(1 day, 6 hours ago)
Public Bill Committees
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I remind Members please to switch electronic devices to silent, and that tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings.
Clause 3
Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation
Amendment proposed: 12, in clause 3, page 9, line 28, leave out subsections (2) to (4).—(Jess Brown-Fuller.)
This amendment would prevent the provisions on trial on indictment without a jury applying retrospectively to cases where the defendant has elected trial by jury before these provisions become law.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 29—Review of impact of provisions of section 3—
“(1) The Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament a report containing a review of the impact of the provisions of section 3 during each relevant period.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the relevant periods are—
(a) before the end of 12 months, and
(b) no sooner than 35 months but no later than 36 months
beginning on the day on which section 3 of this Act is commenced.
(3) Reviews under this section must consider the impact of the provisions of sections 74A to 74D of the Senior Courts Act 1981, as inserted by Section 3 of this Act, on persons who—
(a) are from any ethnic minority background;
(b) are White British and live in lower income households.”
This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to review, after one year and three years, the impact of the provisions of section 3 on people who are from ethnic minority backgrounds, and on White people from lower-income households.
The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair once again, Ms Jardine.
As Members will have heard me say on countless occasions, the pressures on our criminal courts are unprecedented. I do not intend to rehearse arguments that have been made many times in the House. There is a broad consensus that urgent action is required, and it is in that context that I turn to clause 3, which provides for trial by judge alone in cases likely to attract a custodial sentence of three years or less.
Clause 3 introduces a new judge-only division of the Crown court—the so-called bench division—to hear less serious cases without a jury. This does not create a separate jurisdiction; one’s case will still be heard in the Crown court if assigned to the bench division. The same appeal route that is currently available from the Crown court will still be available. The clause operates to provide that certain either-way cases defined by the seriousness threshold in the legislation will be tried by a judge sitting alone in a Crown court.
The evidence we heard in Committee is that sitting with judge alone saves time. A former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Burnett of Maldon, told us he was convinced that
“the time saving will be enormous if the relatively low-level cases are tried by a new constitution.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 76, Q161.]
Similarly, Doug Downey, Attorney General of Ontario, said in evidence to us that there is “no question” but that judge-alone cases are “faster”, and that that is borne out by the data there.
Let me be clear, as I have tried to be clear a number of times: jury trials will remain in place for the most serious crimes. Indictable-only offences such as murder, rape, armed robbery, grievous bodily harm with intent and arson endangering life will never be heard without a jury. But it remains the case that while jury trials are not at fault for the delays, although jury trials only account for 3% of all criminal trial cases they take up approximately 60% of Crown court hearing time, and the independent review’s findings show that jury trials take twice as long now as they did in 2000.
As Sir Brian Leveson told the Committee, trials have become longer and more complex for many reasons, due to the high volume of digital evidence now central to many prosecutions, and the consequence is clear that the delays are rising, and victims and defendants alike are waiting longer for justice. The independent review of the criminal courts estimates that judge-only trials can reduce hearing time by at least 20% and save Crown court time—a figure that Sir Brian himself describes in his review as “conservative”—and those savings will generate more capacity for jury trials where they are most needed.
Critics have said that this measure would produce no time saving at all, but the Committee heard from respected members of the judiciary that that is not the case, and that judge-only trials would save time in practical and important ways, by encouraging more realistic guilty pleas, by avoiding the delays inherent in empanelling and managing a jury, by allowing evidence to begin earlier in the day, and by reducing the disruption caused by juror absence or delay.
As I have set out, the application of these changes would apply to cases in the existing backlog where a trial has not already commenced. It is because we must tackle the mounting caseload in the Crown court as soon as we can that we are implementing the measures in this way. The clause allows cases in the current open Crown court caseload where a trial has not yet begun to be considered under the new allocation test. Trials should take place in accordance with the law as it stands, and applying the new regime to cases in the open caseload will help us begin to reduce delay from the outset. This is a practical step to ensure that the courts can make the best use of available capacity.
The clause also provides safeguards in the form of reallocation provisions, as we have debated. Cases can, and sometimes do, evolve as they progress through the courts, and the clause makes clear provision for cases to be reallocated to a jury trial where the seriousness increases, even after a judge-only trial has begun. The intention of the clause is not to remove jury trials for the most serious cases in our justice system, and where an indictable-only offence is added to a bench division case, it will always be reallocated to a jury trial.
The Government have been clear: we have made the investment in courts that people have been calling for, by uncapping sitting days as well as investment in our workforce through legal aid, but investment alone is not enough. The pressures on the system require structural reform, because it was not designed to withstand the challenges of both the present backlog and the profile of modern criminal trials. We are seeing a growing number of remand cases entering the system, and those cases must be prioritised for hearing in order to meet statutory custody time limits. That in turn pushes other serious cases where the defendant is on bail, including rape and serious sexual offences, further down the list.
The consequences of those delays are not abstract. Longer waits mean longer periods in which the accused may remain on bail, which places greater pressure on policing and monitoring, while victims and complainants endure prolonged uncertainty and distress. Persistent delay, as we have learned, also distorts behaviour across the system, encouraging defendants to postpone guilty pleas in the hope that witnesses, and sometimes victims, will lose confidence as cases drift further into the future. That cannot be right. That is not justice, and it is not sustainable.
The failings of our system were laid bare, not just by the independent review but by the Committee, when we heard most powerfully from victims of crime themselves. We need a more modern model of criminal justice that serves those affected by these failings, and clause 3 is an important part of delivering that change.
I would like to hear from my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington, and hear the debate in Committee, before I set out the Government’s position on new clause 29. It may be convenient, therefore, Ms Jardine, to hear from my hon. Friend at this juncture.
I am sure we will get to hear from the hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington shortly.
The proposal in clause 3 is being framed as a mere administrative adjustment—a common-sense fix for a system under strain. The Government’s plan to introduce a Crown court bench division, where a judge sits alone without magistrates to decide the fate of those accused of either-way offences, is being sold to the public as a remedy for the backlogs that currently paralyse our courts. But we must be clear from the outset that the crisis in our courts is not the result of the jury system. The backlog, which sees tens of thousands of cases waiting for a hearing, is the result of long-term challenges and the unprecedented impact of covid on our justice system.
Eroding a defendant’s right to a trial by their peers is not a fix; it is a fundamental reconfiguration of the English legal system. Across the Bill, we see a pattern emerging: a shift away from what we are clear is the gold standard of justice towards a swift model. The evidence supporting it is dangerously thin, and we must resist the permanent eroding of a right that has stood for hundreds and hundreds of years.
The right to a jury trial is often described as fundamental. It is not merely a traditional quirk of our system; it is an important constitutional safeguard. The core of the Government’s plan, as outlined in their impact assessment and the Second Reading briefings, is to remove the right to elect. Currently, if someone is charged with an either-way offence—crimes like theft, assault or certain drug offences—they have a right to choose whether they are tried by a jury in the Crown court or by magistrates. The Government’s plan to strip away that choice in clause 3, under a new bench division model for when the sentence outcome is likely to be three years or less, will remove even the role of lay magistrates from the decision.
The briefing provided by the organisation JUSTICE, which I have referred to several times, makes a compelling case against that. JUSTICE points out that the right to elect is a long-standing protection that ensures that a defendant can seek the judgment of a diverse group of citizens when they feel the state’s power is being unfairly applied. By removing that right, we are effectively saying that the state knows better than the citizen how they should be judged. This is not unheard of, as we have talked about before, but clause 3, combined with previous clauses, represents it being done at a scale never seen before.
This is a dangerous path. When we move cases from juries to a bench division, we are moving from a system of community participation to a system of professionalised adjudication. The jury is the part of our constitution where the greatest number of ordinary citizens have a direct, hands-on role in the administration of justice. It is the primary way that the public grant their consent to the upholding of criminal law. If we remove the public from the process, we risk the law becoming something done to people, rather than something that belongs to them.
The Government’s narrative suggests that a judge-led bench division will be just as fair as a jury, only faster. But it ignores the fundamental and unique aspect of fairness delivered by a jury trial, which they acknowledge by continuing to maintain jury trials for what they describe as the “more serious” offences. A jury is, by definition, balanced. It consists of 12 people from different backgrounds, with different life experiences and different biases, in the crucible of the jury room. Their diversity is its greatest strength; a single judge, no matter how well intentioned, cannot possibly replicate that breadth of perspective.
There is also the phenomenon of being case-hardened: when a professional judge or magistrate hears 50 similar cases of theft or assault in a year, there is a natural human tendency to begin seeing patterns rather than individuals. Evidence that might seem fresh or potentially exonerating to a jury can seem like the usual excuse to a professional who has heard it hundreds of times before.
Juries bring fresh eyes; they are not jaded by the grind of the system. They are instructed to look only at the facts of the case before them. That is why juries are considered—by the Opposition, at least—to be the gold standard. The evidence submitted to the Committee warns that we lack clarity as to why the Government are so eager to discard this standard. If the jury is the best way to ensure an accurate and fair verdict, the burden of proof for removing it must be exceptionally high.
Furthermore, the bench division model threatens to undermine the lay element of our justice system. Originally, as recommended in the Leveson review, the idea was that a judge would sit with two magistrates. That was intended to maintain at least some form of community involvement. However, clause 3 moves towards judge-only trials for many cases, discarding even the judge-plus-two compromise.
I will now address the primary argument made by the Minister in her opening remarks. The Government claim that moving to the bench division will significantly reduce the backlog. However, the Institute for Government has produced an insightful analysis, which we have referred to frequently, suggesting that the evidence for those savings is incredibly weak.
The IFG points out that the vast majority of Crown court time is not actually spent on the types of trials that the Government want to move to the bench division. The cases being targeted are the less serious ones, which already take up less time than more complex cases such as murder, which will remain subject to jury trial. According to the IFG’s modelling, if judge-only trials are 20% faster than a jury trial, the total impact on the overall Crown court backlog would be a reduction of 2%. When we consider the constitutional cost of us losing, at this unprecedented scale, the right to access a jury, that is simply not sufficient.
The backlog is not caused by juries being slow; it is more often caused by ineffective trials that are postponed because witnesses do not show up, because solicitors or barristers are unavailable, or because courtrooms are not fit to operate in. These are systemic failures, and moving a trial from a jury to a judge does not make a witness appear or fix a broken courtroom.
The Bill proposes a threshold of cases likely to attract a sentence of up to three years being diverted to the bench division. Predicting a sentence before a trial is never an exact science, and that is something that magistrates actually have more experience of than judges. That unprecedented scenario—without the safeguards that we sought to add through a right of appeal, which the Government rejected—will create huge questions of impartiality and bias.
A three-year sentence is not a minor matter. Three years in prison is a life-altering event. It can mean the loss of a home, a career and a family. To suggest that a person facing such a consequence does not deserve what they consider to be the fairest possible trial betrays that principle of fairness in our justice system when the consequences are so severe.
There is also the issue of the absence of a sunset clause. If these measures are truly a temporary response to tackle an emergency backlog, they should include a sunset clause that ensures that rights are restored once the crisis has passed. As I have said previously, changes were made during world war two and then reversed when the war was over. The fact that the Government have resisted such a clause suggests that this is not a temporary fix, but a permanent land grab by the state. Once the right to a jury is surrendered for either-way offences, it is highly unlikely that any future Government will be in a position to restore it.
We must see the Crown court bench division for what it is: a policy of convenience, not a policy delivering justice. It is a policy that ignores the findings of the IFG, which would require us to focus more heavily on other elements of the system. It is a policy that ignores the warnings from JUSTICE, which highlight the erosion of the defendant’s right to elect and its impact on public confidence and fairness in the judicial system. It is a policy that even ignores the original, more balanced recommendations of the Leveson review, which at least sought to keep lay magistrates involved.
We are told that we must modernise and that we must be efficient. The purpose of a criminal trial is not to process cases as quickly as possible; it is to arrive at the truth through a process that the defendant, the victim and the public have trust in. If we allow the Government to erode the jury system in the name of the backlog on this occasion to this extent, we are sending a message that this constitutional right is highly conditional, and that it can be traded away whenever the state finds it too expensive or too cumbersome to maintain. As the Minister frequently points out, lots of countries do without it; “Why shouldn’t we?” will be the next argument.
Instead of stripping away rights, the Government should be more focused on the areas that we can all agree on: prisoner transport, early legal advice, more efficient listing, Crown Prosecution Service reviews of cases in the backlog, facilities that work and IT that works. We do not fix a house by tearing it down to its foundations because the roof is leaking; we fix the roof. Jury trials ensure that our laws remain grounded in the common sense of ordinary people. Let us apply some of that common sense to tackling this issue. Common sense will lead us to oppose clause 3.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
Clause 3 and its various parts outline how trials can take place without juries. The Liberal Democrats have always fundamentally opposed the move to remove the right to a trial in front of one’s peers and the introduction of single-judge trials. To be clear, we do not accept the status quo and neither does anyone who I have spoken to in the legal profession or courts. The backlogs are totally unacceptable and they are failing victims, defendants and the people working in the criminal justice system. But no one in that system thinks that the fault lies with the jury trial system. In fact, Sir Brian stated that in our recent evidence session.
The decision is being made without any decisive modelling that would demonstrate that it would have the intended effect. There is also a timing issue with the proposal to restrict the use of a jury. Nationally, we have seen an intense displeasure with our democracy, and faith in politics and our political system is at an all-time low. It is fractured and deeply distrustful. When we have mistrust in our political system, it seeps into our justice system. Around six in 10 people express a fair amount or a great deal of confidence in juries delivering the right verdict compared with around four in 10 for courts and judges more generally.
Clause 3 proposes something that will risk a great deal without the evidence that shows it will actually work. That is why it is so strongly opposed. The Government instead should be implementing evidence-based reforms to target inefficiencies, including but not limited to negotiating the failed prisoner escort contract, introducing victim-led intensive case management across the regions, and investing in rehabilitation to reduce reoffending. They could also explore reducing the court backlog by running two trials in a day in select courtrooms instead of one, making more efficient use of time by nearly doubling the hearing time per sitting day and accelerating the throughput of cases. They could also develop and implement a more ambitious strategy to reduce delays in rape and serious sexual offences cases, or implement their own manifesto pledge to introduce speciality RASSO courts, which we will no doubt debate at a later stage of the Bill.
I am confident that the Minister will say, as she did in the evidence session, “Why is the backlog not coming down if we can make the system work better?” She put that question to Caroline Goodwin KC, Claire Davies KC and Samantha Hillas KC, saying,
“I have not seen any evidence that it can be reduced absent reform from the circuits.”
Caroline Goodwin came back with:
“The reality is that we have not been able to do this. Because there has been a consistent cap on sitting days, judges have not been able to open up court days. They have not been able to run blitz days where they can really take hold of a case and shake it and say, ‘Right, what is going on?’ We have not had any great directives to the CPS to say, ‘When you’re charging these cases, you need to review these very thoroughly.’ Throughout this entire time, the criminal Bar and the entire justice system has been brought to its knees. So if you are saying, ‘Is there any empirical evidence that this doesn’t work on your circuit, Ms Goodwin?’, we have not been able to do it.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 48, Q94.]
Why do we believe that we need to protect the safeguard of a jury trial while still reforming the criminal courts in other ways? The Lammy review in 2017 found that black and Chinese women were convicted at higher rates than white women in magistrate courts but not by juries. The Criminal Bar Association commissioned an independent study of criminal barristers; of the 2,029 who responded, 94% raised concerns about the lack of diversity in the Crown court bench division and 88% were against the introduction of a Crown court bench division altogether.
If we take the figures in the impact assessment that the Government have provided at face value, the proposal will save 5,000 sitting days per annum. That is around 3.5% of the Crown court workload. That means that rape complainants or victims who are currently waiting years for their own trial to be heard might see their cases brought forward by about a week. On the Government’s own estimates, the changes will not start taking effect until after the next general election. It is not providing a solution to the current crisis. Indeed, the impact assessment was based on a premise that it compared “do nothing” with the effects of all of the Government’s measures proposed in the Bill, but nobody is proposing “do nothing”. Radical investment and reform is already taking place and is welcomed. The Government were right to introduce removing the cap on sitting days and encourage blitz courts in a number of courts in the different regions. That has cross-party support and will bring down the backlog by more direct means.
I would also like to briefly highlight the perversity in the cut-off of three years. Let us take the case of a 20-year-old student charged with unlawful wounding, where someone’s face was gashed by a glass thrown in a bar. Under the sentencing guidelines, if they were of good character they would face imprisonment of between two and three years. That conviction would be life changing and that young defendant would not qualify for trial by jury under these proposals. Let us take exactly the same case, but involving a 40-year-old defendant with a long criminal record who has been to prison before. Because of their record, the likely sentence for the same offence would exceed three years and they would get trial by jury, whereas a young man with no convictions would not. I ask the Committee to reflect on the perversity created by changing the threshold.
I conclude by reiterating that clause 3, which sets out how the Crown court should allocate a case for trial without a jury and the procedure, should not be included in the Bill, and I shall vote against its inclusion.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine. I rise to speak to the new clause that is tabled in my name, which I do not intend to push to a vote. It would require the Lord Chancellor to conduct and lay before Parliament a review of the impact of clause 3 after 12 months, and again after no later than 36 months. At its heart, the new clause is both modest and reasonable. It does not seek to block the Government’s proposals outright, nor does it attempt to rewrite the substance of the Bill. It simply asks that we understand the impact of the changes we are making and that we are accountable for them.
As Members across the House know, clause 3 introduces significant changes to the operation of the courts, particularly through the insertion of the new provisions into the Senior Courts Act 1981. Those provisions mark a clear shift in how justice is delivered. When we make changes of this scale, we have a duty not only to legislate, but to reflect on their impact and remain accountable for the consequences.
The Law Society of England and Wales has raised concerns that reforms to court processes must be carefully monitored to ensure they do not inadvertently undermine access to justice, particularly for those who already face barriers in navigating the legal system. These concerns are drawn from the experience of legal practitioners working day to day in the courts, particularly in cases involving litigants in person who often are trying to navigate complex procedures without legal representation. It has also emphasised the importance of evaluating how such changes operate in practice, including their impact on vulnerable and disadvantaged groups and on the capacity of the courts to deliver justice effectively.
The society has made it clear that such changes can have unintended consequences that are often felt most by the people who already struggle to access justice. That goes directly to public confidence in the justice system. Surely, trust and perception in the justice system are just as important as the legal framework itself. Concerns have also been raised by the Family Services Foundation, which highlights how procedural changes can disproportionately affect vulnerable individuals and families already facing complex challenges. That reflects its work with the families involved in the court system, where even small procedural changes can have a significant impact on people who are already dealing with instability, stress or crisis situations.
New clause 29 would ensure that Parliament receives clear evidence-based assessments of how the provisions are working in practice. Crucially, it would require that the assessments consider the impact on two groups: people from ethnic minority backgrounds and white British individuals living in lower-income households. As highlighted in earlier stages of the scrutiny of the Bill, there is a lack of clear statutory review built into the provisions, in particular in clause 3.
Some may ask, why specify those groups? The answer is simple—because justice is not experienced equally by all. We know all too well through evidence, lived experience and countless testimonies that people from ethnic minority communities often have lower levels of trust in the criminal justice system. That shapes how justice is perceived and whether it is seen as legitimate. For ethnic minority communities, this is fundamentally about trust in the justice system and perception of fairness.
Equally, we must recognise that socioeconomic disadvantage can profoundly affect a person’s experience of the courts. White British individuals from lower-income households are also more likely to feel marginalised by systems that appear distant, complex or unresponsive to their circumstances. If this House is serious about fairness, we must be serious about understanding how reforms affect those who are most at risk of being left behind.
New clause 29 does not assume the outcome. It does not claim that the provisions of clause 3 will necessarily have a negative impact, but it does recognise that without proper review, we simply will not know. That in itself would be a failure of our responsibility as legislators. The timeline set out in the new clause—a review after 12 months and a further review no later than after 36 months—strikes a careful balance. The reviews allow for early identification of any emerging issues, while also ensuring that long-term effects are properly understood. Importantly, the reviews would be laid before Parliament, ensuring transparency and enabling this House to scrutinise the findings. If the changes are working well, a review would demonstrate that; if they are not, a review would give us the opportunity to put things right.
I urge Members across the House to support new clause 29, not as a challenge to the Bill, but as a practical step towards fairness, transparency and accountability in our justice system. This House should be confident in reforms, but it should also be confident in knowing when to pause, assess and reflect. That is all that the new clause asks for.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
I wish to address a number of issues in relation to this grouping. First, I will say something about the figures that have been quoted at length today and in previous sittings. Secondly, I will say something about the reasons given by the Government for curtailing jury trials in this way. Then I want to go on to say something about evidence and procedure, and why jury trials exist at all, because sometimes it is possible to sit here listening, wondering whether the Government’s reasoning would not justify a banning of all jury trials for evermore on any crime. Finally, I will talk about some of the perversities that the hon. Member for Chichester has articulated well.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
I will keep my contribution brief. I want to speak in support of new clause 29, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington. It is clear that Government Members accept the need for reform but, as we go through those reforms, it is also important to keep one eye on ensuring justice for everyone in our society. We know that historically the criminal justice system has not ensured equal opportunity for everyone in our society—there are inequalities within it.
I was pleased to hear the Secretary of State and the Minister confirm that the Government are committed to reviewing the reforms in the future to ensure that they do not exacerbate inequalities in the system. I look forward to hearing the Minister continue to reassure the Committee that that is the Government’s commitment. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington is a tireless campaigner on these issues, and she made an outstanding speech. I will not add anything further to it, other than to thank her for tabling the new clause and introducing the debate.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. As the Committee has likely anticipated, I will argue that clause 3 should not stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3 is the heart of the Government’s constitutional gamble. It creates a wholly new general rule for trial on indictment without a jury in a substantial category of criminal cases. Under the clause, a defendant charged with an either-way offence who has pleaded not guilty will lose the right to be tried by a jury unless the court considers that, on conviction, they would be likely to receive a sentence of more than three years’ imprisonment. It also allows reallocation later if the case changes, says that there is no right of appeal against allocation or reallocation, permits some decisions to be made without a hearing, and still allows a judge sitting alone to impose a sentence of more than three years.
The Government continue to maintain that this change is necessary to reduce the Crown court backlog and reserve jury trials for the most serious cases. I note, though, that the very good House of Commons Library briefing points out that these provisions are based only in part on Leveson, and contain material differences from that which he recommended. Sir Brian proposed restricting, not abolishing, the right to elect, he did not propose the same increase in magistrates’ sentencing powers, and the Government’s model is more aggressive than the one on which much of the original discussion was based.
JUSTICE makes the same point directly in its written evidence. It says that the Bill goes further than the review by removing the right to elect entirely, replacing the full rehearing appeal from the magistrates court with a permission stage, allowing the extension of magistrates’ custodial powers to 18 or 24 months, and introducing judge-only trials for either-way cases with likely sentences of three years or less.
I say that at the outset because I am keen to avoid the suggestion that the Bill amounts to the Government reluctantly implementing a difficult but expert-led recommendation. That is simply not the case in clause 3. In fact, we are dealing with a discretionary political choice to legislate in a way that is broader, harder and less cautious than many of the evidence-based alternatives that are already on the table. As the Law Society put it:
“Clauses 1 to 7 represent radical changes to criminal procedure without convincing evidence that they will improve efficiency.”
The Bar Council says:
“Radical changes to the availability of jury trials…are unnecessary and will consume resources without bearing down on the backlog.”
That is the proper context in which clause 3 should be considered.
As much for my own clarity as for the benefit of the Committee, I would like to dedicate a limited amount of time to clarifying what the clause actually does. It inserts into the Senior Courts Act 1981 proposed new sections 74A to 74D, which create a mechanism under which, in a very wide category of cases, the court must decide at the outset whether a defendant will be tried by a jury or by a single judge alone. The central test is the threshold sentence: whether the defendant, if convicted, would be likely to receive more than three years’ imprisonment or detention. If the likely sentence is above that threshold, the defendant gets a jury; if not, the default is a judge-alone trial in what the Government and stakeholders have described as the Crown court bench division, although that phrase is not used in the Bill itself.
This is about not a tiny number of trivial cases but a structural redesign of the Crown court’s work. According to the Government’s own modelling, about 14,000 cases would continue arriving at the Crown court in 2028-29 and would require a trial, of which approximately 4,000 are expected to be heard by a judge alone, rather than a jury. The package is said to reduce Crown court sitting day demand by 27,000 days a year while increasing magistrates court sitting day demand by 8,500. Even if one accepts every assumption behind those figures—many serious people do not—they demonstrate that this is a major transfer of work and power. The offences within scope are not, as has sometimes been implied, confined to the sort of minor petty theft case used in media briefings.
The written evidence from JUSTICE makes that point bluntly. Clause 3 would cover a huge number of either-way offences, including
“sexual offences, sexual abuse of children, stalking, fraud offences, violence against the person offences and theft offences.”
JUSTICE offers a chilling practical illustration with this observation:
“Most of the postmasters wrongly convicted in the Horizon scandal received a sentence under three years.”
That point ought to give the Committee serious pause. We are being asked to remove jury trial for the types of case in which miscarriages of justice have historically occurred.
The centrepiece of clause 3 is the idea that a court can safely determine, at an early stage, whether a defendant is likely to receive more than three years if convicted, and that that prediction is a just and adequate basis for deciding whether the defendant gets a jury at all. I do not accept that. More importantly, the Bill itself does not truly accept it either. The Commons Library briefing I referenced earlier notes this contradiction plainly:
“While cases that are less likely to result in a sentence of more than three years would be allocated for trial by a judge alone, the judge could still pass a custodial sentence of more than three years.”
In other words, the very legislation that uses the three-year threshold as the decisive basis for removing jury trials simultaneously recognises that the threshold may not map on to the final seriousness of the case at all. The initial allocation may say that the case is not serious enough for a jury, yet the final outcome may be serious enough for more than three years in prison. If that is not an admission that the threshold is an unstable and unsafe proxy, I do not know what is.
Does that not cut to the most basic but most profound concern about this Bill—that it just is not fair? If the threshold cannot reliably distinguish the cases that merit a jury from those that do not, the clause is not preserving jury trial for the most serious cases. It is rationing jury trial on the basis of an impressionistic and sometimes speculative sentence prediction. The written evidence from the London School of Economics says exactly that, stating that the three-year threshold
“is a poor metric for determining the right trial procedure”
and that if jury trial is a
“cornerstone protection against the state”,
alternative measures ought to be exhausted first.
We cannot properly predict a sentence at the plea and trial preparation hearing, and in the context of clause 3, that is a problem. If the allocation decision is to be made at the hearing, the notion that a judge can decide the likely sentence then and there is, in many cases, unrealistic and, at the extreme, absurd. In many cases, the evidence is incomplete at the PTPH. In sexual offences, full achieving better evidence transcripts are often unavailable, and practitioners rely on summaries. CCTV may not yet have been watched in full, medical evidence may be outstanding and the victim impact, which can materially affect a sentence, may be unknown. Sometimes the complainant is still in hospital. It may well be that the psychiatric or psychological impact becomes clear only weeks or months later. Yet the clause asks the court to decide mode of trial at exactly this sensitive and uncertain stage. The Government are therefore building a supposedly rational system on a procedural moment that practitioners know, and I am sure the Minister knows, is often evidentially immature.
The Committee will remember reading the Victims’ Commissioner’s written evidence, which accepts the need for reform but recognises the concern that sentencing ranges vary and that the evidential picture may be incomplete when the crucial decision is taken. JUSTICE likewise says that the proposal risks unfairness because the allocation and reallocation system lengthens the PTPH and depends on speculative assumptions about how much court time will actually be saved. The Bar Council adds that the Bill gives no schedule or annexe identifying categories of offence; instead, a Crown court judge will simply assess in individual cases whether the likely sentence exceeds three years, meaning that the determination is case specific, contestable and uncertain from the outset.
I can well imagine the response to all that being that if circumstances change, the case can be reallocated, but to my mind that is not a defence of the clause; it is an admission that the initial prediction is often too flimsy to bear the weight placed on it. As any King’s counsel will readily point out, real criminal cases are not static things. Charges are amended, defendants are added and new evidence emerges. Perhaps a section 18 becomes a section 20. When something like that happens, is it seriously proposed that the case repeatedly cycles through reallocation every time? Clause 3 says yes, at least in substance.
Proposed new section 74B provides for a formal reallocation mechanism where there is a relevant change of circumstances, including changes in the indictment or new evidence affecting likely sentence. The problem is that that does not solve the uncertainty; it adds another layer of litigation, or at least potential litigation. It invites both sides to argue over whether the threshold position has changed, whether reallocation is required, whether the change is sufficiently material, what prejudice would be caused by moving the case, whether delay, wasted cost or witness inconvenience should prevail, and what happens if the case is already part way down the tracks. Frankly, that sounds like a dream come true for a solicitor’s billing manager, but the rest of us can surely see the problem.
JUSTICE and the Bar Council have both picked up on that point. JUSTICE notes that the
“allocation of cases is going to lengthen the plea and trial preparation hearing as will the process of reallocation”,
and it warns that the absence of any right of appeal against allocation decisions is likely to increase judicial reviews and Court of Appeal litigation. In the Bar Council’s written evidence, it states:
“The proposed Crown Court Bench Division introduces an extra layer of hearings and complication…It could result in further litigation at an interlocutory stage.”
It argues that one of the Bill’s fundamental flaws is precisely the fact that it presents a false binary: either do nothing, or do this. The Bill does not properly assess a range of other policy options.
Having made those points, I would like to pose a question to the Minister, which I think may shed some light on where we are with the clause. Has the additional work needed at both Crown court and magistrates court level for allocation, reallocation, submissions and case management been factored into the claimed 27,000 sitting day decrease and 8,500 sitting day increase? If the answer is yes, can we get some insight into precisely where and how? If the answer is no, the core productivity claim behind clause 3 is overstated from the start.
If clause 3 were merely a bad threshold coupled with an elaborate reallocation maze, that would be bad enough. However, the Government have compounded the problem by providing no right of appeal against allocation or reallocation decisions, and by permitting some decisions to be made without a hearing. Under proposed new section 74D, there would be no right of appeal against an allocation or reallocation determination made under proposed new sections 74A or 74B, and a reallocation determination could be made without a hearing. That is extraordinary. A defendant may lose trial by jury on the basis of an early-stage sentence prediction, under a mechanism that the Government know may need to be revisited as the case develops, yet there is no appeal.
JUSTICE warns that the likely consequence of the proposal is judicial review pressure on the High Court, and appeal pressure on the Court of Appeal once written reasons are handed down, meaning that the supposed efficiency savings may be displaced into other courts. The Bar Council says much the same; it proposes, as a minimum safeguard, that there should be a hearing before reallocation, unless the parties waive it, and that there should be an appeal right. The absence of appeal is especially troubling because summary trial has historically been justified by two safeguards: lower-level offences and the ability to appeal. The Bill proposes to remove both. It moves up the seriousness of cases, while stripping away the classic safeguard of easy correction—that is not a tolerable bargain.
Although the Committee has already debated the retrospectivity point at some length, clause 3 itself remains infected by it. The new allocation procedure will apply to cases already in the Crown court open caseload, including cases where the defendant has already been arraigned at a PTPH before the new regime comes into force, so long as the prosecution has not yet opened its case. For those cases, the court must make a determination under proposed new section 74A as soon as is reasonably practicable, and may do so without a hearing. That means that a defendant who chose a Crown court trial, expecting a jury, may wait months, prepare for that jury and then lose it retrospectively.
The Minister herself has defended that approach by saying that the Government are on sound legal ground, and that there is no procedural or legal impediment, relying on advice from—as I recall—an unnamed KC. However, political defensibility and legal ingenuity are not the same as fairness. To put this in very plain terms, people did not opt to go to Crown court for the car parking or the architecture; they chose it for one thing only—a jury. To move the goalposts after the choice is made is profoundly unfair, regardless of other considerations.
The Committee will recall reading through the written evidence from some eminent groups and individuals that, in as many words, call this retrospective application contrary to the rule of law. The Bar Council says:
“The retrospective provisions may also be subject to numerous legal challenges.”
Dr Samantha Fairclough argues that the plan is unfair, and she says:
“It will also create significant additional work…and likely result in appeals.”
That all points in the same direction. Retrospectivity here is not just constitutionally unattractive; it will ultimately prove to be practically self-defeating.
A very large part of the Government’s case for clause 3 rests on the impact assessment, which says that clauses 1 to 7 will reduce Crown court sitting days by 27,000 a year, while increasing magistrates court sitting days by 8,500. It also says that the Crown court open caseload will fall by around 14,000 cases over 2028-2029, and that
“overall the reforms will reduce demand on Crown Court time by almost 20%”.
However, several stakeholders have criticised the assumptions and modelling, especially those on how much time judge-only trials would save. The Government’s core assumption is that hearing times will fall by 20% for judge-only trials, but Sir Brian himself accepted that this was associated with high levels of uncertainty, and the Justice Committee challenged how anecdotal the basis for that figure appeared to be.
The Chair
Order. The hon. Member has not done anything disorderly or out of order in any way, but I remind Members that the House has agreed that this Committee must conclude its work by 5 pm on Tuesday 28 April. I have no power to impose a time limit on speeches, and it is for the Committee to decide how it uses its time, but I gently encourage Members to consider the length of speeches in the light of the desire of all Members to speak in the debate and on the later parts of the Bill.
Rebecca Paul
I thank you for making that point, Ms Jardine. I just emphasise how serious the changes in this legislation are. I know the Opposition are willing to put in the hours that are needed to go through the full detail, so that everyone can say what they need to. I imagine the Government are equally keen to spend the hours required to do full justice to the Bill.
Rebecca Paul
Absolutely, Ms Jardine—we can go into the early hours of the morning if we need to, and I am happy to do so this evening if that is what people would like to do.
In cases of offensive communications, malicious communications, harassment, stalking and other digital evidence-related cases, the line between criminality and obnoxiousness can be fact-sensitive and context-heavy. We have all seen how politically sensitive a question this has become. We should remember, too, that some of these cases are driven almost entirely by screenshots and unauthenticated digital material, which may be manipulated, selectively presented or forensically thin.
The Chair
I say gently that if we are referring to the Lammy review we give it its name, and if we are talking about the Secretary of State we refer to him as that and not just his name.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington for tabling new clause 29, which I support. It is a long-standing principle, established in the case of R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, that justice must be done and be seen to be done. It is famous as a legal precedent in establishing the principle that the mere appearance of bias is sufficient to overturn a judicial decision.
To be confident in our criminal justice system, the public need to be satisfied that it is fair. New clause 29 would provide important reassurance that there is a check and balance in place to review the changes the Bill introduces, and that any issues of bias arising from a trial without jury can and will be addressed.
The Chair
Order. As I have said, if you are referring to the Secretary of State, can you use his title?
Linsey Farnsworth
I do apologise, Ms Jardine.
The report by the Deputy Prime Minister, as he is now, was conducted almost a decade ago. It highlighted concern about the sentencing decisions of judges, so it is often cited—understandably—as a reason to be cautious about judge-only trials. New clause 29 would ensure that a review of judge-only trials will be conducted after a year, and should there be disparities in the conviction rates for those of an ethnic minority background and/or for white British persons living in lower-income households, measures can and will be put in place to prevent such disparities from arising.
It is also right that a further review is conducted between 35 and 36 months after enactment, as the new clause suggests, both to check the initial findings and to take account of the fact that things can change. In the review conducted by the Deputy Prime Minister, for example, it was found that where CPS charging decisions were concerned, a defendant’s ethnicity did not affect the likelihood of their being charged. However, subsequent research conducted by the University of Leeds, in which the outcomes of decision making in 195,000 cases between 2018 and 2021 were examined, identified evidence of disproportionality in CPS decision making. Specifically, defendants from minority ethnic backgrounds were significantly more likely to be charged than a white British defendant for a comparable offence.
Additional research by the independent disproportionality advisory group and scrutiny by the CPS itself has led to an action plan to tackle the disproportionality that was found to exist, and to deliver change. There is precedent for ongoing review of disparities in outcomes within the criminal justice system where ethnicity is concerned, and precedent for action being taken to address such disparities.
Recent research by the University of Birmingham identified concern about racial bias within juries, particularly when there is no representation of ethnic minorities among the 12 people serving on a jury. This research cited a case in which an attack on the victim was caught on CCTV, yet in May 2022 a jury with no black members acquitted most of the perpetrators. The researchers concluded that their study raised important questions about whether the public in England and Wales see juries as being fair and just in relation to racial minorities, and that juries in England and Wales remain extremely lacking in diversity; that is what the study found. Another problem the study identified in that case was that the concerns of victims’ families about racial bias among the jury were never investigated.
Linsey Farnsworth
No. I will make some progress; we need to make progress today.
The researchers found that more than 90% of respondents in the survey they conducted believed that discrimination on juries should be reported to trial judges and properly investigated, yet there is no mechanism under current law that allows juries to do so.
Appeal, a not-for-profit organisation, has submitted evidence opposing some elements of the Bill. However, in a paper that it prepared in 2024, Appeal set out concerns relating to majority decisions, as opposed to unanimous jury decisions, and the impact of racial bias. The case of R v. Connor et al was cited, in which questions from the jury suggested that there had been a focus on the defendant’s race and a letter from a juror after conviction confirmed racial bias in the jury’s deliberations.
Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 provides for confidentiality in jury decision making. However section 8A, enacted in Scotland, permits the Lord Justice General to allow information about deliberations from the jury room to be disclosed for the purposes of research. That provides an opportunity for the same to follow in England and Wales. Recent statistics show an increase in hate crime, including crime based on race and religion, rates of which spiked after Brexit and, recently, following the Southport murders. Now more than ever, we must be conscious of the impact that discrimination could have on the fairness, or otherwise, of jury trial.
Linsey Farnsworth
I am about to conclude, so I will not.
I support new clause 29, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington, but I submit that the change and modernisation that the Bill seeks to introduce bring an opportunity to review all aspects of the criminal justice system in relation to ethnicity and socioeconomic background to ensure fairness for all.
I want to comment on two points. First, I agree entirely with the speech of the hon. Member for Chichester on the problem with clause 3 and jury allocation, and I especially agree with her point about the retrospective reallocation of cases, whereby people waiting for trial by jury will suddenly find that their case will be removed from the jury and heard elsewhere. She outlined in comprehensive detail all the issues—not just jurisprudence issues but legal and factual issues. I support what she said so I will not repeat it.
I also agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley about these issues. She highlighted the disparities in the way that different groups of people are treated in our criminal justice system. I applaud my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington for tabling new clause 29. I hope that the Government will consider accepting it although, of course, if we did not abolish jury trial we would not need it.
We are told that the reason for clauses 1 and 3, which restrict access to jury trials in many cases, is to do with the backlog. That is where the Government start their position—the backlog—and I want to concentrate on that aspect. Please bear with me: I will blind the Committee with a few facts and figures because I think that they will make logical sense of why people such as me say that juries are not the reason for the delays. It is important that we get that sense.
There are currently around 88,000 cases awaiting trial in the Crown courts. The queue for the Crown court is now so long that some trials are being fixed for 2030—the Committee has heard that. We have talked about the old adage that, “Justice delayed is justice denied.” That is happening, and the delay is unacceptable, but the answer is honestly not to get rid of one of the fundamental systems that we have had in our country for centuries.
The reason for the delay is not juries but the court structure and how things happen there. One judge sitting in one courtroom for one day is known as a sitting day. The Old Bailey has 18 courts. It therefore has capacity for 18 sitting days per day, 90 sitting days per week and 4,500 sitting days in a 50-week year. For the last 15 years, restrictions have been placed on the number of sitting days in Crown court centres around the country. Resident judges, who are the principal judges at each court centre, have been told that funding will be given only for a limited number of sitting days. Restrictions of between 9% and 25% have been imposed. That is what the previous Government did.
There is always a queue for the Crown court; that is inevitable, as cases cannot be tried immediately. However—and here is the story—up until the start of 2019, that queue was managed without any undue delay. The backlog had come down from around 56,000 cases in 2014 to 33,000 cases by the start of 2019. All those cases were tried by a jury, and within a reasonable time: within six months if the defendant was in custody, and between eight and 12 months if they were on bail. Given that cases were being tried within a reasonable time in 2019, the suggestion that jury trials somehow take longer or are more complicated has no basis.
The length of the cases backlog rose from 33,000 at the start of 2019 to 71,000 by summer 2024, and rose by another 10% to around 80,000 last year. That increase is a direct consequence of the restrictions placed on sitting days. The problem was exacerbated by the closure of some courts. For example, Blackfriars Crown court in central London, which was a custom-made, modern Crown court building with eight courtrooms and the capacity to host 2,000 sitting days in a 50-week year, was closed and sold in 2019. Over the six years since then, 12,000 potential sitting days have been lost.
There are around 4,000 rape cases in the backlog. Trials for rape that have one defendant and one complainant often takes five days—although some trials are quicker and some take longer—so 2,400 of such cases could have been tried in the 12,000 sitting days that were lost following the closure of those eight courtrooms at Blackfriars. The budgetary decision to close one court led to the inability to try what would have been half of all rape cases in the backlog. Similar examples exist all over the country, including where individual courtrooms within a Crown court building sit empty, meaning that the court is open but operating below its potential capacity.
The Crown court estate has a maximum capacity of around 130,000 sitting days. Currently, it is permitted to have 113,000 sitting days, which is partly because the Government have invested some money and allowed an increase to the number of sitting days. The Government have said that that number is a “record high”, but it is high only relative to the low numbers of the previous 15 years. Given the current backlog, I would say that it is incorrect to say that it is high. We need to invest in more sitting days and having more courtrooms open.
Alex McIntyre
I too am pleased that the Government have decided to uncap sitting days, but does my hon. Friend recognise that although the physical capacity might be there, there are capacity issues with all the teams around that? Even if we open the courts and uncap sitting days, it will not bring down the backlog in the short term, because we will still need to find more prosecutors, solicitors, barristers, court clerks and, of course, judges. All those need to be in place, which would take longer than just uncapping the funding.
There are enough solicitors, barristers and judges available. Some of my former colleagues, who are now assistant recorders and recorders, were told that they could do x number of jury trials in a year, then the night before they would be due to sit in a particular Crown court, their session would get cancelled. The only issue here is with the number of court clerks, many of whom were dismissed during the years of Conservative Governments. However, those people do exist, and they can be recruited. It is not that difficult to recruit a few extra court clerks, as courts still have the capacity to do so, and it is better to do that than to throw away the whole jury system as we are doing at the moment.
It is important to note that, in any event, this law will not come into place for two or three years, which is enough time to recruit more people if there is a capacity issue—
I will, but first let me explain. We have enough time to get those people in, so that we can increase the sitting days and reduce the backlog.
Alex McIntyre
I do not recognise my hon. Friend’s assertion that the workforce is there and ready and raring to go. Even the Bar Council’s own evidence suggests that the number of silks doing publicly funded criminal cases dropped by about a quarter and the number of senior juniors has gone down significantly as well. Silks are the most senior barristers. I am happy to be corrected if that is not the case. Will it not take time to fill those gaps so that we can have appropriately senior barristers in the courts?
No, because let’s face it: in the jury trials we are talking about, people are not getting sentences of more than three years. There is hardly going to be a King’s counsel dealing with those cases—it is not even going to be a leading junior who will deal with those cases. A lot of the barristers will be middle ranking; the KCs will not be dealing with these types of cases. There are enough members of the Bar to fill the capacity issue.
The hon. Member for Gloucester pointed to what the Bar Council said, but let us be fair and talk about what it said in its completeness. It may well have said that the people currently practising dropped out, but the Minister quite directly asked how it was going to train these people up and get back to that point, and it made the point that the people who have dropped out of practising criminal law have not evaporated into thin air. They are still there; they are just practising in other areas of law, and when the situation is right for them, they can just come back into practising criminal law.
That is absolutely correct. Of course, one of the reasons why some people left the criminal Bar is the fact that the legal aid funding was not great, but I assure Members that if they did not have other work to do, they would come back to the Bar. There are enough barristers and solicitors in the legal system for that.
In a moment.
The main reason why the Government have cited is the backlog. What I am trying to say is that it is not the juries that cause the backlog. It is quite clearly the case that, with investment in court structures and court personnel, the courts could be fully up and running, and we could probably get rid of the backlog within the next year or two. The right to a jury trial is not worth sacrificing to get rid of court backlogs.
Alex McIntyre
I remember the discussion the shadow Minister spoke about; we discussed MPs swapping political constituencies at the same time. The Institute for Government was very clear that the biggest constraint is the workforce, so is my hon. Friend saying that the Institute for Government has got it wrong?
The Institute for Government also said that juries do not take up that much time—they save more time. The point is that, without too much difficulty, we could get the courts up and running and working for extra sitting days. Essentially, if we had more court sitting days, we would not have the backlog; it is not the juries that are causing the backlog.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Does the hon. Lady recognise that the 2025 Criminal Bar Association study noted that one in five barristers are considering leaving the criminal Bar, not because of the ineffectiveness of jury trials but because they have to work in crumbling buildings, because there is a significant administrative burden associated with passing on information to the CPS and because of the number of ineffective cases that then do not go ahead? Does she agree that if we tackle the inefficiencies in courts, we are more likely to improve our retention of criminal barristers and encourage some of them to come back into the profession because the system will work better?
I entirely agree. The state of some of the courts in this country is sad. They are completely neglected, which creates a lot of challenges.
We are leaning heavily on the points made by the Criminal Bar Association. The Government seem quite rightly to be extremely concerned about the training of future barristers, but the Criminal Bar Association has made the point that that training often takes place in what the Government are describing as less serious cases. That is where the more junior people get the experience they need to work on the more serious cases. If those cases are not available, how do the Government expect barristers to be trained to the level required to take on the more serious cases with a jury trial?
I agree with the hon. Member.
I want to set out why we have a backlog and what we can do. Everybody has talked about various things that we could do, such as triaging the cases more effectively and more routinely, like Liverpool Crown court and some of the others that have seen a considerable reduction. There are the issues of transporting prisoners on time and internet connections in court. We have discussed a number of things that can lead to a reduction in the backlog.
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington and I thank her for tabling new clause 29. The reason why we need it is that, years ago, the importance of jury trials was recognised by the current Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, and the fact that the new clause has been tabled shows that we believe they are important. We really should not be restricting jury trials. It is like throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
Amanda Hack (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine.
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington is a passionate advocate for fairness and equality, as she has demonstrated throughout this Committee and in her work more broadly. By tabling new clause 29, she offers an approach to ensuring that we can build confidence in the system once the changes have been implemented. We have to recognise that the system is not creating fairness at the moment. We have significant backlogs, which have more than doubled since 2019. Continuing with the system as we find it is simply not an option. Ensuring that trials go ahead in a timely manner will also improve fairness.
On Second Reading, I spoke about my experience as a victim of an either-way offence. The defendant chose a jury trial. The choice to experience a jury was not mine. I did not choose to be cross-examined by the defendant. I did not choose for the case to be postponed twice, and colleagues working in the system, who had to arrange for witnesses and courts to be available not just once but three times, did not choose those postponements either. We heard the testimony from Chief Constable Sacha Hatchett about the process and the impact that delays are having on all parts of the system. She said:
“Our focus has to be on victims and on keeping people safer from harm. That is absolutely where our officers are, but the caseload and the work that is generated by delays in the system do affect our officers.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 68, Q137.]
We have an opportunity to tackle the backlog and to put trust back into the system. I spoke to the CPS in the east midlands just a few weeks ago, and it said that it is currently listing cases for 2028. We cannot just rely on increasing sitting days to solve the backlog. If it were that simple, we would not have an increasing backlog today. We cannot just rely on improving technology. We have to work through a whole package of changes, and that was echoed in Sir Brian Leveson’s report.
I have heard, not only in the Chamber but in this Committee, that jury trials are a cornerstone of the legal system, but we have to be honest with ourselves. That cornerstone is at risk if changes are not made. We need to ensure that changes to the system, including to jury trials, create confidence in that very system. The evidence presented by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington identified that we need to address the perception of fairness from those of any ethnic background or those who are white British and live in lower-income households. It needs addressing now, even without the changes—we have to reflect on that. The current system has to be addressed, and I would welcome a response from the Minister on how we can work through the detail of the review mechanism suggested by my hon. Friend.
Tristan Osborne (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. I want to discuss two aspects. First, I welcome the consideration of new clause 29. I absolutely believe it is correct for the Government to review and look into inequalities in the criminal justice system. I pay testament to the work done by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington and other MPs, including the Lord Chancellor and Justice Secretary.