Domestic Abuse Bill

Robert Neill Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Tuesday 28th April 2020 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con) [V]]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), and to see the Lord Chancellor be supported, albeit at some distance on the Front Bench, by the Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk), who is the Minister responsible for the Ministry of Justice victims strategy. He is a former member of the Justice Committee, and we are delighted to see him on the Treasury Bench.

This is an important Bill that deals with a real and pressing social evil. The Lord Chancellor was right to bring it forward as swiftly as he has, and I welcome the tone of his remarks. May I concentrate in particular on the provisions that relate to legal proceedings and court procedures, starting with part 5? The prohibition on cross-examination by litigants in person in family cases is to be welcomed as a very important advance. It is something for which lawyers and the judiciary involved in family cases have been calling for a considerable time, and it is good to see it in the Bill. What I hope Ministers will take away is the detail of how we actually make that work in practice.

The first point that I hope the Government will take on board is that those advocates who are appointed to carry out that often sensitive and difficult cross-examination in often very sensitive and fraught cases must be properly remunerated in order to be prepared for that work. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor will know, one of the first things that we were taught at Bar school was that the key to good cross-examination is preparation. To do that, the lawyers have to be appointed in a timely fashion. They must be paid properly to ensure that they are of adequate experience and seniority to deal with these matters, and they must have time to access the material and be rewarded for doing so.

One issue in the family jurisdiction is that there is not the extent of disclosure that we see in criminal cases and therefore preparatory work may be harder in those cases. Perhaps we need to look therefore at what stage those advocates are appointed to carry out that work. It seems to me that, in order to have the ability to cross-examine properly, it may well be necessary for them to be able to read all of the papers in the case. They probably also need the ability to seek a conference in order to get from the person on whose behalf they are appointed the necessary detail to do justice in the case. That cannot be done on the cheap. I am sure the Government will not want to do that, but it is important that that is not missed out, as both the Bar Council and the Law Society have pointed out. It may also be important, as the professional bodies have pointed out, to consider extending that to instructions to carry out examination-in-chief as well. The example that is given is where an alleged perpetrator of abuse seeks to call a child in the family as a relevant witness to some of the proceedings before the court. It seems to me that the same risks of intimidation would be transferred under those circumstances.

It is also important to consider the nature of the proceedings. It may well be that the allegation of abuse relates to one part of the family proceedings, but the coercive behaviour would have an impact on that perpetrator cross-examining the victim under any part of the proceedings. If someone has a history of coercive control over another, it would be just as difficult for the victim to be cross-examined by them about financial provisions as it would in relation to the actual incidents of assault and abuse, or in relation to custody. I hope that we will be generous in carrying out the legal support that is made available. I hope, too, that we will recognise the need to use the review of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 to look at the re-introduction, as soon as possible, of early legal advice in these matters, so that the necessary issues are flagged up at the earliest opportunity.

I am glad to see that the Lord Chancellor is proposing to bring forward the report of the specialist panel. I hope that he will do that as soon as possible, not least because there has been concern that provision around special measures has never been as consistent or as advanced in the family jurisdiction as it has been in criminal courts. That is not because I think family practitioners and judges do not want it, but because the infrastructure has not been there. I hope that that will give us an opportunity to address that.

I am pleased that the Lord Chancellor is proposing to pilot the domestic abuse protection orders and prevention notices rather than going in immediately. We do need to see how those will integrate—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

I am sorry, Sir Bob, your five minutes are up. Thank you for your contribution. I call Yvette Cooper.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Robert Neill Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading & Report stage: House of Commons
Monday 6th July 2020 Commons Chamber

[Victoria Atkins]

If I have understood the hon. Gentleman correctly, he is not just addressing the use of this so-called defence in our courts but reflecting on the wider impact of pornography, particularly internet pornography, on violence towards women and girls in particular. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) will be raising this in her speech and if I may I will respond to her in that part of the debate, but I very much take on board his point.

The hon. Gentleman will know that part of the problem that has emerged in the last 15 to 20 years is that, whereas in the old days cases were reported freely in the newspapers and so on, such cases are now also reported on the internet. In that regard, I must pay particular tribute to the family of Natalie Connolly, who have suffered in more ways than anyone can really contemplate. I am pleased—and I hope they are satisfied—with the developments that have resulted from the hard work of the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham and my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest. I hope that Natalie’s family are satisfied with what we have reached in this Bill.

We have been clear that there is no such defence to serious harm that results from rough sex, but there is a perception that such a defence exists and that it is being used by men—it is mostly men in these types of cases—to avoid convictions for serious offences or to receive a reduction in any sentence when they are convicted. As my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor indicated on Second Reading, this area of law is extremely complex. It is therefore important that anything that is placed in the Bill does not have unintended consequences. In acting with the best of intentions, we do not want to inadvertently create loopholes or uncertainties in the law that can then be exploited by those who perpetrate such crimes.

If I may, I would just like to take a moment to thank my friend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk). As the co-Minister on the Bill, he has brought all his legal expertise to the consideration of how we can address the mischief and the upset, which we all want to address, in a way that does not have unintended consequences.

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

May I join the Minister in doing that? This issue has bedevilled criminal law cases going back to the 1920s and 1930s. The attempt in the past has been to fit appropriate legal protections within the framework of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. It is particularly to be welcomed that we have now moved away from that rather antiquated straitjacket and have something that is fit for purpose. The work the Government and my hon. Friends have done is immeasurably important to legal practitioners, as well as to victims.

[Victoria Atkins]

I am happy to take that intervention and I thank my hon. Friend, the Chair of the Justice Committee, for his support.

In new clauses 4 and 5, the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham and my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest have, broadly, sought to codify the principles set out in current case law in this area, namely that which resulted from the case R v. Brown. That case involved a group of men who participated in sadomasochistic activities. We have taken up the challenge set by the right hon. Lady and my hon. Friend and, working closely with them, have tabled new clause 20 to achieve just that. More specifically, the new clause aims to make it clear that consent to serious harm for sexual gratification is not a defence in law. The new clause codifies, and therefore restates, the general proposition of law expressed in the case of R v. Brown, which is that a person may not consent to the infliction of serious harm and, by extension, their own death. Those interested in such matters will note that we have been careful to preserve the position in relation to sexually transmitted infections, but we have done so in a way very much in keeping with current case law. I hope that the House has been reassured that new clause 20 achieves the objective of providing the confirmation and clarification of the law requested.

I am very conscious that many Back Benchers wish to speak—sadly, many have put in to speak but will not be called due to the level of interest in this important piece of proposed legislation—but, if I may, I will take a little time to address an issue that I know is of great importance not just to those of us in this place, but to those who work in the world of tackling domestic abuse and, of course, to the victims themselves. That is the issue of migrant women, in particular migrant women who have no recourse to public funds. If I may, I will deal with new clauses 22, 25 and 26 in this part of my speech.

I hope hon. Members received a “Dear colleague” letter this morning from me and the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, explaining our position. We are absolutely committed to doing what we can to support all migrant victims of domestic abuse as victims first and foremost. In 2012, we introduced the destitution domestic violence concession—the DDVC—to support migrant victims of domestic abuse who are living in this country on the basis of certain partner visas. Such people have come to the UK with the intention of living here permanently with the reasonable expectation of obtaining indefinite leave to remain. The DDVC is not available to people who enter the country on other visas, such as visitor, student or work visas, or, indeed, to anyone who is here illegally. This is because in order to obtain such visas they will have confirmed that they are financially independent and therefore require no recourse to public funds, and their stay will be for a defined period of time. They do not, therefore, have a legitimate expectation of securing indefinite leave to remain. Simply extending the DDVC to all migrant victims is therefore not the way to address the needs of migrant victims who currently cannot claim under that scheme. We need to find a way of ensuring that they have adequate support, rather than provide a pathway to indefinite leave to remain or a blanket lifting of the no recourse to public funds condition.

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Nokes]

I thank my hon. Friend for that commitment and look forward to the consultation coming forward. It is important that we have the opportunity to look further at how these emergency regulations have worked during the period of covid and that we understand how they can assist women. I am sure that my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor will say something about this in his closing comments. I do not know whether the appropriate place is via new legislation or via the consultation that my hon. Friend referred to, but there is clearly a real need for debate and for this House to be able to express its view and understand the issue thoroughly.

The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) spoke with her usual forcefulness, and she will know that I have found common ground with much of what she said. I welcome her support for the broad direction of the Bill. I also welcome her comments about the need for us to find a mechanism to support migrant women who are the victims of domestic abuse. I have said this previously in the Chamber and I have no doubt that I will say it again. I vividly recall sitting around a table with my hon. Friend the Minister; my hon. Friend the Member for Charnwood (Edward Argar), who was then in the Ministry of Justice; the noble Baroness Williams, who I think was the Victims Minister; Southall Black Sisters and other charities; and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, who I always regard as an expert on these matters. There was consensus around the room that we have to find a way to treat the migrant victims of domestic abuse as victims first. I am sure that there are differences of opinion—as there were in the room that day—as to how we best do that. I very much hope that the pilot projects of which my hon. Friend the Minister has spoken will be able to provide us with the data that we need so that we can find a long-term, enduring solution to help, and help effectively, victims of domestic abuse who are here perhaps with no legal public funds or with insecure immigration status that means they are dependent on their partner for their right to be in the UK.

Whether it is the much-needed changes that are to be introduced in respect of the family courts—I welcome new clauses 16, 17 and 18—or other measures, it is crucial that we find a way to make our court system support the victims of domestic abuse. We must find a mechanism whereby it supports the children who might otherwise be obliged to come into contact with perpetrators. I welcome the fact that we are moving to a position wherein the legal process will no longer be able to perpetuate abuse.

My hon. Friend the Minister has worked hard on the Bill, and I welcome the changes that have been introduced. I commend her for having made such enormous progress. It has been a difficult journey for a Bill much delayed. We are not there yet, but I sincerely hope that our noble Friends in the other place do not delay the process much further. I commend my hon. Friend her for her very hard work.

[Sir Robert Neill]

This is a very important Bill and I warmly welcome it. It deals with a number of what have hitherto been quite intractable legal and social issues. It is to the Government’s great credit, and to the credit of Members from all parties, that we have managed to find a practical way forward to resolve a number of those otherwise intractable issues.

Like my right hon. Friend the Member for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes), I particularly welcome the measures to bring procedures in the family courts into line with the protections that have existed for a long time in the criminal courts. That deficiency is a problem that has been recognised for a long time by practitioners and many of the judiciary in the family courts, so we are right that to plug that gap.

I hope the Minister will indicate that we will have regulations to set out the specified offences in relation to new clause 17 as soon as possible, so that there is clarity on that.

On new clause 18, proposed new section 85H is a particularly important provision. It specifies in subsection (7) that the qualified legal representative appointed by the court to carry out the cross-examination

“is not responsible to the party.”

That is necessary and deals with the difficult situation wherein the abusive party seeking to make the cross-examination raises issues that in the interests of justice need to be tested by the cross-examination of the alleged victim or victim, but that rightly should not be done by the abuser because they will continue the abuse. The court therefore appoints the advocate, and it is important that we stress that that advocate is, in effect, acting as amicus curiae—they are acting to assist the court—and has no responsibility to the abusive party.

I hope, too, that we will make it clear that the regulations that provide for the remuneration of those advocates are interpreted generously, because those who assist the court in such a way will be undertaking a particularly onerous and difficult task. They may well often be hampered by the hostility of the abusive party while acting in the interests of the justice whose case they have to test by cross-examination the case of the victim. That is a difficult position that we are, out of social necessity, putting that advocate in, and they deserve to be properly recompensed for the time that I suspect is likely to be required to do that job properly. Subject to those caveats, the provisions are very welcome.

The abolition of the consent defence in new clause 4 is particularly welcome. There is no doubt that the matter was settled in large measure by the case of Brown and the decision of the House of Lords—the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords, as it then was—but the law had been very difficult going back to the case of Donovan in 1934, which stood during the early days of my practice at the Bar. Even on the Brown decision there was dissent within the House of Lords. A number of judgments in the Brown case suggested that because of the awkward interaction of social policy and the attempt to fit the regime with that in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which hardly works for the type of pornographic videos and so on that we see nowadays and that propagated some of this behaviour, if it were to be changed further it needed the intervention of Parliament, not least because it also engaged issues such as the right to privacy under the European convention on human rights. It is right that we act in the way that we do to give legislative clarity, rather than placing the courts in the difficulty of interpreting such policy areas.

I will turn, if I may, to the point about acquired brain injury that the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) made. I am not sure that legislation is the way forward, but I know that the Justice Committee, in a number of our considerations, noted the fact that it is only in recent years that the extent of pre-acquired brain injury and the impact that it can have within the justice system—criminal, civil and family—has begun to be recognised. Further work and research in this field will be a very welcome thing in any event.

I listened with great care to the shadow Minister’s case for new clause 24 and the proceedings under the Children Act. I am very sympathetic, but my only qualm is in relation to section 11 of the Children and Families Act 2014, which set up the presumption of parental involvement and was regarded as progressive in its time. We do know, and she is absolutely right, that there have been the most egregious and terrible cases of abuse of that presumption, but if we are to change it, are we right to move from a presumption to an outright prohibition in a certain classification of case—where the issue of abuse arises, I accept that—or are we better to go to something like a rebuttable presumption against access in such supervision cases? That is the area in which we need to have a proper debate. That is why I welcome the panel’s recommendation of further consideration of how we get to where I think we all want to be, with the best, most legally watertight and most effective measure.

In relation to new clause 28, with every great respect to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson), I rather agree with the formulation of my right hon. Friend the Member for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes). The only other issue that I would raise from my experience as a criminal practitioner is that, on more than one occasion, I found instances where part of the abuse had been to force the victim to have an abortion. The irony is that reliance on a telephone call to procure the means of doing that does not give the safeguard of knowing who is standing next to the victim when she makes the telephone call. I have certainly seen instances of that in practice, as other criminal practitioners will have done. Although the intentions are good and well meant, I have a concern about moving down the route set out in new clause 28.

All in all, however, this is a good Bill. There are good, constructive amendments that I hope we will forward today. I, too, express the hope that the other place will pass the Bill swiftly, because it is a major piece of reform that has been embarked on here and, for once, the way that the House has worked together on this should bring credit to our system and our consensual approach, for which we should all be very grateful.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Robert Neill]

Those were two very powerful speeches, which is right because this is a really important Bill. It is a major aspect of reform of family private law. The Lord Chancellor is entitled to great credit for what he has done. It is the second time in almost a fortnight that he has brought in major reforms and we should remember that. We have reformed divorce law and now how we deal with private family law.

I welcome the comments by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) from the Opposition Front Bench, because this is something we ought to deal with together. It is a difficult and complex area. As Chairman of the Justice Committee, I can say that we have wrestled with some of those issues from time to time. As a practitioner, as a constituency MP and as a human being, I have seen the consequences of some of the deficiencies in the law as it currently stands. This is a major reform and we should welcome it. There is more to do, I have no doubt, but it is a good step forward. In particular, the changes to the procedures in the family court, which have taken some time to get through, are really important. I hope we will now see that properly resourced. I hope also that we will follow that through in some of the understanding that is required, for example, with regards to acquired brain injury—a point made by the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) in a previous debate—and some of the pressures that are put on people through coercive control, which this Government have recognised and taken on board beyond most others. We need ensure that we keep practice in line with the letter of the law.

I am particularly pleased that the Bill has dealt with the issue of non-fatal strangulation. As a legal practitioner, it always struck me that this was a real difficulty—when one could not prove the necessary intent under section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The irony was that if somebody died, we could prove manslaughter, but sadly we could not prove anything less. That is another gap that the Bills fills.

An awful lot of really important points have been covered by the Bill, but I suspect that the overall thrust is that we are determined to improve the situation of victims in the criminal courts and the family courts. Ironically, crime got in front of the family division in many ways, when it came to the protection of witnesses and the special care that should be given to people. Judges and practitioners have repeatedly sought this and it has been delivered. I hope that we can now move forward towards better reform of private family law generally. But may I just make a final prod to the Lord Chancellor in a nice way, and say that that requires resource? It requires resource for the judges, the ability for people to sit the requisite hours, and resource for those who undertake a number of onerous duties referred to in the Bill on behalf of the public to be properly recompensed. I suspect that he will do that.

We ought to welcome this legislation, and, above all, welcome the fact that we are moving away from what was rather a blame culture in the way in which we dealt with family law, and towards something that is much more constructive. Maybe we should move forward in such a way in a number of other matters too.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Robert Neill Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Thursday 15th April 2021 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

We now go to the Chairman of the Select Committee on Justice, Sir Robert Neill.

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con) [V]]

It is a pleasure to speak in this important debate because this is a very important Bill, it is a good Bill and it significantly improves the law in a number of respects. A number of the amendments made in the other place improve the Bill, too.

I am particularly pleased to see the creation of the offence of non-fatal strangulation. As right hon. and hon. Members will know, I practised in the criminal courts for some 25 years before coming into this place. There was a gap in the law here. Evidentially it was often very difficult to fit that course of conduct into the existing offence under section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 to reflect the gravity of it—the lower offence under section 20 often would not give adequate sentencing powers. Equally it was often difficult to demonstrate that the elements of attempted murder were made out—often it would not be possible to prove that was the case—in the light of what had happened. So the creation of a specific offence to deal with a type of behaviour that is particularly pernicious in abusive relationships—I certainly came across it in my career, as I am sure have many others in this House—is particularly valuable and welcome. I know it is welcomed by practitioners and by judges in these cases, because it now gives us a means of capturing the whole of the conduct that can happen in these types of relationship. So that is very welcome.

I welcome, too, what the Minister said about revenge porn. The Law Commission’s work is very valuable in this field, but the Government’s commitment to moving swiftly on this is important too, because it is critical that offences are kept up to date with the changing technologies and use of social media in society. So these are very good aspects of the Bill, in addition to the others that have already been mentioned.

I want to talk briefly about three Lords amendments that the Government are right to resist, although I understand and support, as will most Members, the sentiments behind them. The first is Lords amendment 33, which relates to judicial training. The Minister’s comments on this are right. It is absolutely right that there must be training. A great deal is being done now to improve awareness by judges and sentencers—both judges and magistrates, because we must remember many of these cases will be tried by lay magistrates as well as by professional judges. It is absolutely right that there is up-to-date and comprehensive training in this regard. The Judicial College has done a great deal of work now. As Baroness Butler-Sloss—a former president of the family division and one of the most experienced family judges we have in this country, although she is now retired—pointed out, that has been incorporated specifically both into the initial training and the refresher training that is required for judges and magistrates. The Justice Committee in previous reports in relation to the role of the magistracy has urged that there be a more comprehensive training programme. It is important that the Minister ensures that the Ministry of Justice makes the funding available for those training programmes, whether residential or day courses, to be systematically and comprehensively delivered across the country, and that all magistrates and judges have access to them in a timely fashion.

However, I do not think we need primary legislation to do that. We certainly should have a practical strategy, but I do not think it is right that that should lie in the hands of the Secretary of State. If I can draw an analogy, later in the proceedings, there is a Government amendment in lieu setting out a strategy for the prosecution of offenders. I think that is properly a strategy that can be owned by Ministers because it relates to what is done by the Executive arms of state such as the prosecution. That is different from what is done by the judicial arm of the state. It does not seem constitutionally proper, despite the good intentions behind the amendment, to enable any Secretary of State to have power to dictate to the independent judiciary how they should set about their training programmes and what they should contain. That is a discrete but significant flaw in the amendment, which is why the House would be right to resist it. The objective can be achieved but without trespassing over the constitutional division between Executive, legislature and judiciary that unfortunately is the inevitable and logical consequence of the amendment. It puts the power in a Minister’s hands when in fact there is a clear willingness by the judiciary to seize the nettle themselves on this. We shall make sure that they have the resources to enable them to seize that nettle, but we should not be dictating to them as to how they do it. That is why the Government are right to resist the amendment.

Lords amendments 37 and 38 relate to reasonable force as a defence and a further statutory offence in domestic abuse cases. Again, the intention is entirely laudable but, certainly in my experience, it is not necessary to put this into primary legislation. For example, the circumstances that are set out in the two amendments and in the lengthy schedule—I think that is Lords amendment 83, which is attached to one of those— relate to offences where it is already possible under existing criminal law for a defendant to raise the full defence of self-defence, which once raised must then be rebutted by the prosecution, or a partial defence—for example, an offence of duress, which can, under certain circumstances, either be a complete defence to an offence or reduce murder down to manslaughter. Those are already available.

Since the decision in the Challen case—a case that came too late in terms of justice to the individual concerned but which has now set the law on a much better and more up-to-date footing—there is a recognition that the course of conduct of coercive control can be regarded as a factor that raises the defence of duress in the appropriate case. Therefore, the means of a victim of domestic abuse to bring that before the court is already available and it does not seem necessary to add these clauses to the Bill. It might actually have the effect of limiting, unintentionally, the scope of conduct that can be captured and used by a defendant to assert that they were acting in self-defence.

The law of self-defence has changed. In fact, I was involved in one of the leading cases in the Court of Appeal, which rightly—albeit I was on the prosecution side—said that the law prior to the case of Bird back in the 1990s was too restrictive in what could be pleaded as self-defence. That is particularly important to a woman, and the defendant in that case was a female. The person she had assaulted in self-defence was, as it turned out, a man. That imbalance was not properly reflected in the law up until the Bird case, but it then was, and therefore the existing common law is on a much sounder footing to deal with this. Therefore, it is not necessary to go down the route set out in Lords amendment 38.

The defence of duress is, as I say, already available. Evidence that shows that the defendant had been a victim of domestic abuse is of itself already relevant and admissible to set up the defence of duress, in the same way as it is relevant and admissible where a defence of self-defence is pleaded. So we are in danger of over-engineering a solution that is already there and where the courts have shown themselves willing to reflect changes in social conditions and the pressures that exist.

Let me end my observations by stating that the attitude of the courts in relation to domestic abuse offences, and to sexual offences more generally as well, is sometimes criticised—sometimes rightly—but I have noticed that the judiciary’s approach has changed vastly over the years I have been involved in criminal law. There is now a much greater understanding of the power imbalance that often exists in relationships and that, very frequently, women are in the more vulnerable position. In both the investigation of offences and their handling in court, far greater sensitivity is now shown to victims and complainants in such cases, and absolutely rightly so.

It seems to me that the law is able to deal with these matters without the need for further primary legislation. The sentiments behind the three Lords amendments I have spoken about are entirely laudable, but they can be picked up and captured elsewhere. For those reasons, it is proper for the Government to resist them.