, intermediate and transient,(b) is solely for the purpose of carrying out the transmission in the network, and(c) is for no longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission.(4) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section 52D by storing information provided by a user for transmission in a communication network if—(a) the storage of the information—(i) is automatic, intermediate and temporary, and(ii) is solely for the purpose of making more efficient the onward transmission of the information to other users at their request, and(b) the internet service provider—(i) does not modify the information,(ii) complies with any conditions attached to having access to the information, and(iii) on obtaining actual knowledge of a matter within subsection (5), promptly removes the information or disables access to it.(5) The matters within this subsection are that—(a) the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network,(b) access to it has been disabled, or(c) a court or administrative authority has ordered the removal from the network of, or the disablement of access to, the information.(6) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section 52D by storing information provided by a user who is not acting under the authority or control of the provider if—(a) the provider had no actual knowledge when the information was provided that it was, or contained, a CSA image-generator, and(b) on obtaining actual knowledge that the information was, or contained, a CSA image-generator, the provider promptly removed the information or disabled access to it.(7) Section 52D(6) applies for the purposes of this section.(8) In this section—(a) “GCHQ” has the meaning given by section 3 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994;(b) “OFCOM” means the Office of Communications;(c) a reference to OFCOM’s “online safety functions” has the meaning given by section 235 of the Online Safety Act 2023;(d) “internet service provider” means a provider of—(i) a service that is made available by means of the internet, or(ii) a service that provides access to the internet; (e) “user” , in relation to an internet service provider, means a user of a service provided by the internet service provider.”.(2) In Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual offences for purposes of Part 2 of that Act) after paragraph 46 insert—“46A An offence under section 52D of that Act (child sexual abuse image-generators), if the offender is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.”.(3) In the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009—(a) in section 55 (offences committed outside the UK) after subsection (7) insert—“(7A) Subsection (1) applies to an act which, if done in Scotland, would constitute an offence under section 52D of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982, as if references to a United Kingdom national included—(a) a body incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom, or(b) an unincorporated association formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom.”;(b) in Schedule 4 (sexual offences for purposes of section 55 of that Act), after paragraph 12 insert—“12A An offence under section 52D of that Act (child sexual abuse image-generators).”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause makes provision for Scotland equivalent to that made by clause 63 for England and Wales.

Amendments 267 and 268 agreed.

Clause 64 agreed.

Amendment 269

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

269: After Clause 64, insert the following new Clause—
“Possession of advice or guidance about child sexual abuse or CSA images: Scotland(1) In Part 4 of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 after section 41 insert—“41A Possession of advice or guidance about abusing children sexually or creating CSA images(1) It is an offence to be in possession of any item that contains advice or guidance about abusing children sexually or creating CSA images.(2) “Abusing children sexually or creating CSA images” means doing anything that constitutes—(a) an offence under section 52 or 52D of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982;(b) an offence under section 1, 2 or 7 of the Criminal Law Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1995 against a person under the age of 18;(c) an offence under section 10 of that Act;(d) an offence under section 1, or any of sections 9 to 12, of the Protection of Children and Prevention of Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2005;(e) an offence under Part 1 or section 46 of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 against a person under the age of 18;(f) an offence under Part 4 or section 42 of that Act;(g) an offence under section 1 of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015 against a person under the age of 18 that is committed with a view to exploitation that consists of or includes behaviour within section 3(3), (4) or (5) of that Act (prostitution and sexual exploitation), or doing anything outside Scotland that would constitute such an offence if done in Scotland.(3) It is a defence for a person (D) charged with an offence under this section—(a) to prove that D had a legitimate reason for being in possession of the item;(b) to prove that—(i) D had not read, viewed or (as appropriate) listened to the item, and(ii) D did not know, and had no reason to suspect, that it contained advice or guidance about abusing children sexually or creating CSA images; or(c) to prove that—(i) the item was sent to D without any request made by D or on D’s behalf, and(ii) D did not keep it for an unreasonable time.(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or to a fine, or to both.(5) In this section “item” includes anything in which information of any description is recorded.41B Section 41A: supplementary provision(1) A service provider does not commit an offence under section 41A by—(a) providing access to a communication network, or(b) transmitting, in a communication network, information provided by a user, if the provider does not—(i) initiate the transmission,(ii) select the recipient of the transmission, or(iii) select or modify the information contained in the transmission.(2) The references in subsection (1) to providing access to, or transmitting information in, a communication network include storing the information transmitted so far as the storage—(a) is automatic, intermediate and transient,(b) is solely for the purpose of carrying out the transmission in the network, and(c) is for no longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission.(3) A service provider does not commit an offence under section 41A by storing information provided by a user for transmission in a communication network if—(a) the storage of the information—(i) is automatic, intermediate and temporary, and(ii) is solely for the purpose of making more efficient the onward transmission of the information to other users at their request, and(b) the service provider—(i) does not modify the information,(ii) complies with any conditions attached to having access to the information, and(iii) on obtaining actual knowledge of a matter within subsection (4), promptly removes the information or disables access to it.(4) The matters within this subsection are that—(a) the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network,(b) access to it has been disabled, or (c) a court or administrative authority has ordered the removal from the network of, or the disablement of access to, the information.(5) A service provider does not commit an offence under section 41A by storing information provided by a user who is not acting under the authority or control of the provider if—(a) the provider had no actual knowledge when the information was provided that it was, or contained, advice or guidance about abusing children sexually or creating CSA images, and(b) on obtaining actual knowledge that the information was, or contained, advice or guidance about abusing children sexually or creating CSA images, the provider promptly removed the information or disabled access to it.(6) In this section—(a) “service provider” means a person providing an information society service;(b) “information society service” means a service normally provided—(i) for remuneration,(ii) at a distance,(iii) by electronic means, and(iv) at the individual request of a user of the services;(c) “user” , in relation to a service provider, means a user of a service provided by the service provider.(7) In subsection (6)(b)—(a) “at a distance” means that the service is provided without the parties being simultaneously present;(b) “by electronic means” means that the service is—(i) sent initially and received at its destination by means of electronic equipment for the processing (including digital compression) and storage of data, and(ii) entirely transmitted, conveyed and received by wire, by radio, by optical means or by other electromagnetic means;(c) “at the individual request of a user of the services” means that the service is provided through the transmission of data on individual request.”.(2) In Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual offences for purposes of Part 2 of that Act) after paragraph 59ZJ insert—“59ZJA An offence under section 41A of that Act (possession of paedophile manual) if the offender—(a) was 18 or over, and(b) is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes provision for Scotland equivalent to that made for England and Wales and Northern Ireland by section 69 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, as amended by clause 64.

Amendment 269 agreed.

Clause 65 agreed.

Schedule 7: Online facilitation of child sexual exploitation and abuse: specified offences

Amendments 270 and 271

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

270: Schedule 7, page 267, line 4, leave out “and 52A” and insert “, 52A and 52D”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Child sexual abuse image-generators: Scotland) inserted after clause 63.

271: Schedule 7, page 268, line 16, at end insert—
“(vi) Article 42A (child sexual abuse image-generators);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Child sexual abuse image generators: Northern Ireland) inserted after clause 63.

Amendments 270 and 271 agreed.

Schedule 7, as amended, agreed.

Clauses 66 to 68 agreed.

Amendment 271A not moved.

Clauses 69 to 71 agreed.

Amendments 271B to 271E not moved.

Clause 72: Duty to report suspected child sex offences

Amendment 271F not moved.

Amendment 272

Moved by

[Lord Meston]

272: Clause 72, page 90, line 20, leave out “, they are given reason to suspect” and insert “and Wales, they know or suspect, or have reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting,”
Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of this amendment is to align the wording with that of the equivalent duty to report money laundering as stated in section 330(2) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and to extend the scope of the duty to cover Wales in addition to England.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My noble friend Lady Grey-Thompson cannot be here and has asked me to speak to her amendments in this group, 12 in number, to which I had already added my name in support. I pay tribute to her dedicated campaigning on what we will now debate. All her amendments concern and seek to reinforce the Government’s decision to legislate for mandatory reporting of child sexual abuse in a wide range of contexts.

My noble friend Lady Grey-Thompson’s amendments are based on her earlier Private Member’s Bill and echo amendments by her to the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, which was debated in June. I recall that in that debate the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, referred to a need for a clear and comprehensive system of mandatory reporting. Following the work of IICSA, which highlighted the widespread and endemic nature of child sexual abuse, the Government’s decision to put forward the duty set out in Chapter 2 is welcome and should be supported—but I would say, only as far as it goes.

The main point of difference is that whereas the Bill does not expressly provide for sanctions for non-compliance with the duty, many of us wish the duty to be underpinned by criminal sanctions, as IICSA recommended. Quite simply, a lesser sanction such as a possible referral to a professional regulator or to the Disclosure and Barring Service is not enough to enforce the new and important duty. We will get to this shortly with Amendment 280.

Before we move on, I would like to say that the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, was quite correct to emphasise the wide range of situations in which abuse can occur. It is not just child grooming gangs, well-known celebrity abuse cases or cases involving institutions such as churches or schools; the reality is that the majority of child sexual abuse occurs in domestic and family situations. It is therefore welcome that this Bill will potentially cover such a wide range of scenarios.

As someone who spent much of his working life dealing with child abuse cases, I suggest that these basic points should inform the debate on this part of the Bill and the amendments to it. First, safeguarding children should be seen as the responsibility of everyone. I quote my noble friend Lady Grey-Thompson:

“A well-designed mandatory reporting law is a key component of an effective safeguarding system”.—[Official Report, 17/1/25; col. 1382.]


I would add that a positive duty to report, with sanctions, is the only certain way of ensuring that steps will be promptly taken to investigate and prevent abuse when it is revealed or suspected.

Secondly, and fundamentally, doing nothing when suspicions of abuse are aroused should not be seen as an option. A failure to report is a culpable failure to protect, and it is a failure to prevent harm to the child concerned and to other children at risk. Thirdly, a child who has the courage to disclose abuse needs to be reassured that his or her anxieties will be quickly and properly dealt with. Fourthly, a strong mandatory law will convey to potential perpetrators that abuse will not be tolerated. Finally, difficult cases concerning historic sexual abuse, whether one likes that term or not, arise in all jurisdictional areas. These require courts to deal with alleged abuse that may have been undetected and/or unreported for many years. A later group of amendments will consider these. In the context of this group, I suggest that a duty to report suspicions of abuse as soon as possible should reduce the number of such historic cases, with all their evidential and emotional complexities.

I turn to the individual amendments. Amendment 272 aims to align the wording of the Bill with that of the equivalent duty to report money laundering in Section 330 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and to extend the duty to cover Wales as well as England. The noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, makes the point that for the past 23 years the country has protected money in ways in which it has not yet protected children. I have compared other formulations of positive duties elsewhere—for example, in the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Female Genital Mutilation Act—and submit that what the amendment here proposes is clearer and more incisive than the wording in the Bill.

Amendment 274 would ensure that any report goes to the local authority that has the duty to protect the child, investigating the child’s circumstances and putting in place therapeutic treatment as well as protective measures. The local authority already has a duty to work with the police and to pass reports on to them if there is evidence of an offence. Amendment 275 is consequential.

Amendment 276 would ensure that a report is made in cases of suspected offences occurring outside England and Wales. Amendment 277 seeks to align the duty with existing statutory guidance, which expects a report to be made as soon as practicable. If there is a risk to the life or safety of a relevant child, the guidance expects the report to be expedited rather than delayed in order to enable fast consideration of necessary intervention.

Amendment 278 would remove the scope for people not to report when they believe that someone else will do so. Experience shows—certainly this is my own experience—that that is just one of the many ways in which people with knowledge or suspicion of abuse will convince themselves that it is all right to do nothing, and to hope that the problem will go away.

Amendment 279 is intended to make it clear that the management and proprietors of a setting have the duty to report suspected abuse—for example, when suspicions are reported to management by other staff. It should not be a prerequisite to have had any direct contact with the child, nor should it be an excuse that they did not have any direct contact with the child. It is not the responsibility or function of management to consider the merits of the complaint; they have a straightforward responsibility to report concerns.

Amendment 280 would make failure to report a criminal offence, and this is perhaps the central amendment as far as we are concerned. The IICSA report made a balanced and carefully considered recommendation that it should be, providing for defences as indicated in the amendment. I suggest that criminalising a failure to report is justified in helping to reduce a significant risk of substantial harm to children. Paragraph 116 of the IICSA report states:

“Where an individual to whom mandatory reporting laws apply has witnessed or received a disclosure of child sexual abuse, it should be a criminal offence to fail to report that to the relevant local authority or police force. Such a failure would amount to a deliberate decision not to pass on information about child sexual abuse to those authorities empowered to protect children from harm and to prevent future abuse by investigating and prosecuting it when it occurs. For those who work with children or are in a position of trust to fail to facilitate that is inexcusable, and the sanction for such an omission should be commensurate”.


Amendment 281 seeks to define “operators of a setting” in cases of private and corporate ownership, and Amendment 284 would clarify and describe the wide range of settings in which relevant activities covered by Clause 72 might occur. These are not exclusive lists, and I hope the Committee will recognise the wide extent of the activities that need to be covered. For example, the amendment refers outside mainstream religious organisations, to

“other organisations holding non-religious worldviews”.

That echoes cases I have dealt with involving sects and cults that are closed and secretive, and insist on loyalty.

18:00

Amendment 286 would remove the “best interests” defence in Clause 79 if the person has delayed reporting suspected sexual abuse. Finally, Amendment 288 would create an offence

“of causing detriment to a person fulfilling the duty to report”.

This is to prevent retaliation against those who report. I well remember a case in which a newly qualified teacher properly reported what a young girl had told her about what had been done to her and her siblings in the family home. She then had to face the vindictive and furious response of those children’s stepfather. That is what this amendment is geared to prevent.

I hope I will be excused for having spoken at some length, but I hope I have also done some justice to the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Kennedy of Cradley) (Lab)]

Before we move on, I clarify that the lead amendment in this group, Amendment 271F, was not moved so we have moved on to Amendment 272, which has been proposed as the lead amendment, and the group will continue as normal.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

Thank you for that. I was slightly confused, because the first amendment in the group was not moved.

[Baroness Featherstone (LD)]

My Lords, this follows on very well because I will speak to Amendment 283 in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, which would insert after Clause 72 the offence of intentionally concealing child sex abuse.

There is a real problem—and it is an omission from the Bill—because leadership and supervisory roles are completely excluded from the reporting duty. The duty applies only to individuals in contact with children, but we in this House and elsewhere all know that it is not just the social workers, the medics or the police who have direct contact with the child who know that there is sexual abuse at play. It is often the leaders, the CEOs, the chairs of boards, the staff who are too scared to mention it in case of reputational damage, and those in command who suppress incidents of child sexual abuse. This confines mandated reporters to only those who have regular unsupervised contact, creating a critical gap in the Bill.

It would be absolutely unforgivable to let this Bill to protect children go through with such a glaring gap in their protection. Furthermore, there are no criminal penalties proposed for failure to report, and without sanction it lacks teeth. An additional problem is that in two of the industrial-scale institutions of child sexual abuse that we have witnessed—the health service and religious institutions—confidentiality is a kind of get-out clause. We need to overcome that.

The UK Government launched the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, which was explicitly tasked with uncovering the systemic failures that allowed such abuse to flourish untrammelled. The key recommendation was that the UK must introduce a mandatory reporting law for child sexual abuse. We welcome that this is now happening, but noble Lords have all encountered or understood that, very often, the protection of an institution, a company or an entity silences many who work in that institution but know what is going on, and that takes priority. That silence—actually silencing staff or members—is commonplace.

Look at the obvious ones, such as the Catholic Church. Across multiple countries, investigations found that Church leaders reassigned accused priests, maintained secret files and prioritised avoiding scandal over reporting allegations. Church of England independent reviews found that senior clergy discouraged reporting and protected accused individuals to avoid damaging the institution’s standing. In the health service, the BBC exposure of Jimmy Savile’s years of abuse demonstrated beyond belief how many people knew but said nothing. Internal discussions showed that investigations were discouraged or blocked due to concerns about reputation, and Savile’s celebrity and connections. In private schools and boarding schools, multiple inquiries documented quiet dismissals of staff and minimised complaints to preserve reputation, funding and donor relationships. It happens in sports clubs and organisations. Various youth sports organisations protected coaches, dismissed complaints and pressurised victims to stay quiet to maintain prestige. So often companies and institutions are too big to fail. They use threats or non-disclosure agreements and so on to cover up misdeeds in fear of reputational damage. This is intentional, and that is why this amendment would put a criminal offence of intentionally concealing knowledge of child sex abuse on to the statute book.

I have personal knowledge of such a case. In this instance, it was child abuse rather than child sexual abuse. Great Ormond Street, our national treasure, suppressed a report, the Sibert-Hodes report, that it had commissioned. It showed the hospital to have responsibility for the failing clinic where baby P, Peter Connelly, was taken multiple times with multiple injuries and subsequently died, and where it had employed an underqualified doctor who failed. In that clinic there were three other doctors, none of whom was present. Two were on gardening leave and the other had left.

Cover-ups are happening all the time. The Bill is an opportunity to stop this practice, where NDAs, threats and gardening leave are all used to prevent exposure. I believe this follows on from what the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, is trying to do with her amendment; it would expand it. I hope and trust that the Government understand the importance of these amendments and move urgently to fill the gaping hole in this legislation as proposed.

While I am on my feet, I will speak to Amendment 287 in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, about training for those subject to the mandatory duty to report child sexual abuse. I am indebted to the NSPCC for its help on this vital aspect of this new duty. In this amendment we are seeking to make mandatory reporting of child sexual abuse a reality, because without training—proper training, probably expensive training—it will not happen as intended in the Bill. It is vital that all those responsible for reporting under the new duty be trained effectively so that they feel supported and able, and are effectively trained to a high standard on their obligations.

The new mandatory duty to report child sexual abuse has the potential to ensure that anyone working or volunteering with children knows that the sexual abuse of children cannot be tolerated or ignored. It will be illegal to tolerate or ignore it, and proper implementation must be embedded from the very start. Those who are responsible for reporting child sexual abuse must be properly trained to know what, how and where to report. The onus for ensuring this cannot rely solely on individual organisations. If this duty is to have a widespread impact, we need cross-sector, cross-government buy-in so that all reporters, no matter what organisation, community or area they come from, are empowered to protect children.

That is why this amendment is so vital: to ensure effective training for all mandated reporters within the mandatory reporting duty. Recognising, reporting and, crucially, responding to child sexual abuse is not easy or straightforward, because we know that disclosures from children do not usually happen in one conversation. They can happen in many forms, verbally or non-verbally, and emerge over a long period of time. They will often be the result of consistent and skilled engagement from a trusted adult that helps the child feel safe and ready to share their experiences.

Reporters may also struggle to decipher whether what they have seen is indeed child sexual abuse—such as if they came across child sexual abuse material online but were unsure of the age of the victim—particularly if they are not already trained to identify recognised signs and indicators of abuse. Their responsibility to the child cannot stop at disclosure or witnessing abuse. It is vital that any child who discloses their experience of abuse is met with an effective response.

We know that there is already a significant need for greater training and support for skilled professionals to improve their response to child sexual abuse, as detailed in the recent reports from the Child Safeguarding Practice Review Panel and the review into child exploitation of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. This is a gap in our child protection system that must be closed to better protect children, and this duty provides us with both the impetus and the opportunity to do so by taking a whole-system approach to embedding the duty. Therefore, those who are responsible for reporting on abuse and disclosures such as these must be trained not only in how to identify what child sexual abuse is, what a disclosure is and where to report it, but also in how to provide vital support to a child all the way through to after the report has been made and beyond.

This duty will apply not only to safeguarding professionals but to volunteers, sports coaches, youth club leaders and faith leaders, to name but a few. We cannot assume that all mandated reporters will already have the necessary understanding of child protection required to carry out their responsibilities under this really serious duty. This is essential, not only on the practical level of understanding the duty itself but, arguably more importantly, in providing this sensitive support to children in a way that does not put them at risk. My amendment seeks to ensure that an understanding of child protection is intrinsic to the duty, guaranteeing that all those with responsibility as a mandated reporter receive, at a minimum, initial and ongoing training—essential elements of their new responsibilities.

In conclusion, from how to recognise signs and indicators to judging when reporting should be delayed for the safety of the child, reporters must be supported. Otherwise, we risk putting children in danger of being harmed by the reporting process, in addition to the hurt they have already received. By baking this guarantee into primary legislation, the Government can be confident that their duty will be implemented and regulated consistently across different sectors. It would also reassure reporters that they will not face sanctions because the organisation they work or volunteer for cannot afford to resource and train them appropriately. We owe it to all the victims and survivors who have bravely called for a mandatory reporting duty over so many years to ensure that it is done properly.

[Lord Murphy of Torfaen (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 283B. Schedule 8 relates to the duty to report child sex offences. Paragraph 17 of that schedule applies this duty to

“Activities of a person in connection with training, supervising or instructing a child for the purposes of a religion or belief, if the person has regular … contact with the child in the course of those activities”.


Some Catholic schools and faith schools obviously have religious objects, and Schedule 8 applies to them. But the problem with that is that all schools are also regulated by Section 21(5) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. That effectively means double regulation, which would put a burden on faith schools, with unnecessary bureaucracy.

The Catholic Education Service, which represents about 2,000 schools in England—that is not counting Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland, of course—has worked closely with the Home Office and has helped to draft my amendment. The amendment would remove from the scope of paragraph 17 activity that is already regulated and governed by the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, therefore preventing unnecessary double regulation. The Catholic Education Service has worked very closely with this Government and the previous one on ensuring the highest standards of children’s safeguards in schools. I would be grateful if my noble friend the Minister would react positively to this amendment in his wind-up.

18:15

[Baroness Walmsley (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with every word of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and of my noble friend Lady Featherstone. I hope they will forgive me if I say no more about all that, because, if I do not catch my train tonight, I will have to sleep on the street. I will speak to Amendments 280A in the name of my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and Amendments 282 and 285 in his name and mine.

Amendment 280A is straightforward in its intent. It seeks to fully implement recommendation 13 of IICSA’s final report. The current Clause 72 introduces a duty on adults engaged in relevant activity to notify police or local authorities when

“they are given reason to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed”.

The Government propose non-criminal sanctions, such as referral to professional regulators or the DBS. We on these Benches maintain that this approach is insufficient. IICSA was clear: a failure to comply with the duty must be a criminal offence. Amendment 280A would insert proposed new subsections (10A) and (10B) into Clause 72, which would explicitly provide that:

“A person who fails to fulfil the duty under subsection (1) commits an offence”,


and that the person

“is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale”.

This criminal sanction is essential because relying solely on professional sanctions creates institutional loopholes. Professional sanctions apply to only a fraction of the mandated reporters and cannot effectively address failings in settings where professional regulation is absent, such as certain religious settings, where, as we have heard, many grievous failings have occurred. Nor do they cover volunteers in schools or other settings. Furthermore, criminalising non-compliance would align us with international best practice in countries such as France and Australia.

Amendment 280 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, is similar to this one, except that it offers some mitigations that the court could consider. Whether this offers a loophole or a reasonable consideration for the courts is a reasonable discussion point.

Amendment 285 addresses the second vital component of IICSA’s recommendation 13. Incorporating the duty to report when a person recognises the indicators of child sexual abuse, the amendment would expand the trigger for the duty to report beyond direct disclosure by a child or perpetrator, or witnessing child sexual abuse, all of which is vanishingly rare, to include circumstances where a person

“witnesses a child displaying sexualised, sexually harmful or other behaviour, physical signs of abuse or consequences of sexual abuse”.

It has to be remembered that only one in three victims of CSA ever discloses what happened, and often it is many years later.

The fact is that, if the Bill passes as it is without amendment, it will undoubtedly fail in its stated objective. The Government themselves recognise this, as witnessed by the figures in the impact assessment. It says that the number of extra anticipated reports of CSA each year for England and Wales under the existing terms of the Bill is only 310, which is an average of 7.9 extra reports for each of the 43 police forces. The total number of cases estimated to be proceeded against in England is 26—with 15 cases in the Crown Court and nine in the magistrates’ court—and only 11 of those would see the award of custodial sentences. The total estimated increase in CSA referrals to local authority-designated officers is 2% per annum.

It would therefore be nonsense to suggest that widening the scope of the duty to report CSA to something like that which exists in countries that have high-standard mandatory reporting systems that have been functioning well for years, as this amendment proposes, would overwhelm our system. It would not. Neither would it result in some cases being hidden in the mass of reports, as some have suggested. On the other hand, widening the scope, as this and other amendments seek to do, would uncover a lot of evil and save many children from terrible lifelong harm, which has a cost to public services. Not doing so would perpetuate the culture of cover-up that led to the IICSA inquiry in the first place.

However, recognising that assessing such indicators can be subjective, Amendment 285 would maintain proportionality, as recommended by IICSA, by ensuring that failure to comply with the duty based solely on those indicators is not a criminal offence, but compliance should be done by any conscientious professional. This careful balance would ensure that staff and volunteers are encouraged to report any sign of potential harm without the fear of criminal prosecution based on subjective observation. This is crucial to fostering a reporting culture that prioritises the immediate safety and protection of the child, which is what we all want to see. It is vital to remember that the investigation of the report of, or reasonable suspicion of, child sexual abuse is not for the reporter to do; it is for the experts to investigate and the courts to decide—but they cannot do that unless they get the report in the first place.

Amendment 282 is designed to include in the reporting duty a comprehensive range of people who care for children, as defined in Sections 21, 22 and 22A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. To ensure that no relevant person is left out, these sections ensure the inclusion in the duty to report the management of settings where some kind of care is given to children, which is one of the gaping holes in the current wording of the Bill. With that, having just reaffirmed my support for the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and those of my noble friend Lady Featherstone, I will finish.

[Lord Polak (Con)]

I rise to speak to my Amendment 286A, which proposes to fill gaps in Clause 79 so we can hold accountable all those who go out of their way to conceal the horrendous crime of child sexual abuse. This amendment is supported by multiple child protection organisations, including the NSPCC, Barnardo’s, the Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse and the Lucy Faithfull Foundation. I particularly thank Gina Rees from the NSPCC, who has advised me.

Obviously, it can never be acceptable for anyone to turn a blind eye to abuse. Yet across the seven year-long investigation, the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse exposed countless instances where those whose organisations had a responsibility to protect children from harm not only failed to report child sexual abuse but took purposeful actions that actively sought to cover it up. These acts of intentionally concealing child sexual abuse are separate from, and go beyond, just failing to make a report, something which the Government’s mandatory reporting duty proposes to address. It means choosing and acting to prioritise something else, be that community, relationships or company reputation, over the safety of a child. I think we can agree across this House that that is unacceptable.

These acts of concealment are not a thing of the past. Take, for example, this real-life contact at the NSPCC helpline for those with concerns about a child. A special educational needs professional told the NSPCC:

“I’ve seen what happens when people report any concerns, even minor ones. Management bullies you, reduces your shifts, stops giving you what you need to support the kids. You’re expected to buy everything yourself for them instead of it being provided. If you thought you were on track for a permanent job, forget it”.


Bullying, threatening job stability and removing support for the children who are meant to be protected—these are actions, along with intimidation of witnesses and destroying vital evidence, that have happened for many years and still happen, with impunity, across our society. They not only undermine efforts to increase reports of child sexual abuse; they can deny victims their right to justice and hinder their access to vital support services in order to help them begin to recover from what they have suffered. As such, it is vital that our criminal justice system be equipped with new laws to catch these bad actors.

I appreciate that the Government’s current drafting of Clause 79 aims to do this by introducing a new criminal offence of preventing or deterring someone, under the mandatory reporting duty, from making a report. While that is an important part of thwarting the cover-up of child sexual abuse, this provision does not go far enough to cover the multitude of ways that reports of abuse can be concealed and could allow many of those who intentionally conceal this crime to slip through the net. This is because Clause 79 is triggered only when the person acting to conceal abuse does so by blocking or deterring someone, under the new duty, from making a report. This would not, for example, criminalise acts that could prevent abuse being discovered by a mandated reporter in the first place, such as intimidating victims or destroying vital evidence. Indeed, if the professional I referred to in my example earlier did not fall under the new duty to report, there is a strong chance that those who try to bully and intimidate someone in respect of doing the right thing would not be prosecutable under the current offence.

This feels to me like a glaring omission that could undermine the Government’s intentions with this clause. It also does not cover preventing those who are not mandated reporters from reporting, or acts to hinder this investigation of abuse after it has been reported. That is why I call on the Government and the Minister to look again at their current proposal and ensure that it is strengthened, so that those who intentionally act to cover up child sexual abuse, including those who threaten or deter those not under the reporting duty, are caught by this offence. I therefore urge the Government to accept Amendment 286A so that Clause 79 captures all individuals who intentionally cover up child sexual abuse.

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendment 273, which is a very simple amendment that aims to put into action what IICSA recommended: that mandatory reporting of child sexual abuse should happen with no exceptions. The inquiry argued that, even if abuse is disclosed in the context of confession, the person—in this case, the priest—should be legally required to report it. It proposes that failing to report such abuse should itself be a criminal offence.

I am very glad that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester is in his place, because I know he has spent a long time on working parties looking at this issue. In earlier discussions in the House, in response to the right reverend Prelate, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, said that he had received representations from churches on this issue and expressed the hope that this would be further debated as the Crime and Policing Bill went through Parliament. My amendment is simply here to enable that debate to happen.

[Lord Bethell (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in support of my noble friend Lord Polak and his Amendment 286A. As he lucidly put it, this amendment proposes to close several glaring loopholes in the offences outlined in Clause 79; otherwise, I fear it will fail to meet the aims and expectations placed on it by this Committee.

Our criminal justice system should be equipped with new laws to hold accountable all those who cover up child sexual abuse. The noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, put that case incredibly well and touchingly. It needs to be known that if someone acts purposefully to stop child sexual abuse being properly investigated and so denies the victims and survivors the protection and justice they are entitled to, they will face strong criminal penalties. That is why I support the Bill’s inclusion of Clause 79, which seeks to introduce new criminal offences for preventing or deterring someone, under the new mandatory reporting duty, from making a report. However, its drafting means that it would be limited in its ability to contribute meaningfully to the important mission of tackling child sexual abuse that we across the Committee strongly support.

Clause 79 is dependent upon the new mandatory duty to report. The clause not only requires the action taken to directly involve a reporter under the duty, it requires the person attempting to conceal the abuse to know that the person that they are deterring is a mandated reporter. This brings with it a whole host of legal complexities. What does it mean to know that someone is under the duty? Does it require them to also know that the child sex offence has taken place to trigger the said duty? How could it be convincingly proved by the courts that someone accused of putting the needs of their institution above protecting a child also understood what the duty is, who it applies to and how that factored into their actions? These are important questions that need to be reconciled.

18:30

As it stands, based on these questions alone, this offence would therefore be incredibly difficult to prosecute. Aside from the moral judgment, we must ask ourselves whether it can be right that someone who knowingly covers up child sexual abuse can walk away without consequences purely because their actions did not involve deterring a mandated reporter, or they did not know that they were one. If we do not close these loopholes, it will mean that active cover-ups by a person or an organisation will, at most, be treated as a failure to report rather than as a serious offence. This cannot be right. That is why I urge the Government to accept Amendment 286A. Its redrafting of Clause 79 would remove the requirement that the act of concealment involve a mandated reporter. It would also remove the need for the act of concealment to directly involve another person, enabling it to cover actions such as destruction of evidence or moving a suspected perpetrator on to another organisation, something which a senior leader could do by an order from afar.

However, although the amendment would remove barriers presented by the current offence, it would not broaden its applicability unnecessarily. I am concerned that were we to apply a duty to report child sexual abuse to our country’s professionals and volunteers working with children, where they were criminalised for failing to make a report or for inaction, this would actually deter people from working with children in the first place, and without people willing to work to support children, how can they protect them from and report child sexual abuse? That is why I do not support amendments proposed across the Committee that would attach criminal sanctions to the duty itself.

Amendment 286A offers us an alternative approach, where only those who take purposeful actions to conceal abuse, specifically with the intention of doing so, would be criminalised. This is a proportionate threshold for criminalisation, where those guilty of concealing this insidious crime are rightfully prosecuted, and those who just fail to report abuse, whether that be due to lack of knowledge or some other motivation, receive appropriate professional and civil sanctions. This duty should empower our child protection system to better combat child sexual abuse, and I believe that Amendment 286A strikes the right balance in enabling us to do just that. I encourage the Government to accept it.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, I am grateful for the chance to speak in this debate. Probably the most harrowing date in my life as a bishop was when I had to give evidence in person to IICSA as the Church of England’s lead bishop on religious communities— we knew that some of the horrific abuse that had taken place was in religious communities. Ever since then, I have worked really hard on these matters. I sought to add my name to Amendments 286A and 287, but I missed the deadline, sadly, so I am grateful for the chance to support them now.

I was going to say quite a bit about Amendment 286A, but the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, said just about everything I wanted to say, so I will not detain the Committee any further on it. On Amendment 287 on training, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Polak, and others. It is important that the Bill will apply not only to already knowledgeable professionals but to volunteers, who will have a whole variety of levels of funding, of safeguarding experience and of experience in dealing with child sexual abuse. We cannot assume that mandated reporters will already have the necessary understanding to fulfil these new legal obligations, so I think this is an appropriate probing amendment to see what support there can be to ensure that those who will have a duty are equipped to discharge that duty properly. Without that, I think we will fail to hit what we are trying to do.

I am sorry that it has taken us this long to get this far with the IICSA report. I think we have made a bit more progress implementing its recommendations in the Church of England than we have in this House, but I am glad that we got this opportunity today. I am grateful to the many noble Lords who have proposed amendments.

I want to say a few words about Amendment 273, as the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, invited me to do so. On the seal of the confessional, if it is possible for a churchman to say this, I remain a bit agnostic. I am interested in what will actually produce good safeguarding. I have heard people say, including survivors sometimes, that the chance to go and talk to a priest, and know it would not go beyond that priest, was what gave them the courage—often with a priest going with them—to make a disclosure to the relevant authorities. I can see that if we change that, some disclosures would happen but some would not, so I am keen to hear a bit more about that.

The other part of the amendment talks about extending it to all those who volunteer. I am not quite sure how wide that needs to go. Certainly, I am happy for it to apply to Church leaders, lay or ordained, paid or unpaid, but it should not be the person who cleans the coffee cups in the church hall on a Sunday morning, or who puts out the “No parking” cones, or who photocopies the parish magazine or arranges the church flowers once a month. Let us be clear exactly what categories we are going to extend any duty to, and whether that is dealt with best in the Bill or in some sort of secondary advice, guidance, legislation or other instrument. I am keen to explore that more. I am very grateful for these matters being raised, and not before time.

[Lord Hampton (CB)]

My Lords, I too support Amendment 286A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Polak, to which I also would have added my name if I had been slightly more efficient. The right reverend Prelate and I need to do better from now on. I acknowledge and thank the NSPCC and declare my interest as a teacher. To quote Keeping Children Safe in Education, which we have to read every year, child protection is everybody’s responsibility.

I was surprised to hear that this issue was not already completely covered. As we have heard now and in previous groups, it is essential that if someone acts purposefully to stop child sexual abuse being properly investigated, they should face strong criminal penalties. Actions like these can delay, and sometimes outright deny, victims their access to justice and the vital support needed to help them recover from such abuse.

The much-quoted Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse uncovered instances in which teachers were transferred to another school with no police referral, after a student was told: “You must not tell the police. We will handle it in-house”. Priests were moved from parish to parish, and there were examples of local authorities destroying files relating to allegations, which survivors perceived as part of a cover-up.

These are actions that can and do continue to happen across our society. While Clause 79 introduces a new criminal offence of preventing or deterring someone under the mandatory reporting duty from making a report, this provision does not go far enough to cover the multitude of ways that reports of abuse can be concealed. This is because Clause 79 is built on the mandatory reporting duty and requires the act of concealment directly to involve someone under that duty. This proposal is separate from applying criminal sanctions directly to the mandatory duty to report child sexual abuse in Clause 72, which I fear could create a defensive fear and blame-based child protection sector that criminalises those who lack the knowledge and training to report effectively. However, intentionally taking actions to cover up child sexual abuse cannot be tolerated and should be criminalised. I believe that this amendment strikes the balance.

[The Earl of Lytton (CB)]

My Lords, this is the first time I have spoken at this stage of the Bill. I must say that, in the presence of such expertise, I find myself entirely inadequate for the purpose. At Second Reading, I raised a question about the interaction of Clause 80 with the clauses that precede it. I profess no track record on matters of child protection, but I thoroughly subscribe to the principle of the duty to report contained in this section of the Bill. Because of its profound significance, it certainly has my full support.

However, I have come to the matter through a rather different route: the way in which crimes are recorded and, in particular, why they may not be recorded accurately or at all. My point is quite simple and revolves around the reliable translation of the definition in Clause 72(1)—namely, a reason to believe that

“a child sex offence may have been committed (at any time)”—

into some sort of recording and/or further action. We cannot know what those reasons to believe might be, so variable is the range of circumstances, as we heard earlier. I note that “reasonable belief” has no definable limit, and nor should it have. However, it may very likely be based on the reporter’s knowledge, training, experience, powers of observation and so on, rather than hard evidence. Here is the point: otherwise, were that not the case, Clause 72 would surely have been differently worded.

I certainly expect that all such professionals involved with safeguarding in mind would have acute sensitivity in this area and, in reporting their beliefs, would themselves be believed as an evidential source. My concern is that their belief alone may still not be enough to generate action without further and better evidence. I think in particular of a situation where the child who is the subject of their belief is uncommunicative, if the information is partly second-hand, if it is about a child not in their immediate charge, and the myriad ways in which this information of relevance can come about. Then, the only purpose of reporting would be to get the matters into some sort of system for follow-up monitoring and investigations which necessarily involve the devotion of resources to confirm the commission of an offence or ultimately dispose of it on the basis that nothing sinister has actually occurred.

Therefore, reporting gets us only so far. What then? What is the follow-up process to be? Clause 80 does not actually tell us but makes a leap to police crime recording, in accordance with “applicable policy and procedure”—presumably meaning the Home Office guidance and the practices within the particular force concerned, attuned to local circumstances, resources and priorities within its area. This, as far as I can see, is the only backstop follow-up from the reporting of reasonable belief under the Bill. As such, its commendable aims are yoked to a general crime reporting principle that applies some way further down the line.

I hope I do not suffer from some sort of hallucinatory process in all of this, but I seek to plug a gap in which reasonable belief in any given instance is not guaranteed to pass the evidential standard for the purposes of police or, for that matter, any other recording of suspected crime. This is because the balance of probabilities test underlying the crime reporting guidance embodies a clear tendency towards such an evidential base. Home Office guidance places the duty on the reporting officer as to what they think has happened in the commission of a crime, not necessarily what the person reporting thinks. Any different approach, especially one involving time and energy in instances of hazy information in the circumstances described, might be difficult to get across the line.

My concern, notwithstanding the current focus on child sexual abuse in the press and everywhere else, is that things might easily erode over the long run and default to standard practices consistent with available finances, manpower and, not least, political pressures to show effective reduction in crime. This was highlighted by the Public Administration Select Committee in its June 2014 report, Caught Red-handed. Its findings were also associated with the demotion of police crime recordings and their removal for national statistics purposes.

The gap I see in the legislative architecture before us matters because of the special attention needed to protect young people. If we are now moving on to a situation where previous failings to protect the vulnerable from things too awful to contemplate are really a thing of the past, with better outcomes going forward, then, as I pointed out at Second Reading, Clause 80 risks merely undoing the policy objectives of Clauses 72 to 79.

Rather than tinker around with the detail, it seemed more appropriate to remove Clause 80 altogether—hence my intention for us to debate whether Clause 80 stands part—and simply leave in place the duty to report and the penalty for obstructing this duty. That would lead, I hope, to the establishment by the relevant duty holders, via their multi agency safeguarding processes, of other follow-up protocols to manage and monitor concerns falling outside police crime recording parameters, but on a structured basis. Otherwise, I cannot conceive of any route to ensure follow-up measures and resources being devoted to mere reasonable belief that does not require an evidential test for crime recording. Therefore, this needs a framework.

18:45

To summarise, the measure I seek is the certainty of a focused response and further action taken on grounds of reasonable belief, and that this shall be structured, consistent, effective and understood across all agencies, with roles and responsibilities clearly understood, nationally operative and adequately resourced. That does not deny the process and importance of crime recording. Clearly, if evidence is available and is known to the person reporting, I am confident that a constable would indeed report a crime and devote energy and resources to investigating it further. My concern is that it does not get that far.

The intention may well be that the answer lies in Clause 81—namely, the Secretary of State’s powers to amend all the provisions through what amounts to a significant Henry VIII clause—but the intention, scope and mechanics of what is intended need to be set out in the Bill from inception. In other words, they should not be left vague or unclarified pending some later reactive measure when it is found that things do not work.

I very much look forward to the Minister’s response. If it is not possible today, given the hour, perhaps I might receive a letter from him setting out the Government’s detailed answer on the point before the next stage. Depending on that, I may return to the matter on Report.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, as was clear from our debate, this is a very important group of amendments, which seek to clarify and improve a necessary measure in the Bill. When we discussed the fourth group today, we heard about the horrific crimes committed against some children in this country: the industrial-scale abuse of young, white, working-class girls over the past four decades, as well as abuse of other groups. This happened —and is still happening—because the people who commit these crimes are among the most depraved in our society. However, it has also happened because people familiar with the abuse, or even those who had mere suspicions, turned a blind eye or simply did not look at what was in front of them.

The victims were failed by everyone, from the police to the authorities, their teachers and community leaders. Too often, they were treated with a blind negligence that bordered on positively enabling the crimes that were occurring. We have heard many powerful speeches today; I cannot list them all, but I remind the Minister of the introduction by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and the powerful speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone.

I think we all now agree that safeguarding needs to be supported by sanctions. How else can we put a stop to bureaucratic failure to report? The difficult and important question is around striking the balance when doing that, to make certain that it is effective but that it does not have unintended, unhappy consequences. It is important also to make non-reporting a criminal offence, but, again, exactly how that is phrased will need considerable care. Many ideas have been canvassed today, and it would be dangerous for me to try to draft on the hoof at the Dispatch Box.

There was force in the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, as to why there should be an exception for what is learned in confession, and that was also important. I am not urging that there should be an exception, but it should be looked at. We have had arguments on both sides. What is the evidence? What are likely to be the benefits of opening that up? Personally, I think it should be opened up, but it should be looked at with care.

We heard earlier today from the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, all about the grooming gangs, so I will not go back to that, but they are an incredibly striking example of why we need a duty to report suspected child sex offences in general and why it is important that the clause is properly drafted.

One important oversight, which was spotted by noble Baronesses, Lady Cash and Lady Grey-Thompson, concerns the reference to Wales. As has been established, it is necessary to correct an oversight in the drafting. As things stand, local authorities and police forces in Wales will have to be informed of crimes, but only if they are considered crimes in England. That must be redrafted, and I hope the Minister will agree to that come Report stage.

Amendment 283A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash—which was not moved, but it is sensible to make the point—would implement another recommendation of the Casey review, adding child criminal exploitation to the crimes for which there is a duty to report. It is important to look at all these points when drafting the obligations.

We on this side are largely supportive of the principles behind the several amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. Leaving out subsections (5) and (6) raises an interesting point. It is obviously better to be safe than sorry. We will have to look very carefully at what removing those subsections would actually do.

We on this side worry about removing defences in cases where an individual genuinely fears for the safety of the victim or believes that someone else has definitely submitted a report. That must be looked at, too. Perhaps the Minister can guide us on how to ensure that genuine defences with merit will remain available without providing a route to or excuse for shirking responsibility.

The noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen, raised an interesting point about the bureaucratic burden on faith schools. Government obviously must look at that. It should not be a let-out; equally, we on this side would not support any extra unnecessary burden being imposed. However, it must be done properly.

My noble friend Lord Polak’s Amendment 286A raises important considerations. It is worth noting that he is supported by Barnardo’s, the NSPCC and other organisations with great specialist expertise and knowledge—and not just anecdotal knowledge; they really know what is going on. He is looking to prevent the intentional concealment of child sex offences. That must be the absolute minimum. My noble friend Lord Bethell was supportive of that amendment, and he was right to caution us about going too far, so that it has the unintended consequence of not achieving what we all want to achieve. His words of caution should be heeded.

As to Amendment 274 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, we are rather hesitant in our support. Ensuring that a report goes straight to the local authority, which then has a duty to inform the police, might risk slowing down a response that is often needed quickly. Indeed, it might never reach the police. If a child is in imminent danger of being abused, it is not the local authority which should know first; it must be the police, who have to respond. There should be a simultaneous notification, because it can be, in effect, simultaneous.

With this amendment, it seems that someone who reported child abuse to the police would be criminalised for not going to the local authority. That cannot be right. Leaving it to the discretion of the individual which authority to report to, while requiring that there be a duty to do so, seems to us to be the right thing. People will know generally where to go but they must go to one or the other, and not automatically to the local authority first.

I think I have addressed the amendments from the noble Baronesses, Lady Featherstone and Lady Walmsley. These are all interesting points. The Government and those behind the Minister must look at this very carefully. It is really important to get the drafting right.

Amendments 283 and 286A seek to create and expand the specific crime of preventing or concealing reports of abuse. These are largely in line with the amendments addressed in the group in which we debated grooming gangs, so we support the intentions behind them.

As I have said, this is a group of amendments that have been tabled with the best of intentions. The issue in question should be entirely non-partisan; it is simply a question of how best to manage it and get it right, making certain that children and young people in this country are not allowed to suffer in the way in which they have for the last 30 years. I hope that the Minister will take away the points which are being made and, not least, add Wales to the list of jurisdictions. That is all I need to say at this stage tonight.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for moving the amendment on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and to colleagues who have spoken this evening. This has been a valuable debate on Chapter 2, Part 5. As noble Lords will know, introducing a statutory duty delivers the intention of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. I am confident that the measures we have brought forward strike the balance that we need.

A number of amendments have been tabled, and I am sorry that Amendment 271F, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, was not moved. However, it is important to put on record that the reason the duty relates to the Welsh Government is that they have declined to legislate for a mandatory reporting duty in their own response to the independent inquiry. Therefore, we are respecting the devolution settlement by not including that legislation in the Bill. It is a devolved matter which requires the consent of the Senedd.

There are a number of other amendments which I will try to speak to. We know that child sexual abuse continues to go unreported. The reasons for this are complex, including fear, stigma and lack of awareness. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester covered some of those points in relation to the performance of the Church of England.

The unique nature of child sexual abuse as a type of harm requires the introduction of this new duty. I want to be clear that the introduction of the new duty establishes a floor, not a ceiling, and does not change or interfere with in any way the existing expectations set by government that all children at risk of harm should be referred to the appropriate authority for guidance and advice.

I want to first touch on Amendments 274 and 276, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, which seek to require that reports under the duty are made to local authorities only, removing, with minor exceptions, the option to notify the police. Allowing reports to be made to either the local authority or the police, as recommended by the independent inquiry, ensures that reporters can act swiftly, so I cannot accept that amendment.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and others, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Walmsley, Lady Grey-Thompson and Lady Featherstone, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, sought to introduce a criminal offence for those who conceal or fail to report abuse. The Government do not consider this type of sanction, which risks creating fear and apprehension among those with reporting responsibilities, to be proportionate or effectively targeted. That is why we are empowering reporters by focusing the criminal sanctions in this Bill on anyone who seeks to interfere with them carrying out their duty, rather than on the reporters themselves. This issue has been carefully considered by a number of agencies and has the support of, among others, the NSPCC, the Lucy Faithfull Foundation, Barnardo’s, the Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse and the Children’s Commissioner, so I cannot support the amendments.

The noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson—via the noble Lord, Lord Meston—the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Murphy of Torfaen seek to extend the duty to a number of additional contexts. The purpose of the duty is to report and place a clear requirement on those most likely to encounter information relating to sexual abuse. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, and the right reverend Prelate that this does include members of the clergy. Proposals to extend the ambit of a reporting duty to those who do not personally come into contact with children would introduce another layer of procedural complexity.

19:00

Amendment 282 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, and others, seeks to insert a legislative reference to a “position of trust”. Adopting a definition in this way would import a framework which was designed around specific interpersonal relationships and the commission of sexual offences by an individual against a young person. Its value as a definition of a reporter is limited in practical terms.

My noble friend Lord Murphy’s amendment probes one of the technical definitions in Schedule 8. We have included a list of regulation-making powers to amend this list as necessary. We will keep Schedule 8 under constant review ahead of commencement. I hope that, at least for the moment, this will give my noble friend food for thought pending further consideration.

Amendments 275, 277, 278 and 286 seek to remove various provisions that allow for short delays, avoid duplication and enable planning conversations. These provisions mean, for example, that a professional will have to have some leeway in dealing with a situation where a child responds to losing control over their personal information by threatening self-harm. We have also sought to ensure that an inexperienced volunteer or newly qualified professional can refer the incident to their organisation’s designated safeguarding lead, to allow them the time for the duty to receive confirmation that it has been made. These are practical measures and essential for this duty to operate effectively.

The noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, made a number of very important points on training and protection. Everyone who is responsible for the safety and well-being of children should receive appropriate training on what they should do in relation to encountering child sexual abuse. It is not appropriate to enshrine this in legislation, but I take on board what she said. We will reflect on the points that she made and work with regulators and professional standards bodies to ensure that we communicate those issues ahead of implementation. I am happy to talk to her about this outside the Chamber.

On the protections for reporters in Amendment 288, the Public Interest Disclosure Act already provides a legal framework for protecting child abuse whistleblowers. Attempting to legislate for, for example, social shunning, reputational harm or informal exclusion would pose significant legal and practical problems. Therefore, I cannot accept that amendment.

The noble Lord, Lord Polak, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Bethell and Lord Hampton, seeks with Amendment 286A to remove the criminal offence of preventing a reporter from carrying out their duty and replacing it with a more general offence of intentionally concealing sexual abuse in any of the contexts specified. This is a real shift in focus from empowering our reporters to concealing punishment more generally. That may be the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Polak, but the proposed offence triggers when a person suspects that abuse has taken place. This is far broader and would be harder to justify or prosecute than interference with a known statutory duty. The Government’s preferred model for this type of offence is narrowly targeted, purpose-driven and clearly aligned with the mandatory reporting duty. We will reflect on what the noble Lord, Lord Polak, said, but the initial response to him and the noble Lords, Lord Bethell and Lord Hampton, is that this is a very difficult and challenging area for us.

The noble Earl, Lord Lytton, raised a number of queries in relation to Clause 80, including the necessity of the clause. This clause is necessary in view of the dual role of the police as both a category of reporter and a potential recipient of reports made under the duty. Clause 80 sets out that a police officer does not need to make a formal report of the offence to their own force where they have already recorded the matter in accordance with relevant policy and procedure. This clause also avoids situations in which, for example, a police officer whose role involves reviewing large amounts of child sexual abuse material would otherwise have to make numerous individual reports to their force on the basis of having witnessed a recording of a child sexual offence. We believe the clause is necessary. Again, we may return to this, and the noble Lord may wish to move his amendment to delete the clause at some point, but I would hope he will reflect on what I have said. I am happy to write to him in more detail when I have had a chance to reflect in detail on the comments he has made to date.

I suspect our debate today will not have resolved the long-standing disagreements over the duty’s design. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for moving the amendments. We have had a lot of discussion with the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, both on her original Bill and on her amendments and outside the Committee, and I have discussed that in wide terms. We will reflect on all the debates and discussions that have been had today. I believe that the Government have a duty to get this right, and, as we plan ahead for implementation, I will be happy to arrange further meetings with any noble Lord or noble Baroness who has spoken today to ensure we are not losing sight of the valuable questions raised in this debate. But I cannot accept the amendments today, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Meston, will withdraw his amendment. Obviously, we may return to this on Report, and the door is open to have further discussions on these matters.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, it is now appropriate for me to beg leave to withdraw Amendment 272, reserving our right to return to it, and others not moved, after proper discussion with the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, when she has seen our debate—and read and marked my homework.

Amendment 272 withdrawn.

Amendments 273 to 282 not moved.

Clause 72 agreed.

Amendment 283 not moved.

Schedule 8: Duty to report child sex offences: child sex offences and further relevant activities

Amendments 283A to 284 not moved.

Schedule 8 agreed.

Clause 73 agreed.

Clause 74: Section 72: reasons to suspect child sex offence may have been committed

Amendment 285 not moved.

Clause 74 agreed.

Clauses 75 to 78 agreed.

Clause 79: Preventing or deterring a person from complying with duty to report suspected child sex offence

Amendments 286 and 286A not moved.

Clause 79 agreed.

Amendments 287 to 288D not moved.

Clauses 80 and 81 agreed.

House resumed.

House adjourned at 7.09 pm.