Medicines and Medical Devices Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 2nd September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as chair of the Association of Medical Research Charities, whose members contributed £1.9 billion to medical research last year, and of the Specialised Healthcare Alliance, which campaigns for those with rare conditions and those needing specialised care.

I will make three broad points. The first is to do with the Bill’s structure. I welcome the Bill, in that it could create opportunities for improved regulatory regimes. We cannot, however, tell whether it will. It is a skeleton Bill with a whole array of delegated powers and no detail of how the powers will actually be used. This makes effective, proper scrutiny very difficult, if not entirely impossible. The DPRRC report is especially damning on this point, as many noble Lords have noted. It is worth quoting its conclusion:

“We are deeply concerned not only by the Government’s failure to provide sufficient justification for the adoption of a ‘skeleton bill’ approach—which would give Ministers sweeping powers to almost completely re-write the existing regulatory regimes for medicines and medical devices—but also by their failure to acknowledge the breadth of the powers that the Bill would confer.”


The Minister wrote to me on 2 August, saying:

“You expressed some concern that this way of regulating the sector meant that Parliament would not be able to scrutinise the powers in the Bill if we did not provide further clarity about the policy changes we intended to make through the delegated powers. I have asked my officials to think further about the extent to which we can provide Parliament greater information to aid its scrutiny.”


That was a month ago. Can the Minister say what progress has been made in his thinking and whether we will see the fruits of it before Committee? For our part, in Committee we will want to explore means to improve scrutiny mechanisms, including the use of the made affirmative procedure mentioned by the DPRRC, and the use of a sunset provision, as discussed in the Commons.

My second point is to do with clinical trials, which are an absolutely critical part of UK life sciences and of what makes the UK a global leader in medical research. Anything that reduces the number of clinical trials will weaken that leadership and could delay access to new drugs and treatments. The Government understand this, which is why I was surprised by the weakness of their approach. The Bill simply requires the Minister, in making regulation, to “have regard to” the attractiveness of the UK as a place to carry out these trials or to supply human medicines. “Attractiveness” is not defined, and in any case this is a very weak and perhaps meaningless obligation that also entirely omits to mention manufacturing. We will want to return to all that in Committee.

We will also want to ask again which aspects of the CTR the Government believe to be in the best interests of UK patients, industry and non-commercial researchers, and which they will regulate for. We will also ask how the Government will assess these best interests and what they may be.

My final point is about consultation. We welcome the commitment to consultation and to a possible early start for it. Such consultation is necessary, but is not, as the DPRRC points out, a substitute for parliamentary scrutiny. The Bill and the Explanatory Memorandum contain no detail about the form of consultation, who is to be consulted and when, or when the consultation results will be available to Parliament. Will the Minister provide answers to these questions ahead of Committee, and could he confirm that patient groups, medical research charities and academic researchers will be among the consultees?

Medicines and Medical Devices Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 19th October 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord O'Shaughnessy (Con)]

My Lords, I point out to noble Lords my interests as set out in the register. On Second Reading, when taking a somewhat unfashionable stance in defence of the delegated powers, I said that I was not going to die on that hill again—but, to mix my metaphors, I have been drawn, like a moth to a flame, back into this argument.

I want to make two brief points. The first has been perfectly well made already by my noble friend Lord Lansley, and is about the sheer impracticality of sunsetting legislation. Committing to an arbitrary deadline of that kind is not something that any Government could responsibly do, particularly at this time, and given the uncertainty that has already been discussed.

The second point is that many of the criticisms raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and by the Constitution Committee have been dealt with, to some extent, by changes that the Minister, my noble friend Lord Bethell, has proposed to the affirmative procedure, which we are not discussing today. It is therefore worth recognising the progress that the Government have already made to try to meet those concerns, which were set out so well by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and others, about the powers being given to the Government.

Again echoing my noble friend Lord Lansley, I would say that if we were to go down that route, the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, represent the right approach, which is to commit not to a sunset clause, with all the cliff edges that that would involve, but to providing draft consolidated legislation. There is a good case in its own right for doing that, particularly in the circumstances. Like my noble friend Lord Lansley, I encourage my noble friend the Minister to look seriously at that idea.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, we have Amendment 139 in this group. It would require all the delegated powers in the Bill to expire on the third anniversary of its passing. We chose the three-year time limit because that had been discussed in the Commons. But, having heard what other noble Lords have said on the issue of expiry, I am persuaded that two years may be more appropriate, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has argued, given the wide-ranging and carte-blanche nature of the delegated powers. I am also persuaded that a sunset provision is absolutely necessary.

As many noble Lords noted on Second Reading, this is a skeleton Bill. It contains no, or very little, policy, and allows policy to be made by secondary legislation. This clearly avoids meaningful parliamentary scrutiny, and is a direct and flagrant abuse of the delegated powers system.

In its 16th report of the 2017-19 Session, The Legislative Process: The Delegation of Powers, our Constitution Committee noted that the Government had designated

“functions for which delegated powers may be appropriate”.

These included

“providing for the technical implementation of a policy; filling in detail that may need to be updated frequently or is otherwise subject to change; and accommodating cases where the detailed policy has to work differently in different circumstances. Such purposes constitute reasonable uses of delegated powers.”

The Constitution Committee’s view of all this was clear. It considered the use of delegated legislation to formulate policy, or to create new criminal offences or public bodies, to be “constitutionally unacceptable.”

The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, in its recent report on the Bill, points out that the Government say nothing about why it would not be appropriate to have aspects of the regulatory regimes which are not detailed or technical on the face of the Bill, combined with more focused delegated powers to fill in the detail. This is still the case.

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[Lord Kakkar (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I support Amendments 5 and 70 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. I seek further clarification on the Government’s purpose regarding the amendments proposed by the Minister.

First, what is the rationale for moving away from the current basis on which regulations in this regard exist, which states the purpose of safeguarding public health? Why do the Government not think that appropriate as the basis for legislation for medicines and medical devices? It has been the basis on which regulations have previously existed in domestic legislation and it seems counterintuitive to move away from that purpose, as so clearly explained by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley.

Secondly, there is this question of whether there should be an objective or a subjective test attending the purpose of legislation, all parties having agreed that it is of benefit to move away from simply having a power to clearly defining a purpose. There has been considerable debate and discussion about what is considered the frequent use of judicial review now and how in some way it undermines the position of Parliament and is less than helpful more generally in our country. It seems therefore intuitive for a Government who have concerns about what is sometimes considered excessive use of judicial review to try to provide legislation that would make it less necessary and less frequently turned to.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, made the point that clarity is essential. Surely an element of clarity would be to have in place an objective test—to safeguard public health—rather than, as currently, merely being “satisfied”. The need that the Secretary of State can make regulations if he is satisfied, as we have heard in this debate, is much more subjective and therefore must be open to much more frequent challenge.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I have only just learned that if we do not pass the government amendments in this group, we put at risk the required legislative consent order for Northern Ireland. I had intended to oppose Amendments 2, 7 and 14; I did not understand why Amendment 2 was necessary or had any real force or meaning—in any case, I much preferred Amendment 5 —and Amendment 7 seemed downright confusing, since its net effect is to impose an obligation on the Minister to have regard to certain things when considering making regulations but no obligation to consider the specified things when actually making these regulations.

I have spoken to the Minister and will now not oppose the government amendments. However, I feel that we have been bounced. I first realised the Government’s intention to move when I read today’s Chair’s guidance and I understood that there was a Northern Ireland problem when I was given, about 40 minutes ago, a copy of the note from the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, from yesterday. We were not copied in on that note. I strongly feel that this is all very unsatisfactory.

The Minister has not really answered the question that I asked him in our impromptu interval of why we need to rush. Could he explain why delaying the start of the legislative consent order process until Report would be a problem? It is still not clear to me. I trust the Minister’s assessment but I do not understand how he arrived at it. In his note to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, he says, for example, that the delay would mean that we could not meet some unspecified timing objective but he prays in aid the notion that the minimum interval between Committee and Report is a contributing factor. We can change that interval; we could choose. Could the Minister explain again why it is necessary to do this today?

[Baroness Jolly (LD) [V]]

My Lords, this has been a useful debate on health and safety when making regs. The Government have tried to strengthen this with their amendments in this group. My noble friend Lord Sharkey just spoke about that; I too will look at them in the light of Committee and determine what to come back with on Report.

On government Amendments 2, 7 and 68, we should have these regulations only if we are absolutely satisfied that they would promote health and safety. Government amendments 51, 54 and 56 are all about the promotion of one or more of health and welfare of animals, health and safety of the public, and the environment. There is a clear connection with animals and the environment; has the Minister spoken to Defra and BEIS about these amendments?

I also wonder that we are not discussing those medical devices that are joint veterinary and medical devices. As I said at Second Reading, veterinary medicine is becoming much more sophisticated and slightly less agricultural—that is not the right way to describe it, but it is now very high-tech in certain areas. Could the Minister outline the legal situation here, as, when we are discussing medical devices, veterinary devices are not included? Clearly this should fall within the scope of the Bill but, as I see it, there are no amendments covering that.

Moving to the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, I supported Amendment 5. We have left the EU, but I see no reason why we cannot use its regulation if we think it cannot be improved on. I was happy to put my name to this amendment and agree that subjective measures are nowhere near as effective as objective ones. This is an area where objectivity is much more important than subjectivity.

The amendment elegantly reflects the objective of safeguarding the public health element in EU regulations. A Secretary of State has a duty to maximise the public health of our English population. I am sure it is not written down anywhere, but that is absolutely what he or she is responsible for doing. As such, I firmly believe that this amendment belongs in the Bill. My noble friend Lady Walmsley spoke powerfully about Amendment 5; we should really consider her arguments when we determine what we will do on Report.

My final point is on the objective of Amendment 70 to

“safeguard public health through the supply of medical devices.”

This amendment elegantly reflects the objective of safeguarding public health in EU regulations. There is much to look at in this group. I am sure that we will determine what comes back on Report later in the day.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

I call the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

[Inaudible.]

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

Could the noble Lord please unmute his microphone?

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

Can you hear me now? Yes? Good. Noble Lords will be relieved to hear that I will not start again. I will speak to Amendments 34, 36 and 37.

Clause 4 deals with clinical trials, which delivered £1.5 billion in GVA and £335 million to the NHS in 2018-19. They are an absolutely critical part of UK life sciences and part of what makes the UK a global leader in medical research. Anything that reduces the number or share of clinical trials in the UK weakens that leadership and could delay access to new drugs or treatments.

In its briefing, the APBI points out that our share of clinical trial applications and patient recruits has fallen since 2016. As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said, we now rank behind the US, Germany and Spain for phase 3 trials—and Covid has had a dramatic effect. The University of Southampton has published research showing that 1,500 clinical trials of new drugs and treatments for cancers, heart disease and other serious illnesses have been permanently closed down in Britain, with a further 9,000 suspended.

The Government know all this and acknowledge the importance of clinical trials. Given that, Clause 4 is a surprisingly weak response. It does not require the Government to do anything at all. It simply says that they may regulate—it does not say how they may regulate—and lists the areas in which they may regulate. This is another example of the abuse of secondary legislation. It gives unspecified policy-changing powers to Ministers without saying what these policies might be, except that they should do no harm—not a very demanding qualification.

When questioned about this and asked which bits of the CTR they will carry across, the Government’s response is, “The elements that are in the UK’s best interests.” These best interests are to be identified after consultation with interested parties. This all seems unnecessarily feeble. Researchers, commercial and academic, need certainty and stability as soon as possible. Ideally, they would like the provisions of the new UK regime to incorporate all possible provisions of the CTR as they come into force. We know what these provisions are. We know all the thinking behind them. The UK played a central part in their construction in the first place. Our amendments try to give some clarity and certainty to the situation.

Amendment 34 would replace “may” with “must”. It would oblige the Government to do something and does not just give them the power to do something if they feel like it. Substituting “must” for “may” would mean that the Government must make provision corresponding or similar to provision in the CTR.

Amendment 36 would modify this requirement slightly to acknowledge that we cannot adopt certain provisions of the CTR. These are the provisions that relate to the EU clinical trials information system and the assessment model involving co-ordinated decision-making on multi-state trials. Amendment 36 would add “where possible” to the requirement to make provision corresponding to or similar to provision in the CTR to allow for this.

Amendment 37 specifies two features of the CTR that the Government must incorporate. These are specified because they are new and very important, and for the avoidance of doubt about the meaning of “corresponding to” or “similar”. The two new features are the new definition of clinical trials and the allowing of co-sponsorship. In its briefing, CRUK notes that the MHRA has had considerable input in the new definition of clinical trials. It notes in particular that the new definition expands the scope of low-risk trials and excludes altogether some studies, such as pure pharmacology studies that are focused on how medicines work rather than on the extent to which they do. The CTR also defines and allows co-sponsorship, where two or more sponsors across multiple countries may share responsibilities. CRUK regards this as a very positive move, allowing for more flexibility in trial set-up and helping to foster collaboration. We helped to design both these new features. We should ensure that they are incorporated into our new regulatory regime.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I am glad to follow the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, because he made some important points and it saves me having to make the same points less well.

The purpose of Amendment 35—in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar—is precisely to explore the issues that the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Hunt, raised. I am concerned that, as it stands, the provision may mean that we do not align sufficiently with the clinical trials regulations as they exist in the European Union. That is a great pity because we have gone to an enormous amount of trouble to try to improve the clinical trials regulations in the European Union; indeed, we arrived at a point where they were significantly better than the previous regulations. To depart from them now seems a retrograde step.

We cannot be sure that we will stay aligned with those regulations for ever but having the objective of seeking to have our clinical trials regulations correspond to those in the European Union opens the option for us to be in the clinical trials information system. If we start to diverge from the EU clinical trials regulations, I am not sure how we can then be incorporated into that system. That automatically means significant difficulties in trying to manage multi-state clinical trials in Europe with a view to an authorisation process through the European Medicines Agency because the information system will, I think, be an essential pre-condition for marketing authorisation applications to the EMA. The purpose of Amendment 35 is precisely to explore this issue. What do the Government mean by “or similar”? Do they intend to diverge or not? If they intend not to diverge and to retain corresponding regulations, that is excellent. If they intend to do otherwise, that is not so good.

I do not intend to enter into the argument about aligning with the European Medicines Agency for the simple reason that we have been here before. We legislated in the Trade Bill in the last Session to align ourselves with the agency and to participate in its processes. Unfortunately, I do not think that that is going to be available to us, so legislating for it in the United Kingdom will be, I am afraid, without effect. I will focus on the Clinical Trials Information System because there is likely to be a willingness and interest on the part of our European partners to retain the United Kingdom in this process. I hope that is so, that we might be able to attain that, and that that will be the Government’s objective.

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[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, we strongly support Amendments 4, 42, 52 and 92 in this group.

The proposal in the Bill to create new criminal offences by statutory instrument is completely unacceptable. It is a matter of basic principle that the creation of new criminal offences requires proper parliamentary scrutiny. The delegated powers affirmative procedure does not provide this or anything like it. This ought not to be controversial. The Government’s own list of the areas in which it is appropriate to use delegated legislation does not include the creation of criminal offences.

Our Constitution Committee has made its position very clear. It considers the use of delegated legislation to formulate policy or create new criminal offences or public bodies constitutionally unacceptable. The Government propose to do the first two of those things in this Bill; it is dismaying that they should so directly and bluntly ignore the conclusion of the Constitution Committee.

The Government appear, however, to have felt the need to modify their initial position somewhat. Their amendments in this group preserve the power to create new criminal offences by statutory instrument, but now cap any sentence for breach at two years. That is a category error. Our objection is to the creation of criminal offences by delegated powers. The length of the sentence attached is completely irrelevant and I am amazed that the Government think that capping the sentence might make the creation of criminal offences proposal more acceptable.

There is an obvious and fundamental principle at stake here. Criminal offences, no matter what penalties are attached, should not be created without full parliamentary scrutiny. They should not be created by the use of delegated powers. I urge the Minister to think again and to remove the offending provisions from the Bill. If he is disinclined to do that, I hope that the House will insist on Report.

[Lord Kakkar (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I very much support what the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, has just said. In so doing, I support Amendments 4, 42, 52, 63, 69 and 92 in this group.

It seems counterintuitive at the very least for a Government to come forward with proposals to give a Minister powers using a delegated provision to create new criminal offences and, when challenged, to justify the position by saying, “Well, we will limit the sanction to two years’ imprisonment.” This completely misses the point, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. There is a clear principle at stake here, which has been well described by the Constitution Committee in its report on this legislation. Very simply, it offends liberty and the functioning of our democracy that a Government can propose to create criminal offences that would deny a citizen their liberty for one day, let alone a maximum of two years, and feel that there should not be proper parliamentary scrutiny in the accepted fashion for the creation of criminal offences. Her Majesty’s Government should think very carefully about what they propose to do here and bring their own amendments beyond the government amendments suggested in this group.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

6: Page 1, line 6, at end insert—
“( ) Regulations made under subsection (1) are subject, in relation to regulations made by the Secretary of State, to the super-affirmative procedure set out in section (Super-affirmative procedure), in relation to regulations made by a Northern Ireland department, to section (Super-affirmative procedure: Northern Ireland), and, in relation to regulations of the Secretary of State and a Northern Ireland department acting jointly, to both.”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and the amendments to page 5 line 12, page 7 line 22 and page 9 line 27 in the name of Lord Sharkey, replace the existing affirmative procedure with a super-affirmative procedure in order to increase parliamentary scrutiny.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 6 deals with human medicines. Amendments 53, 71 and 98 in the group make the same provisions as Amendment 6 but for veterinary medicines, medical devices and information systems. I will also speak to Amendments 143 and 144, which deal with the mechanisms that make Amendments 6, 53, 71 and 98 work. Our Amendments 135, 136 and 142 would replace the negative procedure in cases of urgency with the “made affirmative” procedure. I shall not speak to these because the Minister has more or less conceded the point in his new amendments.

Amendment 6 is in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews. I am immensely grateful for their support and regret that they cannot be present today because they are all speaking at the internal market Bill Second Reading in the Chamber. It is extremely unhelpful that the Government have scheduled two significant Bills for the same time slots. They should be decoupled to prevent future clashes.

Amendment 6 and its equivalents deal with the non-urgent scrutiny procedures currently set out in the Bill. They replace, in Parts 1, 2 and 3, the affirmative procedure for delegated powers with the super-affirmative procedure set out in Amendments 143 and 144 later in the Bill. The purpose of these amendments, taken as a whole, is to restore an element of parliamentary scrutiny to a Bill which so conspicuously lacks it.

This is a skeleton Bill. Parts 1, 2 and 3 contain no policy detail but give the Minister effective carte blanche. The Minister is given almost unfettered power to remake our human medicines, our veterinary medicines and our medical devices regimes. The reports of the DPRR Committee and the Constitution Committee were highly critical of this approach. At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, chair of the DPRRC and speaking for it, said that

“the structure of the Bill is absolutely atrocious and an affront to parliamentary democracy.”

He went on to say that his committee was

“deeply concerned not only by the Government’s failure to provide sufficient justification for the adoption of a ‘skeleton bill’ approach—which would give Ministers sweeping powers to almost completely re-write the existing regulatory regimes … but also by their failure to acknowledge the breadth of the powers that the Bill would confer.”

He concluded:

“Parliament is effectively bypassed; that is a sick joke of good law.”—[Official Report, 2/9/20; cols. 415-16.]


Despite all this, it is likely that the Minister will choose to represent the proposed use of the affirmative procedure in this Bill as meaningful parliamentary scrutiny, but it is emphatically not that. Parliament cannot amend SIs and this House has voted down affirmative SIs just four times in the past 70 years. The Constitution Committee in its 2018 report The Legislative Process: the Delegation of Powers noted:

“Without a genuine risk of defeat, and no amendment possible, Parliament is doing little more than rubber-stamping the Government’s secondary legislation. This is constitutionally unacceptable.”


Affirmative SIs do not constitute meaningful parliamentary scrutiny, and the Government’s promise of wide, but unspecified, consultation on the powers in the Bill does not somehow magically restore parliamentary scrutiny. Parliament is still bypassed.

There is a delegated legislation procedure that allows for significant parliamentary scrutiny. This procedure, which comes in several flavours, is known to the Government as “exceptional procedures” and to Erskine May, in Part 4 Chapter 31.14, as the “super-affirmative procedure”. This is what our amendments propose should replace the existing affirmative procedures written into Parts 1, 2 and 3. Erskine May characterises the super-affirmative procedure as follows:

“The super affirmative procedure provides both Houses with opportunities to comment on proposals for secondary legislation and to recommend amendments before orders for affirmative approval are brought forward in their final form.”


It notes that

“the power to amend the proposed instrument remains with the Minister: the two Houses and their committees can only recommend changes, not make them.”

Our amendments follow this pattern and are more generally based on the variant of the procedure used in the Public Bodies Act 2011. Amendments 143 and 144 set out the details and the stages. First, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a draft of the proposed regulations and a document explaining them; secondly, he or she must request a committee of either House whose remit includes health, science or technology to report on the draft regulations within 30 days; and thirdly, in proposing a draft statutory instrument containing the regulations, the Secretary of State must take account of any representations, any resolution of either House and any recommendations of the committee to which the draft was referred. After the expiry of the 30-day period, the Secretary of State may lay before Parliament regulations in terms of the original or a revised draft. The Secretary of State must also state what representations, recommendations or resolutions were made in the 30-day period and give details of any such. He or she must also explain any changes made in a revised draft. After that, the normal affirmative procedure continues.

The Library records that the last insertion in a Bill of the super-affirmative procedure was by the Government themselves in October 2017 in the Financial Claims and Guidance Bill. When they are not doing it themselves, the Government traditionally put forward any of or all three routine objections to the use of super-affirmatives. The first is that it is unnecessary because the use of the affirmative procedure provides sufficient parliamentary scrutiny. Sometimes, this objection is elaborated by praying in aid extensive consultation. I remind the Minister of the DPRRC’s remarks in paragraph 45 of its report on the Bill where it says that

“we are concerned at consultation being presented as a substitute for Parliamentary scrutiny.”

It is quite obviously untrue that the affirmative procedure allows any kind of effective scrutiny.

The second routine objection is that the super-affirmative procedure is cumbersome. I take this to mean only that this procedure is more elaborate than the affirmative procedure, which is, of course, the whole point. It is necessarily more elaborate because it provides for actual scrutiny where the affirmative procedure does not. The third routine objection is that it all takes too long. This has force only if there is some imminent deadline. The Minister may argue that there is such a deadline at midnight on 31 December. At this point, the Government lose the powers conferred by Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act to modify the regimes, but does this really present a deadline? I leave aside here the issue of whether this Bill will have been passed by then, given its very slow progress and the sparse future scheduling.

The impact assessment helpfully sets out, in Annexe B, the number of times the Section 2(2) powers have been used. Between 2013 and 2019 they generated a total of 11 SIs. In each of the last four years they have generated just one SI. This is not an avalanche. Nothing in these figures shows urgency. Nothing suggests we need to rush regime changes by excluding scrutiny provisions from the Bill. Nothing suggests that using the super-affirmative procedure would cause significant delay or disadvantage.

The impact assessment notes explicitly, on page 5:

“policy development is at an early stage”.

This was in June. If policy development has made progress since then, perhaps the Minister can now tell the Committee what policy changes he intends to propose, using the delegated powers in Parts 1, 2 and 3.

If policy development has not made progress, it is vital that when it does, and sees daylight in SIs, those SIs are scrutinised as fully as possible, as the super-affirmative procedure permits. In the event that a policy or technical change is required urgently, the provisions of this Bill, with the latest Government amendment, should allow the use of the “made affirmative” procedure.

This is a skeleton Bill. It is an attempt to bypass Parliamentary scrutiny. It contains no policy details and has no special claim to urgency as a reason for limiting scrutiny. The affirmative procedure is not meaningful scrutiny, as our Constitution Committee has pointed out—but the super-affirmative procedure is. That is what these amendments propose. Parliament should not be bypassed. I beg to move.

[Lord Kakkar (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and everything he has said in moving Amendment 6. These are clear matters of principle, and although one must accept that government Amendment 133 is an attempt to provide concessions on them, the noble Lord has set out clearly why adoption of even the affirmative procedure will not provide sufficient scope for appropriate scrutiny of what may turn out to be exceedingly important regulations.

The argument for adoption of the super-affirmative procedure has been well made, and I shall not repeat all the noble Lord’s arguments, save to say that in moving his amendment he also dealt with all the potential arguments that could be put against what is proposed in the amendments. In those circumstances, bearing in mind the importance of the issues that the legislation will cover, and the deep anxieties already expressed in Committee about the nature of the Bill, both in practical terms and in terms of its constitutional implications, Her Majesty’s Government should seriously consider accepting these important amendments.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)]

Finally, I call the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, to respond to the debate on his amendment.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Jolly and Lady Thornton, but I am disappointed that the Minister still seems to regard the affirmative procedure as constituting effective scrutiny. Let me briefly quote again the Constitution Committee, which says:

“Without a genuine risk of defeat, and no amendment possible, Parliament is doing little more than rubber-stamping the Government’s secondary legislation. This is constitutionally unacceptable.”


Neither the DPRRC nor the Constitution Committee agrees with the Government’s position on this, I think largely because it is obviously wrong. I am also disappointed that the Government seem to continue to believe that extensive consultation is equivalent to or a substitute for parliamentary scrutiny—another obviously wrong position, as the DPRRC makes clear.

As to the objection that the super-affirmative procedure is too cumbersome or lengthy, neither of these objections could have any weight unless there were some urgency. As I have explained, there is not; even if there were to be, the “made affirmative” procedure would kick in and take care of it.

As I remarked in the opening group this afternoon, at the root of all this is a desire by the Government to take powers to make policy before they have decided what that policy is. This is not only perverse but evades parliamentary scrutiny and bypasses Parliament. We will return to this issue on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 6 withdrawn.

Medicines and Medical Devices Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 26th October 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

The amendment, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt, gives the Secretary of State a duty to act with a view to ensuring, rather than having regard to, safety, availability and UK attractiveness when exercising the powers in the Bill. The Bill states:

“the appropriate authority must have regard to … the attractiveness of the relevant part of the United Kingdom”,

and we want to change that. However, there is no definition of attractiveness in the Bill.

The Independent Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Review, led by the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, published in July, focused on safety issues with just three medical interventions. Along with these, recent scandals such as those relating to metal-on-metal hips and PIP breast implants, show the need for strong regulatory oversight. Patient safety must be prioritised, including where there are competing considerations, such as the attractiveness of the UK as a place to conduct clinical trials and supply medicines and medical devices.

To address this, we believe that either the attractiveness clauses should be removed, or a statutory definition of attractiveness should be included in the Bill, along with a further provision that the appropriate authority should always prioritise safety. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

I shall speak briefly to Amendments 9 and 13. I should start by saying that I enthusiastically support Amendment 8, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton. We all know that the phrase “have regard to” lacks any real force. Like her amendment, our Amendments 9 and 13 are intended to strengthen Clause 1(2), whose opening words read

“In making regulations under subsection (1), the appropriate authority must have regard to”,


followed by a list of the things to which it must have regard. Amendment 9 would change those opening words to read, “In making regulations under subsection (1), the appropriate authority must have regard to, and in the case of regulations not subject to section 42(6), (7) or (8), must publish with the draft regulations an assessment of their impact on,” and then the list of things to which regard must be had.

Clause 42(6), (7) and (8) are excluded because they contain urgency provisions and may now anyway make use of the “made affirmative” procedure. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that there must be a full assessment of the impact of any regulation on the three specified areas. This applies to all three of the areas and is of particular importance in the assessment of safety and how it is to be prioritised, in subsection (2)(a).

Amendment 13 addresses the issue of assigning priority to the safety of human medicines, as do other amendments in this group. It would rewrite subsection (2)(a), so that instead of reading,

“the safety of human medicines”,

it would read “the priority of ensuring the safety of human medicines”. Other noble Lords have tabled amendments suggesting different ways of ensuring this priority and I look forward to hearing their contributions. But whatever the variations in approach, it is obvious that a strong, clear and unambiguous statement of the priority of the safety of human medicines needs to be inserted in the Bill.

[Baroness Cumberlege (Con)]

I shall speak to Amendments 10, 12, 74 and 75 on the second Marshalled List, and I thank the noble Lords who have supported these amendments—the noble Baronesses, Lady Burt of Solihull and Lady Hollins, and the noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Hunt of Kings Heath.

This Bill chimes perfectly with the review that I led into two medications and a device. The review culminated in the report First Do No Harm, which states:

“Innovation in medical care has done wonderful things and saved many lives. But innovation without comprehensive pre-market testing and post-marketing surveillance and long-term monitoring of outcomes is, quite simply, dangerous.”


In conducting the review over two and a half years, my team and I listened to hundreds of women and their families, with their stories of anguish, acute suffering, destroyed relationships and parents whose children have been harmed, deformed and had their potential lives ruined.

I have been told that this Bill is not a safety Bill. If it is not, what is it, for goodness’ sake? How can safety not be the overriding purpose of the Bill? My modest amendments, and those of other noble Lords, seek to make it so.

In paragraphs (a) to (c) of Clause 1(2), safety is not the primary consideration but is on an equal footing with the availability of medicines and the UK as an attractive place in which to conduct clinical trials and the supply of medicines. These aspirations are of course important but in the way in which the Bill is drafted safety is simply an “also ran”. It should not be; it should be of overriding importance. As the noble Lord, Lord Patel, said in his amendment on the first day of Committee, the construction of this clause needs improvement.

My review found safety seriously wanting. We were commissioned to review two medications given to women. The first was Primodos. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, two little pills were given to women to test whether they were pregnant. From the late 1950s, concerns were raised that these tests could harm and cause abnormalities in a developing baby. Although disputed, there is a body of opinion that has linked these hormone pregnancy tests to a wide range of various malformations. We discovered opportunities where action should have been taken and was not.

These pregnancy tests were taken off the market in 1978 following concerns over their safety—more than a decade after safety concerns were first raised. No one listened. The risk to patient safety was not prioritised, one result of which has been a 40-year battle to get an independent review of the regulations that were found wanting. I accept that regulation was in its infancy in the 1960s and 1970s, but patient safety should have been the overriding consideration then, as it must be now.

In the course of our review, we met the children—now adults—who suffered so much and their families. Many dreadful impacts have been associated with these pregnancy tests, such as loss or shortening of limbs—we have seen other examples of this happening in the past—heart defects, spinal issues, seizures, dysmorphic facial features, digestive and bowel issues, and so on. We were struck by the unremitting guilt felt by the women who took the pills. They feel to blame for their children’s disabilities. They suffer enduring psychological harm, and although we told them, “It wasn’t your fault; you weren’t told; how can you be blamed?”, I fear that we did not convince them.

The second medication reviewed was sodium valproate. It is a very effective drug for controlling epilepsy but it has a history that should never be repeated. When first licensed in 1972, it was known to be teratogenic in animals. Prescribing doctors were warned that it should be used only in severe and resistant cases of epilepsy in pregnant women. In the 1980s, academic literature drew attention to the risks. In the 1990s, the risks of neural tube defects and other congenital malformations were known. Even then, women were saying that exposure to sodium valproate had caused damage to their offspring.

In early 2000, doctors were again warned of an association with delayed development in children, with delayed speech, IQ affected and reports of autism. Throughout this tragic history, clinicians have been warned and women and their families have not been listened to; they have been dismissed and had their knowledge denied. It took 40 years after sodium valproate was introduced to the market to produce a toolkit, the purpose of which was to provide information to women of childbearing age and healthcare professionals about the harm that could be caused. Two years later, in 2018, a pregnancy prevention programme was introduced; it stipulated three measures that were designed to prevent further harm.

You would suppose that this is the end of a tragic story—problem solved—but that is not so. It is truly shocking that, today, epileptic pregnant women on sodium valproate have a one in two chance of having a disabled child. They are still exposed to huge risks because they are not told what those risks are. Babies continue to be been born with lifelong disabilities due to exposure to this drug. We know that the results are catastrophic.

The third and final area that we were asked to review was surgical mesh, a device inserted to support pelvic organ prolapse and to treat stress urinary incontinence. For many women, mesh surgery is trouble-free and leads to improvements in their condition, but that is not the case for all. A BMJ article published on 10 October 2018 had the arresting headline “How mesh became a four letter word”. In the article, Jonathan Gornall charts the rapid rise and fall of vaginal mesh; it is, as he says,

“a story that offers lessons for the entire medical community, and for manufacturers and regulators”.

Unlike many other devices, polypropylene mesh is intended to remain in situ for life. We heard from countless women who sought to have it removed but were unsuccessful; sometimes attempts even caused further serious damage.

Why would they want it removed? Because mesh ruins their lives. We were told by hundreds of women that they suffer excruciating pain, recurrent infections and haemorrhages, bowel issues, recurring or new incontinence, and nerve damage that restricted their mobility. Fit young women were confined to a wheelchair for the rest of their lives. I will always remember one little boy telling us, “I just want my old mum back.”

We heard about sexual difficulties leading to the loss of a sex life and broken marriages. We heard from women how the constant pain resulted in the loss of employment—that is, their job—so they lost their income. Because of that, they could not afford the mortgage or rent so they lost their homes, and because they were homeless, they were fearful that their children would be taken into care. One woman told us:

“This is not a life. It is an existence.”


We were so shaken by what we heard that, in July 2018, we recommended that vaginal mesh should be paused. Our recommendation was immediately accepted by NHS England and the Department of Health and Social Care. The scandal is that our recommendations were not new; all had been suggested before, but no action had been taken. It should not have been for us to recommend this. If safety was of paramount importance, the healthcare system should have picked this up decades before. After all, mesh was first used in the 1960s. It gathered pace in the 1990s; by 2001, it was the most common operation used for ameliorating stress urinary incontinence—a very unpleasant condition, but not life-threatening.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 15, but I begin by supporting Amendment 16, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. I strongly agree about the importance of the UK being seen as an attractive place to promote medical innovation.

Amendment 15 is in my name and those of my noble friend Lady Jolly and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, and I am very grateful for their support. The amendment addresses Clause 1(2)(c). As we have just discussed in the previous group, subsection (2) lists what an appropriate authority must have regard to when making regulations under subsection (1). Subsection (2)(c) specifies that the appropriate authority must have regard to,

“the attractiveness of the relevant part of the United Kingdom as a place in which to conduct clinical trials or supply human medicines”.

But we have, in extraordinary circumstances, accepted the Minister’s Amendment 14, so that the text will now read,

“the likelihood of the relevant part of the United Kingdom being seen as an attractive or favourable place in which to conduct clinical trials or supply human medicines”.

That is not a formulation that lends itself to easy measurement.

I listened very carefully to the Minister’s brief explanation of the merits of his amendment, but I was unable to see a clear and actionable distinction between his new version and the old one. It was all getting a little theological—“angels dancing on the head of a pin” sprang to mind. In any case, the new Government amendment shares two defects with the old version.

The first is that they are both completely unambitious. We should be looking at least to maintain, and preferably to increase, the attractiveness of the UK as a place to do clinical trials or supply human medicines. I spoke last Monday about the critical importance of clinical trials to the UK’s global leadership in the life sciences. I have already noted that the number and share of clinical trials has declined since 2016, and we now rank behind the US, Germany and Spain. Because of Covid, we have abandoned 1,500 trials and suspended 9,000 more. We need to do better than simply to have regard to the attractiveness or the likelihood of being seen to be attractive. We need explicitly to maintain or improve that attractiveness, as our amendment proposes.

The second defect in both the Minister’s first and second versions of subsection (2)(c) is that they fail to mention manufacturing. Why is the appropriate authority not required to have regard to maintaining or improving the attractiveness of the UK as a place to manufacture human medicines? The ABPI raised this issue in its briefing for Second Reading, saying that, in addition to having regard to the attractiveness of the relevant part of the UK to conduct clinical trials or supply human medicines, the ABPI would also value an assurance from the Government that secondary legislation will support the attractiveness of the UK as a destination to develop and manufacture human medicines.

The ABPI has a point. I raised this question, and the ABPI’s position, with the Minister in a meeting on 13 October. In that meeting, the Minister’s officials replied that they thought that manufacturing was covered in other regulations. Will the Minister confirm that and tell us which regulations explicitly require the appropriate authorities to have regard to the attractiveness of the UK as a place for developing or manufacturing human medicines? If, however, there is no such statutory requirement elsewhere, would the Minister consider adopting Amendment 15?

Amendments 58 and 78 would make the same provisions as Amendment 15 but for veterinary medicines and medical devices.

I should also say that there are obviously enough opposing or various views on the attractiveness issue to make it clear that we will want to return to this subject on Report, not only in the context of Amendment 14. I look forward to the Minister’s response to Amendment 15.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I thank all the speakers who supported our Amendment 20 and the amendments that follow on from it. I need to start by placing on the record that we do not agree with the Government’s amendments to this clause but we will not object to them. Were we not in the situation of basically having to agree to put these amendments in the Bill, this is a very good example of where we would need to have a different kind of debate. Looking specifically at the Government’s amendments, I think that adding the word “favourable” does not clarify the meaning or elucidate anything. Since we are not absolutely certain what “attractiveness” means, I am not sure we can be clear what “favourable” means either.

Our amendments, and others that noble Lords have tabled, would take the first stab at defining “attractiveness”. I am very attracted to the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, spoke to, because the idea of improvement is also very important. We are in the same territory and we will need to put further thought into this between now and the next stage of the Bill.

My noble friend Lord Hunt was completely correct when he spoke about the need to address how slow we are in this country in the uptake of new medicines and innovations. The noble Lord, Lord Patel, said that if we do not define “attractiveness” we might end up with the sort of undesirable trade-offs we discussed earlier today.

We have had a very interesting and useful discussion—the kind of discussion we should have in Grand Committee—where various points of view come together. We can see that we might end up with a completely new amendment at the next stage that will define “attractiveness” in the Bill and talk about the need for improvement and innovation. We will probably need to put our heads together between now and then.

Medicines and Medical Devices Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th October 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Stunell. As my noble friend Lady Sheehan so clearly and compellingly explained on Monday, this amendment deals with the key question of access to medicines and is particularly relevant as we find ourselves swept along by wave 2 of the global pandemic. It is clear that, at least initially and perhaps for much longer, supply of any Covid-19 vaccines will fall behind demand. This raises the urgent question of who should receive priority access to these vaccines. Who should get them first, here and internationally? How should equitable access be decided?

The Government appear to be adopting two contrasting approaches to this question. On the one hand, we have Gavin Williamson saying:

“It’s the right thing to be doing to be at the absolute front of the queue to make sure we’re in a position to get those vaccines first when they become available”—


and that does seem to be what we are doing. As of August, the United Kingdom was the world’s highest per caput buyer, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, mentioned on Monday. The vaccine taskforce has placed orders for six unproven vaccines, taking its potential stockpile to 340 million doses. Of course, we do not yet know to what extent, if at all, these vaccines might work, so some duplication is obviously prudent. But on the other hand, and while securing our place at the front of the queue as Mr Williamson recommends, we are also involved in trying to work out, under the auspices of the WHO, an equitable access scheme. The rationale for that is pretty obvious. Unless we have such a scheme, rich countries will end up vaccinated well in front of poor countries. In the face of a global pandemic, that approach carries obvious risk. It also carries moral risk.

The Government have committed £60 million to the WHO COVAX facility—the Covid-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility mentioned by my noble friend Lady Sheehan on Monday. COVAX seeks to enable global collaboration and equitable access to vaccines. It views this model of pooled procurement as preferable to rich countries doing bilateral deals. We have also joined 150 countries in expressing an interest in participating in COVAX for our own vaccine purchases. But there is clearly a risk that the bilateral purchasing of vaccines by the United Kingdom and other rich nations could undermine the work of COVAX. Could I ask the Minister how we balance our Williamson approach with our COVAX approach? How are these approaches prioritised? How much should we try to secure for ourselves and how much should we share? What criteria will be used to decide what access means in practice? We know something of what people in the UK think about the issue. Some 96% of the UK public supported the idea that national Governments should work together to ensure that treatments and vaccines can be manufactured in as many countries as possible and distributed globally to everyone who needs them.

My noble friend’s amendment also raises the issue of Crown use licences. We have previously used or threatened to use these licences in our negotiations with pharma. Can the Government confirm their willingness to use these licences if price negotiations on Covid-19 vaccines fail to reach a satisfactory conclusion?

I urge the Minister to give very serious consideration to the issues raised by this amendment. I will listen to his reply with great interest.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

I thank my noble friend Lady Sheehan for her introduction to this amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for the detail that he added to that.

My interest in this matter stems back to 2013, when I was part of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on HIV and AIDS, which produced a report called Access Denied. It was about barriers to access to antiretroviral drugs for HIV and AIDS in low and middle-income countries. In the course of our research work for that report, we held a number of hearings with all sorts of representatives from a number of international research groups based in the United Kingdom but which worked across Africa and Asia. We met user and patient groups and also included representatives from the pharmaceutical companies.

I vividly remember sitting in a room in Portcullis House during one of our question and answer sessions and putting a question to a representative of a pharmaceutical company that has cropped up in our discussions in the last couple of days. I asked him a simple question—whether there was a direct correlation between the R&D costs of a drug and the price. With disarming candour, he said, “No”. Once people’s jaws had ceased to drop, we had the revelation that actually there is no transparency about pricing in the pharmaceutical industry or about the extent to which public and private funding goes into the development of new medicines—and, in effect, an admission that the overstatement by pharmaceutical companies of the need to charge excessive prices in some markets to maintain their viability is not substantiated.

I am not an anti-pharma campaigner. I believe that human and animal welfare rests very much on the development of pharmaceutical knowledge and science, and I am all in favour of extension of research and development of new drugs. However, for far too long Governments of all sorts have been held over a barrel by pharmaceutical companies, and that should stop.

I say this as someone who has had a long-standing interest in HIV. To see some patient groups in some parts of the world continue to become infected and, perhaps, have threats to their lives that would not occur if they had simply been born in another country is devastating. For example, in the world of HIV, very little work is being done on development of antiretroviral drugs for paediatrics because there is very little call for that in western developed nations, whereas there is a very big need for it in sub-Saharan Africa. Our involvement in these matters has a direct bearing on the lives of people across the world and on our standing not only as one of the major governmental funders through the different international funds but as a country in which research into new and emerging transmissible diseases is second to none because of our long-standing history.

For all those reasons, I very much support my noble friend Lady Sheehan, and I await with interest the answer to the question that my noble friend Lord Stunell put, which was the one I was going to ask, about proposed new paragraph (d) in my noble friend’s amendment.

Medicines and Medical Devices Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 17th November 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Patel (CB) [V]]

My Lords, in speaking to my Amendment 127, I also speak in support of the amendments referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, on consultation with the devolved Administrations. While Scotland is devolved in terms of healthcare, the regulations on medicines and medical devices, particularly market authorisation, is not. I support the comments on consulting the devolved Administrations and I have no doubt that the Minister will respond.

I am extremely grateful to my friend, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, for adding his name to my Amendment 127. I am pleased to see that he might speak to it later. The amendment would add to line 9, page 24 of the Bill, the words

“patients and end users directly affected by the regulations”.

It would strengthen the consultation provision by requiring that patients and end users be part of any consultation relating to potential new regulation on medicines, veterinary medicines and medical devices.

Clause 41 creates a duty to consult the relevant authorities when using the delegated powers to make provisions for medicines, veterinary medicines and medical devices. However, this duty refers only to who the authority thinks it should consult, giving a wide area of discretion and providing no guidance or guarantee on consulting patients and end users of medicines and medical devices.

The Cumberlege review found widespread failure to listen to patients’ voices. It recommended that the regulatory framework underpinning the MHRA, and medicines and medical devices in general, be reformed to better take into account patients’ perspectives in the future. In addition, the review recommended that the MHRA regulatory framework should have a requirement to demonstrate how patient views have been taken into account and influenced regulatory design. With this in mind, it is surely crucial that any duty to consult on the exercise of powers should also include reference to the need to consult patients and end users of medicines and medical devices where that is considered reasonable.

I have been deliberately brief because this proposal is so obvious that I do not, I hope, need to speak at length. I am sure that the Minister recognises this, and I look forward to his response.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, all the amendments in this group deal with the very important question of consultation. As the DPRRC has pointed out in its report on the Bill, consultations are not a substitute for proper parliamentary scrutiny, which the Bill so obviously fails to provide, but in the absence of any real parliamentary mechanisms for real scrutiny, consultations take on an added importance.

Clause 41 is slightly improved by the Government’s Amendment 126. The obligation to consult the devolved Administrations is obviously critical, although it would be helpful if the Minister could explain why in Northern Ireland it is the Department of Health that must be consulted rather than Ministers.

The Minister may also be able to reassure the Committee that the government amendment does not provide only one overriding consultation; the text seems to suggest that when it refers to carrying out “a public consultation”. Can we assume that there will be not portmanteau consultations but individual consultations on each proposed significant policy introduction, change or amendment?

The introduction of a new obligation in proposed new subsection (1B) to include a summary in the consultation document, with the relevant authority’s assessment of the matters addressed by the proposed regulations is welcome, as far as it goes. But quite what depth or rigour should these assessments have? Can the Minister assure the Committee that the assessments will have the same reach, depth and rigour as the standard impact assessments produced for SIs?

Apart from naming the devolved Administrations, it is notable that the government amendment does not specify, or even hint at, who should be consulted in any of these consultations. The Bill is entirely silent on the matter. This leaves open the possibility of narrowly drawn consultations and the omission of important interested groups, not to mention short consultations over holiday or very busy periods. I am particularly concerned that the voice of the medical research charities be clearly heard in all the appropriate consultations. I remind the Committee of my interests as chair of the Association of Medical Research Charities, whose 150 members spent £1.9 billion on research last year—the same amount as was spent by the Government. Despite this enormous contribution, the Government have form in overlooking the medical research charities sector. It took an amendment moved in your Lordships’ House to persuade the Government to agree that the board of UKRI should include a person with experience of the sector. We do not want to see the same omission here.

Our Amendment 129 is very similar to Amendment 128 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, which we are happy to support. Both amendments list who must be included in any consultation. The lists should not be contentious or surprising. We include

“representatives of the relevant patient groups … medical research charities”

and pharma as statutory consultees, along with academic researchers. We leave it open to the relevant authorities to add others to that list.

Our amendment also addresses the problems that could be caused by short and short-notice consultations, perhaps over holiday periods among a less than comprehensive range of consultees. It simply requires the relevant authorities to publish on their websites the terms, start dates and lengths of the consultations, along with the proposed consultees and

“date and method of the publication of … results”.

I rather hope that the Minister will tell us that this part of our amendment is not necessary. I hope that he will see our amendment as an opportunity to give firm assurances to the Committee that the groups we name will be consultees, and about the form and detail of each consultation, as we propose. I hope the Minister will feel able to oblige us.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)]

I have been made aware that a Division may happen in the course of the next contribution. I apologise in advance to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, should we have to suspend the Committee. I now call the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett.

Medicines and Medical Devices Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 7th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 7th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 19th November 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in favour of this amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege. Like the preceding speaker, I am aiming to add extra angles and approaches rather than to repeat what has already been said—but I associate myself, essentially, with everything that has already been said.

As I was thinking about this amendment, I was reflecting on a session in the House—I believe it was this week, although it all blurs slightly if one looks at a screen for long enough—when the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, was being questioned by one of his noble friends about why a whole series of Written Questions about Covid had not been answered. The fact is, of course, that all aspects of our health system are currently under enormous pressure. The proposition that I put—as I was arguing in another amendment to the Bill earlier this week—is that this is actually an amendment that makes the Government’s job easier. It carves off a recognisable, obvious piece of work that does not have to be done by already horribly overworked, stretched systems. It means that something can be done: something can be ticked off and said to be under control, managed and done, in a way that does not draw too heavily on that existing overstretched system. That is the first point I wanted to make.

The second point I want to make—and I feel that I need to apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, for bringing this up—is that, as a former newspaper editor, when I was thinking about reports and what happens to reports, I had to go back to the Leveson inquiry, conducted by Lord Justice Leveson. I remember, when I first read that report, I thought about how it had been carefully structured to put aside some of the more difficult areas, particularly the issue of media ownership concentration. In the report Lord Justice Leveson had tried very hard to create something that was implementable and manageable, and that had some chance of being delivered. I think we all know that that is not what happened, so I can understand that anyone asked to take on a huge job of work, as the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, did with this, must ask themselves the question, “If I devote so much time, energy and effort to this work, will it actually be delivered?”

I said before that the patient safety commissioner amendment was possibly the most important one. In some ways, this certainly vies with it. This is about delivery. We know that there are three reasons to call an inquiry. One might be to find information, one might be to reassure the public, and another might be to create a plan of action. Those are the three often-stated reasons, but sometimes there is a fourth reason—perhaps “sometimes” is not the right word; perhaps “often” might be a better word—to kick something into the long grass. It is crucial that the issues uncovered by the noble Baroness are not kicked into the long grass, and that the very clear, obvious and important recommendations are not lost. So I support this amendment and, should it need to go further, I will continue to support it.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 121 is another recommendation, as we have heard, from the Cumberlege review. We would, within three months of the Bill being passed, set up a task force to implement the recommendations of the Independent Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Review. This particular recommendation, like the others in the review, received very widespread support at Second Reading, and a key element of the recommendation contained in this amendment is the appointment of an independent chair of the task force. It is absolutely critical that this independence is real, and perceived as being real. It should be clear to all that the chair is not an establishment place-person, and is an obviously safe pair of hands. It is vital that public confidence in the safety of medical devices be restored, and we very strongly support this amendment. This amendment is the means—and perhaps the only means currently available to us—of making the Cumberlege recommendations a reality. If the Minister is not inclined to accept this amendment, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, will bring it back on Report, so that we can test the opinion of the House.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, I will be very brief, as it must be clear to the Minister that there is unanimity across the Committee in support of setting up this safer care task force. My noble friend Lord Hunt was quite right that this is about whether the Government take this report seriously, and for me this is also an issue of accountability. Recommendation 9 of nine states:

“The Government should immediately set up a task force to implement this Review’s recommendations.”


I hope that the Minister will just say, “Yes, we’ve done it”, so that we can now be told what the timeline for the task force will be and who will be involved. That is my hope from the Minister’s remarks, but if that is not to be the case, I hope that it might be the case in two or three weeks’ time when we move to the next stage of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

I look to my noble friend the Minister to say that the Government will consider Amendment 123 and see what they can say in response to it in particular. That is for the Government to take away and continue the process of finding a basis for consultation on policy on the reform of redress. I know that it is nearly 14 years on, but I still think that a reduction in cost in the NHS Litigation Authority’s responsibilities is the main way of proceeding. We can pursue that through non-adversarial fact-finding and arbitration mechanisms to try to reduce the number of occasions on which people go to court to litigate for compensation to be provided.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I can be very brief. Amendment 122, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Cumberlege and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, would require the Secretary of State to bring proposals before Parliament to establish a redress agency for those harmed by medicines and medical devices.

The arguments advanced for this by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, and others, seem completely and obviously convincing, and we strongly support this amendment. We have not spoken to its proposers about this, but we wonder whether this redress agency might be hosted by the patient safety commissioner. We also wonder whether the amendment perhaps ought to be reworked into a revised task force amendment for Report, as we discussed in the previous set of amendments.

I know that the Government are in resistance mode about the patient safety commissioner but, when he responds, could the Minister tell the Committee what coherent arrangements there currently are for NHS patient redress, and whether he believes these arrangements are satisfactory?

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I think this has been one of those really rather good and unexpectedly deep House of Lords discussions, going back into the mists of time. Until the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, mentioned the redress Act, I had completely forgotten about it—it all came flooding back.

We have two quite different amendments in this group, and my noble friend Lord Hunt said at the outset that his Amendment 122 was a probing amendment. This is about opening up the discussion, which it certainly did—a discussion that has long needed resolving. The noble Lords, Lord Lansley and Lord O’Shaughnessy, were quite right in that it is an issue of the future; this group has one probing amendment about the future—what it should look like and how you create an agency that can address the issue of those harmed by medicines and medical devices. It is a very legitimate discussion, which needs to be had.

The second amendment, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, is about the future, what happens now and what happens about the harms that were done—the avoidable harms, in the case of hormone pregnancy tests, sodium valproate and pelvic mesh. That is very important indeed, and the noble Baroness is right to say that those harms must be specifically addressed by the Government and to push that. I think that is what we would be looking for—how the Government would implement those recommendations. I see the noble Baroness, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, whose comments we very much welcomed and valued, but I do not think that was the last word. I hope she will involve herself in the next stage of the Bill. In fact, I am depending on it.

The Government have to address Amendment 123 in particular, because that is urgent and needs to be done now. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about that in particular.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

145: Clause 44, leave out Clause 44 and insert the following new Clause—
“Commencement
This Act comes into force on the day on which it is passed.”

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, this is a probing amendment; its purpose is to allow the Minister to explain why Clause 44 contains four different commencement provisions for different parts of the Bill. The Explanatory Memorandum is silent about the reasons for that. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain on what basis the paragraphs in subsection (1) were chosen, why the coming into force of the items in subsection (2) is delayed by two months, and, in subsection (3), why Chapters 3 and 4 of Part 3 come into force at the absolute discretion of the Secretary of State. I think that I may understand subsection (4), but it would be helpful if the Minister could explain that to us too for the record. I beg to move.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

The only question I want to ask is the question the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, has just asked. Can the Minister give a rational explanation about why certain parts of the Bill come into force at different times? The key question on commencement is whether the commencement schedule as drafted risks holding up any of the work that needs to be done or allows the Government to move too slowly on anything.

My colleagues in the Commons drew attention to this provision as essentially a means of saying, “at some point in the future”. Can the Minister give an indication of the timeframe in which the Government expect to get these regimes consulted on, regulated for and up and running? As the Bill is drafted, the timing is left rather open-ended.

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[Lord Bethell (Con)]

My Lords, I will seek to provide an answer to my noble friend. Should it not be quite the right answer I will endeavour to write to him. It is my understanding that no substantive provision of an Act should be brought into operation earlier than two months after Royal Assent. However, some sections of the Act can be brought into force on Royal Assent, typically those setting out how the Act is to be cited and what the procedure is for making regulations or commencing them. It is under those arrangements that the sequencing which he describes can be undertaken.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for his intervention. I will read Hansard carefully tomorrow to make sure that I understand not only his question but the Minister’s reply. I thank the Minister for his explanations—they were useful—and for the brief preview of his next speech.

Amendment 145 withdrawn.

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[Lord Patel (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I speak very briefly to support this amendment. The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, have covered the argument extremely well. As the noble Lord said just now, the guidance is produced by the Secretary of State but, when you look at it in practice, it says that the Secretary of State “must have regard to” the guidance—that is, can take note of it but does not have to follow it.

I am a doctor and am used to following guidelines. If I do not follow the guidelines, I am liable to be reported; if I do not follow them for any reason in the management of a patient, I am expected to write down as to why I did not follow them. I am not expected to take note of it or have regard to it—I am expected to follow it. The amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, addresses exactly that point: why is the Secretary of State not asked to follow the guidelines which he or she drafted?

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

We all know that the words “have regard to” create no real obligations, whereas the words “act in accordance with” do create real obligations. Clause 13 seems to contain important restrictions on the actions of the Secretary of State, but it does so via guidance. As the Bill stands, with its “have regard to” wording, that guidance has no statutory force. If the restrictions are to have any reality—and I assume that the Government would like them to, or they would not have written them into the Bill—we must replace “have regard to” with “act in accordance with” as the amendment proposes. We support the amendment.

[Lord Bethell (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for her amendment, which is designed to require that the Secretary of State must “act in accordance with” the guidance on the use of civil sanctions that he is required to publish under paragraph 13 of Schedule 1, as opposed to having regard to the guidance. Paragraph 13 requires the Secretary of State to prepare and publish guidance about the use of civil sanctions. More specifically, this guidance must cover the sanctions that may be imposed if a person commits an offence, the action the Secretary of State may take, and the circumstances in which action is likely to be taken.

I understand the intention behind Amendment 146 and recognise that it is crucial that civil sanctions are imposed in a transparent and consistent manner to ensure that the regime operates effectively. However, the current drafting of Schedule 1, including the obligation on the Secretary of State to publish and have regard to guidance on the civil sanctions regime, will ensure this transparency and consistency.

The guidance will be prepared after consultation with the devolved Administrations and others. The purpose of any guidance is to provide clarity to the civil sanctions regime and detail the circumstances in which different civil sanctions may be pursued. However, instances of non-compliance or criminal activity, where the medical device regulations are concerned, need to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. The scale, complexity and severity of non-compliance can vary significantly. As such, any resultant enforcement activity needs to be proportionate, effective and commensurate with the non-compliance or criminal activity.

The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, would bind the Secretary of State, acting through the MRHA, to act in accordance with guidance in every instance. This would limit the regulator’s ability to arrive at and undertake the most appropriate course of enforcement action commensurate to the multifaceted nature of the case at hand. The MHRA cannot set out every circumstance where it may be appropriate to impose civil sanctions. However, by preparing, consulting and publishing a clear set of guidance we can be clear on the framework and illustrate circumstances on how and why a civil sanction might be imposed without being exhaustive.

The regulator needs civil sanction guidance that is flexible enough to appropriately address all forms of non-compliance. To mandate following the guidance to the letter could potentially mean that no action can be taken if the MHRA encounters a new example of non-compliance that has not been explicitly catered for in the guidance but clearly warrants a civil sanction. Under such circumstances, the Secretary of State will, of course, comply with obligation to publish revised guidance as required in paragraph 13 of Schedule 1.

I remind noble Lords that recipients of civil sanctions can contest the imposition of a civil sanction before it takes effect by appealing to the First-tier Tribunal. It is also worth highlighting that, as currently provided, the guidance will be statutory guidance and the regulator must have regard to it when carrying out enforcement activity.

Furthermore, this type of provision is standard across the statute book. For instance, provisions requiring regulators and statutory bodies to “have regard” to statutory guidance can be found in a wide range of legislation, from Section 2 of the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 to Section 5 of the Business and Planning Act 2020. In a civil sanctions context, Section 63 of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 provides that provisions conferring a power on a regulator to impose a civil sanction must also make provision relating to guidance—in particular, that the regulator “must publish guidance” about its use of a sanction and

“have regard to the guidance … in exercising its functions.”

The Ecodesign for Energy-Related Products Regulations 2010 has a similar civil sanctions regime. These regulations are concerned with the establishment of a framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for energy-related products. In paragraph 28 of Schedule 5 to those regulations the market surveillance authority

“must have regard to guidance”

while exercising his or her functions with regard to the imposition of civil sanctions. I hope that the reassurance we seek is not unusual but in line with how civil sanction and, indeed, other regimes operate domestically. For that reason, I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw Amendment 146.

Medicines and Medical Devices Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Tuesday 12th January 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

3: Clause 1, page 1, line 8, at end insert—
“( ) Regulations made under subsection (1) that introduce significant new policy or significant changes to existing policy are subject, in relation to regulations made by the Secretary of State, to the super-affirmative procedure set out in section (Super-affirmative procedure), in relation to regulations made by a Northern Ireland department, to section (Super-affirmative procedure: Northern Ireland), and, in relation to regulations of the Secretary of State and a Northern Ireland department acting jointly, to both.”

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the amendments in this group are in my name and the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. I am grateful for their support and regret that the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, cannot be here today. He is currently chairing a meeting of the Economic Affairs Committee.

The purpose of the amendments is to replace the use of the affirmative SI procedure in Parts 1, 2 and 3 of the Bill with the super-affirmative procedure. This is to restore an element of meaningful parliamentary scrutiny to a Bill that so conspicuously lacks it. This is a skeleton Bill. Parts 1, 2 and 3 contain no policy detail and effectively give Ministers carte blanche to decide policy. They give the Minister almost unfettered power to remake our human medicines, our veterinary medicines and our medical devices regimes.

Our DPRR Committee and the Constitution Committee were extremely critical of this approach. On Second Reading, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has reminded us, the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, chair of the DPRRC, and speaking for it, said that

“the structure of the Bill is absolutely atrocious and an affront to parliamentary democracy.”

He went on to say:

“Parliament is effectively bypassed; that is a sick joke of good law.”—[Official Report, 2/9/20; cols. 415-16.]


Parliament is bypassed largely because the affirmative SI procedure does not allow for real scrutiny. We cannot amend SIs, and the House has voted down affirmative SIs on just four occasions in the last 70 years.

The Constitution Committee was clear in its 2018 report, The Legislative Process: The Delegation of Powers, when it said:

“Without a genuine risk of defeat, and no amendment possible, Parliament is doing little more than rubber-stamping the Government’s secondary legislation. This is constitutionally unacceptable.”


The affirmative SI procedure does not constitute meaningful parliamentary scrutiny.

By contrast, the super-affirmative SI procedure is designed and used to deliver a measure of real scrutiny. Erskine May, in part 4, paragraph 31.14, characterises the procedure as follows:

“The super-affirmative procedure provides both Houses with opportunities to comment on proposals for secondary legislation and to recommend amendments before orders for affirmative approval are brought forward in their final form. (It should be noted that the power to amend the proposed instrument remains with the Minister: the two Houses and their committees can only recommend changes, not make them.)”


In Committee, I set out at some length the details of how our super-affirmative procedure could work. In her response, the Minister helpfully summarised that the

“procedure would require an initial draft of the regulations to be laid before Parliament alongside an explanatory statement and that a committee must be convened to report on those draft regulations within 30 days of publication. Only after a minimum of 30 days following the publication of the initial draft regulations may the Secretary of State lay regulations, accompanied by a further published statement on any changes to the regulations. They must then be debated as normal in both Houses and approved by resolution.”—[Official Report, 19/10/20; col. GC 376.]

According to the Library, the last recorded insertion in a Bill from a super-affirmative procedure was by the Government themselves, in October 2017, in what became the Financial Guidance and Claims Act. In Committee, I noted that when they are not doing it themselves, the Government traditionally object to the use of the super-affirmative on all or any of three grounds. The first is that it is unnecessary, because the affirmative procedure provides sufficient parliamentary scrutiny; the second is that it takes too long; and the third is that it is cumbersome. The Government did not depart from tradition. In Committee, they used all three objections.

The first objection, that the affirmative procedure provides sufficient scrutiny, is plainly and simply wrong, unless of course the Government regard no effective scrutiny as sufficient. The second objection, that it takes too long, is to misread its purpose. It is the case that the super-affirmative procedure takes longer, but that is because it contains provisions for real scrutiny, which necessarily takes time. This is not a negative; it is the merit of a procedure and the point of it. I should point out here that any emergency or urgent need will not trigger the super-affirmative procedure. The Bill now allows for the “made affirmative” procedure to be used in such cases.

The third objection raised by the Minister was that the super-affirmative procedure could be cumbersome and involve a disproportionate use of parliamentary time. She gave the example of the minor change to the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 to illustrate the point. This was a very helpful observation, and we are grateful for it. It would obviously be wrong to take up parliamentary time on minor changes, but, accordingly, we have revised our amendments since Committee to take account of this. The amendments now before us apply the super-affirmative procedure only to regulations that introduce what the Secretary of State considers to be either significant new policies or significant changes to existing policies. All other SIs can be dealt with as currently specified in the Bill.

This is a skeleton Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, chair of our Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, had something to say about this type of Bill in a 4 January article in Prospect magazine:

“First and foremost, parliament should continue to be vigilant about the balance of power that is at the heart of our constitution. The right of the legislature (parliament) to resist any encroachment on its powers by the executive (government) is central to our democratic system. … parliament should continue to object to the use of ‘skeleton bills.’”


He proposes that the Government:

“Put the appropriate level of detail into primary legislation and avoid skeleton bills.”


It is obviously too late to do that with this Bill, which allows Ministers to take powers and make policy before they have decided what that policy is. Secondary legislation was never intended as a means of making policy. Using secondary legislation to do that, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, so clearly put it, bypasses Parliament.

Our proposal restores a measure of parliamentary scrutiny where there are proposed significant new policies or significant changes to existing policies. It is activated only by significant policy changes. It amounts to meaningful scrutiny without removing the final decision from Ministers. It does not get in the way of emergencies or urgent need, but it does prevent Parliament being bypassed. This is an important test of the balance between the Executive and the legislature and an opportunity for Parliament to assert its right, and its duty, to scrutinise. Subject to the Minister’s response, I intend to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Judge (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I apologise to the House; this is the first time I have spoken on this Bill and I have not been able to speak earlier in the proceedings, so I will try to be brief. I also assume that, notwithstanding the recent vote on sunset clauses, the Minister’s response during the debate indicates that the Government will not be very interested in leaving it in the legislation.

This Bill’s importance is obvious. It is hardly regulation light; to the contrary, in the modern way, it has a banquet of regulation-making powers which would, as the debate has shown, enable the Minister to extend policy and create policy by statutory instrument. For that purpose, I need simply refer to the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, in the previous debate.

In the 30 December debate on the Bill on the trade agreement with the EU, I suggested that, now that all that was done finally, we in this House at any rate needed to focus on the sovereignty not of the Prime Minister or the Executive but of Parliament over the Executive, and proper parliamentary control over the legislative process. We are, as has been discussed, no longer bound to implement EU directives—hence, in part, this Bill. We should decide now—and if not now, when?—to brake, or at any rate better to control, the damaging, wide-ranging, regulation-making powers which now regularly come our way.

Time and again, the cross-party committees of the House have complained about, for example, skeleton Bills, Henry VIII powers and inappropriate delegated powers. Time and again, in Bill after Bill, the pleas—convincing, constitutional and persuasive—have been totally ignored. A cascade of regulation-making powers continues its unabated flood in every Bill that comes before the House, and this Bill is such an example.

That is not the end of it. The consequences are vividly described in the report of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, dated 17 December 2020, just a few days before Christmas. It contains devastating criticisms of risks to proper scrutiny currently observed by that committee. I commend its reading to the whole House. In the first year of this Session, we had 901 statutory instruments. Of those relevant to this Bill, the number from the Department of Health alone was 126. No one in the report has suggested that the department’s work is exempt from its wide-ranging, broad criticism.

The wider use of the super-affirmative process would ensure better parliamentary scrutiny and control of the Executive, which for too long have simply ignored the constant urgings of the parliamentary committees in this House, in particular, as this Bill shows, the recently expressed concerns of the Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers Committee. One day they will ask why they bother. They do so only in the hope that, one day, the Executive of the day will take notice.

As these pleas have been ignored and have failed, and, as is perfectly plain, as I indicated at the outset, the Minister’s reservations and distaste for consolidation and sunset clauses were absolutely manifest, this amendment will secure that, for this Bill and for this department, with these wide-ranging and important powers, the super-affirmative level of control should be exercised. The time to exercise it is now. It is time that the power is exercised more frequently.

--- Later in debate ---

I understand the arguments about parliamentary scrutiny. However, I strongly maintain that the Bill as amended in Committee strikes the right balance between effective challenge and scrutiny of our regulations, and is workable legislation. I hope the noble Lord has now received sufficient assurances, as well as understanding the challenges inherent in his proposed approach, and I hope that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

I am very grateful to all those who have spoken in support of these amendments. Skeleton Bills always limit parliamentary scrutiny, and this Bill is no exception. The Minister in his more than three-minute speech has exaggerated enormously the difficulties with the reach of our proposal. I disagree, for example, with the notion that our proposal blocks the use of the “made affirmative” procedure. It is clear that the Government are wedded to the idea of taking powers to make policy before they have decided what that policy is, and that is at the heart of the matter. This inevitably means bypassing Parliament and we should resist. I would like to test the opinion of the House.

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[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

As I said to the noble Lord and the Bill team yesterday, these are probing amendments and I do not have any intention of pressing them. That is because I accept that the Minister and the Bill team have done a very good job of making this part of the Bill work much better.

It is always worth rehearsing in the Chamber some of the arguments that we have had outside the Chamber, because people often go back to the Hansard record to ask why we changed words from this to this. That is why the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, and I put down some of these amendments. We have had some extremely useful discussions outside the Chamber, as we should have done, so I hope the noble Lord understands that that is why these amendments are being put today.

Under my Amendment 5, the overarching objective in making regulations under Clause 1 must be safeguarding public health. This is a probing amendment on the difference between “public health” in the government amendment before us today and the “health and safety of the public”, which was the phrase used in the amendment introduced in Committee. It is worth explaining why we accept that that change was sensible.

It is my understanding that “public health” is a broader and more subjective concept that may encompass economic interests, or may relate to increased pharmaceutical investment and innovation, and other factors beyond health and safety, which may conflict with them in some circumstances. Does the Minister agree that we have to explain the less strong commitment that is included in the Bill? Safeguarding public health is also not the same as protecting the safety of medicines and medical devices. It is very important that we are clear about that in the powers given to the Secretary of State in determining what would contribute to safe- guarding public health.

I congratulate the drafters on changing “attractiveness” to “favourability” and “benefits” and “risks” in my Amendments 12, 34 and 48. These amendments seek to probe the criteria that determine whether benefits outweigh risks and require the assessment to be published. The government amendments in this group replace the consideration of UK attractiveness with reference to it being a “favourable” place in which to conduct clinical trials and manufacture and research new medicines, medical products and services. The theme that runs through the whole of this legislation, as has been mentioned by many noble Lords, is that that is the place we want to be in, and the country we want to be, as we move forward.

Proposed new subsection (3A) looks like an attempt to allay concerns, stating that, where regulations impact on safety, they may be made only if the benefits outweigh the risks. It is worth putting on the record the discussion that we had about benefits and risks. Risk and benefit analyses are a well-established feature of clinical trials regulations and ethics committees, but they normally have more well-defined parameters than simply a risk-benefit assessment, yet these are precisely the regulations that these powers will allow to be made. This is why we need to make sure that we are clear what we are talking about here. This comes back to scrutiny and the need for the ability to scrutinise the Government’s assessment of risks and benefits in making regulations. These arguments pertain to Clause 9 for veterinary medicine and Clause 14 for medical devices. That is why we wanted to have this discussion.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I welcome the amendments in this group. They add clarity to the obligations laid on the Secretary of State in making regulations under Clause 1(1) and its counterparts.

I particularly welcome Amendment 12 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and my noble friend Lady Jolly, as it seems particularly important. It requires the Secretary of State to publish the criteria used in determining the benefits and risks caused by regulation and to set out how they have been weighed against each other. This amendment touches on the whole issue of transparency in devising regulations. The level of transparency that Amendment 12 requires should certainly apply to the factors listed in the Minister’s Amendment 9. These factors, which the Secretary of State must have regard to, are the safety of human medicines, the availability of human medicines and the likelihood of the relevant part of the United Kingdom being seen as a favourable place in which to carry out research related to human medicines, conduct clinical trials, or manufacture or supply human medicines. These are all clearly important, and I am glad that the Minister has added manufacturing to this list, as I suggested in Committee.

The list contains three rather vague notions: “likelihood”, “favourable” and “being seen as”. For all these terms, we need to know what definitions will be used and what evidence will be required in support. For “being seen as”, the question arises: being seen as by whom? What weight will be given to different views from different sectors? If, for example, it turns out that academic researchers and pharma companies have different views about the favourability of the UK, how are they to be weighted? On “likelihood”, could the Minister say whether he considered the word “desirability” instead, which seems closer to what we want here?

I hope the Minister is able to give reassurance on the points I have raised and that he accepts the merits of Amendment 12 and its counterparts.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy (Con)]

My Lords, I will make three quick points about the government amendments in this group, which I broadly welcome. The first relates to Amendments 4 and 42, where the Minister has clearly listened carefully to the forceful arguments made by my noble friend Lord Lansley, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, and others in Committee. I am delighted that he has.

For those of us who have not been involved in the discussions, and following on from the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, made about why language from the European regulation has been adopted—“safeguarding public health”—it would be helpful if my noble friend could explain, on the record, why that language has been chosen. That is particularly the case given that he expressed some reluctance in Committee, bearing in mind that the regulations being referred to also had some relevance to operating the internal market, not simply medicines safety. It would be good to hear from him on that.

Secondly, on Amendments 8 and 44, unlike other noble Lords I did not believe that there was a suspect motivation behind the use of the word “attractive” by my noble friend and the Bill team, or any desire to reduce stringency to attract investment. But I would be grateful if my noble friend could confirm that the Government remain as determined as ever, if not more so, to grow the UK’s life sciences sector, and that it was never their intention to lower regulatory standards to achieve this.

Thirdly, on Amendments 9 and 45, I commend my noble friend on the subtle but important changes already referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, in Clauses 1(3)(c) and 14(3)(c), especially the inclusion of manufacturing and broader medical research. The salience of these two parts of our overall supply chain has come to the fore during the pandemic, which has demonstrated our strengths in basic science but, unfortunately, exposed our weaknesses in manufacturing resilience. It seems right that this should be explicitly recognised in the Bill and I commend my noble friend for making those important changes and for demonstrating, once again, his ample appetite for listening and acting.

Medicines and Medical Devices Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

3rd reading & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 21st January 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

1: Clause 17, page 12, line 4, leave out from “subject” to end of line 8 and insert “to the super-affirmative procedure set out in section 51”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is to correct the drafting.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, Amendments 1 to 8, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Jolly, are to correct drafting. None of them, individually or collectively, alters the meaning or substance of the parts of the Bill that they would amend. I beg to move Amendment 1.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord Bethell) (Con)]

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, made his points cogently on Report. We do not intend to oppose the amendments on the Marshalled List, as they are technical tidying amendments, consequential on those in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, that were passed on Report.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

I am very grateful to the Minister.

Amendment 1 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

2: Clause 21, page 14, line 21, leave out from “subject” to end of line 25 and insert “to the super-affirmative procedure set out in section 51”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is to correct the drafting.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

3: Clause 52, page 34, line 32, leave out “section 11(1), section 17(1) and section 21(1)” and insert “and section 11(1)”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is to correct the drafting.