Crime and Policing Bill

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

I may have said it yesterday, but it cannot be said enough: once again, I pay tribute to the hard work of police officers, PCSOs and police staff across the country. They put themselves in harm’s way every day to keep our streets safe, under immense pressure. I hope that every Member across the House will join me in thanking them for their service.

Yesterday I mentioned the Opposition’s support for many of the measures in the Bill, although given that the vast majority are carried over from the previous Government’s Criminal Justice Bill, it is probably no great surprise. Enforcing the Bill will require resources. I have already outlined concerns about funding for our police forces and the devastating impact that will have on frontline police numbers. I asked that question of the Minister yesterday, and I am not quite sure I heard an answer. Will the Minister confirm whether there will be more police officers at the end of this Parliament than the record high levels achieved by the last Government in March 2024? [Interruption.] Yes, the highest number on record.

I turn to new clause 130, which relates to tool theft, and I declare an interest as the son of a builder.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

Not a toolmaker?

[Matt Vickers]

He is not a toolmaker, no.

Tool theft is completely out of control, and I know the impact it has on people’s lives. Research from Direct Line shows that 45,000 tool thefts were reported to the police in a single year, amounting to one every 12 minutes. This country is built on the back of our tradesmen—they are the small businesses that make a huge contribution to our economy and literally build the world around us. Just imagine getting up at daft o’clock to go to work and earn a living, leaving the house only to find your van has been completely raided and all the tools stolen. The ability to work is stolen as well. The impact is huge: it is not only the cost of replacing the stolen tools, but days of lost work and disappointed customers, many of whom may have taken a day off work themselves. The issue is made worse still when tradesmen go to car boot sales only to see stolen equipment being sold in broad daylight, with no action taken by the authorities.

In recent months I have been campaigning alongside tradesmen for real action on this issue. Just last week the Leader of the Opposition and my hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr French) met tradesmen, businesses and the police to hear at first hand about the impact. We heard from campaigners, including the gas expert Shoaib Awan and Frankie from On The Tools, alongside affected businesses such as Checkatrade, Balfour Beatty and BT Openreach.

[Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)]

If the Conservatives had won a 15th year in government, would they have started to tackle this epidemic?

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

One of the things we were doing was putting record funding into policing and putting a record number of police on the streets. The one thing we were not doing was taxing our police forces off the streets. We were making huge progress.

I would also like to mention Sergeant Dave Catlow of the Metropolitan police, who joined us last week. He is doing great work on this issue.

New clause 130 proposes three key changes. First, fines for perpetrators would equate to the cost of replacing equipment, repairing the damage caused and the loss of work. Secondly, theft of tools would be treated as an aggravated offence, meaning tougher sentences for the crooks who steal tradesmen’s vital equipment. Finally, councils would be required to put in place an enforcement plan to crack down on the sale of stolen tools at car boot sales.

I will also take this opportunity to pay tribute to the hon. Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin) for her campaigning on this issue. I know how much she, too, wants to see action on tool theft. As the Minister knows, my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Buckinghamshire (Greg Smith) brought the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 through the House. It could make a real difference on this issue. Will the Minister confirm when the Government will table a statutory instrument to put it into action?

I turn to non-crime hate incidents. New clause 7 would change legislation and guidance to remove the recording and retention of non-crime hate incidents. The use of non-crime hate incidents has spiralled out of all control and well beyond its originally intended purpose. The deal should be simple: if the law is broken, justice must be served. But non-crime hate incidents are a different beast—you did not break the law; you just said something daft and ended up logged on police records like a criminal. We need our police on the streets, not policing hurty words on Twitter. We have all seen the utterly barmy story of a nine-year-old who insulted another pupil in the playground. Is that unkind? Yes, of course it is. But instead of a quiet word with a teacher or a call to the parents, the police were brought in. I appeal to Members across the House—would they want that happening to their child, or would they rather give them a proper telling-off at home?

This also has a bigger effect. Our police officers are being tied up documenting playground spats and Twitter comments, treating childish jibes like national security threats, while real crimes such as burglary, robbery and even violent offences are being pushed to the back of the queue. In fact, research from Policy Exchange has found that, nationally, over 60,000 police hours are being spent on non-crime hate incidents. Our police need to get back to keeping our streets safe, not policing silly words or childish playground issues.

Before concluding my remarks, I would like to draw the House’s attention to some of the Opposition’s other amendment that could protect our communities and keep our streets safe. We would have been voting today on new clause 144 to secure that national statutory inquiry into grooming gangs—a scandal that is our country’s shame. Child sexual exploitation ruins lives; preying on the most vulnerable in our communities, exploiting them for horrific sexual acts and often coercing them into a life of crime. A national inquiry is what the victims wanted, so I am glad that the Prime Minister has finally U-turned, given into the pressure and joined what he described as the far-right bandwagon of people who wanted a national inquiry.

As the Leader of the Opposition said yesterday, we must not have another whitewash. The national inquiry must ask the hard questions and leave no stone unturned. Criminal investigations must run in parallel to the inquiry. It must look at the whole system—Whitehall, the Crown Prosecution Service, the police and local authorities—and wherever there is wrongdoing, there should be prosecutions. Foreign perpetrators must be immediately deported, and the inquiry must be fully independent, with statutory powers covering all relevant towns. Local councils simply cannot be left to investigate themselves.

New clause 125 aims to reinstate people’s confidence in policing. We have recently seen the perverse anti-racism commitment issued by the National Police Chiefs’ Council. It calls for arrest rates to be artificially engineered to be the same across racial groups. Advice to treat black and white suspects differently is morally indefensible. It is, by definition, two-tier policing. It undermines trust and confidence in our police. This new clause would give the Home Secretary the power to amend or require the withdrawal of any code of practice intended to direct policing practices.

New clause 139 makes provisions in relation to off-road bikes. I know many Members across the House know the havoc being caused by them in local communities. The issue has been raised by Members on both sides of the House numerous times in Westminster Hall and in this place, and the tweak in approach that features in this Bill will simply not be enough. Using alternative legislation, the police are already able to seize off-road bikes without notice. The new clause would remove the prohibition on the police entering a private dwelling to confiscate an off-road bike and ensure that police destroyed seized bikes rather than selling them back into the market. I urge the Minister—in fact, I beg her—to look again comprehensively at how we tackle the scourge of off-road bikes.

I would also like to draw the House’s attention to new clause 131, which would introduce mandatory deportation for foreign nationals found in possession of child sexual abuse images. These sick paedophiles have no place in our country and they, along with all foreign offenders, should be deported.

To conclude, the British people want our police to be able to focus on putting real criminals behind bars—the thieves who nick our hard-working tradesmen’s tools—not spending time policing playground squabbles and treating them like crimes. Our Opposition new clauses are common-sense changes that I hope the whole House will get behind, protecting victims and restoring policing to what it is meant to be: tackling crime on our streets.

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

I thank all hon. and right hon. Members, including the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley), and the Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick (Andy Slaughter) who have taken part in the debate, and in particular those who have brought forward new clauses. There are well over 100 new clauses in this group, so I am sure the House will appreciate that, sadly, I will not be able to cover them all. I will do my best in the time remaining to respond to as many as I can.

Crime and Policing Bill

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I call the shadow Minister

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

I would like to express my appreciation to all those who have worked on the legislation to develop and shape the policies, whether they be the majority developed under the previous Conservative Government or members of the Bill team, who I am sure have provided helpful assistance to Ministers. As I am sure we will hear today, some of the measures in the Bill are the result of amazing people who have suffered the worst experiences, but who have worked to ensure that others do not have to suffer them in future.

In addition, considering the context of the legislation, it is right to pay tribute to the excellent work of police officers across the country. Week in, week out, those serving in our police forces put themselves in harm’s way to keep our streets safe. Those who serve and place themselves in danger cannot be thanked enough. Many people ask themselves whether they would have the bravery to stand up and intervene. Officers across the country do so on a daily basis. Thanks to the efforts of the previous Conservative Government, the police force numbered over 149,000 officers in 2024, with 149,769 recorded in March 2024. This was the highest number of officers, on both full-time equivalent and headcount basis, since comparable records began in March 2003.

[Wendy Morton]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for setting out those policing numbers. Does he share my concern about the additional police officers we are getting? When I look at our figures for the west midlands, the boost is coming from deployments. I worry about where they are actually coming from and just how much of an increase we are really going to see.

[Matt Vickers]

I wholeheartedly agree. There are a lot of concerns about the neighbourhood policing guarantee and where the resource comes from: whether it is through specials or volunteers—of course, we want to see more of them—or redeployments. When people ring 999, they want to know that they are going to get the response they expected. They do not want to see that depleted to move officers from one bucket to the next. That has real consequences. The biggest hit to our police force numbers at the moment will be the national insurance rise—the tax that is taxing police off our streets.

[Chris Vince]

The shadow Minister and I probably disagree on many things, but he is giving a very well-presented speech. Does he not recognise, however, that there may well be an increase in police numbers, but we have seen a decrease in police staff? In Essex, we lost over 400 police staff during the Conservatives’ period in office and a number of police officers have been redeployed to roles that could have been done by police staff.

[Matt Vickers]

I am glad to see all those police officers getting proper training through the hon. Gentleman’s maths teaching. I am glad he has new recruits in his part of the world, but people are concerned about the frontline numbers. The number of police on our streets is a huge concern to the public. The chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council has said that the funding will not match the Government’s ambitions and falls short of maintaining the existing workforce. And just listen to the Police Federation, which states quite simply:

“This Chancellor hasn’t listened to police officers.”

Can the Minister confirm that by the end of this Parliament there will be more police officers than were serving in March 2024?

[Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)]

The shadow Minister will know from our time in Committee that I am an ex-police officer, and I thank him for his words about police officers serving the country. Does he agree that the Bill will give the police more confidence that they will have the right powers, so that they are able to make a difference?

[Matt Vickers]

I welcome lots of the measures in the Bill and I hope they will really help our police officers to keep our streets safe, but the police need the resource, funding and support to be out there enforcing the legislation we are putting forward today. I thank the hon. Member for his service—on the Committee as well as in the police force.

The House will debate a number of amendments and new clauses today and tomorrow. The Opposition amendments are sensible and aim to improve the Bill, which our constituents would want us to get behind. Amendment 175 relates to the Government’s objective, which we all want to achieve, of reducing knife crime by 50%. We know the untold damage knife crime causes to victims, families and communities across the country. This legislation introduces a new offence: possession of an article with a blade or point, or an offensive weapon, with the intent to use unlawful violence.

Let me put that in context. Imagine you are at home in your garden enjoying a nice peaceful afternoon with the kids. Suddenly, our hard-working police officers swoop in on a man walking down the street—a man carrying a knife or offensive weapon who is then proven beyond all reasonable doubt to have planned to use it for violence. He could have been coming for your neighbours, your friends or your family. This is a man who clearly needs to be locked up. Would you want to see him put away for four years or 14 years? In fact, with the sentencing review, whatever he is sentenced to, he is likely to serve significantly less. Who knows how much of that four years he would serve before he could walk back down your street?

--- Later in debate ---

[Wendy Morton]

According to Keep Britain Tidy, littering and fly-tipping cost the country £1 million a year. Does my hon. Friend agree that that is money that could go to frontline services, so it is about time we took more stringent measures to change behaviour, along with some good enforcement?

[Matt Vickers]

I could not agree more. A small minority wreak havoc on our countryside and our streets, and create absolute chaos. That is what this amendment is about: tougher sanctions to divert people from doing such mindless things.

The money wasted every year on cleaning up would be better spent on frontline services, such as filling potholes or providing community services. Instead, it is used to clean up after those who have no respect for others or for our natural environment. The most common location for fly-tipping is on pavements and roads, which accounted for 37% of all incidents in 2023-24. The majority—59%—involved small van-sized dumps, or an amount of waste that could easily fit in a car boot. It is therefore logical to conclude that a significant majority of fly-tipping incidents stem from vehicles. Using a vehicle to dump a van full or a boot full of waste should come with real consequences, and the people who do it should feel that in their ability to use their vehicle, as well as through financial penalties. The previous Government increased fines for fly-tipping from £400 to £1,000, but we can go further to deter people from dumping on the doorsteps of others. The amendment would require the Home Secretary to consult on the establishment of a scheme of driving licence penalty points for fly-tippers and those who toss rubbish from vehicles.

In Committee, the Minister pledged to engage with DEFRA on this issue. By passing this amendment, we could go further by committing to undertake a consultation to develop a workable and effective scheme. For the benefit of all those who want to be able to enjoy their green spaces, and for our environment and the wildlife that suffers at the hands of fly-tippers and those who toss waste, I urge Members to support the amendment. Let us send a message to the mindless minority who wreak havoc on our green spaces.

Before concluding my remarks, I would like to draw the attention of the House to amendments 167, 168, 170 and 171, which, among other Conservative proposals, aim to strengthen respect orders. We have heard the Minister speak both in Committee and in the Chamber of the role these orders can play in tackling antisocial behaviour. The success of the policy will be contingent on its effective enforcement by the police, and on perpetrators being aware that they will face tough sanctions if they breach the orders. I hope the Government will continue to consider these amendments.

I draw Members’ attention to these amendments as they are indicative of the constructive approach Conservative Members have taken towards improving the Bill in ways that we believe would benefit the legislation as a whole. I hope that Members across the House will give serious consideration to our amendments and new clauses over the coming two days.

The Minister and I have spent more time together than she probably ever envisaged, and I believe we can agree that the Bill contains some sensible and proportionate measures: greater protections for our retail workers, efforts to tackle antisocial behaviour, and more measures to tackle vile and horrendous child exploitation. However, we can work together to go further, and that is what our Opposition amendments seek to do.

[Sam Carling (North West Cambridgeshire) (Lab)]

I begin by once again welcoming the Bill. It will deliver so much for my constituents by protecting people from crime and enabling tough action on antisocial behaviour, including in areas that have too long been labelled “low level” and ignored, such as the illegal off-road bikes that constituents so often raise with me.

The Bill will introduce mandatory reporting for child sexual abuse—one of the key recommendations of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, or IICSA. This is a long-overdue measure, which has long been called for by our Labour Home Secretary and Prime Minister personally. However, I remain concerned that the Government are not going far enough on the issue of mandatory reporting. I have therefore tabled three amendments to the Bill on that subject—amendments 10, 11 and 22—on which I will focus my speech today.

Amendments 10, 11 and 22 are not intended to change Government policy—quite the opposite. They are intended to deliver the Government’s stated policy to implement the IICSA recommendations relevant to the Home Office in full. The Home Secretary stated in January that that was the Government’s intention, and reaffirmed that just yesterday, responding with a firm “yes” to my question after her statement on whether it remained Government policy to implement the recommendations in full.

However, there are three significant gaps in our plans to implement recommendation 13 on mandatory reporting, where the Bill does not deliver what IICSA recommended. With these gaps, I am concerned that the duty to report will be ineffective in some of the settings where it is most needed. My concern applies to religious groups in particular. I will use the example of the Jehovah’s Witnesses—the religious group I grew up in—to illustrate how and why.

Jehovah’s Witnesses have a deep cultural distrust of secular authorities, which, as happens in a lot of religious groups, leads to a culture of dealing with everything internally, including child sexual abuse, and reporting nothing to the police. Their internal processes for doing so are atrocious. Jehovah’s Witnesses have something called the “two witness rule”, which means that no action is taken on any report of wrongdoing unless there are two witnesses to it. There are never two witnesses to child sexual abuse. I give that context to highlight why the mandatory duty to report must be absolutely watertight, as IICSA recommended, to prevent people in the leadership of organisations like the Jehovah’s Witnesses from avoiding it.

I will cover the three gaps in turn. First, there are no criminal sanctions if someone does not comply with the duty. I understand that the Government are proposing professional sanctions, such as a referral to the Disclosure and Barring Service and to relevant professional regulators, but that is not set out in the Bill and would apply to only a fraction of people under the duty. It would not, for example, do much in religious settings, where so many of the failings are happening, and where the duty would, if constructed properly, help immensely to protect children.

IICSA was clear that failure to comply should be a criminal offence, and amendment 10 would make that the case. It proposes a fine as the appropriate sanction, which is in line with best practice overseas. Many other countries—France, Australia, parts of Canada and so on—have introduced mandatory reporting, and many have done so with criminal sanctions of this kind. While the Government will likely say that criminal sanctions could have a chilling effect that would stop people going into professions that work with children, the international evidence clearly shows that this does not happen—in the Australian state of Victoria, for instance. Professor Ben Mathews has done extensive research on mandatory reporting laws and their efficacy, which I thoroughly encourage the Minister to ask officials to examine.

The second gap relates to those who come under the duty to report. IICSA recommended that the duty should apply first to anyone working in regulated activities with children under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, and the Bill uses that criterion—tick. However, IICSA also recommended that it should apply to anyone in a position of trust over a child, as defined by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which the Bill does not include. Amendment 22 would make it so.

The Bill sets out a list of relevant activities in part 2 of schedule 8, which replicates about 90% of what is in the Sexual Offences Act. However, that missing 10% is critical; for a start, it includes sports coaches and teachers, which schedule 8 does not. Going back to my earlier example, section 22A of the Sexual Offences Act includes a very effective definition of religious leaders. Schedule 8 does include a definition of religious leaders, but requires such people to have “regular unsupervised contact” with children to be subject to the duty. That qualification will allow virtually any religious leader—be they paid clergy or a volunteer elder, like in the Jehovah’s Witnesses—to escape the duty, as very few have regular unsupervised contact with children, despite being in a significant position of power and influence.

I personally know at least one person who was sexually abused as a child in that organisation. When they went to speak to religious leaders about it, in the presence of their parents—not unsupervised—they were advised that going to the police would mean bringing reproach on God’s name. So no report was made, by either the victim or their family, or by those religious elders. That is commonplace.

Under the Bill as drafted, there is no sanction for that. Those elders are not mandated reporters; even if they were, the proposed offence in clause 73 of stopping someone else from making a report—an offence I very much welcome, for the record—applies only to other mandated reporters. If, therefore, someone pressures a victim or their parents not to make a report, that will not be illegal. That offence needs to be broadened, too.

The National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children is calling for the Government to consider a broader offence of concealing child sexual abuse, to which I urge the Government to give serious consideration. I will give more detail on that later, if there is time.

Police Presence on High Streets

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Thursday 5th June 2025 Westminster Hall

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Furniss. I thank the hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington (Paulette Hamilton) for securing this important debate and for her passionate work on this subject. In fact, I thank all hon. Members for their insightful contributions to this debate. I welcome the news that the brother of the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Neil Coyle) has joined up to the police force, particularly as he has done so in Durham—on my streets, no less. We all know the brilliant work that our hard-working police officers, PCSOs and civil enforcement officers do to protect our high streets and local communities. The police put themselves in dangerous situations to stop the criminals who blight our communities and undermine the social fabric that binds them together. Although it is welcome that headline figures from the crime survey for England and Wales show that crime fell by more than 50% between 2010 and 2024, there is still much more to be done, and protecting our high streets is an integral part of that mission.

I have the honour of representing Stockton, whose high street is a great place and home to some incredible businesses. I will always encourage people to support them, but I would fail in my duty if I did not acknowledge or try to tackle the many challenges they face. If my grandparents were alive today, they would be devastated to see what has become of our high street. Over decades, Stockton’s Labour council has allowed it to decline and to become home to unacceptable levels of crime and antisocial behaviour. Instead of employing more civil enforcement officers and street wardens, the council chooses to employ a huge number of managers on £100k-plus salaries—it recently came to light that it had spent £15.8 million on recruitment consultants in the last three years.

[Daniel Francis]

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the cuts from the previous Government have resulted in my local authority, the London borough of Bexley, having to make every one of its CCTV staff redundant, so that the council is no longer able to assist the police in fighting crime?

[Matt Vickers]

It is incredibly important that whatever money councils have is put to good use. In Stockton, we have terrible examples: people being flown abroad to watch shows to scout for festival appearances, and the CEO of the council recruiting a chum of his on £900 a day, without it ever being seen and considered by the council. Councils have a responsibility to spend properly the money that is given to them, and in Stockton there are too many examples where that is not the case.

Instead of the council using all the powers available through public spaces protection orders to clamp down on antisocial behaviour, its soft approach means that lots of antisocial behaviour has gone unchallenged. Moreover, Stockton’s Labour council volunteered as a dispersal authority, taking a completely disproportionate number of asylum seekers. For many years it has had one of the highest asylum seeker-to-resident ratios of any local authority across the entire country. Those asylum seekers are all housed near the town centre, creating challenges in accommodation, public services, and integration, and leaving huge numbers of lone men hanging around the town centre. The situation is made worse by the council’s approach to housing, which allows huge amounts of houses in multiple occupation, bedsits and bail accommodation to emerge around the town centre.

I will continue to push the council and local police for more action to support Stockton’s fantastic high street and the incredible businesses therein. Before addressing the police’s specific role in protecting the great British high street, we must acknowledge the challenges facing our high streets as a result of this Labour Government’s actions. The Government’s jobs tax and the slashing of small businesses—well, of small business rate relief, though actually they are slashing small businesses—is putting the survival of many of our high street businesses at risk. Confidence has been sapped, and in April business confidence once again turned negative.

The Government will always have the support of the Conservative party in backing our hard-working police officers. We need more officers than ever. It was interesting to hear, during Home Office questions, the Minister and the Home Secretary reading with some excitement a table listing the number of neighbourhood policing officers in each area. How many more police officers—those who can arrest the most serious criminals in our society—does the Minister expect to be in place by the end of the year? Will that number exceed the March 2024 figure?

This discussion comes against the backdrop of six of Britain’s most senior police chiefs warning that important and laudable ambitions to tackle knife crime, violence against women and girls, and neighbourhood policing are all at risk because of funding shortfalls. The Government’s decision to let criminals out of prison early, many of whom will inevitably commit more crime, will put more pressure on our police.

The proposed settlement for policing in 2025-26 is insufficient and risks causing job losses. The Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Mark Rowley, has said that his force is facing the potential loss of 1,700 officers, PCSOs and other staff. I am keen to hear from the Minister whether she thinks that Sir Mark’s figures are correct.

Special constables are invaluable, but we also need full-time officers to investigate serious crimes and secure convictions against the worst offenders on our high streets. That is critical; the public expect not only a police presence, but effective action. Although we were pleased to agree on stronger laws in the Crime and Policing Bill to address offences on our high streets, such laws are meaningless without proper enforcement and punishment. Having spent a long time campaigning alongside the likes of the Co-op, the BRC and USDAW, I am delighted to see the stand-alone offence of assaulting a retail worker on the statute book.

On policing our high streets. I would be grateful if the Minister could comment on recent remarks made by the Mayor of London and his Drugs Commission. Within the mayor’s expression of support for the proposal to decriminalise possession of small amounts of cannabis, there were concerning references to police stop-and-search powers, in which he questioned the scope of their application. Frankly, that is extraordinary, reflecting a worrying disregard for public spaces such as our high streets, where all of us should expect to feel safe. I hope that the Minister will condemn those comments in the strongest possible terms and send a message to our hard-working police officers that stop and search is a vital tool in their armour, and that we entirely support them in using it.

This week, I met representatives of the Federation of Independent Retailers, who shared their experiences of retail crime and the way that the use of in-store facial recognition and AI technology is making a real difference. They suggested that a grant scheme could help them to take the fight to criminals; I would be delighted to hear whether the Minister has given any consideration to introducing such a scheme.

In conclusion, we should celebrate the work of the hard-working police on our streets and of the retail workers in our stores, but we must remember the challenges that they face because of the decisions of this Government. High streets are at the heart of our local communities. The Government must do much more to ensure that they are safe and thriving places that people want to visit.

Oral Answers to Questions

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Monday 2nd June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Six of Britain’s most senior police officers have warned that the Government’s actions are making it harder to keep our streets safe. From the damaging jobs tax to releasing criminals early, Labour is pushing forces to the brink. Does the Home Secretary agree with Met Commissioner Sir Mark Rowley that he will be forced to cut 1,700 police officers, PCSOs and staff this year?

[Yvette Cooper]

I gently remind the hon. Member that thousands of police and PCSOs were taken off our streets under the Conservatives. That is why the number of people who say that they never see the police in their communities doubled under the Conservatives. This Government are turning that around, with 3,000 additional police on our streets this year alone. That includes 470 more neighbourhood police on London’s streets.

[Matt Vickers]

We did not get to whether Mark Rowley was right or wrong, and I notice that the Home Secretary forgot to mention the hundreds of millions being gobbled up by Labour’s jobs tax, or the fact that police numbers reached record levels under the last Government.

That aside, the National Police Chiefs’ Council has published its anti-racism commitment, saying that racial equality does not mean treating everyone the same or being colour blind, and calling for arrest rates to be artificially engineered to be the same across racial groups. Does the Home Secretary agree that the police should respond to people’s actions regardless of race? If so, why did the policing Minister endorse this barmy document?

[Yvette Cooper]

The shadow Minister is, as he knows, talking nonsense. The police have to police without fear or favour; that is the standard that they apply and sign up to. I am really sorry that he wants to undermine the important work of police across the country, just as his party in government undermined the number of police on the streets—took them off the streets—so we ended up with thousands fewer police on our streets. This Government are finally putting them back into communities and back on the beat where they belong.

Crime and Policing Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 8th May 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Diana Johnson]

These new clauses on bulk and suspicious sales come directly from the police—from Commander Clayman’s report and his concern about the grey market. The police clearly believe that these new measures are necessary for them to use this intelligence to tackle our problems with knife crime. Obviously, that fits with the Government’s manifesto commitment to halve knife crime over the next 10 years.

That information and intelligence will be sent to a central unit in the first instance. We will provide guidance to the police on the use of that information. We expect that the information that is not connected to other relevant intelligence linking it to criminality will be deleted and not subject to further investigation.

I turn now to the sanctions on online executives. Government new clauses 72 to 86 and new schedule 1 introduce civil penalties for online companies and their senior managers should they fail to take down illegal knife and offensive weapons content when notified of it by the police. Knives and weapons that are illegally marketed to encourage violence or to promote their suitability for use in violent attacks are commonly sold online and then used in senseless attacks. We know that the boys who murdered Ronan Kanda did so using weapons that had been illegally sold online. Many of those types of knives are marketed on social media and other platforms, meaning that those companies indirectly profit from their sale.

Commander Clayman’s review set out the extent of the problem related to the online sale of knives and offensive weapons, particularly where it relates to knives illegally being made available to young people. That report recommended that social media platforms be required to remove such prohibited material within 48 hours of police notification. These new clauses deliver on that recommendation.

The Home Office consulted widely on these measures. We engaged directly with tech companies and also held a public consultation. Tech companies and associations, charities, councils and members of the public responded to the consultation, and our response to that was published recently.

Collectively, the new clauses will grant the police the power to issue content removal notices to online marketplaces, social media platforms and search engines. The notices will require them to take down specified illegal content relating to knives or offensive weapons. If the specified content is not taken down within 48 hours, the company and an executive designated as their content manager would be liable to civil penalty notices of up to £60,000 and £10,000 respectively. Additionally, should a company fail to designate an appropriate UK-based executive when required to do so by the police, it would be liable for a civil penalty notice of up to £60,000.

These measures provide important safeguards. Both online companies and their designated executives will have the opportunity to request that the content removal notice be reviewed. The police must comply with such requests. Should online companies not have an executive who meets the criteria to be designated as their content manager, they will have the opportunity to inform the police as such. Prior to the issuing of a civil penalty notice, the company and the content manager will have the opportunity to make representations to the police. Finally, penalty notices may of course be challenged in the courts.

I fully expect online companies to act responsibly and take down harmful illegal content when made aware of it. The measures will be used in the rare cases where reckless companies choose to continue hosting such content. Taken together, this is a comprehensive package of measures that will further help to restrict the supply of weapons, particularly to children, and to keep our communities safe. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. The Opposition welcome the measures that aim to restrict the sale of knives in a wider bid to tackle knife crime. The unregulated purchase of dangerous items such as knives or crossbows presents a serious and growing threat to public safety. Without proper controls the weapons can be easily acquired by individuals with harmful intent, including gang members, violent offenders and young people at risk of exploitation. The availability of such items online without age verification, purchase limits or traceability undermines efforts to reduce knife crime and protect communities. It also places law enforcement in a reactive position, forced to respond to violence that could have been prevented through stronger regulation and control. Ensuring proper safeguards around the sale and distribution of knives is not about restricting legitimate use: it is about closing loopholes that are currently exploited to devastating effect.

Government new clause 66 strengthens the legal framework around the remote sale of knives by tightening the requirement for verifying the age of the buyer. Under the proposed changes to section 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, sellers must obtain both a copy of a valid identity document and a photograph of the buyer before the sale is made. A reasonable person would need to be satisfied that the buyer is 18 or over, based on the evidence. By increasing the burden of proof on the seller and clarifying acceptable forms of ID, the measure aims to reduce the availability of knives to young people and close key loopholes in online transactions, contributing to broader efforts to curb knife crime.

Government new clause 68 introduces a legal duty for sellers in England and Wales to report bulk remote sales of knives and other bladed articles, marking a significant step forward in tackling the online flow of potentially dangerous weapons. The measure is aimed at identifying suspicious buying patterns that might indicate stockpiling for criminal use or illicit resale, helping enforcement bodies to monitor and disrupt supply chains. Notably, the duty applies to individuals and businesses unless the buyer can prove they are a VAT-registered business or incorporated company. Failure to report such sales will rightly be a criminal offence, although sellers will have a due-diligence defence if they can demonstrate they took reasonable steps to comply. The clause bolsters the UK’s strategy to reduce knife crime by increasing accountability in the remote sales sector and closing gaps that criminals may exploit.

Government new clauses 69 to 71 amend the Crossbows Act 1987 to tighten the rules on remote sale and delivery of crossbows, preventing sales to under-18s. Government new clause 69 requires sellers to verify the buyer’s age with identity documents and photographs, ensuring marked packages are delivered only to the buyer, and not to lockers. Government new clause 70 creates offences for delivering crossbows to residential premises or lockers. Government new clause 71 defines terms, allows regulations for additional offences and extends guidance to cover crossbow offences. This aligns with the Bill’s aims to enhance public safety. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell the Committee how the Government will support businesses in complying with the new verification requirements. What resources will ensure effective enforcement of delivery restrictions?

Government new clauses 72 to 83 establish a framework for regulating online service providers by requiring the appointment of content managers to oversee compliance with a new chapter of the Bill. Government new clause 73 mandates the Secretary of State to designate a co-ordinating officer from a police force or the National Crime Agency to manage functions, with authority to delegate tasks. Government new clause 74 empowers the co-ordinating officer to issue an appointment notice requiring service providers to appoint a UK resident content manager within seven days or confirm that no suitable candidate exists, and provide contact details.

Government new clause 75 requires providers to appoint a content manager within seven days if a suitable candidate emerges within two years after they reported them non-existing. Government new clause 76 allows providers to replace content managers and mandates notification within seven days if a manager no longer meets eligibility criteria, requiring a new appointment or confirmation that there is no candidate. Government new clause 77 obliges providers to notify the co-ordinating officer of any changes in required information within seven days, and Government new clause 78 authorises penalties of up to £60,000 for non-compliance, including failure to appoint a manager, provide accurate information or correct any false statements. Government new clause 80 empowers authorised officers to issue content removal notices to providers and content managers, requiring removal of unlawful weapons content within 48 hours.

Government new clause 81 allows recipients to request a review of removal notices within 48 hours, with a senior officer reviewing and confirming, modifying or withdrawing the notice. Government new clause 82 requires decision notices post-review to enforce content removal within 24 hours or the remaining 48-hour period. Will the Government do anything to support service providers—especially smaller platforms—in meeting content manager appointment requirements and ensuring that there is appropriate guidance or training available? How will the co-ordinating officer ensure consistent enforcement of these obligations across diverse online services?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I thank the shadow Minister for the general tone of his response on this group of Government new clauses, which come directly from the review that Commander Clayman set out, as well the manifesto commitment we made, particularly around tech executives and holding them to account.

There has been a great deal of consultation, particularly around the tech executives, how it would work and engagement with tech companies. I take the shadow Minister’s point about smaller platforms, but there has been that engagement. On the issue around training and enforcement in terms of the new clauses relating to sale and delivery, it is clear that all courier and delivery companies will have to ensure that their staff are trained on these new legal requirements. To be clear, if the person who is delivering the package has taken all steps to make sure that they have checked the information that is being provided and the identification document, and they are acting reasonably, that is a defence, but there will be a need for training and for people to know what their legal obligations are, particularly when they are delivering, because we know that has been a particular issue. The engagement, particularly with tech executives, that I talked about has also happened with courier firms and delivery businesses, and will continue.

I want to go back to the point that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East raised about identity checks, just so everybody is clear.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

The devastating consequences of road traffic collisions caused by reckless or dangerous behaviour are not limited to motor vehicles. In recent years, a small but significant number of cases have emerged where pedestrians and other vulnerable road users have been seriously injured or even killed as a result of dangerous or careless cycling. This new clause rightly recognises that, while the majority of cyclists are law-abiding and responsible, the law must be equipped to deal appropriately with the minority who behave recklessly and put others at grave risk.

Currently, there is a glaring gap in the legal framework: while motorists who cause death or serious injury through dangerous or careless driving face severe legal consequences, no equivalent provision exists for cyclists. This clause introduces parity in accountability, ensuring that victims and their families are not left feeling that justice is denied simply because the vehicle involved was a bicycle rather than a car.

New clause 87, alongside Government amendment 82, ensures that the legal definitions of dangerous and careless cycling reflect the realities of modern shared road and path usage, including in public places beyond traditional roadways. With the increase in cycling on footpaths, shared spaces and pedestrianised zones, it is vital that the law keeps pace and applies wherever the public might be put at risk.

Importantly, the introduction of these offences does not criminalise cycling itself; it targets only those rare but serious cases where a cyclist’s conduct falls far below that which would be expected of competent and considerate road users. It draws on the well-established legal test from dangerous and careless driving legislation, helping to ensure that the proposed offences are proportionate, fair and clearly understood.

As Members will be aware, my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green has long campaigned for a change to the law regarding responsible cycling, and I pay tribute to his work to deliver this improvement to public safety. The last Government confirmed that they would adopt an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill that would have resulted in a change comparable to the one we see today.

Much of this would not have been possible without the sustained efforts of people such as Matthew Briggs, who, in 2016, tragically lost his wife Kim Briggs, aged just 44, after she was hit by a cyclist riding a fixed-gear bike with no front brakes. She sustained catastrophic head injuries and sadly died a week later. Unfortunately, Kim is just one of many victims, and Matthew’s is just one of many families harmed by these situations, but he has campaigned for this change in the law after tragically losing a loved one. I pay tribute to Matt and his campaign for justice, and hope that this change effectively bridges the gap in the law that so many have highlighted.

Finally, this measure sends a strong message that all road users, regardless of their mode of transport, are responsible for the safety of others. It underlines the seriousness with which Parliament treats the loss of life or serious injuries, promotes responsible cycling, and contributes to safer public spaces for everyone.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 87 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 88

Places of worship: restriction on protests

“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 12(1) (imposing conditions on public processions)—

(a) at the end of paragraph (ab) omit ‘or’;

(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert ‘or

(c) in the case of a procession in England and Wales, the procession is in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from—

(i) accessing that place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities, or

(ii) carrying out religious activities at that place of worship,’.

(3) In section 14(1) (imposing conditions on public assemblies)—

(a) at the end of paragraph (ab) omit ‘or’;

(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert ‘or

(c) in the case of an assembly in England and Wales, the assembly is in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from—

(i) accessing that place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities, or

(ii) carrying out religious activities at that place of worship.’

(4) In section 14ZA(1) (imposing conditions on one-person protests)—

(a) at the end of paragraph (a) omit ‘or’;

(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert ‘or

(c) the protest is in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from—

(i) accessing that place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities, or

(ii) carrying out religious activities at that place of worship.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause gives the police power to impose conditions on public processions, public assemblies and one-person protests that may intimidate people and deter those people from accessing a place of worship for carrying out religious activities or from carrying out religious activities there. It does not provide power to impose conditions where those who may be intimidated are using a place of worship for other purposes.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

New clauses 88 to 90 further update our public order legislation to reflect operational experience. It is important that the legislation keeps pace with the operational realities faced by police on the ground.

In the wake of the events in Israel and Gaza on 7 October 2023, we have seen a wave of large-scale protests across the United Kingdom. Although the right to protest is of course a cornerstone of our democracy and the majority of demonstrations have been peaceful, we cannot ignore the very real impact that some of the gatherings have had on religious communities. We have heard troubling reports of people of all faiths feeling too intimidated to attend places of worship, and of services being cancelled due to the proximity and nature of the protests.

New clause 88 therefore seeks to provide religious communities with better protection from intimidation caused by protests within the vicinity of their place of worship. The police have powers under the Public Order Act 1986 to manage protests where there is serious disruption to the life of the community or intentional intimidation. However, the powers often do not capture the types of harm currently being experienced by religious communities, especially where the intimidation is not deliberate, but is none the less very real for those affected.

The intention of the new clause is to strengthen the police’s powers to manage intimidatory public processions, public assemblies or one-person protests near places of worship, specifically by allowing police to impose conditions where they reasonably believe that the procession, assembly or protest may result in the intimidation of and deter those seeking to access places of worship.

New clause 88 achieves that by creating a new threshold in sections 12, 14 and 14ZA of the 1986 Act, under which the police can impose conditions on public processions, public assemblies and one-person protests. To be clear, it does not ban protests outright, but it enables the police to use this threshold to consider the appropriate time, location or routing that a protest should have in order to avoid intimidating those wishing to practise their faith at their place of worship.

The new clause will allow the police to assess whether a protest may create an intimidating atmosphere that could deter people from accessing places of worship to carry out religious activities or from conducting religious activities there, regardless of whether the organisers of the protest themselves intended for the protest to have that effect.

I turn to new clause 89. In managing recent protests, the police have relied on their powers under sections 12 and 14 of the 1986 Act to impose those conditions, for example where there is a risk of serious public disorder or serious disruption to the life of the community. However, under the current law, only the most senior officers physically at the scene can impose these conditions on live protests or where people are assembling with a view to take part. That can cause delays, particularly when strategic or tactical commanders, known as the gold and silver commanders, who are often based in off-site control rooms, have better access to intelligence but are unable to impose conditions directly. That can also lead to inconsistencies in how similar protests are managed across different locations, especially when multiple events occur at once.

Policing stakeholders have made it clear that allowing gold and silver commanders to impose conditions remotely, where the statutory thresholds are met, would improve the timeliness, consistency and effectiveness of public order policing. Those commanders typically have the best oversight of unfolding events and are well placed to make informed decisions. New clause 89 therefore amends the 1986 Act to enable gold and silver commanders to exercise powers to impose conditions under sections 12(1) and 14(1) in relation to public processions and assemblies.

Finally, new clause 90 addresses two operational issues raised by the Department for Transport and the Ministry of Defence to ensure that public order powers can be used effectively by the British Transport police and the Ministry of Defence police. First, it amends the definitions in the Public Order Act 1986 to allow the BTP to impose conditions on public assemblies taking place at railway stations. Currently, the law restricts the use of these powers to open-air locations, which limits the BTP’s ability to manage protests in enclosed but high-risk public spaces such as major stations. This change will ensure that the BTP can act appropriately within its jurisdiction across England, Wales and Scotland.

Secondly, the new clause corrects a legislative error made in 2004 that unintentionally prevented the BTP from using section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the existing power to require individuals to remove face coverings. This amendment restores that power. It also empowers the MDP to issue authorisations under section 60AA and section 60 of the 1994 Act to enable MDP officers to exercise powers under these provisions within its jurisdiction, in the same way as territorial police forces.

These are technical but important amendments. They do not expand thresholds or the scope of the powers themselves, but simply ensure that the BTP and MDP can apply them, where appropriate, to keep people safe, particularly in transport hubs and around defence infrastructure. The proposals reflect direct feedback from operational policing and will bring clarity and consistency to the use of public order legislation. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

New clause 88 rightly seeks to strengthen protections for the freedom of religion and belief by ensuring that individuals are not deterred or intimidated from attending or participating in religious worship due to protests taking place in the vicinity of places of worship. It balances the right to peaceful protest with the fundamental right of individuals to practise their faith without fear or obstruction. Places of worship are not just buildings; they are sanctuaries for reflection, community and faith. When people are intimidated from entering these spaces or carrying out religious observance because of aggressive or targeted protests, it undermines not only their personal freedoms, but the broader principle of religious tolerance.

This new clause helps to ensure that those attending religious services can do so without being subject to harassment or psychological pressure. The provision is not a ban on protests: it enables the police to impose conditions, not prohibitions, on processions, assemblies and even one-person protests that occur in the vicinity of a place of worship, where such demonstrations risk intimidating individuals of reasonable firmness and deterring from participating in religious activities. The threshold is carefully defined to target behaviour that causes harm, while still protecting legitimate expression of opinion.

While some may easily dismiss this new clause, it is important to recognise that there are real-world examples where people believe that protests are being used to undermine the ability to worship. For example, recently in Westcliff-on-Sea, a protest organised by Action for Palestine, which the Palestinian Solidarity Campaign described as “not constructive”, took place on Shabbat during the final week of Pesach, in a Jewish neighbourhood where many residents would be travelling to and from the synagogue. The local rabbi said:

“There were quite a few people in the community who were so intimidated that they decided to go to their parents’ in London for the weekend, to get away completely.”

Others decided to attend one of the other orthodox synagogues in the area, such as the Westcliff Charedi synagogue, and ending up having to walk a mile to make Saturday’s two services. While I would not expect the Minister to comment on the specifics of whether that protest would constitute a breach of the new clause in question, it highlights how people practising their religion have felt targeted by particular protests.

Given the rise in targeted demonstrations, whether based on religion, race or identity, this new clause ensures that the law is responsive to the realities of contemporary protest dynamics. It draws on the existing powers under the Public Order Act 1986, applying them specifically in a context where dignity, privacy and religious freedom deserve particular safeguarding. Ultimately, this new clause is a proportionate and necessary step to preserve the peaceful co-existence of rights: the right to worship freely and the right to protest responsibly. It affirms that places of worship must remain accessible and free from intimidation for all communities.

I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. How will she ensure that new clause 88 strikes the right balance between protecting freedom of religion and upholding the right to protest under articles 9, 10 and 11 of the European convention on human rights? What guidance will be provided to the police to assess whether a protest

“may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness”?

How will subjectivity be mitigated to avoid arbitrary enforcement? Has the Home Office identified particular recent incidents that demonstrate a pressing need for the power? How frequently does the Minister expect it to be used?

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Currently, in criminal courts, adult defendants do not have a general right to anonymity, which reflects the principle of open justice. However, judges may impose reporting restrictions where the disclosure of identifying information could hinder the administration of justice, or impact fair trial rights. Armed police officers perform a unique and dangerous role. They are trained to use lethal force on behalf of the state to protect the lives of our citizens. Their work requires them to confront situations that demand split-second decisions that can have profound legal and personal ramifications. They respond to major crimes involving high-risk individuals, often linked to organised crime groups. That inherently dangerous role naturally increases the risk of retribution for both officers and their families, which was a risk highlighted by the police accountability review.

The Government’s plan to introduce the measures set out in new clauses 91 to 94 was originally announced to the House by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary on 23 October. The proposed new clauses address specific concerns raised during the police accountability review, and following the trial of Sergeant Martyn Blake. They will help deliver our commitment to rebuild the confidence of police officers in their vital work to keep the public safe.

Proposed new clause 91 creates a presumption of anonymity for firearms officers who are charged with offences related to the discharge of their weapon during their official duties. That presumption does not extend to other police officers who use force in their duties or to firearms officers if force is used in the line of duty that does not involve discharging a firearm. The starting point for the court will be that anonymity should be granted in these cases, and that such anonymity will remain in place until the defendant is sentenced.

New clause 91 requires that the court must withhold identifying details from the public during proceedings and give a “reporting direction”. The terms of the reporting direction are set out in new clause 93 and prevent the publication of any material that may lead to the identification of the defendant. New clause 91 also gives the courts statutory powers to ensure that the defendant’s identity is protected in the courtroom, if it is

“in the interests of justice to do so”.

New clause 94 sets out the types of measures that can be used, such as screens or voice modulation. It will be for the court to decide whether these are required.

Judicial discretion is preserved under the new provisions, which enable courts to disclose identifying details or lift reporting restrictions, where considered necessary, taking into account the specific circumstances of the case and the overall interests of justice.

New clause 92 provides courts with the statutory authority to extend in-court anonymity measures and reporting restrictions beyond sentencing, should the defendant wish to appeal their conviction. However, it does not establish a presumption, nor does it apply if a firearms officer convicted of an offence seeks only to appeal their sentence. When a firearms officer is convicted, their right to anonymity ceases at the point of sentencing. However, the court may order that anonymity continues pending the outcome of an appeal. If the conviction is upheld on appeal, the right to anonymity will cease upon the finalisation of that appeal.

Conversely, when an officer is exonerated, their right to anonymity will continue, allowing them to resume their professional and personal lives without fear of stigma or threats to their safety. Ensuring national safety and security is a top priority for this Government and the role of firearms officers is essential to achieving that. They serve in their difficult and demanding role voluntarily and we cannot expect them to perform their duties effectively without providing adequate safeguards to protect them and their families. Amendment 83 provides for the new clauses to come into force two months after the Bill is passed. I commend the new clauses, and the amendment, to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Government new clauses 91 to 94 provide anonymity protections for authorised firearms officers in legal proceedings involving qualifying offences. New clause 91 ensures that officers charged with offences related to their authorised use of lethal weapons discharging a conventional round will have their personal details withheld and reporting directions issued, unless contrary to justice. Such measures would protect them from public scrutiny and potential threats during sensitive investigations. They would foster officers’ confidence in performing high-risk duties because they would be shielded from premature exposure before conviction.

Government new clause 92 extends the protections to convicted officers, pending appeals. That would allow courts to maintain anonymity if necessary for justice, and would support fair appeal processes by preventing irreversible reputational damage if convictions are overturned.

Government new clauses 93 and 94 provide clear mechanisms for reporting directions and anonymity orders to enforce the protections, while ensuring that judges and juries retain access to the officer’s identity. That balances transparency with safety. As the Minister has said, Members will be all too aware of the case of Sergeant Martyn Blake, who was acquitted in October 2024 of murdering Chris Kaba after a 2022 shooting in London. Blake faced death threats, including a £10,000 bounty, forcing him into hiding and highlighting the need for anonymity to protect officers and their families from retribution during trials.

These measures will help to ensure that officers who act in good faith under dangerous circumstances are protected from such vindictive attacks while the judicial process is under way—as well as ensuring recruitment and retention in firearms roles, and public safety—while also allowing the courts to lift protections when justice demands. Will the Minister comment further on how the Government will ensure that courts balance anonymity protections with the public interest in transparent justice? In particular, what guidance will be provided to courts to assess when anonymity is contrary to the interests of justice?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome the tone in which the Opposition spokesperson has presented his comments and the fact that he shares our concern about the need for these new measures. Judges will of course have all relevant information in balancing the need for open justice with the need to protect firearms officers in these specific instances. The measures recognise the exceptional circumstances of defendants in such cases and create a presumption of anonymity. The starting point for the courts will be that anonymity should be granted in such cases, unless it is contrary to justice to do so.

Let me add that open justice and the freedom of the press to report on these cases continue to be important principles of our justice system, and this legislation will respect those key principles. A court may already order anonymity measures or reporting restrictions in a case where it judges that disclosure of a defendant’s identity would give rise to a real and immediate risk to life. The measure is being introduced in recognition of the unique responsibilities that firearms officers have, as I have said, and the potential risks associated with their identification during court proceedings. It is really important that judges and the courts get the balance right here, but this measure is absolutely necessary.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 91 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 92

Anonymity for authorised firearms officers appealing convictions for qualifying offences

“(1) This section applies where a person (‘D’) is convicted of a qualifying offence in proceedings in a court in England and Wales, or proceedings (anywhere) before a service court.

(2) The court by or before which D is convicted may, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so—

(a) cause any or all of the information mentioned in section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(3)(a)(i) to (iii) to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court;

(b) give a reporting direction in respect of D (see section (Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions));

(c) make an anonymity order in respect of D (see (Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders)).

(3) Any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under subsection (2) ceases to have effect at the end of the appeal period unless, before the end of that period, D brings an appeal against the conviction.

(4) Where, before the end of the appeal period, D brings an appeal against the conviction, the court dealing with the appeal may, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so—

(a) cause any or all of the information mentioned in section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(3)(a)(i) to (iii) to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court;

(b) give a reporting direction in respect of D;

(c) make an anonymity order in respect of D.

(5) The court dealing with the appeal must at the earliest opportunity determine the issue of whether to exercise any or all of the powers under subsection (4).

(6) Any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under subsection (2) ceases to have effect upon the making of the determination mentioned in subsection (5) (whether or not the court dealing with the appeal gives a direction or makes an order).

(7) Any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under subsection (4) ceases to have effect if the appeal against conviction is abandoned or dismissed.

(8) In this section—

‘appeal period’ in relation to a person convicted of a qualifying offence, means the period allowed for bringing an appeal against that conviction, disregarding the possibility of an appeal out of time with permission;

‘qualifying offence’ has the meaning given by section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(2).

(9) This section does not apply where the proceedings in which D was convicted were begun before the coming into force of section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences).”—(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This new clause, which is related to NC91, provides courts with a power to preserve the anonymity of authorised firearms officers convicted of an offence relating to the discharge of their firearm in the course of their duties, pending any appeal against that conviction.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 93

Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions

“(1) A reporting direction, in relation to a person (‘D’) charged with (or convicted of) a qualifying offence, is a direction that no matter relating to D may be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify D as a person who is, or was, alleged to have committed (or who has been convicted of) the offence.

(2) The matters relating to D in relation to which the restrictions imposed by a reporting direction apply (if their inclusion in any publication is likely to have the result mentioned in subsection (1)) include in particular—

(a) D’s name,

(b) D’s address,

(c) the identity of any place at which D works, and

(d) any still or moving image of D.

(3) A relevant court may by direction (‘an excepting direction’) dispense, to any extent specified in the excepting direction, with the restrictions imposed by a reporting direction if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.

(4) An excepting direction—

(a) may be given at the time the reporting direction is given or subsequently;

(b) may be varied or revoked by a relevant court.

(5) A reporting direction has effect—

(a) for a fixed period specified in the direction, or

(b) indefinitely,

but this is subject to subsection (5)(b) of section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences) and subsections (3), (6) and (7) of section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers appealing convictions for qualifying offences).

(6) A reporting direction may be revoked if a relevant court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.

(7) In this section—

‘publication’ has the same meaning as in Part 2 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (see section 63 of that Act);

‘qualifying offence’ has the meaning given by section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(2);

‘relevant court’, in relation to a reporting direction, means—

(a) the court that gave the direction,

(b) the court (if different) that is currently dealing, or that last dealt, with the proceedings in which the direction was given, or

(c) any court dealing with an appeal (including an appeal by way of case stated) arising out of the proceedings in which the direction was given or with any further appeal.”—(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This new clause, which supplements NC91 and NC92, makes provision about reporting directions that may be given under either of those new clauses.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 94

Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders

“(1) An anonymity order, in relation to a person (‘D’) charged with (or convicted of) a qualifying offence, is an order made by a court that requires specified measures to be taken in relation to D to ensure that the identity of D is withheld from the public in proceedings before the court.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the kinds of measures that may be required to be taken in relation to D include measures for securing one or more of the following—

(a) that identifying details relating to D be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court;

(b) that D is screened to any specified extent;

(c) that D’s voice is subjected to modulation to any specified extent.

(3) An anonymity order may not require—

(a) D to be screened to such an extent that D cannot be seen by—

(i) the judge or other members of the court (if any), or

(ii) the jury (if there is one);

(b) D’s voice to be modulated to such an extent that D’s natural voice cannot be heard by any persons within paragraph (a)(i) or (ii).

(4) The court that made an anonymity order may vary or discharge the order if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.

(5) In this section—

‘qualifying offence’ has the meaning given by section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(2);

‘specified’ means specified in the anonymity order concerned.” —(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This new clause, which supplements NC91 and NC92, makes provision about anonymity orders that may be made under either of those new clauses.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 5

Pornographic content: online harmful content

“(1) A person commits an offence if they publish or allow or facilitate the publishing of pornographic content online which meets the criteria for harmful material under section 368E(3)(a) and section 368E(3)(b) of the Communications Act 2003.

(2) An individual guilty of an offence is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine or both.

(3) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of where the offence takes place.

(4) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if any part of the offence takes place in the UK.

(5) The platform on which material that violates the provisions in this section is published can be fined up to £18 million or 10 percent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.

(6) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the Act receiving Royal Assent, make regulations appointing one or more public bodies (the appointed body) to monitor and enforce compliance by online platforms with this section.

(7) Regulations made under subsection 6 may provide the appointed body appointed by the Secretary of State with the powers, contained in sections 144 and 146 of the Online Safety Act 2023, to apply to the court for a Service Restriction Order or Access Restriction Order (or both).

(8) The appointed body must, within six months of being appointed by the Secretary of State, lay before Parliament a strategy for monitoring, and enforcing, compliance with the provisions in this section.

(9) The appointed body must lay before Parliament an annual report, outlining the enforcement activity undertaken in relation to this section.”—(Matt Vickers.)

This new clause extends safeguarding requirements for pornography distributed offline to pornography distributed online, making it an offence to publish online harmful material under section 368E(3)(a) and section 368E(3)(b) of the Communications Act 2003.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 6—Pornographic content: duty to verify age—

“(1) A person (A) commits an offence if they publish or allow or facilitate the publishing of pornographic content online where it has not been verified that—

(a) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has given their consent for the content in which they feature to be published or made available by the service; and/or

(b) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has been verified as an adult, and that age verification completed before the content was created and before it was published on the service; and/or

(c) every individual featured in pornographic content on the platform, that had already published on the service when this Act is passed, is an adult.

(2) It is irrelevant under (1a) whether the individual featured in pornographic material has previously given their consent to the relevant content being published, if they have subsequently withdrawn that consent in writing either directly or via an appointed legal representative to—

(a) the platform, or

(b) the relevant regulator where a contact address was not provided by the platform to receive external communications.

(3) If withdrawal of consent under (2) has been communicated in writing to an address issued by the platform or to the relevant public body, the relevant material must be removed by the platform within 24 hours of the communication being sent.

(4) An individual guilty of an offence is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).

(5) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of where the offence takes place.

(6) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if any part of the offence takes place in the UK.

(7) The platform on which material that violates the provisions in this section is published can be fined up to £18 million or 10 percent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.

(8) The Secretary of State will appoint one or more public bodies to monitor and enforce compliance by online platforms with this section, with the relevant public body—

(a) granted powers to impose business disruption measures on non-compliant online platforms, including but not limited to service restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an ancillary service, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service); and access restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an access facility, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service).

(b) required to act in accordance with regulations relating to monitoring and enforcement of this section issued by the Secretary of State, including but not limited to providing the Secretary of State with a plan for monitoring and enforcement of the provisions in this section within six months of the bill entering into force, and publishing annual updates on enforcement activity relating to this section.

(9) Internet services hosting pornographic content must make and keep a written record outlining their compliance with the provisions of this section. Such a record must be made summarised in a publicly available statement alongside the publishing requirements in section 81(4) and (5) of the Online Safety Act.”

This new clause makes it a requirement for pornography websites to verify the age and permission of everyone featured on their site, and enable withdrawal of consent at any time.

New clause 7—Pornographic Content: Duty to safeguard against illegal content—

“(1) The Online Safety Act is amended as follows.

(2) In section 80(1), after ‘service’ insert ‘and the illegal content duties outlined in Part 3 of this Act.’”

This new clause extends the illegal content duties in Part 3 of the Act to all internet services which are subject to the regulated provider pornographic content duties in Part 5 of the Act.

New clause 51—Amendment of Possession of extreme pornographic images—

“(1) Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (possession of extreme pornographic images) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (7) after paragraph (a) insert—

‘(aa) an act which affects a person’s ability to breath and constitutes battery of that person.’”

This new clause would extend the legal definition of the extreme pornography to include the depiction of non-fatal strangulation.

[Matt Vickers]

New clause 6 would introduce a safeguard to ensure that all individuals featured in pornographic content online were verified as adults. By requiring verification before content was created and before it was published, the new clause would strengthen protections against the inclusion of minors, whether through coercion, deception or manipulation, and ensure that no content involving under-age individuals was ever legally uploaded in the first place. This is a clear and necessary step to combat child sexual exploitation online, and one that aligns with wider public expectations about safety and decency on digital platforms.

My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Rebecca Paul) has raised this issue in the House on multiple occasions, reflecting deep concern over the ease with which harmful and unlawful content can slip through the cracks of unregulated online platforms. The new clause takes that concern seriously and would place a firm legal duty on content hosts to verify the age and consent of all individuals involved. It would shift the burden on to platforms—where it rightly belongs—to adopt robust age verification measures and uphold basic standards of safety and legality. The new clause would not only protect children from exploitation, but help to rebuild public trust in the digital environment by demonstrating that the law was keeping pace with technology.

The new clause’s suggestion that pornographic content can be uploaded without the age of the individuals involved being verified is very disturbing. I would be grateful if the Minister could comment on that and why she feels that the new clause might not be necessary. What is in place to prevent content featuring minors from being uploaded?

The pornography review led by Baroness Bertin has recommended that individuals who feature in pornography should have the right at any time to withdraw their consent to the continued publication of that content. The review states:

“Even if a performer or creator has provided consent for the initial recording and sharing of pornographic content, they should have every right to withdraw consent at a later point…and have that content removed.”

I am keen to hear the Minister’s view and, in particular, why she thinks that that recommendation is wrong.

New clause 51 seeks to update section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 by expanding the definition of extreme pornographic material to include depictions of non-fatal strangulation where it constitutes an act of battery and affects a person’s ability to breathe. The purpose of the new clause is to reflect growing concern from victims’ groups, criminal justice professionals and law enforcement about the increasing normalisation and distribution of such harmful content. Depictions of strangulation, even when simulated, have been linked to increased risk of real-world violence, especially against women. It has been suggested that strangulation is a strong predictor of future domestic homicide and normalising its portrayal in pornography risks reinforcing abusive behaviour.

Currently, the law prohibits extreme pornography that portrays serious injury or life-threatening acts. However, non-fatal strangulation, although deeply dangerous and traumatic, is not consistently covered by the existing legal framework. The new clause would close that gap by providing clarity to police and prosecutors and sending a clear message that depictions of life-threatening violence for sexual gratification are unacceptable. By targeting depictions in which the act affects a person’s ability to breathe and amounts to battery, the new clause is narrowly focused to avoid capturing consensual and legal adult activity while still addressing that which represents serious harm. It would bring the law into line with recent legislative steps such as the introduction of the offence of non-fatal strangulation in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, acknowledging the real risk and impact of that conduct. Ultimately, this change would strengthen protections for the public and uphold standards of decency, particularly in safeguarding against material that eroticises violence and coercion.

I do not wish to divide the Committee on new clause 6, but would like us to divide on new clause 51, which I understand will be decided on later.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I want to make it very clear to hon. Members that I have immense sympathy for the sentiments behind all the new clauses in this group. All of us in the House wish to make society a safer place for women and girls. Indeed, this Government were elected with a commitment to halving violence against women and girls. I am sure we all agree that the fight against the proliferation of extreme pornography and access to harmful material is one step to achieving that goal, so before I respond to new clauses 5 to 7 and 51, I want to share a few thanks.

First, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato) for tabling new clauses 5 to 7 and for tirelessly campaigning to raise awareness of online harm. I also thank the hon. Member for Stockton West for tabling new clause 51. Importantly, I thank Baroness Bertin, whose independent report on pornography provides us with invaluable insight into pornography and online harm, which the Government continue to consider carefully. All the new clauses shed light on serious issues, and I welcome their being brought to the fore today.

New clause 5 aims to equalise the treatment of pornography regulation online and offline, by making legal but harmful content prohibited online. It seeks to give effect to a recommendation made by Baroness Bertin in her review, which makes the case for parity in the regulation of pornography online and offline. She recommends achieving that through either a new pornography code under the Online Safety Act 2023, or a publication offence, which would render illegal a variety of currently legal pornography content. That approach is similar to what new clause 5 aims to do.

Before I respond to the new clause, I will set out the current legislative framework. Both online and offline pornography is subject to criminal and regulatory legislation and enforcement. The Video Recordings Act 1984 makes it an offence to distribute pornography in a physical media format that has not been classified by the British Board of Film Classification. The BBFC will not classify any content in breach of criminal law or certain other types of pornography. Section 368E of the Communications Act 2003 builds on that framework by prohibiting on-demand programme services, such as ITVX or Prime Video, from showing “prohibited material”, which includes any video that has been refused classification certification by the BBFC and any material that would be refused a classification certificate if it were considered by the BBFC. That is enforced by Ofcom as a regulatory matter.

In addition, the Online Safety Act treats certain pornography or related material offences as priority offences, which means that user-to-user services must take proactive measures to remove extreme pornography, intimate image abuse and child sex abuse material from their platforms. The Act also places a duty on user-to-user service providers to take steps to prevent such material from appearing online in the first place. Those provisions apply to services even if the companies providing them are outside the UK, if they have links to the UK.

The criminal law also prohibits the possession of extreme pornography and the publication of obscene material, either online or offline. The Obscene Publications Act 1959 extends to the publication of obscene material other than pornography. The Video Recordings Act 1984, the Licensing Act 2003 and section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 criminalise the simple possession of extreme pornographic images.

New clause 5 would make the publication, or facilitation of publication, of such content online a criminal offence, with regulatory enforcement of the new criminal regime where the person publishing the content is an online platform. The criminal offence created by the new clause would rely on the definition in section 368E of the Communications Act 2003, which requires a judgment to be made about whether the BBFC would classify content that has not been subject to the classification process. Creating this style of criminal offence would require a clearer and more certain definition of such content, as any individual would need to be able to clearly understand what conduct may result in their conviction. Extensive further work would be needed to consider and define what currently legal online pornography cannot be published with sufficient certainty to ensure that any offence was enforceable and workable as intended.

New clause 6 also attempts to give effect to the recommendations made by Baroness Bertin in her review of pornography. It seeks to create additional requirements for websites hosting pornographic material to verify that all individuals featured were over 18 before the content was created, consented to the publication of the material, and are able to withdraw that consent at any time. It would further regulate the online pornography sector and create a new criminal offence for individuals who publish or facilitate the publishing of content online, where the age and valid consent of the individuals featured have not been verified. The underlying conduct depicted if a person is under 18 or non-consenting would include child sexual abuse, sexual assault, non-consensual intimate image abuse and potentially modern slavery offences.

The existing criminal law prohibits the creation, distribution and possession of child sexual abuse material, and the possession of extreme pornographic material, which includes non-consensual penetrative sexual acts. The law on the distribution of indecent images of children is very clear. Under the Protection of Children Act 1978, the UK has a strict prohibition on the taking, making, circulation and possession with a view to distribution of any indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child under 18, and these offences carry a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. Section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 also makes the simple possession of indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs of children an offence, which carries a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. In addition, all published material is subject to the Obscene Publications Act 1959.

Crime and Policing Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 8th May 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

New clause 6—Pornographic content: duty to verify age—

“(1) A person (A) commits an offence if they publish or allow or facilitate the publishing of pornographic content online where it has not been verified that—

(a) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has given their consent for the content in which they feature to be published or made available by the service; and/or

(b) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has been verified as an adult, and that age verification completed before the content was created and before it was published on the service; and/or

(c) every individual featured in pornographic content on the platform, that had already published on the service when this Act is passed, is an adult.

(2) It is irrelevant under (1a) whether the individual featured in pornographic material has previously given their consent to the relevant content being published, if they have subsequently withdrawn that consent in writing either directly or via an appointed legal representative to—

(a) the platform, or

(b) the relevant regulator where a contact address was not provided by the platform to receive external communications.

(3) If withdrawal of consent under (2) has been communicated in writing to an address issued by the platform or to the relevant public body, the relevant material must be removed by the platform within 24 hours of the communication being sent.

(4) An individual guilty of an offence is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).

(5) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of where the offence takes place.

(6) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if any part of the offence takes place in the UK.

(7) The platform on which material that violates the provisions in this section is published can be fined up to £18 million or 10 percent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.

(8) The Secretary of State will appoint one or more public bodies to monitor and enforce compliance by online platforms with this section, with the relevant public body—

(a) granted powers to impose business disruption measures on non-compliant online platforms, including but not limited to service restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an ancillary service, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service); and access restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an access facility, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service).

(b) required to act in accordance with regulations relating to monitoring and enforcement of this section issued by the Secretary of State, including but not limited to providing the Secretary of State with a plan for monitoring and enforcement of the provisions in this section within six months of the bill entering into force, and publishing annual updates on enforcement activity relating to this section.

(9) Internet services hosting pornographic content must make and keep a written record outlining their compliance with the provisions of this section. Such a record must be made summarised in a publicly available statement alongside the publishing requirements in section 81(4) and (5) of the Online Safety Act.”

This new clause makes it a requirement for pornography websites to verify the age and permission of everyone featured on their site, and enable withdrawal of consent at any time.

New clause 7—Pornographic Content: Duty to safeguard against illegal content—

“(1) The Online Safety Act is amended as follows.

(2) In section 80(1), after ‘service’ insert ‘and the illegal content duties outlined in Part 3 of this Act.’”

This new clause extends the illegal content duties in Part 3 of the Act to all internet services which are subject to the regulated provider pornographic content duties in Part 5 of the Act.

New clause 51—Amendment of Possession of extreme pornographic images—

“(1) Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (possession of extreme pornographic images) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (7) after paragraph (a) insert—

‘(aa) an act which affects a person’s ability to breath and constitutes battery of that person.’”

This new clause would extend the legal definition of the extreme pornography to include the depiction of non-fatal strangulation.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 9

CCTV on railway network

“(1) It is a legal requirement for CCTV cameras across the railway network in England and Wales to be capable of enabling immediate access by the British Transport Police and relevant Police Forces.

(2) All footage retained by CCTV cameras on the railway network must remain accessible to the British Transport Police and relevant Police Forces for the entirety of the retention period.

(3) The retention period specified in subsection (2) is 30 calendar days.

(4) Further to subsection (1), the Secretary of State must publish a report, within three months of the passing of this Act, specifying a compatibility standard that will facilitate CCTV access for the British Transport Police and any Police Force in England and Wales.”—(Luke Taylor.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I rise to speak in support of new clause 9, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper). We seek a simple but critical improvement to public safety: the interoperability of CCTV systems across our railway network. Currently, rail operators maintain CCTV systems that are not integrated with British Transport police or the local territorial forces in the areas they serve. This technological gap is not just a logistical inconvenience, but an active barrier to justice and public protection.

This issue came to light in a very practical context. My hon. Friend became aware of a spike in bike thefts at St Albans City station. Despite the presence of cameras at the station, the police faced severe limitations on their access to the footage they needed, which delayed investigations and reduced the chance of recovering the stolen property. At the other end of the Thameslink line, at Sutton station, I have had an expensive e-bike stolen and two other bikes dismantled—the theft of a saddle made my ride home from work one night particularly uncomfortable.

This is not just about my cycling challenges, but about broader criminal activity on our railways, including antisocial behaviour, assaults and, most gravely, threats to the safety of women and vulnerable people using our public transport. When someone is attacked or harassed on a platform or in a train carriage, time is of the essence, and having the ability to quickly retrieve and share CCTV footage can make the difference between justice and impunity. New clause 9 would fix this problem by requiring rail operators to ensure that their CCTV systems are compatible with law enforcement systems, enabling faster, more co-ordinated responses when incidents occur. In an age when we expect smart, connected infrastructure, this is a common-sense step that aligns with public expectations and operational necessity. In the age of Great British Railways, it would be an opportunity to streamline and standardise the systems used by our currently fragmented rail system into a single, interoperable system that improves the experience and safety of riders.

I urge the Committee to support the new clause not because it would improve security on paper, but because it would make a tangible difference to the safety and confidence of passengers across the rail network.

[Matt Vickers]

Requiring CCTV on the rail network to meet police access and retention standards could bring important benefits for public safety and criminal justice. Ensuring footage is readily accessible to the police would help to deter crime, enable faster investigations and support prosecutions with reliable evidence.

Victims and witnesses benefit when their accounts can quickly be corroborated, and cases are more likely to be resolved effectively. Standardising CCTV systems across train operators would also reduce inefficiencies, removing delays that can occur due to incompatible formats or outdated technology. In high-risk areas or busy urban transport hubs, this kind of clarity and consistency could make a real difference to public confidence and police capability.

No doubt some will argue that increased surveillance on public transport raises questions about privacy and civil liberties, particularly if passengers feel that they are being constantly monitored. Also, rail operators may face high financial and logistical burdens if they are required to overhaul existing CCTV infrastructure to meet new standards. For smaller operators in particular, the cost of compliance could be significant, potentially impacting service provision or ticket prices.

I would be grateful if the Liberal Democrats told us whether this requirement would apply to all train operating companies, including heritage railways and smaller, regional operators. What specific technical or operational standards would CCTV systems be expected to meet, and how would those be determined or updated over time? Have they reviewed how many operators already meet or fall short of the proposed standards, and what level of upgrade would typically be required? Have they assessed the financial implications for train operators, and would they expect any Government funding or support to assist implementation?

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

New clause 9 would introduce a requirement that all CCTV camera images on the railway be made immediately accessible to the British Transport police and the relevant local Home Office police force. I am sympathetic to the cases that the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam, who speaks for the Liberal Democrats, shared with the Committee. I particularly sympathise with his plight and predicament when his saddle was stolen; having to cycle home without a saddle must have been incredibly painful, so I fully welcome the aims of this new clause. We know that lack of immediate access to railway CCTV camera images has been a significant issue for the British Transport police, as it may reduce their ability to investigate crime as quickly as possible. However, I do not believe that legislation is necessary to address the issue. Let me explain why.

My colleagues at the Department for Transport are looking to implement a system that will provide remote, immediate access for the BTP, Home Office forces and the railway industry where relevant. As I said, that does not need legislation. What is needed is a technological solution and the resources to provide for that. I am sure that the hon. Member will continue to press the case with the Department for Transport, and for updates on the progress of the work, but for now, I invite him to withdraw his new clause.

--- Later in debate ---

Existing legislation does not explicitly cover GPS theft, making it harder for law enforcement to prioritise and tackle these crimes effectively. The new clause would fix that, closing a loophole and giving police the clarity they need to take robust action. Let us be clear: the impact of this crime is not just financial. It causes major disruption to food production, delays harvesting and erodes the confidence of rural communities, which already feel under-protected. By explicitly including GPS equipment under the 2023 Act, we send a strong message: our farmers will not be left exposed and our legislation will keep pace with both technology and the evolving tactics of organised crime. I commend the new clause to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

New clauses 27, 96 and 98 seek to tackle the real and growing problem of tool theft from tradesmen. At this point, I declare an interest as the son of a builder. This country is built on the back of tradesmen. They are the small businesses that make a huge contribution to our economy and build the world around us. I have seen at first hand the nightmare that occurs when guys or girls in the trade get up at daft o’clock to go to work and earn a living, only to find that their van or lock-up has been broken into and their equipment stolen. They lose the equipment, their vehicle gets damaged and they lose a day’s work. In fact, they can lose days or weeks of work, and the nature of their employment often means that that is a real financial loss.

Not only do these hard-working people suffer that loss, but they know that little is done to stop this ever-increasing problem. I have spoken to tradesmen and key campaigners on this issue, such as Shoaib Awan and the team at Fix Radio, who have been standing up for tradesmen across the country, organising a rally in Westminster and ensuring that their voice is heard. Many people will have seen my good friend the shadow Justice Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), raising this issue on GB News and talking about the failure of agencies to tackle it.

Shoaib has highlighted the fact that not only do people wake up to the consequences and costs of such thefts, but all too often, they go to a car boot sale at the weekend to see the thieves selling the stolen goods in broad daylight with little, if any, action from the police and trading standards. I ask anyone who does not think that these amendments are necessary to listen to Shoaib or watch the coverage on GB News, should they so wish. As more thieves get away with and profit from this crime, so its prevalence continues to increase. Since Sadiq Khan became mayor, tool theft in London has gone up by 60%. I hope Members will consider these amendments.

New clause 27 strengthens the deterrent effect of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 by aligning financial penalties with the real-world losses experienced by tradespeople and small businesses when their tools or equipment are stolen. The current enforcement provisions may result in fines that are disconnected from the actual harm caused, particularly to self-employed individuals or small and medium-sized enterprises, where the loss of equipment can be financially devastating. The new clause introduces a fairer and more effective approach by unequivocally requiring courts to impose fines that reflect the full replacement cost of the stolen equipment, the cost of repairing any damage done during the theft and the trading loss incurred while the equipment was unavailable, whether it be cancelled jobs, lost contracts or reputational harm.

Tool theft has reached crisis levels in the UK, with one in 10 tradespeople expected to experience tool theft this year alone. Many of the victims have already endured multiple incidents and, alarmingly, self-employed tradespeople are 38% more likely than their employed counterparts to fall victim to this type of crime. Yet, despite the prevalence of this crime, only 1% of stolen tools are ever recovered.

The consequences of tool theft go far beyond the immediate loss of equipment. Victims face an average cost of £2,730 to replace stolen tools, £1,320 in vehicle or property repairs and £1,900 in lost work and business disruption—a combined blow of nearly £6,000. More than four in five victims report a negative impact on mental health, with over one third describing it as “major”. That is no small issue, especially in an industry already suffering one of the UK’s highest suicide rates. More than 40% of victims say the theft has damaged their business reputation, and one in 10 say the reputational impact was significant. Frustration with the police and the legal response is widespread. Nearly one quarter of tradespeople—22.7%—do not even bother reporting tool theft to authorities, citing poor outcomes and a lack of follow-up.

According to figures from CrimeRate, Bristol has the highest rates of general crime, with 106 crimes per 1,000 residents, followed by West Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear and West Midlands. Those rates correlate with high levels of tool theft. The persistent threat of crime means that, for 68% of tradespeople, worrying about such theft is a daily reality. The new clause would not only ensure that victims are properly compensated, but send a strong message to offenders that equipment theft is not a low-risk crime. For many tradespeople, a single incident can lead to thousands of pounds in losses and days or weeks of missed work. The clause reflects a growing recognition that crimes affecting livelihoods must be met with penalties that match the seriousness and consequences of the offence. It supports victims, reinforces respect for the law and helps to protect the economic wellbeing of skilled workers across the country.

New clause 96 seeks to amend the Sentencing Act 2020 to make the theft of tools from a tradesman an explicit aggravating factor when courts are considering the seriousness of a theft offence under section 7 of the Theft Act 1968. The intention is to recognise the disproportionate harm caused when essential work tools are stolen from skilled tradespeople, many of whom rely entirely on their tools to earn a living. By requiring courts to treat such thefts more seriously and state that fact in open court, the clause ensures that sentencing properly reflects the real-world impact of those crimes. It improves public confidence in the justice system and sends a clear message that targeting workers in such a way will not be tolerated.

The UK’s skilled trade sector is essential to infrastructure, housing and national economic recovery, yet, when they are targeted by thieves, many tradespeople feel unprotected and underserved by the criminal justice system. By introducing this aggravating factor, Parliament would send a clear message that these crimes are taken seriously and that the justice system stands on the side of workers who keep our country running. The provision would also help to restore public confidence in sentencing, ensuring that punishment better reflects the real impact on victims.

New clause 96 would also bring greater consistency and transparency in sentencing by obliging courts to state in open court when a theft is aggravated by the fact that tools were stolen from a tradesman. The system reinforces public accountability and the principle that sentencing should consider not only the value of items stolen, but the importance to the victim’s life and work.

New clause 98 addresses a growing concern about the sale of stolen tradespeople’s tools at car boot sales and other temporary markets. Requiring local councils or trading standards authorities to implement an enforcement plan would ensure a more proactive and consistent approach to tackling the issue. Car boot sales and temporary markets, although important parts of local economies and communities, have become a common outlet for the sale of stolen tradesmen’s tools. These informal settings often have minimal regulatory oversight, making them attractive to criminals seeking to quickly offload high value items. Requiring councils to create enforcement plans would close this enforcement gap, helping to dismantle a key part of the stolen goods supply chain.

Tradespeople, many of whom are self-employed, are among those most affected by tool theft. Their tools are not just possessions; they are the means by which individuals earn a living. Stolen tools being resold at car boot sales with little oversight reinforces the cycle of crime and undermines legitimate business. A local enforcement plan will support hard-working tradespeople by increasing the risk for those attempting to profit from their misfortune.

Any Member who has taken the time to speak to affected tradespeople will have heard their overwhelming frustration at the lack of the lack of action at car boot sales, watching tools stolen from them being sold in front of their face in broad daylight with no action from the agencies. This new clause seeks to put that right. By requiring councils to plan enforcement at temporary markets, it would encourage more responsible behaviour among market organisers and set a baseline for due diligence, including vendor checks, co-operation with law enforcement and public awareness initiatives. Such expectations could help to preserve the integrity and trustworthiness of community markets without disrupting legitimate trade.

This is a common-sense, low-cost policy that leverages existing local authority structures. Many councils already have trading standards and enforcement teams in place able to take this on. This measure simply ensures that they will turn their attention to this persistent and growing problem. Enforcement plans could include scheduled inspections, information sharing with police and targeted education for both vendors and shoppers. This preventive approach could reduce the frequency of thefts by making it more difficult for criminals to profit.

The Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 set an important precedent in efforts to crack down on the theft of high-value tools and equipment. However, legislation is only effective when matched by local enforcement. This clause bridges the gap between law and local action, giving councils a clear duty and direction to enforce the law where the illicit trade is happening on the ground.

Local residents and small business owners often feel powerless in the face of persistent tool theft. Seeing their local councils take meaningful and visible action, such as regular enforcement of markets, could help to build trust in the system, sending a message that this type of crime is taken seriously and that steps are being taken at every level to protect those most vulnerable to its effect.

The new clause would help deter the resale of stolen goods, protect legitimate tradespeople from further victimisation and send a clear message that theft and resale will be actively policed at all levels. This targeted local action complements broader sentencing reforms and supports efforts to reduce tool theft across the UK.

New clause 32 seeks to amend the Sentencing Act 2020 and specifically targets the growing issue of rural crime by making the theft of high-value farming equipment a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing decisions. Under the proposed provision, when a court is considering the seriousness of a theft offence under section 7 of the Theft Act 1968, and the theft involves farming machinery or tools valued at £10,000 or more, it must treat the value and nature of the stolen property as an aggravating factor.

The theft of high-value farm equipment has a profound and often devastating impact on rural communities and agricultural businesses. These machines, such as tractors, GPS systems, harvesters and other specialised tools, are not only expensive to replace, but also critical to daily operations. When they are stolen, the immediate financial loss can exceed £10,000, but the broader consequences go much further. Farmers face significant disruption to their work, delayed harvesting or planting and reduced productivity, which can affect the entire food supply chain.

Many rural businesses operate on tight margins and such thefts can push them into financial instability or force them to cease operations temporarily. Beyond economics, these crimes erode confidence in rural policing and leave victims feeling vulnerable and targeted, especially in remote areas where support and security may already be limited.

The new clause would also require courts to explicitly state in open court that the offence has been aggravated by this factor. The intent is to reflect the serious disruption and financial harm caused by the theft of vital agricultural machinery such as tractors, GPS units or harvesters, which are essential for productivity and food security in rural communities. By making that an aggravating factor, the new clause aims to ensure that sentencing reflects the full impact on victims and serves as a more effective deterrent. I hope that the Government will consider backing our farmers and backing this new clause.

My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Buckinghamshire (Greg Smith) has undertaken a significant amount of work to help tackle tool and equipment theft, including the introduction of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 as a private Member’s Bill, to address the escalating issue of equipment and tool theft affecting tradespeople, farmers and rural businesses across England and Wales.

The 2023 Act empowers the Secretary of State to mandate that all new all-terrain vehicles such as quad bikes come equipped with immobilisers and forensic marking before sale. The measures aim to make stolen equipment less attractive to thieves and easier to trace. The Act could make a real and meaningful difference to the issues we are debating here. It received Royal Assent and is designed to deter theft and facilitate the recovery of stolen equipment. I would be grateful if the Minister could comment on the progress of enacting the measures set out in that Act.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I would be happy to do so, but first I must say how grateful I am to the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset and to the hon. Member for Stockton West for setting out the rationale behind these new clauses.

New clause 13 seeks to extend the scope of the 2023 Act to include the theft of GPS equipment. Such equipment is often used in agricultural and commercial settings. We know the significant impact of thefts of agricultural machinery, in particular all-terrain vehicles, on individuals and businesses in rural areas, and the disruption to essential farming when these thefts occur. That is why we are committed to implementing the 2023 Act to help prevent the theft and resale of high-value equipment. We intend to introduce the necessary secondary legislation later this year, and we will be publishing the Government’s response to the call for evidence soon to confirm the scope of that legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

The Policing Minister assures me that that figure for the number of cuts being made by the Met police is not correct. We are happy to debate that. I and this Government are still sufficiently certain that the legislation is robust in this area. We can debate the means that we have to tackle that but, as I have stated, this Government are funding more police resources to ensure that those who commit these crimes are being sought. In an earlier sitting of the Committee, we debated why it is so important to clarify and get right provisions for shop theft, so that the police have adequate equipment and resources to go after the perpetrators. These thefts are illegal but, for whatever reason, the crimes are not being pursued. We are determined to ensure, through our safer streets mission, that that problem is tackled, but the legislation that we have in place is robust.

Regarding the courts and the justice system, the Government do consider that the courts are already considering the impacts of such crimes when sentencing. The addition of the measures in the proposed new clauses would add unnecessary complications to the sentencing framework. Moreover, sentencing in individual cases should as far as possible be at the discretion of our independent judiciary, to ensure that sentences are fair, impartial and proportionate.

Finally, as I have already set out, any changes to the sentencing framework should take into account the sentencing review’s recommendations, which are due to be published shortly.

On new clause 98, I understand the frustration that many individuals feel when they see stolen equipment being sold at car boot sales and other informal markets. I reassure the shadow Minister that the Government take this issue seriously. However, we cannot support the clause in the absence of further policy work and engagement with relevant authorities to explore the best way to ensure that stolen equipment is not sold in informal market settings or at car boot sales.

Overall, I am sympathetic to the spirit of the new clauses, but I do not believe them to be necessary at this time. I reassure the Committee that this Government are fully committed to implementing the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 to tackle the theft and resale of equipment.

[Matt Vickers]

Can I take it that there is a commitment to doing something to clamp down on the situation with temporary markets and car boot sales? Also, will the Minister meet with Shoaib Awan, the gas fitter who has been campaigning on the issue, to discuss what that might look like and to hear the sector’s frustrations?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Yes, we are happy to meet with Shoaib Awan to discuss this, and yes, we have a commitment to looking at the situation more widely and at the issue directly. As someone who loves a car boot sale, I am keen to explore the question further.

I ask the shadow Minister to be patient for a little while longer as we finalise our plans for the implementation of the 2023 Act, and as we look into the issues in more detail to get the policy work right. On that basis, I ask hon. Members not to press their new clauses.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Sabine]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a rural crime taskforce, which is a long overdue step in recognising and addressing the growing threat of rural crime across England and Wales. In 2023 alone, the total cost of rural crime surged to a staggering £52.8 million—a 22% increase since 2020. Behind that figure lie the lives and livelihoods of farmers, landowners and rural communities who are increasingly under siege from organised criminal gangs. These are not petty thefts, but targeted cross-border operations involving the theft of high-value machinery, vehicles and GPS units, often facilitated by networks that are deliberately structured to evade detection by working across multiple police force boundaries. I have spoken to my many farmers in my constituency of Frome and East Somerset, and many of these rural crimes end in terrifying physical altercations between farmers and criminals, and even threats being made against farmers’ families.

Yet, while the threat has grown, the policing response has not. Fewer than 1% of officers in England and Wales are dedicated to rural crime. Many forces lack even the basic tools, such as drone kits and mobile automatic number plate recognition cameras, to respond effectively. It is no wonder that 49% of rural residents feel that police do not take rural crime seriously, and two thirds believe reporting it is a waste of time. This new clause would change that. It mandates the creation of a taskforce with a clear and comprehensive remit to assess crime levels, review police resources, consider rural-specific training, explore the case for rural crime specialists and evaluate whether a national rural crime co-ordinator should be established.

Importantly, the new clause is not just about a report gathering dust. It requires the Secretary of State to respond to the taskforce’s strategy in writing, and to bring an amendable motion before both Houses. That would ensure that Parliament is not just informed, but actively involved in shaping the solution to rural crime. Rural crime is not a niche issue; it is a national issue. Rural communities deserve to know that they are seen, heard and protected by the laws of this land. The taskforce is not a symbolic gesture; it is a practical, focused and long overdue step towards restoring confidence, strengthening policing and securing justice for rural Britain.

[Matt Vickers]

Rural communities deserve the same protection, visibility and voice as those in urban areas, yet too often rural crime goes under-reported, under-resourced and underestimated. From equipment theft and fly-tipping to wildlife crime and antisocial behaviour, the challenges facing rural areas are distinct and growing. Having rural crime recognised in police structures and developing a specific taskforce could send a strong signal that rural communities matter, that their concerns are heard and that they will not be left behind when it comes to public safety.

However, although the new clause is clearly well-intentioned I would like to put some operational questions to those who tabled it, to ensure greater clarity. What assessment has been made of the additional resources that police forces might need to implement such a strategy effectively, particularly in already stretched rural areas? The new clause refers to the creation of new roles. The National Police Chiefs’ Council already has a rural crime lead and many police forces across the country already appoint rural crime co-ordinators. How would the suggested additional roles be different?

How does the new clause balance the need for a national strategy with the operational independence and local decision making of police and crime commissioners? Is there a clear definition of what constitutes a rural area for the purposes of this strategy? How will this be applied consistently across the country? I am interested to hear the answers, but would be minded to support the new clause if it was pressed to a Division.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

As the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset set out, new clause 14 would require the Government to establish a rural crime prevention taskforce. Let me first say that the Government take the issue of rural crime extremely seriously, and that rural communities matter. I want to outline some of the work going on in this area.

I take the opportunity to acknowledge the vital role that the national rural crime unit and the national wildlife crime unit play in tackling crimes affecting our rural areas, as well as helping police across the UK to tackle organised theft and disrupt serious and organised crime. Those units have delivered a range of incredible successes. The national rural crime unit co-ordinated the operational response of several forces to the theft of GPS units across the UK, which resulted in multiple arrests and the disruption of two organised crime groups. The unit has recovered over £10 million in stolen property, including agricultural machinery and vehicles, in the past 18 months alone.

The national wildlife crime unit helped disrupt nine organised crime groups, with a further nine archived as no longer active, as well as assisting in the recovery of £4.2 million in financial penalties. It also oversees the police national response to hare coursing, which has resulted in a 40% reduction in offences.

I am delighted to say that the national rural crime unit and the national wildlife crime unit will, combined, receive over £800,000 in Home Office funding this financial year to continue their work tackling rural and wildlife crime, which can pose a unique challenge for policing given the scale and isolation of rural areas. The funding for the national rural crime unit will enable it to continue to increase collaboration across police forces and harness the latest technology and data to target the serious organised crime groups involved in crimes such as equipment theft from farms. The national wildlife crime unit will strengthen its ability to disrupt criminal networks exploiting endangered species both in the UK and internationally with enhanced data analysis and financial investigation, helping the unit to track illegal wildlife profits and to ensure that offenders face justice.

The funding comes as we work together with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to deliver the new NPCC-led rural and wildlife crime strategy to ensure that the entire weight of Government is put behind tackling rural crime. That new strategy is expected to be launched by the summer. We want to ensure that the Government’s safer streets mission benefits everyone, no matter where they live, including those in rural communities. This joined-up approach between the Home Office, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and policing, as well as the confirmed funding for the national rural crime unit and the national wildlife crime unit, will help to ensure that the weight of Government is put behind tackling rural crimes such as the theft of high-value farm equipment, fly-tipping and livestock theft.

Given the work already ongoing in this area, I believe that the Liberal Democrat new clause is unnecessary, and I urge the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset to withdraw it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Sabine]

New clauses 15 and 16 are vital in ensuring robust neighbourhood policing across England and Wales. New clause 15 mandates the Government to publish proposals within six months to maintain neighbourhood policing teams at levels necessary for effective community engagement and crime prevention. That includes designating a proportion of funds recovered under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 for neighbourhood policing initiatives and ringfencing 20% of total funds in future police grant reports specifically for neighbourhood policing.

New clause 16 would require the Government to ensure that every local authority area has a dedicated neighbourhood policing team assigned exclusively to community-based duties such as high-visibility foot patrols, community engagement, crime prevention initiatives and solving crime. The Home Office must also publish proposals detailing the additional funding needed to meet these requirements without reducing officer numbers in other frontline roles.

The rationale for the new clauses is clear. Home Office figures reveal that the number of neighbourhood police officers in England and Wales as of March 2024 was 20% lower than previously thought. Across the country, there were 6,210 fewer neighbourhood police officers than earlier official figures suggested. In my constituency of Frome and East Somerset the situation is particularly concerning. The latest data shows that crime rates have been rising, with 269 crimes reported in Frome in March 2024 alone. That highlights the urgent need for more neighbourhood police officers to ensure community safety and effective crime prevention. Furthermore, the number of PCSOs has been drastically reduced, with 235 taken off the streets of England and Wales in just one year. My local force, Avon and Somerset, saw PCSO numbers fall from 315 to 255 since September ’23—a loss of nearly 20% and the biggest in any force in England.

The new clauses are essential for reversing those trends and restoring public confidence in our policing. By ensuring minimum levels of neighbourhood policing and dedicated community-based duties, we can enhance public safety, improve community relations and effectively tackle crime. I urge my fellow members of the Committee to support new clauses 15 and 16. Let us take decisive action to strengthen neighbourhood policing and ensure that every community in England and Wales is adequately protected.

[Matt Vickers]

Neighbourhood policing is the foundation of public trust in our police forces. When officers are visible, engaged and embedded in the communities they serve, crime is deterred, information flows more freely and residents feel safer and more connected. New clause 15 recognises the role of neighbourhood policing in preventing crime and promoting community confidence. Having officers who know the patch and who are known by local residents is invaluable in early intervention, tackling antisocial behaviour and protecting the vulnerable.

I should be grateful for further comments and clarity on how new clauses 15 and 16 will ensure that forces and directly elected police commissioners will have the flexibility to deploy resources based on local need, rather than being constrained by rigid top-down targets. What criteria or metrics will be used to define whether neighbourhood policing levels are sufficient to ensure effective community engagement and crime prevention, and who decides what is effective? Further to that, what role will local communities have under this proposal in shaping what neighbourhood policing will look like in their area?

[Luke Taylor]

This year, the Met police will cut more than 1,700 officers, PCSOs and staff. I invite the Minister to intervene and correct me on that if necessary, as it would seem to suggest that there was an error in the figure given earlier. A correction cometh not.

That figure will include the loss of the parks police team and of officers placed in schools, who have been so critical in maintaining early intervention in those settings and diverting young people away from a life of crime. They have also improved relationships between young people and the police, ensuring that young people can trust the police when they have information that might lead to crimes being prevented or solved. Those officers are dearly needed today.

The £260 million shortfall below the required budget in London will also create a 10% cut to the forensics teams, which includes the investigation of offences such as tool theft, sexual offences and many other crimes. There will be an 11% cut to historic crime teams and a 25% cut to mounted police, who police festivals, sporting events and the protests we see happening so much more regularly in central London. There will also be a 7% cut to the dog teams that provide support to officers going into dangerous and challenging situations, leaving them unsupported and potentially at risk. There will also be reduced front counter operating hours, and there are even hints about taking firearms off the flying squad.

One might ask, “Why are these cuts relevant to this new clause?” The cuts throughout the Met police will inevitably lead to more abstractions from outer London police forces. In particular, the cuts to mounted police and dog teams will pull officers from outer London, including from Sutton and Cheam, which will leave our high streets less safe, our residents more fearful of being victims of crime and more crimes going unsolved.

That demonstrates the absolute necessity of community policing, as well as the need for guarantees to be put in place so that those cuts do not happen, which will affect my residents and residents across London. New clause 16 would also require an annual report that would give clear and transparent information on officer numbers, PCSO numbers, costs and the real-world impact on crime and public confidence. I urge Members to support this new clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Sabine]

New clause 17 addresses the critical issue of pollution performance by water and sewerage companies, and is essential to ensuring accountability and protecting our environment. The new clause would make it an offence for a water or sewerage company to fail to meet its pollution performance commitment levels for three consecutive years. It would also be an offence if the company experiences an increase in total pollution incidents per 10,000 sq km or serious pollution incidents for three consecutive years.

In my constituency, there are two amazing local groups, Friends of the River Frome and Frome Families for the Future, that monitor pollution levels and encourage the community to get engaged in their river. However, like many other groups across the country, they are working in a context of insufficient regulation. The new clause is designed to hold companies accountable for their environmental impact. By imposing fines on those who fail to meet these standards, we would send a clear message that pollution and environmental negligence will not be tolerated. Supporting the new clause means safeguarding our natural resources and ensuring that companies take their environmental responsibilities seriously.

New clause 18 addresses the critical issue of senior manager liability for failure to meet pollution performance commitment levels. It would make it an offence for the senior managers of water and sewerage companies to fail to take all reasonable steps to prevent their companies from committing pollution offences. By holding senior managers accountable, we ensure that those in positions of power are responsible for the environmental impact of their decisions. The data is clear: last year, sewage was pumped into waterways for more than 3.6 million hours. That is unacceptable, and highlights the urgent need for stronger enforcement and accountability.

Supporting these clauses means taking a firm stand against environmental negligence and ensuring that our water companies are managed responsibly. I commend them to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

No one disputes the need for stronger accountability on water pollution, but these new clauses take a headline-grabbing, punitive approach that risks being legally unsound, practically unworkable and counterproductive.

The last Conservative Government took decisive action to tackle water pollution, including announcing the “Plan for Water”, which outlined a comprehensive strategy to enhance water quality and ensure sustainable water resources across England. This initiative addressed pollution, infrastructure and regulatory challenges through co-ordinated efforts involving Government bodies, regulators, water companies, farmers and the public. The strategy committed to water companies speeding up their infrastructure upgrades, bringing forward £1.6 billion for work to start between ’23 and ’25. The plan also ensured that fines from water companies would be reinvested into a new water restoration fund—making polluters pay for any damage they cause to the environment.

On new clause 17, why is the threshold three consecutive years? That seems arbitrary. Water companies are already subject to significant civil penalties, enforcement orders and licence reviews by Ofwat and the Environment Agency. Is the clause necessary, or does it simply duplicate existing mechanisms with a more punitive spin? More widely, what evidence is there that these measures will improve water quality outcomes, rather than just increase legal costs and drive defensive behaviour within companies?

--- Later in debate ---

[Luke Taylor]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

There can be no denying that we are entering a new world with the advent of new technologies that fundamentally reshape the relationship between citizens and the state. There is probably no more vivid an example of that than live facial recognition technology, which is rightly causing great concern among people across London and throughout the UK.

I am, for instance, concerned about the installation of permanent cameras in Croydon, just next door to my community in Sutton and Cheam. In Sutton itself, the use of roaming facial recognition cameras has already caused anxiety among local people, not least the thousands of Hongkongers who call Sutton home, many of whom escaped exactly this kind of potentially abusable surveillance from the Chinese Government, only to find it trying to take root in Britain. That anxiety has often been met with the unfair and often disproven riposte that if someone has done something wrong, they have nothing to worry about.

It is undeniable that without proper safeguards, this technology can be a negative force, through either human malpractice or, perhaps just as worryingly, technological shortcomings. Research from the US has shown that the technology can be racially biased, struggling to distinguish between non-white people, because it was trained on white faces. Research from the Alan Turing Institute has shown that a version of the technology developed by Microsoft has a 0% error rate in identifying white men, but a 21% error rate in identifying dark-skinned women. Those would be worrying facts in their own right, but we are talking about liberty and justice—the two cornerstones of our democracy. We must be very careful about adopting technology that undermines that, and any sensible legislator would want safeguards in place.

Anything that further erodes minority communities’ trust in the police must be resisted and avoided. Our neighbours in the EU have done just that, limiting the use of this technology unless it is absolutely necessary for security or rescue, and requiring judicial oversight or an independent administrative authority to facilitate its safe use even in that case. New clause 19 would see us follow our European neighbours in making sure that the technology is deployed only in limited circumstances and with the maximum oversight.

Our proposed measures—including a new oversight body and new powers for the Information Commissioner’s Office to monitor the use of this tech—present a path forward that we urge the Government to take. If we do not, we will continue to languish without a proper legal framework while permanent cameras are installed. For the technology to be embedded before safeguards have been properly considered would be a democratic and civil liberties tragedy and would put us on a path to a creeping digital authoritarianism. To put it another way, it would be unfair even on those who have to use the technology.

Currently, police services across the country seem to set their own rules on usage, without the proper guidance. To protect them from bad intelligence leading to awful miscarriages of justice, they deserve clarity, just as much as the public do, on the right way to make use of this tech. Nobody seriously doubts that this sort of technology and other major advancements in fighting crime will continue to arrive on our shores. The question is how we wield the new powers that they afford us in a judicious manner. That has always been the task for legislators and enforcers. Forgive the trite idiom, but it remains true that with great power comes great responsibility. How we protect privacy and liberty while keeping ourselves safe in the hyper-digital age is a central question of our times.

[Matt Vickers]

When deployed responsibly and with appropriate safeguards, facial recognition technology is an incredibly valuable tool in modern policing and public protection. It is already being used to identify serious offenders wanted for violent crime, terrorism and child exploitation; to locate vulnerable individuals, including missing children at risk; and to enhance safety in high-risk environments such as transport hubs, major events and public demonstrations. It enables rapid real-time identification without the need for physical contact—something that traditional methods, such as fingerprinting and ID checks, cannot provide in fast-moving situations. It can accelerate investigations, reduce resource demand and ultimately make public spaces safer.

The technology is improving in accuracy, especially when governed by transparent oversight, independent auditing and clear operational boundaries. I would be grateful for further comments on whether the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam and the Government feel that this proposed regulation of this crucial technology could limit the ability of law enforcement to respond swiftly to emerging threats or intelligence-led operations.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam for setting out the case for introducing new safeguards for the use of live facial recognition. I agree there need to be appropriate safeguards, but the issue requires careful consideration and I do not think that it can be shoehorned into this Bill.

I say strongly to the hon. Member that live facial recognition is a valuable policing tool that helps keep communities safe. If I may say so, I think that some of his information is a little out of date. Despite what he implied, the use of facial recognition technology is already subject to safeguards, including, among others, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Data Protection Act 2008.

I fully accept, however, that there is a need to consider whether a bespoke legislative framework governing the use of live facial recognition technology for law enforcement purposes is needed. We need to get this right and balance the need to protect communities from crime and disorder while safeguarding individual rights. To that end, I have been listening to stakeholders and have already held a series of meetings about facial recognition, including with policing, regulators, research institutions, civil society groups and industry, to fully understand the concerns and what more can be done to improve the use of the technology.

I will outline our plans for facial recognition in the coming months. In the meantime, I hope that the hon. Member, having had this opportunity to air this important issue, will be content to withdraw his new clause.

[Luke Taylor]

Based on the comments and reassurances, I will be happy to withdraw the new clause. I would be interested in being involved in any discussions and updates as they come forward. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 22

Duty to follow strategic priorities of police and crime plan

“(1) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 8(1) (Duty to have regard to police and crime plan), for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.

(3) In section 8(2) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.

(4) In section 8(3) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.

(5) In section 8(4) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.”—(Matt Vickers.)

This new clause would require Police and Crime Commissioners to follow the strategic priorities of the police and crime plan rather than have regard to it.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 requires police and crime commissioners and others to “have regard to” the police and crime plan. The new clause would replace that language with a firmer obligation to “follow the strategic priorities of” the plan. The change would apply consistently across subsections (1) to (4) of section 8.

The primary rationale for the amendment is to strengthen democratic accountability. PCCs are directly elected by the public to represent local views and set the strategic direction for policing. Their police and crime plans are developed following consultation and are expected to reflect community priorities. However, under the current “have regard to” standard, there is only a weak legal duty to consider the plan, and no binding requirement to act in accordance with it. The new clause would address that gap by ensuring that PCCs and, by extension, police forces must follow the strategic priorities that they have set and communicated to the public.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 35—Stop and search—

“(1) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 60(1)(a) and (aa) leave out ‘serious.’.”

This new clause lowers the threshold for stop and search to “violence” rather than “serious violence.”

[Matt Vickers]

New clause 29 would introduce a statutory requirement for the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on specific police activities in areas experiencing high levels of serious crime. It would mandate the inclusion of data from police forces in England and Wales, identifying the areas with the highest rates of serious offences and reporting on three key areas: police presence, the use of stop-and-search powers, and the deployment of live facial recognition technology. The first report would be required within six months of the Act’s passage, with subsequent reports published annually.

The primary objective of the new clause is to improve transparency and accountability in policing where serious crime is most acute. In communities disproportionately affected by violence, organised crime or persistent public disorder, trust in policing is often strained. By requiring detailed public reporting, the new clause would ensure that policing tactics and resourcing in those areas are subject to regular scrutiny by Parliament and the public. It would allow for an informed debate about whether interventions are effective, proportionate and fair.

In particular, the inclusion of data on police officer deployment would ensure a clearer understanding of how police resources are distributed. That is especially important in communities where concerns about under-policing or over-policing are frequently raised. Having a publicly available record of officer presence would allow stakeholders to assess whether high-crime areas are receiving adequate attention and whether local policing strategies are matched to the severity of criminal activity.

The new clause also includes reporting on the use of stop and search powers under section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Stop and search remains a contentious, yet extremely powerful tool in combating serious crime. Home Office statistics show that in the year ending 31 March 2023, there were 529,474 stop and searches in England and Wales. A recent study published in the Journal of Quantitative Criminology analysed London-wide stop-and-search patterns and concluded that if searches had been maintained at the 2008 to 2011 level, approximately 30 fewer knife murders might have occurred each year. By requiring annual data on its use in high-crime data, this new clause promotes responsible policing and ensures the use of the powers is evidence-led, not arbitrary, and open to challenge where necessary. It enables patterns of disproportionality or inefficiency to be identified and addressed through public oversight.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 33 seeks to amend section 5(3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, which currently states:

“For the purposes of this section it is immaterial whether a belief is justified or not if it is honestly held.”

New clause 33 would replace that with:

“For the purposes of this section, a belief must be both honestly held and reasonable.”

The change would modify the legal standard for the lawful excuse defence under section 5(2)(a) of the Criminal Damage Act, which allows a defendant to claim they believe the property owner consented to the damage. Under the current law, the belief needs only to be honest, regardless of its reasonableness. The new clause would require that the belief also be reasonable, introducing an objective standard alongside the subjective one.

In various areas of criminal law, defences based on belief require that it be honest and reasonable. For instance, in self-defence cases, the defendant’s belief in the necessity of force must be reasonable. Aligning the standard in criminal damage cases with those principles promotes consistency and fairness across the legal system. Public confidence in the legal system can be undermined when defendants are acquitted based on defences that appear unreasonable or disconnected from common sense. By introducing an objective standard, the proposed new clause would reinforce the integrity of the justice system, and ensure that legal defences are applied in a manner that aligns with societal expectations.

The proposed amendment to section 5(3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 would introduce a necessary, objective standard to the lawful excuse defence by requiring that beliefs about owner consent be both honest and reasonable. The change would promote consistency with other areas of law, prevent potential abuses of the defence, balance the right to protest with property rights and seek to enhance public confidence in the justice system.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would mandate that the Secretary of State, through regulations, grant police access to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’ tobacco track and trace system. Such access would enable law enforcement to determine the provenance of tobacco products sold by retailers, specifically to identify whether those products were stolen. According to HMRC, the illicit market in tobacco duty and related VAT was £2.8 billion in 2021-22, preying on the most disadvantaged of communities. In 2023, about 6.7 billion counterfeit and contraband cigarettes were consumed, representing one in four cigarettes, thus undermining progress towards a smoke-free England by 2030.

With the negative impact that the illicit tobacco market has on communities and with UK revenue in mind, it is paramount that our police forces be provided with the resources required to counter the organised crime groups that dominate the illicit tobacco market. The sale of illicit tobacco on the black market also poses significant risks to public health, with illegal tobacco often containing five times the standard level of cadmium, six times as much lead, 1.6 times more tar and 1.3 times more carbon monoxide than regulated cigarettes and rolling tobacco.

The illicit tobacco market poses significant challenges, including revenue loss for the Government and health risks for consumers. Professor Emmeline Taylor’s report, “Lighting Up”, emphasises the potential of TT&T in identifying and prosecuting offenders involved in the illegal tobacco trade. Granting police access to TT&T would strengthen efforts to dismantle organised crime networks profiting from counterfeit tobacco sales.

Giving the police access to TT&T technology has the potential to disrupt the illicit tobacco trade and has been highlighted by the National Business Crime Centre, which argues that police utilisation of TT&T would allow them to routinely check tobacco sold by local retailers to ensure legitimacy, thus shrinking the pool of buyers for criminal gangs and lowering demand for stolen tobacco, helping police to tackle organised crime and safeguard legitimate business.

As a signatory to the World Health Organisation’s framework convention on tobacco control, the UK is obligated to implement measures that curb illicit tobacco trade. Providing police with TT&T access aligns with those commitments by enhancing the traceability and accountability of tobacco products throughout the supply chain. Illicit tobacco sales undermine legitimate retailers who comply with regulations and pay due taxes. Empowering police to identify and act against illegal tobacco products helps to level the playing field, ensuring that law-abiding businesses are not disadvantaged by competitors engaging in unlawful practices.

With that in mind, the Opposition believe that new clause 38, which would grant police access to the UK TT&T system to help determine whether a retailer has obtained stolen or counterfeit tobacco illegally, is necessary to facilitate the police in carrying out their duty in delivering the current plans for smoke-free England 2030. It will help to claim back revenue currently lost to the black market trade of tobacco and protect public health by disrupting the trade in these bogus products.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

New clause 38 seeks to grant the police access to the tobacco track and trace system, as we have just heard. The scourge of the illicit tobacco trade threatens the health of UK citizens, robs the public purse of billions of pounds and funds the wider activities of organised crime. All businesses in the tobacco supply chain are required to register within the track and trace system, and individual tobacco products are tracked from the point of manufacture up to the point of retail. The track and trace system includes a reporting platform that enables nominated authorities to access registry data, traceability data for individual products and UK-wide tobacco market data.

I understand the intention behind the shadow Minister’s new clause, and I know that we both share the same goal of working with our law enforcement agencies to tackle illicit tobacco. The principle of maximising the use of traceability data in these efforts to tackle illicit tobacco is sound. Existing legislation strictly limits who can access traceability and the purposes for which it may be used. At the moment, only HMRC and trading standards may access this data.

I reassure the Opposition that engagement is already under way between the police and HMRC to investigate opportunities for extending access for the police to traceability data. When that engagement is complete, the Government will consider whether it is appropriate to bring forward any necessary legislative changes. However, I do not wish, at this stage, to pre-empt the outcome of that engagement through legislation. In the light of those reassurances, I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw the motion.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would introduce a new statutory offence of soliciting prostitution in exchange for rent by inserting proposed new section 52A into the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It would criminalise the act of causing, inciting or attempting to cause or incite someone to engage in prostitution in return for free accommodation or discounted rent. The clause makes this a hybrid offence: on summary conviction, the penalty is up to six months’ imprisonment or a fine; on indictment, it is up to seven years’ imprisonment. It would also allow for a banning order under the Housing and Planning Act 2016, preventing convicted offenders from acting as landlords.

The “sex for rent” arrangement—where landlords exchange accommodation for free or at a discount in return for sexual relations with tenants—is a problem that has become increasingly common for house hunters in England, particularly in London. In response to this emerging issue, the last Government launched a call for evidence, which closed in the summer of 2023. It sought views on relevant characteristics, circumstances and any additional protective or preventive measures that respondents considered necessary. Given the seriousness of the issue, it would be helpful to know whether the Government intend to publish the findings from this call for evidence, as some of the data could inform debates such as this one.

According to research by polling company YouGov carried out on behalf of the housing charity Shelter, nearly one in 50 women in England have been propositioned for sex for rent in the last five years, with 30,000 women offered such housing arrangements between March 2020 and January 2021. Many victims of sex-for-rent schemes feel trapped, ashamed or powerless to report the abuse due to their dependency on accommodation. By clearly defining this as a criminal offence and providing real consequences for offenders, including banning orders, this clause sends a strong message: exploitation through coercive housing arrangements will not be tolerated.

The charity National Ugly Mugs, an organisation that works towards ending all violence towards sex workers, gave the case study of a tenant who, during the pandemic facing financial hardship, was approached by her landlord with a proposal to reduce her rent and utility costs in exchange for sexual acts and explicit images. Unable to afford alternative accommodation at the time, she felt she had little choice but to agree. Since then, the landlord has regularly turned up at the property uninvited and intoxicated, demanding sex and refusing to leave. She has lived under the constant threat of eviction and homelessness if she does not comply with his demands. The new clause represents a crucial advance in safeguarding vulnerable individuals from exploitation within the housing sector. By explicitly criminalising the act of soliciting sexual services in exchange for accommodation, it addresses a significant gap in the current legal framework.

The new clause would not only reinforce the seriousness of such offences through stringent penalties, but would empower authorities to impose banning orders, thereby preventing convicted individuals from further exploiting their position as landlords. This measure would send a clear and unequivocal message that leveraging housing and security for sexual gain is a reprehensible abuse of power that will not be tolerated. It would underscore a commitment to protecting the dignity and rights of tenants, ensuring that all individuals have access to safe and respectful living conditions.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)]

New clause 41, tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton West, would make it an offence to provide free or discounted rent in exchange for sex. I reassure the hon. Member that the Government firmly believe that the exploitation and abuse that can occur through so-called sex-for-rent arrangements has no place in our society. However, we have existing offences that can and have been used to prosecute this practice, including causing or controlling prostitution for gain.

I know the hon. Member will appreciate that this is a complex issue. I reassure the Committee that the Government will continue working closely with the voluntary and community sector, the police and others to ensure that the safeguarding of women remains at the heart of our approach. We are carefully considering these issues as part of our wider work on violence against women and girls. We are working to publish the new cross-government violence against women and girls strategy later this year. We will be considering all forms of adult sexual exploitation and the findings from the previous Government’s consultation on sex for rent as part of that.

Given that commitment, I hope the hon. Member will be content to withdraw the new clause, although I very much doubt that he will. On that note, I have tabled many Opposition amendments, but I very rarely pushed them to a vote. On this new clause, as on any others, the hon. Member or any other Members of his party are very welcome to approach us for a meeting, or to come and talk to any of us about how to progress this or any issue. I do not wish to school them on opposition, but that is a much more likely way of achieving the ultimate aim. In this instance, his aim is the same as mine—protecting people who are sexually exploited. To date, no approaches have been made, but they are always welcome.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Counter Terrorism Policing: Arrests

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Tuesday 6th May 2025 Commons Chamber

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

I thank the Minister for providing advance sight of his statement on this critical issue. People will have read the deeply concerning report suggesting that an attack may have been just hours away, and this will understandably be worrying to people across the country.

This statement reminds us of the tragic incidents that have plagued our country in the past. This month marks 12 years since the death of Lee Rigby on our streets, as well as eight years since the horrific Manchester Arena bombing. Later this year, we will also mark the 20th anniversary of the 7/7 attacks, which brought to London a level of destruction that many of us never thought we would see in our lifetimes. These acts of terror, along with other cowardly acts, caused untold hurt to victims and their families.

As we discuss the arrests over the past weekend, we must remember the importance of keeping the British public safe from those who seek to terrorise us, and I therefore pay tribute to the hard-working members of the police and intelligence services for their bravery in disrupting terrorist activities. In October, the head of MI5 said that the police and MI5 had together disrupted 43 late-stage attack plots since the Manchester bombing. We must remember that each of these cases is not merely a statistic, but represents someone’s life and someone’s future.

I commend the Minister for recognising the work of the previous Government and for acknowledging the measures that were used effectively in this incident. In turn, we will support measures that enact the National Security Act and give the Government the powers needed to act against malign influences on our country.

Turning to the incidents at hand, I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify certain points. While I am thankful for today’s statement, I hope the Government will be as transparent as possible about the details to avoid the vacuum of information we have previously discussed in this place. While I appreciate that the Government do not want to provide a running commentary, like many other Members I would be grateful if the Government could be as open as possible, given the seriousness of the arrests.

As the Minister has outlined, there were two separate arrests of Iranian nationals in relation to terror offences, which has raised serious questions about how their networks were formed and what their intentions were. Can the Minister provide any further information about the suspects? For example, while we know they were Iranian nationals, what is their immigration status? Was the state aware that these individuals were in the UK, and was there any prior indication of the risk they might pose?

On the broader issue of Iran, while I understand that the Minister may not be able to comment on proscription directly, the Home Secretary did address this while in opposition.

In July 2023, she told the Royal United Services Institute that

“instead of trying and failing to use counter-terror legislation to proscribe organisations like Wagner or IRGC, we will introduce a bespoke proscribing mechanism to address state-sponsored threats.”

She also said at the Dispatch Box in April 2024 that Labour wanted

“appropriately targeted proscription-style restrictions on the operations of state-linked organisations such as the IRGC.”—[Official Report, 15 April 2024; Vol. 748, c. 19.]

However, it was only in March of this year that the Minister for Security announced the review by Jonathan Hall. Does he share my concerns that these mixed signals and the delay suggest a lack of prioritisation by the Government? Ultimately, we must all work together to ensure that the UK adopts the strongest possible stance on national security. As cross-party co-operation is essential, I urge the Government to take every possible step to prevent these cowardly acts of terror.

[Dan Jarvis]

I thank the shadow Minister for the sensible, reasonable and constructive tone of his response. He is absolutely right to draw the House’s attention to the tragic death of Lee Rigby, the tragic bombing in Manchester and, of course, the 20th anniversary of the 7/7 bombings that we will be commemorating in a couple of months’ time.

Let me join the shadow Minister in paying tribute to all those who work tirelessly to keep our country safe. It is one of the greatest privileges of this particular role that we have the opportunity to serve in government, as Conservative Members will also have done, and to work closely alongside those incredibly committed members of the police and the intelligence services; we owe them a debt of gratitude.

I am also grateful for the opportunity that the shadow Minister has afforded me to offer our thanks for the work that was done by the previous Government, both in introducing the National Security Act 2023, which has proved to be an incredibly valuable tool, and in creating CTOC, which is delivering very significant operational value. I can absolutely give an assurance that this Government, like the previous one, will continue to invest in that institution.

The shadow Minister made an important point about transparency, and I can give him the reassurances that he seeks. He and the House will understand that we are just a couple of days on from those arrests that took place on Saturday. The Home Secretary will provide a further update as soon as we are operationally able to do so. I give the shadow Minister a commitment that we will be as transparent as possible while of course ensuring that we do not cut across live counter-terrorism operations.

The shadow Minister mentioned proscription, and I understand why. I know that he will acknowledge—or at least I hope that he will—that on 4 March I announced a very strong suite of measures designed to most effectively address the nature of the threat that we face from Iran. Contained within those measures was a request from the Home Secretary for Jonathan Hall, who I know is held in very high regard because of the experience and credibility that he has in this area, to look very carefully at the legislative framework that might enable us to more effectively proscribe state-based entities. I can confirm that Mr Hall has completed his report and that the Home Secretary and I are considering it very carefully. It will be published shortly. I assure the shadow Minister that we will not hesitate to act if there is a requirement to bring forward further measures.

Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

Good morning, Ms Lewell. It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair on this glorious day.

Clause 78 introduces two new criminal offences in relation to electronic devices used in vehicle-related theft. The first will criminalise the possession of such devices, and the second will criminalise the importing, making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply such devices. Both offences require a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle, theft of anything in a vehicle, or taking a vehicle without authority.

A significant proportion of vehicle theft is driven by serious and organised crime groups, and it costs millions of pounds in social and economic harm each year. Given the high demand for stolen vehicles and vehicle parts, this is an attractive and lucrative area for criminals to profit from. Criminals find ways to overcome security measures, even in the latest vehicle models, by using electronic devices to exploit vulnerabilities in vehicles and new technologies. The Metropolitan Police Service estimates that electronic devices are used in approximately 60% of vehicle thefts in London.

The clause does not define specific electronic devices, but uses a broad definition to cover any electronic device that could be used in vehicle theft. That ensures that the legislation is future-proof for any new devices that may be developed and used by criminals. The offence will be triable either way and, on conviction on indictment, will carry a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment, an unlimited fine or both.

We have also provided a defence for a person charged with this offence to show that they did not intend or suspect that the relevant article would be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle or anything in a vehicle. The clause also outlines that the court may assume that the defendant possessed the relevant article where it is on any premises at the same time as the defendant, or on premises at which the defendant was the occupier or an habitual user otherwise than as a member of the public. The defendant will have a defence where they can show that they did not know of an article’s presence on the premises or had no control over the article. During proceedings, a court can also assume that the articles in question are intended to be used in vehicle theft. That reflects the fact that the specified articles have few legitimate uses.

Clause 79 supports clause 78 by clarifying the evidential burdens for the new offence, while also inserting it into the list of lifestyle offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. That means that, if convicted of this offence, a person’s assets will be considered to have potentially derived from crime and may be subject to confiscation. To have a defence, a defendant will be required to establish the facts that are within their knowledge—such as demonstrating that they run a company that supplies legitimate electronic devices.

Signal repeaters, which have been approved for use by Ofcom, are legal to own and use to boost an otherwise weak mobile phone signal, for example. If a defendant can demonstrate that they did not intend, nor reasonably suspect, that the articles were to be used in vehicle theft, the evidential burden falls back on the prosecution. The prosecution will need to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had reasonable grounds to suspect that the article they were importing, making, modifying, supplying, offering to supply or possessing would be used in vehicle theft.

That reverse evidential burden is appropriate given the few legitimate uses associated with the specified articles. It will ensure that law enforcement agencies are able to target those individuals who keep just enough distance from the serious offences being carried out to avoid consequences under existing legislation.

Serious and organised crime has a devastating effect— I am sure we can all agree on that. Clauses 78 and 79 send a clear message about our commitment to tackling vehicle crime and associated serious and organised criminality, and to making it easier for the police to take action. That means more prosecutions and more criminals off our streets, which will help to restore public confidence.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell.

Clause 78 rightly introduces new offences aimed at preventing the misuse of electronic devices such as signal jammers, signal amplifiers and devices used to access vehicle wiring systems for committing vehicle-related crimes. The offences include the possession, importation, manufacturing, adaptation, supply or offer to supply such devices when there is reasonable suspicion that they will be used in connection with crimes such as vehicle theft, stealing items from a vehicle or taking a vehicle without authority.

The subsections provide a defence for individuals who can prove that they did not intend or suspect that the device would be used for a relevant offence, and they allow a court to presume possession of a device if it is found on premises occupied or habitually used by the accused, unless the accused can demonstrate that they were unaware of its presence or had no control over it.

Clause 79 clarifies the evidential burden in cases under clause 78, which deals with electronic devices used in vehicles. It explains that where a defendant seeks to rely on such a defence—for example, that they did not intend the device to be used in a crime—they must provide enough evidence to raise the issue, and the prosecution must then disprove it beyond reasonable doubt.

Clauses 78 and 79 are needed to strengthen the legal response to the growing threat of tech-enabled vehicle theft, which has become increasingly sophisticated with the use of electronic devices such as signal jammers and relay attack tools. Clause 78 creates targeted offences around the possession, manufacture and supply of such devices, recognising the role they play in modern vehicle crime. By focusing on intent and suspicion, the clause allows for earlier intervention and prevention even before a theft occurs.

We support the measures, but what consultation was done with law enforcement, manufacturers and cyber-security experts to develop the provisions? Does the Minister expect this designation to lead to more asset confiscation from organised crime groups involved in vehicle theft?

[Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell, as always.

The Liberal Democrats very much welcome the measures in clauses 78 and 79 to give the police and courts more powers to reduce vehicle theft. It is disheartening to see so much car theft in our cities, particularly London. In south-west London, a regular complaint of residents is that the police are not able to do anything about it. The police themselves are struggling. The technology has become an arms race, and these clauses are needed to keep up with thefts that are becoming so much more technologically advanced.

It is depressing that a litany of old-fashioned manual theft prevention measures are now necessary again—people are having to use steering locks and wheel clamps—because the police cannot keep up with the technology that thieves employ. We are very supportive of these measures to give the police the tools they need to crack down on this incredibly distressing form of theft.

--- Later in debate ---

Finally, schedule 10 provides the police a power of entry to search for SIM farms and specified articles used in connection with the new offences created by clauses 80, 81, 83 and 84. I must stress that schedule 10 does not introduce novel or unprecedented police powers. It replicates powers already in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in England and Wales, and equivalent powers elsewhere, and applies them to these new offences. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

A SIM farm is a system used to manage and operate a large number of SIM cards simultaneously, often using multiple mobile devices or modems controlled by central software. Farms can contain hundreds or even thousands of SIM cards, and they are typically used to send or receive a high volume of messages, calls or mobile data across networks.

While there can be legitimate uses for SIM farms, such as in telecoms testing or large-scale communication platforms, they are commonly associated with illicit and fraudulent activities. One of their most concerning uses is in the spread of spam and phishing texts, where mass messages with links to scams or malware are sent to unsuspecting individuals. They are also frequently used to bypass verification systems by creating large numbers of fake accounts on social media, messaging apps or online services. In other cases, SIM farms are employed in SIM box fraud, a scheme in which international calls are rerouted and disguised as local calls, depriving telecom providers and Governments of revenue and making the original caller harder to trace.

According to research carried out by Ofcom in August 2022, the scale of nuisance and potentially fraudulent communications across UK mobile networks remains alarmingly high. An overwhelming 75% of mobile users reported receiving suspicious texts or calls in just a three-month period, highlighting the widespread nature of the issue. These figures demonstrate the persistent and pervasive threat posed by scam communications, underlining the urgent need for more robust protections and enforcement mechanisms to safeguard the public.

SIM farms pose serious risks to national security and digital infrastructure. Their use can lead to network congestion, overwhelming mobile networks and disrupting legitimate communications. More critically, they are often exploited by organised crime networks to co-ordinate illegal activity as they are cheap, disposable and difficult to trace. That makes it significantly harder for law enforcement to monitor communications or link messages to specific individuals. The previous Conservative Government committed to banning SIM farms as part of their fraud strategy announced in May 2023. They subsequently launched a consultation on how best to implement the ban, although, interestingly, there were only 50 responses, many from businesses or individuals identifying as legitimate SIM farm users who opposed a ban.

In response to the 2023 Home Office consultation on SIM farms, Mobile UK, the trade body representing the UK’s four major mobile network operators, raised concerns that the proposed ban risked being ineffective due to evolving fraud tactics and technological advancements, including the fact that single-SIM devices, rather than SIM farms, are now the most common tools used to send spam SMS messages, according to data from one mobile operator. Mobile UK further warned that the proposed measures would not eliminate large-scale spam or scam messaging, and urged the Government to broaden the definition of SIM farm to include software-based or e-SIM-enabled methods used to achieve the same fraudulent outcomes.

In the Criminal Justice Bill in the 2023-24 Session, the previous Government included provisions to criminalise the possession or supply of devices capable of holding five or more SIM cards, targeting the infrastructure used in large-scale scams. I welcome the Government’s carrying forward the provisions in the Criminal Justice Bill to amend the definition of SIM farm and prohibit other electronic devices used to commit fraud via secondary legislation.

Clause 80 introduces the new criminal offence of possessing a SIM farm, reflecting growing concerns about their misuse in fraudulent and criminal activity. The clause makes it an offence for an individual to possess such a system unless they can demonstrate that they have a lawful authority or good reason for doing so. That shifts the burden to the defendant to prove the legitimacy of their possession, aiming to deter misuse while protecting legitimate operations.

The clause also provides examples of what may constitute a good reason, including the use of SIM farms for broadcasting services, public transport operations, communications network maintenance or freight tracking. Those carve-outs are designed to safeguard industries with genuine operational needs for such technology, while still targeting the widespread abuse seen in mass-messaging scams, SIM box fraud and illegitimate telecommunications activity. The clause is a key part of the broader effort to close regulatory gaps and strengthen the legal tools available to tackle modern digital fraud.

Clause 81 makes it a criminal offence to supply a SIM farm to another person. Clause 82 offers a meaningful definition of what constitutes a SIM farm for the purposes of clauses 80 and 81, and provides the Secretary of State with the power to amend the definition by regulation. Schedule 10 provides for powers of entry and other investigatory powers relating to offences involving SIM farms. Clauses 83 to 85 create the offence of possessing a “specified article”; criminalise the supply of such articles, with appropriate exemptions; set out the sanctions; and allow for the Secretary of State to amend the definition of a specific article via amendment to keep the legislation in line with technology and changing criminal behaviours.

Will there be a formal review mechanism to assess the effectiveness and proportionality of these offences, particularly regarding the number of prosecutions under clauses 80 to 85? Given Mobile UK’s concerns that fraudsters are increasingly using single-SIM devices, e-SIMs and apps such as WhatsApp to bypass traditional SMS channels, is the Minister confident that the measures in the Bill and the Government’s current definition of SIM farm are sufficiently future-proof to tackle emerging forms of fraud?

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I support the clauses, which outlaw the use of SIM farms and the supply of SIM farms to others.

It is a defence for a person to show that they have “good reason” to use a SIM farm. Examples are given in the Bill, including providing broadcasting services, operating or maintaining a public transport service and tracking freight. I do not suggest that amendments are necessary, but I wonder whether the Minister can help us understand the provisions. What are examples of legitimate use in broadcasting services or tracking freight? These are areas of legitimate commercial activity that lay people are not particularly familiar with. I would be interested to know why a company would want to use multiple SIMs and phone numbers to track freight, for example. It is not meant to be a complex question.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

We are all too familiar with those who use protests and the anonymity of face coverings to commit criminal acts and intimidate others. When individuals conceal their identity, whether through masks, scarves or other objects, it becomes much harder for police to identify suspects involved in criminal activity such as violence, vandalism or intimidation. That anonymity can embolden a small number of individuals to commit offences, in the belief that they will not be held accountable. In 2024, masked individuals were reported to have attacked police officers in Rotherham during protests, leading to discussions about banning face coverings at such events. Members might recall that in Birmingham, a group of men wearing balaclavas and waving Palestinian flags stormed a pub, assaulted a patron and caused property damage. That incident was part of wider unrest across the UK, prompting investigations by law enforcement.

My hon. Friend the Member for Windsor has ably set out the purposes and benefits of amendment 51, which seeks to provide a framework requiring those concealing their identity to provide advance notice. We heard during our evidence sessions about the legitimate reasons why people may wish to conceal their identity, and we are also aware of the need to protect the public from those who exploit such concealment to do harm to others. The amendment could provide a great opportunity for law enforcement to assess and monitor situations properly, offering a more flexible and accountable approach to managing exemptions. Does the Minister feel there could be enforcement benefits to having a more flexible power to assess the use of face coverings?

Clause 86 rightly introduces a new offence aimed at individuals concealing their identity while attending public protests in designated areas. It recognises and provides for certain legitimate reasons that a person might have for covering their face, including those related to health, religious observance or occupation. It also rightly sets out obligations on the authorities to ensure public awareness of the rule when it is in effect, as well as the sanctions for those who fail to comply. The clause sends a clear message that protest should be lawful, peaceful and safe. When used appropriately and with the public properly informed, the measure could greatly enhance the safety of both demonstrators and the wider public by discouraging those who intend to use anonymity as a cover for criminal acts.

Clause 87 sets out the powers available to senior police officers to designate a specific locality in England or Wales where the offence of concealing identity at protest will apply. It allows for the designation to be made for up to 24 hours if it is reasonably believed that a protest is happening or is likely to happen in the area, that it may involve criminal activity, and that it is necessary to limit or prevent such offences. The clause further sets out how the designation can be expanded and provides for the British Transport police and Ministry of Defence police to apply similar designations within their jurisdictions. Clause 88 sets out the requirements and procedures around creating such designations.

I would be grateful if the Minister set out what safeguards are in place to ensure that the designation power is not applied disproportionately or used to deter legitimate protests. How will the police ensure that adequate and timely public notice is given to protestors or members of the public who may enter a designated area unknowingly? Will the Minister clarify how long written records of designations and directions would be retained, and whether they would be publicly accessible for scrutiny and accountability? Will there be a requirement for post-event review of designations and use of these powers to assess their proportionality and impact?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

During recent protests, the police have observed that protesters are increasingly using flares and fireworks. Although there is existing legislation that prohibits the use of fireworks in public places and the possession of explosives other than for a lawful purpose, it does not consistently cover the mere possession of flares and fireworks during protests. The clause therefore creates a new criminal offence of possession of a pyrotechnic article for those taking part in a protest.

The misuse of pyrotechnic articles has implications regarding public safety. This new measure will enable the police to take the necessary preventive action against such behaviour during protests. It is a defence for a person to show they had a reasonable excuse for having the pyrotechnic article, such as a flare or firework, in their possession at the material time, or, in particular, to show they had it in their possession for use in connection with work.

The offence applies only to those taking part in a protest. It does not capture a person who is taking part in, for example, a cultural or religious event where pyrotechnic articles are customarily used. The maximum penalty for the offence will be a level 3 fine of £1,000. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

I am content.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the hon. Member’s support and hope the Committee will agree to the clause standing part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 89 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 90

War memorials

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

We all understand and accept that war memorials play a vital role in commemorating those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, including those who have no known grave. They offer a place of reflection and should be protected.

In some recent protests, protesters have climbed on war memorials, causing anger and outrage among the public. The new offence will provide greater clarity for policing. In particular, the measure makes it clear that the act of climbing on specified war memorials is unacceptable. It gives police the powers they need to ensure that justice is delivered to those who engage in such disrespectful conduct.

A war memorial is an object that preserves the memory of a war or conflict and those involved in it. It can take any form and be created by anyone at any time. It can be permanent or temporary; it can be a living thing such as a tree; it can a building or a more traditional plaque, monument or sculpture. The offence is intended to ensure that our most significant war memorials are used for their intended purpose of providing remembrance for those who have died and have no grave to be visited, and are not to be disrespected.

Schedule 11 specifies 25 war memorials, including the Royal Artillery memorial and the Cenotaph in London, the Portsmouth naval war memorial, and the Liverpool Cenotaph. The clause includes a power to amend the list of specified war memorials in schedule 11 by regulations.

The penalty for the offence will be a level 3 fine of up to £1,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months. It is a defence for a person charged with the offence to provide that they had good reason for climbing on the specified war memorial, or had the owner or occupier’s consent to climb on it. That will ensure that activities such as maintenance approved by the owner will not be criminalised. If a war memorial has a base or steps that are designed for individuals to climb, individuals will not be criminalised. On that basis, I commend the clause and schedule 11 to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

The clause introduces a new offence targeted at individuals who climb on designated war memorials without lawful justification. It is designed to protect sites of national remembrance and ensure that they are treated with appropriate respect and dignity. The act of climbing on such memorials, often during protests or large gatherings, can be seen as disrespectful, provocative or even intentionally inflammatory, particularly when shared on social media.

For example, at a pro-Palestinian demonstration in London in 2023, a group of protesters climbed on to the Royal Artillery memorial at Hyde Park Corner, which honours the tens of thousands of Royal Artillery soldiers who died in the first world war. The Metropolitan police described the actions as inflammatory, but noted that at the time no specific law prohibited climbing on war memorials, so no arrests were made.

The introduction of the offence reflects growing public unease about the perceived disrespect towards war memorials during certain protests in recent years. It is right that this measure should be put in place to protect the memory and legacy of those who made the ultimate sacrifice.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am pleased with the cross-party support for the measure.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 90 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 11 agreed to.

Clause 91 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 92

Suspension of internet protocol addresses and internet domain names

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

The clause introduces schedule 12, which provides for a new power for law enforcement and certain investigative agencies, such as the National Crime Agency and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, to apply to the court for an order to suspend internet protocol addresses and domain names when they are used to facilitate serious crime.

All too often, criminals use IP addresses and domain names to facilitate crimes such as fraud, the distribution of child sexual abuse material, malware and phishing. Currently, law enforcement agencies do not have the legal power to mandate the suspension of IP addresses and domain names, so in some scenarios the UK public continue to be at risk of falling victim to crime.

Law enforcement agencies currently utilise voluntary arrangements with industry to request the suspension of IP addresses and domains. In the majority of domestic cases, voluntary arrangements are successful, and the Government are clear that they should continue to be the first port of call in the United Kingdom. However, most of the organisations responsible for providing the IP address or domain name are situated in foreign jurisdictions and often require a formal request, such as a court order, before they will take action. The measure will provide for such a court order to be obtained. Domestically, the provision will empower law enforcement agencies to compel the small number of organisations that do not co-operate with voluntary arrangements.

The measure will protect the public by giving law enforcement and certain investigative agencies the tools they need to tackle crimes facilitated by IP addresses and domain names, and to prevent individuals from becoming potential victims. It will ensure that the UK cyber-landscape continues to be one of the safest in the world. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

The clause rightly provides a legal framework for suspending IP addresses and domain names linked to serious crime. This is a valuable measure in the fight against cyber-enabled criminal activity, including fraud, child exploitation and unlicensed online gambling.

By allowing appropriate officers to apply to a judge for a suspension order, the clause ensures that access to digital infrastructure used for criminal purposes can be swiftly and lawfully disrupted. It will be particularly effective in cases where traditional enforcement is difficult because of the borderless nature of online platforms. Crucially, safeguards are built in to ensure that the powers are used only when necessary, and proportionately. The involvement of a judge, strict criteria for suspension, and provisions for variation or appeal ensure a fair balance between enforcement and civil liberties.

--- Later in debate ---

The clauses provide a targeted and proportionate extension of police powers to enter and search premises without a warrant. They respond to understandable public concerns about the scale of mobile phone theft and the effectiveness of the police response. We have ensured that these provisions are subject to appropriate safeguards, on which basis I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 93 is hugely important and rightly allows the police to search premises for electronically tracked stolen goods without a warrant, offering a fast and efficient way for the police to recover stolen items before they are further distributed or sold, with the clause defining the authorisation procedures and limitations on the powers.

The clause empowers senior officers at the rank of inspector or above to authorise searches based on reasonable grounds and electronic tracking data. This is particularly useful in cases where obtaining a warrant in time could risk losing crucial evidence or missing the opportunity to seize the stolen goods. It is designed to enable law enforcement to act quickly when there is clear electronic tracking evidence that stolen goods are present on the specified premises. It seems like a common-sense measure that will allow law enforcement to act swiftly in recovering electronically tracked stolen goods, making it a highly effective tool in the fight against crime.

When stolen items are equipped with tracking devices, the ability to bypass the often time-consuming process of obtaining a warrant can be crucial in preventing further harm, such as the sale or distribution of the goods. The clause will ensure that officers can quickly respond to real-time data, reducing the window of opportunity for criminals to move or hide stolen goods.

The clause adopts a narrower approach to these powers than that proposed by the Criminal Justice Bill. I have always been of the view that, wherever possible, we should look to further enable our police officers and law enforcement agencies to tackle crime. Will the Minister comment on the rationale for narrowing the scope of the powers being given to our police by this measure?

[Luke Taylor]

I broadly back the powers in the clause. However, I have been involved in two cases in which an item was tracked but the tracking was not sufficiently accurate to ascertain the address. I was witness to a neighbour banging on the door of another neighbour’s home, demanding that he be let in to retrieve his phone, which he claimed had been tracked to that address. The police had been called, but they were not able to enter. When the resident came home, it was demonstrated that the phone was not at that address; it was actually five doors down. The individual had dropped the phone while walking home, and another resident had picked it up, brought it home and was looking after it until they could take it to a police station.

That individual had been incredibly agitated. Under these measures, if the police were called and the tracking information showed that the phone was at a particular address, the inaccurate data would have allowed the police to enter the property incorrectly. Are there appropriate safeguards in relation to the accuracy of the location information that is used? What measures are in place to compensate people when errors are made?

The second example is that, when my bike was stolen, I followed its tracker and went to the house where it seemed to be located. I called the police, who attended. The bike was not in the house; the tracker was actually in a van that was parked on the street outside. Again, if entry to the property had been obtained under these measures, there would have been damage and an incorrect entry to a resident’s home.

These powers seem like a good idea. The hon. Member for Stockton West called them common sense, but what seems to be common sense usually omits serious thought. Without an additional step of scrutiny, I do not think tracking information is sufficiently accurate to ensure these powers are used appropriately. I therefore invite the Minister to provide a bit more reassurance that thought will be given to accuracy and that mitigations will be in place to compensate residents when the measures are used incorrectly. We must not put residents and citizens at risk of property damage for reasons beyond their control.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope we can all agree that this clause provides for a sensible clarification and updating of the legal framework governing law enforcement access to driver licensing information in order to investigate crimes, protect the vulnerable and keep communities safe. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 95 updates and expands police and law enforcement access to driver licence data held by the DVLA. It replaces the existing section 71 of the 2000 Act with a revised framework, adding proposed new sections 71A and 71B. The modernised provision allows authorised individuals including the police, service police and other specified law enforcement bodies to access driver licensing information not just for road traffic offences but for a wider range of policing and law enforcement purposes. The Secretary of State is given power to regulate access, impose conditions and consult relevant bodies before issuing new rules or codes of practice. The clause also introduces oversight measures, such as a statutory code of practice and an annual report to Parliament, ensuring transparency and responsible data use. I welcome the Minister’s comments on the role of facial recognition technology and on the safeguards put in place to ensure the power is not used disproportionately or inappropriately.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 95 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 96

Testing of persons in police detention for presence of controlled drugs

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

These clauses relate to drug testing. There are a number of provisions we wish to introduce. Clauses 96 to 100 and schedule 13 amend existing legislation to expand the powers of the police to drug test people aged 18 or over on arrest, or aged 14 or over on charge, where the offence they have been arrested for or charged with is a “trigger offence” or where a police officer of at least the rank of inspector reasonably suspects that their drug use caused or contributed to their offending.

These clauses expand the police’s powers to drug test in three clear ways: first, by expanding the range of drugs that can be tested for, from specified class A drugs only to any specified controlled drug; secondly, by expanding the list of trigger offences which may automatically trigger a drug test; and thirdly, by expanding the power to take an additional sample for drug testing when the first is unsuitable or insufficient, and up to a maximum of two samples. The clauses also expand the regime for subsequent assessments for misuse of controlled drugs following a positive test result.

As we all appreciate, drugs can have wide-ranging and devastating impacts on individuals and society. Addressing the drug use that is linked to crime is key to the Government’s safer streets mission. The purpose of drug testing on arrest is to reduce reoffending by referring those whose offending is believed to be at least in part caused by drug use into assessment for treatment and support services. The intention is not to further criminalise drug users, although refusing to provide a sample or to attend or stay for an assessment is an offence. Nor does it mean that they will receive treatment instead of a sentence. Drug testing on arrest is a discretionary power, subject to the safeguards included in the existing legislation, the PACE codes of practice and other relevant guidance. How it is implemented and funded is a local decision made by the police and crime commissioner and service providers.

Clause 96 amends the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to expand the existing police power to drug test in police detention to include any “specified controlled drug” as opposed to just specified class A drugs. The list of controlled drugs will be specified in secondary legislation, subject to the negative procedure. To be specified, drugs must be controlled drugs within the meaning of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.

Clause 96 also inserts new schedule 2B into PACE, which provides an updated list of trigger offences for drug testing on arrest. A number of the additions to the list of trigger offences are key to the Government’s safer streets mission, including offences linked to violence against women and girls, knife crime and antisocial behaviour. Some existing trigger offences are removed, such as fraud and vagrancy offences where there is no longer a clear link to drug misuse or those offences are being repealed. The clause also moves the Secretary of State’s power to amend the list of trigger offences in secondary legislation, subject to the draft affirmative procedure, into PACE. Clause 97 amends the Drugs Act 2005 and the Bail Act 1976 to reflect the expansion from class A drugs to “specified controlled drugs” to align with the changes in clause 96.

Clause 98 amends PACE to expand the police’s power to take an additional sample from a person in police detention for the purpose of testing, where the first sample is unsuitable or insufficient, up to a maximum of two samples. It allows the police to take an additional sample where required—for example, where one sample alone is not suitable or sufficient for testing across more than one machine or kit to test for additional, different drugs. Only one additional sample may be taken, and only when the first sample is unsuitable or insufficient. The legislative safeguards that apply to the first sample will continue to apply, such as being reminded that refusal to provide a sample is a criminal offence, having a maximum of two samples taken during the period of detention, and not being tested before having seen a custody officer.

Clause 99 repeals subsections (8A) and (8B) in section 37 of PACE and amends section 38, which currently enable the police to continue to detain an individual for the purpose of taking a sample for drug testing, before or after charge. We have determined that, due to changes in operational procedure and drug testing technology, the power is no longer necessary and so we are removing it.

Finally, clause 100 removes the notification conditions in section 63B of PACE and in the Drugs Act 2005. In 2011, Home Office guidance advised all forces in England and Wales that they did not need to seek additional, individual authorisation from the Secretary of State to conduct drug testing on arrest. These amendments reflect that guidance by removing the notification condition from both PACE and the Drugs Act 2005. They remove an administrative burden on the police, improving efficiency. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 96 and schedule 13 significantly expand the existing powers of the police to conduct drug testing on individuals in detention. Currently, the police can test only for class A drugs under certain conditions. The clause amends sections 63B and 63C of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to enable testing for any specified controlled drug, broadening the scope beyond class A to include class B and C substances. The change allows for testing following arrest for those aged 18 and over, or charge for those aged 14 and over, where the arrest relates to a trigger offence or where a police inspector reasonably suspects that drug misuse contributed to the offence.

The clause also inserts new schedule 2B into PACE to define the list of trigger offences, replacing the outdated schedule 6 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. The updated schedule retains many existing offences, particularly theft and drug offences, but removes fraud and vagrancy offences. It adds a range of new offences such as common assault, certain violent crime and public order offences. The Secretary of State is given the power to amend the list of drugs and offences through regulations subject to either the draft affirmative or negative resolution procedures, depending on the nature of the change.

Clause 97 makes related changes to the Drugs Act 2005 to align the drug assessment framework with the new expanded testing regime. Sections 9 and 10 of the 2005 Act, which govern the process for initial and follow-up assessments following a positive drugs test, are amended to refer to specific controlled drugs rather than just class A substances.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 101 expands the current criteria for foreign national conditional cautions to encompass foreign nationals with limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom. A foreign national conditional caution requires a foreign national to be removed from the UK as an alternative to prosecution. It will also specify that they may not return within a specified period of time.

Presently, foreign nationals may be given a foreign national conditional caution to secure their removal from the UK if they do not have existing leave to enter or remain here. The clause extends that to apply to foreign nationals with limited leave to be here. The clause will extend the pool of persons to whom a foreign national conditional caution may be given with a view to securing the removal from the United Kingdom of more foreign nationals who commit crime. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

The clause expands the definition of a “relevant foreign offender” in both the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, to include individuals who have limited leave to enter or remain in the UK as defined by the Immigration Act 1971. By doing so, it ensures that people with limited immigration status are treated as relevant foreign offenders for the purposes of issuing conditional or diversionary cautions, enabling those cautions to carry immigration-related consequences, such as potential removal from the UK.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 101 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 102

Confiscation

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Schedules 14 and 15.

Clause 103 stand part.

Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

When the Committee adjourned this morning, I had just started to set out that the Home Office had consulted extensively on the reform of confiscation orders in clause 102. Not only did we consult extensively on those new measures, which were recommended by the Law Commission, but we had the benefit of over 20 years of operational insight. The reforms will support the delivery of key objectives endorsed by the Government in the economic crime plan 2 to reduce money laundering and increase asset recovery returns, to ensure that criminals are deprived of their benefits from crime.

The wide-ranging reforms are introduced across 12 parts in schedule 14 in relation to England and Wales. The provisions in schedule 15 largely replicate the reforms for Northern Ireland, with appropriate modifications. I do not propose to go through the whole of schedule 14 part by part because much of it contains necessarily very technical provisions, but I am happy to explain particular provisions if any hon. Member would find that helpful.

Clause 103 introduces cost protections for enforcement authorities in the High Court, and the Court of Session in Scotland, in civil recovery proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The Government are concerned that the current rules that govern how costs are awarded in civil recovery cases expose enforcement authorities to the risk of excessive strains on their budgets, particularly in cases against wealthy individuals who use very expensive legal teams. Even if a law enforcement agency applies for a civil recovery order in good faith and in the public interest, losing a case exposes enforcement agencies to paying substantial legal and court fees. Enforcement authorities work to make decisions in the public interest, and it is detrimental to the protection of the public if authorities are deterred from pursuing an investigation for fear that, if any resulting legal action is unsuccessful, they would face adverse costs and expensive litigation.

Clause 103 therefore amends the so-called “loser pays” principle to ensure that the court does not make an order for costs against an enforcement authority unless the authority has acted “unreasonably”, “dishonestly” or “improperly” during the course of proceedings or it would be

“just and reasonable to make such an order”

against them considering all the facts of the case. Cost protections will provide a positive step forward for the UK’s broader goal of recovering criminal assets and disrupting criminal activity, and I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Clause 102 reforms the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, aiming to clarify and strengthen the confiscation regime for proceeds of crime in England and Wales. Schedule 14 outlines several significant amendments with the primary goal of improving the effectiveness and fairness of confiscation proceedings.

One key change introduced by schedule 14 is the insertion of section 5A into the 2002 Act. The new section provides an overarching principal objective, which has been lacking, for the confiscation powers under part 2. The principal aim as defined in section 5A(2) is

“to deprive the defendant of the defendant’s benefit from criminal conduct, so far as within the defendant’s means.”

That will help to ensure that confiscation powers are used proportionately and in line with the objectives of the law, addressing gaps in case law and providing a clear framework for the court.

Paragraph 2 of schedule 14 now allows the prosecutor to decide whether to pursue a criminal lifestyle assessment rather than automatically applying it. That change allows for more flexibility in the application of these provisions, enabling prosecutors to allocate resources more efficiently and only pursue the criminal lifestyle route where appropriate.

Paragraph 4 introduces a change to the test for determining whether an offence constitutes part of a defendant’s criminal lifestyle. Previously, the law required at least three offences to qualify, but this change reduces that threshold to two offences. That will also apply if the defendant has benefited or intended to benefit from the criminal conduct involved in the offence, making the test easier to meet and broadening the scope of the confiscation regime.

A significant reform is found in paragraph 6, which amends section 7 of POCA to clarify how the value of the recoverable amount should be calculated. Currently, certain categories of property are ignored when calculating the value of a defendant’s benefit from crime, including property that has been forfeited or is subject to a recovery order. The proposed amendment extends that to further categories of property, such as property seized under any rule of law and property returned to victims. That ensures that the confiscation amount reflects only the actual benefit derived from crime and prevents double counting of assets that have already been returned or forfeited.

In the light of the changes introduced in clause 102 and schedule 14 on criminal lifestyle provisions, can the Minister clarify how the new flexibility in prosecutorial discretion will ensure that limited resources are effectively allocated, while safeguarding the fairness of confiscation proceedings for defendants who may not meet the criteria for a criminal lifestyle?

Clause 103(1) inserts new section 288A into part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. This provision aims to protect the enforcement authorities from being ordered to pay costs in civil recovery proceedings conducted in the High Court. The court is prohibited from making such orders unless the enforcement authority acted unreasonably, dishonestly or improperly during the proceedings.

Proposed new section 288A(1)(c) of the 2002 Act introduces a discretionary power for the court to determine if, in unforeseen circumstances, it would be just and reasonable for an enforcement authority to pay costs. This provision acknowledges that civil recovery orders, which result in the permanent deprivation of a person’s property, engage the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. It ensures that the enforcement process complies with the right to access to a court, as guaranteed by article 6 of the European convention on human rights. I would be grateful if the Minister would tell us what mechanisms would ensure that enforcement authorities could be held accountable if acting unreasonably, dishonestly or improperly during civil recovery proceedings.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I thank the shadow Minister; he went into some detail about how schedule 14 operates. I want to refer to the issue of criminal lifestyle offences in schedule 2 to POCA, which is about what the court utilises to determine whether a defendant has a criminal lifestyle. This is about the changes that we are adding. I refer in particular to the two environmental offences:

“depositing…certain waste, otherwise than in accordance with an environmental permit”

and

“operating a regulated facility, or causing or knowingly permitting a water discharge activity or groundwater activity, otherwise than in accordance with an environmental permit.”

The third offence that we are adding is the keeping of a brothel for prostitution. I want to make clear that those offences are being added.

The shadow Minister asked how this would be kept under review and whether unreasonable measures will be introduced. The legislation will set that out, but it is my understanding that the court will still have a role to play in any measures that are deemed to be unreasonable and forming a view about that. This part of the schedule is very technical, so I am happy to put in writing to the shadow Minister any further information that I have not been able to provide, but I think the general view is that it is implementing the recommendations from the Law Commission. As I understand it, it is very similar to what the previous Government were going to support. On that basis, I commend the provisions to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 102 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedules 14 and 15 agreed to.

Clause 103 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 104

Extension of polygraph condition to certain offenders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Lewell. Clause 104 seeks to build on existing polygraph testing powers by making an express provision to enable the Secretary of State to impose mandatory polygraph testing as a licence condition for the most serious offenders who commit historic offences connected to terrorism, or who pose a risk of sexual offending.

Polygraph tests are used to monitor compliance with licence conditions. The information obtained from a test is used by probation practitioners to refine and strengthen risk management plans, thereby providing probation practitioners with additional risk-related information that they otherwise would not have known. Without this clause, these serious offenders would remain excluded from polygraph testing while on licence. Polygraph tests have been successfully used by the Probation Service in the management of sexual offenders since January 2014. Initially, it was as a successful pilot and later, a national programme. More recently, it was extended to terrorist offenders by the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021.

Subsection (3) of the clause extends eligibility for polygraph testing to offenders who have been convicted of murder and are assessed as posing a risk of sexual offending on release. It also extends to those who are serving multiple sentences alongside a sentence for a sex offence, to make sure that they can be polygraph tested for the duration of their licence.A gap in existing powers means that currently, for example, someone can be polygraph tested on licence when they have been convicted of rape, but if they have raped and murdered the victim, they are unlikely to be able to be polygraph tested because the sentence for rape is likely to have ended prior to their release on licence.

Subsections (4) to (8) of the clause extend polygraph testing to a cohort of individuals who committed a non-terrorism offence, such as conspiracy to murder, that would have been considered terrorist connected, but their offence was committed before the relevant legislation came into force enabling the court to make a formal determination of a terrorist connection.We refer to this cohort as historic terrorism-connected offenders. Following the changes introduced, where it is determined by the Secretary of State that an offence was an act of terrorism, took place in the course of an act of terrorism or was committed for the purposes of terrorism, individuals will become eligible to have the polygraph condition applied to their licence, subject to meeting the relevant policy criteria.

The polygraph testing licence condition is a vital tool for probation practitioners who are managing individuals who have been convicted of terrorism offences, yet it cannot currently be applied to historic terrorism-connected offenders. That means that polygraph is not available as a tool to manage the risk posed by this cohort, whereas it is available for an individual who commits the same offence today. The clause will therefore fill the gap in legislation and contribute to the consistent and effective risk management of historic terrorism-connected offenders in the community, seeking to close those small but significant operational gaps. Taken as a whole, clause 104 will ensure that polygraph testing can be used to strengthen the management of those who committed historic terrorism-related offences, and those who pose a risk of sexual offending.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 104 broadens the use of polygraph testing for offenders by amending the Offender Management Act 2007. It allows polygraph testing for individuals convicted of murder upon release if they pose a risk of committing a sexual offence, and are 18 or over. It also applies to offenders who have served time for a relevant sexual offence, provided they are 18 or older at release. Additionally, the definition of “relevant offence” is expanded to include terrorism-related offences, including those committed for terrorist purposes. The provision functions as a preventive safeguard.

Polygraph testing can act as a deterrent, encouraging compliance with licence conditions or reminding offenders that their conduct and disclosures will be monitored. That is especially significant where there are concerns about future harmful behaviour, even if the original offence did not relate to sexual offending. The clause provides tools to manage individuals involved in terrorism-related offences, helping authorities gather intelligence and make informed decisions on their supervision. It also promotes consistency and supervision, as polygraph conditions are already used for sexual and terrorist offenders, ensuring a balanced approach to risk management across high-risk groups.

What safeguards ensure that the Secretary of State’s discretion in determining risk is transparent and fair? Given that polygraph evidence is not admissible in trials, why is it being increasingly used as a post-sentence supervision condition? Will there be an independent review of its effectiveness in reducing reoffending among the newly included categories?

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

This clause will create a new duty on offenders serving a sentence in the community and supervised by probation or a youth offending team, requiring them to inform the responsible officer if they change their name, use a different name or change their contact information. I thank my very good friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Newport West and Islwyn (Ruth Jones), for her work in the previous Parliament on this issue, and I am delighted to be bringing forward this proposal.

The clause will improve the ability of probation and youth offending teams to monitor offenders in the community and will ensure that the public are protected. A significant number of offenders serve sentences in the community, and responsible officers must have the information that they need to keep tabs on those individuals, including if they change their name and contact information. The provisions in this clause are robust. Contact details can change for any reason, but the offender must report any difference from what is kept on file. The clause captures not just formal legal changes of name by deed poll but, for example, the use of an online alias.

We have a separate youth justice system, but it is equally important that services are able to maintain contact with children and have the right information about them to do their jobs. This policy therefore applies equally to offenders of all ages and will create consistency across offenders on licence and those serving sentences in the community, overseen by probation services or youth offending teams.

Probation and youth offending teams will have discretion about whether an offender is returned to court if they fail to comply with this requirement. It is right that the enforcement provisions for this clause are robust and reflect the seriousness of non-compliance. It is right that probation officers and youth offending teams have the same powers to deal with non-compliance with this duty as they have for any other case of non-compliance with a sentence requirement. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 105 requires certain offenders, including those under referral orders, youth rehabilitation orders, community orders and suspended sentence orders, to provide up-to-date contact information to relevant authorities. Offenders must notify their responsible officer or panel member of any changes in names, phone numbers or email addresses as soon as reasonably practicable after the relevant order is made or after they begin using new contact details. For youth offenders under referral orders, the clause adds a new section to the sentencing code, mandating them to inform a youth offending team member of any aliases and their current contact details as soon as reasonably practicable.

Similar requirements apply to offenders under future and existing orders. The overarching aim of the clause is to close a monitoring gap by ensuring that responsible authorities are kept fully informed of how to reach the offender. That is particularly important for managing compliance with rehabilitative requirements and preventing individuals from circumventing supervision through undisclosed identities or means of communication. Will the Minister clarify what threshold is intended by the term “reasonably practicable” in this context? Given that it is open to interpretation, will statutory guidance be issued to ensure consistent application by youth offender panels and responsible officers?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. We will of course ensure that guidance is available for this new measure. We will provide the responsible officers with all the tools they need to protect public safety, and ensure that they have all the relevant information available to manage offenders on licence in the community.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 105 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 106

Accelerated investigation procedure in respect of criminal conduct

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Part 13 of the Bill pertains to matters relating to the police. Before I talk in detail about clauses 106 to 108, it may assist the Committee if I first provide some context for these provisions. Following the shooting of Chris Kaba, and the subsequent trial and acquittal of Sergeant Martyn Blake in October 2024, the Home Secretary made a series of commitments in response to the issues raised under the previous Government’s accountability review. The measures announced by the Home Secretary will rebuild confidence in police accountability systems for both the public and the police.

As the Home Secretary said when making her announcement, the case happened against a backdrop of wider and long-standing concerns about accountability, standards and confidence in policing. The British model of policing relies on mutual bonds of trust between the public and the police. For our model of policing to work, it is essential that the police have the confidence of the communities they serve, and that officers have the confidence they need to do the vital and often extremely difficult job of keeping us all safe. Too often in recent times, both elements of that confidence have become frayed.

Clauses 106 to 108 give effect to certain findings of the accountability review. Clause 106 will improve timeliness in the system by allowing the Independent Office for Police Conduct to make referrals to the Crown Prosecution Service prior to completing its final report. Clause 107 will amend the threshold for the IOPC to make referrals to the CPS, and clause 108 places the IOPC’s victims’ right to review scheme on a statutory footing, further improving the robustness of the IOPC’s investigative process.

Clause 106 will improve timeliness in the misconduct system. At present, a number of factors cause delay in the misconduct system, one of which relates to the fact that in order for the IOPC to make a referral to the CPS, it is legally required to complete its final report, concluding its investigation, which causes delays in making referrals. The final report has to include misconduct findings and lessons learned for the IOPC. Such elements are not required for referrals to be made to the CPS, so the change that we are making will enable the IOPC to make a referral prior to completing its final report, allowing for an improvement in pace in the accountability system.

Currently, the law states that the IOPC may refer a police officer to the CPS where there is an indication that a criminal offence may have been committed. This is a relatively low bar for making referrals to the CPS. Clause 107 changes this to bring the system in line with the threshold that the police apply when making referrals of members of the public to the CPS, which requires there to be a realistic prospect of conviction. It is right and fair that, as a result of this change, officers and members of the public will be referred to the CPS at the same threshold. The CPS will continue to make charging decisions at the same threshold, which is the full code test. This change will improve overall fairness in the system.

Finally, the IOPC’s victims’ right to review currently allows for victims and their families to challenge the IOPC when it decides not to refer matters to the CPS. This right is currently available to victims and their families through guidance. Clause 108 places this right on the statute book to protect victims and demonstrate our clear commitment to victims’ rights. Taken together, these clauses are a balanced package of measures that will help to speed up IOPC investigations while strengthening the rights of those who may be aggrieved by the outcome of an investigation.

Clause 109 amends the powers of the Secretary of State to make provisions on appeals to the police appeals tribunals. It will enable chief constables to appeal the findings or outcome of police misconduct proceedings, with a similar right for police and crime commissioners to appeal where the officer subject to proceedings is a chief constable. It will also enable a right of appeal to be conferred on the director general of the IOPC where the IOPC has presented the case at the misconduct proceedings.

This Government are committed to restoring public trust and confidence in policing, which is something fundamental to our model of policing by consent. While the majority of our police officers act with bravery and integrity, where things go wrong the public rightly expect that there is a system to robustly hold the police to account.

In the context of recent high-profile cases that have damaged that vital trust and confidence, chief constables must be empowered to drive up standards. While chief constables are themselves rightly held to account for standards in their forces, they are not afforded the same ability to challenge disciplinary decisions as the officers in their force. The only route for chief constables to challenge decisions that they consider to be unreasonable is through judicial review. That is a lengthier and more complex process than the existing specialist police appeals tribunals.

Clause 109 will allow the Secretary of State to make amendments to existing rules. First, it will provide for a right of appeal for chief constables to challenge the findings or outcomes of misconduct proceedings in relation to officers within their force, and an equivalent right of appeal for police and crime commissioners where the officer concerned is a chief constable. This is designed to ensure parity within the system, supporting the wider responsibilities of police and crime commissioners in respect of chief constables.

Furthermore, the clause will provide an equivalent right of appeal for the director general of the IOPC, limited to circumstances in which the IOPC has presented at the misconduct proceedings. This again supports public trust and confidence by ensuring vital independence in the system in the most serious and sensitive cases. Amendments to secondary legislation will be developed in consultation with the sector, including the Police Advisory Board for England and Wales.

I will speak to new clauses 23 and 31, which are also in this group, once we have heard from the shadow Minister.

[Matt Vickers]

On 5 September 2022, an armed police officer shot and killed Chris Kaba during a vehicle stop in south London. The police referred the case to the IOPC, as required when someone dies or is seriously injured in police custody or contact. The IOPC investigated and referred the case to the Crown Prosecution Service, which authorised a murder charge in September 2023. Concerns over accountability systems led the Home Office to launch a review in September 2023. In March 2024, the officer was identified and the Home Secretary announced three immediate changes to improve accountability: raising the threshold for CPS referrals; relaxing restrictions on criminal proceedings; and formalising victims’ rights under the IOPC’s victims’ right to review policy.

Clauses 106 to 108 implement these proposals, which had previously been tabled as amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill. Clause 106 introduces significant procedural reform to allow certain criminal investigations into police misconduct to be expedited. It is clear that the clause will help to significantly speed up accountability, especially in cases involving clear and serious misconduct by police officers. By allowing criminal proceedings to be brought sooner, it reduces the delay in holding individuals accountable for their actions, ensuring that justice is not unduly postponed.

In situations where there is clear evidence of misconduct, that allows for quicker action. A quicker response can help to reassure the public that, where there are serious allegations, the authority is acting swiftly and decisively. It demonstrates that law enforcement and oversight bodies are committed to transparency and integrity. What safeguards are in place to prevent inappropriate or premature referrals to the Director of Public Prosecutions under this accelerated procedure? How will the IOPC or other appropriate authority be held accountable for determinations made?

Currently, chief officers have no right of appeal against panel decisions and may only challenge outcomes via judicial review. In October 2022, the Government launched a review of the dismissal process, with findings published in September 2023. Recommendations included a presumption of dismissal for gross misconduct; automatic gross misconduct designation for certain convictions; streamlined performance and vetting-based dismissal processes; and a new appeal right for chief officers. Met commissioner Sir Mark Rowley welcomed the reforms, citing the need for greater control to uphold standards. However, the Police Federation criticised the changes, warning they could undermine fair hearings and lead to excessive influence by chief officers, risking biased outcomes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Part 14 of the Bill is about counter-terrorism and national security. Protecting the public is the first duty of any Government, which is why national security is a key pillar of the Government’s plan for change. The UK has one of the strongest counter-terrorism frameworks in the world, but we cannot stand by while threats evolve.

As the Home Secretary has set out in her statements to the House, the Security Service, Counter Terrorism Policing and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation have all consistently raised concerns related to the increasing number of young people being investigated for terrorism offences. While there must always be the potential to pursue prosecutions in the most serious cases, it is important to ensure that there are alternative risk management measures that do not automatically result in a young person receiving a terrorism conviction, which can have a hugely destructive impact on their life prospects. We have listened to operational partners about the need for alternative and earlier interventions, and we are taking the opportunity to build on a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC. Chapter 1 of part 14 therefore introduces new youth diversion orders or YDOs.

YDOs will be a new civil order designed to better manage terrorist risk from young people, while reducing the need for their further involvement in the criminal justice system. They demonstrate this Government’s commitment to ensuring that operational partners have the tools they need to reduce terrorism risk and support rehabilitation.

Clause 110 introduces a new power for the police to apply to a youth or magistrates court for a YDO. To impose a YDO, the court will need to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent has either committed a terrorism offence, committed a non-terrorism offence with a terrorism connection, or engaged in conduct likely to facilitate the commission of a terrorism offence. The court will also need to consider that it is necessary and proportionate to make the order to protect the public from a risk of terrorism or serious harm, as defined in clause 111. This ensures that the new orders will be imposed only where there is a serious risk to the public.

The technical Government amendments 53 to 55 adjust the definition of “offence with a terrorist connection” to avoid the need to refer to legislation relating to sentencing. Sentencing will not take place in YDO applications, but the judge considering a YDO application will be able to consider whether the individual has committed an offence with a terrorist connection, in the same way as a judge would consider this on sentencing.

Finally, new clause 61 requires individuals to provide their personal details to the police where a YDO includes notification requirements. The relevant details are the respondent’s name, including any aliases, and their home address. This requirement will not be automatic or mandatory for every YDO, but will need to be agreed by the court on a case-by-case basis.

The notification requirement will also include a requirement to provide information about the individual’s school or other educational establishment if relevant. This information would be helpful, for example, in a scenario where someone moved school and there was no other trigger for the local authority to inform the police of the move.

The new clause is supported by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and operational partners have confirmed that it is necessary to support the effective day-to-day management of YDOs. I commend the Government’s amendments to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

The new youth diversion orders are designed as a counterterrorism risk management tool for individuals under the age of 21. The purpose of the YDOs is to divert young people from engaging in terrorist activities, and to allow police to intervene at an earlier stage.

Clause 110 grants the police the authority to apply to the courts for a YDO. Clause 110 clarifies that a YDO can be applied for by a chief officer of police when the respondent meets certain criteria based on their age and involvement in terrorist-related offences. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the respondent must be between the ages of 10 and 21, and in Scotland, between 12 and 21.

The aim of the order is diversion, rather than punishment. The YDO is intended to help prevent further involvement in terrorism or related activities. The order may give rehabilitation, counselling or other interventions designed to steer the individual away from terrorism-related conduct. Clause 111 defines serious harm in the context of YDOs.

New clause 61 introduces notification requirements for a youth diversion order, where the respondent must notify the police within three days of being served with the order. The notification includes personal details such as the respondent’s name, any additional names, home address, and the name and address of any educational establishment the respondent normally attends. It is intended to help ensure the youth’s compliance with the order, as well as assist in tracking their progress or risk of non-compliance.

This approach strengthens the monitoring aspect of YDOs by tying in an educational component. It ensures that authorities have up-to-date information regarding the young person’s school involvement, which can be a crucial element in their rehabilitation. How will the Government ensure that the notification requirements, particularly educational details, do not inadvertently stigmatise the young person, or disrupt their education experience, especially in cases where the individual might already be vulnerable or at risk of exclusion from school?

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

In educational settings, if people are given the details and the contact, might that be reflected?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I do not wish to try your patience, Mrs Lewell, but my understanding is that this would not be public information that was shared. It would remain within the youth court or the magistrates court. I am looking to my officials, and they are nodding at me, so this is not information that would be in the public domain. I hope that that deals with the point around any stigmatisation of a young person who was subject to a YDO.

Amendment 53 agreed to.

Amendments made: 54, in clause 110, page 129, leave out lines 8 and 9 and insert—

“‘relevant offence’ means an offence which—

(a) was committed on or after 29 June 2021,

(b) is punishable on indictment with imprisonment for more than 2 years, and

(c) is not specified in—

(i) Schedule 1A to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, or

(ii) Schedule A1 to the Sentencing Code;”.

This amendment, Amendment 53 and Amendment 55 replace the concept of an “offence with a terrorist connection” with the concept of a “relevant offence with a terrorist connection” so as to enable the court dealing with an application for a youth diversion order to makes its own determination as to whether an offence has a terrorist connection.

Amendment 55, in clause 110, page 129, line 14, at end insert—

“(3A) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a)(ii), a relevant offence has a terrorist connection if the offence—

(a) is, or takes place in the course of, an act of terrorism, or

(b) is committed for the purposes of terrorism.” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 54.

Clause 110, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 111 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 112

Content of youth diversion orders

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 112 sets out a non-exhaustive list of prohibitions or requirements that may be included in a YDO and the safeguards that the police and courts must consider. The police must have the ability to mitigate risk to the public from young people being drawn into terrorism—a growing problem, as we all appreciate. The YDO will enable the police to impose necessary restrictions on an individual, subject to a court order. These may include limits on accessing certain websites or apps, or restrictions on engaging with specific individuals or groups. For example, this could include engagement with other children who have been assessed to be vulnerable to radicalisation. A YDO may also include positive requirements that the respondent must comply with. These may be rehabilitative in nature, including, for example, mandatory attendance at intervention sessions that seek to support the respondent in moving away from extremist ideologies.

Although it is critical that the police are able to impose necessary risk management and rehabilitative measures, the legislation ensures that there are safeguards to limit the extent of such measures. First, each measure must be necessary and proportionate for the purpose of mitigating a risk of terrorism or serious harm. Secondly, any measure included as part of a YDO must not unnecessarily interfere with a respondent’s educational or work commitments, or their religious beliefs. Thirdly, any measure may not exceed a total duration of two years. The aim is to ensure that YDOs have enough time to make a positive impact on a young person’s life while remaining proportionate to the scale of risk they pose to the public by being drawn into terrorism.

The Government amendments to clause 112 provide further examples of the measures that may be imposed through a YDO. This increases transparency and provides a clear statutory basis for the most intrusive measures that will be available. The expanded list of prohibitions and requirements represents the measures that we expect the police will most commonly apply to the court to include in a YDO.

Amendment 57 allows for potential restrictions on entering a specific area, including travel restrictions inside or outside the UK. Amendment 58 outlines potential requirements for the respondent to answer questions, provide information, or produce documents. Amendment 59 provides that, if included in a YDO, the individual may be required to comply with notification requirements, as detailed in new clause 61, and may be subject to restrictions on the possession of weapons and explosives. Amendments 56 and 60 are consequential on these other amendments.

New clauses 62 and 63 and Government amendment 79 enable a YDO to include an electronic monitoring requirement. This will enable the effective monitoring of and compliance with measures such as curfew requirements and exclusion measures. Operational partners have been explicit that having this capability will maximise the utility and effectiveness of YDOs.

Finally, amendment 40, tabled by the shadow Minister, seeks to give the police the ability to apply for a YDO in cases where a young person exhibits extremist views; it would also prevent an order from expiring unless there is an independent expert assessment that concludes the individual no longer poses a terrorist risk or holds extremist views. YDOs are designed for terrorism-related cases only. A YDO is a tool to be used only when young people pose a public safety risk. There are no plans to use YDOs for cases that do not meet terrorism thresholds, as this would interfere with the rights of young people.

This Government take extremism very seriously, and we are committed to ensuring that we have the tools and powers needed to address this issue. Efforts to counter extremism span a broad range of Government and law enforcement activity, and we must persist in our efforts to challenge extremist narratives, to disrupt the activity of radicalising groups, and to directly tackle the causes of radicalisation. The Home Office leads work on countering extremism, and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government will lead work with local councils on strengthening community cohesion. It is vital that the two programmes on cohesion and extremism work in parallel.

Clause 116(4), which we will debate in a later group, permits the police to apply for the extension of a YDO. There may be two extension applications, and each will be for a maximum of six months, so the maximum duration of an order is two years in total. I assure the hon. Member for Stockton West that counter-terrorism police will regularly assess the risk posed by the individual while the order is in force. Although decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, the police may decide to apply to the court to extend an order. Where the police assess that the risk posed by the respondent remains despite the order having been in place, they may consider, in consultation with the relevant prosecutorial authority, whether the relevant test for prosecution for terrorist offending is met. Should the risk posed by the individual persist for longer than 24 months, other tools may be considered.

I hope the shadow Minister will agree not to press amendment 40 given the clear operational need for the Government’s amendments, which I commend to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Amendment 40 primarily focuses on the duration, assessment and possible extension of YDOs, and it would ensure that the orders are subject to review and that further intervention is applied when necessary. Under the amendment, YDOs must specify a period of up to 12 months in which the young person is monitored and guided through the diversion programme. This would ensure there is a clear time limit with a defined end point for the intervention.

Additionally, before the order concludes, an assessment must be carried out to evaluate whether the individual continues to hold extremist views or poses a terrorism threat. This would add an important safeguard to the process, ensuring that young people who may still be a risk are identified before the order ends. A critical element of the amendment is the requirement that qualified experts carry out the assessment. The evaluation of whether the individual continues to hold extremist views or to present a terrorism risk must be conducted by an expert in extremism and counter-terrorism. This would ensure the assessment is informed by a high level of expertise and understanding of the complexities of radicalisation.

Assessments made by the youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert who has no pre-existing relationship with the respondent. This independent review would guarantee objectivity and minimise any potential bias in the evaluation process. If the individual was assessed to be still holding extremist views or continuing to pose a terrorism risk, the youth offending team or a chief officer of the police would have the power to apply to the court for an extension of the youth diversion order. This extension could be granted for an additional 12 months, allowing continued intervention and monitoring of the individual. Importantly, the extension would ensure that the order remained in place for as long as the individual was considered to pose a risk to public safety.

Finally, the amendment specifies that all provisions, prohibitions and requirements set by the YDO will remain in effect until the individual has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing no terrorism threat. This would ensure that the protective measures stipulated in the order were maintained throughout the duration of the individual’s involvement in the diversion programme, offering ongoing protection to the public while allowing continued monitoring of the individual’s risk level. The amendment would ensure that the diversion process is both effective and responsive to the changing nature of extremist behaviour, and that any decision to conclude or extend the order is based on robust and independent expert evaluations, thus improving the overall effectiveness of the youth intervention measures in countering extremism and terrorism.

Clause 112 outlines the content and conditions of a youth diversion order, providing the framework for how the order can be structured and what it can include. How will the Government ensure that YDOs do not interfere with religious or cultural practices of respondents, as the clause provides, especially when it comes to limitations on association or communication?

[The Chair]

My sincere apologies to the Committee: before I called the shadow Minister, I should have proposed Government amendment 56. I call the Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clauses 113 to 115 set out duties on the police to consult with relevant authorities, provide for applications to be made without notice in urgent circumstances, and provide for interim YDOs to be made.

The Committee will recognise the importance of ensuring that the police take wider factors into consideration—for example, a person’s age, mental health, safeguarding and educational needs—before applying for a YDO. Clause 113 therefore introduces a duty to consult before applying for an order or applying for variation or discharge of an order. In England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland, the police will be required to consult with youth offending teams and the Youth Justice Agency respectively for applications involving individuals under the age of 18. In Scotland, the police will be required to consult with the Lord Advocate for all applications. This is necessary to give effect to the different position in Scotland, where consultation with the Lord Advocate is appropriate for all YDOs, including for 18 to 21-year-olds, and for without-notice YDO applications. That reflects the Lord Advocate’s specific functions in relation to their role as the head of the system for the investigation and prosecution of crime, which includes a specific working relationship with Police Scotland.

Government amendments 62 and 65 make the additional requirement in respect of Scotland that the police consult with the local authority before making an application for a YDO, irrespective of the age of the respondent, and remove the requirement for consultation with the Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration for YDOs for under-18s. Again, the amendments are necessary to give effect to the different position in Scotland, where there is no equivalent to youth offending teams. Government amendments 63, 64 and 66 are consequential on those amendments, while Government amendment 61 ensures consistency of drafting between the subsections of clauses 113, as amended.

Consultation will be an important part of the YDO application process, ensuring that the police have thoroughly considered the necessity and proportionality of a YDO and taken into account the expertise of those who work closely with young people in the community. This statutory duty does not prevent the police from engaging with other authorities, such as the CPS or the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland, wider social services, or the respondent’s school or college, where appropriate.

While it is likely to be rare in practice, there may be circumstances in which an urgent YDO application is required and providing notice to the respondent may increase risk. Therefore, clause 114 provides a route for police to apply for a YDO without notice to the respondent. The requirement to consult does not apply in such cases, although the police will still be required to consult relevant authorities before the full court hearing for a YDO.

Where an application is made without notice, the court will be able to consider whether to impose an interim order, in line with the approach taken with other preventive orders, such as knife crime prevention orders. Due to the temporary nature of an interim order, clause 115 ensures that the only positive requirements that can be included in such an order are to provide information and to comply with notification requirements. For example, the Bill does not allow the police to impose a requirement to attend intervention sessions similar to Prevent in an interim order, but they will be able to impose risk-management measures where necessary and proportionate, subject to the court’s permission. Amendment 67 clarifies the measures that can and cannot be imposed in an interim YDO.

I commend the amendments and the clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 113 outlines the duty to consult before making an application for a youth diversion order or the variation or discharge of such an order, particularly when the individual involved is under 18. It ensures that key stakeholders are involved in the decision-making process, so that the young person’s best interests are taken into account, and it ensures that the relevant agencies are informed and consulted before any formal application is made. How do the Government plan to ensure that the agencies that are consulted—in particular the youth offending teams—have the necessary expertise and resources to adequately assess the case before the application for a YDO is made?

Clause 114 outlines the process for making an application for a youth diversion order without notice to the respondent. This provision is significant because it allows for situations in which immediate intervention is necessary and the respondent is not notified before the application is made. How will the Government ensure that respondents’ rights are protected in cases where an application is made without notice? What measures are in place to prevent misuse of this provision?

Clause 115 makes provision for an interim youth diversion order to be made during the adjournment of a hearing for a full YDO. It ensures that even while a decision on the full application is pending, the court can take immediate temporary action to manage the respondent’s risk, particularly in cases involving potential extremism or terrorism. The clause allows the courts to impose interim measures to temporarily manage a respondent’s behaviour, safeguarding public safety, while the full process is ongoing.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

The shadow Minister raised the issue of consultation with youth offending teams and their equivalent in the devolved nations. My understanding is that we are not talking about a large number of individuals being subject to these provisions. The reason we say that youth offending teams have to be consulted is that they have the expertise and the knowledge of working with young people, and it is likely that the individuals they will be consulted on will already be known to them. It is a good, positive measure to undertake that consultation with youth offending teams and recognise the skills and safeguards that they will bring. Their knowledge of the individual will perhaps include, as I spoke about earlier, issues in their background or safeguarding issues that need to be considered. That is really important.

An interim YDO may be required if there is an immediate risk that has to be managed. That is why provision needs to be made for interim YDOs, but of course they are interim, and a full hearing will take place. Interim YDOs will be used only in urgent circumstances, and of course the court will have to agree; while an application can be made, if the court does not recognise the urgency, it will not be granted. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has agreed that the power to make interim measures is necessary in order for YDOs to be effective.

I hope that, on the basis of those answers, the shadow Minister is satisfied that the clause should stand part of the Bill.

Amendment 61 agreed to.

Amendments made: 62, in clause 113, page 131, line 10, leave out from “Scotland” to end of line 15 and insert

“must consult—

(a) the Lord Advocate,

(b) the relevant local authority, and

(c) if the respondent will be under the age of 18 when the application is made, the Principal Reporter.”

This amendment changes who the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland must consult before making an application for a youth diversion order or for the variation or discharge of such an order.

Amendment 64, in clause 113, page 131, line 21, at end insert—

“‘relevant local authority’ means—

(a) the Scottish local authority in whose area it appears to the chief constable that the respondent lives, or

(b) if it appears to the chief constable that the respondent lives in more than one such area, whichever one or more of the relevant Scottish local authorities that the chief constable considers it appropriate to consult;”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 62.

Amendment 63, in clause 113, page 131, line 21, after “section” insert “—

‘Scottish local authority’ means a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994;”.—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 62.

Clause 113, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 114

Applications without notice

Amendments made: 65, in clause 114, page 131, line 27, leave out “Section 113(1) does” and insert

“Subsections (1) and (2)(b) and (c) of section 113 do”.

This amendment disapplies the requirement to consult the relevant local authority and (where the respondent is under 18) the Principal Reporter where an application for a youth diversion order is made without notice in Scotland.

Amendment 66, in clause 114, page 131, line 35, leave out “section 113(1)” and insert

“subsection (1) or (2)(b) and (c) of section 113 (as the case may be)”.—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 65.

Clause 114, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 115

Interim youth diversion orders

Amendment made: 67, in clause 115, page 132, line 8, leave out subsection (3) and substitute—

“(3) The only requirements that may be imposed by an interim youth diversion order on the respondent are—

(a) a requirement of the kind mentioned in section 112(3)(b) (requirements to provide information etc);

(b) a requirement to comply with section (Notification requirements) (notification requirements).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment enables an interim youth diversion order to require the respondent answer questions, provide information or produce documents, or to comply with notification requirements under NC61.

Clause 115, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 116

Variation and discharge of youth diversion orders

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I wonder whether it might be helpful for the Committee if I respond after the shadow Minister has spoken to his new clause 42.

[Matt Vickers]

Clauses 118 and 119 outline the offence of breaching a youth diversion order and subsequent processes for issuing and revising guidance on the exercise of functions related to youth diversion orders.

Clause 118(4) provides that if a person is convicted of breaching a youth diversion order, the court cannot issue a conditional discharge requiring a substantive penalty instead. This provision prevents a lenient approach that might fail to deter non-compliance. The clause also establishes varying penalties based on age, with difference consequences for individuals under and over 18. How do these penalties balance deterrence with the goal of rehabilitating young offenders, particularly those under 18?

Clause 119 grants the Secretary of State the authority to issue guidance for local police forces. How does the Minister plan to ensure that that guidance brings consistency in the application of YDOs across different regions? Further clauses outline wider procedures, including for applications for YDOs.

New clause 42 would require the Secretary of State to publish a report within three months of the passage of the Act detailing the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders. The report must cover the organisations involved, the counter-terrorism and deradicalisation training they possess and any additional resources required to effectively manage the YDO provisions. Within one month of the report’s publication, the Secretary of State must present a plan to address training, financing and guidance to meet the required standards. Additionally, the Secretary of State must commission an independent assessment by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to evaluate whether the proposed levels of funding, training and expertise are adequate, with that assessment being laid before Parliament alongside the plan.

The new clause would ensure the effective implementation of youth diversion orders with the necessary expertise. The requirement for a report and plan would ensure that organisations are prepared to handle counter-terrorism and deradicalisation issues. It would set clear expectations for training and funding, holding the Government accountable for providing sufficient resources. The independent assessment by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation would add scrutiny, ensuring that the Government’s plans meet the required standards. Overall, the new clause would introduce a proactive and transparent approach, fostering confidence in the system’s ability to address terrorism and extremism.

What steps are the Government taking to ensure that the organisations involved in implementing YDOs have the necessary counter-terrorism and deradicalisation training and expertise? Are the Government confident that those organisations are sufficiently prepared without the need for an independent assessment? Given the complexity of implementing YDOs, does the Minister agree that additional resources might be required to ensure that the orders are effectively enforced? If not, what plans are in place to guarantee that the organisations responsible are adequately resourced?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clauses 118 to 121 will support the implementation of YDOs. Although the aim of a YDO is to divert a young person away from terrorist offending, it is critical that there is an effective deterrent against breaching the order, and that where a young person breaches the order, the police can take action.

Clause 118 ensures that a separate criminal offence is available for breaching a YDO without a reasonable excuse. In practice, we propose that statutory guidance will set out that the police will be expected to consult youth offending teams where there is a suspected breach, and for less serious breaches the police may consider alternatives to prosecution, such as varying the measures in the order or issuing a formal warning to the individual. Prosecution for this offence will therefore be a last resort.

Government amendment 72 makes it an offence for a person to knowingly provide false information, produce a false document or notify false information in purported compliance with notification requirements imposed under a YDO. Government amendments 73 and 74 make the offences under clause 18 triable either way irrespective of the defendant’s age, with a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. The amendments ensure that there is a consistent maximum penalty for any breach of a YDO, regardless of the young person’s age, and that the legislation more accurately reflects the potential severity of breaching a YDO. For example, a serious breach may involve a breach of a weapons measure, such as by making plans to purchase knives or encouraging or assisting others to do so. We would expect a prosecution for that offence to be the last resort. Detail on other options to be considered beforehand will be included in the statutory guidance. The change is supported by operational partners and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. Government amendment 75 enables a copy of a YDO to be admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings for breach of the order.

Clause 119 introduces a new power for the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the police in relation to YDOs. In issuing such guidance, we recognise the importance of proper consultation with relevant authorities, including the police, the prosecution service in England and Wales and in Northern Ireland, and the Lord Advocate in Scotland. That is why clause 119 requires mandatory consultation with certain parties and permits the Secretary of State to consult with other stakeholders, where appropriate. Government amendment 76 expands the list of consultees to include youth justice agencies.

Clause 120 ensures that rules of court can provide for anonymity for individuals going through civil proceedings for a YDO. That is important to ensure that reporting restrictions apply, and it is in line with the general policy aim of ensuring that young people do not feel stigmatised through engagement with the justice system—something that the shadow Minister has spoken about.

Finally, clause 121 makes procedural provision in respect of applications for a YDO. Government amendment 77 disapplies the time limit that would otherwise prevent an application for a YDO from being made in relation to matters arising more than six months prior to the making of the application. Amendment 78 enables proceedings in Scotland for, or in relation to, a YDO to be heard by a summary sheriff.

I turn to the Government new clauses in this group. To safeguard effectively the data that is gathered under electronic monitoring requirements, new clause 64 will require the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice for the processing of such data. The processing of such data will be subject to the requirements in the UK general data protection regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018. New clause 65 will enable the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to review and report on the use and operationalisation of the youth diversion order. The independent reviewer already has a number of statutory functions, and this new clause aligns his statutory functions, enabling him to report on the YDO. The independent reviewer has been consulted on the clause, and his view is that the power to review the operation of the youth diversion order is important.

New clause 42, tabled by the shadow Minister, would require the Government to publish a report on the organisations that are responsible for implementing and enforcing YDOs, and a plan for delivering the relevant funding, training and guidance available for these organisations. It would also require the Government to commission a report from the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation.

As Matt Jukes, the head of counter-terrorism policing, set out in his written evidence to this Committee, counter-terrorism policing is a collaboration of UK police forces with a network of exceptional investigators. It is the lead law enforcement agency for managing terrorist risk, so it is appropriate that it will lead the implementation and enforcement of YDOs. It will be supported in this role by youth justice partners who have substantial experience of working with young people who are subject to court-imposed orders.

As I have already set out, Government new clause 65 already ensures that YDOs are added to the statutory remit of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. As part of this role, the independent reviewer is required to review the operation of YDOs in practice and report to Parliament. I hope that the shadow Minister agrees that new clause 42 is therefore unnecessary.

On the other issue that the shadow Minister referred to, regarding the consistent use of YDOs across the UK, one of the key objectives of the statutory guidance under clause 119, which chief officers must have regard to, is to ensure that there is consistency. To go back to the point about the youth offending teams, given the small size of the cohort of children who are likely to be given a YDO, we do not anticipate that the changes will add significant pressures to those youth offending teams. On that basis, I commend the Government’s amendments to the Committee.

Amendment 72 agreed to.

Amendments made: 73, in clause 118, page 133, line 23, leave out subsection (2).

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 74.

Amendment 74, in clause 118, page 133, line 33, leave out “aged 18 or over”.

This amendment makes offences under clause 118 (breach of youth diversion order) triable either way whatever the age of the respondent.

Amendment 75, in clause 118, page 134, line 8, at end insert—

“(5) In proceedings for an offence under this section, a copy of the original youth diversion order, certified by the proper officer of the court that made it, is admissible as evidence of its having been made and of its contents to the same extent that oral evidence of those matters is admissible in those proceedings.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment enables a copy of a youth diversion order to be admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings for breach of the order.

Clause 118, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 119

Guidance

Amendment made: 76, in clause 119, page 134, line 16, at end insert—

“(za) the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales;

(zb) the Scottish Ministers;

(zc) the Youth Justice Agency in Northern Ireland;”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment adds to the list of persons the Secretary of State must consult before issuing or revising guidance to chief officers of police about youth diversion orders.

Clause 119, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 120 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 121

Applications

Amendments made: 77, in clause 121, page 135, line 17, at end insert—

“(2) Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (time limit for complaints etc) does not apply to a complaint under this Chapter.”

This amendment disapplies the time limit that would otherwise prevent an application for a youth diversion order being made in relation to matters arising more than six months prior to the making of the application.

Amendment 78, in clause 121, page 135, line 17, at end insert—

“(3) In Schedule 1 to the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 (asp 17) (civil proceedings etc in which summary sheriff has competence), after paragraph 12 insert—

‘Youth diversion orders

13 Proceedings for or in relation to a youth diversion order under section 110 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.’” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment enables proceedings in Scotland for or in relation to a youth diversion order to be heard by a summary sheriff.

Clause 121, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 122

Prevention of terrorism and state threats: weapons etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence for a person to wear or display an article in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that they are a member or supporter of a proscribed terrorist organisation. The offence is committed only if the person carries out such conduct in a public place.

Clause 123 makes two key changes to section 13 of the Terrorism Act. The first is to create a new offence where a person carries out the conduct in one of the relevant premises set out in the Bill, including prisons, young offender institutions and immigration removal centres. In 2022, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation undertook a review of terrorism in prisons. That was in the context of the UK suffering four terrorist attacks in 2019 and 2020 committed by serving prisoners or terrorist offenders who had been released on licence. One of the reviewer’s recommendations was for the Government to consider amending section 13 to extend the offence to prison settings. This clause implements and builds on that recommendation. The new offence will act as a deterrent to such harmful conduct in the prison estate, and it will help to prevent exposure to articles that are linked to terrorist organisations. That, in turn, may reduce the risk of individuals being radicalised or otherwise encouraged to support such groups.

The second change concerns the powers of seizure under section 13. In his report “The Terrorism Acts in 2022”, the independent reviewer highlighted that the existing seizure powers would not be available where the police could not connect an article, such as a flag or banner, to specific individuals for the purpose of further criminal investigation. He recommended that that gap should be rectified. The clause will therefore amend section 13 to ensure that the police can seize such articles even when there is no real prospect of prosecuting an individual for a section 13 offence. An article may therefore be seized to prevent its continuing display and to preserve it as evidence.

Both changes to section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 implement the independent reviewer’s recommendations and are supported by the police. They will ensure that the offence and associated seizure powers can be used to full effect. I am happy to respond to new clause 43 once we have heard from the shadow Minister.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 123 amends section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which concerns the offence of wearing or displaying articles in support of a proscribed organisation. The key amendment is the introduction of a new offence:

“A person commits an offence if, on relevant premises, the person…wears…or displays an article, in such a way…as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.”

What is the rationale for introducing the concept of reasonable suspicion in the offence of wearing or displaying articles, as opposed to requiring more direct evidence of support for a proscribed organisation? I would also be grateful for clarity on how the list of relevant premises is determined. Could that include other locations or contexts beyond those listed?

New clause 43 introduces a criminal offence for individuals who travel outside the United Kingdom to support a proscribed organisation. The offence covers various forms of support, including joining or working for a proscribed organisation or its affiliated groups, attending events in support of such an organisation, meeting with its members, creating content to promote the organisation, or travelling to areas controlled by the organisation without a legal exemption. The new clause provides specific exemptions for accredited non-governmental organisations and humanitarian organisations, media outlets and journalists, and diplomats or Government officials travelling in an official capacity. A person who is found guilty under the provision could face a severe penalty of imprisonment for up to 14 years on conviction on indictment, or up to six months and a fine on summary conviction.

The measure is a proactive step to curb the influence and spread of terrorism. By criminalising travel abroad to support a proscribed organisation, it would help to prevent individuals from engaging in activities that might contribute to terrorism and destabilisation abroad. The inclusion of various forms of support, ranging from membership and financial involvement to attending gatherings or creating content, provides clarity on what constitutes illegal activity. That would ensure that law enforcement could pursue a wide range of actions that support proscribed organisations.

New clause 43 is designed to prevent individuals from becoming embedded with or supporting proscribed organisations. Why would the Government not support a preventive measure that helps to protect the UK from individuals travelling abroad to engage in terrorism-related activities?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

As the shadow Minister has explained, new clause 43 seeks to introduce a new offence for travelling abroad to support a proscribed organisation. The UK has one of the strongest counter-terrorism frameworks in the world. That includes, under the Terrorism Act 2000, the ability to proscribe an organisation that the Home Secretary reasonably believes is concerned in terrorism. That means that it commits and participates in terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise concerned in terrorism. Some 80 terrorist organisations are currently proscribed.

As part of the counter-terrorism framework, there are a wide range of powers and offences that can be used by the Government and operational partners to disrupt travel overseas for terrorist purposes and to prosecute individuals on their return. That includes, for example, an executive power to cancel a British citizen’s passport and the power to temporarily seize a passport when there is a reasonable suspicion that the person is traveling to engage in terrorism-related activity.

There are also a wide range of terrorism offences that could be engaged in relation to an individual who travels to support a proscribed organisation. For example, it is an offence to be a member of a proscribed organisation, to invite support—the invited support can be intangible, and it is not limited to money, property or support that incites violence or encourages terrorism—for a proscribed organisation, to attend a place used for terrorist training or to provide or receive terrorist training, and to undertake preparatory acts with the intention of committing an act of terrorism or assisting another to commit an act of terrorism.

The counter-terrorism framework also includes the designated area offence, which permits the Secretary of State to designate an area if she is satisfied that it is necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism to restrict British nationals and residents from entering or remaining in the area. It is an offence for UK nationals or UK residents to enter or remain in a designated area. I recognise that the power has not been used to date, but the Government’s view is that it remains a useful tool to disrupt terrorist travel in the right circumstances.

As the shadow Minister may be aware, the Government are considering a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, on the topic raised by his new clause. The Government will not hesitate to address gaps in our toolkit and to ensure that it keeps pace with the modern terrorist threat. We have brought forward measures in the Bill to implement and build on recommendations the reviewer put forward under the last Government. In November 2024, the Home Secretary accepted his recommendation to consider introducing a new terrorist travel offence. Officials are currently considering it with operational partners, as well as the extent to which there is a gap. It is vital that any new offence extends the ability of operational partners and the CPS to disrupt and prosecute those involved in terrorism. In due course, the Government will respond fully to that recommendation on disrupting terrorist travel.

Before I conclude, on the issue of reasonable suspicion and the requirement, this measure simply extends beyond private settings to designated settings. We are not changing the reasonable suspicion test; I hope that that is helpful to the shadow Minister. For the reasons set out, I hope he will be content not to press his new clause 43 when we reach it later in our proceedings.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 123 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 124

Management of terrorist offenders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 127 relates to the implementation of international law enforcement information-sharing agreements, clause 128 sets out the meaning of “appropriate national authority” and clause 129 relates to the consultation with devolved authorities about regulations under clause 127.

International law enforcement information-sharing agreements are a vital tool that provides law enforcement officers with access to new intelligence to fight crime, increase public protection and reduce the threat of societal harm posed by international criminality. Clause 127 will provide the appropriate national authority with the power to make regulations to implement any new legally binding international law enforcement information-sharing agreements. Such regulations may, for example, make provision for the technical and, where appropriate, operational detail needed to facilitate the information sharing provided for in a particular agreement. Clause 127 also stipulates that regulations can be made in connection with implementing an international agreement only in so far as it relates to the sharing of information for law enforcement purposes, and that any data sharing must comply with data protection legislation.

Clause 128 defines the appropriate national authority as the Secretary of State or, where a provision falls within devolved competence, Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers or the Northern Ireland Department of Justice. Clause 129 requires the Secretary of State, before making regulations, to consult devolved Governments about any provisions in the regulations that would be within the legislative competence of the relevant devolved legislature.

These measures will enable the swift implementation of new international agreements that are designed to help keep the public safe from the threat posed by international criminality and cross-border crime, and help to protect vulnerable people. I commend them to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 127 gives the Government the power to make regulations to implement international agreements relating to the sharing of law enforcement information. The agreements may evolve over time, and the clause ensures that UK law can adapt accordingly.

The clause allows regulations to override existing restrictions on information sharing, but with two key safeguards. A data protection safeguard means that regulations cannot require or allow the processing of personal data in a way that would breach UK data protection laws, unless the regulations themselves impose a legal duty or power. Regulations also cannot override the restrictions set out in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which covers the surveillance and interception of communications.

The clause aims to ensure that the UK can meet its obligations under international law enforcement agreements, while still upholding important privacy and legal protections. Clause 128 defines who the appropriate national authority is for the purposes of making regulations under clause 127.

Clause 129 places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult the devolved Administrations before making any regulations under clause 127 that include provisions falling within the legislative competence of a devolved legislature, as set out in clause 128. That ensures proper engagement with, and respect for, the roles of the Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive when regulations touch on devolved matters. We welcome these measures, but could the Minister briefly comment on what format such consultation would take?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am happy to comment. With matters such as this, the normal procedures are in place around consultation. There has been extensive consultation on getting these provisions into the Bill. That is just the normal way that we consult. I hope that that satisfies the shadow Minister.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 127 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 128 and 129 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 130

Criminal liability of bodies corporate and partnerships where senior manager commits offence

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

As we know, crimes can be committed by corporate bodies, just as they can be committed by individuals. It is important that corporate bodies are held liable for committing criminality and face justice accordingly. That is achieved through what is called the identification doctrine.

In the 1970s, the Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass case determined that a corporation can be held liable for a crime if it is committed by its “directing mind and will”, but there is a lack of clarity on what that constitutes. As companies have grown in size and complexity, there are often multiple controlling minds within different business functions who can exert control and cause harm through different functions of the business.

Through clause 130 the Government are placing the case law test for attributing crimes to corporate bodies on a statutory footing, and clarifying and extending the circumstances under which a body corporate or partnership is liable for any criminal offence, if that offence has been committed by its senior management.

The previous Government undertook the first stage of this reform in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, placing the identification doctrine in legislation for economic crime offences. However, the identification doctrine was never intended as an economic crime-only regime. It has historically applied to any criminal offence in case law, and it is important that statute reflects that.

Clause 130 therefore repeals the relevant sections of the 2023 Act and replaces them with an identification doctrine that applies to all relevant crime, not just economic crime. As a result of the clause, a body corporate or partnership in the UK can be held liable for any criminal offence and fined accordingly where a senior manager who has control over the whole or a substantial part of the business commits an offence while acting in the scope of their actual or apparent authority.

The broadening of the principle to senior managers with control over any substantial part of the body corporate reflects the wide decision-making responsibilities of organisations and mitigates prior concerns that individuals committing crime could escape liability by changing or removing their title. That will ensure that businesses cannot continue to avoid liability where senior management have clearly used the business to facilitate or conduct crime.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 130 holds organisations criminally liable when a senior manager commits an offence within their authority, expanding liability beyond economic crimes to all criminal offences. This reform addresses gaps in the previous identification doctrine and applies to both UK and non-UK entities. However, liability will not apply if the offences occur entirely outside the UK, unless it would be criminal at the corporate level in the UK. How will the Government ensure that the broader application of corporate liability strikes the right balance between holding organisations accountable and avoiding unfair penalisation for offences that occur in part outside the UK?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the question. It is clear that offences committed outside the UK would not be covered by the clause—I think that that answers the shadow Minster’s question. It is clearly something that we need to keep under review, because other legislation does have extraterritorial application. I am certainly willing to go away and look at that point, and to come back to the shadow Minister.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 130 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered,

That the Order of the Committee of Thursday 27 March be varied by leaving out paragraph 1(g).—(Keir Mather.)

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Keir Mather.)

Headingley Incident

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Monday 28th April 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Everybody will have found the reports about this incident, which was of great severity, deeply concerning. I would like to express my deepest sympathies to those who were injured during this horrendous attack. Our thoughts are with them at this time. I also thank the public, the police and the emergency services more broadly for their response to the incident.

There are two aspects that I would like to touch on with the Minister. West Yorkshire police has said that counter-terrorism police are involved in responding to the incident. We have heard from the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation about the importance of not allowing an information vacuum to form. Will the Minister ensure that there is as much transparency as possible in the release of information about this case?

Secondly, I am aware that in the aftermath of the incident, although the police are not seeking anyone else in connection with it, there will be an increased police presence across Headingley and the broader city of Leeds in the coming days and weeks. Given that this horrific attack was on two young women, I would be grateful if the Minister could outline whether there have been any discussions about what that presence will entail and what measures are being taken, in particular to ensure that young women and girls feel safe in Leeds following this incident.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his comments; he is absolutely right to praise the public of Headingley and the emergency services. The policing presence in Headingley and across Leeds is an operational matter for the chief constable, and I know that he will be mindful of the needs of the community in making clear what police presence is needed.

I am mindful of the issue around transparency and the flow of information, but again, this is a live police investigation. The police make decisions about what information is disclosed at the appropriate time. As I have said—and as you have set out to the House, Mr Speaker—it is important that there is not speculation at this stage, and that we allow the police to do their job and to investigate, look at the evidence and take the appropriate action as and when.