Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Scriven Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 14th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

I thank the noble Baroness. I note that my former tutorial partner from Oxford was intervened on, or interrupted, for speaking for too long beyond 10 minutes. I shall endeavour still to be within 10 minutes despite having been doubly intervened on.

The report noted that the committee had not taken evidence from terminally ill people. I will leave it at that in terms of responding to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton. However, we took evidence, as we were requested to do, on safeguarding and procedures, and, within the confines of a very brief committee, we took a wide range of evidence. Should we and could we have taken more? Absolutely, but within the confines of what we were able to do I think we did a job. I certainly did not at any point speak or vote against, or indeed take any view on, the idea that we should not take evidence from terminally ill people, so it is unfortunate that that has become a topic of debate.

The reason I rose to speak is that the question of capacity versus ability is hugely important. There are references throughout the Bill to the Mental Capacity Act, but to suggest that this one amendment is not appropriate is an unfortunate legal point. The amendment says that people should have the ability to make the decision, but “ability” reaches far beyond the narrow confines of the Mental Capacity Act. At various points in Committee, we will talk about capacity. The committee took evidence on capacity, and a key thing to bear in mind about the Mental Capacity Act is that it was never designed for a life or death decision. We need to be very clear as a Committee of the whole House and as parliamentarians—

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

The Mental Capacity Act is used in life and death issues in healthcare. If someone decides not to have care, the doctor has to ensure that that person has capacity to make that decision, so it is already used in that way.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for pointing out that the Mental Capacity Act is used for life and death issues, but it certainly was not designed for assisted dying and I suggest that it is not a robust test for these particular purposes. If we are going to pass this legislation, we need to be sure that we have tests that are as robust as possible.

A particular point that we need to bear in mind is that the legislation was not drafted in the way that it is normally drafted; it was done in a way that was described as “on a shoestring”. It is surely up to your Lordships’ House and the other place to ensure that the provisions we have in place do not look as though they have been made on a shoestring. They need to be robust. Decisions about capacity can be taken at a moment in time. We need to ensure that the decision where someone says, “Yes, I think I want an assisted death”, is when they are at a later stage in their illness.

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[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords, earlier on in the debate, there was a discussion concerning members of the committee, on who was or was not called, or who was denied the right to be called to it. I suggest that the straitjacket of the time this House allocated probably did not allow the relevant committee the appropriate time to call everyone that it thought was appropriate. It ought to have been given more time, but it seems that it had to be rushed.

Concerning the Mental Capacity Act, Margaret Flynn, chair of the National Mental Capacity Forum, said it was designed to protect us

“when others start to make decisions about our lives … Assisted dying was not on the table during the Law Commission’s consultation which resulted in the MCA”.

Therefore, the suitability of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 as a test for a decision to end one’s life is a major source of debate. I believe the many experts and professionals arguing that it is insufficient for this specific irreversible decision.

The MCA was not designed for assisted dying. It was created to safeguard people who lack capacity in decisions about their care, treatment or finances. Assisted dying was not on the table during the Law Commission’s consultation. The Royal College of Physicians, as the noble Lord said a moment ago, said that applying the MCA to the decision to end one’s life is an entirely novel test in uncharted territory with no experience or precedent. It is a very low threshold. The Royal College of Physicians argues that assessing a person’s mental capacity to decide to end their life is an entirely different and more complex determination, requiring a higher level of understanding than assessing capacity for treatment decisions.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I have listened very carefully to the noble Lord and a number of others. I am still struggling to understand what the higher test of ability would be, over and above the Mental Capacity Act. Will the noble Lord let the House know what that higher test is that people would have to go through on ability rather than capacity?

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

The noble Lord knows that I am not a proposer of the change of words. I am dealing with capacity. Therefore, I am also dealing with the fact that professionals within the field have stated that to use the Mental Capacity Act for a decision to end one’s life is an entirely novel test and uncharted territory for which there is no experience or precedent. That is not my statement; that is the statement of professionals within the field. They say also that to decide to use it for the decision to end one’s life is an entirely different and more complex determination requiring a higher level of understanding than assessing capacity for treating decisions.

Capacity can fluctuate in terminally ill patients due to physical fatigue, illness, medication or delirium, making the irreversibility of the decision risky under this framework. Therefore, I ask this Committee to think carefully in trying to base its whole argument on this being good legislation because mental capacity is the deciding factor.

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[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

There is never enough training—let us assess that.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

If I may help the noble Baroness, the answer is that the Oliver McGowan training—which is a statutory requirement for all doctors—is now in place. It is high-level training on both capacity and of dealing with people who are vulnerable.

[Baroness Scotland of Asthal (Lab)]

My Lords, I have hesitated to intervene at this point because we are going to come later to talk about capacity and why the Mental Capacity Act and its definition does not fit well with this Bill. I am disappointed in the way in which the last few comments have turned this debate, not least because all of us belong to professional bodies which express collective views on our behalf and have to be respected. It is disappointing that we should have in this House an attack on a view which is expressed by a professional body in this way.

However, there are real reason as to why the Mental Capacity Act is seen as having deficiency in this context, which it normally does not have. It is a fine piece of legislation that we were very proud to introduce, and it has given liberty, capacity and the opportunity to be heard to many people who had limited capacity in the past. I give quarter to no one about the power of that Act.

But is the Mental Capacity Act perfect when we come to consider this particular issue? It is not. Why is it not? Because you can have and suffer from a mental illness and still have capacity. Yet we know that, when individuals are faced with the terrible diagnosis that they are to die, and their families are distraught, and they themselves have to face that reality, depression is not abnormal; it is normal. The fact is that some of those people, many of whom we know, some of whom are within our families, some of whom have suffered deeply, contemplate whether it would not be simpler, easier, less painful for everyone if they simply ended their lives. But what else do we know? We know that, when that depression bites, there is means of alleviation. We know that, with good palliative care, they can be enabled to make an informed decision. That informed decision may be that they still want to take a step, but the opportunity to get that support is essential.

Yet when we look at the capacity Act, the fact that someone is deeply depressed does not mean that they lack capacity within the meaning of the Act—

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Scriven Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 5th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

The noble Baroness will know that, at present, an 18 to 25 year-old with a terminal diagnosis has the legal capacity to withdraw consent to treatment. Do they go through a different capacity assessment from somebody who is over 25?

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

I am delighted that the noble Lord has asked me that question, because it reminds me of a patient I had. He was a young man with an advanced testicular tumour and had refused treatment. He was referred to me, and I looked after him for a couple of years, during the time that he became more and more ill with his metastatic disease. He consistently refused treatment. However, when he was moribund, and his parents had come in and were sitting at the bedside, he suddenly asked me, “Is it too late to change my mind and have treatment?” At that point, I was indebted to my local oncologist, who I phoned, and we arranged transfer that day to the Royal Marsden Hospital, which then treated him because that was his wish. My assessment every time I saw him was not to persuade him to have treatment but to allow him to talk about his fears and difficulties. That is the role of specialist palliative care when you are looking after these young people who are very vulnerable. I am simply suggesting that, due to the way the Bill is written, the assessments may not be adequate.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I listened to the noble Baroness’s individual case. My question was very specific. Is somebody who is 25 or over given a different mental capacity assessment based on their wish to withdraw treatment from somebody who is 18 to 25? That is the specific question based on what the noble Baroness is now suggesting happens in the Bill.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

The issue with the Mental Capacity Act is that each assessment must be done individually. It relates to the decision that is to be made, the size of the decision, the time and the personal characteristics. There is no absolute. If we are talking about safety in relation to the Bill and avoiding abuse, I am simply trying to suggest that one way forward may be to ensure that the assessment of young people’s eligibility is particularly thorough. That may mean having different criteria and looking at whether they have pain or suffering.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Scriven Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 12th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions on this group. To echo the comments of my noble friend the Chief Whip, the Government remain neutral on the principle of assisted dying and on the passage of this Bill. Whether the law in this area should change is a matter for Parliament. As before, any comments that I make will focus on amendments where the Government have major legal, technical or operational workability concerns.

This group relates to deprivation of liberty and eligibility for seeking an assisted death. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and my noble friend Baroness Keeley for tabling the amendments in this group. Amendments 16 and 114, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, seek to prevent individuals who have been deprived of their liberty within the last 12 months under the Mental Capacity Act being eligible for an assisted death. In the case of Amendments 16A and 114A, tabled by my noble friend Lady Keeley, someone would be ineligible as a result of an application for deprivation of liberty having been made, irrespective of the outcome of that application.

Noble Lords may wish to consider that the amendments would introduce a departure from the Mental Capacity Act framework by linking a lack of capacity in one area—capacity to consent to care and treatment arrangements that amount to confinement—to lack of capacity in another area, that being capacity to make the decision to end one’s life. Amendments 16A and 114A go further and would make a person ineligible on the basis that only an application for deprivation of liberty had been made. This may result in a situation where the application was unwarranted, but that person would still be ineligible for assisted death.

Regarding the European Convention on Human Rights—

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I want to ask what the Government’s view is. This actually changes the whole basis of the Mental Capacity Act. The Mental Capacity Act concerns existing capacity. These amendments move into retrospective or future capacity, which is completely incompatible with the Mental Capacity Act. Do the Government have any views about that significant change of capacity and the test of the capacity of an individual?

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I hope that the comments I have made already indicate where we are concerned, rather than going into further areas, but I would be very happy to look at the noble Lord’s point.

I also wish to raise points relating to the European Convention on Human Rights. As before, these are potential risks that I am raising to inform noble Lords’ decision-making, but I wish to be clear that the underlying policies are rightly a matter for Parliament. Noble Lords may wish to note the requirement for an objective, proportionate and reasonable justification to treat those who have previously lacked capacity in a different context differently from others who have not. Noble Lords may also wish to consider whether there is justification for different treatment where an application for deprivation of liberty has been made, but not necessarily completed or approved. In the absence of justifications that are sufficient to persuade a court, the amendments may conflict with ECHR obligations, specifically Article 14 on the prohibition of discrimination, when read with Article 8.

I confirm to noble Lords that, if a court finds that primary legislation is incompatible, it may make a declaration of incompatibility. This does not invalidate legislation. As is usual, the Government would then consider—

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[Lord Scriven (LD)]

It is not an assumption. It is in the Bill that if the co-ordinating doctor is not the GP of the person seeking the assisted death, under Clause 10(3)(b)(ii) the co-ordinating doctor has to write to the GP practice to make it aware of the request.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

I agree with that, but the point of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Rook, is to tie together a period of someone being in the National Health Service. I agreed with the comments made by the lawyers about “normally resident”, rather than other words. The noble and learned Lord who introduced the Bill might consider that this amendment will give some confidence to those who had a concern because it means that “normally resident” has been underlined by the fact that someone has in fact been in a general practice of the National Health Service. I cannot see that it does any harm, given that there is a year in any case. It underlines what the noble Lord reminded us of: the idea that this should be a part of the normal way in which people are dealt with.

I do not like the Bill very much, but it is our job to make it work. To do that, it is more valuable to fix it within the National Health Service as we have it, rather than trying to invent a service that we might well like to have—and I am old enough to remember when we did have it. Let us not pretend, when things are not as they ought to be.

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[Lord Harper (Con)]

I am trying to make some comments on the amendments. Let me do that and then, if I have time—I am very careful to keep my remarks to less than 10 minutes, which is the guidance in the Companion—I will address the noble Baroness’s points. She is right that, when I was Government Chief Whip, she was my opposition and we had a very good working relationship, which I want to continue in this House.

What has come out of the debate is a general view from everybody, whatever their view on the Bill, about the importance of the relationship that people have with their general practitioner, whether it is an individual or, as the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada, said, a multidisciplinary practice. That is a very important point. The amendments that have been tabled to Clause 1 are about the eligibility criteria for whether someone is able to make a request for an assisted death.

The flaw in the amendments—I support the idea behind them, but I do not support them—is that they do not make an appreciable difference to the safeguards in the Bill. When the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, made some remarks in this debate, he put his finger on it: there is no requirement in the Bill for the GP or the team at the GP practice to be the doctor who makes the assessment about whether the person has the capability to make this decision or not. That, as was said by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, is the role of the co-ordinating doctor, who does not need to have any relationship with the patient at all.

When the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, looked at this issue before, there was a report from the Demos assisted dying commission, which the noble and learned Lord chaired. Its recommendations recognised the need for

“a doctor who … knows the person well and supports the person and their family”.

The report also said that that doctor who knows the person can better assess whether the request to die is a cry for help, a sign of poor care or a result of coercion, and that

“if an assisted death was to go ahead, the first doctor should be responsible for arranging support for the patient and their family during and after the assisted death”.

It envisaged that

“the first doctor would have a greater level of involvement”

and

“an established relationship with the person requesting this assistance, and be familiar with their personal history and family context”.

That seemed to be the general view of all of the noble Lords who have spoken.

The problem is that there is no requirement in the Bill before us for the GP or multidisciplinary practice to be the co-ordinating doctor or even to be consulted before the co-ordinating doctor makes the first assessment. It is absolutely true, as the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, said, that, when the co-ordinating doctor has made the assessment, he or she has to send that to the GP practice. However, as the Bill is drafted at the moment, the role of the GP practice is to act as a postbox, log the report—I see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, nodding—and pop it on somebody’s medical records. There is no requirement or duty on that GP practice to read the report, to make an assessment of the decision of the person with whom they have a relationship to die or to do anything about it at all. That is the flaw in this.

The problem with the amendments on the eligibility criteria that we are considering is that, if they were all adopted—this is an administrative point—they would not ensure that that knowledgeable individual or practice with whom the patient has a relationship has any role whatever in making this important decision, involving the family or consulting anybody at all. That is the flaw.

This has been a valuable debate because I think it has demonstrated—and I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, recognised in his earlier comments —that there was value in that relationship, and I am not surprised by that, given the conclusions that the commission he chaired came to, but the problem is that that is not reflected in the Bill at all.

If I may, I will conclude on this point before I address the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Winterton. Why we have these debates, and the reason for hearing from noble Lords with opinions, is because it highlights the flaws that exist in the Bill. The point of this process is that that then enables the sponsor of the Bill and all noble Lords to listen carefully to the debate and to bring forward improvements on Report.

I hope that, in his response, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, will draw on the concerns that have been highlighted and can indicate his approach. If he is minded to bring forward amendments that deal with some of these things, that clearly means that other people do not need to. If he indicates he is not minded to do that, then other noble Lords can bring forward amendments to deal with it, which can then be debated and voted on at Report stage. That is the point of our process and why we debate these things in the Chamber: so that everybody can hear the debate and the points. It is a better way of improving the legislation than having lots of private discussions to which most of us are not party.

What I would say to the noble Baroness, Lady Winterton—

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, I think there is a misconception by the noble Lord on how modern general practice works through the electronic patient record. If the report goes to a GP, like any report does, it is clinically coded, and there would be a flag on the patient’s electronic patient record that would indicate to the GP and anyone in that practice that an assisted death had been requested through the co-ordinating doctor. It would not, to use the noble Lord’s words, just be postboxed; it would be automatically registered on the electronic patient record, and a flag would come up for anyone in the GP practice to see what was happening.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

That is a very helpful intervention, and I absolutely accept that. I understand that that is the way it works. Certainly, with the way the NHS works now, you can go on to the NHS app, which many noble Lords may use, access your own patient record and see all those various notifications registered. He is absolutely right that a flag would be raised; the problem is that there is no requirement in the way the Bill is drafted at the moment for that GP practice to do anything as a result of that flag being raised—none at all. I think there should be. We can come on to that, as we progress through the Bill, when we get to Clause 10. That is the point I was trying to raise.

I do not want to go over my time, but I will deal briefly with the points by the noble Baroness, Lady Winterton. I agree with her. It is right that the House scrutinises the Bill properly. If you look at the number of days of debate in the House of Commons, I think there were 11 days in Committee. If you look at the normal way this House conducts itself—because we tend to do a more detailed level of scrutiny than the House of Commons—you would expect, as a rule of thumb, about 16 days of debate in Committee; then we normally have 50% of that on Report and at Third Reading. I do not disagree with her. It may be that this Bill requires more time, and that is clearly a discussion for the sponsor to have with the Government Chief Whip about making that time available. But I think the wrong response is for us to not do our jobs properly, not scrutinise the Bill and not make sure that it is a properly fit piece of legislation to get on to the statute book. That would be the wrong response. If we were to do that, we would be failing in our duty to legislate properly for the people of this country.