Deaths of Corporal James Dunsby, Lance Corporal Craig Roberts and Lance Corporal Edward Maher: Inquest
Penny Mordaunt Excerpts(8 years, 7 months ago)
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The Minister for the Armed Forces (Penny Mordaunt)
On 15 July 2015 I made a statement regarding the inquest into the deaths of three Army Reservists, Corporal James Dunsby, Lance Corporal Craig Roberts and Lance Corporal Edward Maher who died as a result of training activity on the Brecon Beacons in Wales. I confirmed that following the conclusion of her inquest into the incident, HM Senior Coroner for Birmingham and Solihull highlighted a number of failings which contributed to the deaths of the three soldiers and made a number of recommendations to prevent future deaths. I responded to the Coroner on 14 September 2015 and, after allowing a short period for the Coroner and families to consider my response, I have today placed a copy of my response in the Library of the House. In addition to the improvements outlined in my letter we have a service inquiry under way to look at the wider safety aspects of such training and I will keep the House informed. My thoughts remain with the families of Corporal Dunsby, Lance Corporal Roberts and Lance Corporal Maher and we are committed to doing all we can to ensure such a tragic event cannot happen again.
[HCWS225]
Members of the Reserve Forces in Support of UK Operations to Counter the Threat of ISIL
Penny Mordaunt Excerpts(8 years, 7 months ago)
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The Minister for the Armed Forces (Penny Mordaunt)
With the expiry of the call-out order made on 1 October 2014, on 21 September 2015 a new order was made under section 56(1 B) of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 to enable Reservists to be called into permanent service in support of United Kingdom operations to counter the threat of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
Under the call-out order made on 1 October 2014, 85 Reservists have been called out for operations. We anticipate a continued requirement for Reservists, with the right skills and experience, over the period the new order will be in force. This is fully in line with our policy of having more capable, usable, integrated and relevant Reserve Forces.
The order takes effect from 30 September 2015 and ceases to have effect on 29 September 2016.
[HCWS216]
Reserve Forces Call-Out Orders: Defence Objectives
Penny Mordaunt Excerpts(8 years, 7 months ago)
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The Minister for the Armed Forces (Penny Mordaunt)
Changes made by the Defence Reform Act 2014 allow for Reservists to be called out under section 56(1B) of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 if it appears to the Secretary of State that it is necessary or desirable to use members of a reserve force for any purpose for which members of the regular services may be used. Reservists called out under this power may be required to serve for a period of up to 12 months.
With the expiry of the orders made on 1 October 2014, on 21 September 2015 I made four new call-out orders under section 56(1B) of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 to continue to allow Reservists to be called into permanent service to support defence engagement activities (for example the provision of short term training teams and military capacity building overseas); global counter-terrorism and counter-piracy; the operation of our permanent joint operating bases (PJOBs) in the South Atlantic islands, British Indian ocean territory, Cyprus and Gibraltar; and maritime security objectives.
Under the orders made on 1 October 2014, 280 Reservists have been called out (193 for defence engagement, 66 for global counter-terrorism and counter-piracy, 10 for maritime security operations and 11 for the operation of PJOBs). We anticipate a continued requirement for Reservists, with the right skills and experience, over the period the new orders will be in force.
For operations that fall outside the scope of these orders, for example military aid to the civil authorities, or warfighting, or for operations which are likely to involve a large number of Reservists, I would expect to make separate call-out orders.
These orders take effect from 30 September 2015 and cease to have effect on 29 September 2016.
[HCWS217]
Inquest into the Deaths of Corporal James Dunsby, Lance Corporal Craig Roberts and Lance Corporal Edward Maher
Penny Mordaunt Excerpts(8 years, 7 months ago)
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The Minister for the Armed Forces (Penny Mordaunt)
On 15 July 2015 I made a written statement (HCWS107) regarding the inquest into the deaths of Corporal James Dunsby, Lance Corporal Craig Roberts and Lance Corporal Edward Maher, who died as a result of training activity on the Brecon Beacons in Wales. Following the inquest, HM Senior Coroner for Birmingham and Solihull highlighted a number of failings which contributed to the deaths of the three soldiers and made a number of recommendations to prevent future deaths. I responded to the Coroner on 14 September 2015 and will place a copy of my response in the Library of the House in a month’s time. The delay in releasing this is at the request of the Coroner. We have a service inquiry under way to look at the wider safety aspects of such training and I will keep the House informed. My thoughts remain with the families of Corporal Dunsby, Lance Corporal Roberts and Lance Corporal Maher and we are committed to doing all we can to ensure such a tragic event cannot happen again.
[HCWS205]
Submarines and the Fishing Industry
Penny Mordaunt Excerpts(8 years, 7 months ago)
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The Minister for the Armed Forces (Penny Mordaunt)
I congratulate the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) on securing this debate on a subject that I know is of great importance to him and his constituents. I also thank all hon. Members who spoke and made representations on behalf of their constituents. I welcome the opportunity to address Members’ concerns and those of the fishing community, for whom safe and secure operations of our military vessels in the vicinity of their activity are essential. I repeat what I said in my written ministerial statement on 7 September: this incident and the delay in identifying and addressing the events and their consequences are deeply regretted.
I have written to the Karen’s master and met him and the owner to acknowledge the Royal Navy’s responsibility for the incident and to offer my personal apologies on behalf of the Ministry of Defence. A representative of the Royal Navy met them both personally to apologise on behalf of the Navy for the incident and the delay in acknowledging responsibility. I touched on compensation previously with the hon. Member for South Down (Ms Ritchie). Of course, there must be full compensation. My role in that process is to ensure that that happens swiftly. If there are any concerns about that process, please feel free to let me know.
Jim Shannon
Can we have a timescale for the compensation? The hon. Members for South Down and for Dunfermline and West Fife are also interested in that issue. There has been delay: five months of not working while the boat is repaired. There has been £10,000 worth of damage, so we need a timescale. Let us have it in black and white.
Penny Mordaunt
I will be happy to put in writing to the hon. Gentleman the process that will now happen. The delay is clearly unacceptable. I will talk about the reasons for it, but now that we know what happened, there should be no delay in ensuring that these people are properly compensated for the trauma they have endured as well as the material damage.
The Karen was very close to sinking and I have no doubt at all that that must have been a terrifying experience for the crew. The fact that the vessel did not sink was almost wholly attributable to the crew’s swift and professional response. They took immediate action to release the brake on the winch and prevent their vessel from capsizing. They are to be commended for their actions, which undoubtedly prevented a much more serious outcome.
As Members will be aware, the Royal Navy stated it was confident that no submarine was involved and I gave that advice to the House. New information that came to light as a result of the Royal Navy—not as a result of an external investigation or my inquiries—confirmed that, in fact, a UK submarine was responsible for snagging the Karen’s nets.
Once that information was confirmed, the Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Michael Fallon) was informed on 6 August. During August, I held meetings to establish the full facts, question the Royal Navy and discuss changes to policy to ensure the safety of fishing vessels. I wanted to ensure that all the facts had been captured, that the incident and failings by the Royal Navy were fully understood, and that we had in place a policy that would provide reassurance to the fishing community and to the crew of the Karen in particular. That work was done at speed and took about a month to complete. I then took the earliest opportunity to inform the House and put the record straight on 7 September.
That answers given earlier were proved to be incorrect is deeply regretted. I am sure that the House will appreciate that our standing policy is not to comment in detail on submarine operations. However, I can say that the incident occurred because the submarine did not correctly identify the Karen as a fishing vessel with nets in the water and thus did not give her the berth she otherwise would have had.
People have questioned why the submarine did not surface at the time of the incident. It has also been suggested that the recovered fishing gear shows evidence of having been cut, further raising speculation that the submarine surfaced after the incident to remove the material. I can only repeat that the submarine was not aware of the incident at the time. I expect the issues raised by hon. Members to be covered by the Marine Accident Investigation Board report.
If the submarine had been aware of the incident, the protocols in place under the code of practice for submarine operations in the vicinity of fishing vessels would have required her to surface and remain on scene to render assistance.
Ms Ritchie
I thank the Minister for giving way. In her response, will she indicate when the report will be made available and to whom and where it will be placed?
Penny Mordaunt
Certainly. As I have already said to the hon. Lady, that report will be produced in short order. I know that there is a meeting on 24 September between Commander Operations Royal Navy and that body and I will do everything I can to facilitate the report’s circulation by placing a copy in the Library of the House of Commons.
If I were able to tell Members the full details, I think they would come to two conclusions. Although why the incident happened might be understandable—due to the nature of submarine operations—it is in no way acceptable. It is clear that our policy on fishing vessels and reporting such incidents must be improved and made more consistent. Having identified the very specific circumstances of the incident, the Royal Navy has already taken steps. I will come on to consultation in a moment, but changes took place with immediate effect because I felt that was incredibly important.
First, the process by which a vessel is classified has been reinforced, using stricter criteria to prevent incorrect assumptions being made. The instructions issued to submarine commanding officers have been updated to reflect the lessons learnt, which will also inform the training given to future commanding officers. If a vessel’s identification cannot be established, the commanding officer must assume that it is a fishing vessel with nets in the water and behave accordingly.
Secondly—this is critical—the Royal Navy’s reporting procedures have been reviewed to enable it to confirm more quickly whether a UK submarine was involved. For operational reasons, if we cannot confirm that it was not us in short order, we will assume that it was. There should be no delay in verifying whether a Royal Navy submarine was involved, regardless of the kind of submarine it was and the operation or activity it was conducting. We should respond within a few days and take action accordingly. I assure the House that the safety of our submarines and that of other mariners is most important to the Royal Navy.
Jim Shannon
Can I ask the Minister why Her Majesty’s Coastguard in Belfast was never informed? If she cannot give an answer today, perhaps she can give the answer to that and the other questions we have asked later? I would appreciate that.
Penny Mordaunt
In the brief moments I have left, I am looking at what is known as a Subfax. Clearly, we want that to be as comprehensive as possible. It cannot include submarine operations from other nations, but I am looking at that and I will happily follow up with the hon. Gentleman on that. On other issues raised, with regard to speculation that it was a Russian vessel, that is not something that we have said, although I can understand the speculation in the press on that.
The importance of the relationship between the Royal Navy and the fishing communities is fully recognised. That is why the code of practice was drawn up. The Royal Navy will step up its engagement with the fishing community. Good work has been done to date: for example, close working relationships have been developed with the Clyde Fishermen’s Association and other organisations on the west coast of Scotland. However, we want to do more. Following the incident, I have asked the Navy to establish a formal working group to improve communications and consultation with the Northern Ireland fishing industry in particular and, as I have already expressed to the hon. Member for South Down, I welcome input on that.
I am afraid that I have run out of time, but I assure the House that we want to do all we can to ensure that those in the fishing industry can go about their business not only in safety, but without fear. I will be happy to write to hon. Members to give them further details.
Motion lapsed (Standing Order No. 10(6)).
Libyan Personnel: Bassingbourn Barracks
Penny Mordaunt Excerpts(8 years, 8 months ago)
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The Minister for the Armed Forces (Penny Mordaunt)
I thank the hon. Member for Cambridge (Daniel Zeichner) for initiating the debate. I appreciate the concerns of his constituents about the tragic events he has described.
As the hon. Gentleman rightly pointed out, at the 2013 G8 summit the UK pledged, along with international partners, to train up to 7,000 Libyan troops. Of those, the UK offered to train up to 2,000 Libyan armed forces personnel. They were to return to Libya as a general purpose force to support the democratically elected Libyan Government; to disarm and integrate militias; and to improve the security and stability of the country. That was part of the wider ongoing political, economic, justice, and security support package with which the UK was providing the country at the time. The first phase of the training began in June 2014 at Bassingbourn barracks in Cambridgeshire, when 3 SCOTS delivered training to 328 Libyans.
If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I would like to record my thanks to 3 SCOTS. It did tremendous work in the training it provided, and these appalling events should not mar its efforts. There is a direct connection between the work it has been doing and making our country safe and secure. Security in Libya and a political settlement there will help the security of our nation tremendously, and 3 SCOTS did a huge amount of work to support the mission.
The majority of Libyan trainees remained in the programme until the end, and were trained successfully despite the ongoing political uncertainty in Libya from August 2014 onwards. At the point when the training was eventually concluded, the battalion had exceeded its training objectives. The battalion could have been reinserted into a meaningful role in Libya if one had existed. Let me also add our gratitude to the hon. Gentleman’s local community, the Cambridgeshire constabulary and other Government Departments for their enormous support throughout that period.
The hon. Gentleman raised several points and I shall take them in turn, and the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) rightly identified the issue of training in-country as opposed to training here; that is clearly our preference and I will touch on that as well.
The hon. Gentleman asked about the publication of the report. Key findings were published in January and I will touch on the reasons the full report was not published then, but the full report now has been published, although it does have some redactions, which I will talk him through. He also raised concerns about one of the key findings of the report, which was the poor communications, to say the very least, with some elements of the local community, and I will talk about that and the lessons we have learned. He rightly talked about an apology and redress as well, which I will touch on, too. He mentioned vetting security and the process, too, and I will start with that.
Every potential recruit who successfully passed the Libyan vetting and selection process was subject to additional UK vetting in Libya to ensure that they met the minimum UK security, immigration, medical, physical, literacy and numeracy criteria. Home Office visa processes included checks against UK criminal databases and a visa declaration by all trainees confirming they had no criminal convictions or charges in the UK or elsewhere. In addition, to ensure a balanced mix of trainees, the selection process was designed so that no single group or region was over-represented in the training cohort. We were not aware that any of the candidates who passed UK screening had criminal convictions or faced charges at that time in the UK or elsewhere. If we had known of any, those candidates clearly would not have been in that cohort.
However, as the House is aware, there were some serious disciplinary issues. Libyan officers proved unable or unwilling to apply the sanctions that were available to them to deal effectively with the disciplinary and behavioural issues that arose. In order for the disciplinary issues not to affect the training any further, the Defence Secretary authorised the introduction of a package of incentives for good behaviour, including a system of training bonuses, and a change to the walking-out policy, as it was known, effectively allowing Libyan recruits unescorted time in Cambridge. That led to a period of relative calm within the camp.
It was not until 17 October that further incidents caused concern, when there were allegations of sexual assaults on members of the public in Cambridge. This led the chief constable of Cambridgeshire to request that the commanding officer of the training unit suspend local visits outside the camp, including visits to Cambridge. He did that, and also put in place heightened security at the barracks.
Bassingbourn is not a prison; it is designed to keep unwanted persons out of the camp, rather than to stop people leaving. It is also important to note that trainees could not legally be treated as prisoners. In the event, the extra security did not prevent substantial unauthorised groups of trainees from leaving the camp on 25 and 26 October, during which time two Libyans left the camp unauthorised and went on to commit a serious sexual assault in Cambridge. This led to another major increase in police and Army resources to secure the base, and the police and the Army concluded that the training had to be ended.
The dysfunctional position in Libya and the continuing absence of a defined role for the Libyan purpose force that we were training meant there was nothing to be gained in military terms from the training planned for the final four weeks of the course. Continuation of the course and further live firing training might have placed the trainers at unacceptable risk, and concerns were also being expressed about the strain that the training was placing on the unit itself. Taken together, those circumstances led to the Secretary of State for Defence ending the course. All Libyan trainees not in UK custody or claiming asylum were returned to Libya by mid-November.
I shall turn now to the report. Following the premature completion of the training, an independent report into the circumstances was produced. Its key findings were released in January of this year, and we accepted its recommendations in full. The Secretary of State made a statement to that effect in the House, but, as hon. Members will know, the full report was not released owing to ongoing criminal proceedings against the five Libyans accused of sexual offences. Those proceedings were concluded in May.
Having consulted the police and the Libyan embassy, and across Government, we have placed a copy of the report in the Library of the House of Commons. Those reading it will notice that, in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, the technical arrangement between the UK and the Government of Libya has been redacted. This is unfortunately unavoidable. This is a bilateral document and, due to the fragility of the political situation in Libya, we are still awaiting agreement from the Libyan Government to publish that information. All names below senior civil servant level have also been redacted in line with the Freedom of Information Act.
The Defence Secretary has already gone on record confirming that no future general purpose force training will take place at Bassingbourn. The report underlines one area in particular where we could have done considerably better, which the hon. Gentleman raised: communication with the local community and in particular the way in which we communicated changes in the walking-out policy. Home Office Ministers were aware of the situation and the police were fully consulted on this change and provided advice during the decision-making process but, unfortunately, the local MP, local councils and the communities that were most affected were not told that there would be periods when trainees would not be escorted.
The heightened security at Bassingbourn and the suspension of all visits to Cambridge did not, in the event, prevent the most serious offences from being committed, but a more active approach to communicating with the local community was clearly needed. Since then, the Army has met local councils to discuss how the processes for communicating policy that affects local communities might be improved. Communication procedures have now been reviewed and measures are in place to ensure better communication, should a similar event ever arise.
The report also raises the issue of disciplining foreign troops. It is clear that the breakdown in the political situation in Libya played a large role in the problems we encountered, but the report concluded that the UK trainers had few tools at their disposal to discipline the Libyan trainees. The report asked whether we could apply UK service discipline to troops training in the UK. This would involve bringing foreign troops into the British military chain of command and require significant amendments to the Armed Forces Act 2006. My Department has assessed the challenges and downsides of making those changes and decided that they would currently outweigh any benefits, particularly as we are keen to provide training in-country. I have therefore not instructed my Department to instigate such changes now, but I will keep the matter under review. The report also recommends, however, that, in future, on courses of this kind, we consider delivering that training to the officers involved separately and in advance of the remaining trainees and carrying out basic training for the rest of the recruits in their own country. That will provide an additional layer of vetting, filtering out those for whom a career in the military may not be suitable, and securing a higher level of commitment from trainees.
Finally, I wish to turn to the issue of apology and redress. The Ministry of Defence has already expressed its deep regret about these appalling incidents. I add my personal voice to that to say how sorry I am that this has happened. These were heinous crimes committed against entirely innocent and random passers-by. Everyone who has been close to this case has been appalled by it and deeply regrets it.
I wish to place it on the record that these crimes were not committed by our armed forces. I am very conscious of that. The perpetrators clearly did not follow the high standards that we expect from our own military or from other military personnel, so as well as the tremendous hurt and harm they have done to members of the public in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency, they have also done a grave disservice to anyone who wears a uniform.
Mrs Moon
I hear what the Minister says, and she has been very open and honest in her response, but we are still left with the MOD’s own risk assessment before the personnel came to the UK. It says:
“There were reports of widespread sexual and gender-based violence during the conflict and there is some evidence that serious human rights abuses involving sexual violence took place. A UN mission in 2012 found incidents of rape perpetrated against both women and men. This is likely to represent significant under-reporting, due to the sensitivity of sexual violence and reticence to discuss these issues outside the family.”
We knew that there was a problem, and yet still those personnel were brought to this country. The UK personnel who were asked to provide the discipline were not given the tools to do so.
Penny Mordaunt
I thank the hon. Lady for her point, because it gets to one of the issues that the hon. Gentleman raised. Clearly, there were risks associated with the cultural norms in Libyan society. Obviously, they were clearly identified in the risk assessment. Having read the report in preparation for this debate, I can say that there were things put in place to mitigate them, so a cultural education took place as part of the preparation for that course. Those providing the training took that extremely seriously.
I have already touched on the consultations that took place when policy was being changed to cope with what was a pretty unique set of circumstances, as these trainees were watching what was happening in their own country. A clear process was gone through. Clearly, there were issues around communication, and we regret what has happened. I just wish to state that there was no lax attitude in trying to mitigate the risks that any training course carries. Furthermore, decisions that were taken on changes of policy were clearly designed to improve the situation and not worsen it. We need to look at the conclusions of the report, which I have already done. Clearly, this has been an appalling episode that we never want to happen again. I know of the interest that the hon. Lady takes with regard to incidents of violence and sexual violence. She can be reassured by the cultural training that took place before the course started.
Finally, let me talk about redress. The hon. Gentleman very kindly spoke to one of my colleagues about some of the issues that he has raised, and he has also touched on the cost to the MOD, which clearly we would like to recoup for the British taxpayer and our own budget. In that conversation, although not on the Floor of the House, he alluded to losses that his local authority has incurred. Clearly that should not be allowed to stand, and if he has concerns about that I encourage him—if he has not done so already—to write to me or to my colleagues in the Department for Communities and Local Government, and we stand ready to provide him with advice. We are seeking financial redress, and perhaps others who are out of pocket should also do that. If he has such concerns, I will do all I can to assist him and his local authority, and I thank him again for allowing me to get that point on the record.
Question put and agreed to.
Royal Navy Operations
Penny Mordaunt Excerpts(8 years, 8 months ago)
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The Minister for the Armed Forces (Penny Mordaunt)
On 15 April 2015, while in the Irish Sea, the fishing vessel Karen sustained damage to her nets and deck equipment and, following repairs, resumed fishing shortly after.
On the information available at the time, the Royal Navy (RN) was confident that no UK submarine was involved in the incident, and I also informed the House in response to questions from the hon. Member for South Down (Ms Margaret Ritchie) on 10 June 2015 (question 1312) and during Defence oral questions on 13 July 2015, Official Report, column 579.
I now wish to inform the House that, on the basis of new information that has become available, the RN has now confirmed that a UK submarine was, in fact, responsible for snagging the Karen’S nets. The incident, the delay in identifying and addressing the events on that day, and their consequences, are deeply regretted.
It is standing Ministry of Defence policy not to comment in detail on submarine operations but, exceptionally, I can say that this incident occurred because the submarine did not correctly identify the Karen as a fishing vessel with nets in the water, and thus did not give her the berth she would otherwise have had. Moreover, had the submarine been aware of the incident at the time, which it was not, then the protocols in place under the Code Of Practice For Submarine Operations In The Vicinity Of Fishing Vessels would have required the submarine to surface and remain on scene while the matter was investigated.
Notwithstanding the enduring requirement to operate RN submarines in busy coastal waters to guarantee our national security, this is the first incident between an RN submarine and a fishing vessel since the code was introduced in 1993. Having identified the specific circumstances, the RN has already taken steps to further reduce the risk of such circumstances happening again: the instructions issued to submarine Commanding Officers (COs) have been updated to reflect the lessons learned, which will also inform the training given to future COs. The RN’s reporting procedures have been reviewed to enable it to confirm more quickly whether or not a UK submarine was involved. These new arrangements will enable the Ministry of Defence’s established claims procedures to be invoked with minimal delay and the matter fully investigated.
MOD officials have contacted the Karen’s owners and insurers to discuss appropriate compensation.
I can assure the House that we take the safety of fishing vessels, and of life at sea, very seriously. The RN is co-operating with the Marine Accident Investigation Board’s independent inquiry, and will continue to engage with the UK’s fishing communities to explain our position and how we are responding. We will continue to work closely with the Fishing Industry Safety Group and Trade Associations to ensure the continuing safety of fishing vessels and our ships and submarines.
[HCWS177]
Military Inquests
Penny Mordaunt Excerpts(8 years, 10 months ago)
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The Minister for the Armed Forces (Penny Mordaunt)
On 13 July 2013, Army Reservists Corporal James Dunsby, Lance Corporal Craig Roberts and Lance Corporal Edward Maher were among 37 reserve soldiers taking part in an individual navigation exercise on the Brecon Beacons. Tragically, Lance Corporal Maher and Lance Corporal Roberts died while taking part in the exercise and Corporal James Dunsby was evacuated and died in hospital on 30 July 2013. An inquest into the circumstances of these tragic deaths heard evidence from 1 to 26 June 2015, and HM Senior Coroner for the City of Birmingham and the Borough of Solihull yesterday returned a narrative conclusion. The coroner has identified failings in the running of the exercise and has indicated that she will make a number of recommendations to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) in order to prevent future deaths.
I would like to apologise on behalf of the MOD and the armed forces for the deaths of Corporal Dunsby, Lance Corporal Roberts and Lance Corporal Maher. We would also like to offer our sincere condolences to their families and friends who have shown great dignity during what has been a very difficult period.
We accept the failings identified by the coroner and are truly sorry. In response to our own and the Health and Safety Executive’s investigations we have made a number of changes to the way this exercise and similar exercises are conducted. These changes include improvements to the preparatory training that reserves undertake and a thorough review of the risk assessment process to ensure that all those involved have been trained in the effective management of risks. A new tracker system has been implemented to improve monitoring of individual candidates and to enable two-way communications between directing staff and candidates. We are looking at how this can be further improved. We continually review our code of practice for the prevention and initial medical treatment of climatic injuries in the armed forces in order to minimise the risk of such tragic events. We will continue to work hard to ensure the code of practice is understood and followed.
Over the next few days the coroner will issue her report to prevent future deaths to the MOD. We will treat her recommendations with the utmost seriousness. We will ensure everything possible is being done to reduce the risk to personnel who undertake these types of exercise and to try to prevent a reoccurrence of these terrible events. The MOD will have 56 days to provide our formal response, a copy of which I will place in the Library of the House. As soon as civil investigations are complete we will initiate our own service inquiry to see where further lessons can be identified and improvements made. The Royal Military Police will also consider whether any non-criminal service offences appear to have been committed.
The reserves continue to form an important part of military capability, whether on operations or at home. We will continue to ensure that the reserves have the necessary training, skills and fitness levels to do the tasks required of them. It will always be necessary to train and test our military personnel to the highest possible level so that they can meet the challenges to national security that we face both in the UK and overseas.
Achieving this end does involve individuals having to push themselves and take some risk. However, as an organisation we must ensure that this is balanced with the need to ensure these risks are effectively mitigated. In this case, we did not do this and we accept full responsibility for these tragic deaths. We are determined to learn the lessons. I am the Minister who will be responsible for taking any corrective action forward. I will be writing to the families personally and will make myself available to meet them if they wish, and to facilitate any requests they might have.
[HCWS106]
Oral Answers to Questions
Penny Mordaunt Excerpts(8 years, 10 months ago)
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The Minister for the Armed Forces (Penny Mordaunt)
There have been no such discussions between the Secretary of State, or other Defence Ministers, and the Northern Ireland Executive.
Ms Ritchie
The Minister is well aware that I have been in correspondence with her regarding an incident on 15 April, when a Northern Ireland-registered fishing vessel had its gear snagged. The Ministry of Defence confirmed that it was not a vessel belonging to the Royal Navy. Would it be possible for the Minister and the MOD to pursue the matter of jurisdiction and who undertook such activity, in order to obtain compensation for the loss of fishing days?
Penny Mordaunt
I know that the hon. Lady is very concerned about this issue. She will know that the Royal Navy takes its responsibilities very seriously. Since 1993, it has adhered to the comprehensive code of practice and conduct for operations in the vicinity of fishing vessels, which ensures not only the safety of our ships and submarines, but other vessels. I can tell her that any NATO submarine under UK operational control would also have to conform to that code of practice, but obviously we are not responsible for other people’s submarine operations.
Andrew Bridgen (North West Leicestershire) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that under the Scottish National party’s deeply flawed defence plans, this country would have far less ability to detect, intercept and deter potentially hostile vessels in the Irish sea and elsewhere? [Interruption.]
Andrew Stephenson (Pendle) (Con)
8. What plans he has to increase the proportion of recruits to the armed forces who come from ethnic minority groups.
The Minister for the Armed Forces (Penny Mordaunt)
The Prime Minister has made a clear commitment to have at least 10% of armed forces recruits from black, Asian and ethnic minority backgrounds by 2020. Increasing the diversity of our workforce is an operational imperative, which is why we have set up a diversity programme. Each service has developed a range of initiatives to achieve this aim. An increasing defence budget and the regeneration of our capabilities will be an attractive proposition to any potential recruit, no matter what background they come from.
Andrew Stephenson
Pendle residents have a strong tradition of service in our armed forces. I was pleased that the Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment exercised their freedom of the borough of Pendle in May with a parade through the town of Colne. Is my hon. Friend aware of any outreach work being done by our armed forces to ensure that we are recruiting from all of Pendle’s diverse communities, including our sizeable Pakistani heritage community?
Penny Mordaunt
I am pleased to tell my hon. Friend that a great deal is being done in the Pendle area in this regard. That same regiment also conducted an adventurous training event over a weekend in May with community leaders from Pendle and surrounding areas, including the chairman of Lancashire council of mosques. The Army will be holding a personal development engagement event at Burnley College and at the mosque in Nelson. As my hon. Friend is aware, the Army promotes regular and reserve opportunities at its annual jobs fair in Pendle, an event my hon. Friend has been instrumental in organising.
Karen Lumley (Redditch) (Con)
10. What steps his Department is taking to degrade and defeat ISIL.
Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)
12. If he will establish an inquiry into UK armed forces operations in Helmand province in 2006.
The Minister for the Armed Forces (Penny Mordaunt)
No decisions have been made about an inquiry, but we have been learning tactical lessons throughout our operations in Afghanistan. We will also want to look at the broader lessons that can be learnt from the campaign. However, combat operations have only recently ceased, and our focus remains on supporting the Afghan Government through NATO’s current mission.
Paul Flynn
Five of our brave British soldiers lost their lives in the first five years of the Afghan war. An additional 448 lost their lives following the decision to invade Helmand with impossibilist aims and a hope that not a shot would be fired. Do not the loved ones of the fallen, and the House, deserve to know the truth of what was a major blunder, certainly before we contemplate sending more troops into a four-way civil war in Syria?
Penny Mordaunt
I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising that important issue. The matters to which he has referred, particularly the incidents in 2006, have been the subject of a Defence Committee report, and I suggest that he read the report and the Government’s response to it. Along with the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier), who is the reserves Minister, I served on the Committee at the time.
Having recently returned from Afghanistan, and having spoken to some of the next of kin at the recent Para memorial, I would say that we have a legacy to be proud of. Afghanistan has never had what it has now. There are millions of people in education, including girls; there is a strong army and a strong police force; and economic regeneration is taking place. Although it has cost us much in blood and treasure, we have a legacy to be proud of in Afghanistan, and the United Kingdom is safer.
Scott Mann (North Cornwall) (Con)
14. What capability upgrades are planned for Typhoon jets.
Nuclear Warheads (Transportation)
Penny Mordaunt Excerpts(8 years, 10 months ago)
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Sir Edward Leigh (in the Chair)
Order. The rules of the House state that if an hon. Member wishes to speak, she must have the permission of the mover of the motion—I assume the hon. Lady does—and of the Minister.
The Minister for the Armed Forces (Penny Mordaunt)
I congratulate the hon. Member for Rutherglen and Hamilton West (Margaret Ferrier) on securing this important debate and on her appointment to the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs. Nuclear warhead transportation is clearly of concern to her and her constituents. It should be noted that it and related issues are of concern to people across the country, including those in areas such as the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Oliver Colvile). I listened carefully to what the hon. Lady said and I will address her points in turn. She will appreciate that I am limited in what I can say by security considerations, but I will try to give her the fullest answers possible. I start by reassuring her over the issues of cost that she raised. We are committed to all aspects of the deterrent and its security and safety. That has been the Government’s policy and it will continue to be. She will know that it was one of the red lines in our manifesto and is one of our red lines as we go into the strategic defence and security review.
The protection and defence of the United Kingdom is the primary responsibility of Government. In a world becoming more uncertain, as seen by the recent actions of a resurgent Russia, the Government are committed to maintaining the continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent to provide the ultimate guarantee of our national security. In recent years we have reduced our stockpile of warheads and the number of warheads on our submarines. The ratio of our warheads to Russia’s is roughly one to 40. I hope that indicates to the hon. Lady the scale of what we face and the fact that Trident is a deterrent.
Margaret Ferrier
I thank the Minister for her answers so far. As SNP Members, we will admit that we do not want any nuclear weapons, and her comparison between the UK and Russia does not sit well with us. We would like to see the deterrent abolished completely. If we use nuclear weapons, where would that leave the UK? There would be no UK; there would be obliteration. What are her comments on that?
Penny Mordaunt
I appreciate the hon. Lady’s intervention, because although the bulk of my remarks will focus on the safety and transportation concerns she has expressed—I take her concerns at face value—at the heart of the debate is her and her party’s position on nuclear weapons. Of course we never want to use such weapons. However, as a Defence Minister who passionately believes that there would be dread consequences for the hon. Lady’s constituents and the whole UK if we did not have a deterrent, I believe it is absolutely fundamental that we retain that deterrent and say to those who would do us harm that there would be consequences if they used such dread weapons against us. I am happy to debate that point with the hon. Lady and her colleagues at any time; it is incredibly important and at the heart of what the debate is about. I will take at face value her concerns about the transportation of warheads, so I will address the bulk of my remarks to those points.
The specialist defence sites involved in delivering our nuclear weapons programme are based at Clyde, at Coulport and at the Atomic Weapons Establishment in Berkshire. As such, it is necessary to transport nuclear defence material, including warheads, between those sites, although the movement of such material is kept to the minimum necessary to meet operational requirements in support of the UK’s strategic deterrent programme. It is an important principle of nuclear warhead safety that warheads should not be moved unless it is necessary.
I make it absolutely clear that the safety of the general public and the security of nuclear weapons convoys are our first priority at all times. Safety is paramount during the transportation of defence material, and all appropriate measures are taken to ensure that such weapon convoys can operate safely. Our safety record is excellent. In more than 50 years of transporting such material by road in the UK, there has never been an incident that has presented any risk to the public or the environment. A stringent safety reporting system is in place so that all incidents, however minor, are recorded and assessed for possible improvements to future operations.
The hon. Lady and her colleague referred to the log and expressed concerns, particularly about transportation during severe weather. As Members would expect, I have been through the log. On the Erskine bridge incident, the authorities were consulted. In any scenario where there are adverse weather conditions, Traffic Scotland and the police in Scotland are consulted. The convoy was not crossing the bridge until the weather had moved on. That is recorded.
Concerns have previously been expressed about convoys travelling through residential and urban areas. While the House would not expect me to discuss the specific details of routes for obvious security reasons, I assure Members that the routes are carefully selected as part of a rigorous risk assessment process and are regularly reassessed for their continued suitability. The transportation of nuclear and other hazardous materials is governed by international and national regulations, including the Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2009, as amended in 2013. Although there are exemptions for certain defence-related activities, Government policy is to comply with the principles of those exemptions.
The safety of nuclear convoy operations is carefully considered at all stages of the transportation process. Operational planning always takes into account such factors as road and weather conditions, and we consult with all relevant local agencies before undertaking a convoy move. Contingencies are planned for. The convoy is operated by a highly trained crew, consisting of a first-aid team, firefighters, mechanics and others to enable roadside repairs and personnel equipped to monitor for radiological hazards.
Members will be aware that the weapon is by its very nature an extremely robust device, designed to withstand launch and re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere. It is transported in a benign configuration and secured in a custom-designed container that is tested in accordance with International Atomic Energy Agency standards to protect against a range of scenarios, including impact on a motorway at speed, a drop from height and a fuel fire, among others.
Penny Mordaunt
If the hon. Gentleman does not mind, I will make a little progress. The vehicle that carries the container is custom-designed to provide robust crash protection, even in the event of a severe road accident. We have invested in our vehicle fleet and completed a significant upgrade programme in 2014.
Another issue that the hon. Member for Rutherglen and Hamilton West mentioned was the threat of terrorism with the transportation of nuclear materials. The risks associated with terrorist attack are mitigated by a range of counter-measures, including the vehicle itself, specific warhead protection measures, intelligence, monitoring and armed escort, which includes the Ministry of Defence police. Although the operational details of those counter-measures are understandably classified, Members can be reassured that we have the capabilities to deal with any such threats. Our security arrangements are kept under review, frequently tested and subject to formal inspections to ensure that they meet the required standards.
The limited movement of nuclear defence material together with inherent safety and security features and procedures mean that the probability of an accident leading to a release of radiation is extremely low. Nevertheless, as part of our rigorous approach to safety we maintain wider arrangements to respond to any incident, no matter how unlikely; that includes the Nuclear Emergency Organisation and the necessary contingency plans to deal with any accident. Under the auspices of the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator and with the participation of the emergency services and local authorities, we also carry out regular exercises to rigorously test the continued effectiveness of our response.
Kirsten Oswald
Does the Minister not accept that that will be cold comfort to our constituents, given that it would take a minimum of four hours for those emergency activities to manifest themselves in our constituencies should an incident occur?
Penny Mordaunt
The hon. Lady is not correct. The nature of the convoy means that those necessary responses are built in. Any reaction that would need to go beyond that is rigorously tested and speedy.
I understand that this is not the first SNP debate that focuses on safety concerns. The hon. Member for Rutherglen and Hamilton West will know from freedom of information material that the incidents she referred to are very low-level and include putting the wrong fuel into a support vehicle. They have not in any way threatened the safety or security of the material in transit. The level of concern that the hon. Lady expresses is disproportionate to the incidents—I think that comes down to her party’s objection to the deterrent full stop.
I hope that the hon. Lady’s party will focus on that issue. I would be happy to engage in the debate because I passionately believe that we need the deterrent. Focusing disproportionately on safety—the incidents are in the public domain, so I can clearly show what they were, how meticulously they were recorded and the “lessons learned” programme that followed—does those who support Operation Relentless a grave disservice. These are incredible men and women who, whether they are on the submarines or part of the support and logistics operation, do an incredible job. One thing that I object to about the hon. Lady’s line of argument is that it does those people a disservice. If the issue is whether we should have nuclear weapons, I hope the hon. Member for Rutherglen and Hamilton West will focus on that.
Penny Mordaunt
I will have to draw my remarks to a conclusion, for the reasons that you set out at the beginning, Sir Edward.
I think I will close on this: I am happy to hear any suggestions that SNP Members have about how safety can be improved and any other practical concerns, but I am not sure what they are suggesting. Are they suggesting that we move part of the operation elsewhere? I am not sure, but I would be happy to hear what they have to say.
Question put and agreed to.