English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Moving from devolution by deal to devolution by default is at the heart of the Bill. Clause 6 and schedule 2 are essential to achieving that. The Bill ensures that strategic authorities have a consistent set of functions, and these provisions standardise how they exercise those functions. Many existing strategic authorities have complex and varied arrangements for agreeing fundamentals such as budgets and transport plans. That makes it hard for the public to understand how decisions are made and, therefore, to hold the strategic authority to account.

The provisions in clause 6 and schedule 2 would create a transparent and consistent default voting arrangement—a simple majority. It would unblock decision making to ensure that the right decision, even if it is difficult, can be made. In mayoral strategic authorities, the mayor must be in the majority for a vote to pass. Mayors are directly accountable to all voters in their area, so it is right that decisions cannot be made if they disagree. The Government expect mayors and other strategic authority members to continue to work together to build consensus. We heard time and time again in the evidence sessions that the model works well when the mayor works in partnership with its constituent authorities, but it is important that one member cannot get in the way of the right decisions being made for the entire area. It is therefore imperative that clause 6 and schedule 2 remain within the Bill to ensure that mayoral strategic authorities can operate effectively, and to provide the public with clarity on how decisions are made, so they can hold these institutions to account.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I rise to speak to new clause 48, tabled in my name. I also want to raise another issue for consideration by the Minister at a future stage.

In clause 6, the new rules for mayoral combined authorities give simple majority voting for relevant decisions by bodies to adopt budgets or policies, such as spatial development strategies, local transport plans and other strategies set out elsewhere in the Bill. For example, schedule 2 outlines that

“a resolution to adopt the strategy is to be made by a simple majority of the constituent members present and voting”.

There are other rules to do with a tied vote.

I think that the Bill should also amend the Greater London Authority Act 1999 to give simple majority voting for decisions by the London Assembly on the budget and mayoral strategies of the Mayor of London. That is for consistency of decision making across the different authorities and bodies, and for fairness to London’s democracy. Along with many Opposition Members, this is something that I have wanted for some time now, as I was a member of the London Assembly in my previous job. In these Committee debates I will frequently bring up examples from my long experience of being part of an effective scrutiny body in a devolved authority at the strategic level—I feel that I have a good handle on how it works.

Using “a simple majority” is the right way to go about this. The Minister has talked about building consensus and working in partnership. I really value it when cross-party working can result in genuine dialogue, with mayors that will listen and make changes, and bodies scrutinising or working with them to put forward their own ideas and have them taken up. Those are all really healthy things for our democracy. New clause 48 would simply amend the parts of the 1999 Act that outline how the Assembly votes. Currently, the Act requires at least a two-thirds majority for any changes to be made, and the new clause would instead insert the words “a simple majority”. It is a very simple change, which the Minister should consider.

The second issue I want to raise relates to forward plans, which are incredibly useful for the general public, or anyone who wants to influence mayoral decisions and the decisions of combined authorities or local authorities. At the moment, only local authorities have this particular requirement written into law, under the Local Authorities (Executive Arrangements) (Meetings and Access to Information) (England) Regulations 2012, which clearly set out how key decisions are to be included in forward plans. I am not talking about planning decisions but key decisions, as set out in the schemes of delegation. Those forward plans are required to be published in advance, so that people who want to influence or scrutinise those decisions can bid to change them, or for things to be taken into account at the appropriate time.

Again, this certainly comes out of my experience in the London Assembly. It unanimously passed a motion in 2022 that was put forward by one of the Liberal Democrat members and me, which said that the Mayor of London should publish a forward plan. However, he did not agree to do that, as he said that he was complying with everything in legislation; so the answer seems to be for legislation to require both the Mayor of London and these new combined authority mayors to publish a forward plan along the same lines. Looking at the 2012 regulations, it would be very simple to change the current wording, “local authorities”, to “strategic and local authorities”, if the Minister wanted.

I also point the Committee to the excellent report published last month by the GLA oversight committee, a cross-party committee currently chaired by a Labour member of the London Assembly. It makes exactly the same request: for a forward plan of key mayoral decisions to be put into the 1999 Act. Because of the complexities of the different regulations, I have not tabled an amendment for such a change, but I hope the Minister would consider the question of effective scrutiny of these new bodies and the ability to influence them. I hope she could potentially come forward with a new clause at a later stage for us.

[David Simmonds]

The Opposition support the amendment; the principle of having a simple majority is sound. In oral evidence, we heard about why Manchester works and London does not, and there is a logic to implementing those measures consistently across the country. We support introducing that consistency.

There is a broader question, however. I understand what the Minister and the Government are trying to achieve; it would clearly be frustrating if one authority was effectively acting as a blocker. However, I asked the Minister earlier to give us some assurances about the treatment applied when financial impacts occur that affect one or more of the constituent authorities in a combined authority area. There will be cases—we have seen them in planning, for example—where an authority argues that to deliver its housing target, a site in another local authority’s area must be developed, because it does not have sufficient developable land to hit the target that it has been given; legally, it is not that authority’s decision. There will be other examples.

I am mindful of some of the Government’s amendments that introduce a lot more scope into this Bill for mayors and combined authorities to undertake their housing responsibilities. One of the main routes for funding is through borrowing against the housing revenue account, which is ringfenced. Each individual local authority has a legal duty to balance that account and the power to borrow against it; it also holds all of the legal housing duties and responsibilities. The purpose of the measures is to make mayors the vehicle for the delivery of asylum accommodation, as opposed to asylum hotels, as is the case now to some degree. Yesterday, on the Floor of the House, another Minister in the Department alluded to this in his response to a question about asylum accommodation.

Those decisions will have a significant impact on the legal obligations of the authorities that sit beneath the mayoral authority. There is a risk that being outvoted in a decision made at combined authority level would put an individual constituent authority in breach of its legal obligations to balance its dedicated schools grant, its housing revenue account or some other element of its council tax account. Will the Minister, either now or in writing, set out what arrangements will apply in the likely situation of a conflict between the legal obligations on a constituent authority to balance the budget and the strategic decisions put forward by the combined authority? How will the conflict be resolved without undue detriment to the constituent authority in particular, which is the one that will find itself in court?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will respond to the amendment to clause 48, and then I will pick up the specific questions from the hon. Member. The GLA has a different and long-established governance model. In London, the mayor is elected by the people of London to make decisions; the Assembly’s role is to scrutinise those decisions. As a London MP, I think that model has worked well for London for well over 25 years. It is tested and it strikes the right balance between the executive authority of the mayor and the scrutiny of the Assembly.

[Siân Berry]

It is notable that recently the London Assembly has, on a number of occasions, made constructive changes to the mayor’s budget at stage one of budget setting, which have simply been overturned at the second stage. This tendency, I think, is part of the growing need for a change in the threshold.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We think that the model works well. We have heard representations from constituents, local authorities, Assembly members, and the mayor himself. Any model needs to evolve; as we think about how we expand the powers of the mayor, which we want to, we will also be thinking about reforming the GLA to make it fit for purpose in the 21st century. We will take into consideration some of the points that have been made in this Committee.

On the specific question about decisions at the strategic authority level putting an individual local authority in breach of its legal obligations or jeopardising its financial viability, all our experience of combined authorities is that they always operate within the legal duties of constituent authorities. I struggle to think of an example where constituent authorities have been put in such a position by their mayor and the decisions of the collective. There are sufficient safeguards in place to mitigate that risk.

I hope that majority working will benefit the collective area. This Government will make sure that clear legal obligations on constituent authorities are not breached. I am happy to write to the hon. Member to provide further reassurance on that point. I think we agree that we want clear and effective decision making with a democratic mandate, that will not jeopardise individual authorities by forcing them to breach their legal requirements and/or putting them in financial distress.

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[David Simmonds]

The Opposition have some sympathy with the points that have been made in the debate. It is an area in which there is scope to move towards a degree of consensus. I think that we all recognise that part of the underlying thinking behind the mayoral combined authority is that it brings a new element of leadership, and from those models where they are established, such as in London, we can identify some of the issues. As we heard at the start of the Committee, there is clear evidence about accountability.

One of the issues that persists in London is that there are a number of advisers—whether they are commissioners or not is a moot point—who undertake sometimes quite highly paid roles on behalf of the mayor, but they are not visibly accountable to the GLA, the boroughs or anybody else. That begins to undermine public confidence, and it clearly creates a sense of distance between those who are elected and those who they are there to serve.

While I agree that there is no reason why somebody who is elected should not occupy those roles, one of the issues with the proposed amendment is that there is clearly a risk of constraining them—in particular, in relation to the wording of the proposed amendment. When we consider some of the statutory roles that might be occupied—directors of children’s services, statutory directors of social care, monitoring officers, section 151 officers and others who have legal duties—there is a risk that by defining it as narrowly as the amendment does, we create some concerns about the interaction between those who are part of the professional officer corps that serves local government and those who are political appointees. I do not think that that is intentional; it is simply a risk that arises from the way in which it is drafted.

We will not be supporting the amendment, but I am mindful of the comments that have been made by those on the Government Benches about the need to ensure that those who occupy the roles are fit to do so, and that they are publicly accountable, because they will be public servants and they need to be answerable to effective scrutiny measures for the work that they do.

[Siân Berry]

I want to participate in this debate, despite having not tabled any amendments. I am grateful to the Members who have done so. The issue of commissioners is interesting. It is also interesting that the Government have chosen this model to codify in the Bill. From my experience, I believe that the London model of how this is done is far ahead of other combined or strategic authorities that already exist, and of the Government’s imagination in terms of the Bill. London Assembly members are used to having the equivalent of commissioners—deputy mayors—to scrutinise. The Assembly members do that effectively, not only by asking the deputy mayors questions and making them accountable, but also by providing them with evidence and new ideas, and by highlighting problems across the strategic area. Many effective changes have been brought through in that way.

However, to have those kinds of commissioners without that level of scrutiny is a mistake. In that respect, I am not in favour, and I am not convinced by the argument from my Liberal Democrat colleagues that people who are separately responsible for running services—many of them statutory services—and who have a lot of other responsibilities and duties in the constituent part of the strategic area are the right people to be given those kinds of roles. It is a really interesting question.

I have also found that, aside from a very short period when a Green deputy mayor was appointed to serve under an independent mayor in London, most mayors seem to be allergic to appointing anyone from an opposition party to any of those roles. There are examples of independently minded, effective, delivery-focused people. Chris Boardman, in Manchester, was mentioned. However, there does seem to be a party political element to the appointment of the roles, if the Minister and the Chair were to look at the record.

In conclusion on this clause—and it will come up in relation to other parts of the Bill—we collectively need a wider discussion about scrutiny and governance of the new roles. Some of the comments earlier from the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner suggested that if we all got together in a room, we might be able to come up with a better idea than what is being proposed. I very much agree with that. There are things that we should be discussing.

It was pointed out to us in evidence that we will lose something like 90% of our elected representation in certain areas. In certain parts of the country, people will end up with somewhat of a deficit of overall elected representatives—people to come to with casework. More should be looked at on whether or not a model more like the London Assembly could be adopted, where people are separately elected with strategic responsibilities. In London, there are constituency Assembly members, and Assembly members who are London-wide and take a more strategic view. Those are good models that have worked, and the Government and others should look at that. It is not up for debate today, but my new clause 15 proposes a review of scrutiny, which I will argue for later. When the Government come to look at this in review, which inevitably they will have to do, I hope they will look again at potentially having more directly elected—

[David Simmonds]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Siân Berry]

I will.

[David Simmonds]

I am listening attentively to what the hon. Lady described. We heard in evidence from Councillor Sam Chapman-Allen of the District Councils’ Network that under these proposals, shire England stands to lose 90% of its elected representation, which the hon. Lady referred to. There is not anything really concrete in the Bill that sets out what scrutiny should look like—what those minimum standards should be. There are elements about conduct and things like that, but that is very basic. Does the hon. Lady have a view about what a good model should look like, so that local residents can exercise their control over what happens in their neighbourhood effectively?

[Siân Berry]

I am attempting in my speech not to be too biased towards what I am used to, because that is a failing as well. We should discuss this in a very open way. Other new clauses I have tabled contain proposals for things such as a citizens assembly. We should look at international examples as well. When there are proposals to spend a significant amount of money on the commissioners, there is value in spending an appropriate amount on decent scrutiny and elected representatives. Again, I am biased—I am an elected representative. I think we are good value, but that is a case to be made.

Finally, I cannot find any mention in schedule 3 about guidance that the Secretary of State may issue to commissioners about conduct, standards and transparency. I would like some reassurance from the Minister about guidance on those aspects of the job. Even if they are not elected, they are accountable to the public and must be given a process and regime of standards, and potentially be brought into existing standards systems. Without scrutiny, standards and regulations to govern their behaviour, I worry about this in the same way as several other Members today have.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Commissioners can and will support mayors in getting the job done for their communities. They are not compulsory. There is no obligation on a mayor to appoint commissioners, but it gives the mayor the option of increasing capacity and expertise to do that. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion talked about the example of Greater Manchester, where they have council leaders who are portfolio leads. It is worth pointing out that Manchester also uses commissioners—for example, on active travel—so it can be complementary or can supplement. It is just giving them an additional set of levers in order to respond.

It is also worth pointing out that there will be some roles that the mayor has accountability for that they simply cannot delegate to councillors—for example, strategic planning powers, where direct delegation to a commissioner might expand the mayor’s capacity to dispense with that responsibility. However, to the point about checks and balances, which has been made time and again, it is important to be clear that we completely agree on the need for accountability for commissioners. They will be accountable to the mayor for their performance, who has the power to terminate their appointment, and the combined authority or combined county authority must also agree before any non-mayoral functions are delegated to the commissioner. Critically, the combined authority or combined county authority overview and scrutiny committee will also have the power to recommend the termination of commissioners if they think the commissioner is not performing or delivering. A two-thirds majority of members of the authority is required to accept that recommendation.

[Siân Berry]

Does the Minister believe that the people who are able to recommend that the commissioner be terminated have sufficient ways to discover whether or not they should be?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The hon. Member made the point about the scrutiny of commissioners, which is a fair and valid point, and my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire made the point about flexibility in different contexts, particularly for smaller strategic authorities. We have come at this in such a way as to allow local areas as much flexibility as possible, but these are valid points about making sure that the model is flexible enough to respond to specific contexts. We will provide further detail in statutory guidance on the selection and appointment of commissioners, as well as other operational matters that the combined authority or combined county authority will need to consider, and we will take some of the points that have been raised as we do that in due course.

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[David Simmonds]

That was a fairly shameless political pitch, but we should just reflect on the debates that took place across the Dispatch Boxes yesterday during Housing, Communities and Local Government questions, when it was highlighted that we have a Mayor of London who is quite happy to issue precepts to indulge his personal political priorities but is an abject failure in discharging his mayoral functions around housing. Thousands of people are unable to find homes in the capital because the mayor is failing to build out more than 300,000 planning permissions that have already been granted by the local authorities. That is an injustice that is being inflicted on the citizens of our capital, and this provision, as envisaged by this Labour Government, potentially inflicts the same, or an even greater, injustice on other areas of the country. For those reasons, we remain deeply concerned about it.

Particularly in an environment where, as we heard earlier, local authorities were left £1.5 billion worse off—net—by the Government’s decision to introduce additional taxes on their employees, the temptation will be for the mayoral precept to be seen as the catch-all or safety valve through which additional taxes can be extracted to meet whatever demand central Government choose to impose, without central Government being accountable for it. That is why we oppose the measures.

[Siân Berry]

I had not previously heard the Conservatives’ argument on this issue, and I have to say that I disagree. The Minister said that the original intention of the policy was to allow for a wide range of precepting, and if there is one thing that directly elected mayors are really accountable for, it is the level of precept that they set.

I am in favour of creativity in conversations with the electorate about what initiatives, appropriate to the local area, might be funded by precept on a short-term basis or just in the local area. The way that the provision is set up allows mayors to be properly accountable for that. I worry less about it resulting in huge tax rises without consent, because consent is built in at election time.

I appreciate the concerns about austerity continuing in councils that are underneath and part of the combined authority if mayors are taking up available taxpaying powers. In every debate in this Committee, I would love to bring up the fact that all this reorganisation is happening in the absence of an end to austerity. The Government need to provide more funding to local councils so that this is not all being taken in council tax, which is a very unfair tax.

[Vikki Slade]

I have no principled objection to the mayor setting a precept. I found it confusing when I heard Mayor Houchen explain how he had a zero precept. How does anything get done? Where does the money come from? [Interruption.] I am sure he has a salary, and I am sure he has an extensive office that is paid for by someone. I accept that the principle of a precept is, in some respects, self-limiting, but what bothers me is that the combined authority mayors have no referendum cap, unlike upper-tier, lower-tier, police and crime or fire authorities.

It is fire authorities I particularly want to speak to, because although some Government amendments have been tabled on the role of the mayor in terms of fire and rescue, there is almost silence in the Bill about the role of the fire and rescue service, while embracing it completely and almost making the whole service disappear. I am really concerned that fire authorities are already desperately under-resourced. Dorset and Wiltshire Fire and Rescue Service gets £1.76 a week per household. It has desperately been trying to get a 20p per week increase, but has been told, “No, you can’t have that.” There is nothing in the Bill that protects and ringfences any money for fire services, whereas there is more talk about police services. I am looking for some reassurance and commitment about how fire services funding will be properly resourced and ringfenced to make sure that no area suffers as when we had those horrendous wildfires, where fire services had to beg, borrow and steal equipment.

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[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 16 will prevent individuals from being a Member of Parliament, or of the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, and a mayor of a strategic authority at the same time.

The Government are clear that mayors are central to delivering the growth, economic prosperity and change that local communities want. Already, the impact of our mayors, from West Yorkshire to the North East, from Greater London to the West Midlands, is being felt clearly. However, their responsibilities will only increase once this Bill is in law.

It is right that the role of mayor receives the officeholder’s full time and attention. Both MPs and mayors have a duty to represent the constituents that elected them. Fulfilling two different democratic roles could lead to conflicts of interest, given the differences in public expectations for each role and the differing responsibilities of a mayor and an MP. Clause 16 prevents that conflict and will ensure that regions benefit from their mayor’s full time and attention.

[Siân Berry]

I agree with the principle of not having too many people able to do double-hatting, but it is a fact that there have been overlapping periods when mayors of different combined authorities and London have also been MPs, either at the beginning or end of their term. That has been dealt with in a pragmatic way, with nobody overextending those kinds of double-hatted jobs.

As I understand it, and I would like the Minister to clarify this, writing this rule into statute would mean that, while nobody would be prevented from campaigning to be a mayor or an MP while in either of these jobs, at the moment they are elected, the situation then becomes illegal. An instant resignation takes place on that day. There would be immense disruption across a wide area—perhaps not so much for one constituency, as we have got used to having by-elections for various reasons, but in holding a mayoral by-election.

I wanted to check whether the Government’s intentions here, in making that resignation statutory and instant, are not a bit too much, when these issues have been previously worked out. Does there need to be more detail in the clause to allow for a transition period?

[David Simmonds]

The Opposition have a high degree of sympathy with the points made by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. It is very striking when we compare our local and regional democracy with those of other countries: in our nearest neighbour, France, with the cumul des mandats, there is almost an expectation enshrined in their politics that, for someone to become Member of the national Parliament, they will have represented their area as a mayor. Indeed, when President Chirac cast around to find someone who was eminently qualified to become Prime Minister of that country, he took the view that there was nobody within the National Assembly who could possibly meet that standard; it needed to be somebody from local or regional government. He lighted on Alain Juppé, the well-reputed mayor of Bordeaux, who served with great distinction as Prime Minister. If we begin to introduce restrictions of this nature, it will significantly constrain the ability of our politics to rise to the challenges that our communities and our areas face.

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[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

If I may finish, I will give way to hon. Members. The point about transition is a fair one. To clarify, we are setting out in legislation that, at the point someone is elected as a mayor, they resign as an MP, and vice versa. It is at the point of gaining office that this comes into effect. In response to the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion’s example of the transition period when campaigning, there are flexibilities within that.

[Siân Berry]

I appreciate that, but these are two things in different directions. A sitting mayor who becomes an MP would need to resign as mayor that day, given what the Minister has just outlined for us. A mayoral by-election across a large area is a much bigger thing than a parliamentary by-election, and I am not sure that making it instantly statutorily illegal has been properly thought through.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will take the other interventions.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Third sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We absolutely recognise the hon. Member’s point about democracy. Directly elected mayors can play a powerful strategic role. They are a key new part of the devolution architecture that we have seen work well across the country. I point to Greater Manchester, which has delivered the fastest growth of any local economy. They sit alongside strong democratic structures that we will have in local government. The Bill is complementary to that and does not cut across or undermine those structures.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. This is not my first Public Bill Committee, but I have had the whole summer to forget how these things work, so I look forward to being firmly guided by you if I stray from good practice.

I will speak to new clause 35. In that context, I emphasise how friendly, constructive and helpful the new clause is intended to be as a way of getting the Committee started on a good note. I ask Ministers to take the need for it on board, although I will not press it to a vote. I tabled the new clause to ensure that, more broadly, words such as “strategic” and “local”, where they relate to a level of government or a level of area of policy, have a consistent meaning for strategic authorities, constituent authorities and community-level groups.

I will give some examples of possible confusion growing in the areas cited in new clause 35. We have a strategic road network, which is in fact a national network managed by National Highways. We have new strategic authorities, which will have to manage a key route network, analogous to the Transport for London route network. We also have local roads managed by local authorities. In the Bill, however, we have strategic authorities being asked to make a local transport plan. That could be more helpfully named a strategic transport plan.

Another area of policy I am very familiar with is the community infrastructure levy. In later clauses, we will discuss new applications of the mayoral community infrastructure levies. I have experience of how, more locally, spending on what most local councils call strategic community infrastructure levies is done by local authorities. Decisions on local CIL spending, which is what councils normally call is, are made closer to the community, often by ward councillors or neighbourhood forums.

We are slightly better off in planning, where there is a national basis for decisions on nationally significant infrastructure, and where strategic planning applications may be called in by regional strategic level mayors under current or new structures. However I do think that we lack rigour, sometimes logic, and often clarity in all these terms now. More thought about making things more standardised and easier to understand would be very welcome. I am not proposing a vote on this new clause, but what I would like to hear from the Minister today is that she will take this away, ask for at least a report on the current range of terminology we have ended up with in different areas of policy, and consider potential further amendments and the fuller review the new clause calls for.

[The Chair]

As a point of advice, if people want to contribute after I have called the Minister to sum up then just let me know in advance and I will call the Minister at the end, so she can respond to a variety of points that have been made. I do not want the Minister to have to keep getting up and responding to every speech. I know people are new to Committee, but it helps the Minister be able to sum up her consideration of all the points that have been made.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I am sympathetic to the intentions behind the new clause, and the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion makes a good point regarding the tapestry of terms that we have in a very complicated local government structure; however, the Bill already includes defined terms relevant to interpreting local government structures. For example, clause 1 defines exactly what strategic authorities are. My concern is that taking a one-size-fits-all approach might have unintended consequences by altering existing definitions that have been deliberately tailored to work in specific legislative contexts. My view is that as we go through this process of standardising the new structure, with strategic authorities now established in legislation working alongside local government and community structures, the roles and the definitions of different structures of government will become much clearer. I hope the hon. Member will not press the new clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Functions of Strategic Authorities and Mayors

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 261, in clause 2, page 2, line 21, after “economic development”, insert “, poverty and socio-economic inequality,”

This amendment would make poverty and socio-economic inequality an area of competence for devolved authorities, ensuring they can take action to address the root causes of disadvantage in their areas.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Siân Berry]

The amendment relates to the fact that the new strategic authorities simply must be tasked with reducing inequality as well as creating growth. We know that growth for growth’s sake does not trickle down or help everyone equally. The strategic authorities must be tasked with understanding, measuring and reducing socioeconomic inequality. The socioeconomic duty in the Equality Act 2010 is not yet commenced for England, but if it were the amendment would have to be made.

The amendment would make poverty and socioeconomic inequality an area of competence for devolved authorities, ensuring they can take action to address the root causes of disadvantage in their areas. As co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on poverty and inequality, this is an issue close to my heart. In July, the officers and I sent a letter to the Secretary of State for Education and the Minister for Women and Equalities to ask about the urgency of commencing the socioeconomic duty. We said,

“The urgent need for the duty could not be clearer. Rising child destitution, increasing reliance on foodbanks and untimely excess deaths attributable to austerity policies all highlight the imperative for a legal tool to reduce socio-economic inequalities”.

We also said,

“Activation of the Socio-Economic Duty marks an important shift from piecemeal responses to rising poverty and widening inequalities, to a proactive systemic approach, embedded across all policy areas”.

The Bill is an opportunity to embed those principles.

I do not believe that these two actions—the commencement of the duty and the writing of this Bill—are mutually exclusive in achieving these goals. I cannot see why, given the Government’s promise to enact the duty, the new bodies should not be set up with it in place and in mind. I know that organisations including many local authorities are already preparing to comply with it in England. Towards the end of last year, one of my Green party colleagues on the London Assembly questioned the Mayor of London with some urgency about the work that he is doing with local authorities and agencies across London to prepare for this. We are now approaching the end of this year and it is still not in place. I believe that the Bill is the right place to start putting this into legislation.

I do not plan to push the amendment to a vote, but I would like to hear more from the Minister about when the Labour Government plan to bring the duty into force, and what plans Ministers have to use a statutory instrument to apply it to strategic authorities and mayors. Even if they will not accept the amendment, I would appreciate anything on the record asking those bodies to get ready for the duty, so that when they are set up, they can hit the ground running on addressing poverty and inequality in their areas.

[David Simmonds]

The Opposition have some sympathy with the amendment, but we spent time reflecting on its implications and appropriateness for the Bill. I suspect that, to a degree, the Minister and I agree on this point. If we reflect on the legislative framework around our local authorities from their earliest origins, the relief of poverty and addressing inequalities—the duties that the amendment refers to—have been enshrined. It goes back as far as the Poor Laws, but in more recent years the National Assistance Act 1948 compelled all local authorities to support those destitute in their areas, and the Localism Act 2011 gives scope for local authorities to use their economic powers through activities such as procurement in ways that specifically benefit the local area.

The Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, which was much debated and broadly had cross-party support, is reflected in a lot of this Bill. It was specifically about local authorities using their powers to support the economy of their local area. Just a short time ago, some of the members of the Committee were in this room debating the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, in which the Government set out a vision—contested to some extent—about how those measures affecting local authorities will address persistent issues of inequality. We recognise that sometimes that is about legislation, but sometimes it is about Government action.

Mention has been made of food banks, which were rolled out under the last Labour Government as a means of addressing persistent issues of poverty. I remember them being opened during my time as a local authority councillor, and Gordon Brown visiting and saying, “This is an example of how we expect local authorities to address some of these persistent issues.” Local authorities already have these duties at both the strategic and the micro level. I question whether it is necessary to add an amendment that, in essence, reflects existing duties throughout all the different tiers of local government in England.

--- Later in debate ---

We believe that the intent and objective are right, and that we have set out the thematic areas in a way that allows mayors the discretion and ability to work across a range of policy areas to deliver that objective. I hope that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion is happy with that explanation.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Single foundation strategic authorities

[Vikki Slade (Mid Dorset and North Poole) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 3, page 2, line 27, leave out subsections (1) to (3) and insert—

“(1) A unitary district council or a county council may submit a proposal to the Secretary of State for designation as a single foundation strategic authority.

(2) A proposal under subsection (1) must be prepared in such form and contain such information as the Secretary of State may by regulations prescribe.

(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations designate a unitary district council as a single foundation strategic authority if—

(a) a proposal has been submitted in accordance with subsection (1), and

(b) the Secretary of State is satisfied that the designation is appropriate having regard to the need to secure effective and convenient local government in relation to the areas of competence.”

This amendment would restrict the Secretary of State's power to designate a single foundation Strategic Authority. Instead, a local authority would initiate the request by submitting a proposal to the Secretary of State.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

As the hon. Lady knows from when we were on the BBC’s “Politics South” programme some weeks ago, I rarely agree with Liberal Democrats, but I suspect that she and I agree on this point. I know that she stands for her area and, as a former council leader, for the wider area, and that she knows a lot about the Isle of Wight. I did not know that she got married there, but I am sure it was a lovely wedding, because the Isle of Wight is a beautiful place steeped in history. She is absolutely right that while Hampshire and the Isle of Wight have been together geographically, they have also been together in the way organisations have worked, over hundreds of years. I see the Solent as the water motorway connecting the mainland to the Isle of Wight. We could not interact without having it there. “Hampshire and the Solent” is the wrong name for the proposed mayoralty, because it leaves out the distinct identity of a proud people on the Isle of Wight.

[Siân Berry]

I want to express my sympathy with the amendments related to the Isle of Wight. It is not miles away from the area that I represent, Brighton Pavilion. I know many people there who are similarly proud of their distinct identity. I note that the name for the new combined authority that will envelop Brighton is “Sussex and Brighton”. If it is good enough for us, it is good enough for the Isle of Wight.

[Paul Holmes]

I agree. I have had many a night out in Brighton, and I know that it is a very vibrant city. If it is good enough for Brighton to be named within that county, I do not see why the population of an island in this United Kingdom should not be named as part of its mayoral authority.

I say to the Minister, in the same spirit of co-operation in which I know she will respond, that if there is no movement in the decision on the name, that risks wider implications for the Bill. Many other areas will then start to think about why we went through the parliamentary boundary commissions’ changes to the names of our seats. That was a very difficult thing; people were not recognised.

The Isle of Wight has a precedent for being treated differently. It has always received special dispensation in the boundary discussions that we have had before. It would therefore be perfectly sensible for the proud and great people of the Isle of Wight to be recognised and have their name in a proud county name, if this devolution goes forward.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Second sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Andrew Cooper]

Q Do you believe that this Bill will do that?

Gareth Davies: As we have said, it is not going to be quick or easy, but this is the right approach. It is just going to need substantial application of shoulder to the wheel and strong leadership of the new Local Audit Office, when that is created. That will make a big difference because it will have a loud voice in this area of work, and all the levers necessary to acquire the capacity required to perform to a high standard and to restore proper accountability. Even though we know that will not be easy, and we have explained why it is not simple, I think that is the right approach.

Bill Butler: This is getting tedious, but I agree with Gareth. It is a local issue. It is fundamentally important that we recognise that these are local democratic bodies and that the Local Audit Office, and auditors, need to operate independently from them and without unnecessary interference from anywhere else. The job needs to be done properly, and framework in the Bill for reforming local audit is exactly the right direction to go.

As I think we said, we need to address a number of environmental issues now to see that benefit. The risks you described apply to all 716 sets of unassured accounts. In my experience in this area, although audit does not always find a problem, I find it difficult to believe that there are not significant problems lurking where audits have not been completed. I hope there are not many. I would be delighted, but very surprised, if there were none.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

Q I want to press you slightly on the make-up of audit committees. Mr Davies said that it was not for him to say, but given the varied make-up of councils across the country, I do not think it would be too hard for you to say that an opposition councillor could be the chair, or something along those lines. In your experience, what makes a good audit committee?

Gareth Davies: It is about the person and their skills and approach more than any office they hold or party they come from. You need the right approach and the right skills to do a good job. I have seen elected politicians fulfil that role brilliantly. The reason I said what I said is that I am a bit suspicious of anything that says, for example, “We must have an independent chair who is not a member of the council.” The audit committee is there to be part of the council’s governance arrangements. If it is too independent of the council, it does not engage with the machinery of running the council or influence the decision makers sufficiently, in my experience. If it is entirely made up of members who, with the best will in the world, do not have the skills required to perform a role that sometimes has technical elements, that model also has weaknesses.

The best models I have seen consist of a cross-party committee of members who are very interested in getting value for money for the taxpayer and ensuring that controls are operating properly across the council, and in ensuring that the council is maintaining public trust; you need people with those kind of motivations, supplemented with some independent membership. The chair does not necessarily have to come from that independent membership, but it must be somebody who is prepared to read all the accounts and ask difficult questions about why a surprising number has appeared out of nowhere.

That is why I would not be prescriptive. You need a mix of skills around the table and the committee must be connected to the leadership of the council, so that difficult messages coming out of the audits are relayed to the decision makers, raised in full council if necessary, and certainly raised with the executive or the mayor. That linkage needs to be clear and fully operational for it to work properly.

Bill Butler: That is not different—

[The Chair]

We are going to finish.

Bill Butler: I will be brief. I have chaired quite a few audit committees, but not in local government. A good audit committee works. It ensures that the organisation operates effectively by being part of it, while everybody knows that if it has a problem, it will voice it and it will be trusted. That is what you are looking for in any audit committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear evidence from Richard Hebditch, coalition co-ordinator at the Better Planning Coalition, and Naomi Luhde-Thompson, member of the Better Planning Coalition steering group and director of rights community action at the Better Planning Coalition. We have until 5 pm for this panel.

[Siân Berry]

Q Could each of you lay out what you think are the benefits of the Bill from a planning perspective? Are there lessons from London? We just listened to John Denham talking about how there is a gap at London level below the unitaries, but there is nothing in the Bill that is changing the way the boroughs are, and maybe that works; maybe it does not. Can you tell us more about that?

Richard Hebditch: I think the Bill could be a very powerful tool from a planning point of view. The ability to co-ordinate across housing, transport and planning is really important. As in the London model, which obviously you know very well, that can be very powerful. One thing that is interesting with the Bill is the comparison with London’s accountability. What has been really important in London is the fact that you have the directly elected Assembly, committee structures with powers, and active civil society and media. There is also the statutory passenger watchdog in London, London TravelWatch, of which I am a board member. There is a developed infrastructure to scrutinise what the strategic authority and the mayor do, and that is important. Particularly given the increased powers there will be for strategic authorities elsewhere to call in planning applications and have mayoral development bodies, it is important to have that level of accountability.

[Siân Berry]

Naomi, do you have anything to add?

Naomi Luhde-Thompson: I could mention a little bit about public participation, but I do not know if you have a question on that later.

[Siân Berry]

Q Others might. I want to move to duties. We see duties for health and health inequalities in the Bill already. Are there any other duties that you would like to see added, potentially in Committee or at the next stage?

Richard Hebditch: As I mentioned, these are potentially very powerful bodies, as the Bill collects powers and duties from other legislation, rather than being a stand-alone piece of legislation. The health duty is potentially important. We would like to see duties around climate and nature. Those are long-term issues; they are not the kinds of things where, as a mayor or an authority, you are under short-term pressure—or, necessarily, pressure from central Government—to deliver, but they are really important. In the collection of duties from elsewhere—on local transport plans, for example—there are duties to have regard to national policy, but not in terms of the exercise of your functions, so these strategic authorities will be powerful delivery bodies in their own right, not simply as plan-making and strategy bodies, which makes it important to have those climate and nature duties as well.

Naomi Luhde-Thompson: The Labour Government in Wales introduced a different format in the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015—a public authority duty. It has a series of goals, and each public authority has to carry out those duties in relation to their functions. I should declare that I am a member of the Eryri national park authority, so I have a very close view of how this is actually carried out. It comes to the point about where the public interest is in the proposals in front of us. There is growth and a bit about health, but where is the public interest? It does not seem to me to be properly explained or described in the Bill that this is all about delivering on the public interest—what is the Government’s role in doing that?

There is a bit of confusion between the two Bills. Look at the health duty in this Bill and then look at the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, which is obviously in the Lords at the moment. There is no consultation for health groups in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, but there is a health duty on the combined county authority. It is just not connected. On the spatial development strategies, it is not particularly mentioned as a group, but there is a duty on the CCA, so it is really important to examine the connection between the two a bit more closely.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q I have two questions, one at the strategic level and one at the community level. Obviously we are pushing through strategic planning powers for mayors. I am interested in your assessment, given your huge expertise, of whether that is the right function, and what we need to do to ensure that it delivers sustainable development, which is obviously our objective.

At the community level, we obviously want to build in a way that is sustainable, but we need to make sure that there is public consent. I am interested in how we ensure that strategic planning powers sit alongside community engagement and community consent to make sure that there is a whole place sense of the direction of travel and the development that needs to happen, in a way that builds public support.

Naomi Luhde-Thompson: On public participation, the UK is a signatory of the Aarhus convention. Article 393 of the trade and co-operation agreement is really clear that when you are doing something that has an impact on the environment you must have a proper process of public participation. It must happen at an early enough time to influence the outcomes; otherwise, what is the point of having people involved? You are literally just asking them, “What colour do you want the gates to be?” You are not asking them to be involved in the full decision.

The issue that you have here—I will talk about the products that are produced—is that, if you look at the spatial development strategies, it specifically says in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, in proposed new section 12I of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004:

“No person is to have a right to be heard at an examination.”

That is completely the opposite of what you have on local plans: any person who makes representations must be given the opportunity to be heard in front of the examiner. That is not going to send out a strong signal that you actually want people to participate in the making of these spatial development strategies.

It is not a sell-out event to go to a plan examination, so I do not think that you need to be worried about that. I do, however, think that you need a right to be involved at that stage, and it cannot be at the discretion of someone else. I think that is one of the issues: if you have to wait for somebody else to give you consent or permission to enter that space, you do not have a right to enter it, because it is at somebody else’s discretion. That is why the formulation of such a right of access—a right to participate—is really important.

Your other point was about the duties, and how that is carried out. I would be really interested to see how the local growth plan is supposed to comply with, for example, the environmental principles policy statement. How does it combine with that? How does it combine with the spatial development strategy? What is the interaction there? It is quite complex, if you look at the organogram of the different plans that, if you are a member of the public, might affect and shape the place in which you live, and therefore what the purpose of all these plans are—whether they are there to achieve sustainable development in the public interest—and how you are supposed to get involved in influencing the outcome of the decisions that are made through these plans.

Richard Hebditch: It is probably also worth talking about the resourcing of all this. As people have discussed, we have the local government reorganisation at the same time. The new format for local plans, which are out of date, has new housing targets as well. Then we have the SDSs—spatial development strategies—on top of that. How do we make sure that we have the resourcing to develop all those things, which are happening at the same time? We then have wider planning reform, and we might have another planning Bill in the new year. There is a lot of potential chaos at the same time. I am sure the Government want to address that, and the resourcing for planners to develop the SDSs is very helpful, but there is a risk of not necessarily having a clear road map for how you get to that place. As I was saying, we are very supportive of the idea of spatial development strategies and the strategic layer, but the journey there is going to be quite chaotic. I think it would be good to look at issues around workforce skills and the timing of all the different things that are going on.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs Blundell]

Q Thank you, Minister, for appearing before us today. In Rochdale borough, where I am an MP, we will never forget the appalling case of Awaab Ishak, who of course was the two-year-old toddler who lost his life as a result of the local housing association’s failures. This came after Rochdale Boroughwide Housing removed elected representatives from its board. They were the people who could voice the concerns of local people on the representative body. Do you agree that local councillors or the local authority should be represented on housing boards, and that their statutory role on those boards would only serve to strengthen the voices and protect the rights of tenants?

Miatta Fahnbulleh: We are clear that councillors have an absolutely fundamental role to play in the democratic system that we are trying to create. They are not only elected, but champions and conduits for their community.

As we drive through these reforms, there is a question about how we build on the power of councillors and the role that they play, whether within our neighbourhood governance structures or, indeed, in how they interact with the mayor, and the accountability and scrutiny of the mayor.

You can have our assurance that councillors have a fundamental role in the landscape and are part of the infrastructure that we need to build on. There are huge opportunities for that as we take the process forward.

[Siân Berry]

Q Minister, has today’s evidence shown a gap opening up, with the simultaneous creation of unitaries alongside these new mayoral bodies, in terms of real professional scrutiny, accountability and actual checks on these powerful new bodies between elections? In particular, will you look again at resourcing the scrutiny of the mayors and bringing in opposition-led scrutiny, which is what has existed successfully and constructively in London for 25 years now?

Miatta Fahnbulleh: We recognise that, if you like, the scrutiny landscape is not as it should be, which is why some of the measures that we are driving through the Bill try to address that. We are moving at pace and creating institutions at pace—we recognise that and do not resile from it. We are doing so because we looked at the inheritance and were not pleased with it, so we thought that we had better make some progress in the time that we have.

However, it is absolutely the case that strong, accountable leaders are only as strong and accountable as the scrutiny institutions that you build around them. I think they have emerged organically in some instances, but we hope to use the Bill to create more structure around that so that alongside—hopefully—powerful mayors and powerful local authorities, we have that scrutiny function in place. Again, we will learn from what is working well and we will look at how we build on what is working well.

[Siân Berry]

Q My question was about resourcing. Have you had assurance that you will get some resources for this?

Miatta Fahnbulleh: Resourcing is a challenge across the piece. As we think about the structures that we are creating, we are also thinking about how we build capacity, because if we do not do that, we will create structures that will not be effective, which is not the outcome that we are trying to achieve.

[Lewis Cocking]

Q Minister, we have heard a lot of evidence today about how metro mayors work in urban areas—we have heard some successful examples. However, we have hardly heard any evidence at all about metro mayors in the shires or in rural communities. How do you see the positives of metro mayors working in rural communities?

Miatta Fahnbulleh: There are two things that I would say. Even in our urban areas, or what are defined as urban areas—for example, North of Tyne—there are big rural constituencies within them. Actually, many of our metro mayors straddle urban areas—in some instances, there are core cities—and rural areas.

The benefits are the same for both. If your starting position is, “How do we drive economic growth?”—that is one of the big issues—the evidence of the last decade and a half, as well as that from other countries, is that such a strategic level creates a massive opportunity to unlock growth. That is as true for our urban areas as it is for our rural areas.

However, I would also say that, yes, there is a model that we are trying to drive forward, but it has to be specific to particular places. There will be different constellations, if you like, of strategic authorities. That is okay, because what matters is that we create governance structures that can fundamentally drive outcomes that are tailored and specific to those areas.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Siân Berry Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

There are ideas in this Bill that devolve powers that we Greens can support. A layer of strategic government with funding and fundraising powers could empower areas of the country, such as Sussex, to improve daily life for our citizens and could strengthen democracy. However, it is worrying that the process for doing that so far and the ways in which decisions are moving forward on the reorganisation of local government have not listened to people who want to maintain their district and borough councils and have not properly engaged local people in devising new proposals rather than just commenting on them. If this is done without consent or respect for local areas, it will not be democratic or empowering.

Clause 57 is very unfair in grandfathering in existing mayoral arrangements for local councils but not preserving any committee systems—not even those chosen recently by referendum. On fair voting, the Bill is inadequate. For the new elected mayors, the Bill specifies a supplementary voting system that is better than first-past-the-post, but, as other Members have pointed out, that should be used next year in Sussex. Also, for the new authorities where new councillors are being elected, there is a genuine missed chance to have a fairer voting system for councils too.

The Bill is dangerously light on the democratic scrutiny of new mayors and combined authorities, and poor on standards in public life. There should be transparency duties on mayors to disclose their lobbying meetings, as Ministers do and all MPs should. Mayors will also be able to appoint commissioners for different areas of their powers, which will be powerful positions that are likely to be well remunerated. Yet the Bill appears to be silent on any higher standards of accountability, transparency or conduct for such people. Mayors and commissioners should all come under the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, as other people in this place do. There are big missed chances in the Bill in terms of new duties for poverty and inequality, climate, nature, healthy air, land and water pollution and health, particularly in relation to the impacts of transport and housing policy. On health determinants, the Bill mentions prosperity but not poverty or inequality; nor does it mention the huge chance to improve health by cleaning up filthy air pollution. Why not?

Greens will be arguing for all these goals and duties and more to be put in place firmly and clearly in the Bill, and for them to be matched with powers, funding and the ability to raise and use investment for homes, transport, education, justice, social justice, public health and all these other things to close the gaps that have so shamefully grown under successive Governments and continued Labour austerity. This Bill could help to deliver great things, but it will take many big changes, much work and much listening to good ideas from this part of the House for the Government to achieve that.

Oral Answers to Questions

Siân Berry Excerpts

Monday 14th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[Matthew Pennycook]

My hon. Friend will have noted the £39 billion allocated at the spending review to our new 10-year social and affordable homes programme, which, as the Deputy Prime Minister has made clear, we think will deliver about 300,000 affordable homes over its lifetime, with about 180,000 for social rent. He will also know that our Renters’ Rights Bill includes provisions that will empower tenants to challenge unreasonable rent increases.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

T3.  Two major reports—one from Shelter, which is coming, and one last week from Heriot-Watt University—have exposed something that I have observed myself in housing casework for many years, as a councillor and as an MP: people from some minority groups, even beyond the structural racism in society, experience worse outcomes and even direct discrimination from councils in regard to their access to housing. Will the Secretary of State commit to writing a formal response to me on the recommendations in those reports?

[Mr Speaker]

A “yes” will do.

Coastal Communities

Siân Berry Excerpts

Thursday 20th March 2025 Commons Chamber

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I am pleased to speak in the debate and I thank the hon. Member for North Norfolk (Steff Aquarone) for securing it.

In 2019, a House of Lords report on the future of coastal communities called Brighton

“probably the UK’s most successful seaside community,”

and we are. I am very pleased that the city council has recently set up a new seafront development board, and I have already had a positive meeting with its chair to discuss how we continue to make our seafront better, to support and grow our city’s wonderful reputation for heritage, music, the arts, shopping, amusement, community action, diversity, nature and wellbeing.

As others have said, there are currently no Government funding schemes specifically for coastal areas, and there is no ministerial focus; I echo the comments of everybody in this House on that. We need focus on the specific challenges that our coastal communities face, because austerity and Brexit have bitten Brighton’s communities too. Our people have big problems with housing costs, holiday lets, employment, health, transport and health inequality, which all need dealing with.

[Seamus Logan]

Does the hon. Member agree that Brexit has done immense harm to places such as Brighton and other coastal communities?

[Siân Berry]

I could not agree more. The amount of different sectors of the economy in Brighton and Hove that have remarked to me on the impact of Brexit is huge, not least the cultural industries.

I will echo others and talk a little about the regularly appalling state of our sea water, which is a genuine threat to our success. Southern Water has been taken to court and found guilty of criminal behaviour and lying, yet we still have sewage overflows off the south coast on a regular basis. I have met sea-swimming groups and individual constituents who have been very sick after swimming in the waters around Brighton, and the only way to get that properly under control is public ownership. My Green colleagues and I will continue to push for that in this Parliament.

I will very quickly shout out Lucy Davies, the brilliant and enthusiastic new director of Brighton Dome. When I met her recently, she told me about the excellent collaboration happening between cultural institutions along the Sussex coast. The coastal catalyst programme will support creativity and culture for young people from Bognor Regis to Bexhill, and it is exactly the kind of co-operative work that needs to happen.

There is no single solution to the challenges that impact on our coastal communities, but we need ambition, vision, a dedicated Minister and a proper package of strategic initiatives and funding. As MPs we can help by working together and with local leaders to build on the ideas, build up new initiatives that we all agree our communities need because of their very special natures, and put on the pressure for that to happen.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 2 Report

Siân Berry Excerpts

Wednesday 26th February 2025 Commons Chamber

[Angela Rayner]

As my hon. Friend has said, this is a devolved matter, but I am happy to work with the Scottish Government. I hope that they have looked at what we are doing in respect of the remediation acceleration plan, and also at the reforms that are under way to drive up standards in social housing through stronger regulation and enforcement measures, strengthening tenants’ voices and improving their access to redress. My hon. Friend is right to raise these issues, and I hope that the Scottish Government are following in our footsteps and will continue to learn from the legacy of Grenfell so that people in both Scotland and England can feel safe.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I thank the Deputy Prime Minister for, in particular, her comments about the way in which residents were treated. There have been strong recommendations for a review of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. My former role involved listening to and trying to support the many local community organisations that were dealing with the enormous gaps in the humanitarian response that had been left by the local authority; the problems continued for weeks. Can the Deputy Prime Minister tell us when we will hear about the timing and the format of that review of the Act?

[Angela Rayner]

We have looked at the Civil Contingencies Act and also at the category 1 training, and we have said that we accept what has been said and will take action. We will work with local partners in scoping progress for local authorities in regard to the training, and we are working with all other Departments to ensure that we can do that as quickly as possible. I commend the hon. Lady for her comments about social housing tenants. Having listened to what has been said by Members on both sides of the House in support of their constituents, I hope that those outside the House have been listening as well.

Proportional Representation: General Elections

Siân Berry Excerpts

Thursday 30th January 2025 Commons Chamber

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I associate myself with the comments of many other hon. Members today, and thank the hon. Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) for introducing the debate.

This debate comes at a crucial time. We are in a world characterised by democratic decline and falling trust in institutions. Without public belief in making change through democratic debate, political pluralism and representation from people who listen to them, we have a society vulnerable to exploitation by populist division and tyranny. First past the post adds to these risks. Those who seek to distort our national conversation from outside, using money and influence to pursue their own agenda, can see dangled in front of them the huge prize of what is virtually absolute power if they can achieve the slimmest of margins to reach first place in a volatile system. A two-party system, which first past the post assumes, is, in fact, long out of date.

As other hon. Members have said, the most recent UK general election was the most disproportionate on record. Not only did 58% of voters not receive an elected official of their choosing, but the election was one of the most disproportionate elections to a primary chamber anywhere in the world. People are voting in historic numbers for parties other than the Conservatives and Labour, representing different views across the political spectrum and bringing in points of view from across our island’s different nations, yet this Parliament does not come close to correctly reflecting that shift. We have a Parliament that is highly misrepresentative of the public’s preferences and a Government with a huge majority but only 33.7% of people’s preferences. That seems unbalanced and unrepresentative to me.

I am not here to make arguments that are only in my own self-interest. Proportionality is not the goal here; a better politics is. It is not just parties, but minority groups and the interests of groups who might be ignored, face discrimination or are geographically spread out, and whose interests do not often get a fair look-in when a large majority in this House is elected by only swing voters in marginal constituencies.

Like other Members from different parties, I was for many years a member of the London Assembly, elected under PR to scrutinise and hold to account a Mayor elected within a modified alternative vote system. I came here to this building to give evidence to the relevant all-party parliamentary group of the time in that capacity. I talked about how, as a London-wide member, working alongside constituency Members, my role was often to listen to groups who were not necessarily getting the ear of their constituency Member or the Mayor, and who were trying to highlight issues that were happening to people like them in pockets all around London.

[Mr Mohindra]

Will the hon. Member explain how constituency casework would be done? As constituency MPs, we all represent a defined area of the population. Is the hon. Member suggesting a two-tier system, where she will instead just sweep up from the constituency MP? Is she effectively asking for two tiers of MPs?

[Siân Berry]

Yes, exactly. I am describing the different kinds of work that different kinds of Members in the additional member system can do and how that benefits equality and representation. I am not making a party political point at all. I think members from other parties in the London Assembly can give examples of ways in which they have reached out and heard from people in different parts of London who have brought issues to prominence in the Assembly. In the case of the Green party, we can talk about council estate residents, private renters, young people, disabled people and older people, and the way that bringing their voices into the Assembly had a positive influence on the London Mayor’s policies and made him a positive advocate for helping to reduce the number of demolitions, for rent controls, for toilets on the London tube, and for youth services. That is very positive.

[Paul Holmes]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Siân Berry]

I will press on, because I have one more point to make.

That shows a contrast with the current system for general elections, where people believe that the national politics conversation does not necessarily involve them. We find that millions of people around the country are never canvassed or courted on the doorstep at all. They are taken for granted, and that is really poor. As the hon. Member for Leeds Central and Headingley said, the Members for those seats are called to other parts of the country, when they would prefer to be knocking on doors in their own.

On solutions, we urgently need an independent national commission on electoral reform. I want that done by the Government as soon as possible. The commission should look at how local councils and other bodies can be elected, too. We have an opportunity, presented by imminent local government reorganisation—the creation of combined authorities and potentially very large councils—to shift to a more proportional system, potentially using multi-member wards and the single transferable vote. That is the system used in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland. It is incredibly simple for voters to cast their preferences. The election counts are extremely exciting—almost like the final stages of “Strictly”—and it delivers remarkably proportional results. It delivers candidates based on consensus, not division. Importantly, it delivers for many people: not only hardworking representatives in the administration but people whose job it is to listen and represent them from opposition parties. That could help with the potential remoteness of the uber councils that are being talked about. That should be looked at by the commission as well. I will end there.

Planning Committees: Reform

Siân Berry Excerpts

Monday 9th December 2024 Commons Chamber

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

In advance of these proposals, has the Minister made any assessment of the number of senior local authority planning officers who move on to work directly for, or as private planning consultants to, large developers? Will he consider something I would like to see done anyway, which is registers of interests, gifts and hospitality, and bringing senior planners under the wing of the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, or a similar independent body, so that we can have the transparency we really need?

[Matthew Pennycook]

I thank the hon. Lady for her suggestion. Proposals in that area are not considered as part of this working paper, but she is more than welcome to submit her views in detail on that point.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Siân Berry Excerpts

Monday 2nd December 2024 Commons Chamber

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I am here to talk about the people, their treatment and their rights, and I am sorry I do not have more time to do the topic justice. I had been a London Assembly member for one year in 2017 when the Grenfell disaster happened, and it had such a huge impact on my work and on me personally. I will never, ever forget the many things that I saw and heard. I will never forget the smells, the burned debris on garden hedges, the community’s shock and heartbreak, and its spirit as it called me and many other elected representatives down there to try to deal with the issues that they themselves were dealing with and identifying. The people around Grenfell, the victims, the 72 people killed that day—they are constantly in my heart when I work on any related issue. I was also a councillor in Camden, and a few days later five of our blocks had to be evacuated due to related issues, so I have a perspective of dealing with a non-fatal but nevertheless disruptive evacuation and incident.

Let me rattle quickly through a few of the recommendations relating to people, and to these issues. I am desperate on behalf of the residents I represented then, and those I represent now in Brighton Pavilion, where we have a huge number of medium and high-rise blocks that need work. For no good reason I still see many of these issues emerging in relation to the treatment of residents in blocks, the information they can get out of their landlords, the slowness of the action, and the fact that substandard work is still being done on many people’s blocks—I should not still be doing this so long afterwards.

Let me start with the recommendations related to management. The way that the TMO treated its residents was abysmal. We have seen much evidence for that, but the report gets to the heart of it when it states that however “irritating and inconvenient” it may have been to deal with those residents,

“for the TMO to have allowed the relationship to deteriorate to such an extent reflects a serious failure on its part to observe its basic responsibilities.”

The housing ombudsman echoed that, speaking of gross imbalances of power. Residents who ask questions, or who start to organise their neighbours to have some kind of collective voice that might get things done, are still talked about as troublemakers, as militants, or as a nuisance. I am still encouraged not to listen to those residents when there are issues, which is not correct.

I also want to focus on transparency of information—these things are the basic building blocks on which resident trust can possibly be built. In 2017 I was having trouble getting fire risk assessments from Camden council. I went to the Information Commissioner’s Office, which responded in a fantastic way. She was clear that councils needed to publish those assessments proactively, yet here I am representing residents in Brighton, and it has taken 18 months. My predecessor, Caroline Lucas, first asked the council to publish its fire risk assessments when she realised that it was not complying with the ICO’s recommendations. I wrote to the council about the issue back in September when I realised that was the case, and finally last week I was told that some assessments would be published imminently. That is just not good enough from councils. I do not even know where to start when trying to get information about non-council landlords. It has been ridiculous on behalf of so many residents. Finally, I want to talk about the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and its recommendations, which are tremendous. The humanitarian response on the ground was nowhere near good enough—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

Order.