Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (First sitting)

Tim Roca Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Bradley Thomas (Bromsgrove) (Con)]

Q Picking up on what Jen mentioned about FTSE and publicly traded companies being within scope, is there a view on ensuring g that privately owned companies of a particular scale are within scope, and if so, how will you determine that? Might it be based on things such as turnover or number of employees, or would it be some other identifiable characteristic?

Jen Ellis: For sure, it should not come down to whether you are public or private; it should be about impact. Figuring out how to measure that is challenging. I will leave that problem with policymakers—you’re welcome. I do not think it is about the number of employees. We have to think about impact in a much more pragmatic way. In the tech sector, relatively small companies can have a very profound impact because they happen to be the thing that is used by everybody. Part of the problem with security is that you have small teams running things that are used ubiquitously.

We have to think a little differently about this. We have seen outages in recent years that are not necessarily maliciously driven, but have demonstrated to us how reliant we are on technology and how widespread the impact can be, even of something like a local managed service provider. One that happened to provide managed services for a whole region’s local government went down in Germany and it knocked out all local services for some time. You are absolutely right: we should be looking at privately held companies as well. We should be thinking about impact, but measuring impact and figuring out who is in scope and who is not will be really challenging. We will have to start looking down the supply chain, where it gets a lot more complex.

[Tim Roca (Macclesfield) (Lab)]

Q This question is mainly for Jen. Your colleague Jamie MacColl has made a series of forthright comments about the Bill and compared it to NIS2. How does the Bill compare to legislation worldwide?

Jen Ellis: As a starting point, I will clarify that I am a fellow at RUSI. I work closely with Jamie, but I do not work for RUSI. I also take no responsibility for Jamie’s comments.

On the comparisons, David alluded to the fact that Europe is a little bit ahead of us. NIS2, its update to NIS1, came into force three years ago with a dangling timeline: nations had until October 2024 to implement it. My understanding is that not everybody has implemented it amazingly effectively as yet. There is some lag across the member states. I do not think we are too out of scope of what NIS2 includes. However, we are talking about primary legislation now; a lot of the detail will be in the secondary legislation. We do not necessarily know exactly how those two things will line up against each other.

The UK seems to be taking a bit of a different approach. The EU has very specifically tried to make the detail as clearly mandated as possible, because it wants all the member states to adopt the same basis of requirements, which is different from NIS1, whereas it seems as though the UK wants to provide a little bit of flexibility for the regulators to “choose their own adventure”. I am not sure that is the best approach. We might end up with a pretty disparate set of experiences. That might be really confusing for organisations that are covered by more than one competent authority.

The main things that NIS2 and CSRB are looking at are pretty aligned. There is a lot of focus on the same things. It is about expanding scope to make sure that we keep up with what we believe “essential” now looks at, and there is a lot of focus on increased incident reporting and information sharing. Again, the devil will be in the detail in the secondary legislation.

The other thing I would say goes back to the earlier question about what is happening internationally. The nations that David mentioned, like Australia or the jurisdiction around the EU, are really proactive on cyber policy—as is the UK. They are taking a really holistic view, which David alluded to in his introduction, and are really looking at how all the pieces fit together. I am not sure that it is always super clear that the UK is doing the same. I think there is an effort to do so, and UK policymakers are very proactive on cyber policy and are looking at different areas to work on, but the view of how it all goes together may not be as clear. One area where we are definitely behind is legislating around vendor behaviour and what we expect from the people who are making and selling technology.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

Q Thank you very much to both of you for your insights today. The question on my mind is related, in part, to the point that Jen raised. There are a range of levers at the Government’s disposal in thinking about and acting on cyber-security. I am interested in your thoughts on which parts of the economy ought to be in the scope of regulation and legislative measures, and where effective measures that sit outside of regulation and legislation—guidance being one from a range of non-regulatory measures—would be better suited.

Jen Ellis: Again, that is a hugely complex question to cover in a short amount of the time. One of the challenges that we face in UK is that we are a 99% small and mediums economy. It is hard to think about how to place more burdens on small and medium businesses, what they can reasonably get done and what resources are available. That said, that is the problem that we have to deal with; we have to figure out how to make progress.

There is also a challenge here, in that we tend to focus a lot on the behaviour of the victim. It is understandable why—that is the side that we can control—but we are missing the middle piece. There are the bad guys, who we cannot control but who we can try to prosecute and bring to task; and there are the victims, who we can control, and we focus a lot on that—CSRB focuses on that side. Then there is the middle ground of enablers. They are not intending to be enablers, but they are the people who are creating the platforms, mediums and technology. I am not sure that we are where we could be in thinking about how to set a baseline for them. We have a lot of voluntary codes, which is fantastic—that is a really good starting point—but it is about the value of the voluntary and how much it requires behavioural change. What you see is that the organisations that are already doing well and taking security seriously are following the voluntary codes because they were already investing, but there is a really long tail of organisations that are not.

Any policy approach, legislation or otherwise, comes down to the fact that you can build the best thing in the world, but you need a plan for adoption or the engagement piece—what it looks like to go into communities and see how people are wrestling with this stuff and the challenges that are blocking adoption. You also need to think about how to address and remove those challenges, and, where necessary, how to ensure appropriate enforcement, accountability and transparency. That is critical, and I am not sure that we see a huge amount of that at the moment. That is an area where there is potential for growth.

With CSRB, the piece around enforcement is going to be critical, and not just for the covered entities. We are also giving new authorities to the regulators, so what are we doing to say to them, “We expect you to use them, to be accountable for using them and to demonstrate that your sector is improving”? There needs to be stronger conversations about what it looks like to not meet the requirements. We should be looking more broadly, beyond just telling small companies to do more. If we are going to tell small companies to do more, how do we make it something that they can prioritise, care about and take seriously, in the same way that health and safety is taken seriously?

David Cook: To achieve the outcome in question, which is about the practicalities of a supply chain where smaller entities are relying on it, I can see the benefit of bringing those small entities in scope, but there could be something rather more forthright in the legislation on how the supply chain is dealt with on a contractual basis. In reality, we see that when a smaller entity tries to contract with a much larger entity—an IT outsourced provider, for example—it may find pushback if the contractual terms that it asks for would help it but are not required under legislation.

Where an organisation can rely on the GDPR, which has very specific requirements as to what contracts should contain, or the Digital Operational Resilience Act, which is a European financial services law and is very prescriptive as to what a contract must contain, any kind of entity doing deals and entering into a contract cannot really push back, because the requirements are set out in stone. The Bill does not have a similar requirement as to what a contract with providers might look like.

Pushing that requirement into the negotiation between, for example, a massive global IT outsourced provider and a much smaller entity means either that we will see piecemeal clauses that do not always achieve the outcomes you are after, or that we will not see those clauses in place at all because of the commercial reality. Having a similarly prescriptive set of requirements for what that contract would contain means that anybody negotiating could point to the law and say, “We have to have this in place, and there’s no wriggle room.” That would achieve the outcome you are after: those small entities would all have identical contracts, at least as a baseline.

Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting)

Tim Roca Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Bradley Thomas]

Q Are you able to quantify that in any way?

Ian Hulme: At the moment, to give you a few broad numbers our teams are around 15 people, and we anticipate doubling that. In the future, with self-funding, we will be a bit more in control of our own destiny. It is a significant uplift from our perspective.

Natalie Black: The challenge is that the devil is in the detail. Until that detail has worked through secondary legislation, we will have to reserve our position, so that we give you accurate numbers in due course. From Ofcom’s point of view, it is about adding 10s rather than significant numbers. I do not think we are that far off the ICO.

But I want to emphasise that this is about quality, not necessarily quantity. Companies want to work with expert regulators who really know what they are doing. Ofcom is building on the work we are already doing under the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021. It will be a question of reinforcing that team, rather than setting up a separate one. We want to get the best, high-quality individuals who know how to talk to industry and really know cyber-security, to make sure people have a good experience when engaging with us.

Ian Hulme: To add to that, the one challenge we will face as a group is that we are all fishing in the same pond for skills. MSPs and others will also be fishing in that pond from the sector side. There needs to be recognition that there is going to be a skills challenge in this implementation.

Stuart Okin: To specifically pick up on the numbers, we have a headcount of 43 who are dedicated within cyber regulation. That also includes the investment side. We also have access to the engineering team—the engineering directorate—which is a separate team. There is also our enforcement directorate, as well as the legal side of things. The scope changes proposed in the Bill are just the large load controllers and supply chain, so we are not expecting a major uplift. These will be small numbers in comparison. Unlike my colleagues, we are not expecting a big uplift in resourcing.

[Tim Roca (Macclesfield) (Lab)]

Q I was reading the ICO’s response in December, as this legislation was proceeding, and it talks a little about having clarity around secondary legislation, the Secretary of State’s powers and the definition of “significant impact”. What are your concerns about the secondary legislation, or what you would like to make sure is right in it?

Ian Hulme: There are two angles to that. From a purely planning and preparation perspective, it is incredibly difficult, without having seen the detail, to know precisely what is expected of MSPs and IDSPs in the future, and therefore what the regulatory activity will be. That is why, when I am answering questions for colleagues, it is difficult to be precise about those numbers.

Equally, we are hearing from industry that it wants that precision as well. What is the expectation on it regarding incident reporting? What does “significant impact” mean? Similarly, with the designation of critical suppliers, precision is needed around the definitions. From a regulatory perspective, without that precision, we will probably find ourselves in a series of potential cases arguing about the definition of an issue. To give an example, if the definition of MSP is vague, and we are saying to an MSP that we think it is in scope, and it is saying, “No, we are not,” then a lot of our time and attention will be taken up with those types of arguments and disputes. Precision will be key for us.

[Tim Roca]

Q Is there anything that you would have preferred to see in the primary legislation, or do you think secondary legislation affords industry and Government flexibility?

Ian Hulme: There is a balance to be struck. When something is written on the face of the Bill and things change—and we know that this is a fast-moving sector—it makes it incredibly difficult to change things. There is a balance to be struck between primary and secondary, but what we are hearing and saying is that more precision around some of the definitions will be critical.

Natalie Black: I strongly agree with Ian. A regulator is only as good as the rules that it enforces. If you want us to hold the companies to account, we need to be absolutely clear on what you are asking us to do. The balance is just about right in terms of primary and secondary, particularly because the secondary vehicle gives us the opportunity to ensure that there is a lot of consultation. The Committee will have heard throughout the day—as we do all the time from industry—that that is what industry is looking for. They are looking for periods of business adjustment—we hear that loud and clear—and they really want to be involved in the consultation period. We also want to be involved in looking at what we need to take from the secondary legislation into codes of practice and guidance.

[Dr Spencer]

Q Natalie, I am going single out Ofcom, which has a lot on its plate at the moment, particularly when it comes to the implementation of the Online Safety Act 2023 and all its other duties. Are you set up to administer your duties under the Bill? Are your resources siloed, given Ofcom’s competing considerations, particularly over the next few years?

Natalie Black: That is a great question, and I am not at all surprised that you have asked it, given everything that is going on at the moment. As well as being group director for infrastructure and connectivity, I am also the executive member of the board, sitting alongside our chief executive officer, so from first-hand experience I can say that Ofcom really recognises how fast technology is changing. I do not think there is another sector that is really at the forefront of change in this way, apart from the communications sector. There are a lot of benefits to being able to sit across all that, because many of the stakeholders and issues are the same, and our organisation is learning to evolve and adapt very quickly with the pace of change. That is why the Bill feels very much like a natural evolution of our responsibility in the security and resilience space.

We already have substantial responsibilities under NIS and the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021. We are taking on these additional responsibilities, particularly over data centres, but we already know some of the actors and issues. We are using our international team to understand the dynamics that are affecting the Online Safety Act, which will potentially materialise in the security and resilience world. As a collective leadership team, we look across these issues together. The real value comes from joining the dots. In the current environment, that is where you can make a real difference.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bradley Thomas]

Q For the avoidance of doubt, I will put on the record that I am a member of the IPAC caucus in this Parliament. Thank you for coming in to see us. You have spoken about the threats from hostile and adversarial states. Given the scope of what we are talking about, can you give us any insight on what comparable western nations are doing to protect themselves?

Chung Ching Kwong: The US is probably a good example. It passed Executive order 14028 in May 2021, which requires any software vendor selling to the US federal Government to provide something called a software bill of materials—SBOM. That is technically a table of ingredients, but for software, so you can see exactly what components the software is made of. A lot of the time people who code are quite lazy; they will pull in different components that are available on databases online to form a piece of software that we use. By having vendors provide an SBOM, when anything happens, or whenever any kind of vulnerability is detected, you can very easily find out what happened.

That is due to a hack in 2021, in which a tiny, free piece of code called Log4j was found to have a critical vulnerability. It was buried inside thousands of commercial software products. Without that list of ingredients, it would be very difficult for people who had been using the software to find out, because, first, they may not have the technological capabilities and, secondly, they would not even know if their software had that component. This is one of the things the US is doing to mitigate the risks when it comes to software.

Something that is not entirely in the scope of the Bill but is also worth considering is the US’s Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act. That is designed to prevent goods made with forced labour from entering the supply chain. The logic of preventing forced labour is probably something that the UK can consider. Because the US realised that it could not inspect every factory in Xinjiang to prove forced labour, it flipped the script: the law creates a rebuttable presumption that all goods from that region are tainted, so the burden of proof is now on the importer to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that their supply chain is clean.

A similar logic could be considered when it comes to this Bill to protect cyber-security. Any entities that are co-operating with the PLA—the People’s Liberation Army—for example, should be considered as compromised or non-trustworthy until proven otherwise. That way, you are not waiting until problems happen, when you realise, “Oh, this is actually tainted,” but you prevent it before it happens. That is the comparison that I would make.

[Tim Roca]

Q I, too, put on the record that I am a member of the IPAC caucus in this Parliament.

Thank you for speaking to us today. May I turn the conversation a little on its head? We have been talking about national security and the threat from China and others. You were an activist in Hong Kong and made a great deal of effort to fight the Chinese Communist party’s invasion of privacy—privacy violations using the national security law—and other things. Do you see any risk in this legislation as regards civil liberties and privacy? We have had a bit of discussion about how much will go into secondary legislation and how broad the Secretary of State’s powers might be.

Chung Ching Kwong: The threat to privacy, especially to my community—the Hong Kong diaspora community in this country—will be in the fact that, under clause 9, we will be allowing remote access for maintenance, patches, updates and so on. If we are dealing with Chinese vendors and Chinese providers, we will have to allow, under the Bill, certain kinds of remote access for those firms to maintain the operation of software of different infrastructures. As a Hongkonger I would be worrying, because I do not know what kind of tier 2 or tier 3 supplier will have access to all those data, and whether or not they will be transmitted back to China or get into the wrong hands. It will be a worry that our data might fall into the wrong hands. Even though we are not talking specifically about personal data, personal data is definitely in scope. Especially for people with bounties on their head, I imagine that it will be a huge worry that there might be more legitimate access to data than there is right now under the Data Protection Act.

[Tim Roca]

Q From the other perspective—I am thinking about a UK Government in the future overreaching—do you think there is any risk from this legislation?

Chung Ching Kwong: It is always a double-edged sword when it comes to regulating against threats. The more that the Secretary of State or the Government are allowed to go into systems and hold powers to turn off, or take over, certain things, the more there is a risk that those powers will be abused, to a certain extent, or cause harm unintentionally. There is always a balance to be struck between giving more protection to privacy for ordinary users and giving power to the Government so that they can act. Obviously, for critical infrastructure like the power grid and water, the Government need control over those things, but for communications and so on, there is, to a certain extent, a question about what the Government can and cannot do. But personally I do not see a lot of concerns in the Bill.

[Emily Darlington]

Q I want to move from software to hardware that is particularly vulnerable to potential cyber-attack, particularly from the integration of Chinese tech into SIPs, possibly making them vulnerable to cyber-attack by someone who knows the code into those bits of hardware. Should we be doing more to protect against that vulnerability? Should that be covered by the Bill?

Chung Ching Kwong: It should definitely be covered by the Bill, because if we are not regulating to protect hardware as well, we will get hardware that is already embedded with, for example, an opcode attack. Examples in the context of China include the Lenovo Superfish scandal in 2015, in which originally implemented ad software had hijacked the https certificate, which is there to protect your communication with the website, so that nobody sees what activity is happening between you and the website. Having that Superfish injection made that communication transparent. That was done before the product even came out of the factory. This is not a problem that a software solution can fix. If you were sourcing a Lenovo laptop, for example, the laptop, upon arrival, would be a security breach, and a privacy breach in that sense. We should definitely take it a step further and regulate hardware as well, because a lot of the time that is what state-sponsored attacks target as an attack surface.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I call Tim Roca.

[Tim Roca]

Sorry, Chair, I don’t have a question.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bradley Thomas]

Q With regard to skills, given the acute shortage and the growth of this industry, what do you propose to ensure that the public sector is adequately resourced, given what will undoubtedly be a very lucrative private sector appeal for that talent?

Kanishka Narayan: This is a great question. There are two things on my mind. One is that the Government have published a cyber action plan, the crux of which is to make sure that, from the point of view of understanding, principles, accountability and, ultimately, skills, there is significant capability in the public sector. The second thing to say is that we have a very broad-based plan on skills more generally across the cyber sector, public and private. For example, I am really proud of the fact that, through the CyberFirst programme, some—I think—415,000 students right across the country have been upskilled in cyber-security. It is deeply important that the public sector ensures that we are standing up to the test of hiring them and making the attraction of the sector clear to them as well. There is a broad-based plan and a specific one for the public sector in the Government context.

[Tim Roca]

Q The Committee heard this morning about the public sector’s level of technical debt. This Bill is important in terms of safeguarding essential services, but we heard that an important factor—notwithstanding this Bill—is tackling the enormous number of legacy systems. How do you see us running the two in parallel?

Kanishka Narayan: That is a great question. Broadly, the Bill takes a risk-based and outcomes-focused approach, rather than a technology-specific one. I think that is the right way to go about it. As we have heard today and beyond, there are some areas where frontier technology—new technology such as AI and quantum, which we talked about earlier today—will pose specific risks. There are other areas where the prevalence of legacy systems and legacy database architectures will present particular risks as well.

The Bill effectively says that the sum total of those systems, in their ultimate impact on the risk exposure of an organisation, is the singular focus where regulators should place their emphasis. I would expect that individual regulators will pay heed to the particular prevalence of legacy systems and technical debt as a source of risk in their particular sectors, and as a result to the mitigations that ought to be placed. I think that being technology agnostic is the right approach in this context.

[Lincoln Jopp]

Q Going back to our conversation with the head of IT security and compliance at NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde and what could be designated an operator of essential services, and our subsequent conversation with Palo Alto, how do you envision that bit of the Bill working? Taking Glasgow as an example, while neither of us are doctors, we both broadly know what happens in hospitals—and there is also a doctor sitting to my right on the Committee, should we need one. On the example that I gave, given what is written in the Bill, how do you think it should work?

Kanishka Narayan: Do you mean operators of essential services, or critical suppliers, as in the third party element?

Pride Month

Tim Roca Excerpts

Monday 23rd June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Tim Roca (Macclesfield) (Lab)]

It is a privilege to speak in this debate. I rise with personal pride as Macclesfield’s first openly gay Member of Parliament, and with real pride at how far Macclesfield and the country have come over the years. I grew up in the Macclesfield constituency, and if anyone had told me back then that we would have our own Pride, I would never have believed them. People lining the streets in celebration and solidarity is a wonderful thing to see, and I know Members across the House have the same experience in their area. It is joyful and defiant, but as the Minister and others have said, it is also political. It is a protest as much as it is a party—a refusal to accept that anyone should be ashamed of who they are.

That matters because, as Members have said—or, I am sure, will say—we have seen a shocking rise in homophobic and transphobic hate crimes over past years. That is why I was proud to support the amendment to the Crime and Policing Bill tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire and Bedworth (Rachel Taylor), to make those hate crimes aggravated offences treated with the seriousness they deserve. Hate has no place on our streets, in our schools or in our politics, but we have seen that hate even in Macclesfield. Just recently, anti-LGBT posters appeared around the town—nasty, cowardly attempts to intimidate and divide—but just as quickly as they went up, they were taken down. They were taken down by neighbours, by volunteers, and by people who simply refused to let that kind of poison define our community. In their place came messages of love, solidarity and inclusion. That is the Macclesfield I know and am incredibly proud to represent.

We cannot ignore the wider context. The UK has dropped dramatically in the ILGA-Europe rankings for LGBT+ rights, which is a signal that we are no longer the standard bearer we once were. The recent Supreme Court decision has created confusion and concern among the trans community. People are left asking what rights they can rely on and whether the protections they thought they had still apply. That uncertainty feeds fear, and fear is something that no one should have to live with simply because of who they are. We must all redouble our efforts to uphold equality in law and in life. I welcome the statement earlier about trans conversion practices and the ban on it coming soon.

Progress is not permanent; it has to be protected, nurtured and renewed. The same is true with equality. When we stop fighting for it, we risk losing it. These can be difficult times, but I am an optimist and I remain hopeful, because I have seen the resilience of our community. I have seen it in Macclesfield with the rainbow flags flying from shop windows, and I know that people across this House will stand with the LGBT+ community to say loudly and clearly that nobody should be made to feel afraid, ashamed or excluded because of who they are or who they love.

--- Later in debate ---

[Oliver Ryan (Burnley) (Ind)]

I will start by answering the question that is so often asked, first under the breath, and then in the dark corners of the internet, and now, in some places, in the unfortunate mainstream: why do we have Pride? Why do we need Pride? The answer is that for far too many people, even in the Britain of 2025—one of the greatest places in the world to be LGBT, I believe—being yourself and being who you are feels like a trial and a struggle, and it is just not good enough. We need it because too many LGBT people are attacked, abused or dismissed because of their sexuality, and because even in our free country, too many LGBT people have to constantly check that they are not behaving in too gay a fashion in order to avoid inciting anyone or giving too much away for their own safety, or even due to fears of being othered. We need it because too many LGBT people are homeless and too many LGBT adults are experiencing mental health conditions or suffering from drug or alcohol abuse or poverty as a result of their sexuality. It looks like a parade and a party on the street, but Pride is about acknowledging that struggle—the struggle for respect and equality, and to breathe as freely as everyone else.

The history of Pride is always a reminder that so many have come before us, and that they endured not just the harassment, but, in this country, the criminalisation, the chemical castration, the shaming, the ostracisation, the bullying and names and the punching and spitting—as I was spat at once, on Manchester’s Canal Street. It is a reminder of those who were killed or not cared for during the AIDS epidemic—those who were left to die, considered diseased or crazed. It is on those brave shoulders that openly gay LGB and T people like me stand in 2025. I will say now that transgender people deserve our respect and support, and that I believe in LGB with the T.

Sure, we have come a long way. Some places let people marry who they love, and lots more folks understand the beautiful umbrella that exists within our community. However, the truth is that it is not the same everywhere, and it can change fast, as the Minister said. There are still many countries where someone being who they are can land them in jail or condemn them to death.

Even here in the UK, both the Conservative candidate for my constituency and I had our sexuality paraded around, commented on and weaponised by other candidates at last year’s election, as if it were a slight on our character. I said to my now constituents at the election, “I am who I am. Dislike me for my politics and my opinions, but do not disengage because of who I love. By the way, as much as I am going door to door, I’m not trying to convert anyone, although we are a very broad church.” I am proud that in all the communities in my constituency, respect and tolerance found more of a home than hate. I say to my constituents in Burnley, Padiham and Brierfield who are lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender, from all creeds and castes, I am here to represent you as much as anyone else.

[Tim Roca]

My hon. Friend has worked very hard on the issue of compensation for LGBT veterans because of the disgraceful way they were treated by the British state, which has been raised at various points this evening. I wonder whether he would comment more on that and on Lord Etherton’s landmark report.

[Oliver Ryan]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention, and I absolutely will. One of the first experiences I had as an MP was being approached by a constituent, Steven, whom I had not met during the election campaign, and who has now received compensation for his disgraceful treatment when he was a member of the armed forces. I met Lord Etherton during that time and we had an Adjournment debate. It was a much longer story, and I came in right at the end of it, as so many MPs do, but I was proud to have met him and experienced the work he had put into representing those men and women who had served our country so valiantly and had been so harshly let down.

This month is the chance for us to be with our people—the people who accept us, who welcome us and who care. Wearing a lanyard is not a political statement; it is a statement of respect. Raising a rainbow flag on a building is not a political statement—

AstraZeneca

Tim Roca Excerpts

Monday 3rd February 2025 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant]

The right hon. Lady puts it in a particular way, but it is not a way that is consonant with the facts. The fact is that this deal had not been signed or got over the line by the previous Government, who, as I have said, would quite often announce things and not actually deliver in the end. In spring 2024, the then Chancellor made it very clear in the documents that accompanied the Budget that all of this was contingent—his words, not mine—on due diligence. The then Government had not yet done the due diligence.

[Tim Roca (Macclesfield) (Lab)]

More than 5,000 people are employed at AstraZeneca’s Macclesfield campus, producing world-class medicines and contributing £1.8 billion in GVA and 1% of total UK exports. AstraZeneca has confirmed to me that the Speke decision does not impact Macclesfield, a site that it is committed to. Will the Minister confirm that the Government are committed to working with AZ so it continues to have a bright future in Macclesfield?

[Chris Bryant]

Yes, 100%. I know that my hon. Friend has visited AstraZeneca and spoken to it many times. He is absolutely right to note that there are, I think, 4,000 working at the Macclesfield site, and will continue to do so. I am sure that AstraZeneca has a very strong future in Macclesfield. Nothing in this decision changes that one iota.