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As Leader of the House I take very seriously the responsibility incumbent on all Ministers and departments to provide full, timely and comprehensive answers to Questions for Written Answers. The Department for Health and Social Care received 1206 QWAs in 2021 compared to 599 in 2019, and have doubled the size of the relevant team to deal with the increased work and pressure.
My office approach departments who have not responded to questions after 10 working days, and remain in contact with them until the questions are answered. This process has been followed with the Department of Health and Social Care, and my office will continue to work with the department during this busy period to ensure prompt responses to all Questions for Written Answers.
The information requested falls under the remit of the UK Statistics Authority.
Please see the letter attached from the National Statistician and Chief Executive of the UK Statistics Authority.
The Rt Hon. the Lord Tyrie
House of Lords
London
SW1A 0PW
24 January 2024
Dear Lord Tyrie,
As National Statistician and Chief Executive of the UK Statistics Authority, I am responding to your Parliamentary Questions asking what proportion of the (1) gross, and (2) net, migration figures for 2022 were foreign students (HL1764); and what proportion of the (1) gross, and (2) net, migration figures for 2022 were dependents of foreign students (HL1765).
Your questions can be answered by using data published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). These data can be found in our year ending June 2023 edition of our Long-term international immigration, emigration and net migration flows, provisional dataset [1]. This includes data up to June 2023. Specifically, for long term migration [2] by reason, including study visas, please see table 3 of the aforementioned dataset. Please note that the estimates within the dataset are still provisional.
For the year ending December 2022, estimates for both students and dependants are available for non-EU migrants. We do not currently have comparable figures for EU and British nationals.
For the year ending December 2022, total immigration was 1,234,000, of which 1,030,000 were non-EU migrants.
For the year ending December 2022, 315,000 students immigrated long-term, 31% of all non-EU migrants. In addition, 93,000 student dependants immigrated long-term, 9% of all non-EU migrants.
For the year ending December 2022, total emigration of all nationalities was 489,000 and emigration of non-EU migrants was 157,000.
72,000 were non-EU migrants who initially arrived on a study visa leaving (46% of all non-EU emigrants) and a further 12,000 were non-EU migrants who initially arrived on a study dependant visa leaving (8%).
To calculate net migration for students and their dependents, we take the number of individuals who emigrated – who initially arrived in the UK on a study visa (or study-dependant visa) – away from the number of individuals who immigrated on a study visa (or study-dependant visa).
This comes with some caveats. It compares immigration to emigration within the same period, so the migrants counted are a summary of both past and current behaviours at a fixed point in time. Individuals counted as an emigrant in this method could have transitioned to a different visa type during their time in the UK. This means that this measure could present a distorted view of the true causes for migration, for example where someone studies and then works.
For the year ending December 2022, net migration of non-EU migrants was 873,000. 243,000 was net migration for study visas, 28% of all non-EU net migration and 82,000 were study dependants, 9% of all non-EU net migration.
Figures used to answer your questions in this response have been included in Table 1.
Table 1: Immigration, Emigration and Net Migration for year ending December 2022
Year ending Dec 2022 | All nationalities | All Non-EU migrants | Non-EU Students | Non-EU Student dependants |
Immigration | 1,234,000 | 1,030,000 | 315,000 | 93,000 |
Emigration | 489,000 | 157,000 | 72,000 | 12,000 |
Net migration | 745,000 | 873,000 | 243,000 | 82,000 |
The most up to date information is from year ending December 2023. This has been provided in Table 2 in case helpful.
Table 2: Immigration, Emigration and Net Migration for year ending June 2023
Year ending June 2023 | All nationalities | All Non-EU migrants | Non-EU Students | Non-EU Student dependants |
Immigration | 1,180,000 | 968,000 | 282,000 | 96,000 |
Emigration | 508,000 | 200,000 | 88,000 | 27,000 |
Net migration | 672,000 | 768,000 | 194,000 | 69,000 |
Because of the increases seen in the immigration of students in the recent time periods, we would expect emigration to continue to rise as those students come to the end of their studies. However, research in our Reason for international migration, international students update: November 2023 article [3] suggests that more recent cohorts of students are staying in the UK for longer. We will continue to monitor this trend to see how it evolves over time.
When accessing any of our files, you may find it helpful to read the 'notes, terms and conditions' contained within them.
Yours sincerely,
Professor Sir Ian Diamond
[2] We continue to use the UN definition of a long-term migrant: a person who moves to a country other than that of their usual residence for at least a year. https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/longterminternationalmigrationprovisional/yearendingjune2022#glossary
The information requested falls under the remit of the UK Statistics Authority.
Please see the letter attached from the National Statistician and Chief Executive of the UK Statistics Authority.
The Rt Hon. the Lord Tyrie
House of Lords
London
SW1A 0PW
24 January 2024
Dear Lord Tyrie,
As National Statistician and Chief Executive of the UK Statistics Authority, I am responding to your Parliamentary Questions asking what proportion of the (1) gross, and (2) net, migration figures for 2022 were foreign students (HL1764); and what proportion of the (1) gross, and (2) net, migration figures for 2022 were dependents of foreign students (HL1765).
Your questions can be answered by using data published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). These data can be found in our year ending June 2023 edition of our Long-term international immigration, emigration and net migration flows, provisional dataset [1]. This includes data up to June 2023. Specifically, for long term migration [2] by reason, including study visas, please see table 3 of the aforementioned dataset. Please note that the estimates within the dataset are still provisional.
For the year ending December 2022, estimates for both students and dependants are available for non-EU migrants. We do not currently have comparable figures for EU and British nationals.
For the year ending December 2022, total immigration was 1,234,000, of which 1,030,000 were non-EU migrants.
For the year ending December 2022, 315,000 students immigrated long-term, 31% of all non-EU migrants. In addition, 93,000 student dependants immigrated long-term, 9% of all non-EU migrants.
For the year ending December 2022, total emigration of all nationalities was 489,000 and emigration of non-EU migrants was 157,000.
72,000 were non-EU migrants who initially arrived on a study visa leaving (46% of all non-EU emigrants) and a further 12,000 were non-EU migrants who initially arrived on a study dependant visa leaving (8%).
To calculate net migration for students and their dependents, we take the number of individuals who emigrated – who initially arrived in the UK on a study visa (or study-dependant visa) – away from the number of individuals who immigrated on a study visa (or study-dependant visa).
This comes with some caveats. It compares immigration to emigration within the same period, so the migrants counted are a summary of both past and current behaviours at a fixed point in time. Individuals counted as an emigrant in this method could have transitioned to a different visa type during their time in the UK. This means that this measure could present a distorted view of the true causes for migration, for example where someone studies and then works.
For the year ending December 2022, net migration of non-EU migrants was 873,000. 243,000 was net migration for study visas, 28% of all non-EU net migration and 82,000 were study dependants, 9% of all non-EU net migration.
Figures used to answer your questions in this response have been included in Table 1.
Table 1: Immigration, Emigration and Net Migration for year ending December 2022
Year ending Dec 2022 | All nationalities | All Non-EU migrants | Non-EU Students | Non-EU Student dependants |
Immigration | 1,234,000 | 1,030,000 | 315,000 | 93,000 |
Emigration | 489,000 | 157,000 | 72,000 | 12,000 |
Net migration | 745,000 | 873,000 | 243,000 | 82,000 |
The most up to date information is from year ending December 2023. This has been provided in Table 2 in case helpful.
Table 2: Immigration, Emigration and Net Migration for year ending June 2023
Year ending June 2023 | All nationalities | All Non-EU migrants | Non-EU Students | Non-EU Student dependants |
Immigration | 1,180,000 | 968,000 | 282,000 | 96,000 |
Emigration | 508,000 | 200,000 | 88,000 | 27,000 |
Net migration | 672,000 | 768,000 | 194,000 | 69,000 |
Because of the increases seen in the immigration of students in the recent time periods, we would expect emigration to continue to rise as those students come to the end of their studies. However, research in our Reason for international migration, international students update: November 2023 article [3] suggests that more recent cohorts of students are staying in the UK for longer. We will continue to monitor this trend to see how it evolves over time.
When accessing any of our files, you may find it helpful to read the 'notes, terms and conditions' contained within them.
Yours sincerely,
Professor Sir Ian Diamond
[2] We continue to use the UN definition of a long-term migrant: a person who moves to a country other than that of their usual residence for at least a year. https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/longterminternationalmigrationprovisional/yearendingjune2022#glossary
It is vital for trust and integrity within the security and intelligence services that all employees are able to report wrongdoing and to do so in confidence.
There are appropriate policies in place should members of staff in the relevant services wish to report their concerns and a number of internal and external routes available for whistle-blowing, one of which is through the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, but all of which the Government considers to be safe and effective.
The Government has no plans to place The Principles on a statutory basis.
His Majesty’s Government has no plans to refer the case of Jagtar Singh Johal to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.
Under section 2(3)(b) of the Justice and Security Act 2013, the Prime Minister may ask the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament to consider a matter outside of the Committee’s self-determined work plan, provided that the consideration of the matter is consistent with any principles set out in, or with any other provision made by, the agreed Memorandum of Understanding, as per section 2(4) of the Act. One such principle in the MoU is that careful consideration must be given to whether it is appropriate to investigate a matter which relates to criminal or civil legal proceedings, inquiries, or inquest proceedings.
As the subject of ongoing legal proceedings, it would not be appropriate to comment on the allegations brought against His Majesty's Government by Mr Johal. However, His Majesty's Government has consistently raised concerns about Mr Johal’s case in India with all levels of the Indian Government. Ministers and officials have together raised Mr Johal’s detention on over 100 occasions since 2017, and they will continue to do so.
His Majesty's Government regularly engages with the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, and with the Committee as a whole. Details of formal interactions with the Government are published in the Committee's Annual Reports, which are publicly available on the Committee's website.
The Government values the work of the Committee, and understands the importance of regular engagement as part of an effective oversight relationship.
The UK Government has always been clear that we would prefer to settle these issues consensually and reach a positive outcome with the EU through negotiations.
However, if a negotiated outcome cannot be found, Article 16 remains a legitimate provision within the Protocol to safeguard peace and prosperity in Northern Ireland and to support the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement.
In such circumstances, we will, of course, set out our justification for using Article 16 and its legal basis at an appropriate time. The Government remains committed to keeping Parliament updated on the UK-EU relationship and to providing legal certainty and clarity for Northern Ireland.
This is a matter for individual political parties.
The CMA’s informant reward programme is an important tool in uncovering cartel activity. Payments have been made under the informant rewards programme.
The CMA does not provide figures about the levels or numbers of such payments. Given the number of CMA cases, divulging even aggregated payment figures could over time risk allowing the identification of cases having a whistleblower. This could put whistleblowers at risk and undermine the programme as a whole.
Informant reward payments are directly covered by the CMA’s budget.
There are no transatlantic submarine or pipeline telecommunications cables under direct UK public ownership or control. We anticipate this to be the same for other NATO member states, but it would be a matter for NATO member states to confirm.
Subsea cables are privately owned and operated, although governments work with the operators, regulators, international partners and others to assess the overall resilience of subsea infrastructure and respond to high-impact events.
There are no transatlantic submarine or pipeline telecommunications cables under direct UK public ownership or control. We anticipate this to be the same for other NATO member states, but it would be a matter for NATO member states to confirm.
Subsea cables are privately owned and operated, although governments work with the operators, regulators, international partners and others to assess the overall resilience of subsea infrastructure and respond to high-impact events.
The UK is in not dependent on Russian gas. In 2021 it made up less than 4% of UK supply. The integrated nature of the European gas market, and the fact that gas is an international traded commodity, means that factors that influence European or internationally prices are likely to be reflected in UK prices. The Government remains confident in the UK’s energy security and the UK’s highly diverse sources of gas supply.
Crude oil operates in an international market and influenced by a range of supply and demand factors. The phasing out of Russian imports will not be immediate, but allows the UK time to adjust its supply chains.
The Conservative Manifesto stated that “Through our Red Tape Challenge, we will ensure that regulation is sensible and proportionate, and that we always consider the needs of small businesses when devising new rules, using our new freedom after Brexit to ensure that British rules work for British companies.” We shall announce further details of the Challenge in due course.
The Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA), now part of JISC, is responsible for collecting and publishing data about UK higher education (HE)
Table six of HESA’s ‘HE finance data’ reports on the income from tuition fees and education contracts at UK HE providers between the 2017/18 and 2021/22 academic years. This data is available by level of study and students’ domicile (UK, EU, non-EU) and is accessible at: https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/finances/table-6.
Complete data for 2022/23 will be published in Spring 2024.
The Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA, now part of JISC), is responsible for collecting and publishing data about UK higher education. The latest statistics refer to the 2021/22 academic year.
Figure 15 of HESA’s 'Higher Education Student Statistics: UK, 2021/22’ reports the number of qualifications obtained at undergraduate and postgraduate level at UK Higher Education Providers between the 2017/18 and 2021/22 academic years, and is available by students’ domicile (UK, EU, non-EU) prior to study. See figure 15 attached.
Updates on the timing of HESA Student Statistics for the 2022/23 academic year are available via the following link: https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/upcoming.
The Government recognises the achievements made by Open Banking and the potential for the Industry Delivery Group, as a part of the Money and Pensions Service to learn from their experience to inform the development of pensions dashboards. At the same time, we recognise that Open Banking aims to improve consumer outcomes in an environment where consumers already know what they have and who they bank with, which enables consumers to authenticate themselves directly with their bank provider.
The Department for Work and Pensions response to its consultation on pensions dashboards highlighted where there were potential opportunities to align with Open Banking for example, on some aspects of the data standards and the governance register. The Department for Work and Pensions is working with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, which is currently leading a smart data review that is looking at ways to promote interoperability across financial services and other sectors. The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy’s proposals, following on from its consultation paper from June 2019, will be published in due course.
The Antivirals and Therapeutics Taskforce engages with other nations on the use, deployment and evaluation of therapeutics and antivirals. We understand that more than 20 countries have procured Evusheld and a proportion have begun to deploy the treatment.
AstraZeneca announced positive trial data from the PROVENT trial, which showed Evusheld’s efficacy against developing symptomatic COVID-19. However, this trial took place prior to the emergence of the Omicron variant. The TACKLE study will provide additional efficacy data on Evusheld for the treatment of COVID-19. AstraZeneca commissioned the UK Health Security Agency to undertake testing into the effectiveness of Evusheld against the Omicron variants. Initial data against BA.1 and BA.2 has been shared with AstraZeneca. The Department is currently reviewing the efficacy of Evusheld for prophylaxis.
The shielding programme ended on 15 September 2021. The COVID-19 vaccination programme has ensured that shielding is no longer necessary for immunosuppressed people. In addition, the Government has issued public health advice in an online only format for those whose immune system means they are at higher risk of serious outcomes from COVID-19. This advises eligible individuals to ensure they receive additional doses of the vaccines as appropriate.
Many people in this cohort are also eligible for new monoclonal antibody and antiviral treatments to prevent the risk of serious illness and hospitalisation. The advice also suggests that those who are immunosuppressed should seek advice from their National Health Service clinician where appropriate and consider additional steps to prevent the risk of infection. This may include avoiding those who have tested positive for COVID-19 and their household contacts until 10 days after a positive test and ensuring their home is well ventilated when receiving visitors.
The Department is currently assessing Evusheld, which includes requesting clinicians to advise on the most appropriate option for the National Health Service with the available data, the public health situation and other treatments available. We expect to receive clinical advice shortly.
The Therapeutics Clinical Review Panel provides advice on the most appropriate patient cohorts for new COVID-19 therapies, including preventative treatments. However, we are currently unable to confirm the efficacy of Evusheld for specific patient groups. Final clinical policies and eligibility would be proposed by the NHS and agreed by the United Kingdom Chief Medical Officers.
Urgent work is underway with clinical experts to estimate the size of the cohort. The Therapeutics Clinical Review Panel provides advice on the most appropriate patient cohorts for new COVID-19 therapies, including preventative treatments. Final clinical policies and eligibility would be proposed by the National Health Service and agreed by the United Kingdom Chief Medical Officers.
AstraZeneca commissioned the UK Health Strategic Authority (UKHSA) to complete testing into the effectiveness of Evusheld against the Omicron variants. The initial testing is now complete and data has been shared with AstraZeneca. After reviewing the data, it is a matter for AstraZeneca to determine whether to commission further testing, therefore we are unable to confirm when testing will be completed.
The direct cost of an NHS Test and Trace polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test is commercially sensitive as the release of this information would be detrimental in future negotiations with individual suppliers of PCR tests.
Data on the number of COVID-19 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for travel was previously held for arrivals from ‘red’ and ‘amber’ list countries.
Data on testing for international arrivals from red list and non-red list countries, including confirmatory PCR tests, from 30 September 2021 is published weekly in an online only format at GOV.UK.
From 12 November, all private providers are required to maintain the Government’s minimum standards for the international arrivals services they offer. The changes ensure that the standards of service of private providers are consistent with the quality expected, from initial application to throughout the lifetime of the service, to support public health. Any organisation involved in carrying out the end-to-end testing service cannot sell tests until the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) has written to the appropriate organisation to confirm that the testing service meets the standard. Additionally, there have been amendments to the daily sales reporting, which as a mandatory legal requirement for all providers of international arrivals testing, must now include details in relation to tests that were cancelled that day.
Following the recent changes to international travel, from 30 November 2021, it became a legal requirement to report S-gene target failure and particularly failure for the S-gene deletion 69-70 where the diagnostic laboratory is able to identify it. The minimum standards have been updated to reflect this.
As of 15 October 2021, there are currently 555 providers of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing for travel listed on GOV.UK.
Suppliers are required to complete a self-declaration against the Government’s minimum standards, which the United Kingdom Accreditation Service will review to met. Providers of COVID-19 testing services are required to apply for accreditation to provide sample collection and/or sample testing services The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Testing Requirements and Standards) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2021 set out the deadlines for obtaining accreditation. Providers may not market these tests if these deadlines are not met.
The Department monitors issues raised by the public, data submitted by the provider and reports from regulatory and oversight bodies. Where the Department identifies that a supplier is not providing the high-quality service expected, we can ask for remedial action. Where minimum standards have not been met or public safety is at risk, we will ask for improvements to be made and the provider could be removed from the GOV.UK listing.
The lowest cost of such tests is £1.25 and the highest is £1080.00. While the median cost is not collected centrally, the mean cost is £45.00
Data on the number of polymerase chain reaction tests for international travel is not held in the format requested.
We are unable to provide the direct cost of NHS Test and Trace polymerase chain reaction tests as this information is commercially sensitive.
We have been moving at pace to sanction those propping up Putin's regime. Our sanctions since the invasion cover more than 1,200 Russian and Belarussian individuals, entities and subsidiaries at the heart of, or supporting, Putin's regime. This includes travel bans and asset freezes applied to Russia's leading oligarchs, with a combined worth in excess of £100 billion. Measures taken so far are historic and are having a real impact on Putin and his war machine. Nothing and no one is off the table.
Enforcing a no-fly zone would very likely lead to direct combat between NATO and Russian jets. The risks of escalation would be extremely high, and the potential consequences would be catastrophic for the entire world - including Ukraine. A no-fly zone would also apply to Ukrainian aircraft, preventing them from attacking from the air and allowing the vast Russian ground forces to move around freely.
The measures introduced on 1 March against the Central Bank of Russia, the Russian National Wealth Fund and the Russian Ministry of Finance prevent UK persons from providing financial services related to foreign exchange reserves or asset management to these persons or persons acting on their behalf or their direction. This action was taken in coordination with the EU and the US, who have introduced similar restrictions. This will prevent the Russian Central Bank from deploying its foreign reserves in ways that undermine the impact of sanctions imposed by us and our allies, and to undercut its ability to engage in foreign exchange transactions to support the Russian rouble.
The UK is not supporting British nationals going to Ukraine to fight in the conflict. We advise against travel to Ukraine and anyone who travels to conflict zones to engage in unlawful activity should expect to be investigated upon their return to the UK.
The UK continues to work in lockstep with international partners to coordinate sanctions as necessary, including on Belarus. As with all announcements on sanctions, the ultimate objective is to ensure that Putin fails in Ukraine. The whole of the UK Government, along with our international allies, is working to ensure that happens. The Lukashenko regime is being made to feel the economic consequences for its support for Putin.
The UK has not provided any financial aid to the Government of India since 2015. Our work in India makes investments and deploys world-leading expertise in areas of mutual interest like tackling climate change. To date, approximately £80 million of our ODA investment has been returned to HMG.
In coordination with other countries, the UK is introducing the largest and most severe economic sanctions that Russia has ever faced. We remain focussed on building the broadest coalition possible, including with India, to continue the severe economic pressure on President Putin.
As part of our response to the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the Lukashenko regime is being made to feel the economic consequences for its support for Putin. The UK is working with our international partners to prevent those who fail to respect the rules-based international order from reaping its benefits.
Since 1 March, the Foreign Secretary has launched a series of sanctions on Belarusian individuals and organisations who have aided and abetted Russia's reckless aggression towards Ukraine. The Foreign Secretary has committed to going further. Our intention is to extend recent Russia sanctions to Belarus in due course.
Language skills are critical to the FCDO's operation and Russian, as one of the FCDO's five top priority languages, is no exception to this. FCDO officers undertake full-time language training in preparation for roles overseas which require them to speak the local language (known as speaker slots). Although there are no formal 'speaker slot' roles based in King Charles Street, some roles in London (such as Research Analysts) will draw on language skills in their day to day work and officers returning from speaker slots are incentivised to maintain their language skills and 're-qualify' once their FCDO exam pass has expired (after 5 years).
The Asset Purchase Facility (APF) deed indemnity will not be published. The disclosure of the APF deed indemnity would be likely to expose sensitive information relating to the quantitative easing scheme and related processes.
HM Treasury indemnifies the APF which means that any losses or gains from the APF accrue to HM Treasury. This is public knowledge and the publication of the deed of indemnity will not advance the public’s understanding of that arrangement.
The Bank of England publishes quarterly reports for the APF, which explain to the public the implications of indemnity for the Treasury and the cash transfer arrangements between the Bank and Treasury.
The government and Bank of England have cooperated closely in implementing sanctions on Russia and will continue to do so. The Bank of England has engaged with the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). The BIS has suspended access of the Central Bank of Russia to all BIS services, meetings and other BIS activities.
The government and Bank of England have cooperated closely in implementing sanctions on Russia and will continue to do so. The Bank of England has engaged with the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). The BIS has suspended access of the Central Bank of Russia to all BIS services, meetings and other BIS activities.
The Asset Purchase Facility (APF) deed indemnity will not be published.
HM Treasury indemnifies the APF which means that any losses or gains from the APF accrue to HM Treasury. This is public knowledge and the publication of the deed of indemnity will not advance the public’s understanding of that arrangement.
This decision not to publish the information based on an assessment of risk that the Treasury has considered.
The Asset Purchase Facility (APF) deed indemnity will not be published.
HM Treasury indemnifies the APF which means that any losses or gains from the APF accrue to HM Treasury. This is public knowledge and the publication of the deed of indemnity will not advance the public’s understanding of that arrangement. Furthermore, the indemnity contains operationally sensitive information which should not be made public.
Monetary policy is the responsibility of the independent Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England and this includes decisions on Bank Rate and quantitative easing. The separation of fiscal and monetary policy is a key feature of the UK’s economic framework, and essential for the effective delivery of monetary policy, so the Government does not comment on the conduct or effectiveness of monetary policy.
The Government continually monitors economic developments, including any changes to the interest rate, to consider the impact of these developments on businesses and households.