Defamation Bill

Simon Hughes Excerpts

Wednesday 12th September 2012 Commons Chamber

The Joint Committee recommended that the Department should produce guidance that was clear and simple to use. There is no clarity on clause 5. There is no guidance, there are no regulations, and the Government are not taking a strategic approach. For all those reasons, we will press amendment 7 to a vote later this afternoon.

[Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)]

Let me begin by welcoming my colleagues who have just joined the team—the new Under-Secretaries of State for Justice, my hon. Friends the Members for Kenilworth and Southam (Jeremy Wright) and for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant). I know my hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald the better of the two, and have great confidence in her. If her colleague is as competent as she is, we shall be in good hands in the days ahead. I also welcome the new Secretary of State, who I expect will join us later. I have already had the welcome opportunity of holding a brief conversation with him about the Bill, and I look forward to a more general conversation with him about it after the completion of its House of Commons stages later today.

I have taken over responsibility for the Bill from my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake), who has joined the Government as Deputy Leader of the House. I congratulate him on that. I shall be carrying out a holding operation today without other support, but we will bolster our troops when the Bill goes to the other place.

Our general position is that it is absolutely right to reform the law. These new clauses and amendments relate to a matter of great significance out there in the real world. As was pointed out by the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman), this is real live legislation for 2012 and beyond. Bills, and the drafting of Bills, may appear to be somewhat esoteric, but what is done with websites, how people are held to account for what is said, how the transmission of information is managed, and how inappropriately transmitted information is controlled are important issues.

The right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane) also raised the general issue of appropriateness. Items can appear on websites overnight, for instance on Wikipedia, and catching up with them, correcting them and ensuring that information is accurate is an extraordinarily difficult job. It may be thought that people’s reputations are not hugely adversely affected by something that may be there one day and gone the next, but that is clearly not the reality of the world. A message that has appeared on Twitter can subsequently be removed, but by that stage—I am afraid that I cannot quote “A Midsummer Night’s Dream” accurately—it will, like Puck, have gone around the world before anyone has had a chance to do anything about it.

I welcome the Government new clause and the two new Government amendments. All the matters with which they deal were discussed in Committee. It was decided that new clause 1 was necessary, and it is a welcome proposed addition to the Bill. It may need to be tidied up further, and I am sure the Government do not pretend that this will definitely be the end of the conversation.

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[Paul Farrelly]

I entirely agree. I do not propose a return to the bad old regime, but I hope that the Government will give some thought to the remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent South and the hon. and learned Member for Harborough. The situation is unbalanced now and we need to address that.

So often, if people do not sue, our media do not take them seriously. That simply increases the licence to libel. I know people who defend responsible journalism and investigative journalists who have had to take that course of action because newspapers with an agenda have been out to get them; if they did not threaten or take legal action, the situation would never change. I believe the culture of our media needs to be borne in mind, as we will be reminded when Lord Leveson reports next month.

[Simon Hughes]

I welcome back to our debates the former Solicitor-General, whom I thank for his work in that office. It was much appreciated and I wish him well in considering things from a non-Government and non-Law-Officer perspective.

I declare an interest that means that I will not vote on the new clause if it is pressed to a Division. I am the recent recipient of a conditional fee agreement in the well publicised series of actions against News International. Even though, like all my colleagues here, I am on a parliamentary salary of more than £60,000 a year, had I not been offered a conditional fee agreement the prospect of taking News International to court subject to the risks that, in theory, followed from that might well have dissuaded me from doing it. If those risks might have dissuaded me and anyone on a salary similar to mine, how much more would they have dissuaded people earning a lower salary, much less experienced than I in such matters—not a lawyer—and not used to dealing with the media? We have to be realistic about the relevance of the issue and be aware of the need to continue the debate.

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[Simon Hughes]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 9, page 2, line 40, in clause 4, leave out from ‘statement’ to end of line 41 and insert—

‘the court must have regard to all the circumstances of the case and those circumstances may include (among other things)—’.

Amendment 1, page 3, line 5, after ‘it’, insert—

‘or within or a reasonable amount of time following initial publication’.

Amendment 10, page 3, line 7, leave out paragraph (g).

Amendment 2, page 3, line 8, at end insert—

‘within a reasonable amount of time, allowing for the public and commercial interest in publication.’.

Amendment 11, page 3, line 9, leave out from ‘the’ to end of line and insert—

‘urgency of the matter; or’.

Amendment 3, page 3, line 10, at end insert—

(j) whether the defendant had made reasonable efforts to abide by the National Union of Journalists’ Code of Conduct.’.

Amendment 12, page 3, line 10, at end insert—

‘() the extent of the defendant’s compliance with any relevant code of conduct or other relevant guidelines’.

Amendment 4, page 3, line 21, at end insert—

‘(7) In determining public interest, the court shall have regard to whether the claimant is a person in public life, which should be taken to include (amongst others) politicians, public officials, celebrities and others whose influence, earnings or social status is dependent on a public image.’.

[Simon Hughes]

This debate is about how we deal with what is or is not a matter of public interest—which, in itself, is increasingly becoming a matter of public interest.

I had a few days off in August. I tried to escape the British media by going to Spain—in particular, to watch Barcelona play Real Madrid in the first half of the super cup, in that most fantastic of stadiums in Barcelona. I did not succeed entirely in having five days free from the British media, because even the Spanish media were reporting that The Sun was publishing photographs of Prince Harry, defending its actions on the basis that they were in the public interest. In that way, the debate starts to take over everything that people want to justify. However, in the light of the Prime Minister’s statement earlier and the comments across the House, I hope that The Sun understands today what is in the public interest and that that appears on the front page of tomorrow morning’s paper by way of an apology to the supporters of Liverpool who were killed or injured at Hillsborough 23 years ago.

I want to introduce the debate by tracing where we have got to in terms of legislation. My new clause 4 suggests an additional way of dealing with public interest matters, which I hope will commend itself to the House. I have had the benefit of a brief word with the new Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant), who will be responding to this debate, both of whom we welcome to their posts. It is not my intention to divide the House on my new clause today; we just need to flag up where the issues are. Also, given that the time we have been given since the Bill was in Committee has been foreshortened, I accept that the issue will need more consideration.

Until recently, the question of what was in the public interest was dealt with by the common law, as opposed to by statute. I can do no better than to quote a short excerpt from the excellent Library note on the Defamation Bill—research paper 12/30, published on 28 May—to explain what the position was then. The case of Reynolds v. Times Newspapers in 2007 established what has become known as the “Reynolds privilege”, which is a common-law defence that a publication is acceptable and therefore cannot be the subject of a successful libel action because it is in the public interest. That defence is of particular importance to the press and broadcasters, although it is available to anybody, publishing in any medium, who wishes to use it. There was then a further case in the House of Lords, called Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl. The commentary on those two cases, which followed one another pretty speedily, by the authoritative book on the subject, “Carter-Ruck on Libel and Privacy”, said that, in the case of Jameel,

“the House of Lords sent a strong signal that the direction of travel, post-Reynolds had not been sufficiently in favour of press freedom,”

and, as the Library paper sets out, highlighted:

“Lord Hoffman’s comment that the non-exhaustive list of ten factors that had been set out in Reynolds to consider whether the journalism employed had been responsible had been taken by some judges as a set of hurdles to be overcome by a defendant.”

Before the Reynolds case, it seems that

“it was clear that, although no generic privilege existed for fair publication in the press on a matter of public interest, there were some situations in which a qualified privilege would attach to publications to the general public,”

yet it was unclear quite how that would work.

The Bill we are considering today was preceded by a draft Bill, which was considered by a Joint Committee of both Houses. It concluded on the subject:

“The Reynolds defence of responsible journalism in the public interest should be replaced with a new statutory defence that makes the law clearer, more accessible and better able to protect the free speech of publishers. The Bill must make it clear that the existing common law defence will be repealed.”

Therefore, clause 4, which is entitled “Responsible publication on matter of public interest”, contains a proposal to replace the common law defence with a statutory defence. Subsection (6) states:

“The common law defence known as the Reynolds defence is abolished.”

[Sir Peter Bottomley]

The right hon. Gentleman might prefer to leave this question to the Minister to answer. If that substitution becomes part of our law, does that mean that no other common law could be found by judges that would allow a defence against a claim for defamation?

[Simon Hughes]

My understanding of the situation is that, once we expressly repeal the common law defence and enact a statutory defence, that becomes the basis of all the decisions the courts will make subsequently. Of course, common law will build up as the new statute is interpreted, but it will be an end to the old case law and we will start again with this legislation. Therefore, if we are taking the opportunity—I think we all want to take it—to bring to Parliament the way we define these things, it is important to try to get it right. That is why I have proposed a new clause that would deal with some of the issues, which I hope colleagues in the House believe are appropriate ones to have in the legislation. I will return to that point in a moment.

The Government’s explanatory notes to the Bill state:

“The factors listed at subsection (2) are not intended to operate as a checklist or set of hurdles”.

Clause 4(2) provides a list—paragraphs (a) to (i)—setting out matters that are defined as follows:

“in determining for the purposes of this section whether a defendant acted responsibly in publishing a statement the matters to which the court may have regard include (amongst other matters)—

(a) the nature of the publication and its context”.

For example, is it a broadsheet newspaper with a national circulation, a paper published by three people, or whatever? The list continues. The Joint Committee had suggested:

“When deciding whether publication was responsible, the court should have regard to any reasonable editorial judgment of the publisher on the tone and timing of the publication.”

That suggestion did not find support with the Government, who responded:

“We have considered the need for a specific provision of this nature, but believe that this is unnecessary, as in practical terms in determining whether a publisher had acted responsibly in publishing the statement complained of, the court would in reality be considering whether the publisher had exercised its editorial judgment responsibly. There is also the need to ensure that the defence is clearly applicable in a wide range of circumstances beyond mainstream media cases, and focusing on editorial judgment in this way might cast doubt on that. Including a specific provision would therefore appear unnecessary and potentially confusing, and we consider that the clause already provides protection for responsible editorial judgment as it stands.”

That is how the Bill came to the House and to the Committee, and the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald, who was a member of the Committee, and others then looked at those issues. I think that the debate hinged on two things. First, did the drafting of the statutory defence in fact take account of the law as it now is, because things had moved on? There had been a case called Flood, which had just been decided and was reported this year. The Government were asked whether they appropriately took that case into account as the latest interpretation of the Reynolds case. The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent South (Robert Flello) suggested that it did not look as though the Government had taken that case into account and therefore argued, with the support of the Libel Reform Campaign, that there had not been enough flexibility in trying to catch up with the position the judges had arrived at. Secondly, was that sufficient in any event anyway? The debate on the second point hinged around whether it should be for the claimant to prove that the publisher had acted irresponsibly and, therefore, what the balance of argument should be. Should there be more of an onus on the claimant or on the defendant? The hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly)—I join others in thanking him for his collaboration and assistance when he was the Under-Secretary—said that it would “unfairly tilt the balance” against the defendant. At that stage, he therefore resisted a change. He made it clear that the Government were seeking to bring the Bill to Parliament to reflect case law as it had developed after the Reynolds case and in the light of the Flood case. Ministers, including the hon. Gentleman, were good in saying that they would consult further and hear further points. My right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) and I subsequently went to see Lord McNally, to put the case for a broader definition.

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[Paul Farrelly]

I am fully aware of the provenance of the new clause and of the sterling work done by the Libel Reform Campaign, and I am very sympathetic to what the right hon. Gentleman is trying to achieve, but I want to ask him a question. Let us suppose that an innocent mistake is made, which may not be apparent to the newspaper. When a complainant writes to the newspaper saying “I want an apology”, the newspaper gives the standard response, “We stand by our story: it is true and in the public interest.” I fear that in those circumstances there will be no defence for responsible journalism, because under the new clause it falls away.

[Simon Hughes]

I accept that, and I pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman’s work, which has been gleaned from his experience in his previous life as a journalist.

What we are trying to do between us is ensure that if we are to replace the common-law defence with a statutory defence, we not only deal with the general proposition that if something is in the public interest, that should be a defence, but find ways of giving the public a remedy—which they do not currently have, short of going to law—and ratchet up the probability that a public interest defence will be unsuccessful if the defendant has been malicious.

As the hon. Gentleman rightly pointed out, the definition of “malice” in the new clause is not my own handiwork. Others have been working carefully to craft what they consider to be the right second-tier definition. The aim is to establish two tiers of consideration: there should be a general public interest defence, but the situation should be deemed to have gone beyond that when a publisher has flown in the face of the facts or the evidence. That would not apply to the example given by the hon. Gentleman, because if a newspaper could honestly argue that the statement that it had published was ignorant and innocent and that there had been every reason for believing that it was true, it would obviously have a much more complicated public interest defence case to argue. In the absence of my new clause, it would then have to rely on something like the clause that is currently in the Bill.

Let me make just two more substantive points. I am keen for us to end up with legislation that will give people a way out of the legal process when that is possible. Who knows what the Leveson inquiry will produce? I sense that one of its main recommendations will concern how we should deal with the public’s desire for inaccuracies to be corrected. I gave evidence before Lord Justice Leveson, as did others, and that was a major subject of debate. We may have to legislate if Lord Justice Leveson proposes legislation, and I hope that that would happen in the Session that will begin next May. It is therefore possible that we will return to this issue.

There is a debate about when the Leveson report will be ready, but if it appears as early as October, it may give us time to incorporate any proposals in this Bill. If it does not produce its recommendations until December, which now looks more likely, I sense we will have to come up with further legislation specifically to deal with the Leveson recommendations. Although we may not come up with a perfect solution in this Bill, however, both Government and Opposition parties have said they want to try to get this issue sorted now and get a better definition of public interest defence.

I want the House to agree to a measure that adds to the current clause 4, with a new defence available to publishers who are prepared to correct the record or publish a right-to-reply response promptly and prominently, thereby avoiding the use of lawyers. That answers the need in the internet age for a much speedier response—otherwise many readers are unlikely to see both the original content and the later clarification. It offers newspapers and other publishers a way of being responsible after the publication of the initial story, too, because they can be shown to have corrected what they have published. It will also serve not to permit the repetition of a defamatory allegation that has been promptly or prominently corrected or clarified. It would, therefore, take disputes out of the courts, thus saving people money, and it would speed up justice and make it more publicly accessible. It would not apply if the author were motivated by malice in its widest definition, which includes political or personal ill will or vendetta, rather than just the old honest opinion defence. The information must also be understandable to the public.

The Reynolds defence no longer works. Everybody accepts that we must move on from that common-law position for all sorts of reasons. We are in the age of the citizen-journalist, and we need to adapt the rules to accommodate that. We need something that will work for conventional newspaper groups and new media organisations. The Reynolds defence has outlived its time. It will no longer be sufficient to have a checklist of tests in every court case. Perhaps we ought to debate again whether to have early strike-out clauses in order to get other kinds of cases out of the courts, too. We need a measure that sorts out at the beginning of proceedings, rather than the end, whether there is a public interest component.

[Fiona Mactaggart (Slough) (Lab)]

The right hon. Gentleman referred to strike-out clauses. He is probably aware of the case of my constituent Hardeep Singh, who was the subject of a lengthy and unfair—and extremely expensive, for him—case centring on a matter of religious dispute. The judge eventually clearly ruled that the matter should not be dealt with by the courts. A similar doctrinal dispute could arise in future, so if there is not an early strike-out opportunity someone else could suffer as Mr Singh did. What can be done to end this?

[Simon Hughes]

I know about that particular case; indeed, it has become something of a cause célèbre. I support having an early strike-out provision. We had a long debate on the subject in Committee, which is why Mr Speaker did not select an amendment on it for debate on Report. I hope we can persuade the Government that an appropriate public interest defence, plus a remedy for resolving disputes along the lines I have suggested, plus early strike-out is the right combination not just to address cases such as that of the hon. Lady’s constituent, but to prevent other kinds of unacceptable attack. I hope she will work with us. I am sure that she will. She also has relevant experience that I hope she can bring to the debates after today.

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[Robert Flello]

Clause 4 is an important, central part of the Bill, but some commentators believe that, as drafted, it does not represent an effective public interest defence. Others, as we have heard, believe that it should either be amended or improved by new clause 4.

Members will notice that my copy of the Joint Committee’s report is well-thumbed, and I draw their attention to what it has to say about the matter. I am sure that the Minister has already read it, but it would be worth her while to look again at what it says about what was clause 2, on responsible publication. It is important and relates to some of this afternoon’s amendments and comments. It will also elaborate on the Bill and inform views as the Bill makes its way through Parliament.

Today’s has been a good debate, as was the one in Committee, and I begin with a few observations on new clause 4. It was tabled by the right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) but bears an uncanny resemblance to the new clause that I tabled in Committee.

[Simon Hughes]

Same parents.

[Robert Flello]

Indeed. As I was about to say, because we both know their provenance, we understand the reasons for that uncanny resemblance, so it would be hard for me not to support new clause 4, especially given that my new clause was withdrawn with the specific intention of fighting it another day.

You will be reassured, to know Madam Deputy Speaker, that I have no intention of rehearsing our discussion of clause 4. Instead, I invite the House to read in Hansard what was said. However, I was dissatisfied with the previous Minister’s assurances on the predecessor to new clause 4, and was not reassured that it encompassed Reynolds, as revised by Flood and Jameel. I hope, therefore, that the other place can pin down the Minister on this matter and get some better legislation out of this.

As I understood the observations of the right hon. Gentleman, new clause 4 is intended as an addition to the statutory version of Reynolds. The existing clause 4 defence would be available to publishers with deep enough pockets who did not wish to publish a clarification, contradiction or, where relevant, a correction. The new clause 4 defence would be available to publishers prepared to correct the record promptly and, if needs be, prominently, and to publish a right of reply promptly and prominently, avoiding the use of lawyers.

As Members on both sides of the House have said, in the internet age, a prompt and prominent clarification, contradiction or correction can be an adequate remedy for non-malicious public interest publication, particularly given that some readers might see an original posting but not a subsequent one. So publishing a correction straight away online is often a good way of doing it—perhaps we could call it a post-publication responsible publication. The Opposition are concerned that we end up with a clause 4 that does the job. As I said, I support the direction of travel in new clause 4, and look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments. I hope to hear something new, not what we heard in Committee, and something from which we can take reassurance.

On the amendments tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Paul Farrelly) and for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell), my constituency neighbour, my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme, pointed out that the Reynolds list was meant to be flexible, but that this had led to a catalogue of problems. I welcome his attempt to tidy up clause 4 while seeking to probe the Government’s thinking. It is important that the Minister gives us the reassurance and advice we seek.

My hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington outlined the NUJ’s understandable interest. It will have concerns that good journalism will suffer because of the behaviour of bad journalists and the unfair pressure placed on good journalists by editors and owners not as concerned about good journalistic standards as they are about profits and getting the sensational headlines to generate them. I see where he is going with his amendments, and I understand the positive intentions behind them. I suspect that much of clause 4 will need to be revisited following the conclusion of Lord Leveson’s work. It is almost a great pity that the Bill has proceeded so quickly through the House. If it had been delayed, perhaps by a few months, we could have incorporated conclusions and findings from the Leveson inquiry and the inquiry into privilege. It should all be looked at as a package, rather than taking defamation as a stand-alone issue. This is an important subject and the law has not been amended since 1996. All the party manifestos wanted the law amended, but the undue haste of trying to get the Bill through Parliament—specifically clause 4 —means that the amended Bill with its additional new clauses does not currently pass the test of good and effective potential legislation. In the spirit of trying to get a good result, I look forward to what the Minister has to say.

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[Mrs Grant]

I cannot comment on the details of individual cases, but if my hon. Friend writes to me, I will look at what he says.

In the light of the assurances I have given the House that the Government continue to look broadly at how a public interest defence might be framed, I hope hon. Members agree not to press their proposals to a Division.

[Simon Hughes]

I shall be brief in winding up this valuable debate. I am grateful to colleagues, who have expressed different views on how we should proceed. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr Garnier) said that it would be best to leave it to common law, but the problem with the common law argument, as he conceded, is that someone is required to go to court to take the law on and test the case. Libel and defamation cases are hugely expensive. I and many hon. Members are trying to ensure first that the law is clearer, and secondly that we protect our constituents from having to go to court to assert their rights.

The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) argued for a differential test for those in public life and those not in public life. Those of us in public life are much better equipped and able to go to law if we want to do so. If the bar were to be lower for people in public life, so the capacity to respond would also be easier. I do not necessarily accept that that is where we want to go, but that is another debate. The bulk of my constituents and the hon. Gentleman’s are not in a position readily to go to court to defend their interests, and nor could they get an adequate remedy. The new clause therefore seeks to find a remedy outside the courts.

I hear what my hon. Friend the new Minister says about the level of evidence needed to establish malice, and therefore understand that we need to have a debate on that. However, I am encouraged by the fact that she and her colleagues are willing to draw breath, as it were, and to look at the arguments as they have been presented and at the unanswered questions that both current and previous Ministers have said they will address.

There is one last thing to say before asking the House for leave to withdraw new clause 4. Will Ministers look at the big question of the timetable for the Bill, and particularly this part of it, in the light of the Leveson report? We need to ensure that we are seen to be legislating carefully, but we would perhaps make ourselves look foolish if we tried to legislate this year or a few months into the next year in the certain knowledge that we would need to return to the matter. The House and the Government should reserve a space to legislate in the light of Leveson. It would be unacceptable for anybody in the months ahead to put the argument that we cannot return to the matter because we have addressed it in the Bill.

[John McDonnell]

I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman and the parties that there should be a discussion on the process through the usual channels. I agree that the Bill could be completely abortive, and that we would look ridiculous if we returned to it so soon after it was passed. There is potential for an agreed discussion on the timetable between the parties.

[Simon Hughes]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman.

[Mr MacShane]

It is vital that the other place slows the Bill down because it is in lock-step with Leveson. There is complete and utter parallelity or parallelness between the two—[Laughter.] Hansard can sort that out. I strongly second what the right hon. Gentleman says.

[Simon Hughes]

I agree that there is complete and utter whatever-it-is between the two.

[Sir Peter Bottomley]

I disagree with the good people on the Opposition Benches. This Bill is about defamation. We know that there will be something on privacy, and we also know that Lord Leveson is likely to talk about the way in which the press and others operate. If this Bill, dealing with defamation, is held up to bring in something dealing with privacy in its own time, we will end up with the kind of confusion that we are trying to get away from.

[Simon Hughes]

We are hearing a quick last set of bids for how the Government should proceed. The point that will reconcile those views and mine is this. Although my noble Friend Lord McNally is keen that we should introduce reforms and have a modern law on defamation, the Ministry of Justice should none the less have a wider debate with colleagues in both Houses, particularly in this House, about how that should be achieved, while at the same time ensuring that we do not lose the opportunities to do what Lord Justice Leveson recommends. We need to have that debate. It would not preclude concluding the Defamation Bill, but whether it would include this part of the Bill, for example, or whether we would leave the issue to be addressed in the public interest debate post Leveson is a matter to be resolved. I hope that there is agreement that that sort of conversation could happen. I am sure that Ministers will want to be helpful, and I will certainly talk to my colleagues across Government in other Departments, including the Deputy Prime Minister, and say, “There is an issue here and Government collectively need to address it.” With those words, I beg to ask leave to withdraw new clause 4.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 5

Operators of websites

Amendment proposed: 7, page 3, line 22, leave out clause 5.—(Robert Flello.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Simon Hughes]

I join hon. Members in thanking the outgoing ministerial team and the former Secretary of State for Justice for their collaboration and work; I congratulate them on that. I also congratulate the new team on their appointment, particularly the new Secretary of State, whom we very much welcome to his responsibilities. As the shadow Secretary of State said, the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats and the Labour party went into the last election with a commitment to reform defamation and libel law. That commitment was satisfactorily reaffirmed in the coalition agreement. There is consensus that the one thing we must deliver this Session is reformed libel law along the lines of the Bill. We have made good progress, but there is general agreement that we are not completely there yet.

I share exactly the view expressed by the new Secretary of State on why we need the Bill. We need to uphold the rights of freedom of expression, in particular for journalism, and to encourage good journalism, including good investigative journalism, in the process. Journalists should not be afraid of exposing what they need to expose in the public interest. We also need to ensure that ordinary people are protected against poor and misrepresenting journalists, who ruin reputations in such a way that they cannot be recovered. That is the balance we need to strike.

After the election, my noble Friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill was pivotal in putting the matter on the agenda. Both Houses have worked hard through the Joint Committee to make progress, and the Government picked up many, but not all, of its suggestions. My party has twice in the last year looked at the matter at our conferences: to ensure that we have methods for resolving disputes—built into the legislation, if possible—so that if, for example, untrue defamatory statements are propagated, they can be withdrawn without everything having to go through the courts; and to ensure that we enhance our freedom in this country, not reduce it.

There are three matters left to look at, as part of the ongoing debate. One is whether the current processes in the law on early strike-out are sufficient. I heard what the Minister said, but that remains an issue. We want to be able to get rid of nonsense cases—our hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley) made the case powerfully—to stop them clogging up the courts. We need to see whether we have adequate processes to do that. Secondly, we need to ensure that the public interest defence works appropriately. That is probably the most difficult and controversial area to get right. I am grateful that Ministers have said that they are willing to look broadly at the issues again. Lastly, there is the controversial question of whether the law should protect only individuals or also corporations, and, if so, how. I have no doubt that we shall return to that issue.

We now have some time after Third Reading before the Bill goes to the Lords. We will engage with people in the other place. We need to pause to ensure that when Lord Justice Leveson reports we do not confuse things in taking the Bill to the statute book, while at the same time picking up all the proposals he makes. Many people have helped us in the campaign to get libel law reformed, not least the Libel Reform Campaign. We thank them and look forward to continuing to work with them. The work is not completed, but a lot of good work has been done and there is general good will about ensuring that, for the first time in a generation, we bring the libel laws up to date for a modern Britain, in a modern world of communication, but where freedom of speech remains something of which we can be justifiably proud.