Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Purvis of Tweed
Main Page: Lord Purvis of Tweed (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Purvis of Tweed's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(4 days, 1 hour ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I gave very careful consideration to the points raised in these amendments by both noble and gallant Lords. They raise significant issues, which I am very sympathetic to. I am also very keen to hear the Minister’s response, given her commitment in Committee, especially in relation to the consequences of Article 1 of the treaty, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, has indicated.
There are, however, elements of the amendments which I am perhaps not entirely persuaded by. They are the conditions within the bailiwick of the Mauritian Government that could give rise to the circumstances where we would seek to stop payments. They are not covered by this amendment, per se. They would, however, be covered in subsection (4) of the proposed new clause in my Amendment 50, which will be discussed much later during our considerations today and which would create the conditions where, if the Mauritian Government by their actions were putting at risk the consequences of our payments, Parliament would be able to pause the payments.
If there are reasons unspecified by Amendment 1 which are non-defence related, there is the potential for UK funding for resettlement support, the trust fund operations or Chagossian community-specific support to be put at risk, so it is worth while to separate out the defence interests from the other elements of the treaties. As the mechanisms in Amendment 50 are preferable in our view, we would find it difficult to support these amendments.
My Lords, Amendment 26 standing in my name states that:
“Sections 2 to 4 come into force only when the Secretary of State has assessed … the impact of the termination of all rights granted by the Treaty to the United Kingdom with respect to the entire Chagos Archipelago through Article 15 of the Treaty”
and
“the impact of the arrangements in Article 15 on the leverage opportunities at the Secretary of State’s disposal in negotiating with Mauritius after ratification”.
Article 15(1)(a) of the Mauritius treaty states that Mauritius can terminate the Mauritius Treaty in the event of
“a failure by the United Kingdom to make payment as required by Article 11”.
This means that if a payment is more than 22 days late, the entire Mauritius treaty is terminated, subject of course to the fact that sovereignty over the Chagos Islands will be in the hands of Mauritius. In that event, we would lose absolutely everything, and if the United States wanted to keep its Diego Garcia base, it would probably have to do so by force. While the United Kingdom could no doubt seek to achieve this, China, Russia and other countries could protest very loudly and have international law on their side. It would provide an excuse for any other power to try to take Diego Garcia and could lead to a major war.
Of course, the Government can respond by saying that this will not happen if we pay on time—and, no doubt, they will assure that we will pay. While we are protected from this eventuality by dutifully paying up completely and always on time, Article 15(1)(a) places the United Kingdom, and by extension the United States, in a formally intolerable, weak position.
To understand the problems arising from the very weak footing on which the treaty places us when negotiating with Mauritius, we must appreciate the huge concerns about what happens in relation to the Chagos Islands beyond Diego Garcia. Mauritius has a clear incentive, arising from the income stream we have promised, to seek additional income streams for leasing other islands or parts of islands. The Government have sought to make much of the fact that we have a veto on the deployment of security and defence forces beyond Diego Garcia, but the problem is that the real threats do not announce themselves as deployment of security and defence forces and are much more subtle. Something that begins as a non-security and defence deployment, in relation to which we have no veto, can evolve into something very different—an emergent risk, over which the treaty affords us no right of veto but only a right to object. The right to object can be resolved only on a consensual basis within the joint committee between the UK and Mauritius proposed by the Mauritius treaty and could no doubt take a long time if Mauritius wanted it to. It is here that our complete lack of leverage provided by paragraph 1(a) of Article 15 is a particular cause for concern.
Mauritius could generally adopt a very unco-operative approach on the joint committee, knowing that, if it resists one of our concerns and we counter by threatening to withhold payment, subject to satisfactory resolution, that will serve simply to renounce all our remaining rights in relation to the Chagos Islands, giving them completely to Mauritius. Of course, if ever a deployment of non-security and defence personnel from another country becomes an emergent risk, and one wherein those concerned in effect become security and defence personnel, the UK would have a right of veto. However, the difficulty is that, by that stage, they will be established in place, and if they did not want to leave, they could be removed only by force, threatening war and international instability.
If we look at other categories of emergent risk, in relation to which we have powers only to lodge objections on the joint committee, we are further confronted by the way in which the terms of the Mauritius treaty—especially paragraph 1(a) of Article 15—rob us of leverage. These risks would all be avoided if the UK did the right thing and corrected the historic wrong of the forced removal of the Chagossians from their islands and afforded them self-determination. While it is plain that not all would vote to be a separate jurisdiction from Mauritius—in the same way that not everyone on the Ellice Islands voted to become a separate jurisdiction from the Gilbert Islands—polling suggests that a majority would vote to become a resettled, largely self-governing British Overseas Territory, legitimately under British sovereignty. In that event, none of the above difficulties would arise.
My Lords, it is always informative to follow the noble Lord, apart from when he is having his witty barbs against my party, which is often the case. He made a very strong case today, and I hope that he may feel that his points are reflected in part of the text in my Amendment 33.
This has been an important debate and group. Since we are on Report, I will simply focus on the amendments that I have tabled: Amendment 19 and then, although it will be considered consequential, the more substantive Amendment 33. I am aware that for the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey and Lady Foster, Amendment 33 will be a bird in one hand and half a loaf in the other, but nevertheless I am grateful for their prospective support. I give notice that I will likely test the opinion of the House on Amendment 19, and I understand that the Government have indicated that, if Amendment 19 is supported, Amendment 33 will be considered consequential. For the avoidance of doubt—and I know it is disappointing to the noble Baroness—we cannot support Amendment 33A, as that change would, in effect, link the arguments in my amendment with those on Amendment 32, which I will outline a little bit further.
The House has heard me on many occasions refer to the lack of legislative guarantees of the rights of the Chagossian community, including those that the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, has indicated with regard to the right of participation within Diego Garcia in particular, as well as resettlement into the wider archipelago. Because we are on Report, I will not rehearse the arguments I have previously made, but my amendments seek to resolve this as best as I have been able to draft. I hope that the Government will, even at this stage, reconsider and support them.
Amendment 33 states that, to address the lack of definitive legal right enshrined in statute in Mauritius law and acknowledged in the UK, we need formally to seek the views of the Chagossian community on whether they are willing to consent to the terms of the implementation of the treaty rights, which so far are only permissive in nature within the treaty—that is the essence if we are talking about self-determination. There is no point simply referencing self-determination if there are no legal rights to back it up, and that is the essence of what I am seeking to achieve. That would include the resettlement to the archipelago, distinct from Diego Garcia, the right of participation in opportunities of working in Diego Garcia and statutory involvement in the decision-making of the trust fund for their overall rights as the treaty is implemented.
Amendment 32 in the name of noble Baroness, Lady Foster, has some issues. She spoke with sincerity today, as she has in Committee and all the times we have raised these matters. First, I understand the views and political arguments of the Conservative Benches in support of her amendment, but the amendment would overturn a century of long-standing convention on those Benches that Parliament should not retrospectively fetter the prerogative powers of treaty making. That is not necessarily the view of our Benches, but it is certainly the view of their Benches; this amendment would overturn that. I understand that is the deliberate process, but that is the consequence of what voting for it would bring about. It is an interesting and novel constitutional approach, but one where the consequence is worth recognising. Indeed, that was the point that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, referred to earlier in his remarks.
Another issue is that, although the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and the noble Lords, Lord Morrow and Lord McCrae, spoke very strong, powerful, emotive words with regard to the right to self-determination, what they are proposing would be a limited right, because that limited right of self-determination is not about the ability to decide the future of Diego Garcia and the military base. The Official Opposition have indicated that it is non-negotiable that Diego Garcia will be retained in perpetuity as a military base. That is not a decision that has been made with the consent of the Chagossian people about what their territory would be used for. That is a predetermined decision. They have stated that today, and they stated it as recently as April 2024 in the letter from the Foreign Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, to the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Commons. If there is an argument for self-determination and consent, then presumably the argument of those supporting Amendment 32 is that that consent should include the use of Diego Garcia, but that has been precluded or ruled out. I do not see how that squares in that respect because, presumably, if the principled stance is one where only consent should be applied, then it should be applied also for Diego Garcia and the use of the military base.
On what the noble Lord has said, surely limited self-determination is better than no self-determination, which is what is being put forward by the Government. Surely he must be concerned by the United Nations recent report in December last year in relation to the issues that have been stated there.
I read it carefully and I think my amendment covers the concerns in that committee’s report and the concerns raised in the IRDC. That is why my amendment has been drafted carefully. The noble Baroness is right in indicating that limited self-determination is better than no self-determination. The point is that her amendment does not have any limits to it, and it is her inability to square that aspect that I simply raise as an issue. However, that is, with respect, decisions that she and those that will be supporting it will make. I think it is worth recording that Amendment 32 would not give the Chagossian community the right of self-determination about part of the archipelago. That is worth stating categorically.
Amendment 32 also does not address rights. Indeed, what I feel we should be morally bound to address is the right that has been denied to that community for a long period, which is that of resettlement, and the right to be involved in decisions being taken going forward. We can only correct rights that are in our power to do so, and that would be by securing the consent of the Chagossian community before the treaty is ratified in order to ensure that there is statutory underpinning of the permissive elements of the rights that are in the treaty.
It is worth reflecting on the fact that the only rights that the Chagossian community may potentially have ahead of them are those that are provided for in the treaty. Indeed, the letter that I referred to from the former Foreign Secretary in April 2024 reiterated the previous Government’s view that the right of resettlement would not be accommodated. We are close to having rights enshrined for the Chagossian community for the first time in a very long time, but the treaty only goes as far as giving the potential ability for the Chagossian community if the Mauritian Government choose to do so.
Now that we hand over from our parliamentary processes, these Benches believe that it is correct to make the case that those rights should be underpinned in law, so I respectfully hope that the Government will be able to see this and accept it. If not, I will test the opinion of the House, and I do so respectfully, understanding the sincerity of the arguments being made so far by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and others.
Before the noble Lord sits down, could he help me interpret Amendments 19 and 33? Amendment 33 would not delay ratification of the treaty. Its wording is a little odd in places. When we talk about self-determination, we are dealing with concepts, not chaps, so subsection (5) of the proposed new clause should refer to “principles” rather than “principals”. In proposed new subsection (5)(b), working out the difference between the “operation in” and the “opportunities of working in” Diego Garcia is a little complex. I think we are talking about jobs on the base, which could be expressed more clearly.
I see nothing in principle against Amendment 33. But I pause at Amendment 19, because under it, as I read it, ratification would have to be delayed until the referendum called for in Amendment 33 had been carried out. If that is the case, I cannot support it.
I accept the admonishment with regard to the spelling and drafting. I cannot blame the clerks for that; it is my fault. If, in proposed new subsection (5)(b), “participation in the operation in” and “opportunities of working in” Diego Garcia means jobs, I accept that also.
Recognising that the treaty is some distance from being ratified anyway, I strongly believe that other elements need to be in place, in agreement with the Government of Mauritius, before it is ratified. These measures are some of the elements that should be put in place before the treaty is ratified. We will discuss other elements in considering later groups, but between now and ratification, extra measures should be put in place to ensure that the consent of the Chagossian community is given and that their rights are underpinned by statute.
My Lords, as I have stated throughout the Bill’s progress through the House, I would like to acknowledge at the outset the importance of the islands to Chagossians as well as the different views within the Chagossian community on their future. This Government deeply regret the way the Chagossians were removed from the islands. We are committed to building a relationship with the Chagossian community that is built on respect and an acknowledgment of the wrongs of the past.
I also acknowledge the strength of feeling in this House on addressing the range of issues raised by Chagossian communities here in the UK and in other parts of the world. In this context, I thank the IRDC for undertaking its recent review and publishing its report on the views of the Chagossian community regarding the UK-Mauritius agreement on the Chagos archipelago, including Diego Garcia. As the report acknowledges, there is a wide range of diverse views among the Chagossian community, and I thank the noble Lord for introducing the report.
Such diversity of views is vital when considering Amendments 2, 9, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 23, 25, 32, 33, 33A and 55, which pertain to engagement and consultation with the Chagossian communities. I agree with those in this House who say that transparency and frankness with the Chagossian community is vital. That is why I have resisted some of the discussions around consultations and referendums. To give the impression that a consultation or referendum can elicit a change to a treaty that has already been negotiated and signed in a state-to-state negotiation is wrong.
The negotiations on the treaty were necessarily state to state, with our priority being to secure the full operation of the base on Diego Garcia. That is what we have done. This deal will protect our national security for generations and ensure that the UK keeps unique and vital capabilities to deal with a range of threats.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I was tempted to come and do another forensic analysis of the financial aspects of the treaty, but I will restrain myself and just speak briefly in support of all of the amendments in this group.
As we heard from my noble friend Lord Callanan, the Government like to talk about an average of £101 billion a year, in 2025-26 prices, and the total cost being £3.4 billion; that is discounted using the social time preference rate. All these figures ignore the cash that is going to go out of the Treasury’s coffers and into Mauritius’s coffers. All these amendments are trying to do is get the focus back on cash because, at the end of the day, cash is what is important. It is cash that will end up in the Government’s accounts. It is cash that will be leaving our economy.
Amendment 39 would require a schedule of the amounts likely to be paid, which would show no single year in which £101 million will be paid—it will always be more than that—and would show that the total will be not £3.4 billion but closer to £35 billion. It would also show that, in the first five years, the cost will be nearly £900 billion; of course, that is a really big sum of money in the context of a cash-constrained Budget. I note in particular that Amendment 50 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, would ask for that schedule to be updated every five years. This is also very important because inflation expectations can vary. For example, if there were just a small inflation spike, as occurred in 2023, you could change the overall numbers by £1 billion or £1.5 billion; that is a very modest assumption.
It is really important to keep a strong focus on cash and not to talk in these funny money terms, which try to divert attention from how much money is really involved.
My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendment 50, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, referred; I am grateful for her support.
This treaty is both a diplomatic measure, when it comes to sovereignty, and a financial relationship; it also adds some obligations to a community whose rights have, as we have acknowledged, been diminished. So it is quite unusual. That is why, at Second Reading, I raised concerns around the financial elements of the treaty, the lack of clarity around how much will be allocated to addressing the rights of the Chagossian community, and the lack of transparency. I acknowledge Letter No. 1, which is appended to the treaty and outlines the figures, but I feel that further clarity is required.
I will not repeat the points I have made previously, but Amendment 50 seeks to address the major concerns around the lack of transparency in the planned implementation of the financial elements of the treaty—including through, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, indicated, a five-yearly update to Parliament on both progress and the contemporaneous situation with regard to the finances.
New subsection (4) in Amendment 50 also introduces what I would consider to be a break clause in the financial relationship outlined in the treaty and in letter one. Earlier in our proceedings, the Minister helpfully said that the treaty could be terminated on two grounds only. The second ground was in reference to the Vienna convention, if there are circumstances which mean the treaty is unimplementable, and the first element is the failure to make payments by the UK.
I say this without suggesting that Mauritius will act in bad faith or has entered into the treaty in bad faith, but there are no mechanisms which would allow us to consider whether Mauritius is also operating to fulfil its obligations, beyond those which have been elevated on diplomatic terms to Prime Minister level for dialogue. If that dispute mechanism has been exhausted, we believe that there should be some formal mechanism by which Parliament should then have the ability to say that the agreement on the finances reached under letter one should require supplementary approval. Indeed, the obligation on the Government of the day would be to come back to Parliament to say that the dispute mechanisms have been exhausted and no agreement has been reached, and therefore that this needs to be brought back. The sums of funds are extremely high; the obligations are serious. Therefore, I hope the Government will consider moving on this element.
Amendment 47, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is not at all contradictory to this, and if he tests the opinion of the House, we will support him on that amendment. I am also grateful so far for the indications of support for my amendment.
My Lords, Amendments 7, 39, 47, and 50 all relate to financial transparency and parliamentary oversight of expenditure under the treaty.
Amendments 39 and 47, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, seek to require the Government to publish a schedule of payments to Mauritius and a detailed statement of the total cost of the treaty, including the methodology used by the Government Actuary’s Department and the Treasury. These amendments are not necessary, as we published full details of the financial arrangements on the day the treaty was signed, including the finance exchange of letters and the Explanatory Memorandum laid before Parliament.
These documents set out the payment schedule and confirm that the net present value of the treaty is £3.4 billion in today’s money, calculated using the standard Green Book methodology that successive Governments have applied to long-term projects. The average annual payment is £101 million—less than a 0.25% of the defence budget and a fraction of the cost of comparable overseas facilities. This is a sound investment in our national security, and the figures have been confirmed by the Government Actuary’s Department. For these reasons, we reject these amendments.
Amendment 7, which ties commencement of Sections 2 to 4 of the Act to the discharge of duties under Amendment 47, would introduce unnecessary delay in ratification. The Government have already provided the transparency sought by the noble Lord through the published Explanatory Memorandum and accompanying documents, as well as a significant number of Parliamentary Questions and debates in this Chamber and the other place. We therefore do not accept this amendment.
Amendment 50, from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, proposes an ongoing estimates and supply scrutiny process for expenditure under the treaty, including parliamentary approval of future payments and supplementary estimates. The agreement has already undergone scrutiny under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, and neither House objected to ratification during the statutory period.
The treaty provides robust mechanisms for dispute resolution under Article 14. It is normal practice for payments under treaties to be made under the prerogative power. While the standard annual estimates process still applies, the introduction of additional parliamentary approval requirements is not necessary and would undermine the certainty and stability that this long-term agreement provides. As I have said on many occasions, the US covers the running costs of the base on Diego Garcia, which are significant, but any expenditure met by this Government will be published in our annual departmental accounts.
My Lords, the Government indicated previously that if Amendment 19 passed, they would consider this to be consequential. My understanding is that that continues to be the position, but I must still move the amendment formally.
My Lords, my Amendment 51 addresses an issue that I raised in Committee: that there should be an ongoing representation of the Chagossian community, including its members living in the UK as joint nationals, and a means by which the parliaments of the UK and Mauritius can have dialogue on the operation and implementation of the treaty.
I set out the justification for that in Committee, so I do not need to repeat any of those comments and do not wish to detain the House any further. I was grateful to both Minister Doughty and the Minister in this House for engaging in discussions with me since Committee. Ministers have been very open, and I appreciate that. I hope that that openness will encourage them to give supportive words at the Dispatch Box for this proposal, so I am keen to hear what the Minister has to say. I am very happy to continue having discussions on this issue and to hear from the Government. I do not need to say anything else at this stage. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has chosen to re-table amendments on an inter-parliamentary committee to monitor and assess the implementation and operation of the treaty. We have been seriously concerned about the ongoing assessment of the success of the treaty, and this is just one mechanism that could be used to deliver that ongoing monitoring.
We are pleased that we have so far secured a number of significant concessions from the Government on the detail of how the treaty’s implementation will be monitored, including, for example, the release of much more detailed information about the contact group and how it operates. I am pleased also that, towards the end of last year, the Government released some further information about the trust fund board. We have heard today about the legislation in Mauritius on the establishment of that trust fund board, which is all very positive. These are important organisations that will have a role in holding both the UK and Mauritius to account as the treaty is implemented.
Delivering greater clarity during the progress of the Bill in your Lordships’ House shows the impact that parliamentary scrutiny can have. So, in light of those facts and the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I would be grateful if the Minister, when she replies, can confirm what further opportunities Parliament will have to discuss and scrutinise the implementation of the treaty. As I said before, I do not believe that it bodes well that the Government refused to allow a substantive Motion in the other place on the treaty under the CRaG procedures, so can she give the House a cast-iron assurance that Parliament will be granted the opportunity to debate the implementation of the treaty at regular intervals, should it be implemented?
My Lords, Amendments 51 and 54, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, concern the establishment of a UK-Mauritius inter-parliamentary committee to oversee the implementation and operation of the treaty. I would love to please the noble Lord—I am happy to continue talking to him—but I am afraid that I will disappoint him this evening.
Amendment 51 seeks to require the Government to engage with Mauritius to create a committee, with equal representation from both parliaments and the purpose of promoting mutual understanding of the provisions of the treaty. The committee would have responsibilities, including monitoring the implementation of the treaty and its impact on Chagossians. Amendment 54 ties the commencement of the Act to the establishment of this committee.
I completely recognise that the intention behind the amendments is to promote dialogue and scrutiny. However, Mauritius’s agreement to it could not be guaranteed, and the treaty itself makes no provision for an inter-parliamentary committee. Indeed, there would seem to be some potential for overlap—perhaps even conflict—between the proposed role of the committee and that of the joint commission under the treaty. Furthermore, introducing this requirement would at least delay, if not prevent, the ratification and implementation of an agreement that is vital for our national security.
There are numerous committees across the two Houses that can—and, I am sure, will—undertake periodic inquiries into the operation of the treaty. This joint committee could overlap with the work of these Select Committees—and that would not be right. We have Select Committees for a purpose, and it is for them to scrutinise the work of departments, so I do not believe that we should try to replicate that.
I know that the noble Lord feels passionately about supporting Chagossians. He has told me that and I commend him on it, but I do not think a joint committee will increase trust among the Chagossian community. As mentioned on earlier groupings, this Government are committed to a relationship with Chagossians built on trust and acknowledgement of the wrongs of the past. There are also elected representatives in the other place who are there to advocate for their constituents, and there are many in this House who also do this.
The agreement has already been subject to extensive scrutiny under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, and both Houses have had the opportunity to consider its terms. The treaty also establishes a joint commission under Article 12 to manage its operation, which is the appropriate forum for bilateral engagement. For those reasons, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, for his indication of support, and to the Minister for her reply. I listened carefully to what she said. Of course, the joint commission on the treaty is executive-to-executive level, and I have consistently sought an opportunity for parliamentary dialogue to continue. It is absolutely right that elected Members of Parliament will represent their constituents and their constituents’ interests; indeed, MPs in the Mauritian parliament will do likewise. My ambition is to find a vehicle by which that can be done in a systematic way, not to contradict or to conflict with parliamentary committees but for there to be a parliamentary voice on behalf of the community where our commitment for their rights should be ongoing and not end once this treaty is ratified.
I am grateful for the Minister saying that she is willing to continue to talk. Equally, I understand that that is language not to give any commitment to anything at Third Reading, but I would like to continue the engagement with the noble Lord and the Minister on this, and indeed with other parliamentary vehicles. Because of the lateness of the hour—we have had a very busy Report stage—and notwithstanding the importance of this issue, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment in my name.