European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Pat McFadden Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Monday 6th February 2017 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

Yes, and, again, we have heard no strategic alternatives from the Government and have no idea what their plan will be.

[Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)]

Given that the Government have said that they will pull out of Euratom, because it is part of the EU, is not the logical extension of their position to pull out of all those agencies? If so, why does my hon. Friend think they do not want to face up to it? Is it because they do not want to face up to the cost of duplicating the work of 30-odd agencies?

[Chris Leslie]

I do not think Ministers know what to say about some of these questions. They hope that because the issues are fairly low level and very specialist, nobody will spot them, but they will start to affect very many people. Myriad issues will arise.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Pat McFadden Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 7th February 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jones]

I give way to the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden).

[Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)]

Timing is significant only if it further empowers Parliament to have a meaningful say on the negotiations. Can I ask the Minister again: what will happen if the House declines to approve the draft agreement that he intends to bring before us?

[Mr Jones]

I think that I have already answered that extremely clearly. There will be a meaningful vote. The vote will be either to accept the deal that the Government will have achieved—I repeat that the process of negotiation will not be without frequent reports to the House—or for there to be no deal. Frankly, that is the choice that the House will have to make. That will be the most meaningful vote that one could imagine.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

New clause 110 is certainly very well meaning, but I happen to think that there are some problems with it, and I will explain what they are in a moment.

One point that should be made is that it is usual for Government to bring important treaties to the House for approval before signing them. That is a common phenomenon; it is not unusual. There is a long history of doing that with important treaties, so we cannot simply say, “Normally, we ratify them after they are signed.” The obvious course of action, sequentially, is for the Government to publish the White Paper—I am delighted that we succeeded in securing one, because it sets out a plan—and then to get on with the treaty negotiations. In an ideal world, I would like the Government to come back before anything is concluded to ask the House for its approval and to indicate what they have succeeded in achieving. The House will have to make judgments at that time in relation to the overall situation.

[Mr McFadden]

I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way while he is taking us through this sequence. The Minister indicated at the beginning of the debate that the Government were bringing forward a concession that would make the process more meaningful. I do not expect him to comment, but it appears that No. 10 is now briefing that it is exactly the same as what the Prime Minister offered in her Lancaster House speech, meaning that nothing has changed.

[Mr Grieve]

I do not think I agree with that. I do not know what No. 10 may or may not be doing, but I had a role in trying to secure the concession read out by the Minister. It is by no means a perfect concession as far as I am concerned, and in a moment I shall come to some of the difficulties that I think the House has.

--- Later in debate ---

[Claire Perry]

We can probe, we can ask questions, and we can bring our collective knowledge and wisdom, of which there is an enormous amount on these Benches, and our understanding of what alternatives there might be. If there is no alternative, or there is no process, then at least we know that, but we have bought today, with the concession given by the Minister, an option that was not on the table at the start of this process and. when you are negotiating in an uncertain environment, optionality is hugely valuable.

My second point of principle, which I referenced earlier, relates to equivalence. If we look at the negotiation for exit, it is bizarre that while the European Parliament has a number of go/no-go decision points where it effectively has a right of veto, we have been scared to give the same to this Parliament. That does not sit well with me as somebody who wants to stand up for this sovereign Parliament; it is a very perverse thing, and I am glad we are trying to correct it.

The third point of principle relates to representation. I am still mystified that there are those who think they should be scared of Parliament. How many more votes do we need to have to demonstrate the overwhelming support in this place for executing the will of the British people? They gave us a mandate, and we are not going to replay the arguments. We have a mandate, and we know we need to get on with this. We have now had two votes suggesting that right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House—possibly with the exception of those from north of the border—accept the view of the Union. We should not be scared of bringing these things to Parliament.

Ultimately, are we not here to represent our constituents? We do not want a second referendum, and I completely agree with my neighbour, my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Richard Benyon), that it would be absurd to go back. However, we are the next best thing: we are the opportunity to bring up what our constituents are saying, and many of them still have lots of questions about what this process looks like. We can put those questions to each other and to Ministers, and we can represent our constituents. The principle of representation is absolutely vital.

I have to say that the tone of these debates—we have heard a little of this today, although things are starting to calm down—sometimes borders on the hysterical. I feel sometimes that I am sitting with colleagues who are like jihadis in their support for a hard Brexit. No Brexit is hard enough—“Begone you evil Europeans. We never want you to darken our doors again!”[Interruption.] People say, “Steady on, Claire,” but I am afraid I heard speeches last week making exactly that point. The point is that the more we get these things out in the open, the more we will not be led by some of the more hysterical tabloid newspapers out there, but actually have an open and frank conversation with each other about what we want to do better.

On the issues of scrutiny, representation and parliamentary sovereignty, I am very interested in the proposals made by the Opposition. I am pleased to say I have heard some very substantial concessions today on the timing and the detail, although there is an equivocality about the ending, which still does not sit well with me. While it might not be the Government’s and the Prime Minister’s intention to bring forward a bad deal, we still have not allowed ourselves to put that to the test. So before I decide which way to vote, I am going to listen very carefully to what the Minister has to say. I am hoping to get his assurance that, if there is no deal, that can be put within the bounds of what I think should happen, which is a parliamentary decision on this vital step for our country.

[Mr McFadden]

There are two issues at the heart of today’s debate, which is about the role of Parliament in judging the final deal. The first issue is the timing of any such vote, and the second is how to make that vote meaningful. I want to speak to new clause 137, which is in my name and those of my hon. and right hon. Friends.

A significant part of the argument for leaving the European Union was about restoring parliamentary sovereignty so that this House could take decisions about the country’s future, yet attempts to assert that sovereignty have been constantly dismissed as undermining the Government, if not the country. The cry over and over again has been, “Blank cheque, blank cheque, blank cheque.” We should not give a blank cheque; there is a legitimate role for us.

The new clause seeks to do two things: first, to enshrine in the legislation the Prime Minister’s promise of a parliamentary vote on a final deal; and, secondly, to assert what can happen if Parliament declines to approve the final deal.

The Government have set out their aims in the White Paper and in other statements. The White Paper defines the Government’s aim as

“the freest possible trade in goods and services between the UK and the EU.”

The Secretary of State for Brexit said that this would be

“a comprehensive free trade agreement and a comprehensive customs agreement that will deliver the exact same benefits as we have”.—[Official Report, 24 January 2017; Vol. 620, c. 169.]

That is the test the Government have set themselves. I wish them well in ensuring that we do get the exact same benefits as we have.

This new clause does not seek to tie the Government’s hands in the negotiations. It does not seek to influence the content; it focuses on what happens if Parliament declines to approve the final deal. The choice that we do not want to be presented with, I am afraid, is the one that the Minister set out at the beginning, which is defining as success whatever the Government negotiate or falling back on the WTO. I do not want to go through the WTO rules in detail, but let me give just one example: a 10% tariff on car exports. Take the Nissan Qashqai, proudly made in the north-east of England. That tariff would mean a surcharge of over £2,000 on each car made in the north-east, compared with a competitor vehicle made in a plant in the European Union, or even another Nissan model made in the EU. On food and drink, the tariffs are 20%, and on some agricultural products they are even higher. That is before one even gets to the weakness of enforcement mechanisms within the WTO, where businesses cannot even take enforcement cases and only Governments can do so.

The Government themselves say that they do not want this option. They set out 12 points in their White Paper, the 12th of which says that they want

“a smooth, mutually beneficial exit”.

Paragraph 12.2 says:

“It is…in no one’s interests for there to be a cliff-edge for business or a threat to stability…Instead, we want to have reached an agreement about our future partnership by the time the two year Article 50 process has concluded.”

This new clause empowers Parliament to avoid the very outcome that the Government themselves say in the White Paper that they want to avoid. For that reason, it is not, as too many Members have asserted, some attempt to undermine the Government. We should be using the power of Parliament to influence these negotiations.

Let me deal with the “five minutes to midnight” point made by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). It is hardly unknown for the European Union to schedule another round of talks—it happens very frequently. In these circumstances, we would be entirely within our rights to strengthen our Government’s hand by saying, “Go back and renegotiate on this point or that point.”

[Mr Grieve]

I do not disagree with the right hon. Gentleman, but I want to emphasise this point. All sorts of things are possible—the Commission and the Council may decide to extend the period of negotiation—but we have to look at the legal implications of what we pass into law by amendments. If the new clause is prescriptive in a way that could allow the problem to occur that has been identified—dropping off because one has lost time and cannot come back to this House—we cannot just ignore that. We have to find a way round it or accept the assurances that the Government give.

[Mr McFadden]

The new clause is very simple on this point. It asks that in those circumstances the Government will seek to negotiate an alternative agreement. That is perfectly reasonable.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr McFadden]

I do not have much time so I am going to conclude.

The point of all of this is to avoid the choice between being told that we have to define as success, on the first account of it, whatever the Government have managed to negotiate, or default to the WTO. To be honest, a concession on timing that does not allow us to ask the Government to go back and negotiate a better agreement is simply holding a gun to Parliament’s head a few months earlier than would otherwise have been the case. This new clause is about taking all the claims made for decades about parliamentary sovereignty and making them real, rather than giving us a choice between deal or no deal, take it or leave it, my way or the highway. Frankly, Parliament and the country deserve better than that.

[Mr Tyrie]

rose—

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Pat McFadden Excerpts

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Monday 13th March 2017 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

I would not put it as “one last chance”. The negotiations will lead first—I hope—to an article 50 agreement; secondly, to transitional arrangements; and thirdly to a final agreement between ourselves and the EU. That will define the future of the UK for generations in Europe and beyond Europe, and it is imperative that this House has a vote on that at the end of the two-year exercise.

[Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)]

I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend for giving way. The discussion so far has been about a parliamentary vote in the event of the Government reaching a deal. Is it his interpretation of the Secretary of State’s speech today that, in the event of no deal, the Government seek the authority to default to WTO rules—which are not used by any major economy alone to trade with the EU—without this House having a say?

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that intervention. That is my interpretation and it causes me great concern. We need to be clear: reaching no deal is the worst of all possible outcomes for Britain. The president of the CBI has described it as the “worst case scenario” for which many firms cannot even prepare because

“the cost of change is simply too high to even consider it”.

Just yesterday, the director-general of the CBI, Carolyn Fairbairn, emphasised that no deal should not be “plan B”, but “plan Z”. I could not agree more.

Research published today by Open Britain warns that leaving the EU without a deal would leave Britain facing greater barriers to trade with the EU than any other G20 country. The cross-party Foreign Affairs Committee warned on Sunday that

“a complete breakdown in negotiations represents a very destructive outcome leading to mutually assured damage for the EU and the UK. Both sides would suffer economic losses and harm to their international reputations.”

That is why having a vote not only on a deal if there is one, but on no deal, is so important. It represents a check on the Prime Minister deciding to take the country down the most dangerous path. That is why I urge Members, including those on the Conservative Benches, to vote for the amendment.