Immigration and Asylum Bill (Sixteenth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd November 2026 Public Bill Committees

Regulations

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 69, in clause 50, page 52, line 1, at end insert—

“(1A) Where any provision of this Act includes a power to make regulations and such provision or regulations would affect—

(a) the identification of victims of slavery and human trafficking in Scotland,

(b) the provision of support to victims of slavery and human trafficking in Scotland, or

(c) any duties on Scottish public authorities relating to tackling slavery and human trafficking in Scotland,

the Secretary of State must consult with and receive consent from Scottish Ministers before making such regulations.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult with and receive consent from Scottish Ministers before making regulations relating to slavery and human trafficking which affect Scotland.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 134.

Clause stand part.

Government amendment 127.

Clause 51 stand part.

Government amendments 128, 135, 129, 136 and 46.

Clauses 52 and 53 stand part.

[Siân Berry]

It is great to have you finishing up the Committee for us, Dr Murrison.

I have tabled amendment 69 in relation to clause 50 and part 1. That area of the Bill gives the Secretary of State quite broad power to make regulations that are consequential to the Bill. As it stands, the Bill has quite a range of implications for Scottish trafficking laws and how they are carried out. The amendment aims to ensure that the Government receive consent from Scottish Ministers before introducing regulations affecting slavery and human trafficking.

The amendment refers in particular to clause 11, which creates a new legal procedure for claim notices requiring people to notify the Home Office of any reasons or grounds for why they should be allowed to enter, remain or not be removed from the UK. In that respect, the Bill tries to shift the burden of responsibility on to survivors by creating the obligation to treat a failure to disclose relevant details at the earliest opportunity as damaging to one’s credibility.

The way things are looked at in Scottish law seem to be different from the English approach. This kind of restrictive approach to vulnerable groups seeking sanctuary in the UK seems to contradict the commitments in Scotland to the UN refugee convention and the UK’s obligations under the inter-agency co-ordination group against trafficking. Those obligations require victim identification procedures to take into account the possibility of trauma, coercion and subsequent delayed disclosure. The amendment would help by forcing the Government to look again at how clause 11 might interfere with the obligation placed on Scottish Ministers via the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015 to provide support to victims of trafficking.

Section 9 of that Act requires Scottish Ministers to secure necessary support and assistance for adult victims of human trafficking, and gives Scottish Ministers their own statutory duty. That duty is triggered by a reasonable grounds decision. The new credibility penalty in clause 11 seems therefore to conflict with the statutory framework established by the 2015 Act and with the approach enshrined within it—a fundamental human rights approach to believing survivors.

That statutory inconsistency between the two provisions poses a question of how reserved powers within the Bill and devolved functions will interact. Consideration must be given to the Bill’s implications for those devolved powers, particularly in relation to trafficking frameworks, and to whether the Bill’s provisions can be enacted without undermining existing statutory duties in Scotland.

I worked with the Scottish Refugee Council on the amendment. It recommends that Scotland should maintain its greater flexibility to provide secure immigration status for trafficking survivors, and its goals of supporting recovery and reducing the risk of re-trafficking. To do that, the Bill should explicitly protect the operation of the 2015 Act and preserve Scottish Ministers’ discretion to provide support. The amendment is therefore needed to ensure that UK immigration measures do not impede the fulfilment of devolved duties on trafficking.

Although I do not intend to push the amendment to a vote, I hope that the Government will look again and discuss this matter further with Scottish Ministers before the Bill’s final stages.

[Blake Stephenson]

We have reached the final provisions of the Bill—“Hurrah!”, I hear everyone say. These provisions cover regulations, extent and commencement. Such clauses are often treated as housekeeping, but how and when the Bill comes into force decides whether anything in it actually happens. And here the Government’s amendments tell a revealing story.

Government amendment 134 would mean that regulations made under the core protection powers are subject to affirmative procedure where they amend primary legislation. That is right; where Ministers change Acts of Parliament, Parliament should be able to vote. I only wish that the Government had applied that principle consistently. My amendment 142 would have done the same for regulations exempting further categories of people from contributing to the cost of their asylum support. As drafted, Ministers can widen those exemptions by negative procedure without a single vote. If the principle is good enough for Government amendment 134, it is good enough for amendment 142.

Government amendments 127 to 129 and 136 deal with extent to the Crown dependencies and overseas territories, and with aligning commencement dates with the provisions that they amend. They are technical amendments, and you will be pleased to hear, Dr Murrison, that we do not intend to divide the Committee on them.

Government amendment 135 deserves the Committee’s attention, however. As the Bill was introduced, part 3—on core protection—would have come into force automatically two months after Royal Assent. Under Government amendment 135, it will come into force only when the Secretary of State chooses to make regulations. A fixed date of implementation has become an open-ended discretion. Government amendment 46 gives the Lord Chancellor a new power to rewrite tribunal rules around the start of the new appeals authority, again by negative procedure and with no vote required.

The Government can move quickly when they want to. Government amendment 47 brings the new deportation provisions into force on Royal Assent. The question, then, is not whether Ministers can set a firm date, but why, on the central reforms of the asylum system, they are now choosing not to. The Government’s message on asylum has been about urgency: “The system is broken and must be fixed.” Yet when it comes to the provisions that are meant to fix it, the start date slips from a certainty to a maybe. We saw the same pattern on settlement this week. It started with a policy announced a year ago; it was delayed from April to the autumn; and when it finally arrived, it was softened. There is tough language, but the Government are quietly kicking the can down the road.

Amendment 69 in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion would require the Secretary of State not only to consult Scottish Ministers, but to obtain their consent before making any regulations under the Bill that affect the identification or support of victims of modern slavery in Scotland or the duties of Scottish public authorities.

I recognise that victim support in Scotland operates within a devolved framework. Ministers should talk to their Scottish counterparts, but consultation and consent are very different things indeed. Consent is a veto. Immigration is a reserved matter and the national referral mechanism is a UK-wide system—one that is too often used by those facing removal to delay it. Handing the Scottish Government a block on changes to that system would create precisely the kind of divergence that people smugglers and those rigging our laws are quick to exploit. There has been an obvious pattern throughout the Committee where the Green party has tabled amendments to leave out clause after clause of the Bill. Amendment 69 is another attempt to slow down a system that already moves far too slowly, and we will oppose it.

Earlier in the Committee, we sought to put deadlines in the Bill, requiring the first time period regulations to be made within six months of the new authority being established and limiting how long cases could be routed back to the first-tier tribunal. The Government did not accept them. Amendment 135 shows why they were needed. Without dates in law, there is nothing to hold Ministers to. I therefore ask the Minister two questions. First, will she set out a timetable for commencing each part of the Bill? In particular, when does she expect part 3 to come into force? Secondly, why have the Government moved part 3 from automatic commencement to commencement by regulations, and will she commit to publishing that date before Report? If the Government are serious about fixing the system, they should be willing to say when.

As this is likely to be the last time I speak in this Committee, I thank you, Dr Murrison, and the Chairs of previous sittings; the Clerks, for their very patient work indeed on a substantial amendment paper; and the Minister and Members on all sides for this debate. We have disagreed—often sharply, but politely. The Committee has given these issues the scrutiny they deserve and we will no doubt return to many of them on Report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I thought the hon. Gentleman was going to pose another devastating challenge. I hope hon. Members feel the intentness with which we listened and absorbed the discussion and debate. Many things from this Committee will influence a lot of our thinking.

To conclude, I just want to say a few more things on the Bill. We are proud of the protection that we provide in this country to those fleeing war and terror. However, we also know we must bear down on abuse and restore order and control to our borders. This Bill provides protection to those in need while bearing down on abuse of the system. It ensures swift and fair decisions, giving sanctuary to those in need while removing those with no right to remain. It provides robust legal protections while tackling abuse of human rights laws. It ensures that the right to support comes with responsibilities and expectations on those who receive it.

Abuse of our system is eroding public support for the very idea of providing asylum at all. This Bill ensures that our asylum system is fit for the modern world, and earns the consent of the British people, who are open, tolerant and generous, but rightly expect that we restore order and control to our borders.

[Siân Berry]

I echo some of the comments from other hon. Members on the Committee and thank the Minister for engaging with the many amendments I have tabled to the Bill, because I think they are necessary. I believe that the Bill does not reflect the long-held British value of welcoming refugees, which is still the view of the majority of people in our country. I do not think that obstructive and unfair processes, damaging attitudes and downgrading human rights will stop the criminal gangs or the boats, or tackle the lack of safe routes, which feeds the market for that kind of organised crime. However, I believe that we have had a constructive debate about many of these things, and Parliament will hopefully convince the Minister and the Home Secretary to think again. I also very much appreciate the excellent chairing that we have had.

Finally, I want to thank the many different charities, grassroots support networks, non-governmental organisations and independent experts who have helped and supported the scrutiny I have given to the Bill, not least the Refugee Council—an amazing organisation that rightly essentially won “The Traitors” last week, after Romesh Ranganathan gave his well-deserved prize money to support their work. May they long continue to be faithful. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 134, in clause 50, page 52, line 10, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—

“(b) regulations under section (Core protection: amendments) which amend, repeal or revoke primary legislation (within the meaning of that section);”.—(Anna Turley.)

This amendment is consequential on NC36. The effect of it would be that regulations made under the power in the new clause inserted by NC36 would be subject to the affirmative procedure if they amended primary legislation, and otherwise subject to the negative procedure.

Clause 50, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 51

Extent

Amendment made: 127, in clause 51, page 52, line 21, at end insert—

“(3) Paragraph 21 of Schedule 1 (and section 1(3) so far as relating to that paragraph) also extends to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man and the British overseas territories within the meaning of the British Nationality Act 1981 (see section 50(1) of that Act).

(4) His Majesty may by Order in Council provide—

(a) for any of the provisions of this Act to extend, with or without modification, to the Isle of Man, and

(b) for any of the provisions of Parts 3 and 4, and this Part so far as relating to Parts 3 and 4, to extend, with or without modification, to the Bailiwick of Guernsey.

(5) A power under any provision listed in subsection (6) may be exercised—

(a) so as to extend (with or without modification) to the Isle of Man any amendment or repeal made by or under this Act of any part of an Act to which the provision listed in subsection (6) relates;

(b) so as to extend (with or without modification) to the Bailiwick of Jersey any amendment or repeal made by or under Part 2 or 5 of this Act of any part of an Act to which the provision listed in subsection (6) relates;

(c) so as to extend (with or without modification) to the Bailiwick of Guernsey any amendment or repeal made by or under Part 2, 3 or 4 of this Act of any part of an Act to which the provision listed in subsection (6) relates.

(6) Those provisions are—

(a) section 36 of the Immigration Act 1971;

(b) section 9(3) of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997;

(c) section 170(7) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999;

(d) section 163(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002;

(e) section 49(3) of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004;

(f) section 63(3) of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006;

(g) section 60(4) of the UK Borders Act 2007;

(h) section 60(6) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015;

(i) section 95(5) of the Immigration Act 2016;

(j) section 86(4) of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022;

(k) section 64(4) of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025.”—(Anna Turley.)

This amendment provides for the consequential amendment of the British Nationality Act 1981 in paragraph 21 of Schedule 1 to the Bill to extend to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the British overseas territories. The amendment also provides powers for other provisions of the Bill to be extended to the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man.

Clause 51, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 52

Commencement

Amendments made: 128, in clause 52, page 52, line 23, leave out “(5)” and insert “(5B)”.

This amendment is consequential on amendments 129 and 136.

Government amendment 47, in clause 52, page 52, line 30, at end insert—

“(ba) section (Liability to deportation of certain residents despite section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971);”.

This amendment would mean that the new clause inserted by NC5 would come into force on Royal Assent.

Government amendment 135, in clause 52, page 52, line 37, leave out paragraph (a).

This amendment would change the way in which Part 3 (core protection) is commenced, so that instead of it commencing automatically two months after Royal Assent it would be commenced by regulations.

Government amendment 129, in clause 52, page 53, line 7, at end insert—

“(5A) Section (Enforcement of decisions of the Immigration Services Commissioner) comes into force at the time when paragraphs 9 and 14 of Schedule 1 to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 come fully into force.”

This amendment makes provision about the commencement of the new clause inserted by amendment NC33.

Government amendment 136, in clause 52, page 53, line 7, at end insert—

“(5B) In Schedule (Core protection: amendments)—

(a) paragraph 9(c) comes into force at the same time as paragraph 3(3) of Schedule 11 to the Immigration Act 2016;

(b) paragraph 28 comes into force at the same time as section 59(3) of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 comes fully into force;

(c) paragraph 51 comes into force at the same time section 135 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 comes into force.”

This amendment would delay the commencement of three amendments made by the new Schedule inserted by NS1, so that they come into force only when provisions being amended are brought into force.

Government amendment 46, in clause 52, page 53, line 25, at end insert—

“(11) The Lord Chancellor may by rules made by statutory instrument make amendments to Tribunal Procedure Rules in connection with regulations under subsection (1) that bring Part 1 into force.

(12) Before making rules under subsection (11), the Lord Chancellor must consult the Senior President of Tribunals.

(13) A statutory instrument containing rules under subsection (11) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”—(Anna Turley.)

This amendment would give the Lord Chancellor the power to amend Tribunal Procedure Rules in connection with the commencement of the powers of the IIAA. This may be especially needed if commencement regulations make the kind of provision mentioned in clause 52(8). (See also amendment 43.)

Clause 52, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 53 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

I would like to reflect on everyone’s comments in conclusion to today’s proceedings, which were well made, and add my own. I thank officials and all colleagues for the thoughtful way in which they have approached these matters.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd November 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Today we will continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Immigration and Asylum Bill. As a reminder, the Committee must conclude its consideration of the Bill today. In accordance with the programme order for this Bill, if the Committee is still sitting at 5 pm, the Chair will put the questions necessary to bring proceedings to a conclusion. There can be no debate after 5 pm.

Before we begin, I remind hon. Members to please switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Members are reminded to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in any debate.

New Clause 25

Review of non-statutory first responder organisations

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act and annually thereafter, review the list of first responder organisations which are not public authorities (‘non-statutory first responder organisations’) for the purposes of assessing whether further organisations should become non-statutory first responder organisations.

(2) Any review under subsection (1) must—

(a) have regard to the need to maintain a system for identifying victims of modern slavery which is effective, ensures appropriate and timely safeguarding of potential victims, and provides appropriate and timely access to support;

(b) be based on regular review and analysis of—

(i) the number of referrals received through the National Referral Mechanism from statutory and non-statutory first responder organisations, and any changes or trends in the number of referrals received or the proportions received from statutory and non-statutory first responder organisations;

(ii) the geographic areas from which referrals are received and the types of exploitation to which they relate, any changes or trends in such data, and whether there are any identifiable gaps in reporting related to geography or exploitation type.”—(Siân Berry.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to annually review whether further organisations should be registered as non-statutory first responder organisations, based on the capacity and needs of the system.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 26—Review of training for first responder organisations—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, conduct a review of the training and guidance provided to first responder organisations.

(2) A review under this section must consider—

(a) the quantity, quality and content of training currently provided to first responder organisations;

(b) the training needs of first responder organisations, and the extent to which these needs are met by current training provision;

(c) any gaps or weaknesses in the training currently provided to first responder organisations;

(d) any further resources which are required to meet the training needs of first responder organisations.

(3) A report on the findings of a review under this section must be laid before both Houses of Parliament.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to conduct a review of the training and guidance provided to first responder organisations which assesses the quality of current provision, the needs of first responders, any gaps in current provision, and any further resources required.

New clause 27—Resourcing of non-statutory first responder organisations—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, review the resourcing of non-statutory first responder organisations.

(2) A review under this section must have regard to the need to increase the capacity, effectiveness and efficiency of non-statutory first responder organisations.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review the resourcing of non-statutory first responder organisations.

[Siân Berry]

It is great to have you back in the Chair today, Mrs Barker.

I am speaking today in support of new clauses 25, 26 and 27, which I tabled and which address the issues faced by non-statutory first responder organisations. As we know, people suffering from modern slavery cannot self-refer themselves into the national referral mechanism. These new clauses are a vital part of making sure that we fulfil our duties towards victims of modern slavery.

We have designated statutory and non-statutory organisations that are known as first responders. Those organisations have a duty to refer potential survivors of trafficking and modern slavery into the NRM when they identify indicators of trafficking that suggest somebody may be a potential victim of trafficking or modern slavery. However, the number of non-statutory first responders in the UK has not kept up with the increasing demand for referrals into the NRM. We know that the percentage of referrals from non-statutory first responder organisations is dropping. That does not mean a lack of demand, but rather a lack of capacity; it means that the number of non-statutory first responders has not kept up with the increasing demand for references into the national referral mechanism. I believe that the Government need to take action on this, hence these new clauses.

Non-statutory first responders play an absolutely crucial role in the identification and support of survivors. Many organisations that support potential victims report that many survivors are afraid of public authorities, the statutory first responders. They worry that the statutory first responders will, for example, prioritise criminal investigations over the survivor’s safety and that these FROs might have information-sharing policies with other Government agencies, as we have discussed when debating earlier amendments.

These organisations find that their service users are better served with referrals made by non-statutory first responders. We can see in the evidence that the data suggests that referrals made by non-statutory first responders are more likely to get positive decisions in the NRM. That suggests higher quality service and referrals, along with support to gather the evidence provided about potential victims and getting those people properly referred in to the support that they need.

Between the second quarter of 2025 and the second quarter of 2026, referrals made by non-statutory first responder organisations received a positive reasonable grounds decision in 81% of cases. The rate of positive decisions for referrals by local authorities was 73%, while it was 62% for police referrals and just 47% for the other Government agencies. That suggests a lack of capacity in those organisations, but also systemic issues around collecting evidence and making the appropriate support available so that the right disclosures can be made.

Higher-quality referrals of the kind made by non-statutory first responders also make the job of NRM decision makers easier and faster. Their work leads to a more efficient use of the public purse as they cut down on the need for reconsiderations. However, many of these organisations report a lack of capacity, which in some cases leads to potential victims being turned away. In many cases, potential victims have also given up looking for a non-statutory first responder at that point. As an MP, I am not a first responder of any kind, but in my casework I have had people come to me with indicators of modern slavery, and I found it hard to find the right first responder organisation and to reassure that person that they would be able to get hold of them. For my casework, I would love to have more non-statutory first responders available in my area.

The evidence underscores the urgent need to increase the number of non-statutory first responders through an open tender and transparent application process to deal with increased demand for referrals, reduce the postcode lottery in access to support for survivors of modern slavery, and reduce the stigma around referrals. That is the ultimate call of new clause 25: to hold a review to look for new non-statutory first responder organisations.

I have also tabled new clause 26, which asks for a review of training for first responder organisations. We need high-quality and specialised training for first responders. That is integral to successful victim identification and would ensure better quality and more efficient decision making. Statutory and non-statutory first responder organisations and non-first responder organisations have said that there are serious gaps in first responder training provision. In fact, many officers in statutory first responder organisations are unaware that they are first responders, which means that Home Office toolkits and information hubs alone are ineffective. My new clause would ask for a review of the quantity, quality and content of training, ensure that such training reaches the organisations who need it, and make a report on the review available to the Houses of Parliament.

New clause 27 would, again, tackle the issues that I have outlined. It asks for a review of the resourcing of non-statutory first responder organisations. The capacity issues faced by first responders highlight their lack of resources to make enough referrals to keep up with the increased number of survivors who need them. First responders do not receive dedicated funding to discharge their responsibilities, which can significantly affect their capacity to fulfil their role effectively. In practice, it can limit their ability to allocate specialist staff, undertake first responder duties and ensure sufficient staffing levels to meet demand and to respond to the people referred to them and other organisations that raise cases with them.

Accordingly, there have been many calls for the further allocation of resources to non-statutory first responders and the need to enable survivors to access identification and support through the NRM. We are asking for a review of current resourcing for first responders, to get some evidence of the scale and impact of this issue, identify gaps in capacity of service provision and assess how that affects the identification of and support for potential victims. Such a review would also help to determine what actions, resources or structural changes are needed to address those gaps and ensure that first responders are able to discharge their responsibilities effectively. It would also ensure that we, as a country, are discharging our duties towards the victims and survivors of modern slavery.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

As always, Mrs Barker, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I wish a good morning to honourable colleagues. I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for new clauses 25, 26 and 27, which seek to introduce statutory reviews relating to first responder organisations. Modern slavery is a brutal crime that strips people of their dignity, and the Government remain unwavering in their commitment to tackling this abuse and ensuring that survivors can access the right protections and support they need to recover and rebuild their lives. The Government recognise the vital role that first responders play in identifying potential victims of modern slavery and referring them into the national referral mechanism. Work is ongoing to consider the support and training needed for first responders as part of the implementation of the Bill to ensure a robust end-to-end system.

However, the Government do not consider these new clauses necessary. Mandating specific reviews in primary legislation would duplicate existing activity, reduce operational flexibility and create additional statutory reporting requirements without improving outcomes for potential victims. The existing framework enables referrals through a broad range of statutory and non-statutory first responder organisations. The overwhelming majority of referrals are made by statutory first responders, demonstrating that existing arrangements are well established and operating effectively.

We have recently introduced a range of improvements to support first responders, including enhancements to the NRM referral form and the publication of the first responder toolkit, which provides practical guidance to support high quality referrals. We keep the operational effectiveness of the first responder system, including the training and support available to first responders, under regular review. We continue to consider evidence from operational engagement, published data, stakeholder feedback, and the lived experience advisory panels that were attended as part of the recent call for evidence on victim identification. I am particularly grateful to the survivors who shared their feedback, which continues to inform our work.

I reiterate that, since taking office in 2024, this Government have demonstrated their commitment not only to improving identification and support for modern slavery victims, but to tackling modern slavery in all its forms. That includes, but is not limited to, clearing the unacceptable NRM backlog in just two years. As a result, victims are now spending less time waiting for recognition of their victim status, which helps them with their recovery. We have improved support for adult victims through the procurement of a new support for victims of modern slavery contract, replacing the current modern slavery victim care contract. We have also invested £25 million to deliver a new contract, which will provide national coverage of the independent child trafficking guardianship service across England and Wales from 2027 to support child victims.

We have introduced a change to support skilled workers leaving exploitative employers and moving to new, safe employment. We have provided a more cohesive response to labour exploitation, by introducing stand-alone offences for child criminal exploitation and cuckooing through the Crime and Policing Act 2026, and by creating the Fair Work Agency through the Employment Rights Act 2025. Those changes seek to collectively tackle modern slavery and make the operating environment tougher for those who commit these horrendous crimes and more supportive of those affected by them.

I will refer to a couple of points made by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. She is right that the overwhelming majority of referrals are made by statutory first responders. In the year ending June 2026, a total of 25,373 potential victims of modern slavery were referred to the Home Office, a 5% increase compared with the year ending March 2026. Of those, 93% of were made by statutory first responders and 4% were made by non-statutory first responders. Our established position is that an effective first responder cohort is essential to victim identification and that the operation of the first responder system should be kept under review through existing policy and operational processes.

The Home Office engages regularly with statutory and non-statutory first responder organisations and other stakeholders to identify operational challenges and opportunities for improvement. As I mentioned, we recently introduced the updated referral form, first responder e-learning and the first responder toolkit. The recent call for evidence on victim identification gathered evidence relevant to the operation of the NRM and continues to inform policy development. The Home Office continues to consider opportunities to strengthen support and training for first responders, informed by stakeholder engagement and calls for evidence.

I think I have responded to the hon. Member’s points. We continuously review and develop processes relating to first responders. I am afraid that, for the reasons I have set out, we do not support these new clauses, and they should not be added to the Bill.

[Siân Berry]

I appreciate the detail in the Minister’s response, and I am content to withdraw the new clause. However, I would very much like the points around resourcing to be tackled, and I do not think that that was covered in the Minister’s response. She might agree to write to us with more about the resourcing of non-statutory first responders and the future plans for it. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 28

IIAA: publication of data

“(1) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for the publication of data relating to the work of the IIAA.

(2) The data required by this section must be updated and published at least every three months.

(3) The data to be published under this section must include—

(a) the number of appeals submitted to the IIAA;

(b) the number of decisions made by the IIAA;

(c) the outcomes of decisions made by the IIAA;

(d) the proportion of people submitting appeals to the IIAA who had legal representation;

(e) the number of appeals waiting to be processed by the IIAA;

(f) the length of time taken for a decision to be made on an appeal by the IIAA;

(g) the number of appeals that were withdrawn before being heard by the IIAA;

(h) the number of reviews of decisions made by the IIAA under section 6; and

(i) the outcomes of reviews of decisions made by the IIAA under section 6.

(4) The data published must, where possible, be broken down by—

(a) the type of appeal;

(b) the nationality of the person submitting the appeal;

(c) the gender of the person submitting the appeal; and

(d) the age of the person submitting the appeal.”—(Siân Berry.)

This new clause would require the Home Secretary to arrange for the publication, at least every quarter (as is the case for the existing Immigration and Asylum Tribunal), of data relating to the work of the IIAA.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 38—Use of immigration data to develop artificial intelligence—

“(1) Personal data obtained or generated in the exercise of functions relating to immigration, asylum, nationality or modern slavery may not be used to train, fine-tune, test, evaluate or otherwise develop an artificial intelligence system.

(2) Any contract for the provision of an artificial intelligence system used in connection with those functions must prohibit the supplier from retaining or using such data for any purpose other than providing the service and must require the deletion of such data upon the completion of the task for which it has been provided.

(3) For the purposes of this section, an interview record, witness statement or account given by a person remains personal data even where names or other direct identifiers have been removed.”

[Siân Berry]

The purpose of my new clauses is to ensure that the Government stop using artificial intelligence systems to shape life-changing—and, in some cases, life-or-death—decisions about people’s protection, liberty and removal until they can show that they are lawful, accurate and open to challenge.

This debate is not solely about the future, because that goes on in the present: the Home Office already deploys two AI tools in asylum casework. The asylum policy search tool has operated since July 2025, and the asylum case summarisation tool was rolled out to all decision makers in April 2026. Both tools use OpenAI’s GPT-4.

According to the Department’s own impact assessment, those tools summarise around 17,500 asylum cases every month, including interviews in which people share traumatic experiences relating to torture, persecution, their sexuality, faith and politics. A machine condenses those detailed accounts into the summary, which a decision maker reads before deciding whether that person will be sent back. That is the human cost at stake.

The Home Office and the Minister need to deal with those issues—particularly the legality of that practice. The Home Office ignored its own AI playbook when introducing those tools. Neither is listed on the algorithmic transparency register, there is no independent audit and testing of the policy search tool has now stopped altogether. As far as I can see, the Government’s only justification for using those tools is speed, rather than quality or someone’s human right to have their evidence in a life-or-death case considered in full by another human. When the cost of an error is a person being returned to danger, speed is not a safeguard and does not equal justice. Parliament must not accept a system that cannot show its working or justify its decisions. The Minister must deal with those points if she wishes to dismiss the new clauses.

New clause 37 is simple, but it is also comprehensive and precise. It says that no decision with a legal or a similarly significant effect on a person and relating to protection, leave detention, removal, support or trafficking may be made by, or with the help of, an AI system that processes their personal data. Subsection (3) makes it clear that any “summary, transcript, translation,” or “search result” generated by AI and given to a decision maker counts as assistance.

A human who reads a machine’s summary of an interview is already seeing the case through the filter of that machine. If the summary omits a detail that shows an account’s credibility, the decision maker may never know to look for it. That is unacceptable when a person’s life or freedom is at stake. Subsection (6) matters, as the immigration exemption in the Data Protection Act 2018 currently lets the Home Office set aside people’s data rights. That subsection ensures that the exemption cannot be used to involve AI in those decisions.

New clause 38 protects the data itself. Asylum interviews hold the most sensitive information that the state collects, about health, sexuality, religion, political opinion, criminal allegations and details of children. The Department’s own impact assessment for the ACS and APS tools ticks every one of those categories. People give that information to claim protection; they do not give it to train commercial AI. New clause 38 would set out that the data may not be used to build, train or test AI systems, and that suppliers must not keep or reuse it.

Subsection (3) closes an obvious loophole. An asylum account does not stop being personal just because the name is removed. In so many cases, the story itself identifies the person because of the detail that must be included. The impact assessment for the asylum case summarisation tool records that no other party is involved in processing and names no processer, even though the model is supplied by OpenAI and is hosted on Microsoft’s Azure platform. Parliament is entitled to know what those contracts say. New clause 38 would put the answer to that beyond doubt.

Relatedly, I am also concerned about the appeals systems set up by schedule 3 and clause 13, which we have debated. Under the new appeals authority, if an adjudicator cannot see whether AI shaped the decision under appeal, the appeal cannot correct it. Changes need to be made to schedule 3 to require the Home Office to say, in every appeal, whether AI was used in the original decision, and to produce any output that was relied on. The legislation, through amendments that I hope the Government will introduce, needs to state that an adjudicator may not use AI to decide an appeal, judge credibility or write reasons. Credibility is a human judgment about a human being, and such decisions are about people’s human rights. To ensure that the conditions stay that way, restrictions on AI must be added to the Bill.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for tabling new clauses 37 and 38, which address an important issue. It is right that, as technology develops, we continue to monitor it and do everything we can to use it effectively and responsibly.

New clause 37 would effectively bar the use of AI systems in immigration and modern slavery decisions in all but a small number of highly limited circumstances. It would apply to any decision made by or with the assistance of AI systems. That would include the prohibition of summaries, transcripts or search results being relied on or made available to a decision maker. The Government are fully committed to implementing AI systems in a responsible way, in line with our legal and ethical obligations, which we take seriously. We have in place robust policies and frameworks that guide our approach to adoption of AI systems. All new AI tools must undergo mandatory evaluation and insurance, and we have in place measures to ensure that staff who use such tools are provided with clear guidance and ongoing training on how to use them responsibly. We also have in place measures to ensure that where AI systems are used, they are adopted in a transparent way, with clear mechanisms for accountability.

The UK general data protection regulation, or GDPR, already sets out robust safeguards to protect the rights of an individual who is subject to a solely automated decision that has no meaningful human involvement. For example, under article 22C of the regulation, safeguards are required where a significant decision is based solely on automated processing and based entirely or partly on personal data. Those safeguards include measures that

“provide the data subject with information about decisions...enable the data subject to make representations…enable the data subject to obtain human intervention”

and

“enable the data subject to contest such decisions.”

Together, those existing legal, ethical and governance safeguards already require careful consideration of the rights and interests of individuals when deploying artificial intelligence. I hope that that reassures the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion that the Government remain committed to ensuring that AI systems are adopted in a fair, responsible and ethical way.

However, we must also recognise that AI is creating new opportunities. AI has the potential to greatly transform the way in which the Government carry out functions and provide services. In his recent speech to the UN General Assembly, the Prime Minister said that the UK will put AI at the heart of our G20 presidency next year, and that we will bring the right people together to deliver on the potential for AI to be used for good, while guarding against the risks. This new and powerful technology can increase speed and consistency across our services, providing a better experience for those who interact with them.

[Siân Berry]

The Minister mentions speed and consistency, but I am worried about quality and bias. Given that AI is trained on what is currently on the internet, and given the biases that exist in society, is she confident that credibility decisions and recommendations will not be subject to racial or gender bias, for example?

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Lady makes an important point—we have all seen issues of ingrained bias in the media—but we are ensuring that we have safeguards in place. AI systems should not undermine people’s rights or discriminate unfairly. The Government are committed to responsible and evidence-based AI adoption guided by robust policies, ethical frameworks and transparent governance. That includes mandatory evaluation and assurance for all new AI tools, including ongoing staff training in responsible AI practices and clear accountability mechanisms to ensure that every deployment of AI upholds public trust and meets our legal and ethical obligations.

Operational efficiency time savings, as measured during the pilot, are set out in the pilot evaluation. A high volume of detailed information is gathered during the asylum decision-making process and interviews. Decision makers who have had access to the case summary are able to effectively identify areas of review to aid the decision-making process. We will continue to review and improve the tool’s outputs for the benefit of decision makers. The output of the tool is deliberately designed not to provide enough information for the decision maker to make their decision. It is there to aid them in the decision-making process and direct them to the information that they need to do that more efficiently.

I want to re-emphasise the mitigations we are putting in place to protect public safety and national security from AI harms. They include new offences targeting AI-generated child sexual abuse materials and the creation of non-consensual sexually explicit deepfake images, and the extension of the paedophile manuals offence to cover AI-generated material. We are also working with industry and the AI Security Institute to understand and address AI-enabled harms. We have introduced measures that will enable authorised organisations to safely and easily test AI systems for harmful and illegal outputs, which will help to identify vulnerabilities in safety mechanisms, improve safeguards and prevent criminal misuse.

To reiterate, data protection law applies to any processing of personal data, including personal data processed by or for the development of AI systems related to immigration functions. Where solely automated decision making—any decision taken by automated means and without meaningful human involvement—has taken place for a decision that has legal or similarly significant effects, there are specific provisions in place. The Home Office does not undertake solely automated decision making, but uses AI in various roles across the system, such as translation, summarisation and other assistive roles. The use of those AI systems is governed by data protection law where personal data is processed, and by the Home Office’s internal AI use policy. The Information Commissioner has also published guidance on how to apply data protection law to AI, which is reflected in the Home Office’s processes and policies.

As I have said, AI can support our decision-making process, particularly by reducing the time that decision makers spend on basic, time-consuming tasks, allowing them to focus their attention and human expertise, to which the hon. Lady referred, where they are most beneficial. AI tools are already assisting asylum decision makers. The asylum case summarisation and asylum policy search tools are already in operation. Our evaluation of those tools shows that their use can reduce the time taken to carry out some decision-making tasks, creating new efficiencies. The Home Office published those evaluations, demonstrating our commitment to transparency.

It is right that we work to harness those opportunities for the benefit of those we serve. The Government’s position is that AI will have a significant part to play in transforming our public services and ensuring that the immigration system remains fair and sustainable in the future, while not placing unnecessary burdens on UK taxpayers. The new clause does not add to the safeguards already in place, but it does significantly restrict our ability to realise the benefits of AI in delivering better public services now and in the future. I do not believe that that it is proportionate or desirable.

New clause 38 seeks to prevent personal data relating to immigration, asylum and modern slavery from being used to train and develop AI models, to prevent suppliers of AI systems from retaining or using such data except to fulfil their obligations in providing the service, and to include redacted information within the definition of personal data for immigration purposes. AI systems must be tested and evaluated using real-world data to ensure that they are accurate, safe and effective. By prohibiting the use of immigration and other related data for those purposes, the new clause would severely constrain the development and deployment of AI, including for tools that have not been trained on Home Office data. Taken alone, it risks encouraging the deployment of AI that has not been rigorously tested and evaluated.

[Siân Berry]

As I said in my speech, the impact assessment for the summarisation tool states that no other party is involved in the processing of people’s personal data. I think the Minister has confirmed that data is passed back into OpenAI and Microsoft systems for training by the tools. Would she be prepared to put that in writing for us so that we can look at it again?

[Anna Turley]

Yes, I am happy to respond and clarify. I reiterate that by prohibiting the use of immigration and other related data for these purposes, new clause 38 would severely constrain the development and deployment of AI, including for tools that have not been trained on Home Office data.

Taken alone, new clause 38 risks encouraging the deployment of AI that has not been rigorously tested and evaluated. The Government are committed to responsible AI adoption, so that is not tenable. In conjunction with new clause 37, however, the cumulative effect would be that AI could not be developed using, or deployed within, immigration and other related functions. That would prevent the use of AI to improve the efficiency and security of the immigration system and to protect the vulnerable, even where it is effective, efficient and ethical to do so.

The use of any personal data in the development of AI systems related to immigration and related functions is also governed by the UK GDPR, as I have said. Existing GDPR obligations impose rigorous processes to ensure that the processing of personal data is lawful, proportionate, secure and transparent. They also require those processing personal data to consider whether anonymous or pseudonymised data could be used to achieve the same result.

The Home Office manages AI suppliers through procurement, contractual and assurance controls designed to protect personal and Government data. Our AI policies have introduced appropriate contractual provisions. Contractual controls, including non-disclosure agreements and confidentiality clauses, expressly restrict how any Home Office data is processed and used—for example, Home Office contract material requires authority data to remain within the supplier’s secure environment.

Lastly, the intent of new clause 38(3) is already covered by data protection legislation, which provides the legal definition of personal data. The test for determining whether data is categorised as personal data requires a holistic assessment as to whether that data can be used to identify an individual, and does not rely solely on whether direct identifiers are included within it. Altering that definition through new clause 38 would have wide-ranging impacts, including on the definition of personal data offered in new clause 37.

For those reasons, the Government cannot accept the new clauses and I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion to withdraw the motion.

[Siân Berry]

I am afraid that I am not convinced that the Home Office has the right protections in place under current law or through the Bill. I detect that the Minister is not completely sure of the grounds that she has given for dismissing the new clauses, or that safeguards are in place for privacy and the most sensitive personal data in current and future use of AI.

I suspect that I have made the Minister think more about this today, so I hope that she will seek further information and consider introducing further measures to the Bill in its next stages. For now, pending further debate, I am happy not to press these two new clauses. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 39

Further provisions relating to the prevention of slavery and human trafficking in organisations and value chains

“After section 54 (transparency in supply chains etc) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, insert—

‘54A Duty to prevent slavery and human trafficking in organisations and value chains

(1) A relevant organisation must take reasonable and proportionate steps to prevent slavery and human trafficking arising or occurring in—

(a) its own operations;

(b) the operations of any franchisee or subsidiary undertaking; and

(c) the operations, products or services of any person in its supply or value chain or other business relationship.

(2) In determining what are to be considered reasonable and proportionate steps for the purposes of this section, regard must be given to guidance issued by the Secretary of State under this section.

(3) The Secretary of State must issue guidance on what are to be considered reasonable and proportionate steps for the purposes of this section within 12 months of passing of this Act.

(4) The Secretary of State must by regulations designate an enforcement authority with responsibility for ensuring that relevant organisations comply with the requirements of this section.

(5) The enforcement authority may, where it is satisfied that a relevant organisation has failed to comply with any of the requirements of this section—

(a) issue a public censure notice;

(b) require the organisation to take specified compliance, prevention, restoration or remediation steps within a specified period;

(c) require the organisation to compensate any persons adversely affected by the noncompliance;

(d) impose a monetary penalty of up to 5% of the organisation’s global turnover;

(e) exclude the organisation from participation in public procurement procedures for a period determined by the Secretary of State.

(6) For the purposes of this section—

“relevant organisation” means—

(a) a body corporate or partnership, wherever incorporated or formed, which carries on a business or part of a business in the United Kingdom, supplies goods or services, and has, inclusive of any subsidiary undertaking, total turnover of £36 million or more;

(b) a public undertaking within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Procurement Act 2023;

“value chain” includes all activities undertaken by any entity during the lifecycle of a good or service upstream and downstream of the commercial organisation, including but not limited to material sourcing, processing, production, manufacturing, development, sale, warehousing, logistics, marketing, finance, use and end of life disposal.

54B Responsibility for slavery or human trafficking in organisations and value chains

(1) Where slavery or human trafficking occurs or is identified in the supply or value chains of a relevant organisation (“O”), O is responsible for such slavery or human trafficking if—

(a) any activity of O causes or contributes to the occurrence of the slavery or human trafficking, or

(b) the occurrence of slavery or human trafficking is directly linked to O’s operations, products or services by O’s business relationships.

(2) O is not responsible for the slavery or human trafficking if it is proved that O had taken reasonable and proportionate steps under section 54A.

(3) Where O is responsible for slavery or human trafficking, O commits an offence.

(4) Where an offence under subsection (3) is committed with the consent or connivance of a director, manager, partner or other senior officer of O, that person also commits the offence.

(5) A party guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) in the case of a relevant organisation, and any director, manager, partner or other senior officer of that organisation who commits an offence under subsection (4), to an unlimited fine;

(b) in the case of an individual—

(i) on summary conviction, to an unlimited fine, with such a fine being proportionate to the degree to which they were responsible for slavery or human trafficking;

(ii) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years, or to an unlimited fine, or to both.

(6) A person adversely affected by any slavery or human trafficking for which a relevant organisation is alleged to be responsible may bring civil proceedings against that organisation, whether or not criminal proceedings have been commenced or concluded in respect of the same conduct.

(7) Civil proceedings under this section may be brought by the person who claims to have been adversely affected by slavery or human trafficking (a “victim”), the Secretary of State, or any person acting on behalf of a victim.

(8) For the purposes of this section, “relevant organisation” has the meaning given in section 54A.’”—(Blake Stephenson.)

This new clause would require organisations to take steps to prevent slavery and human trafficking in their operations, and make organisations or individuals responsible for slavery or human trafficking liable to fines or imprisonment unless they have taken reasonable steps to prevent it.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Blake Stephenson]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 29th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Kohler]

But that mistake was made because the attention of the Home Office was diverted to other issues at the time. [Interruption.] The hon. Member looks at me quizzically, but a mistake was made. Yes, the Government have started to solve that mistake, but asylum hotel numbers went up by 8% last year, so the idea that they have just gone down and down is not accurate.

The new clause would create a new Government Department that could put its entire focus on effective immigration policy. It would produce an annual immigration plan—subject to scrutiny and a vote in Parliament—setting out how the Government will deliver a fair, controlled and effective system. It would also work across Government to develop long-term workforce plans for public services and critical national infrastructure, ensuring that migration policy is designed in tandem with investment, domestic skills and training, to strengthen our services. This plan would ensure that British people and services finally get a system built to work for them—a system based on evidence that works across Government and different sectors to deliver better public services and a growing economy.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to have you overseeing proceedings this morning, Mr Stuart.

I will abstain on new clause 8, but I absolutely appreciate the sentiments behind it. I will not back it in full because the Green party has been thinking about this issue for some time, and we have our own alternative proposal. I will speak a little about the ways in which breaking up the Home Office—along the lines set out in new clause 8—would be a good idea.

I refer in particular to the “No Way Home?” report, which was commissioned in June 2025 by my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol Central (Carla Denyer), and produced by Zoe Gardner, an independent researcher and campaigner on immigration and asylum policy. The report recommended that we make a new Department for population, infrastructure and immigration and a Department for community security from the Home Office. Previous Green party policy has used different names for those ideas—including in 2019, when we talked about creating a Ministry for sanctuary and a Ministry for the interior—but they follow the very same lines in splitting up the responsibilities.

The “No Way Home?” report goes into more detail. It says in particular that cross-governmental work should be embedded in the remit of the new Departments, and that

“A Department for Population, Infrastructure and Immigration”

should be

“taking on joint task forces with shared budgets with Department for Housing, Communities, and Local Government in order to ensure a long-term approach to the country’s population, workforce and infrastructure needs is built into the management of immigration policy.”

On the other side, the new Department for policing and security matters—a “Department for Community Security”—should have

“joint teams working across mental health, housing, homelessness and social services”

to manage things such as addiction, rather than taking an enforcement approach to drug policy—allowing social services to deal with that—and ensuring that policing work is better integrated across the board with a preventive approach to crime. The report says:

“The current remit of the Home Office does not include responsibility for long-term integration, infrastructure planning, and community cohesion”.

Those are all issues that we have raised in this Committee as being harmed by the Bill, potentially because the Home Office is not tasked with being concerned about such harms.

The report talks about the history of the Home Office as a Department, and how it has been “beset by repeated scandals”. Very famously, those have included the Windrush scandal, which emerged out of the policies of the former Prime Minister, now Baroness May of Maidenhead. Her hostile environment policies, which I think were enacted between 2012 and 2016, were

“designed to make life unbearable in the UK for immigrants who were unable to prove their status”,

and the Windrush scandal resulted. The “Windrush Lessons Learned Review” made it abundantly clear not only that the political direction set by the then Home Secretary but that the culture and internal structures at the Home Office were at fault for producing the crisis. Earlier, in 2006, a scandal emerged regarding the release of about 1,000 foreign national prisoners, which forced the resignation of the then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke. He was replaced by John Reid, who famously proceeded to describe the Department as “not fit for purpose”. We are nearing a consensus view on the issue, I believe, and the Department should be looking very closely at what it can do.

The current work and remit of the Home Office

“covers some of the most hotly politically contested areas”.

I know that from my brief as my party’s spokesperson in the House on the Home Office and the Justice Department—we are constantly in the news on these issues. Every change is fought over in the public arena, because these are some of the most salient issues of the day. It is no wonder that

“the role of Home Secretary is often viewed as a poisoned chalice.”

Ministers—in the room today and more widely—might be interested in a more focused remit if they are to take on these responsibilities in future.

Despite repeated attempts at reform,

“the Home Office has continued to exhibit deep-rooted cultural and institutional problems in its management of the immigration brief, in particular…As a result, a growing number of voices from across the political spectrum have begun to call for an exploration of options for more radical reform. In most cases, the conclusion is that the Department should be split,”

with immigration moved into a more dedicated department. The report concludes:

“The remit of the Department itself contributes to negative outcomes by linking immigration with security, but neither immigration nor security with community cohesion, infrastructure, or the country’s economic needs”.

It says:

“The time is ripe for root and branch reform, and only a full break up and redistribution of the responsibilities of the Department has the potential to solve all the problems”.

I hope that Ministers will look at that in the future, and that this new clause nevertheless stimulates some discussions in Cabinet and with the Prime Minister about how to improve those deep-seated problems and scandals and avoid them in future.

[Anna Turley]

New clause 8, tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, sets out the desire for a new Government Department for immigration and border security to be established, and for the transfer of all the Home Secretary’s immigration, asylum and border security functions to that new office. I have to say that I really admire the hon. Members for Harrogate and Knaresborough and for Wimbledon for attempting to reshape Whitehall through an amendment to a Bill—it is impressive, and I will do my best to respond to it. I appreciate that it is a thought-provoking new clause that of course warrants broader discussion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Blake Stephenson]

The Liberal Democrats’ new clause 10 would give asylum seekers the right to work after three months, and the Green party’s new clause 24 would give them an automatic, unrestricted right after six months that lasts through every appeal. We oppose both new clauses.

People who enter the UK illegally should not be able to claim asylum here at all. The new clauses go in the opposite direction. They would make the UK a more attractive destination for people deciding whether to pay a smuggler to cross the channel. Everybody wants to reduce pull factors so that we can reduce dangerous crossings, and I am afraid that the new clauses would introduce additional pull factors.

I will keep my remarks brief and just ask the Minister a question. How many asylum seekers currently have permission to work, and what assessment have the Government made of the effect that earlier work rights would have on the number of claims?

[Siân Berry]

The right to work does not impact only those seeking sanctuary; the impact also falls on their children and on communities. Giving people seeking sanctuary the right to work—or, rather, restoring their agency—is a matter of basic dignity and human rights. People who have fled war or persecution should have the opportunity to rebuild their lives in the UK with dignity and independence. That means that they need a safe place to live, access to support and a genuine right to work, as set out in new clause 24. It is important to stress that this debate is about restoring choice and agency to people seeking sanctuary, not imposing new requirements on those who are not ready or able to work.

As it stands, the law permits a person seeking asylum to request permission to work if they have been waiting more than 12 months for a Home Office decision on their asylum claim through no fault of their own. That may be 12 months after they initially claimed asylum or 12 months after they made further submissions, which are then considered as a fresh claim.

It has been more than two decades since those seeking asylum could apply to work after six months. People repeatedly raise the issue of enforced worklessness while claims are processed. My new clause 24 would simply restore the previous time limit and match the Home Office’s own targets for decision making. The Liberal Democrats’ new clause 10 would grant the right to work at three months, which is also perfectly reasonable. New clause 24 goes into more detail about how the proposal should be implemented. It states that the right should be automatic, without the need for an application, and that there should be no restrictions on the type of employment. It also states when the right should end, if a decision on the application is made one way or the other.

More often than not, vulnerable people are left waiting for months, and often years, for a decision. For that entire period, however qualified and willing they are, they are not permitted to work. That is profoundly felt by people who arrive with real skills, a keen willingness to contribute and a desire to rebuild their lives. Instead, the current rules require them to survive on a small weekly allowance. They are unable to contribute, build a life and often even volunteer in their communities without navigating endless bureaucratic red tape.

The most potent and poisonous rhetoric of the far right plays up the dependence that people are left in; it stokes conflict between people in the asylum system, who are denied the ability to earn, and others in society. Members can hear the voices I am referring to in their heads right now. There is absolutely no need to leave in place the restrictions that fuel that kind of rhetoric and racism, and that badly harm the acceptance and integration of refugees.

Work can bring not only integration and community strength but genuine benefits to people fleeing war, trauma or oppression. That is because people seeking sanctuary in the UK are five to six times more likely than the general population to have mental health needs. A review of the impact of asylum processes on mental health found that policies restricting work contributed to psychological distress and social exclusion. The mental health cost of robbing vulnerable groups of the ability to exercise their agency and provide for themselves and their loved ones is far too high.

Many people seeking asylum in the UK and elsewhere are living with trauma. That contributes to their poor mental health. They might also be recovering from illness or caring for family members. It is important that a humane and just system recognises the structural barriers to finding work that many of these people will face. We must recognise that some people will want to work immediately, while others may need time and support to rebuild their lives. Therefore, my new clause is set out as a right to work. If the Government make any moves in this direction, they must refrain from making it a mandate to work.

Despite the clear and mounting evidence in favour of the right to work, successive UK Governments have closed their minds to the idea and refused to implement it. The usual response, which has already been aired in this debate, is that permitting work sooner risks acting as a pull factor to further migration, but that does not hold water given the evidence. The UK maintains one of the strictest systems in Europe concerning the right to work for people seeking asylum. The international evidence is unequivocal and the difference in waiting times across comparable countries is enlightening.

In 2018, Ireland opted in to the recast EU reception conditions directive and allowed work after nine months. That was subsequently reduced to six months in 2021. Comparable countries in Europe have far more lenient policies on the right to work. In Germany, it is granted after three months, with the only restriction being on self-employment. There is a similar policy after 60 days in Greece. In Italy the period is two months, in Spain it is six months, in Belgium it is four months, and in Denmark it is six months—all with no restrictions. In Sweden someone can apply to work immediately in limited sectors, and in France there are restricted types of work that someone can do after six months. All this is evidence that an alternative can be imagined that is intensely practical, would not have the knock-on effects that other parties have suggested, and can work.

Alongside the moral arguments, there is a strong economic angle to be considered. The Lift the Ban coalition, which has already been quoted in this debate, estimates that lifting the ban could save the Treasury over £280 million per year, and recent research by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research found that lifting the ban after six months could save the Government a total of £4.4 billion per year, increase tax revenue by £880 million and add £1 billion to GDP.

Restricting access to legal work inevitably increases the risk of exploitation. When people are prevented from supporting themselves lawfully, they can be pushed towards unsafe and illegal forms of work. Granting people the right to work therefore extends itself to protecting vulnerable people from further exploitation and abuse, and extends the ability to maintain community cohesion and safety.

In my view, though, the greatest cost of the current policy is the human cost—years of wasted potential, lost independence and lives left on hold while awaiting a decision. The Government should heed the approach taken by much of mainland Europe already and accept these amendments.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Members for Harrogate and Knaresborough and for Brighton Pavilion for tabling the new clauses, and I am grateful for the discussion. As we have heard, new clauses 10 and 24 would significantly change the Government’s policy on the period before asylum seekers can seek permission to work from the Home Office, reducing that period to three months and six months, respectively. New clause 24, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would go much further and grant asylum applicants and their adult dependants an automatic and unrestricted right to employment and self-employment after six months of waiting for a decision on their asylum claim—a right that would continue until the claim and any appeal had been finally determined.

Hon. Members will know that those who claim asylum are not normally allowed to work while their claim is considered. They may instead receive accommodation and support to meet their essential living needs if they would otherwise be destitute. Under our current policy, asylum seekers may be eligible to apply for permission to work in the UK where their claim has been outstanding for 12 months or more, through no fault of their own. Where permission is granted, employment is restricted to jobs on the skilled worker occupations at regulated qualifications framework level 6 or above.

To respond to the question of the hon. Member for Wimbledon about legal entrants, it is important to flag that all legal entrants are prohibited from working. Some individuals who claim asylum after being here legally retain the right to work throughout their claim. An asylum seeker is allowed to apply for permission to work after 12 months, as I said, if they have not received a decision and will be employed in a high-skilled job. On the statistics he asked about, the Home Office publishes a vast amount of statistics regularly. The numbers for those who have permission to work will fluctuate constantly, as people move in and out of the system quite rapidly. Our focus has been on ensuring that people receive an initial decision on their claim as quickly as possible.

--- Later in debate ---

Division 55

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 3

Noes: 11

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

On a point of order, Mr Stuart. I did not withdraw new clause 24. Am I allowed to press it to a vote?

[The Chair]

New clauses are taken in numerical order and the opportunity will come later.

[Siân Berry]

Of course!

New Clause 11

Refugee family reunion

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the date on which this Act is passed, lay before Parliament a statement of changes to the immigration rules for the purposes of making provision for refugee family reunion in accordance with this section.

(2) Any changes to the immigration rules included in any statement laid before Parliament under subsection (1) must come into effect after 21 days.

(3) Before a statement of changes is laid under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult with such persons as the Secretary of State deems appropriate.

(4) A statement laid under subsection (1) must set out rules providing for leave to enter and remain in the United Kingdom for family members of a person granted refugee status or humanitarian protection.

(5) In this section—

the

‘immigration rules’ mean any statement of rules, or any changes to such rules, presented to Parliament pursuant to section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971;

‘refugee status’ and

‘humanitarian protection’ have the same meaning as in the immigration rules;

‘family members’ include—

(a) a person's parent, including an adoptive parent;

(b) a person's spouse, civil partner or unmarried partner;

(c) a person's child, including an adopted child, who is either—

(i) under the age of 18, or

(ii) under the age of 25 but who was under the age of 18 or unmarried at the time the person granted asylum left their country of residence to seek asylum;

(d) a person's sibling, including adoptive sibling, who is either—

(i) under the age of 18, or

(ii) under the age of 25 but who was under the age of 18 or unmarried at the time the person granted asylum left their country of residence to seek asylum; and

(e) such other persons as the Secretary of State may determine, having regard to—

(i) the importance of maintaining family unity,

(ii) the best interests of a child, read in accordance with Article 3 of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,

(iii) physical, emotional, psychological or financial dependency between a person granted refugee status or humanitarian protection and another person,

(iv) risks to the physical, emotional or psychological wellbeing of a person granted refugee status or humanitarian protection, including from the circumstances in which the person is living in the United Kingdom, or

(v) such other matters as the Secretary of State considers appropriate;

‘adopted’ and

‘adoptive’ refer to a relationship resulting from adoption, including de facto adoption, as set out in the immigration rules.” —(Tom Gordon.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make changes to the Immigration Rules to make provision for leave to enter or remain in the UK to be granted to the family members of refugees and of people granted humanitarian protection.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Tom Gordon]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart. New clause 11 would require the Secretary of State to make changes to the immigration rules to make provision for leave to enter or remain in the UK to be granted to the family members of refugees and of people granted humanitarian protection. The family reunion route was paused on 4 September 2025, with a stricter system promised from spring 2026 still not in place, as we discussed earlier in Committee. So I ask the Minister: if the Government announce a new settlement route, will there be a new family reunion route, too? We want to see the details of the resettlement scheme announced with this legislation. Obviously, the purpose of this amendment is to make sure we end up with the tens of thousands of people, predominantly women and children who used to use the family reunion visas, able to access it.

I meet many people in my constituency of Harrogate and Knaresborough, from victims of genocide such as the Yazidi people to people who came through the Afghan route. Quite often the distress and additional trauma that is caused by having been separated from their families compounds the issues that they are already trying to grapple with.

With the new rules set to come in under this Bill, there will be issues around refugees being able to hit the income thresholds so that their family members can come with them. That is the purpose of this new clause and I would welcome any news or updates from the Minister further to the questions already put during the course of this Bill Committee.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg.

As we read the amended clause, the national security ground applies regardless of age. I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed that, where a child has been groomed and exploited into offending, that must be properly weighed. The public also expect serious offending by under-18s to be dealt with, so the Minister should tell us what assessment has been made of the cases affected and how the safeguarding, criminal justice and security systems will handle that.

The bad faith provisions apply to claims made as an adult, including where someone knowingly provides false information or makes a claim when their removal is due. We all know the pattern of the claim that appears at the 11th hour, just as the flight is booked. The Home Office’s own figures show the scale of this: last year, around a third of charter flight returns that failed to go ahead involved a modern slavery referral made after the return had been arranged. On flights with an out-of-hours decision service, three quarters of the referrals were made between 3 pm the day before and 6 am on the day of removal, with one in seven made after 11 pm. Members can draw their own conclusions about what that pattern tells us.

The clause contains exceptions to the timing rule when someone met a claim notice deadline or had compelling reasons for not claiming earlier. Those exceptions have their place, but “compelling reasons” has to mean something. It cannot become a catch-all for explaining away every claim made at the departure gate. I would welcome the Minister giving the Committee examples of what would and would not meet that test, and telling us who will make that judgment. A late claim and a knowingly fabricated one are not the same thing. Decisions needs clear reasons if they are to survive a challenge. Otherwise, an attempt to tackle delay just produces another round of litigation.

Government amendments 116 and 117 take the provisions on leave out of disqualification sections, and amendment 118 deals with leave in section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, covering national security, adult public order cases and bad faith claims made as an adult. We accept that restructuring, but the decisions on protection and leave must join up. The Minister should set out how existing grants of leave will be reviewed and how revocation decisions will be made where the law allows. Disqualification is not removal. The point I made about clause 37 applies here in full. Once a disqualification decision is made, the case must not fall into the gap between two processes. These measures are a step in the right direction, and we support clause 38 and the Government’s amendments. We look to the Minister to show that the amended clause will work in practice.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I wish to speak briefly against clause 38. Public order disqualification, in the way it has been applied so far, has exacerbated ongoing systemic issues arising from failures in identification and safeguards within the criminal justice system. Available evidence shows that this provision has disproportionately affected individuals subjected to criminal exploitation.

As we heard when discussing previous clauses, many survivors of criminal exploitation were forced to commit offences as part of their exploitation. They are often prosecuted for those crimes as a result of gaps in the application of the non-punishment principle in the UK, including defences under section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Those who have criminal convictions are at heightened risk of exploitation, too. The criminalisation of survivors has been used time and again as a tool to control people and keep them in exploitation. The clause is an unnecessary extension of existing harms and should be dropped.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I thank colleagues for their contributions to the discussion of the clause.

Clause 38 strengthens and clarifies the public order and bad faith disqualification frameworks due to long-standing challenges in their practical operation, especially in cases involving foreign national offenders. It expands the grounds on which an individual can be disqualified if they pose a threat to national security or public order by including suspended sentences to reflect the changes in the Sentencing Act 2020. It provides clarity in statute as to what is meant by bad faith, ensuring that those who seek to misuse the system with false and fabricated claims, or by raising information for the first time only after removal directions have been set, can be disqualified, ensuring that they are not able to take advantage of the generosity of our system.

The clause also makes it clear that no further modern slavery decision making is required should someone become disqualified. Finally, it exempts child victims from disqualification on public order grounds and makes the exemption for all victims where the risk of re-trafficking is clear. The clause provides a more consistent and robust approach to disqualification decisions and strengthens the Government’s ability to respond where individuals pose a threat to public order or seek to misuse the system.

I shall respond to some of the points that hon. Members made. The shadow Minister asked for case studies or examples of where the clause would be implemented. Suppose that individual C is convicted and receives an 11-month custodial sentence for common assault, battery or breach of a restraining order, which are not covered by public order disqualifications; when they raise modern slavery grounds, that is considered by the national referral mechanism. Where they are a victim, the individual will proceed through the decision-making stages, gaining protection from removal and access to support, and on to a conclusive grounds determination. Where they have ongoing needs and no right to remain, they would get a temporary permission to stay consideration.

Under the new system, even if individual C is a modern slavery victim, a foreign national offender who has received any custodial sentence, including a suspended sentence, will fall within scope of public order disqualification. Where the disqualification is applied, they will be disqualified from support and no further decision making on modern slavery will take place unless an “immediate and significant” risk of re-trafficking in the UK is identified. That means they will not receive a conclusive grounds decision and will not therefore be eligible for temporary permission to stay. British nationals are subject to a different threshold; they will be disqualified on the basis of a public order threat where they have committed one of the crimes set out in section 4 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

The shadow Minister also asked why children are still in scope of the national security limit disqualification. It is right that we can withhold modern slavery protections where an individual poses a threat to national security. That principle should apply regardless of age. Retaining the power to disqualify a child on national security grounds exists solely as a backstop for the rare circumstances in which an individual under 18 poses a significantly serious national security threat and disqualification from the national referral mechanism is therefore appropriate. The exception to disqualification where there is a risk of re-trafficking in the UK will still apply and require decision makers to consider the facts of each case.

This approach intends to strike an appropriate balance between safeguarding children and ensuring that national security considerations are prioritised where necessary. In parallel with our modern slavery response, the UK has one of the most robust counter-terrorism frameworks in the world. Prevent is one of the four pillars of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy; it operates in the non-criminal space and is designed to support people away from radicalisation before they commit an offence. The Home Office is testing new approaches to better spot and refer individuals at risk of radicalisation online, and testing how those insights can be translated into timely, proportionate interventions. That is particularly important considering the rise in children being arrested for terrorism-related activity, much of which is carried out online.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked about how we will ensure people who are exploited in criminal activity will not be unduly penalised for the exploitation that they have suffered. It is important to flag that the criminal justice system contains safeguards against penalising victims of exploitation, including under section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. That provides a defence in criminal proceedings for people who have been forced or compelled to commit crimes through slavery or exploitation. Clause 38 also expressly sets out that disqualification will not apply where a person is considered to be at “immediate and significant risk” of exploitation in the UK.

I hope I have responded to all of the questions that hon. Members had and provided clarification. I commend amendments 114 to 118 and clause 38 to the Committee.

Amendment 114 agreed to..

Amendment 115 to 118 agreed to.

Clause 38, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 39

Removal of duty to grant leave to remain to assist recovery

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

My new clause 29 is intended as a replacement for clause 39, being a redrafted version of it. It would give limited leave to remain to all victims of slavery or human trafficking, and prevent such leave being withheld if the Secretary of State believes that a victim’s needs can be met elsewhere.

Clause 39 removes the Secretary of State’s duty to grant temporary permission to stay for the purpose of assisting survivors in their recovery from any physical or psychological harm arising from their exploitation. That is currently the most common reason for granting leave to remain of this kind, and 96% of those granted leave to remain as victims of trafficking in 2024 were given it for recovery purposes. Grants of leave continue to be low, however, and are usually for very short periods, leaving survivors at risk. Clearly, removing the duty altogether will reduce grants further and cause harm. Forcibly returning more survivors of trafficking to their countries risks disrupting existing therapy and support, leaving them unable to obtain specialist care and putting them at further risk on return, including of re-trafficking.

We must remember the purpose of survivors securing limited leave and, as I propose, long-term immigration status. It provides victims with the security necessary to engage meaningfully with recovery, protection and support processes and to rebuild their lives free from the influence of traffickers. This is the essence of our obligations under international agreements. Insecure immigration status is a well-recognised vulnerability factor that perpetrators frequently exploit to facilitate and maintain survivors’ exploitation, using the threat of immigration enforcement, detention or removal as a means of control.

As my new clause sets out, granting a 60-month residency permit with a pathway to settlement is an essential safeguard in addressing these vulnerabilities, freeing people from exploitation, bringing perpetrators to justice and providing meaningful protection and support to victims, while supporting their reintegration into society and rebuilding their independence.

It is so important that survivors have this alternative route to leave to remain. The Minister has talked about other options for people within the immigration system, but there are examples of migrant victims of human trafficking or modern slavery with a valid skilled worker visa who have been denied VTS leave on those grounds. That meant that those victims could be tied to their exploiters due to their visas, including those co-operating with the authorities to prosecute their exploiters.

Following legal challenge in August 2026, the Home Office conceded that discretion can be exercised when considering whether or not to grant VTS leave to someone with a valid skilled worker visa. From what the Minister has said today, clause 39 seems to be reversing that. We know now that the concession is applied only on a discretionary basis, and is therefore susceptible to a range of variables. The need for a duty to grant long-term leave to victims remains critical in providing recovery, protection and support for survivors and in preventing trafficking and modern slavery going further.

The Government, as well as providing no rationale for the scrapping of VTS leave, have not provided any data showing how many survivors of trafficking are granted leave by other routes. If the Government press ahead with this measure, they should provide further evidence and detail on how these rights will still be protected under the clause.

[Matt Vickers]

Supporting a victim of modern slavery and deciding what immigration permission that person should have are related questions, but they are not the same. The law must protect people who have been exploited while maintaining an immigration system that is controlled, and that the public can have confidence in. Clause 39 removes the specific duty to grant limited leave to help someone recover from physical or psychological harm caused by their exploitation. It keeps the duty where leave is needed for a victim to seek compensation or to co-operate with an investigation or criminal proceedings.

Whatever some may claim, this is not the removal of every route by which a confirmed victim can receive leave. The Opposition support keeping this route focused on a specific, evidenced need. A finding that someone has been exploited does not answer every question about where they should live or for how long. The Minister needs to tell us how this will work for a genuine victim who still needs help, and how continuity of recovery support will be ensured.

There is also a bigger point here: the grounds that remain are the ones that matter most for bringing traffickers to justice. However, according to the figures that charities have put before the Committee, in 2024 only a handful of grants were made so that victims could seek compensation or help with criminal proceedings. A prosecution that collapses because the key witness left the country is a win for the trafficker, and nobody on the Committee wants that. Can the Minister tell us how the Home Office will ensure that these remaining grounds are actually used, and that its decisions never undermine a victim’s ability to help put an exploiter behind bars?

Government amendment 119 adds existing leave to enter and the right of abode to the circumstances in which there is no duty to grant leave under this provision. Avoiding duplication makes sense, and we support it. New clause 29 goes in a very different direction: it would require at least five years’ leave for qualifying confirmed victims, with access to public funds and permission to work, as well as eligibility for settlement after five years’ residence with any form of leave. That is a very substantial immigration proposal, and it would send exactly the wrong signal to the gangs who sell places on small boats. We oppose it.

Being recognised as a victim is a serious finding, but it should not automatically settle the separate question of a long period of residence, access to public funds and a route to settlement. Those who back the new clause need to explain why five years is the right minimum in every single qualifying case; how many people it would cover; what it would cost in housing and public services; and why residence under any form of leave should count towards settlement. We support clause 39 and Government amendment 119, and we hope that the Minister will set out the safeguards that will sit alongside them.

[Anna Turley]

I thank all the hon. Members who have tabled amendments in this group and contributed to the debate. I want to start with new clause 29, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. As was set out earlier, it would grant eligible confirmed victims of modern slavery at least five years’ leave to remain, with a route towards settlement.

I want to be clear that temporary permission to stay is a targeted and temporary form of leave designed to meet specific needs arising from an individual’s experience of exploitation that meets the UK’s international obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. Temporary permission to stay will continue to be available where it is necessary for a confirmed victim to remain in the UK to co-operate with law enforcement agencies in the investigation of crimes or to seek compensation in relation to their exploitation.

New clause 29 would require the Government to grant leave in a way that would go beyond what is proportionate or reasonable and would significantly exceed what is required under our international obligations.

[Siân Berry]

I asked in my speech not about people claiming asylum but about those here under other forms of immigration status. Does the Minister not see the replacement of those with VTS leave being reduced as a result of clause 39? That is one of the problems that I wanted to raise. When people are here under potentially coercive forms of leave, such as sponsored work visas, will VTS leave still be available as a replacement to prevent people being left in the hands of exploiters?

[Anna Turley]

I will cover that in the more in-depth response to the hon. Lady’s comments at the appropriate time.

As I said, the new clause would require the Government to grant leave in a way that would go beyond what is proportionate or reasonable, and that would significantly exceed what is required under our international obligations. When individuals require protection or are seeking to remain in the UK, other routes remain available, depending on the individual circumstances. Creating an automatic pathway to long-term leave and settlement through modern slavery provisions would conflate the modern slavery identification and support system with an immigration route, and thus risks blurring that distinction. That has the potential to increase opportunities for improper use of the system and would have significant implications for wider immigration objectives, which we have been clear must operate on the principles of fairness.

I hope to cover some of the points that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion raised—if I fail to pick them up, I ask her to come back to me or I can respond in writing. She asked whether the temporary permission to stay framework meets our international obligations. Decision to grant temporary permission to stay does not automatically lead to removal from the UK. There are various routes to remain in the UK that will remain available to foreign nationals depending on their circumstances. Any applications will be considered on their individual merits in line with published policy.

The hon. Lady asked whether any further statistics could be shared. Temporary permission to stay data is currently drawn from a number of different Home Office systems. Further work is under way to establish the most robust dataset. We are continuing to assess what information can be shared publicly and we will provide further data in due course where appropriate.

The hon. Lady also asked whether we are disadvantaging people by removing recovery from exploitation. The measure does not prevent individuals from accessing support from the point of their positive reasonable grounds decision—or earlier, if emergency support is required to assist with recovery from their exploitation. Access to the national referral mechanism support is based on national referral mechanism status, not immigration status. All adult victims in England and Wales who need to can continue to access specialist needs-based support to assist their recovery, irrespective of their immigration status or a refusal of temporary permission to stay.

The hon. Lady also flagged whether the changes were compliant with international law. The Government’s view is that the change to the temporary permission to stay policy absolutely does not impede our compliance with our international compliance. Temporary permission to stay, in its current forms, goes beyond what is required under article 14 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. The changes will provide stronger clarity on the UK’s obligations while still complying with article 14.

Article 4 of the European convention on human rights imposes a positive obligation on member states to identify and protect victims of trafficking, which is met in part through the operation of the national referral mechanism. That obligation does not go so far as to require member states to grant leave. In any event, support is not dependent on temporary permission to stay leave being granted, so that even when an individual is not granted temporary permission to stay leave, they can still access modern slavery support while they remain in the UK.

Further, an individual’s immigration status and assessment of risk on return are considered if an individual makes a protection claim. That includes an assessment of whether the individual has a well-founded fear of persecution or is at real risk of serious harm. Any claim will be considered on its individual merits, in line with published policy and country information.

The hon. Lady also asked about skilled workers. As of 8 October 2026, skilled workers who receive a positive conclusive grounds decision, where that decision was made during their most recent permission, may have their visa amended for the remaining period of extant leave. Individuals will not need to be sponsored and can work in any occupation. The change supports skilled workers to leave exploitative employers and move to new, safe employment. In the immigration White Paper, the Government committed to explore introducing further reforms to our sponsorship system by putting more responsibility and accountability on effective and responsible sponsors. That will include exploring whether the Government can make it easier for workers to move between licensed sponsors for the duration of their visa, giving them more control over who they work for and reducing the risk of exploitation.

The hon. Member for Stockton West asked what the changes will mean for compensation and people’s co-operation with the process. Under the changes to temporary permission to stay, victims can continue to engage with law enforcement agencies in supporting criminal investigations and pursue compensation in relation to their exploitation. By focusing temporary permission to stay on those specific purposes, the Government can ensure that it remains available in supporting victims’ engagement with the criminal justice system and accessing compensation. More broadly, the Government are strengthening the tools available to law enforcement and courts to disrupt criminal activity, prevent modern slavery and protect those at risk.

On victim engagement with the criminal justice system, I should say that the modern slavery victim care contract provides adult victims in the national referral mechanism with a dedicated support worker to assist them to access legal aid and legal representation. That support will be further strengthened when the modern slavery victim care contract is replaced by the new support for victims of modern slavery service. The new contract introduces specialist support workers to help victims to engage better with the criminal justice system. That will include, but is not limited to, providing tailored guidance and advocacy to help victims understand complex legal processes, and helping to remove barriers to accessing and receiving the assistance they need at every point in the criminal justice process.

--- Later in debate ---

Assistance and support for potential victims

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I beg to move amendment 70, in clause 43, page 45, line 1, leave out subsection (3).

This amendment would remove the provision which enables the Secretary of State to override an assessment that a potential victim of slavery or trafficking requires assistance and support.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 71, in clause 43, page 45, line 4, at end insert—

“(3A) In considering whether assistance and support is necessary, the Secretary of State or an authorised person must have regard to—

(a) the best interests of the person receiving such assistance and support and of any children dependent on that person;

(b) the need to ensure that assistance and support is provided on the basis of the individual needs of the person receiving it; and

(c) the need to act in a way which is compatible with the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and the European Convention on Human Rights.”

This amendment would require parties considering whether a potential victim of slavery or trafficking requires assistance and support to consider the best interests of the person (and any dependent children) and to comply with the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and the ECHR.

Amendment 72, in clause 43, page 45, line 6, leave out “do not apply in relation to a child” and insert

“apply in relation to a child, and any necessary assistance and support must be provided in a manner that is age-appropriate, trauma-informed and consistent with the best interests of the child.

(4B) Nothing in this section prevents a local authority or any other public authority from discharging duties owed to a child under any other enactment, and the existence of such duties does not relieve the Secretary of State of the duties imposed by this section.”

This amendment would assert that the requirement to provide assistance and support to potential victims of slavery or trafficking does apply to child victims, regardless of whether the child would be otherwise supported by a local or other public authority.

Government amendments 120 to 123

Amendment 73, in clause 43, page 45, line 18, at end insert—

“(5A) After subsection (6), insert—

‘(6A) The Secretary of State must—

(a) ensure that adequate funding and resources are provided to local authorities for the purpose of ensuring that potential victims who are children receive assistance and support which is—

(i) compliant with the obligations of the United Kingdom under Article 12 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and

(ii) at least equivalent in nature and extent to that which would be provided to a potential victim who is an adult under this section.

(b) within 12 months of the passing of the Immigration and Asylum Act 2026 and annually thereafter, lay before Parliament a report setting out—

(i) the funding provided to local authorities for the purpose of supporting potential victims who are children,

(ii) an assessment of whether such funding is sufficient to enable compliance with Article 12 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and

(iii) the number of potential victims who are children who have not received assistance and support equivalent to that which would have been provided under this section to a potential victim who is an adult.’”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to ensure that sufficient funding is provided to local authorities to support child victims of slavery and trafficking, and to report annually on the provision and adequacy of such funding.

Clause stand part.

[Siân Berry]

It is my view and that of a wide range of refugee and modern slavery organisations that clause 43, particularly subsection (3), is incompatible with article 12 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, which puts a duty on state parties to afford support to survivors of modern slavery in receipt of a reasonable grounds decision. The removal of the duty to provide support will put adults, children and young people at risk of destitution, homelessness and further harm, as we have discussed in relation to previous clauses.

We know that trauma can manifest in a wide range of ways and may significantly affect an individual’s ability to engage consistently with support services or comply with procedural requirements. Penalising people for such difficulties fails to take account of the realities of trauma and recovery and, again, creates detriment from a known feature of abuse. Additionally, while we agree that safeguarding and supporting children should be the responsibility of local authorities, they do need to receive adequate resources in order to discharge those duties appropriately and in the best interests of the child. Local authorities do not currently receive any funding to offer specialist support to children affected by trafficking and exploitation, and my amendments to this clause therefore seek both to reduce the harms being caused by it and to boost the support that can be offered to survivors.

Amendment 70 would remove subsection (3) and take away the Secretary of State’s power to override professional assessments. Support for the survivors of modern slavery is currently delivered through Government-funded contracts such as the modern slavery victim care contract in England and Wales, and equivalent arrangements across the devolved Administrations. Specialist organisations and trained support workers provide this support directly to survivors and are responsible for carrying out detailed assessments of need. The assessments should be informed by the professional expertise of frontline practitioners and crucially by survivors’ own views and experiences. I believe that support workers and survivors are best placed to identify an individual’s needs, because they are in direct and ongoing contact with the person concerned. It would therefore be harmful for the Secretary of State, who is removed from this direct engagement, to override such assessments without having had contact with the individual or a comparable understanding of their circumstances.

Allowing decision makers who are distant from a survivor’s situation to disregard professional assessments risks undermining survivor-centred support and could result in people being discharged from support with outstanding high needs. The Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group has presented further evidence to us on these points, around subsection (3). It says that it

“reflects the operational reality of how the MSVCC contract already functions in assessing survivors' needs.”

It therefore makes worse what is already bad. At the moment, an MSVCC provider completes a needs assessment and submits it to the Home Office for approval. The Home Office then reviews the assessment and either agrees or disagrees with both the assessment itself and the level of support recommended. It is concerning that this decision maker power, that ultimately rests with the Home Office, will be given directly to the Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State will be even further removed from the care, safeguarding and day-to-day insight available to frontline service providers, and could issue blanket rules or directives in situations of strained resources, for example, that would even more arbitrarily remove support from survivors. The Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group tells us that there is evidence for already ongoing issues with meeting the thresholds required to secure additional support, including for mental health needs. The recovery needs assessment process is highly bureaucratic—individuals are often discharged from support despite having significant unmet needs. If a similar approach is applied to decisions relating to the recovery and reflection period, there is a substantial risk that individuals will be discharged from support while still experiencing high levels of unmet need, exposing them to an increased risk of re-exploitation.

In amendment 72, I have asked for assistance to apply to children. While we agree that safeguarding and supporting children should be the responsibility of local authorities, I think it is very important that the Secretary of State retains an overarching duty to ensure that children receive support in line with article 12 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. This would help ensure national accountability for the protection and recovery of child victims of trafficking and not leave it to the piecemeal provisions of local authorities. Maintaining this duty would also ensure that the Secretary of State remains responsible for ensuring that local authorities are adequately resourced, as my next amendment would require. It would be, therefore, an important safeguard to ensure that all children receive the support and assistance to which they are entitled, regardless of where they are located.

Amendment 73 would ensure funding for local authorities to support children. We need to make sure that they have adequate resources to discharge their duties in the best interest of children. Currently, local authorities do not receive any specialist support funding for children affected by trafficking and exploitation, but it is essential, as is the mainstream child protection that local authorities provide. The charity, ECPAT, which stands for Every Child Protected Against Trafficking, has told me that not providing dedicated funding to local authorities to meet the ECAT entitlements of children leaves an enormous gap. It says that the Home Office provides local authorities with £143 per child, per night, towards the cost of supporting unaccompanied children, but there is no equivalent funding attached to a child’s identification as a potential victim of trafficking. That responsibility is placed on the existing social care system, which we all know is under substantial financial pressure. I really hope that the Government will listen to that point.

A final point in relation to subsection (3) is that all it says is

“where the Secretary of State disagrees”

—which is incredibly broad. Will the Minister tell us whether the Secretary of State will publish criteria governing when this override power may be used, and will she address the fact that there is currently no defined threshold for displacing an authorised person’s professional assessment by the Home Office? I will not press my amendments to a vote, but I want to see the risks and problems identified by them addressed, either in regulations or in the Bill, before the legislation leaves this House and goes to the other place.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for tabling amendments 70 to 73, which propose several changes to clause 43 on support and assistance provided to adult and child potential victims of modern slavery. I will start by reiterating the purpose of clause 43 and then turn to the amendments. Currently, where a potential victim has had suitable statutory support put in place to meet a modern slavery need, and that support is removed due to their conduct, the Secretary of State is required to provide that person with the equivalent support again. That results in the duplication of support provided across Government and the associated excessive costs to the taxpayer.

Clause 43 will ensure that the Secretary of State is not required to provide equivalent support again in those circumstances. For example, if a potential victim has their asylum accommodation withdrawn because they did not follow asylum support conditions, they will no longer be able to access equivalent modern slavery accommodation in its place. That will safeguard the integrity of the modern slavery system, ensuring support is not provided unconditionally and indefinitely. We recognise, however, the specific vulnerabilities and impact that trauma may have on an individual’s conduct. To safeguard vulnerable victims, support will not be withheld if there is a good reason, related to their modern slavery experience, for the conduct that led to that element of support being removed.

I wish to be clear that the Government remain committed to supporting vulnerable people. We have invested £25 million in the national independent child trafficking guardianship service and are in the process of procuring the new adult victim support contract to assist victims to achieve long-term stability and to live independently, and to reduce their risk of re-exploitation. Together, those investments form part of our wider programme of modern slavery reform, designed to safeguard the integrity of the system and ensure that resources are targeted at those who need them.

Clause 43 also makes technical amendments to section 50A of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. They will not change the support provided to adult or child victims; rather, the clause ensures that current support arrangements for adult and child victims are correctly reflected in statute. In line with existing practice, the amendments remove children from the provision to reflect that local authorities safeguard and promote the welfare of all children within their area, and the independent child trafficking guardian service provides further specialist modern slavery support. The amendments also make it clear that an authorised support provider can assess the support needs of adult victims of modern slavery.

Turning to amendments 70 to 73, the Government understand that their intention is to safeguard vulnerable potential victims. The Government share that commitment and are equally committed to ensuring that all victims of modern slavery, including child victims, can access the necessary support and assistance they require. The Government do not, however, consider the amendments necessary. In fact, they directly contradict the intention of clause 43 in two ways.

First, amendment 70 seeks to remove the Secretary of State’s power to override an authorised person’s assessment that support is necessary to assist a potential victim in their recovery. That would mean that the Secretary of State would be unable to intervene where appropriate to ensure that the outcome of a support assessment aligned with the relevant statutory guidance. That is a necessary power, ensuring fairness in the provision of support to adult victims across England and Wales. The power provides an important safeguard to ensure that Government-issued guidance on the assessment of necessary support is appropriately adhered to.

The need to intervene may arise in particularly complex cases and where other state support services have jurisdiction. For example, where an authorised support provider has determined that financial support is necessary but has not accounted for income the victim receives from another statutory service, the Secretary of State must be able to intervene to ensure that financial support is not provided where it is not necessary, in line with guidance.

As an another example, where an authorised support provider has determined that ongoing support should be provided to a victim despite their lack of engagement, but it has not given due attention to the non-engagement policy and the other statutory support available to a victim, the Secretary of State must be able to intervene to withdraw that support in line with statutory guidance on non-engagement to ensure consistency and fairness in the application of the policy across victims in England and Wales. I want to be clear, however, that the Home Office has a robust contract management regime in place to ensure that our supplier will deliver a high-quality service to victims in line with its contractual obligations underpinned by statutory guidance. The supplier has consistently met and exceeded delivery expectations, and the Home Office has a strong relationship with it.

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Finally, amendment 71 makes additions to the assessment of support, requiring consideration of the best interests of adult potential victims and their dependent children, and that assessments be needs-based and comply with the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—ECAT—and the European Convention on Human Rights. Those additions are unnecessary as the Government are confident that support provisions for adult and child potential victims are compliant with our international obligations. Adult support needs assessments already consider the individual support needs and circumstances of victims, and local authorities already have a duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children within their area.

[Siân Berry]

My concern is that subsection (3) provides the Home Secretary with a broad, unqualified power to disagree with the assessments that the Minister has just mentioned. Amendment 71 seems to provide a perfectly reasonable set of safeguards against breaching those international obligations. Will the Minister look at providing more detail about the criteria that the Home Secretary would use in future regulation to reassure us?

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Lady referencing that. Of course, we will always consider any issues and desires for clarification that are raised in this Committee through the development of the regulations. Her concerns have been noted, but I am reassured that we are compliant with the ECAT and ECHR obligations.

The hon. Lady made a couple of other points about a potential increase in homelessness and destitution. The Home Office remains committed to meeting legal obligations, ensuring that policies do not leave people destitute or at risk of re-trafficking. However, individuals should not be able to use modern slavery to circumvent the conditions for other statutory support services. To ensure a coherent approach across Government to supporting victims, adult modern slavery support will be withheld in particular circumstances in order to align with decisions made by wider statutory services to withdraw support from someone who has failed to follow reasonable conditions.

To safeguard vulnerable victims, support will not be withheld if a victim has a good reason related to their modern slavery experience to explain why they were unable to meet reasonable conditions. As only the particular element of modern slavery support that was removed by another service will be withheld, where necessary, support worker assistance will remain available to advise and signpost to other avenues of accommodation or financial support.

The hon. Lady also asked about the Home Office’s oversight and monitoring of local authorities to ensure that children do not fall through gaps in provision. I think I have covered most of that, but the children’s social care national framework is statutory guidance for local authorities that sets the national direction for practice. It provides clarity on the outcomes that children’s social care should achieve for children, young people and families. “Working Together to Safeguard Children 2026” is the multi-agency statutory guidance. It provides detailed information on the duties and responsibilities of all agencies to safeguard children.

Both pieces of statutory guidance—the national framework and “Working Together”—should be read alongside each other. Ofsted independently inspects local authority children’s services through its inspecting local authority children’s services framework. Those inspections consider the experiences and progress of children and families, the quality of practice and leadership, and whether services are meeting their statutory duties. Local authorities are assessed using performance data, reform, delivery and wider regional intelligence to determine the appropriate level of support and intervention.

As I have outlined, the amendments are unnecessary, as the Government are confident that support provisions for adult and child potential victims are compliant with our international obligations. Adult support needs assessments already consider the individual support needs and circumstances of victims, and local authorities already have a duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children within their areas. For the reasons outlined, I respectfully request that the amendments not be pressed.

Government amendments 120 to 123 will make minor changes to proposed new subsection 50A(5ZA) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, inserted by clause 43, to clarify how the provision will work in practice. First, amendments 120 to 122 put beyond doubt that proposed new subsection 50A(5ZA) is a targeted provision such that where a particular form of support is to be withheld, such as accommodation, the duty to provide other forms of support, such as financial support, will continue. That will prevent the duplication of support provided across Government and the associated excessive costs to taxpayers by ensuring that specific forms of support are not provided unconditionally and indefinitely. However, we recognise the specific vulnerabilities and impact that trauma may have on an individual’s conduct, which is why the amendments will make the safeguards for vulnerable potential victims clearer.

As a result of amendment 123, when decision makers are deciding whether an element of support should be withheld, they will consider whether the conduct that resulted in other statutory support being removed is attributable rather than “properly” attributable to their modern slavery experience. That is to avoid decision makers having to make unduly complex assessments, which could have an adverse impact on vulnerable potential victims. I commend Government amendments 120 to 123 and clause 43 to the Committee.

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[Anna Turley]

I think I have answered most of the hon. Gentleman’s questions, and if not, I will clarify in writing.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 120, in clause 43, page 45, line 9, after “support” insert “of a particular kind”.

This amendment and amendments 121 and 122 clarify that where assistance or support of a particular kind would have been available from elsewhere had it not been for the victim’s conduct it is only assistance or support of that particular kind that the Secretary of State will no longer be under a duty to provide.

Amendment 121, in clause 43, page 45, line 10, leave out first “the”.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 120.

Amendment 122, in clause 43, page 45, line 10, after “support” insert “of that kind”.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 120.

Amendment 123, in clause 43, page 45, line 15, leave out “properly”.—(Anna Turley.)

This amendment leaves out an unnecessary word from the inserted subsection (5ZA).

Clause 43, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 44

Content of slavery and human trafficking statements

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Schedule 5.

Clause 45 stand part.

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[Siân Berry]

I add my support—for a change in this Committee—to the broad approach taken in this part of the Bill. I realise that the Bill’s scope is narrow, but have the Minister or the Home Secretary had any discussions with colleagues in the Cabinet and other Departments about using these quite creative new reporting requirements—which cover the supply chain and require reasons to be given for not doing things—as a template for use in other areas, such as environmental pollution or other human rights issues? Will the Minister commit the Home Office to taking the learnings from implementing this to other Departments?

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Lady makes an important point. We are proud of the provisions, and a review is being undertaken by the Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade to consider how to develop them further. I hope that the Home Office example is setting out best practice for other Departments to ensure that, in a world of global business, we are able to hold corporations to account in our legislative and democratic framework. I appreciate her point.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 44 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 5 agreed to.

Clause 45 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46

Application to public authorities

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Matt Vickers]

Clause 49 brings us to the practical question of what happens when an organisation fails to do what the law requires. We have spent preceding groups discussing what organisations must report, and how we must publish it. Those duties need to mean something. A business that takes its responsibility seriously should not find that a competitor can ignore the rules and carry on without consequence. We support effective enforcement against organisations that fail to comply without a reasonable excuse.

The clause allows Ministers to establish financial penalties through regulations. The maximum for an individual penalty will be the higher of £1 million or 1% of the organisation’s total turnover, or of a public authority’s total budget. That is a substantial power. It is a ceiling, not a standard fine, and how penalties are set below it will matter enormously. There must be a sensible distinction between a genuine mistake that is quickly corrected and a deliberate refusal to comply.

An organisation that has ignored repeated requests should not be treated in the same way as one that has made an isolated administrative error. Equally, the “reasonable excuse” provision must not become a stock response for those who simply cannot be bothered. Much of that detail is left to regulation. The clause allows for warning notices, representations and appeals. Organisations should know how a penalty has been calculated and have a fair opportunity to challenge a wrong decision. I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed which of those safeguards the regulations will include, and how the seriousness of a failure will be assessed.

There is a particular issue with fining public authorities. A fine on a public body ultimately comes out of public money, but that does not mean that public bodies should escape enforcement. However, moving money out of a service budget while leaving the same failures untouched would achieve very little. The Minister should explain how a penalty will lead to better conduct and how senior officials will be held accountable for putting matters right.

The clause also provides for civil court enforcement; the Minister should explain how that route and the penalty regime will fit together, and who will make the decisions. There is an example here from the existing law. The 2015 Act already allows the Home Secretary to seek an injunction against a business that fails to publish a statement, yet that power has, as far as I am aware, never been used. A strong power on paper is of little use if the enforcement team lacks the information or capacity to use it. The Minister should tell us what resources have been judged necessary and when the new arrangements will be up and running.

Finally, we should be clear about what the penalties address. They concern failures to comply with the reporting duties. The compliance statement is not proof that exploitation is absent and a reporting penalty is no substitute for investigating evidence of slavery. Where such evidence emerges, there needs to be a clear route to the agencies that can protect victims and pursue the perpetrators. We support giving these duties proper teeth and we support clause 49. The test for Ministers is whether persistent non-compliance is tackled, whether decisions are fair and whether identified risks lead to action. I look forward to the Minister’s explanation of how the regulations will deliver that in practice.

[Siân Berry]

Very briefly, although I think this is a good clause because it allows for fines and payments to be made, I want to echo a question asked of us in written evidence by Dame Sara Thornton, the former Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. Although she describes the clause as a “game changer”, she highlights evidence that there is widespread non-compliance with the current reporting requirements: she provides data showing 194 instances across 160 companies over the past six years. She says that the legislation is

“silent on who will enforce these requirements”.

At the moment, the clause simply calls this the “enforcement authority” in lowercase letters—it is not yet an official body. It is incredibly important that the issue is resolved properly and that the enforcement body has the teeth, resources and ability to enforce the rules. If this is done properly it will be self-financing, but have the Government any plans to put more detail behind it before the Bill finally becomes law? This seems to me to be a very crucial part of any new powers.

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[Siân Berry]

I want to raise a few alarm bells in terms of what I feel about this measure, and I hope the Minister can answer me clearly. My misgivings arise partly because the Minister talked about basing the need for the new clause on a single case example; partly because it has been introduced into the Bill at a late stage in our considerations; and partly because it will come into force immediately on Royal Assent. It appears to be a rush, and I am not convinced that it will not have equalities impacts or overlap with the lessons we should have learned from the Windrush scandal. If the Minister can give some more assurance that this has been looked at carefully and not rushed into on the basis of a single case, I would be glad to hear it.

[Anna Turley]

I can be explicit: this change in the legislation has been inspired by one particular case. I will not apologise for that, because I am sure the hon. Lady would agree that the current situation is not acceptable. Some of the most serious offenders, including individuals involved in terrorism, serious organised crime or war crimes, cannot be deported even after we have stripped them of British citizenship, because of this loophole. It is important that we take steps to address it.

I want to give the hon. Lady some reassurance, however, because people may express concerns about protection given in law to others—for example, the Windrush generation or others who came here previously. I will be absolutely clear and explicit in Committee: they will not be affected. Any broader protection for the Windrush generation is not affected by the new clause. The power will be exercised personally by the Home Secretary. The Government are clear that the wider protections offered by section 7 will remain intact. The new clause will not affect the overwhelming majority of people protected by section 7 or their rights. This measure is intended solely to ensure that specific individuals whose conduct places them among the most serious threats to the public can be deported.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

Is it fair to put the burden of proof on potentially traumatised victims? Will the Government consider reversing the burden of proof with an appropriately worded provision regarding the appropriate presumption?

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I rise to oppose clause 36. I believe that the roots of the plan lie in the previous Prime Minister’s Administration, and the fact that the clause will affect and harm so many victims and survivors of modern slavery in the face of so few actual cases reflects and results from the awfulness of the rhetoric around migration in recent years, on which the Government have joined in.

The British Medical Association made that point in its written evidence to the Committee. It said:

“We are also concerned by the rise in anti-migrant rhetoric in the UK. Public debate on immigration and asylum has too often relied on misinformation, alarmist language and unfair scapegoating of migrant communities. Sections of the media and some politicians have played a significant role in shaping and amplifying this hostile framing. For example, language used by the then Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, when launching the Immigration White Paper”.

It was referring there to the “island of strangers” speech. The BMA also said:

“the Government and others since, has contributed to racist and xenophobic narratives…This hostile climate has real consequences. International healthcare workers, including doctors and nurses, have reported rising racist abuse and discrimination, both in workplaces and in the wider community. A recent RCN survey showed a 55% increase in racist incidents experienced by nursing staff in the last three years. The real figures are likely to be much higher”.

That is the background to the Bill and I absolutely believe that clause 36 needs to be removed. The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner is utterly opposed to the clause being included in the Bill and has brought many victims’ voices into the evidence we have received.

Clause 36 requires those deciding whether an individual should receive modern slavery support to regard the following factors as damaging to a person’s credibility: delays in making a modern slavery claim; delays in providing relevant information; significant inaccuracies, inconsistencies or omissions in the information provided; inconsistencies between a modern slavery claim and other protection, human rights or civil or criminal proceedings; and striking similarities between one person’s claim and another person’s claim or related legal proceedings.

The Home Office has said these factors will not apply where there is a “good reason”, and Ministers lean heavily on that in the human rights memorandum and say that decision makers must “assess all evidence fairly” and exercise “powers reasonably”. However, Ministers have yet to define for us what a “good reason” is. The clause introduces vagueness and an automatic duty to doubt victims into law, while the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 already has clauses that would enable further questions and deadlines to be put to victims where credibility is genuinely in doubt.

Treating all survivors this way—mandating detrimental treatment for any late claim—is a massively traumatic response to a tiny issue by any measure. There is no evidence of widespread misuse. The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner told us that in oral evidence. She said:

“Of the flights that did not go ahead in 2025 after 3 pm, that is less than 1% of the number of potential victims of modern slavery whom we identified in the UK last year.” ––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 6.]

We were also told that in 2025, 180 referrals were made after 3 pm on the day before an arranged return. That is all there were; these are really small numbers. We also heard that in the national referral mechanism as a whole, only six potential victims were disqualified on bad faith grounds, and only 224 in total were disqualified on any ground, public order or bad faith combined, which is again under 1% of all referrals.

The director general of the Office for Statistics Regulation has, in contrast, sent a reprimand letter to the Home Office expressing concerns around its claims that people are gaming the modern slavery system. He said the office does not have any evidence to confirm those claims and reprimanded the previous Home Secretary for failing to back up public statements with evidence. There is a lack of further background in relation to how long since their arrival people were removed. It does not offer a breakdown of the other reasons why someone may not have been removed, so even the data that the Minister is quoting at us is not reliable.

The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner also points out the vital issue that people cannot self-refer. In written evidence that we received from Professor Parosha Chandran via Unseen UK, she says that the overall approach of adding all these reasons to doubt to the legislation is legally wrong. She says:

“It creates a statutory adverse inference from precisely the features that frequently arise in trafficking and modern slavery cases: delayed disclosure, partial disclosure, inconsistent accounts, inaccurate accounts, gaps in memory, fear, shame, mistrust of authorities…and inability to recognise oneself as a victim.”

The Bill’s explanatory notes give this away. Professor Chandran says:

“They reveal that Clause 36 is intended to close what the Government characterises as opportunities for immigration misuse”,

based on poor data, as we have just seen. She says:

“That is an immigration-control rationale, not a victim-identification rationale.”

Can the Government really justify mixing up these motivations at such detriment to the wider population of victims beyond the tiny number of examples of abuse that they have talked about?

I think this is a very important objection that we have received from many groups. The clause will apply to all victims of trafficking and exploitation, including children and UK nationals. It will include doubting young women who have been sexually exploited, children involved in county lines, and older people and disabled people who are cuckooed in their homes. Survivors across the board are calling for the clause to be removed.

In the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner’s briefing to us, she quoted participants in her recent summit, which had representatives from 15 lived experience advisory panels. They said:

“Trauma affects memory, behaviour and disclosure. Trauma shapes communication, memory and presentation of information. It leads to inconsistencies, gaps in memory, delayed disclosure, or confused details. These are typical trauma responses, not signs of dishonesty. Disclosure happens once trust and safety are established, which takes time: ‘becoming safe’ is different from ‘feeling safe.’

Fear of authorities and consequences, fear of deportation, imprisonment, or loss of support can lead to delay and inconsistency when recounting experiences. Mistrust of authorities compounds this, and traffickers exploit legal knowledge as a scare tactic and threaten victims with this information. Threats to survivors or their families and emotional ties to traffickers create powerful barriers to speaking out. It takes time for someone to feel safe enough to disclose their experience.”

A spokesperson for No One Above, which represents survivors linked to Mohammed al-Fayed, said:

“For many survivors of Mohamed Al Fayed, it has taken years or even decades to speak about what happened to them. The fact that somebody did not disclose their exploitation at the time does not make their experience less real. Survivors can face fear, shame, trauma and enormous power imbalances, while the institutions around them may completely fail to recognise what is happening. We are deeply concerned that these changes will make it even harder for survivors to be believed and get the support they need simply because they were not able to come forward sooner.”

Via the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, we also have evidence from Sosa Henkoma, a survivor of child criminal exploitation. He said:

“I was eleven years old when I was first exploited by a gang. I didn’t know I was a victim—I was a child. When I was twelve, I tried to tell social services what was happening, I was called a fantasist.”

The Bill will create the conditions for more children like Sosa to be treated like fantasists. Clause 36 is not trauma informed, and will cause incredible harm.

We should also listen to the people who are actually facing immigration enforcement, as those victims matter too, and the clause harms victims of trafficking and exploitation more widely. The Gatwick detainees self-advocacy group says:

“When people arrive, like with any serious trouble people have, people are exhausted. They can’t go into these things straight away—they don’t trust the home office or the police. It is really hard to talk about these things because you don’t know what it might bring you—it might bring you trouble as well.”

In recent years, the Government have made good progress on violence against women and girls and on modern slavery, but clause 36 is completely contrary to very recent Government promises to believe and support survivors. The VAWG strategy, “Freedom from violence and abuse”, which was published in December 2025, acknowledges that victims are

“more likely to struggle to engage with support due to trauma and negative previous experiences with services.”

It says:

“We also recognise how immigration status can affect victims of VAWG and that many migrant and asylum-seeking victims will not come forward to report abuse out of fear about their future.”

How does the Bill fulfil the pledges in that Government strategy? Importantly, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association said in its written evidence that clause 36 is

“inverting the trauma-informed approach that Article 13 of the European Convention Against Trafficking in Human Beings”

requires.

Government Members will not have received these briefings, as the organisation working on this campaign, Freedom United, decided that it was only worth asking me and the two Liberal Democrat Members on the Committee. That is really sad. We have received nearly 700 emails from people and member groups who are really worried about this. They ask us to guarantee that survivors of modern slavery are believed and supported, not penalised for their trauma. I urge the Government to listen to the victims’ voices that we have heard, listen to the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner and think again about clause 36.

[Anna Turley]

I thank all hon. Members for their contributions. This is a really important discussion because these are important clauses. Clause 35 clarifies who can make decisions about whether an individual is a victim of modern slavery for the purposes of part 5 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. For adults, as I have said, it will formalise the existing operational model, with the Secretary of State acting as a competent authority for all modern slavery decisions. For children, it will enable the Secretary of State to nominate other public authorities to act as the competent authority. That will allow modern slavery decisions relating to children to be devolved nationally, ensuring that decisions are made by those best placed to safeguard and support them, building on the success of the pilot.

Schedule 4 complements these changes by making important consequential amendments to reflect the definition of competent authority and ensure consistency across the statute book. It will enable the Secretary of State to lay regulations on the making of reasonable or conclusive grounds decisions by all competent authorities and issue guidance on the processes to be followed by nominated public authorities.

Clause 36 places on a statutory footing credibility considerations that are already set out in guidance. That will make it clear that these factors will be considered to be damaging to a person’s credibility unless good reasons are put forward. That will provide a more robust framework—one that supports consistent decision making while recognising factors that could impact credibility indicators, such as a person suffering from coercion, fear or trauma.

I come back to the points raised during the discussion. I am afraid that I take issue with the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for talking as if the purpose of the Bill is just to drive rhetoric or a political argument. These important measures will give our constituents confidence in the immigration and asylum system, and they will make sure that these important provisions, which are a credit to the Conservatives, are genuinely there to protect those who require and deserve support having faced the horrendous issue of modern slavery. It is really important that we protect them from abuse.

I go back to some of the facts and evidence I have already mentioned. The hon. Lady seems to dismiss the evidence out of hand, but there are some important factors here. I mentioned in my introductory remarks that modern slavery referrals have gone up 900% since 2014. Of arranged returns that failed to go ahead, 34%, or over a third, involved a referral for modern slavery made after the return had been arranged—not prior, but after. That is people who have gone through numerous appeals processes and have had numerous opportunities to highlight issues or concerns, but who had a return arranged because they have no right to be in this country.

Of cases raised through the national referral mechanism’s out-of-hours decision-making service ahead of a charter flight, 76% were raised between the hours of 3 pm on the day prior to the planned removal and 6 am on the day of the planned charter removal. Of the total referrals, 15% were raised after 11 pm.

[Siân Berry]

Will the Minister give way?

[Anna Turley]

I am just addressing the hon. Lady’s point. She said that those are not big statistics, or she dismissed them. They might appear small in scale, but they place a hugely disproportionate pressure on operations. Home Office officials are getting all the paperwork in place and liaising with different countries and airlines. These cases are hugely expensive and damaging for operations. They delay removal action due to disingenuous claims, prevent proper decision making and impact support for those who need it most. That is what the Bill aims to address.

[Siân Berry]

This is a useful debate, because the Minister’s points are speaking to the operational nature of this. I hope she will go away and reflect on the wider harm that will be caused by adding this to all victims, in response to what is an operational decision. She is very much relying on that, rather than on our obligations under human rights law and the nature of why late referrals may occur in those circumstances.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Lady’s intervention. I will come on to trauma and the exemptions that we have, because this is really important. We want to make sure that genuine victims are protected, but I want to outline another fact—the facts are really important here—because the UK refers more victims of modern slavery than the whole of Europe put together. In 2023, the UK referred 17,004 cases, yet there were 10,907 referrals in the whole EU. I do not think anyone can accuse us of not living up to our obligations on modern slavery.

The hon. Lady and the hon. Member for Wimbledon have both mentioned victims of trauma. As a Government, we have engaged extensively with organisations working to address modern slavery. We have had a call for evidence and lived experience forums. We have had a range of expert insights, including survivor voices, to ensure that we have informed policy development. That has helped to ensure that the reforms reflect how the system operates in practice and take a trauma-informed approach to identifying and supporting victims. We will continue to engage with stakeholders as the Bill progresses, to ensure that the system remains responsive to victims’ needs.

I reiterate that individuals have opportunities throughout their immigration process to raise any modern slavery-related information, or any other information.

[Siân Berry]

Will the Minister give way on that specific point?

[Anna Turley]

I will give way, and then I will make the point I had intended to make.

[Siân Berry]

The Minister repeatedly refers to “individuals” making the claim, but people cannot self-refer to the national referral mechanism. A professional is making the judgment that they may be a victim. Will the Minister acknowledge that? These claims of abuse hinge on the belief that individuals are making claims, but they are not.

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Lady must not misinterpret us; we are absolutely clear that individuals do not make those claims. However, they raise information. If they raise information on the plane’s steps, it is very clear that many individuals are knowingly gaming the sorts of information that will be relevant to a modern slavery claim. Individuals can raise, at any point in the immigration process, not a referral but any information relating to any concerns they may have about their experience of modern slavery. That could be at the moment they arrive at a UK port, when they are encountered by immigration officials, or it could be to the police, a local authority, a community group or a charity. All this information can be flagged.

If modern slavery information is raised, or if it is identified through general immigration screening processes, a trained first responder—in these circumstances, from UK Visas and Immigration, Border Force, Immigration Enforcement or the police—will make a national referral mechanism referral. Adults must consent to such a referral being made. The referral process includes questions designed to surface any modern slavery experience, to aid decision making by the single competent authority and the immigration enforcement competent authority. People are trained specifically to ask questions throughout the process to identify victims of modern slavery.

Returning to the issues of trauma, the Government recognise the horrific experience that many victims of modern slavery have endured. We understand that trauma can have a profound effect on their ability to raise and discuss it, which is why decision makers are trained and must consider whether there are good reasons to explain the factors that might otherwise be viewed as undermining an individual’s credibility.

Detailed guidance will support decision makers in considering each person’s individual circumstances and experience. That will be trauma-informed, and it will ensure that credibility assessments are made fairly and on a case-by-case basis. First responders are also trained to recognise any signs of modern slavery and identify potential victims, to use trauma-informed approaches to help individuals disclose their experiences and, where appropriate, to refer them to the national referral mechanism.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asks about the provisions applying to children. The Bill’s credibility provisions will apply to individuals of all ages, but specific safeguards will be in place with regard to age. The Government recognise the specific vulnerabilities that children can have, which may affect their ability to disclose relevant modern slavery information. That will be factored into decision makers’ consideration of whether there are good reasons to explain the factors that might otherwise be viewed as undermining an individual’s credibility. This could include, for example, a child’s developmental stage and emotional maturity, which could have an impact on their ability to disclose information. Detailed guidance will support decision makers in considering each person’s individual circumstances and experiences, ensuring that credibility assessments are made fairly and on a case-by-case basis.

The hon. Lady also asks whether the credibility provisions will apply to British nationals. Yes, they will apply to all individuals, including British nationals. We recognise that some individuals, including British nationals who have experienced modern slavery, may have reasons for being unable to disclose information at an early opportunity. For example, victims of historical exploitation may not have previously come into contact or had repeated interactions with authorities, resulting in delayed disclosure. Equally, victims might not recognise themselves as victims of modern slavery or might be reluctant to be identified as such. That is why our first responders are trained to understand and identify signs that may indicate that a person is a victim.

The clause also requires decision makers to consider all relevant circumstances and evidence when assessing the credibility of an individual’s account on a case-by-case basis. As I said, where they identify that there are good reasons for the delayed disclosure, they will not draw a negative credibility finding on that basis alone.

The hon. Lady mentioned the al-Fayed cases. We are absolutely committed to supporting victims to come forward and disclose their experiences, including victims of historical exploitation, victims of grooming gangs and al-Fayed trafficking victims. Those are horrendous cases. Under the modern slavery system, first responders must refer consenting adults and children to the national referral mechanism when modern slavery indicators are present. This is true regardless of how long ago the incidents may have occurred. Decision makers will take this into account when considering cases. Where there is an explanation for the time taken between the exploitation and disclosing it, the delay in disclosure will not result in a negative credibility finding on that basis alone. The credibility provisions on delayed disclosure focus on where individuals have had repeated opportunities to disclose and did not do so. It is not a blanket provision on all lateness.

Hon. Members have asked for more detail on why good reasons are not listed in the Bill. The Bill sets out a pretty exhaustive list of five specific factors that decision makers are required to consider as having a negative impact on credibility when assessing the account of an individual referred to the national referral mechanism, while recognising there might be legitimate reasons for these issues arising. Where the competent authority is satisfied that there are good reasons for the issues with an individual’s account, such as delayed disclosure and inconsistency of account, this will mitigate against any adverse credibility finding. The legislation does not include an exhaustive list of good reasons, primarily because the range of potential mitigating circumstances is so broad that any attempt to provide a closed list would inevitably fail to capture the full range of potential mitigating circumstances.

Decision makers should not be restricted to a set of good reasons. Having these reasons in guidance will retain flexibility for decision makers to consider individual factors that appear to impact on an individual’s credibility. Those decision makers should consider all relevant factors in the round on a case-by-case basis before making a credibility finding. In terms of good reasons, relevant consideration may include the impact of trauma, fear of authorities, cultural or gender-related barriers to disclosure, a lack of self-identification as a victim or, for children, factors such as developmental stage, maturity and the effects of grooming, coercion and control.

The hon. Member for Stockton West asked about consistency across local authorities and local decision-making structures. It is important to say that any individual would receive a consistent decision and outcome. That is important to us, irrespective of which competent authority makes the decision. Regulations will be put in place to establish a clear framework that all competent authorities will be expected to operate within in order to ensure that decisions are taken consistently across all areas. All decisions will be made in line with modern slavery statutory guidance that will be consistent across all competent authorities. For decisions made by local public authorities, there will be separate additional guidance setting out the process and timelines for decision making through this model.

The shadow Minister also asked who might be nominated. Ahead of any public authority being nominated as a competent authority, it will be provided with a comprehensive programme of training to ensure that it understands its responsibilities as a competent authority and is able to make timely and accurate decisions. In addition, the Home Office will put in place clear oversight processes, including clear intervention steps that will be taken should concerns be raised about performance.

The shadow Minister also asked how the measures will apply in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The intention is for this model of decision making to apply to children across all parts of the United Kingdom. We already have successful pilot sites operating in all four nations, as the model allows for local safeguarding partners to have flexibility over how they deliver many elements of the decision-making process. This means that decisions can work alongside any differences in legislative framework across the UK, while ensuring that all decisions are made to a consistent standard. We will continue to work with local safeguarding partners and devolved Governments on this approach and implementation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kohler]

Under section 61 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, a person is entitled to a minimum 30-day recovery period from the day on which they receive a positive reasonable grounds decision. Clause 37 amends section 61 so that, in the event that a person receives a negative conclusive grounds decision within the 30-day period, the recovery period and its associated protections come to an end. It also makes similar provision enabling an equivalent outcome with regard to any additional recovery period under section 62.

This cliff edge risks placing vulnerable people in the way of future harm. A report published by the Modern Slavery and Human Rights Policy and Evidence Centre, led by the University of Oxford, describes the overturn rate of negative NRM decisions as extremely high. Such decisions are not perfect, and removing the recovery period for those with a negative decision means that people who have been trafficked will, in many cases, face being left without protection.

The statistics are stark. Since 2023, the proportion of reconsidered decisions that turn positive has been higher than the proportion of initial positive decisions at the reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds stages. At the reasonable grounds stage, positive outcomes after reconsideration ran between 62% and 82% between 2021 and 2025, while initial positive rates fell as low as 53% in 2024. Between January 2021 and June 2025, of those won a reconsideration of a negative reasonable grounds decision, 646—or 70% of that group—went on to get a positive conclusive grounds decision, too.

I ask the Minister to reflect on those figures and explain why she wants to continue with this cliff edge. I call upon the Government not to pursue clause stand part.

[Siân Berry]

I also oppose clause 37. Under that clause, survivors who receive a negative decision could be immediately removed from support, which could expose them to destitution, homelessness and an increased risk of further harm and exploitation.

Allowing competent authorities to make and serve conclusive grounds decisions during the recovery and reflection period could have a devastating impact on survivors’ wellbeing and recovery. This approach may reduce the amount and quality of evidence available to inform decision making, because survivors may not have sufficient time to understand the process, build trust with support providers or access legal advice. Given the complexity of many cases and the evidential requirements often associated with conclusive grounds decisions—including the need for medical or mental health assessment reports—many individuals may find it difficult to obtain and submit the necessary evidence within such a short timeframe.

I believe that there will also be wider impacts on survivors and society—particularly an increase in homelessness, which the Prime Minister is committed to reducing. Clause 37 could result in survivors being exited from support on the same day that they receive a negative decision, which would clearly put them at a heightened risk of destitution and homelessness. A negative decision notwithstanding, anyone in the national referral mechanism was referred by a first responder who identified trafficking indicators. Those indicators suggested the need for appropriate support to prevent the individual’s situation from deteriorating, whether or not they met the threshold for identification as trafficked at the point of referral.

Additionally, instructing decision makers to decide at any point in the recovery and reflection period means that survivors may be expected to provide far too much relevant information about their case far too quickly after being rescued or escaping a situation of exploitation. Those decisions may be rushed; there may be political or administrative pressure on decision makers to rush processes so that decisions are made more quickly and support can be withdrawn. The overturning data is very instructive on that point. I agree that the quality of decisions matters more than speed. Clause 37 is very risky in its potential to do harm.

The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association suggested in evidence that if clause 37 is retained, a further short 30-day period of support should be provided, to avoid the cliff edge. No amendment to that effect has been tabled. Does the Minister really intend for people to receive literally nothing after a negative decision, risking homelessness, destitution and re-exploitation? She should bear in mind not the six people disqualified on bad faith grounds, or the small number of people whose cases start while they are under removal plans, but the huge number of potential survivors this will affect right across the country.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the contributions that hon. Members have made. As I have made clear, the Government are committed to ensuring that the modern slavery national referral mechanism operates efficiently and effectively. Clause 37 is an important part of that. It will remove inefficiencies and allow for support to be targeted at those who are recognised as victims, rather than having an arbitrary period to wait when we have conclusively identified that an individual is not a victim. As I am sure hon. Members would agree, support should be removed in a recovery period when there is sufficient evidence to conclude that an individual is not a victim of modern slavery.

Let me respond to some of the points that colleagues have made. I have heard language describing people whose conclusive grounds decisions state that they are not victims of modern slavery described as “survivors”. It is important to note that the conclusive grounds decision is that they are not a victim of modern slavery, and therefore that they are not considered to have recovery needs stemming from modern slavery. It stands to reason that those individuals should not be entitled to the recovery period or to modern slavery-specific support—nor would they need them.

For someone who does not receive a negative conclusive grounds decision in the recovery period, those protections will continue for the duration of the 30 days or until such time as a conclusive grounds decision is made. During the recovery period, when there are still reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is a victim of modern slavery, protection from removal and entitlement to support will be ongoing. The recovery period itself is not being reduced; the new provision merely makes it clear that, where there is sufficient evidence to warrant making a negative conclusive grounds decision during that time, doing so will end the recovery period.

The quality of decision making has been flagged by a number of Opposition Members. We are talking about highly trained staff, and negative conclusive grounds decisions are always checked by a second pair of eyes, so there is quality assurance and effective decision making. In 2025, of the 17,560 negative decisions, only 1,467 were accepted for reconsideration. Changing the outcome, however, does not mean that the original decision was incorrect. In most cases, additional information was provided that was not available originally, so that is not an issue of decision-making quality.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Ninth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Anna Turley]

That Act is the interpretation of these principles in our domestic law, so it is the same outcome.

I have thoroughly enjoyed the debate this morning. Clause 22 ensures that our protection system remains fair, and preserves our commitment to providing sanctuary and the benefits of the refugee convention to those who genuinely need them. At the same time, it recognises that those who commit serious crimes should not be entitled to the same benefits and privileges as those who respect our laws. We are rightly obliged not to send them back to face death or torture, but that does not mean that we should give them the package of support and entitlement that other decent law-abiding refugees get. In so doing, the clause delivers a clearer, fairer and more meaningful distinction between those who deserve our protection and those who have fundamentally abused it.

Amendment 133 agreed to.

Clause 22, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Power to require payments from recipients of asylum support

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I beg to move amendment 81, in clause 23, page 21, line 33, at end insert—

“(3A) Subject to subsection (3B), where the Secretary of State did not make a decision on a person’s protection claim within 180 days of the making of the protection claim, any sums to be paid by the person under subsection (3) must be reduced by 20% for every period of 30 days that elapsed before a decision on the person’s protection claim was made.

(3B) Subsection 3A does not apply where a decision on the protection claim was not made within 180 days of the claim being made due to the actions of the applicant.

(3C) For the purposes of subsection (3A), ‘protection claim’ has the same meaning as in section 82(2)(a) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.”

This amendment would reduce the level of payments required from a person by 20% for every 30 days longer than six months that passed before a decision was made on the person’s asylum claim.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 124 and 125.

Amendment 76, in clause 23, page 22, line 6, leave out from “without” to end of line 7 and insert

“them or their household becoming impoverished.

(5A) For the purposes of subsection (5), a person or household is impoverished if its equivalised net income for the relevant financial year is less than 60% of median equivalised net household income for that financial year.”

This amendment would amend the provision relating to repayment of asylum support so that people would not be required to make payments if doing so would leave them, or their household, impoverished (defined as having an equivalised net income of less than 60% of the median).

Amendment 79, in clause 23, page 22, line 7, at end insert—

“(5A) Regulations under subsection (4) must include provision to ensure that a person is not required to make payments in excess of the cost of the support provided to them while in receipt of asylum support.”

This amendment would ensure that an individual would not be liable to repay amounts above the actual cost of the support they received.

Government amendment 126.

Amendment 141, in clause 24, page 23, line 3, at end insert—

“(7A) In deciding an application for entry clearance, leave to enter or leave to remain in the United Kingdom (including indefinite leave to remain), the Secretary of State may take into account any amount that a person has been required to pay under section 23 and has not paid.

(7B) Nothing in subsection (7A) applies to an amount which, by virtue of regulations made under section 23(4) in accordance with section 23(5), the person was not required to pay.”

This amendment would mean that any sums that a person has been required to repay towards asylum support and has not paid may be taken into account when deciding applications to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, including for settlement.

[Siân Berry]

It is pleasure to have you back in the Chair, Mrs Barker. I hope my voice holds out, as I will speak at some length on these amendments.

The Committee has reached the part about charging refugees for the support that they receive, so I want to make some points about my overall discomfort with these proposals. Requiring retrospective payments from refugees after they have secured the right to stay is completely wrong. Many organisations, including the Refugee Council, are rightly calling the proposal a refugee tax, because it is a tax for successfully claiming asylum, and it breaks our commitments under the convention.

The proposals do not guard against destitution, so I believe that they also breach article 25 of the universal declaration of human rights—my favourite article—which states:

“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”

That absolutely applies to refugees.

Local authorities have told us that the requirements will push more families into poverty and will place a greater strain on family support services, advice services, crisis response services and housing services at the local authority level, for which duties towards children will remain. I am not certain that the Government have properly considered the impacts.

[Catherine Fookes]

I understand where the hon. Lady is coming from in relation to local authorities, but does she agree that clauses 23 and 24 exclude certain groups of people, including under-18s and those whom the payments would make destitute?

[Siân Berry]

One of my amendments would raise the level for repayments beyond mere destitution, which is wise in the circumstances, given some of the feedback we have received from support services, charities and local authorities.

The clause will also entrench inequality among refugees. Not all refugees applying for asylum in this country require support; some have managed to flee the circumstances that led to their needing asylum with some resources. In her letter responding to questions in the oral sessions, the Minister confirmed that

“around two in every five people awaiting an initial decision on their claim were in Home Office provided accommodation”.

She also said that some of them may have received accommodation in the past, but that figure is not a high proportion of refugees. The clause therefore targets the most vulnerable—those without the means to support themselves—in an already vulnerable population. The clause will apply only to those who use Home Office accommodation, but, given the randomness of the circumstances in which people become refugees, many come with skills from previous employment—jobs that have been torn away from them—and would be able to support themselves if they were simply allowed to work, as I propose in my new clause 24, which we will debate later.

I believe the whole clause needs to go, but I have also tabled targeted amendments with constructive measures to mitigate its impact. Amendment 81 would reduce payments if the Home Office’s decisions are delayed. At the moment, the main driver of cost in asylum support is delayed decision making, and sometimes poor-quality initial decisions leading to appeals. The Bill reflects neither that nor the detrimental impact that delayed decisions can have on people’s ability to find employment and thus make repayments. The amendment would require that, once someone has been awaiting a decision for longer than six months, or 180 days, the charge intended to be levied against them—the refugee tax—would decrease by 20% for every further 30 days that passed.

Amendment 81 is only fair, given that, according to the Home Secretary, the aim of part 4 of the Bill is partly to tackle the cost of asylum support. The Home Secretary must recognise that the drivers of those costs are delays in decision making and poor decisions. How long it takes to process a claim is not up to the individual, and delayed decisions will have a detrimental impact on their ability to find employment, integrate and make repayments. In some professions, continued practice is a condition of continued recognition in that role, so delays could have disruptive consequences on people’s ability to earn. The reduction in payments that the amendment proposes would also reflect those kinds of impacts.

[Ben Goldsborough]

One really important aspect of the Bill is the focus on avoiding destitution. This is not about asking people to pay a never-ending tax or preventing them from living and working in the UK. When they can afford to, they can pay back to the state. I would just like the hon. Lady to bear that in mind, because the system we are proposing is fair but firm.

[Siân Berry]

I am afraid I cannot agree with the hon. Gentleman. The evidence we have heard about the impact on people’s ability to integrate and on community cohesion has been clear. Amendment 81 in particular would be a good measure because it would incentivise the Home Office to reduce those costs and make decisions on time. It would also mean that people kept in the system for longer than necessary are not unfairly penalised for overly long decisions. That is the focus of the amendment. If the asylum claim took longer than six months because of the actions of the applicant, this would not apply—the amendment covers that as well.

On my amendment 76, as mentioned earlier, if the Government decide to go ahead with the payments, they cannot guard against destitution with their requirement. Poverty ought to be the defining measure. That would allay a lot of the fears of local authorities, which are nevertheless obliged to deal with the consequences of people being in poverty. It would also save money, reduce those impacts and be much clearer about what would happen. People are fearful that the word “destitution” is a very low bar. As defined in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, someone is destitute if they do

“not have adequate accommodation or any means of obtaining it”,

or if they have

“adequate accommodation or the means of obtaining it, but cannot meet his other essential living needs.”

The Government’s definition of “essential living needs”, as set out in the Asylum Support Regulations 2000, is extremely minimal. As the Bill is drafted, individuals or families could be required to pay this charge, regardless of whether they are deemed to be in poverty, or even deep material poverty, if we are to use those definitions.

[Ben Goldsborough]

The hon. Lady is being very generous with her time. She said that if we changed definitions, it would save the state money. Could she elaborate on that and give evidence that that is the case?

[Siân Berry]

The evidence I have comes from local authorities that have given evidence to the Committee and are very worried that their obligations will be extended by this Bill. People will be driven into poverty by the Home Office taking this money away from the overall system in the local area. It would be useful if the Home Office told us where the money will be spent in order to alleviate that. I am not sure that the Bill sets out where the repayments are going to go, but the implication is that they will go to the Home Office, not to local authorities.

Amendment 76 would change the provision related to the repayment of asylum support so that people would not be required to make payments if doing so would leave them or their household impoverished. It also defines impoverishment as having an equivalised net income of less than 60% of the median—a fairly normal definition of poverty that is also the Government’s own definition for whether a household is low income.

Clearly, it is the Government’s intention to provide safeguards to ensure that people are not made destitute. This amendment would strengthen that safeguard on the face of the Bill so that people who fled war and have been granted protection are not plunged into deeper poverty, just as they are starting the process of rebuilding their lives and integrating into communities.

Finally, my amendment 79 is fairly pragmatic. It sets out that payments may not exceed the actual cost of supporting an individual. Currently, there is no link in the Bill between the level of the charge and the cost of support provided to someone. I would like to hear what the Government’s intentions are in setting out those charges. There is a broad power in the Bill and it would come through regulations. However, we need reassurance that no one could face a charge higher than the cost of the actual support they have received.

On Second Reading, the Home Secretary said that clause 23 creates a power

“that requires those who have received taxpayer-funded support to pay back a portion when they can.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 13 July 2026; c. 678.]

The implication is clearly that this should not exceed the cost of being supported. Government amendment 124 would allow the Home Secretary to reduce the payments owed. It would be useful to hear more detail from the Minister about the criteria for applying the power to reduce the payments and about the cases in which they would expect the amounts people owed to be reduced. If the Government plan on reducing them, in line with the amendment, would they consider putting that on the face of the Bill?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Brash]

I fear that there may be some issues with the numbers that the hon. Lady has just given. One of the commitments that this Government have made on dispersal accommodation is to disperse more fairly across the country. As a result of the private contracts signed by the previous Conservative Government, areas of low housing cost were targeted in my Hartlepool constituency. This Government, as I understand it, are looking to do that much more fairly to reduce the burden on deprived communities such as mine. As a result, dispersal accommodation costs will probably go up.

[Siân Berry]

That is an entirely fair point. There has been a focus on the lowest-possible-cost accommodation, and it is only right that people can stay closer to where they may have a connection and all the other considerations.

It is important that those figures are just the current average. Overall, given the gravity of the impacts and the concerns from local authorities and many of my constituents about the problems, I want to see answers from the Minister on the amendments that would mitigate the impacts. I will be pressing my amendments to a vote if I do not hear good answers, and I will be opposing clause 23.

[Melanie Onn]

On the point about contributions, it is worth reflecting on this country’s tradition of collective contributory institutions. Whether it is the welfare system, the NHS, education or pensions, we recognise that we all pay something in so that we can all benefit. Some pay less and some pay more, and some people use those institutions a lot and some use them very rarely, but we accept the balance and the level of fairness in the system. Provided we get our bins collected and we can see a doctor and so on, we are all generally fairly satisfied. When people are feeling a great financial squeeze—it is fair to say many across the country are—and they see examples of others not participating in that agreed settlement, which is our social contract with the state after all, it starts to breed discontent. We should have measures in place to ensure where people have received from the state, they give something back when they are able.

Those who arrive on a work visa are already required to pay reapplication fees every few years for them and their family, which can amount of a significant sum, and to pay annual NHS surcharges. The question is why those on work visas who are aiding this country in shortage occupations have to pay that while others are not required to contribute anything. Should they be granted asylum and are able to work and participate in general life, they should recognise the contribution that enables them to live a settled life in this country. Why should one group be required to pay something and another group not?

[Melanie Onn]

My hon. Friend makes a valid point that we should seek to avoid multiple tiers of different systems applying to people in those circumstances wherever we can. He is also right to recognise the contributions that people make to this country.

[Siân Berry]

I take the hon. Lady’s point that people who have claimed asylum should be regarded as akin to those here on work visas. However, does she understand the points in my amendments about how different groups of asylum seekers are being treated differently? People who needed accommodation due to poverty will be asked to pay back, while those who did not need accommodation, due to not being in poverty, are not. That distinction, which sets different asylum seeker groups against each other, is unhelpful.

[Melanie Onn]

I recognise the point the hon. Lady is making. However, as I pointed out in my opening statement, some people pay more and benefit more already. We have an accepted system that there is a general balance between those who pay higher rates of tax and others who pay lower rates, and between those in receipt of more NHS care and support, and others who rarely need it. We must recognise that we will not be able to get everything exactly right or accurate for every subsection of society.

--- Later in debate ---

[Melanie Onn]

That is a slightly different argument. I was trying to explain how we have a broad group of existing British citizens who pay, contribute and get some benefit. It is the same for asylum seekers: those who benefit should contribute at a later stage when they are able. That is a fair and reasonable point.

[Siân Berry]

For clarity, if this is akin to those on work visas, why are the Government proposing that only those asylum seekers who were here in poverty should pay back those contributions? Why not have a more redistributive approach and also charge the most well-off people seeking asylum, or make it more progressive?

[Melanie Onn]

I thank the hon. Member for her contribution. I feel uncomfortable about dropping the shoulder like this, but you are asking about what the Government should be doing, yet there is a Minister in the room—who will hopefully provide more detail.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I thank Members for their important contributions to this debate on asylum costs and the mechanism the Government are creating to recover some of them. As we heard from my hon. Friends, fairness is at the heart of this debate. We are discussing the concept that individuals who have benefited from the sanctuary and generosity of this country and its taxpayers should contribute towards the support that they received. That is not about punishing anyone; it is about those who have received support having a stake in the success of this country and contributing to the cost of that support, and thereby to the sustainability of giving it to others, once they are financially able.

The right to receive support must come with responsibilities. Each year, the taxpayer funds £4 billion of asylum costs. While it is right that we support those fleeing war and persecution, it is also right that those who have received that support make a fair and proportionate contribution when they can. The measures will ensure that they put back into the system that supported them and contribute towards the provision of that support to others, as well as ensuring that others who are paying for that support consent to doing so.

We have heard examples of our constituents contributing to many different forms of collective support, including through national insurance, and through tax to fund access to healthcare. Contribution is an important principle of the social contract in this country. For that reason, the Bill introduces a new power, under which asylum seekers will pay back a portion of the cost of their support when they are financially able to do so. It will be possible to recover those costs through tax receipts, benefit payments and/or as a debt to the Home Office. That mirrors the way in which the Department for Work and Pensions deducts from universal credit where people have child support payments due, owe money for hardship payments, or have unpaid bills or tax.

Amendments 81, 76 and 79, which were tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, seek to prescribe in the Bill how and when asylum support contributions should be calculated and reduced. The Government cannot accept the amendments because they would be too complex to enable effective delivery of the policy and would move us away from the policy intent of a fair and proportionate contribution towards the costs of support once a person is financially able to pay.

Clause 23 establishes an important principle that, where someone has received asylum support at public expense and later has the means to contribute, it is fair that they do so. Of course, any contribution must remain affordable and not push a person into destitution. Clause 23(5) already requires regulations to include provisions to ensure that nobody pays where it would leave them destitute. Further details of this important safeguard will be set out in the regulations that we have committed to sharing during the passage of the Bill.

[Siân Berry]

Will the Minister give way?

[Anna Turley]

I have a huge pile of responses to the points the hon. Lady made, and there are some important clarifications I want to make. If I do not answer her questions sufficiently, I will be happy to take an intervention.

I want to pick up the hon. Lady’s point about destitution and poverty. I think it is right to set the provision at this level, and I do not think it is appropriate to define poverty in the statute book. Given I have wards in my constituency where as many as 60% of children are growing up in poverty, as per the definition that the hon. Lady set out—I am sure the same is true for the constituencies of other Members present—I am afraid I cannot accept an amendment that says that people in my area can be below that poverty line but asylum seekers cannot. All my constituents have obligations to pay that are contributing to the challenges that they face, and I do not think it is appropriate to safeguard one group and not another, as much as we all have a desire—an absolute commitment—to reduce poverty, particularly child poverty, in this country.

The hon. Lady also raised the matter of whether the Bill breaches article 25 of the declaration of human rights. We are absolutely confident that it meets our international obligations, including under the refugee convention. We believe it is compatible with both the letter and the spirit of our international obligations, while maintaining a sustainable system for the future.

The convention does not anywhere require states to provide indefinite support, free of charge and irrespective of an individual’s circumstances. What it does require is that people fleeing persecution be given protection and access to support, which we are doing. Asylum seekers receive a comprehensive package of taxpayer-funded accommodation support, which is very different from the state support provided to destitute British nationals. Nothing in the refugee convention prevents us from requiring asylum seekers to make a contribution, when they can, towards the system that they benefit from. Protecting refugees and ensuring fairness to taxpayers are not mutually exclusive—we can and will do both.

The hon. Lady also asked how we got to the figure. The figure is an indicative amount. The exact figure will be set out in regulations. I want to reiterate that we have committed to publishing the regulations during the course of the Bill’s passage, and I undertake to do that as soon as possible. I am sure that colleagues will understand that it requires a lot of complex engagement with the Treasury and others. We want to make sure that we have got this absolutely right and that we do not fall foul of the situation Opposition Members found themselves in when they tried to introduce this Bill—the workings out had not been done.

The hon. Lady asked why anyone should pay more than the cost of the support they received. This policy is intended to generate a contribution towards the overall cost of asylum support, not to be an itemised recovery of the precise costs incurred by an individual. That would be extremely difficult—nigh on impossible—and it would undermine the ability for us to raise any money through the measure. The flat rate will be calculated by reference to average support costs and the average time spent in asylum accommodation. A flat rate is clearer and more feasible to administer, while payments will remain linked to affordability.

The hon. Lady also asked about the Home Secretary’s power to make exemptions. I want to flag that it is very similar to an existing power that the Home Secretary has that is covered by the Immigration (Health Charge) Order 2015. It is really important to maintain the ability to make exemptions in extreme and unusual circumstances.

I want to pick up the point about forcing people into destitution. That will not be the case. Payments will apply only where someone has the means to pay. Safeguards will ensure that no one is pushed into destitution. Payments will be linked to income and affordability thresholds. Deduction rates and exemptions will be designed to protect those without the means to contribute. As I said, further guidance will be set out throughout the course of this Bill’s passage. Could a person be penalised where a payment could cause destitution? No. Clause 23 requires regulations to contain provisions that ensure that a person is not required to pay where doing so would cause destitution, as we have already flagged.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Jade Botterill.)

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Tenth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair, Mr Twigg. I appreciate all the discussion and debate we have had so far today. I will pick up my response to the various Opposition amendments, starting with amendment 141, in the name of His Majesty’s Opposition, which would allow outstanding liabilities to be considered in immigration applications, including for settlement. The Government are already considering the wider approach to settlement, as hon. Members will hopefully have seen from some of the media debate. That is currently undergoing a lot of discussion, so it would not be appropriate to pre-empt that work through this amendment. For those building a life in the UK, paying towards the cost of their asylum support will form part of their wider contribution to society. People with outstanding asylum support debt will be prevented from returning to the UK until that debt is repaid. It is our intention that those who receive support will be expected to make contributions when they are financially able to do so.

The detailed operation of the scheme will be set out in secondary legislation. As I have mentioned to hon. Members already today, we have committed to sharing draft regulations during the passage of the Bill, providing them with the opportunity to scrutinise the detail of the policy and how those provisions will operate in practice. That approach ensures appropriate parliamentary oversight, while retaining the flexibility needed to develop the scheme in the light of wider decisions on settlement policy. The draft regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure and will afford a further opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny before they are made.

I will take this moment to respond to some of the questions that the hon. Member for Stockton West raised this morning. He asked whether the scheme would raise more money than it costs, which I think is an important challenge. The Government are determined to reduce the cost to the taxpayer. That is part of the principle of this, although the primary objective is fairness and sustainability, with any revenue generated reducing the burden on the public purse. As I have said, details of the scheme are under development and will be published in draft regulations. We will look for as much transparency as possible, not just in the process but in how we can publish data in our regular asylum statistics.

The hon. Gentleman also mentioned amendment 124, which is about the powers given to the Home Secretary for exemptions, and the circumstances in which they might be used. The amendment enables regulations to confer a discretion on the Secretary of State to waive, reduce or refund liabilities arising under the asylum support contribution scheme. As I mentioned this morning, that is commensurate with article 8 of the Immigration (Health Charge) Order 2015, which gives the Secretary of State for the Home Department the same discretionary power to reduce, waive or refund part of that charge. The power will of course be at the discretion of the Secretary of State, and we anticipate that it will be used only in exceptional cases.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the amount payable and how the income threshold will be set. Hon. Members have raised the £10,000 figure, which is an indicative estimate of the standard contribution that may be required. The final flat-rate contribution will be set in secondary legislation. As we discussed this morning, it is intended to reflect average asylum support costs across the system, rather than the precise costs incurred in an individual case. That is how the figure was reached. The estimates will depend on the final design and implementation of the scheme, including collection mechanisms. We will continue to assess the expected costs and benefits as the scheme is developed. However, we do not consider it appropriate to make commencement legally dependent on five-year forecasts, which may be subject to considerable uncertainty. I hope I have addressed the issues that the hon. Gentleman raised.

On Government amendment 124, the policy intention remains that those with the means to contribute towards the cost of the support they previously received should do so. However, there may be circumstances in which it would be fair and proportionate to depart from that general principle. The amendment provides flexibility to respond to such circumstances and supports the fair and effective administration of the scheme. The detailed circumstances will be set out in regulations and will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The amendment therefore complements the wider contribution scheme, while ensuring that it can operate fairly and proportionately in individual cases.

Government amendments 125 and 126 are technical amendments that deal with how the requirement to pay back a contribution towards asylum support operates if the recipient becomes bankrupt or enters another form of insolvency process. The amendments enable the Secretary of State to make regulations that set out the effect of a person becoming insolvent on their liability to make payments. They also define when a person is to be treated as insolvent across the jurisdictions of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. That will allow the Government to set out in regulations that, where appropriate, liabilities under the scheme are not extinguished by bankruptcy or certain other insolvency processes.

In addition, the amendments provide a power for regulations to make consequential provision in relation to insolvency legislation where necessary. The amendments provide the flexibility needed to ensure that the asylum support scheme can operate effectively alongside existing insolvency frameworks across the United Kingdom. They make no changes to the safeguards that will be built into the scheme.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is very good to have you in the Chair this afternoon, Mr Twigg. From the discussions we have had today, I think it is clear what a mess the proposals in clauses 23 and 24 are. If it is not an itemised recovery of costs, it is a refugee tax—worse, it has become clear that is only a poor refugee tax. As such, the philosophical basis for the proposals is broken.

The Government have set a terribly high bar for being excused, and they are not seeking any payment from successful refugees who have the means to support themselves while they wait for a decision. That is despite the hon. Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes likening the proposal to NHS surcharges for those on work visas, to which the Minister also referred. The Government have been clear that they are setting a flat charge rate, but they will not apply it to all asylum seekers. Why not? If one accepts the premise of the charge—I do not—would that not be fairer across the board? The Government propose to charge it only to those people who are destitute when they arrive here.

This will do much harm to these people’s ability to settle in the future. Why would the Government drive them into poverty for extended periods and cause that kind of problem? It seems unfair to impose this on people. The Government have introduced this in clause 23, while amendment 141, tabled by the Conservatives, tries to codify it further. In my view, any kind of refugee tax should not be an additional barrier to stability. These clauses are reckless, unfair, cruel and irrational. Without my amendments, they become even worse. I will seek to divide the Committee on them.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Division 46

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 2

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Green Party: 1
Liberal Democrat: 1

Noes: 11

---

Labour: 8
Conservative: 3

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 77, in clause 23, page 22, line 9, leave out “18 at all times” and insert “21 at any time”.

This amendment would extend the exemption for repaying asylum support from any person who was under the age of 18 at all times they were in receipt of support to any person who was under the age of 21 at any time they were in receipt of support.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 50, in clause 23, page 22, line 9, leave out “all times” and insert “any time”.

This amendment would exempt from being required to make payments to the Secretary of State any persons who were, at any point, under 18 years of age during the time they received asylum support.

Amendment 78, in clause 23, page 22, line 9, at end insert—

“(aa) were over the age of retirement at the time they ceased to be an asylum seeker (within the meaning given by section 94 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999),

(ab) have received a positive conclusive grounds decision (within the meaning of Part 5 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022),

(ac) are a survivor of sexual or gender-based violence, or have been a victim of domestic abuse (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021)

(ad) are an individual who has been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence,”.

This amendment would add people over retirement age and victims of modern slavery, domestic abuse, or serious sexual or physical violence to the list of people who would be exempted from repaying any asylum support they received.

Amendment 82, in clause 23, page 22, line 9, at end insert—

“(aa) were granted leave to remain in the United Kingdom following an appeal by the person against the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse a protection claim.”

This amendment would exempt from the requirement to make payments under Clause 23 anyone who is granted protection following a successful appeal.

Amendment 139, in clause 23, page 22, line 10, leave out paragraph (b).

This amendment would remove the exemption from making payments for asylum support received for people who received support before clause 23 comes fully into force.

Amendment 80, in clause 24, page 23, line 3, at end insert—

“(7A) The Secretary of State must cancel the liability of any person to make payments required under section 23 when one of the following occurs—

(a) the person dies;

(b) the person receives a disability-related benefit and because of the disability is permanently unfit for work;

(c) the person reaches the age of 65; or

(d) the tenth anniversary of the date on which the person stopped receiving asylum support (as defined in section 23(2)).”

This amendment would set out circumstances in which the liability for making payments for asylum support received would cease to apply: the death of the person; the person turning 65; the person being permanently unfit for work; the tenth anniversary of the person stopping receiving asylum support.

Amendment 142, in clause 50, page 52, line 13, at end insert—

“(d) regulations under subsection (6)(c) of section 23.”

This amendment would make regulations exempting further categories of people from the requirement to contribute towards the cost of asylum support subject to the affirmative procedure, so that they cannot be made without the approval of both Houses.

[Siân Berry]

I have four amendments in this group, and I will speak as briefly as I can about each of them. They are in the spirit of trying to improve the clauses even though I oppose them in principle.

Amendment 77 seeks to strengthen the exemption on children and increase the age to 21. As the explanatory statement says, it would

“extend the exemption for repaying asylum support from any person who was under the age of 18 at all times they were in receipt of support to any person who was under the age of 21 at any time they were in receipt of support.”

It is welcome that the Government have already acknowledged that children should not be counted within this policy, including that parents should not have to pay £10,000 for any dependants who are children. However, there are two concerns that this amendment is seeking to address. First, on the face of the Bill, an individual has to be:

“under 18 at all times at which they received asylum support”

That implies that if someone turns 18 the day before they are granted status, they would still be liable for the full payment of up to £10,000, which the Government have confirmed they want to charge at a flat rate. That seems particularly unfair, especially when one considers that applicants have no control over how long it will take for their application to be processed.

Additionally, the Bill does not reflect that when someone turns 18, they are still a young person just starting their adult life. Through measures announced elsewhere, such as the work and study protection framework, the Government have made it clear that they want people to be encouraged into study and work opportunities. It therefore seems both harsh and counterproductive to be giving a young person thousands of pounds of debt when they are taking their very first steps in building a new life in a new country. The change in amendment 77 would therefore better protect children and young people who have gone through the asylum system and allow them to have the best start at rebuilding their lives in the UK.

Amendment 78 adds further exemptions to those that the Government have outlined. The only exemption on the face of the Bill is currently for children who are under 18, although more amendments could be added through regulations. I am happy for amendment 78 to be a probing amendment, provided that the Government are prepared to give some clarity on further exemptions that they might be prepared to add.

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[Ben Goldsborough]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. As it says on the face of the Bill, deprivation has to be taken into account. Again, that reinforces the idea that the Government are putting forward a firm but fair immigration system.

[Siân Berry]

Does the hon. Member have any insight into the gap that I think the Minister left in the discussion on the last group, between claims that repayments will be affordable and what it says in the Bill, which is that it will only avoid destitution? Does the hon. Member agree that there is a gap between those two definitions?

[Ben Goldsborough]

What was really important in the Minister’s closing comments on that group was that this is obviously not something that is taken into account for our own constituents who have not sought asylum themselves. There is no definition of destitution versus poverty. What we need to do is have a fair system, not only for those that are seeking asylum, but for our constituents as well. We need to ensure we do not create this two-tier running that then undermines the confidence in the system that we need.

Subsection (2) makes it clear that provision covers support provided through several existing statutory routes, including sections 4, 95 and 95A of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, as well as accommodation in accommodation centres under section 17 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. That is an important foundation for a coherent approach. Asylum support is delivered through different statutory arrangements, and the Government need a framework that can operate across those routes rather than leaving gaps in the system.

Subsection (3) provides the power to require payments, while subsection (4) allows regulation to establish how those payments will be calculated, when they will be required, the timeframes for payment and how individuals will be notified. I welcome that approach, because effective reform requires more than setting out a principle in legislation; it requires practical machinery to implement the principle consistently.

Taxpayers rightly expect public money to be managed responsibly across our public services. We have to make difficult decisions about how resources are allocated and ensure that money is used where it is needed most. The asylum system should be no exemption from that. Where someone has received support at public expense and is subsequently in a position to contribute towards those costs, it is reasonable for the Government to have the power to require an appropriate payment. That is not about penalising people for seeking asylum; it is about recognising that the public support comes with responsibilities where an individual has the means to meet them.

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[Mr Kohler]

As we have heard, the Bill offers little detail on how the asylum support repayment system will work in practice, such as how repayments will be made, the exact amount that refugees will be expected to pay back, and how much refugees need to earn before they are required to make repayments. Can the Minister commit to a timeline for bringing forward those crucial details?

Requiring refugees to pay back their asylum support is likely to create barriers to integration, leaving refugees in debt at exactly the point where they should be focused on rebuilding their lives. How will the Home Office ensure that this proposal does not undermine wider Government objectives on improving social cohesion? The Red Cross questioned that in its evidence. How will the Home Office ensure that the asylum support repayment system does not leave refugees vulnerable to exploitation if they are struggling the repay their debt? Hon. Members raised questions on clause 23(5). As the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion said, affordability is very different from destitution—destitution is such a high bar. If people are trying to integrate into society and they cannot afford these repayments, what will happen? They will become vulnerable to loan sharks. That is the kind of problem they will face.

I would also like to focus on the consequences of non-repayment. If refugees are required to fully repay their debt before being eligible for settlement, that risks leaving the most vulnerable with prolonged insecure status. Can the Minister clarify that point? Will refugees who are unable to work through no fault of their own, for example due to medical conditions or care responsibilities, still be able to qualify for settlement? I would also like to hear an answer on that from the Minister.

[Siân Berry]

I have spoken quite a lot about my overall position on these clauses, but I would like to say a little more about the fact that clause 23 gives the Home Secretary the power to require these unfair payments from a minority of asylum seekers who are destitute when they arrive here. The Minister needs to consider the lack of safe routes and the extent to which people wanting to claim asylum here end up more destitute as they are exploited the entire way by the kind of organised criminals that are currently running the only routes into this country. We need to see much more detail than is on the face of the Bill about how the system will work.

I essentially wish to speak in support of amendment 140, tabled by the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire. He makes a good point. On Second Reading, the Home Secretary promised that Parliament would have the opportunity to see draft regulations, but we have not seen them yet. The Committee is being asked to assess and approve a system when we are not able to scrutinise the details. We deserve to see more of them now. They are not minor details. We have already spoken about the fact that £10,000 is the amount that the Government are talking about, but that is not on the face of the Bill, and neither is the payment threshold nor how much people will have to pay over that amount. All of that is information that we would need to assess the impact that this policy would have on individual refugees at the point they are trying to rebuild their lives, not just on the public purse, as the Opposition amendment seeks to set out.

Although the Government have indicated how they might recover those payments, the detail of the Bill does not cover everything. They say it will enable the Home Office to have its own cost recovery mechanism, supported by HMRC, which will apparently play its part. How will that work, how will it sit within other parts of the Government’s core protection system, and how much will it cost? That is especially important when weighed against the fact that the policy might bring in only limited amounts and may even reduce the overall tax take from this group. Without knowledge of the decisions about the system, the Government may be proposing something that costs the public purse large amounts in cash terms, let alone in its wider impacts. I think we need to see the Government’s analysis of all this.

It is also important to acknowledge that individuals claiming asylum have fled war and persecution and are not responsible for the overall cost of asylum support. That cost has grown, often as a result of policy decisions or failings of this Government and the previous one. Earlier, we discussed the difference in cost between nightly paid hotel accommodation and properly settled dispersal accommodation in genuine homes. The Government are not spending their money wisely at present, and I think Ministers are seeking to address that. Would tackling that not be more cost-effective than trying to recover money from close-to-destitute asylum seekers?

The Home Secretary has also said this policy is introducing a “contributory principle”. What she ignores, however, is that refugees do contribute, and have always done so, through working, paying taxes and contributing to their local communities. In fact, on wider impacts, the refugee tax is not introducing the idea that refugees should contribute. In my view, it is making it harder for them to do so, while also harming community cohesion and integration.

A policy that was truly focused on increasing refugee contributions could look at how barriers to employment can be removed, so that people can access work more easily, progress in a career and transfer their qualifications to this country. I have had casework on those matters, which are barriers to refugees contributing to society through their taxes and making the most of the skills they can bring here by accessing education and further training. That would all help the Government to address asylum support costs, but it would do so by supporting vulnerable refugees, not targeting them with this tax.

Has the Minister really addressed, in any of her comments today, the facts in the letter she wrote to us at the end of the oral evidence session, which admits fully that three in five of the people currently awaiting a decision are not claiming support? Why are those people not being asked to contribute in any way, if recovering the costs from people is the most important thing to the Government? Amendment 140 gets to the heart of that: what is the balance of payments?

Finally, I believe this policy is cruel. It seeks to deter people from coming to this country, and that is the key reason why it is so targeted at the most vulnerable refugees, and not at those who can pay their own way. However, will it actually work as a deterrent? In general, the Home Office already has evidence that punitive measures such as the refugee tax have little impact on where people choose to seek asylum. Furthermore, in the oral evidence session, when asked about this, the Refugee Council highlighted that people will be able to avoid these payments simply by not applying for asylum support while their application is being processed, a risk also recognised in the Home Office’s impact assessment. Although that may reduce asylum support costs, I do not think that such a result is the Government’s intention, as it will push more people seeking asylum into vulnerable situations in which they can be exploited further. Do the Government not think that policies from this and previous Governments have already done enough of that?

[Anna Turley]

I thank hon. Members for their amendments in this group, as well as for the discussion and interest they have shown in this provision, which we have debated at length today.

Clause 23 enables the Secretary of State to require those who have received asylum support and accommodation, known as section 4 and section 95 support, to pay a contribution towards those costs. The clause contains an important safeguard: it requires the regulations to ensure that individuals are not required to pay when doing so would cause them to become destitute. That means that people will not be required to pay if it meant they could not meet their essential living needs or if it would place them at risk of homelessness.

The clause exempts children. Other exemptions will be set out in secondary legislation to ensure safeguards, thus protecting vulnerable groups. I look forward to working further with Members on that throughout the course of the Bill. Details of how the charge will be applied and how the system will operate will be set out in regulations and the Home Secretary has committed to sharing a draft of those regulations with Parliament.

The Bill is built on a balance of rights and responsibilities. This reform protects support for those who need it most, while reinforcing the principle that support should come with an expectation of contribution when that is affordable. When confidence in the asylum system is low, and with asylum support costing the taxpayer around £4 billion, it is right to take steps to reduce costs and ensure that those who can make a proportionate contribution do so. This policy achieves that.

The measure is not a tax on asylum seekers or refugees. It does not affect a person’s right to claim asylum nor their entitlement to receive support when it is needed. The clause reflects the broader principle that, alongside the rights and protections afforded to those seeking asylum, there are responsibilities that our constituents would expect one another to undertake: to contribute towards public costs where it is fair and reasonable to do so. This aids integration, helping to foster a shared sense of fairness, responsibility and belonging. It says to our constituents who contribute for their entitlement that no one should be entitled to a free pass.

Building on the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk, the measure is also about asking people to contribute for those who come after them. My hon. Friend the Member for North Northumberland mentioned the desire that he heard expressed by asylum seekers coming to this country that they want to pay and contribute. Many of them will want to enable the system to continue, so that other people fleeing war and persecution can benefit.

Clause 24 enables asylum support repayments to be recovered through the tax system. It provides a power for regulations to make provision for HMRC to collect repayments on behalf of the Secretary of State from individuals who are liable under clause 23. The clause also creates the statutory framework for information sharing between HMRC and the Home Office where that is necessary for the administration and collection of repayments.

Hon. Members asked whether HMRC will be responsible for collecting payments. We are ensuring a range of repayment mechanisms, including options that could make use of the tax system. Decisions on the final repayment model will be taken in due course, informed by our discussions. We will continue to work across Government to identify the most effective and proportionate response.

The powers we are introducing will help ensure that, should the Government decide to use the tax system as a collection mechanism, repayments can be administered effectively and efficiently. The clause therefore provides the legislative framework necessary to support recovery of asylum support costs through the tax system. I listened carefully to the points made by hon. Members and their detailed questions on the set-up of the scheme, its processes and the collection mechanisms. The Home Secretary has committed that information on those factors will be published during the process of the Bill. I undertake to ensure that hon. Members continue to get more information as the drafts are published.

Moving on to the amendments in this group, amendment 140 and new clause 62 concern transparency and reporting on the asylum support contribution system. The Government recognise the importance of scrutiny, but we cannot accept these provisions. On amendment 140, the Government have already committed to sharing draft regulations during the Bill’s passage, allowing Parliament to discuss the detailed operation of the scheme. Building on the conversation we had on the previous group, I will review whether exemptions will be subject to the affirmative rather than the negative procedure. I hope hon. Members will take that commitment.

The amendment would also make commencement of the scheme conditional on publishing five-year estimates of the number of people liable, sums recovered and administrative costs. Those will depend on the final design and operation of the scheme, and may be subject to considerable uncertainty. For example, the numbers of asylum claims in this country are coming down, so five-year estimates would not necessarily give us any degree of certainty. We will provide relevant analysis through the impact assessment, and are committed to providing data to support transparency on the effectiveness of the scheme as implemented. However, we do not consider it appropriate to make commencement dependent on such five-year forecasts.

Likewise, we do not think that a separate reporting scheme on liabilities, recoveries, write-offs, exemptions and administrative costs, as set out in new clause 62, should be prescribed in primary legislation. We will explore what appropriate information on the operation of the scheme can be incorporated into Government asylum statistics and reporting once the scheme is operational.

To conclude, the Government are committed to ensuring that the scheme is transparent and deliverable, and provides value for money.

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[Anna Turley]

I moved to my conclusion too quickly; forgive me, Mr Twigg. I still have a number of points to respond to—I thought we were getting an early escape.

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, and one that I wanted to cover, regarding asylum support. Section 98 support is temporary emergency accommodation, which is not within the scope of clause 23. Section 98 is the immediate emergency support, and asylum seekers then apply for section 95 support, which is what the clause addresses. He asks why that is not included, and I take his point. We are trying to move away from the kind of expensive and unsustainable emergency support that we saw explode under his party’s Administration. We have already saved more than £1 billion by closing hotels, so that will not be part of this measure. The asylum support that people apply for is what is covered by the clause.

The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked about repayment thresholds. As I said, the Bill establishes the principle and the key framework for the recovery of asylum costs; the detailed operation, including thresholds, will be set out in secondary legislation. That is a common and proportionate approach to drafting such legislation, for which operational detail may be adjusted over time. The policy intent is that repayment will begin only once an individual reaches a defined threshold for repayment, and that deductions will be set at a manageable rate, so that recovery remains proportionate and does not cause hardship or destitution. Any regulations will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and there will be clear safeguards.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked whether we expected to raise any money. The answer is yes. As I have mentioned, the asylum system represents a significant cost to the taxpayer of about £4 billion. The Government are determined to bring those costs down. The policy of recouping asylum support is a world first. It is about ensuring that those who benefit from this specific, targeted form of support contribute towards its cost, when they can. Our objective is fairness to everyone in this country, as well as sustainability, with any revenue generated reducing the burden on the public purse. It is about not just recovering costs, but contribution. Costs will be recouped over time from individuals who have moved into employment or otherwise have the means to contribute.

[Siân Berry]

Will the Minister give way?

[Anna Turley]

I was going to mention work and study, but I will come back to that.

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[Siân Berry]

My question is more about the revenue and its spending. We have heard from local authorities concerned that they might have higher costs as a result of the measures. Can the Minister give us any reassurance that the costs will not spill over into services that might be affected by some of the things in the impact assessment?

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Lady makes an important point, but I do not see that the implications will fall on local authorities. As I said, in the course of publishing regulations as a result of the passage of the Bill, we will explore the mechanisms for bringing the money in and for where it will go in the Exchequer. However, at this point I do not want to commit to any undertakings to local authorities. The measure is about ensuring that people contribute and pay their fair share.

The hon. Lady mentioned work—we share that commitment. We all want to see those who have come here fleeing persecution move as quickly as possible into work and into contributing to this country. That is why our new work and study routes will allow people to get off core protection, off dependency and as quickly as possible into the work and study routes that we will provide and encourage asylum seekers to use.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Seventh sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Good morning, everyone. We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Today, we will continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. Before we begin, I remind Members please to switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during the sittings. The selection for today’s sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and amendments have been grouped together for debate. Members are reminded to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in any part of the debate.

Clause 19

Public interest considerations

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 19, page 17, line 1, at end insert—

“(3AB) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the elimination of violence against women and girls, that due regard be given to circumstances arising from a person who seeks to enter or remain in the United Kingdom being a victim of violence against women and girls, including domestic abuse (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021).”

This amendment inserts a new public interest consideration into section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, requiring a court or tribunal to take into consideration the effects of violence against women and girls when deciding whether an interference with a person’s Article 8 rights is justified.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 104, in clause 19, page 17, line 1, at end insert—

“(3B) In determining for the purposes of subsection (3A)(c) whether a person is of good character, the court or tribunal must apply the guidance issued by the Secretary of State for the purposes of the good character requirement in paragraph 1(1)(b) of Schedule 1 to the British Nationality Act 1981, as that guidance has effect from time to time.”

This amendment would require the new “good character” consideration to be applied in the same way as the good character requirement for naturalisation as a British citizen.

Amendment 105, in clause 19, page 17, line 3, leave out “should” and insert “must”.

This amendment would require, rather than advise, that no weight is given to private or family life established while a person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully, with leave obtained by deception or in serious breach of their conditions.

Amendment 106, in clause 19, page 17, line 7, leave out “serious”.

This probing amendment would apply the “no weight” rule to private or family life established while a person is in any form of breach of a condition of their leave, not just a ‘serious’ breach.

Clause stand part.

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[Siân Berry]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. My amendment would introduce a public interest test for survivors of violence against women and girls, domestic abuse and sexual violence into the considerations. I will also speak to the matter of leaving out the clause. I will start with the clause and what it does.

The clause will fundamentally alter the balance that has long existed between article 8 rights and the public interest by restricting the courts’ ability to assess the individual circumstances of each case. Our courts and tribunals carefully balance the right to private and family life against the public interest in an effective immigration system. Our judiciary performs that task every day, helping to deliver justice, uphold the rule of law and guard against abuse. Yet the clause assumes that the balance is being struck wrongly, without the Government having demonstrated that. The main evidence is only a 2022 internal sample of Home Office decisions.

The existing statutory framework already strongly favours the public interest, in particular in deportation cases. While preserving the ability to consider individual circumstances, the clause will replace that with a more prescriptive framework. Here are my views on the main changes in the clause: first, it will require courts to predict whether a person will remain financially independent. That is an inherently speculative exercise, because it fails to consider the uncertainties of ordinary life, including illness, disabilities, caring responsibilities or economic downturns. The effect is likely to discriminate most heavily against disabled people, as well as those with long-term health conditions and caring responsibilities.

Secondly, the clause will discount genuine family life, because of immigration status. Family life formed while a person was here with no leave to remain would be given no weight at all, and family life formed while people’s status was precarious would be given little weight. Precarious migration status covers everyone with anything short of indefinite leave to remain or citizenship—care workers, skilled workers, international students, refugees and partners on the family route.

Under the earned settlement proposals, the qualifying period to become eligible for settlement would be extended to a baseline of 10 years, and in some cases 15 or even 20 years for refugees. Many people will therefore remain on in a precarious position for years, during which the relationships they form and the children they raise would count for little or nothing under the clause. The reality is that family relationships do not cease to exist or be formed just because an immigration status is uncertain.

Strasbourg accepts that precarious status can reduce the weight that is given to family life, but it has not said that it counts for nothing. In an important case, Jeunesse v. the Netherlands, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation—even when the applicant had remained without leave for years—because of the impact on her children. With a “No weight” rule, as in clause 19(4), there will be no space to assess such cases and to retain flexibility. It will weaken protection for children.

Finally, and perhaps most alarmingly, when courts assess a child’s best interests they do not look at one factor in isolation—they examine the full picture: a child’s age, health, education, friendships, cultural identity, family circumstances, personal development and connection to the UK—and the children are not defined by a checklist; yet clause 19 would introduce a closed checklist, under which it would be unreasonable

“to expect a child to leave the United Kingdom if (and only if)”

they would receive no education abroad, face “very significant obstacles” to integrating in the new country, or suffer

“a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect”.

Each is a very high bar. Remarkably, the Government’s impact assessment describes those factors as a “non-exhaustive” list, but subsection (7) uses the phrase “if and (only if)”. It is very clearly a closed list. The Bill therefore goes even further than the Government say they intend, in terms of its effect on children.

I am also concerned that the clause applies to British children too. As drafted, it could result in a British child with a migrant parent either being separated from their parent or having to leave the UK to preserve the family unit. That results in two-tier British citizenship. The Government’s own impact assessment lists family separation among the consequences of these reforms, and says—with little humanity—that the new test will allow decision makers

“to consider whether parents can maintain their relationship with a child from outside the UK”

or whether a British child can

“successfully adapt to life abroad”.

The existing framework is not perfect, but it already places substantial weight on the public interest and has safeguards allowing courts to consider the facts of each case. Clause 19 risks upsetting that balance. At its heart, the issue here is a simple one: do we trust our courts to weigh the facts before them, or do we seek to predetermine the outcome through statutory presumptions? I believe that the existing approach better serves both justice and the rule of law, and for that reason clause 19 should not stand part of the Bill.

Amendment 61 would reduce the harm of this clause, if it remains, by inserting a new public interest consideration into section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, requiring a court or tribunal to take into consideration the effects of violence against women and girls when deciding whether an interference with a person’s article 8 rights is justified. In my view, without the amendment the Bill will remove or weaken application grounds or causes of appeal relied on by many women living in abusive or exploitative conditions, making them even more vulnerable. That may leave victim-survivors at risk of being refused leave to stay, removed or deported for factors that are a direct consequence of the abuse to which they have been subjected.

To bring that point home, I will provide some examples from organisations that are currently supporting such women. My first example shows how the stricter public interest considerations risk undermining evidence for financial dependency and contact with the criminal justice system being usual results of an experience of violence against women and girls. Julianne was living in another country when she began her relationship with a British man. While visiting him in the UK, she became pregnant with his child and he encouraged her to stay, promising to support her and secure her immigration status. Trusting those assurances, Julianne stayed and became an overstayer. Once her status became insecure, her partner’s behaviour changed dramatically. He subjected her to domestic abuse, isolated her from friends and family overseas, and exploited the fact that she had no support network in the UK. The abuse escalated after the birth of their child.

Julianne eventually fled with her child after a violent assault. She sought medical treatment, reported the abuse to the police and received emergency support from the local authority. Traumatised and destitute, Julianne was left to navigate a complex immigration system alone, as she had been unable to secure legally aided advice and could not afford to pay for a solicitor. She lives with the constant fear of removal. I have changed Julianne’s name.

Julianne had a pathway to regularisation as the parent of a British child; however, if clause 19 becomes law the barriers to regularising her immigration status would be raised significantly, potentially preventing her from qualifying to remain in the UK as the parent of a British child. Re-emphasising the weight of financial independence without reliance on state support and public services will create pressure on victim-survivors like Julianne to stay in abusive and exploitative situations instead of leaving and claiming support, as she did.

Women who have been subject to economic and immigration abuse will be penalised due to their lack of financial independence. The public interest considerations would weigh heavily against Julianne because she accessed support from the local authority while protecting herself and her children from domestic abuse, and because no weight would be given to her family life, as it was established when she overstayed. Without amendment 61, there would be no discretion to consider the role her abuser played in causing her to overstay.

In respect of the redefinition of family, I have a further example of where limiting family life to core cohabiting family and replacing a judicial assessment with a checklist will ignore nuances and external factors forcing a family not to cohabit, such as coercive and controlling behaviour. More broadly, women who are convicted of criminal offences would also be put at increased risk of deportation, as a high evidential standard is needed to prove a disproportionate impact on them or a family member.

That includes women who are coerced or pressured into criminal activity—those driven to engaging with the criminal justice system due to unmet needs, such as being unable to afford food or having unaddressed mental health problems, and those who retaliated against the person abusing or exploiting them, or who had a counter-allegation made against them falsely. All those women are vulnerable and deserving of protection and support, not the further punishment of possible deportation.

My second case study is Blanca. Blanca came to the UK with a visa to work, and while here, she married a British man and had a baby. He had a good job, so they agreed she would stop working, and they then had two more children together. Over time, he became more controlling. Although the children’s benefits were registered in her name, he controlled the payments and did not give her access to the money.

As Blanca did not have her own income, he gave her money for the family’s food, but he would demand that she provide receipts and the exact change. If she bought anything he considered unnecessary, he would be angry and make her return it. That included sanitary products, which Blanca found humiliating and confusing. He also became verbally and later physically abusive towards Blanca, and she became more and more scared of him.

One day, when she was in the supermarket, her period started. She did not know what to do, and she was scared of her husband seeing that she had bought something he thought was unnecessary. She stole a box of sanitary pads, but on her way out of the shop, she was stopped by security who reported her to the police. She was charged and later convicted of theft.

If part 2 of the Bill were fully implemented, Blanca’s conviction would put her at high risk of deportation. No consideration would be given to the abuse that she experienced, which pushed her to commit the crime, nor would it be given to her vulnerability and trauma. In addition, as she did not have lawful status for much of the time she was in the UK, her private and family life may be deemed to hold no weight—or, at best, little weight—if it were held to have been established when she arrived with precarious status.

The Committee can see that clause 19 has all these knock-on effects into further parts of the Bill, and that this additional public interest consideration is necessary. I hope the Committee will discuss and support amendment 61, if clause 19 is to remain in the Bill. I am happy for this to be a probing amendment, if the Government will consider these risks and make their own similar changes to the Bill later.

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. As we discussed in the last sitting, clause 18 asks who counts as family, but clause 19 asks what weight that family should carry against the public interest. The clause goes to the heart of public concern, as it considers people who build a life here, while they have no right to be here, only to rely on that recently constructed life as a reason to stay in the UK indefinitely.

I will speak to amendments 104 to 106, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West and I, as well as amendment 61, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, and clause 19. The Opposition support the broad direction of travel in which the Government are going with the clause; however, to our reading, much of it is unfortunately drafted in a way that means it will be all too easy for the courts to set aside. Furthermore, the evidence behind the clause has not yet been published. I will take the Committee through both aspects.

First, clause 19 amends section 117B of the 2002 Act, which deals with the public interest considerations that apply in every article 8 case. Subsection (2) replaces the requirement to be financially independent with a three-part, forward-looking test, which is that a person must be, and is

“likely to remain, financially independent…able to house themselves…without reliance on state support”

and is not

“reliant on public services, in particular health or social care services, in the long-term”.

Subsection (3) adds a new public interest in people who have not been convicted of an offence anywhere, have co-operated with the immigration authorities and

“are otherwise of good character.”

Subsection (4) changes “little weight” to “no weight” being given to a

“private or family life established by a person”

who is here without leave, or with leave obtained by deception, or who is in “serious breach” of its conditions. Subsection (5) extends “little weight” for precarious status to family life as well as private life. Subsections (6) and (7) tighten the rule on parents with qualifying children. There must now be

“a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect”

on a child who stays, and it is unreasonable

“to expect a child to leave the United Kingdom if (and only if)”

one of three conditions is met.

On the evidence base, the Home Office told the Committee that 71% of those newly granted article 8 leave

“had entered illegally or overstayed”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 73, Q130.]

and that grants made in 2025 cost the taxpayer an incredible £4.9 billion. If those figures are correct, the case for this clause is overwhelming and undeniable; however, the Committee has not seen the evidence behind them. If the Government want the House to legislate on the strength of the 71% and the £4.9 billion cost figures, it is our view that they should publish the sample, definitions and method before Report.

On financial independence, subsection (2) is, in our view, right in principle. The Library records that the Home Office’s aim is

“increased refusals or unsuccessful appeals in cases where applicants impose avoidable burdens on public resources”.

I certainly think the public will agree, but the test is a prediction about the future, and the Bill says nothing about how it is to be made. In its evidence, the Law Society told us:

“No detail has been provided on how the elements of this test are to be determined”.

Over what period will future reliance be assessed? What evidence will be required, and will guidance be published before commencement?

There is a further difficulty, which is whether this subsection will be able to survive the courts. Again, according to the Law Society,

“the Government’s human rights memorandum at paragraph 27”

acknowledges that the new criteria are

“likely to result in discriminatory outcomes for…older or disabled people”.

The Bar Council makes the same point. A test that the Government themselves expect to operate unequally is one that will in all likelihood be litigated under the Equality Act 2010 and perhaps article 14—and one that the courts may well soften as a result. I ask the Minister: what mitigation does the Government propose to avoid that?

On good character and amendment 104, subsection (3) sets out a new public interest in people who have not offended, have co-operated with the authorities and are “of good character”. Again, we support the direction of travel, but “good character” is not defined in the Bill or the explanatory notes, which seems an extraordinary gap, though I recognise that it is quite difficult to define it in the Bill. This is another example of the Government potentially setting themselves up for failure in the Bill. The Bar Council says that it hands the Home Office

“a general evaluative test that is highly subjective in scope”.

The Law Society and the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association made similar points in their evidence. An undefined test is an invitation to future litigation.

There is a ready answer, though, to which I shall point the Committee: the good character guidance used in naturalisation decisions, which is detailed and demanding, with periods that taper according to the length of sentence. Will the Minister confirm whether the Government will apply that guidance here? Amendment 104 would add that to the Bill. What will count as a failure to co-operate with immigration processes—absconding, the destruction of documents, ignoring a claim notice under clause 11, et cetera? It would be helpful to understand what the Government’s understanding is.

On amendments 105 and 106, the explanatory notes accept that courts can depart from the weightings under section 117A(2) of the 2002 Act. The Law Society says that the change

“appears to be an attempt to bar a full proportionality assessment”,

and sets up a conflict with the duty on the Home Secretary and the courts to

“act compatibly with Convention rights under section 6 of the Human Rights Act.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

Forgive me, but I have not addressed these issues yet, so if the hon. Gentleman can be patient for a little longer—I am sure he will have more questions afterwards—I would like to make some progress, if I may.

The clause also introduces character and conduct as a factor in the public interest test. This will require judges to have regard to harmful conduct, including criminality below the deportation threshold and outside the mandatory suitability refusals. This is an important element of tackling abuse and takes us one step towards a fairer system that the public can have confidence in.

The clause further reduces avenues for abuse by requiring that no weight—instead of little weight, as now—should be given to an article 8 claim established when someone is here illegally, or legally but only by deceiving the Home Office, or if they have seriously breached the conditions of their permission to be in the UK. That will enable us to more effectively enforce our immigration rules and prevent people from unfairly benefiting from time spent in the UK in violation of our rules, and will avoid the creation of perverse incentives for people who are here unlawfully to try to deliberately establish article 8 claims.

Although it is right that essential protections for children are retained, it is not right that adults who abuse our immigration system are almost guaranteed to be allowed to stay if they can prove a parental relationship with a child in the UK. Currently, there is no need to carry out a full balancing exercise if there is a child. This is the main source of successful article 8 claims, two thirds of which result in residence rights being granted.

The clause clarifies which factors should be considered when determining whether it is in the public interest to remove the parent of a qualifying child from the UK, and introduces a provision to assess the impact of removing a parent where a child remains in the UK.

I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for amendment 61, which sets out a new public interest consideration, under which specific regard would be given to the circumstances of victims of violence against women and girls when assessing whether interference with an individual’s article 8 right is justified. Of course, we absolutely recognise and take seriously the importance of tackling violence against women and girls, and the devastating impact that it has on victims. However, the Government do not consider the amendment to be necessary.

Clause 19 already preserves a case-specific assessment in which courts and tribunals can consider all relevant facts and evidence, including experiences of domestic abuse, violence and exploitation, and the safeguarding concerns that the hon. Lady mentioned in her case studies. The holistic article 8 assessment that the clause retains ensures that protections exist for vulnerable people and that support remains available for those who genuinely need it. In addition, existing provisions in the immigration rules, including “Appendix Victim of Domestic Abuse” and the migrant victims of domestic abuse concession, provide specific protections. Those safeguards are there to ensure that victims’ experiences are properly recognised and taken into account.

I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling amendment 104. I understand the intention behind it, but I am afraid that the Government do not consider the amendment to be helpful. I agree that good character is an important consideration in article 8 cases. Including that factor in the public interest test ensures that protections are focused on those who have acted responsibly. That is an important element of creating a fair system that the public have confidence in and that is not open to abuse. The clause establishes that and requires the courts and tribunals to have regard to harmful conduct, including that below the deportation threshold and outside mandatory suitability refusals. We will set out further detail on that in published guidance and the immigration rules.

Let me be clear that the existing guidance, including the guidance mentioned by the hon. Gentleman, will be a useful comparator and will play an important role in shaping this. We do not want to be tied exclusively to the 1981 guidance, but want to develop ours further. Our approach will therefore reflect that already taken in nationality legislation, where good character is not exhaustively defined on the face of the Bill but is addressed through the guidance.

[Siân Berry]

I am very interested in the fact that the Minister has just talked about going further on good character in some guidance. Will that guidance take into account factors that might otherwise weigh against the character of someone making an appeal if they have been exploited or abused? Is that the kind of thing that the Minister is thinking about in terms of deviating from the 1981 guidance?

[Anna Turley]

The guidance will set out very clearly what we will ask the courts and tribunals to have regard to in relation to harmful conduct. We will also make sure, as I have already mentioned, that there is sufficient protection regarding issues around domestic violence. That will be in our immigration rules, and it is in our existing provisions. We will ensure that courts and tribunals consider all relevant facts and evidence. I place this on the record in Committee: we will expect experiences of domestic violence, abuse and exploitation, and safeguarding concerns to be a key part of that.

To go back to amendment 104, our approach will reflect the approach already taken in nationality legislation, so that good character is not exhaustively defined in the Bill, but addressed through guidance. Everything raised by colleagues in Committee will be on the record.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I am not going to rule that out here in the Committee, but I can come back and clarify that point for the hon. Gentleman. My expectation is that if someone is deported, and they wish to take their child with them, they are perfectly entitled to do so. It is not for the Government to say that the child has to stay in this country, rather than moving with their family. I will not rule that out here in the Committee.

In conclusion, clause 19 tightly defines the public interest test to ensure that individual rights are properly balanced against the public interest in effective immigration control, and to eradicate the abuse that has crept into our system.

[Siân Berry]

Further to the discussion with the Minister about ensuring that victims of abuse and sexual violence are protected, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 105, in clause 19, page 17, line 3, leave out “should” and insert “must”.—(Blake Stephenson.)

This amendment would require, rather than advise, that no weight is given to private or family life established while a person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully, with leave obtained by deception or in serious breach of their conditions.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Blake Stephenson]

We are here to legislate, so I do not think it is unreasonable for us to be defining what is right and wrong. Perhaps we can leave it to the Minister to respond.

The unfortunate reality is that, with this Bill, the Government are falling into the very same trap that the previous Government fell into. The legislation may be designed to work around the constraints imposed by the ECHR, but it will ultimately run up against the very same problems. The courts will default to the positions that they have consistently taken, enabling individuals with no right to remain in this country to delay or prevent their removal. Indeed, when the Bill fails to enable the Government to address the extensive range of grounds for resisting removal that flow from the ECHR, will the Minister finally accept that—as we have long argued—the real problem lies outside the drafting of the legislation, however robust it might be, and however robust the Government intend it to be today?

As I have already noted, the Minister described discussions about leaving the ECHR last week as unnecessary and counterproductive. If she genuinely believes that deterrence must sit at the heart of the response to these challenges, I struggle to see how removing the ability of foreign criminals to rely on the convention to delay or prevent their removal could reasonably be considered as either unnecessary or counterproductive.

The Opposition will not oppose clause 20. Extending these rules to all deportation cases and restoring the balance against the public interest are steps in the right direction that we support. However, the clause removes the clear lines that protected the public from the most serious offenders, and it gives these criminals access to exceptions that cannot be used today. We will seek to press amendments 107 and 108 to a vote, and I would be grateful for the Minister’s answers to the various questions I have asked.

[Siân Berry]

I will speak very briefly on clause 20, specifically subsection (4). At present, it will expand the scope of section 117D of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 so that it automatically applies to everyone whose deportation the Home Secretary has decided is conducive to the public good, regardless of the objective seriousness of their offence, under the Immigration Act 1971 and its use of the word “deems”, which I think is very important.

I hope the Minister can answer three questions on the clause. First, do the proportionality qualification and the exceptions in the clause offer any protection for those whose criminality is as a result of exploitation or abuse, particularly those who face immigration-related domestic abuse and have been convicted of crimes related to that? On that theme, the new clauses tabled by the official Opposition would clarify the word “serious” so that some offences would be considered serious automatically. I see the point they are trying to make, but if we made that automatic, it would not be possible for those who are exploited and drawn into criminality to face a proportionate, human-rights-based public interest test. I do not support those new clauses, nor do I support amendments 108 to 111.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ben Goldsborough]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Siân Berry]

I am asking the Minister these questions, so it would be marvellous if we could wait to see how she answers them.

Thirdly, does that approach not allow the Home Secretary to unilaterally stack the deck against an appellant in an appeal, on an arbitrary basis? Does that take away from the objective seriousness of the offence that they have committed? Does the approach therefore impermissibly limit the ability of the appellate body to decide an article 8 ECHR claim on its merits, as is required under the Human Rights Act 1998?

[Joe Robertson]

Clause 20 deals with cases involving foreign criminals and others liable to deportation. The issues I have with the clause are broadly twofold. One issue is around the drafting, which has a number of serious deficiencies. That is not about whether the Government are getting it wrong or right on what they are trying to achieve, but about having certainty on what the legislation will do when it comes to people having to make decisions. My second issue is disagreement with what the Government are trying to achieve.

Under proposed new section 117C, which I will try to deal with as precisely as I can,

“(1) Where a person is liable to deportation, the public interest, and in particular the interest in public safety and the prevention of disorder or crime, requires their deportation unless its effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate.”

That deals with the public interest and its definition. Let us put aside the “unless”, which clearly opens an avenue for the court to examine whether the effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate, and deal with that public interest element. Proposed new subsection (1) says that “the public interest...requires” the deportation of those liable to it, which directs the court to define “public interest” as one thing. However, the Bill tries to define what that public interest is in proposed new subsection (2). It sets out “more serious” factors that point towards a greater public interest in a person’s deportation. It does not matter what those factors are, but they are in proposed new subsection (2)(a) to (c).

Why on earth does the court need direction in assessing the extent of the public interest when it is being directed to consider that public interest simply “requires their deportation”? It seems entirely meaningless to start directing the court as to what public interest might mean in terms of giving weighting to the factors in proposed new subsection (2)(a) to (c) when the court is being told to simply deport under the public interest. I fail to see how it has any relevance whatsoever, and it is potentially distracting from what the Government are trying to achieve.

I will now deal with the “unless” element, because that is entirely separate. Proposed new section 117C says that deportation is required

“unless its effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate.”

The court decision makers are given some help on what “disproportionate” would mean, which is entirely sensible. I disagree with some of the elements that the court should consider, but it is sensible to give the decision makers some direction.

I will stick to the drafting of paragraphs (a) to (c) of proposed new section 117C(4). Paragraph (a) says that exceptional circumstances apply where a person

“has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of their life”.

Given that provisions in relation to children, not just in this Bill but generally in the way we do law in this country, are different from provisions in relation to adults, that provision needs to be clear about whether it means a person has been resident in the United Kingdom for most of their adult life or their entire life from birth. Although it may suggest entire life from birth, I can see a court assuming it means adult life because we deal with children separately. It would therefore be much easier for someone who is, say, aged 24 and has been in the country for only three or four years to say that they have been a resident for most of their life, because provisions for children are separate. That is an avenue that could be exploited through a lack of drafting, unless the Government mean adult life. I think they should mean entire life, and they should be specific about what they mean.

Secondly, paragraph (b) says that exceptional circumstances apply where

“the person is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom”.

How on earth is a decision maker or a court supposed to determine whether someone is or is not socially and culturally integrated into the UK? We could have an entire PhD thesis on the extent of somebody’s social and cultural integration. We may all have views on what it means to be socially and culturally integrated. There may be some common themes around our views, but there will be much disagreement about the specifics when trying to make a decision about an individual case.

Of course, the decision makers are not there to do some highly resourced, detailed investigative study into someone’s circumstances. They will basically be relying on assertions. Surely it is open to someone saying, “I’ve lived here for a number of years. I speak English to a degree and I can go about normal daily life without endlessly causing friction or hardship, and I am therefore sufficiently socially and culturally integrated into the UK.” Or is the court supposed to examine the way they dress or eat, who they mix with and how often, the cultural background of the people they mix with or their religious traditions? Not only is it opening a can of worms, but it is quite offensive to have the state investigating someone’s social and cultural integration in order to make a yes or no decision.

According to this provision, a court—the decision maker—is not to make a decision about someone being reasonably well integrated or showing signs of cultural integration; someone is either socially and culturally integrated, or they are not. I just cannot see how the Government can possibly expect a decision maker to open up such an investigation. And that would be only one part of the integration inquiry.

Proposed new subsection (4)(c) then talks about

“very significant obstacles to the person’s integration in the country to which they are proposed to be deported.”

Having run the analysis and come up with a view about an individual’s cultural and social integration into the UK, the decision maker has to run a similar test on their ability to integrate into the country to which they are supposed to be deported—a theoretical test, because it might be somewhere they have not been for some time—where it is even harder to make some sort of value judgment, because it is a country that the decision maker could have absolutely zero experience of living in, and so they will, again, be reliant on assertions.

The test in that case is not even the same as in proposed new subsection 4(b), where the person must be “socially and culturally integrated”; at subsection 4(c), it is the person’s “integration”—there is no qualification of cultural and social integration. In this country, they could be socially and culturally integrated, but not integrated in a wide range of other ways; yet in the country that they are proposed to go to, any integration issues, not just social and cultural ones, could be a “significant” obstacle to integration. I do not understand why the definition is narrower on the question of a person’s integration—albeit far too broad for a court to tackle—for assessing the situation in this country and much wider for the situation elsewhere.

There are serious drafting issues here. We cannot merely just see where it all comes out in the wash, saying Home Office officials are very capable and all that sort of stuff. We have seen the problem with the number of appeals. Some of these provisions will genuinely need the court to tackle the interpretation issues, in the normal way that we do common law in this country, through test cases. These provisions will require an unusual set of test cases, through to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, to get judicial interpretation and assistance for the courts to apply thereafter, but, as we have seen in test cases, it is rarely one case that sets a new environment for the lower courts and decision makers to adhere to, but a series of them.

This is not only going to require an extraordinary amount of time to understand terms that the Government just need to deal with at this stage through the legislation process, but it will take years; any individual case that goes all the way up to the Supreme Court on how the court interpreted “socially and culturally integrated” will take a long time in and of itself—months into years. Where we may have challenging cases that seek to overturn what, for example, the Court of Appeal has said, by using the Supreme Court, we are talking years on years.

The Government are creating massive scope for backlog and uncertainty, and a huge opportunity for the legal profession to run a high volume of case law—it would be genuinely interesting, but would completely undermine the Government’s intention, which is to tackle backlogs, speed up the system and stop the endless need for judicial interpretation. That is what has led us to where we are, which is broader and broader interpretation.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Eighth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

Core protection: regulations about protection status and protection claims

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I beg to move amendment 75, in clause 21, page 19, line 19, at end insert—

“(2A) In making regulations under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare and best interests of any children in respect of whom a protection claim is made or who are granted protection status.”

This amendment would require regulations under Clause 21 to take into account the best interests of children.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 51, in clause 21, page 19, line 26, leave out paragraph (c).

This amendment would leave out the provision for regulations about protection status and claims to confer rights or impose obligations on a person.

Amendment 52, in clause 21, page 19, line 34, leave out paragraph (e).

This amendment would leave out the provision for regulations about protection status and claims to make different provision for claims made on Convention or humanitarian grounds.

Amendment 137, in clause 21, page 19, line 37, at end insert—

“(3A) Regulations under subsection (1) which provide for the grant of protection status must provide that, before any further leave to remain is granted to a person with protection status, the Secretary of State must consider whether the person’s removal from the United Kingdom would still breach the United Kingdom’s obligations on the Convention ground or the humanitarian protection ground.”

This probing amendment would require regulations to provide that a person’s continuing need for protection is considered every time their protection status comes up for renewal, rather than only in targeted cases.

Amendment 53, in clause 21, page 19, line 38, at end insert—

“(3A) Regulations under subsection (1) must provide that a person granted protection status—

(a) must be given an initial grant of leave to remain of not less than five years, and

(b) must be eligible to apply for indefinite leave to remain after holding protection status for five years.”

This amendment would mean that people granted protection status would also be given an initial grant of leave to remain for at least five years, with the ability to apply for indefinite leave to remain after five years.

Amendment 54, in clause 21, page 19, line 38, at end insert—

“(3A) Regulations under subsection (1) must provide that close family members of a person granted protection status are able to apply for leave to enter and remain in the United Kingdom.

(3B) For the purposes of subsection (3A), ‘close family members’ include—

(a) a person’s spouse, civil partner or unmarried partner; and

(b) any child, including adopted child, of the person who is either—

(i) under the age of 18, or

(ii) over the age of 18 but dependent on the person.

(3C) Regulations described in subsection (3A) must not require the payment of any fee, charge or immigration health surcharge, nor impose any minimum income, maintenance, accommodation or financial requirement.”

This amendment would require regulations to allow close family members of people granted protection status to apply for leave to enter and remain in the United Kingdom, without having to pay any fee.

Amendment 74, in clause 21, page 19, line 38, at end insert—

“(3A) Regulations under subsection (1) may not make provision which has the effect of making the rights, entitlements or protections available to a person granted protection status more restrictive than those available to a person granted asylum or humanitarian protection before 30 June 2026.”

This amendment would reflect the commitment in the delegated powers memorandum for this Bill that the Clause 21 regulation-making powers “will not be used to reduce the entitlements currently held by refugees or persons with humanitarian protection.”

Amendment 138, in clause 21, page 20, line 32, at end insert—

“(7) Before a draft of the first statutory instrument containing regulations under this section is laid before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish—

(a) a draft of the regulations, and

(b) a statement of the changes to the immigration rules which the Secretary of State proposes to make in connection with protection status, including—

(i) the period of leave to be granted to a person with protection status,

(ii) the circumstances in which a person’s continuing need for protection will be reviewed, and

(iii) the qualifying period for indefinite leave to remain.”

This probing amendment would require the Government to publish its draft regulations on protection status, together with the proposed Immigration Rules on the length of leave, reviews and the route to settlement under core protection, before asking Parliament to approve the regulations.

Clause stand part.

Government new clause 35—Core protection: protection claims and protection status.

Government new clause 36—Core protection: amendments.

Government new schedule 1—Core protection: amendments.

[Siân Berry]

It is great to have you in the Chair this afternoon, Mrs Barker.

Amendment 75 was tabled to the original clause 21. The Government published amendments on 13 October that removed clause 21 and added new clauses 35 and 36, a new schedule and some additional amendments linked to the new core protection status. However, the issues raised in my amendments 75 and 74—as well as in amendments 51 to 54 tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough—continue to be relevant to this debate.

Amendments 75 and 74 are focused on the broad nature of the powers in relation to conferring rights and obligations or requirements on someone with or claiming protection status. That was set out in clause 21(3)(c) and is retained in subsection (3)(c) of Government new clause 36. My concerns remain relevant, as I said. I will not press my amendments to a vote, but the Government need to consider those issues seriously and respond to my points.

Government new clause 35 will remove clause 21(6)—the sunset clause—which limited the time period for regulations to be made under the clause to one year after the Bill comes into force. New regulations can therefore be made indefinitely under that new clause, and I would like the Government to justify that change.

Amendment 75, which was tabled to the Bill as introduced, sought to ensure that regulations must have regard to the best interests of a child. No child rights impact assessment has been produced on any aspect of this corporate action model, despite the fact that the shortening of refugee leave to 30 months already applies to children and families seeking asylum for over six months.

The amendment would make sure that, before making regulations, the Government look properly at the impact of corporate action, including the short periods of leave and the long route to settlement in this—I think downgraded—protection status. I am particularly worried about this in relation to the ability to settle, make family life and all the kinds of rights that children have. When the Government do this, they need to pay particular attention to the Home Office’s legal duties under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. Applied to children and young people, corporate action and the 20-year route will undermine children’s well-established need for stability, particularly refugee children as they recover and rebuild their lives following what is probably life-changing trauma and distress.

In addition, repeated immigration status reviews and uncertainty around long-term residence will drive avoidable school and college moves as families are forced to relocate at short notice or potentially lose housing as a result of insecure employment status and other impacts of this shorter period of leave and the resulting uncertainty. For children, each move disrupts attendance and their ability to get pastoral or potentially special educational support. It can set back attainment or harm social integration, particularly at a stage when continuity is most important for children and young people. Temporary leave cycles and renewal windows are inevitably going to risk coinciding with exams, including GCSEs, highers, A-levels and vocational assessments. Anxiety about imminent status decisions could undermine revision and therefore exam performance, and in some cases, young people facing disruption will miss exams completely. This must be looked at very closely.

I also want the Government to think about children who are getting ready for higher education; they are just about to become adults and are potentially looking to study in this country. Unstable status also makes it harder for young people to secure home fees and student financing. Short grants of leave could push refugees into the overseas fee category for a long time or leave them ineligible for maintenance support. The rights of children growing up in this country would be impacted because they would have university access and progression closed off to them. They might be forced to defer going to university, which might stall their integration into the community or harm their earnings potential.

I do not think that any of those impacts are in the public interest, and I want Government to at least commit today to conducting a child rights impact assessment that will look at all of these things in part 3 of the Bill before Third Reading—and certainly before any of the regulations in this part are made.

Amendment 74 would ensure that there was no regression of rights and entitlements. It is needed because the broad regulation-making powers contained in clause 21 currently have very few limitations on scope. The delegated powers memorandum says that the powers will not be used to reduce the entitlements of refugees, and this amendment would seek to reflect that by requiring that they do not reduce rights and entitlements below what was in place on the day that the Bill was introduced. The amendment merely reflects what the Government have said their intentions are: in part 48 of the delegated powers memorandum, the Government state that the measure will not be used to reduce

“the entitlements currently held by refugees”

or persons with humanitarian protection.

The amendment seeks to reflect this commitment in the Bill: that people who have already been granted protection status before the Bill is introduced retain the rights, entitlements and protections that currently exist. That would include family reunion with no additional eligibility criteria and a five-way pathway to settlement, if interpreted correctly according to what the Government have said. That clarity is very much needed for refugees who are currently in the UK and need certainty of their situation so that they can focus on developing their life in this country—integrating, earning and all the things that will help their family life and their children.

I have a question about a particular part of new clause 35. I welcome the detail in schedule 1 and I appreciate having it at this stage so that we can scrutinise the Bill. However, part 7 of new clause 35 gives the Secretary of State the power to

“revoke a person’s protection status.”

That is literally all it says. While a whole section of the immigration rules covers the situations where a person’s refugee status and humanitarian protection can be revoked, on the face of this Bill, the Government are creating a very broad ability to revoke that status, which is currently unconstrained. Why are the Government not listing suitable uses of that power on the face of the Bill?

This issue is particularly relevant because in the last few weeks other parties—not represented on this Committee—have announced their desire to revoke the right to asylum and revoke refugee status for some who have already found protection in the UK. The Government rightly stood up for the right to asylum and stood against those proposals. It would be good to have that on the face of the Bill, so that we have better protections against the risk of the power being taken over by another party or future Home Secretary who would abuse it. I would like the Government to clarify that.

Finally, it would be useful to hear how the Minister believes the change in new clause 35 will simplify decision-making processes since we have heard in oral evidence that the convention grounds cannot be done away with. Merging them with what had previously been known as the humanitarian protection grounds is potentially complex and confusing for people. Will the Government clarify how people will be told on what grounds they have been granted protection, in order to make sure that the Bill is very clear?

[Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)]

I will speak to my amendments 51 to 54. I have a number of questions that I hope the Minister will be able to answer and give more clarity and certainty on.

On amendment 51, part 3 gives the Home Secretary a very broad power to make regulations introducing core protection. The delegated powers memorandum says it is to bring the statute book in line with the new definition of protected status, but clause 21(3)(c) lets regulations confer rights and impose obligations on those claiming or holding protection, and clause 21(3)(e) lets them treat convention and humanitarian grants differently. In my view, that goes well beyond updating definitions. Could the Minister explain that?

If the powers are to deliver entitlements in restoring order and control statements, which is obviously the 30-month protection, 20-year route to settlement, no family reunion, new work and study route, then Parliament should see them during the passage of the Bill. Changing refugees’ entitlements matters for how they rebuild their lives and integrate, and for the wider points around the economy and social cohesion. That needs proper scrutiny, not a negative procedure SI.

In reference to amendments 51 and 52, if regulations will change entitlements and obligations, can the Minister set out what exactly those changes will be? If not now, will they be set out before the Bill leaves the Commons? How will those changes meet the desired outcomes and will there be further impact assessments to understand the implications of them?

Amendment 53 is about the five-year leave and settlement. Since March 2026, refugees have been granted 2.5 years instead of five. The Home Secretary insists on a minimum 20-year route to settlement, up from five. Amendment 53 would restore an initial grant of at least five years and eligibility for settlement after five years. Reviews every 30 months and a settlement route that feels out of reach makes it harder to focus on learning English, training and work. People invest in their future when they know that they have one here. The Refugee Council estimates there will be up to 1.1 million reviews in the first decade, at a cost of up to £725 million. That would add additional pressure to the Home Office, which cannot yet decide claims well the first time. The Government say that they were inspired by Denmark, but in some ways it is far more restrictive. Most of Europe grants around five years and then settlement, but Denmark allows settlement after eight years for restricted conditions.

--- Later in debate ---

The hon. Lady talked about revoking status and asked whether we are giving the Home Secretary a freestanding, unconstrained power to revoke protection status. New clause 35 includes provision for the Home Secretary to revoke protection status, alongside provisions to grant or refuse protection status in the first instance. The revocation of protection status links directly with the right of appeal under section 82(1)(c) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The circumstances in which protection status may be revoked will continue to be set out in our immigration rules as usual, and will remain based on our international obligations. Protection status will be revoked where it is established that it was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, the person has acquired the protection of another country or has re-availed themselves of the protection of their country of origin, or there has been a significant and non-temporary change in either personal or country situation that means they no longer qualify for protection.

[Siân Berry]

I would like further clarity on why those grounds—the reasons for which revocation could be made—which the Minister read out very clearly, are not simply added to the Bill at this point to make the situation incredibly clear.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Lady’s question. The reason is that immigration rules are not normally put on the face of primary legislation. It would be unusual to do that on the face of the Bill. I can clarify that shortly with the hon. Lady, but that is my understanding of why this is not on the face of the Bill—because it is done through the usual route of immigration rules.

The hon. Lady asked what applicants will be told and how this will support those going through the process in simplifying their decision making. The decision-making process will be simplified in all decisions that would not currently be a grant of refugee status, because they will no longer refuse refugee status and then go on to separately consider serious harm. Instead, a single decision on risk on return will be made. Officials are already working with non-governmental organisations in the sector to identify the precise wording most appropriate in a new grant letter.

The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough asked what the 30-month renewal will involve. We are committed to ensuring that our policies are sustainable and do not place unnecessary burdens on the taxpayer, and this policy is no different. In terms of resources and processing, only those who do remain on core protection will have their protection needs regularly reviewed. Reviews will be targeted based on objective country information and any other new information that comes to light, allowing us to make the most efficient use of resources. We will continue to monitor staffing levels and will deploy our workforce flexibly, subject to business needs, as we have done in the past. The approach to reviewing status will be efficient and targeted, and we will reassess where country conditions or personal circumstances change.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman raising that point. He will understand that this decision making is part of the core business for the Home Office. I can come back to him during the Committee with more specific detail on what that process will look like, but it is important to reassure him that we will continue to monitor our staffing levels and deploy our workforce flexibly, subject to business needs.

[Siân Berry]

It is important to know whether the 30-month process will be more like a simple renewal—like me renewing my TV licence or something like that—or whether it will be a reinterrogation of the person seeking protection all over again? Will the onus be on the Government to say, for example, that a country has suddenly become safe, that there has been a new Government, that major changes have occurred and, therefore, that we will look more closely at a number of cases, but that in countries where the situation has remained the same, we will not be looking in depth? How simple the process will be is really bothering people. Having all their circumstances reinterrogated and having to prove themselves over and over again is something people have learned to expect from the Home Office. It is up to the Minister to reassure us on this point.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Lady raising that point. I was intending to come to it; she will be pleased to know that I still have quite a lot to get through in my speech. To reassure her, individuals will need to meet the relevant suitability requirements for ongoing permission to stay. If someone is convicted of a criminal offence that meets the relevant thresholds, they will be excluded from protection and will not be eligible for core protection. If there has been a significant and durable change in their country’s situation or a change in their personal circumstances, their ongoing need for protection will be reviewed. For anyone who has returned to the country of persecution or serious harm, or obtained a national passport, their circumstances will be reviewed. I hope that that gives the hon. Lady a degree of clarity, but I am happy to go back and clarify that in more detail during the Committee—I can see that it would mean a lot to both her and the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough.

Amendments 53 and 54, tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, would revert to the previous position of granting five years’ leave to remain to refugees and placing them on a five-year route to settlement, and would allow automatic entitlement to family reunion. In recent years, the number of people seeking protection has significantly increased, placing unprecedented pressure on housing, public services and communities across the UK. From 2004 to 2020, between 22,000 and 46,000 people were claiming asylum in the UK each year. However, there has been a huge increase since the second half of 2021, reaching a peak of 110,000 in the year ending September 2025. Although the numbers of people claiming asylum fell to 85,891 in the year ending June 2026, it still remains high compared with levels seen in the decade to 2021.

I know that many of our constituents have huge concerns about fairness, how the system operates and whether it supports those who truly need protection. That is why the Government published a new asylum policy statement in November last year that set out significant reforms to the UK’s asylum system. Core protection is one of the key elements of the asylum reforms. Under this new policy, protection will be granted for the duration of need and will be renewable where a person remains at risk on return. Greater entitlements, including a shorter period to settlement and a route to sponsor family members, will be accessed by demonstrating contribution to and integration into UK society. Settlement will no longer be automatic. Instead, there will be a 20-year route to permanent residency, crucially with the ability to reduce that period by switching into the protection work and study route to ensure long-term commitment, contribution and integration.

As a first step towards that, the Government changed immigration laws on 5 March 2026. Any adult or accompanied child who claims asylum from 2 March 2026 onwards and qualifies for a grant of refugee status or humanitarian protection will be granted leave for 30 months. At a 30-month review, refugees with a continuing need of sanctuary will have their protection renewed, while those who no longer have a protection need will be expected to return home. The safe return review will consider whether there has been a fundamental and durable change in their country of origin.

We recognise that, when a country situation changes, not everyone will be safe. Of course, as occurs now, individual circumstances will be taken into account, and each case will be assessed on its own merits. The overthrow of one political party in favour of another might only be transitory. The changes must be such that the reasons for becoming a refugee have ceased to exist and there are no other reasons for an individual to fear returning to their country.

[Siân Berry]

For clarity, will the onus be on the Government to prove the change, or will it be like reapplying from scratch each time? Again, my casework shows that we are more used to the Home Office asking for chapter and verse from the applicant each time. If the Minister is prepared to promise that it will be for the Government to prove changes, that would mean a lot to many people listening.

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Lady pre-empts my next paragraph. To clarify for her, once the individual acquires protection status, the burden of proof is on the Home Office to demonstrate that protection is no longer required. It will be us who will demonstrate that; it will not be for the claimant to make another asylum claim, unless there are new grounds that have not been raised before. Any decision to revoke protection status will continue to have a right of appeal. As always, we will continue to uphold the fundamental principle that we will not return anyone to a country where they are at risk.

Refugees with a continuing protection need will have to wait 20 years for settlement unless they switch to protection work and study as part of the core protection model. A new, bespoke work and study route will allow access to family reunion and settlement rights, with new fees and conditions in accordance with the rules of that route. That will enable refugees to earn down the length of time before they can settle in the UK, and demonstrate that they are contributing to the UK and can support their family before they may bring their partner and children over. Further details will be set out in future immigration rule changes. This route will not include a safe return review.

--- Later in debate ---

As I outlined earlier, the Government will vote against clause 21 as it currently stands, as it is our intention that it be directly replaced by Government new clauses 35 and 36 and new schedule 1. I ask that the Committee vote in the same way, and I commend the new clauses and new schedule to the Committee.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 21 disagreed to.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Jade Botterill.)

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Sixth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Blake Stephenson]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention—perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East was correct to say that I was far too generous in taking it; I should have just closed my speech.

The hon. Member for South Norfolk clearly recognises that the Opposition commissioned Lord Wolfson to conduct a very serious legal analysis of the benefits or otherwise of leaving the ECHR, which he has done. I go back to the comment I made earlier about how there are no legal barriers to us departing the ECHR. There is no risk to the Union and there is no risk to the Good Friday agreement in a legal sense. It will, of course, result in a political discussion, and that will be had at the appropriate time, but the political questions that will arise are not insurmountable.

I will now close. The Opposition support the aim of clause 18 and will not oppose it standing part of the Bill. We support Government amendments 44 and 45, but a definition that is qualified by “normally” applied through a duty only to “have regard to”, with the excluded factors let back in by clause 18(6), is a definition that the courts can step around. I will seek to press amendments 98 and 99 to a Division.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to have you in the Chair today, Mr Twigg.

I take completely the opposite position from the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire in almost every respect. I am going to speak against clause 18 and its inclusion in the Bill, and I am going to oppose the Government amendments that would put further tests on parent-child relationships and parental involvement for refugees. I will also be opposing the Conservative amendments, which would put even tighter constraints on family life.

I am here to defend our article 8 protections—I say “our”, because I believe it is really important that we set laws for refugees and asylum seekers that we would happily be subject to ourselves. That is absolutely at the core of the universal nature of human rights and the international agreements we have made to respect human rights around the world in the way that we would want them to be respected should we be in the horrible position of needing to claim asylum.

Article 8 protects the right to family life specifically for us under the European convention on human rights. Although it is not absolute, it requires any state interference in these rights to be lawful, necessary and proportionate. I do not agree with the Government when they say in their human rights memorandum that they are taking

“proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aims.”

To me, paragraph 26 in the memorandum clearly admits that there is interference in our rights with this legislation. The Government are using the argument that they are taking “proportionate means” of “achieving the legitimate aims”, but the legitimate aims they lay out are:

“maintaining effective immigration control, economic wellbeing and the prevention of disorder or crime.”

I honestly do not see how clause 18, on family life and people making claims for reuniting their families and maintaining this essential human right protected under article 8, comes into those “proportionate means”. It is about reducing the ability of families to reunite. The impact assessment clearly says that many thousands of people who would be able to come here under current laws will be denied their claims. This is a reduction in human rights and it seriously needs looking at. I am neither equipped nor planning to add further arguments relating to Northern Ireland and the Windsor framework, but further conversations are needed about what is currently in the Bill, never mind what would happen if we withdrew from the ECHR.

Everybody on the Committee wants a fair, robust and effective immigration system—one that works and upholds the rule of law and on in which people have confidence. Article 8 is not an abstract concept within all this; it is the law that decides whether a parent can stay in the country where their children live or whether a British child grows up with both parents. We do not want to see families separated or children separated from the parents who care for them, yet that is precisely the risk posed by clause 18, according to the Government’s own impact assessment.

[Dr Zubir Ahmed (Glasgow South West) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Lady accept that article 8 was never intended to be interpreted as it is now, and therefore that if we do not provide guidance or adjust it, we will further dampen the British public’s confidence and trust in the immigration and asylum system? I can tell her from personal experience that when that happens, it is people from minority communities that are already here, sometimes for many generations, such as my father, who are first in the firing line. Does she therefore agree that if she, like me, wants Britain to be a compassionate, welcoming country, we must acknowledge that those articles are in some cases not being interpreted in the intended manner and that the adjustment is appropriate?

[Siân Berry]

I thank the hon. Member for his perspective. He must appreciate through his constituency casework, as I do, the general principle that article 8 claims need to be assessed on an individual basis. The Bill tries to codify and generalise things in ways that reduce the ability for anyone making decisions to look at the genuine family lives of those making the claims. Bad decisions can result from people misunderstanding different cultures, from unconscious biases and from all kinds of things like that. It is really important that we do not try to prescribe family life under state definitions. I will come on to talk more about that and about the toxic rhetoric and the awful anecdotes, such as the examples we have heard from Ministers, which increase the toxicity of the debate. We can do much better than this Bill to reduce that.

Clause 18 would replace the reality of family relationships with statutory presumptions. Families today come in many forms. We have single-parent households, blended families, grandparents raising children, and parents who do not live under the same roof through circumstance rather than choice. A family does not stop being a family because it fails a cohabitation test. I will always stand up against people trying to define what a normal family is. The Government’s stated objective is to confine family life “normally” to the core cohabiting family unit. A parent who does not live with their child must prove that the relationship is genuine and be judged on how often and how recently they have had contact, even where work, shared care or the immigration system itself has kept them apart.

[Ben Goldsborough]

If we followed the hon. Lady’s line of thinking, my concern is that we would leave section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 completely unamended, which would mean that there is no clarity—not just for the state and our constituents, but for those going into the system who may be seeking refuge. Is there not also a moral case? If we leave this be, we will end up in a muddle, which will mean that backlogs continue to grow, people do not get the surety of an answer and the immigration and asylum system will not have the confidence of the public.

[Siân Berry]

I thank the hon. Member for making those points, but as we spoke about on Second Reading and in earlier debates on this topic, the muddle lies in the bad initial decision making in the Home Office. If it is not clear what kind of evidence people need to establish family life, it should be dealt with through better processes, better information and more support for legal representation. Codifying it, as is done in the Bill, is not the right way to deal with that.

[David Smith]

I thank the hon. Lady for being so generous with her time. I want to build on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk. The hon. Lady spoke about the Bill referring to core cohabiting family, but does she accept that there must at some point be a limit on what we define as family? If I were fleeing to another country, would it be reasonable for me to say, “I desperately want my third great uncle on my mum’s side to be part of my family”? Does she accept that there has to be a definition and parameters for what family actually is, which the Bill seeks to establish?

[Siân Berry]

I disagree wholly with that. During the speeches made by Opposition Members earlier in the debate, I kept thinking about the people who, due to natural disasters or wars, are left without core family, and have to find another family member who will take them in and take that place. There is an inherent danger in putting in place these limits, and in the amendments tabled by Conservative Members that would add rigid definitions. Given the stories about the different ways in which people have experienced refugee status over the years, which all hon. Members will have heard about in casework and read about in memoirs and novels, the need for this change does not ring true. We should keep the system as it is now, where the reality of every single case needs to be looked at.

[Blake Stephenson]

The hon. Lady described our amendments as “rigid definitions”, but is it not right that we as legislators make sure that our definitions have certainty? We want to have a system that the British public have confidence in, and that is not the case at the moment—in good faith, the Government are trying to deal with that. Do we not need rigid definitions and certainty to achieve that?

[Siân Berry]

I fundamentally disagree with the hon. Member. We need to look at individual cases individually, as no two families are the same. We could imagine many circumstances for which we would want exceptions to this rule. The Government have rightly left caveats in the Bill, but the Opposition are arguing against them. Putting in rigid criteria on top of what is already in the Bill is absolutely the wrong way to go about addressing the issue. The best way to deal with any problems we might see is to do so in the initial decision making.

Clause 18 says that financial or emotional dependence, illness, or living in a conflict zone alone is not enough to establish family life, yet families routinely support each other financially, emotionally and practically. Ministers say that those factors can still be weighed at the public interest stage, but once family life is ruled out, that stage is never reached. What will that mean in practice? As I have hinted at, the Government’s impact assessment says that their article 8 reforms will mean 14,000 more refusals every year. Even after appeals, around 11,700 people more will be refused each year. Under the law as it stands, those people would succeed. That shows that clause 18 does not simply clarify existing principles, but is intended to change outcomes at a substantial scale. The clause does diminish human rights for refugees in this country, as is admitted in the Government’s human rights memorandum.

The way the clause is doing that is very troubling for two main reasons. First, it suggests that family relationships deserve protection only when they fit a model chosen by the state, but article 8 has never worked that way. The European Court has always looked at the substance of an individual relationship, not its form. Indeed, the very cases the Government cite require an individualised assessment of all the circumstances. As the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire said, we have been here before. The examples we are hearing from the Home Secretary and the Minister come as part of what is now a mini-tradition of Home Secretaries using exaggerated anecdotes to add to toxic rhetoric about migrants.

[Blake Stephenson]

This might be an opportune moment to intervene and allow the hon. Lady to get to the right place in her notes. She mentioned that we have been here before; that was a central part of my speech. In order to break this cycle, would she not agree that the right thing to do is to depart from the ECHR?

[Siân Berry]

I thank the hon. Member for trying, but he is talking to a person who cannot read the universal declaration of human rights without welling up, and I will never give up making arguments of this sort.

Previous legislation on these matters, to which the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire referred, followed on directly from the infamous 2011 party conference speech of the then Home Secretary—now Baroness May of Maidenhead. She repeated false claims from newspapers that judges had permitted a man to escape deportation because he had a pet cat—something she says she did not make up. In reality, neither of the judges’ decisions in the case was based on the man having a pet, and the second and final decision was not based on any human rights consideration at all. It was straightforwardly based on a failure by the Home Office to apply its own policy.

Amnesty International gave us more information in its written evidence:

“This—together with the readiness of many political commentators to cherry pick often minor or irrelevant facts that are mentioned in tribunal or court judgments and present these as if the main or sole reason for a decision that may have little or nothing to do with them—continues to underpin criticism of Article 8 in immigration-related decision-making. That criticism is plainly misinformed, often careless and, in some cases, on its face, clearly ill-intended—including out of dogmatic hostility to the ECHR and other political motivations.”

On Second Reading of the Bill, the current Home Secretary summarised an unnamed case. She said:

“In 2025, an Albanian man jailed for growing cannabis escaped deportation not because he had any right to be here, but because it was deemed unduly harsh on his partner to deport him. She was not his wife or life partner—instead, this relationship began only after a deportation order had been served. Why was the deportation deemed to be unduly harsh? The partner spoke no Albanian and had never visited the country before.”—[Official Report, 13 July 2026; Vol. 789, c. 675.]

[Ben Goldsborough]

I thank the hon. Lady, who is being very generous with her time. It is important for us to hammer home that, through the Bill, we are passing legislation for all eventualities. I wish that everyone coming here was squeaky clean and had the best intentions in the world, but we have to pass legislation that takes those with bad motivations into account. Will she respond to that?

[Siân Berry]

Yes, I will respond to that shortly with some data.

To return to the anecdote from the current Home Secretary, Amnesty again corrects the record:

“A key error in this summary is the statement that the relevant relationship had only begun after a deportation order had been served. That is not correct. The judge’s decision makes clear that it began significantly before the order. Of especial relevance was that the notice that such an order might be made was served in December 2019, but no order was then made for more than four years. By the time it was made in January 2024, the relationship had developed over a relatively lengthy period.”

The Home Secretary mentioned the criminal conviction. Amnesty also corrects that information. It says that he was jailed for four months for a relatively minor offence, and was now

“working lawfully and supporting himself.”

It also says:

“There was no suggestion of any risk of reoffending. His partner, who had no connection and had never been to Albania, was working and providing daily support to her sister and mother. Whatever may have been the position in 2019 was clearly not the position in 2024; and the relevant facts were clearly not adequately presented in what had been reported or at Second Reading.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)]

The hon. Lady says that this is not a way to reform the system. Does she have any ideas about the kinds of reform that she would be ready to accept?

[Siân Berry]

I have said that, based on my own casework, my experience of the Home Office’s errors, and the cases that I have seen, I would like to see investment in Home Office decision making to make it better in the first place. That would be the best way to deal with this issue, particularly when more than half of appeals are being approved.

[Melanie Onn]

I thank the hon. Lady for giving way once again. Given the number of amendments she has tabled—the point being that she will not support any element of change whatsoever—I gently and respectfully suggest that she is actually very happy with the system as it is, she is happy to accept all the evidence from a huge industry that exists to support immigrants, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and she does not want any reform whatsoever other than throwing the system open even further.

[Siân Berry]

It is pretty clear that I think the Bill is a result of the Government responding to toxic rhetoric coming from other parties, and that it is an attempt to be seen to be doing something.

[Blake Stephenson]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Siân Berry]

I will finish my point. In an evidence session, we challenged the National Crime Agency on the roots of the organised crime that the hon. Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes mentions, which is doing huge harm. I will not argue that the small boats system is the best way to bring people to this country. Small boat numbers started to grow the moment safe routes were closed. We need safe routes, and that is the approach the Government could take to reduce small boat crossings. The law that protects our rights does not need to be undermined. I would absolutely argue that.

[Blake Stephenson]

The hon. Lady refers to other parties and their toxic rhetoric. Perhaps she could give some examples. If she wishes to call out those parties, will she do so by giving clear examples rather than by making throwaway comments? That would really help the Committee.

[Siân Berry]

I am happy to clarify that I am talking primarily about Reform UK. That party is not represented on this Committee and can answer for itself in other ways, but it has, until recently, been taking votes from the Government on the right. I am happy to come back in future sittings with further examples of anecdotes being used instead of evidence. I chose to highlight two examples of Home Secretaries doing that, because the Minister is here to represent a Home Secretary.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Siân Berry]

This is turning into a very broad debate, but I give way to the hon. Member for Glasgow South West.

[Dr Ahmed]

It is the hon. Lady’s contention that those of us on the Government Benches were somehow manipulated by others to arrive at this Bill. Will she at least concede that toxic rhetoric and hatred do not occur in a vacuum, as I know personally, but often exploit structural deficiencies in systems, and that sadly there are structural deficiencies in this system? Is fixing them not therefore the responsible thing to do, so that we can turn the tap off that these haters and racists use to fire abusive language at Members of Parliament and members of the public who do not look like them?

[The Chair]

Order. I have been very lenient, but I gently say that we need to keep interventions sharp and succinct, please.

[Siân Berry]

Much appreciated, Mr Twigg.

I would say that the best way to stand up to toxic rhetoric is to stand up to it. We are familiar with the concept of the Overton window, and I am distressed that a Labour Government have been moving in this direction through their immigration policies. As I said at the beginning of my speech in the previous debate, the Government ought not to bring forward this Bill or row back on other civil liberties and human rights legislation—that would be the right thing to do. I am a lone voice on this Committee, but that cannot be right when we know that people around the country want migrants to be welcomed and want to see more unity, inclusion and social cohesion. The way to build that is not to hear the argument about how article 8 and the ECHR need to go and then do a little bit of that. The answer is to stand up to the rhetoric and build a better country.

[Joe Robertson]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Siân Berry]

One more time, then I will press on to the end of my speech.

[Joe Robertson]

I agree with the hon. Lady that there is some toxic rhetoric around this, although not from Members on this Committee. Does she not agree nevertheless that there is a problem with immigration and asylum in this country, and that part of the problem is that the numbers are too high?

[Siân Berry]

I do not concede that we are taking in too many refugees. As I said at the beginning, we have an international obligation to take our fair share of people seeking asylum, because of all the causes around the world that the hon. Gentleman mentioned earlier—he left out climate change, but I will forgive him that. There are many, many reasons why we ought to take a humane approach to asylum.

Some Government Back Benchers talked earlier about safe routes. There have been good schemes, aimed at particular conflicts in particular countries, and I hope the Government will continue to bring in more such schemes, but it is not good enough to cherry-pick particular conflicts or the kinds of refugees that we find acceptable. The volume of Ukrainian refugees has been absolutely huge, and has not caused social cohesion problems. We can make that work for many other countries as well, but the volumes in other schemes have always been too low. We need a universal framework of law that will work for all kinds of refugees.

[David Smith]

I was one of the Members who referred earlier in the debate to safe and legal routes, which are a very good idea. May I ask a very simple question: are there any specific restrictions at all that the hon. Lady would like to add to our immigration system?

[Siân Berry]

Off the top of my head, I cannot think of any. I really think that the current law needs to be administered better, and that we need better decision making, more humanity in all of this, and more support for people to get good decisions made the first time. I would be very happy to receive from the Government any clear evidence of abusive claims under the current law that does not rely on anecdote, but I am absolutely sure that, in clause 18, the Government are seeking to prevent people who would currently succeed from achieving asylum in this country and from being reunited with their families.

Let me move on to more things that the Government have said. The Government tell us that clause 18 is consistent with Strasbourg case law, and they even cite the cases, but, as other hon. Members have mentioned, they cannot have it both ways. If the clause simply restates the law, it is unnecessary. The Government’s impact assessment says that they expect grants to be cut by a third by those reforms. If the clause goes further, it risks putting the country in breach of the convention and inviting years of litigation. Either way, the clause does not deliver the clarity that Ministers promise, and I think that Opposition Members are united on that today.

I believe that a fair immigration system should tackle abuse while protecting genuine family life, and that it should put the best interests of children first and reflect the reality of modern families. Clause 18 does neither. It risks real hardship for genuine families, with little evidence that it will achieve anything else. I urge the Government to think again. We can maintain effective immigration control without using this clause to break up thousands of families. We can protect our borders without sacrificing the fundamental British values of compassion and fairness. For those reasons, I ask the Committee to agree that clause 18 should not stand part of the Bill.

[Joe Robertson]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Twigg. I will address clause 18. I must confess that I have a slight tendency to stray, but I am comforted by the fact that the hon. Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes will be on it and ensure that I stick to the grouping before us.

I made some comments on clause 18 in the morning sitting, so what I will say now is additional. I will focus on situations in which a right to family life can still be argued under the Bill, even though it seeks to restrict human rights applications based on family life. Those are not situations involving a core cohabiting family, but ones in which a sponsor in the UK who does not necessarily have a UK passport but nevertheless has a right to reside here applies for somebody—not necessarily a family member—who lives elsewhere with no right to come here, has a mental illness, needs the sponsor’s support and cannot find that support at home. That seems to me the widest part of the Bill, allowing a great range of claims to be made and increasing or maintaining the backlog at the Home Office and in the courts.

It seems that this mental illness provision could create a dodgy market of mental health clinics elsewhere in the world, set up specifically to provide paperwork for an application—that is not fanciful. We know the huge pressure from the black market abroad, involving people smugglers and all sorts of behaviour that is not just immoral but illegal and abhorrent, to get people into this country, because of course it is a great place to live and build a life. We know that the pressure is already there; that is why we have such high numbers coming. Setting out in law a mental illness route that seems to have such a low bar for evidence could lead, I think, to an entirely new dodgy avenue opening up.

Let us envisage a very real type of application. Someone in this country says that a family member or close friend living in another part of the world has a mental illness and a certificate to prove it. However, that certificate could very well come from a clinic that does not adhere to the standards of the NHS, the Care Quality Commission or anything that could be recognised in this country. That bit of paperwork—the bottom of which says, by the way, “Sorry, there is no support at home”—could give rise to an application. Without any evidence to the contrary, I do not see how the Home Office—or indeed a court—could deny that application.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I thank hon. Members for their contributions this afternoon. It has been fascinating to have one side saying that we are not going far enough and the other that we are going too far. I hope that means that we are getting the right balance between what the British people wish to see and allowing for the fundamental human rights we all benefit from.

I hope the Chair will indulge me for a moment because I would like to directly address the comments from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. It was unfair and, frankly, quite insulting to suggest that we introduced the Bill to chase rhetoric. I feel very passionately on behalf of my constituents about the importance of the Bill. I know that the hon. Lady and I represent very different constituencies, but she says that there is universal support for refugees. I am sure that she, like me, is watching with horror the masked-up thugs on the streets trying to attack asylum seekers and chasing them out of their accommodation, but when I knock on doors in my constituency, people constantly raise the unfairness of people who seek to exploit our systems, processes and commitment to values like universal human rights, because they can see that those people are not genuine and that they are exploiting our generosity. While we want to fulfil those commitments, it is really important to me that the system has integrity, and that is what the Bill is about.

[Siân Berry]

rose—

[Anna Turley]

I do not mean to be rude, but the hon. Lady has had plenty of time. We can pick this up outside the Committee room, but I wanted to get that on the record.

Clause 18 introduces a definition of article 8 family life into UK primary legislation for the first time, giving courts and decision makers a more consistent framework to apply to immigration cases. Until now, courts have had to determine the existence and scope of family life on a case-by-case basis, which has resulted in significant variability in outcomes. Article 8 is a two-stage test. First, a decision maker or court must decide if family or private life exists. Secondly, where family or private life is established, they must decide whether interference with it pursues a legitimate aim, such as the interests of public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, and is proportionate when the nature of the breach is balanced against the public interest of removing an individual or refusing them entry.

It is right that article 8 acts as a safeguard to protect genuine family relationships. However, these protections can create opportunities for individuals to rely on weak or peripheral family connections as a basis to remain in or come to the UK. Clause 18 addresses this. It acts in tandem with clause 19 by setting coherent parameters for when family life can be established in line with Strasbourg case law before the strengthened public interest test is applied. It provides a clearer statutory framework for determining whether family life exists for article 8 purposes.