Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting)

Sarah Sackman Excerpts

Tuesday 21st April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 29—Review of impact of provisions of section 3—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament a report containing a review of the impact of the provisions of section 3 during each relevant period.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the relevant periods are—

(a) before the end of 12 months, and

(b) no sooner than 35 months but no later than 36 months

beginning on the day on which section 3 of this Act is commenced.

(3) Reviews under this section must consider the impact of the provisions of sections 74A to 74D of the Senior Courts Act 1981, as inserted by Section 3 of this Act, on persons who—

(a) are from any ethnic minority background;

(b) are White British and live in lower income households.”

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to review, after one year and three years, the impact of the provisions of section 3 on people who are from ethnic minority backgrounds, and on White people from lower-income households.

[The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair once again, Ms Jardine.

As Members will have heard me say on countless occasions, the pressures on our criminal courts are unprecedented. I do not intend to rehearse arguments that have been made many times in the House. There is a broad consensus that urgent action is required, and it is in that context that I turn to clause 3, which provides for trial by judge alone in cases likely to attract a custodial sentence of three years or less.

Clause 3 introduces a new judge-only division of the Crown court—the so-called bench division—to hear less serious cases without a jury. This does not create a separate jurisdiction; one’s case will still be heard in the Crown court if assigned to the bench division. The same appeal route that is currently available from the Crown court will still be available. The clause operates to provide that certain either-way cases defined by the seriousness threshold in the legislation will be tried by a judge sitting alone in a Crown court.

The evidence we heard in Committee is that sitting with judge alone saves time. A former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Burnett of Maldon, told us he was convinced that

“the time saving will be enormous if the relatively low-level cases are tried by a new constitution.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 76, Q161.]

Similarly, Doug Downey, Attorney General of Ontario, said in evidence to us that there is “no question” but that judge-alone cases are “faster”, and that that is borne out by the data there.

Let me be clear, as I have tried to be clear a number of times: jury trials will remain in place for the most serious crimes. Indictable-only offences such as murder, rape, armed robbery, grievous bodily harm with intent and arson endangering life will never be heard without a jury. But it remains the case that while jury trials are not at fault for the delays, although jury trials only account for 3% of all criminal trial cases they take up approximately 60% of Crown court hearing time, and the independent review’s findings show that jury trials take twice as long now as they did in 2000.

As Sir Brian Leveson told the Committee, trials have become longer and more complex for many reasons, due to the high volume of digital evidence now central to many prosecutions, and the consequence is clear that the delays are rising, and victims and defendants alike are waiting longer for justice. The independent review of the criminal courts estimates that judge-only trials can reduce hearing time by at least 20% and save Crown court time—a figure that Sir Brian himself describes in his review as “conservative”—and those savings will generate more capacity for jury trials where they are most needed.

Critics have said that this measure would produce no time saving at all, but the Committee heard from respected members of the judiciary that that is not the case, and that judge-only trials would save time in practical and important ways, by encouraging more realistic guilty pleas, by avoiding the delays inherent in empanelling and managing a jury, by allowing evidence to begin earlier in the day, and by reducing the disruption caused by juror absence or delay.

As I have set out, the application of these changes would apply to cases in the existing backlog where a trial has not already commenced. It is because we must tackle the mounting caseload in the Crown court as soon as we can that we are implementing the measures in this way. The clause allows cases in the current open Crown court caseload where a trial has not yet begun to be considered under the new allocation test. Trials should take place in accordance with the law as it stands, and applying the new regime to cases in the open caseload will help us begin to reduce delay from the outset. This is a practical step to ensure that the courts can make the best use of available capacity.

The clause also provides safeguards in the form of reallocation provisions, as we have debated. Cases can, and sometimes do, evolve as they progress through the courts, and the clause makes clear provision for cases to be reallocated to a jury trial where the seriousness increases, even after a judge-only trial has begun. The intention of the clause is not to remove jury trials for the most serious cases in our justice system, and where an indictable-only offence is added to a bench division case, it will always be reallocated to a jury trial.

The Government have been clear: we have made the investment in courts that people have been calling for, by uncapping sitting days as well as investment in our workforce through legal aid, but investment alone is not enough. The pressures on the system require structural reform, because it was not designed to withstand the challenges of both the present backlog and the profile of modern criminal trials. We are seeing a growing number of remand cases entering the system, and those cases must be prioritised for hearing in order to meet statutory custody time limits. That in turn pushes other serious cases where the defendant is on bail, including rape and serious sexual offences, further down the list.

The consequences of those delays are not abstract. Longer waits mean longer periods in which the accused may remain on bail, which places greater pressure on policing and monitoring, while victims and complainants endure prolonged uncertainty and distress. Persistent delay, as we have learned, also distorts behaviour across the system, encouraging defendants to postpone guilty pleas in the hope that witnesses, and sometimes victims, will lose confidence as cases drift further into the future. That cannot be right. That is not justice, and it is not sustainable.

The failings of our system were laid bare, not just by the independent review but by the Committee, when we heard most powerfully from victims of crime themselves. We need a more modern model of criminal justice that serves those affected by these failings, and clause 3 is an important part of delivering that change.

I would like to hear from my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington, and hear the debate in Committee, before I set out the Government’s position on new clause 29. It may be convenient, therefore, Ms Jardine, to hear from my hon. Friend at this juncture.

[The Chair]

I will first call Dr Kieran Mullan.