Legacy of Jo Cox

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Thursday 9th September 2021 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

Madam Deputy Speaker, thank you for calling me despite me charging into the Chamber, barely a second late. You may think that it is because my timekeeping is poor, but it was actually a tribute to my friend Jo Cox, who, in my recollection of working with her for a very brief period, almost always came in with a crashing door, a burst of colour and an “I’m sorry I’m late.” As many Members have already said, in those moments when she would burst in, she brought with her an extraordinary ball of energy, an extraordinary passion and an extraordinary strength that I am delighted to see have returned to this House in the hon. Member for Batley and Spen (Kim Leadbeater). She has demonstrated that the family who gave birth to one extraordinary individual and raised her has achieved it a second time. For that, I pay the most extraordinary tribute to a fantastic mother and father.

I am going to share with the House my experience of working with Jo, because together we had put together almost all of a paper on the cost of non-intervention. Both of us had seen, in different ways, the impact that intervention—military intervention in my case, humanitarian in hers—had had on lives around the world. We had seen the problems in Iraq and the failures in Afghanistan, and we were aware that in many parts of the world, including in the United Kingdom, there was a desire—almost a hope—that we would never do it again: that we could turn away, look past and pretend it was not happening. But we cannot—and Jo knew that, because what she also brought to this place was the reality of the lived experience of somebody who actually knew the cost. She was somebody who really saw the price, whether in Darfur or Syria, and who knew what that intervention meant to the lives of the most vulnerable and most at risk in countries around the world.

Together Jo and I pulled together most of the paper “The Cost of Doing Nothing”, which was published by Policy Exchange. But, sadly, before it was able to come out—indeed, before it was fully finished—we know what happened. That was a terrible moment, I am sure, for everybody. My memory of it was phoning her number many times, and sadly, like everyone else, getting no answer.

I pay huge tribute to my friend, the hon. Member for Wirral South (Alison McGovern), for the extraordinary courage that she showed after that, in taking up the work that had been done—not imposing herself on it, but ensuring that what was published was in keeping with the words that Jo herself would have written. I also pay another tribute: to my friend, Brendan, who is up in the Gallery and who helped us.

[Jess Phillips]

While the hon. Gentleman is heaping out praise, let me refer back to what the right hon. Member for the royal town of Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell) said earlier. I would not ever wish to speak for Jo, or ever claim that I could, but I know what she would be thinking at the moment and over the last few weeks: she would be heaping praise on the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) for the interventions that he has made. If she and her legacy give him any courage in what he is doing, he should know that she is—in my eye and in my mind—standing shoulder to shoulder with him.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am enormously moved, and as somebody who is my girth and size knows, that is quite hard to achieve.

It has been in thinking of the work that Jo and I did together that I have been motivated and given strength to speak out in recent weeks, because I know that these are not political issues in the narrow sense, but issues that unite the core of our country.

Let me come to my last point. The hon. Member for Batley and Spen has already demonstrated that she knows perfectly well how to find her way around Hogwarts and that she knows exceptionally well how to make her voice heard in this place. She knows, I can tell the House, how to make friends across parties. In that, she needs absolutely no advice. The one thing that I think we all need to remember—I do not single her out especially, as this applies to us all—is what this place is for. It is too easy to think of it as a place for soundbites and video clips, as a place where we pass a quick Bill or make a cheap point.

What this place is for is to have the fights that a democracy needs to have, to have the arguments that free people need to express, to test ideas, to challenge each other—respectfully, yes, but to challenge each other—and to try to make the best for this amazing country, which we are privileged to be in. That is sometimes hard to remember; I admit my own failings. It is hard to remember when too often the accusations are of immorality or deceit, or the supposition is that parties define individuals, rather than that they are defined by the individuals who make them up.

What Jo demonstrated—and, for me, what made her not just a great friend but an amazing parliamentarian and, more importantly, a great Briton—is that she knew the purpose of this place; she knew that absolutely fundamentally. She knew that it was not to back down or make cheap compromise, but, as my friend the hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) put it, to make compromise from a position of strength and principle, to choose the battles to fight and to make sure that they were won, in a way not that ground down her opponents, but which brought them with her. And that she achieved—remarkably, in under two years. I still cannot believe how brief the period was. I have been here for six years and have consistently failed since, but Jo demonstrated that and that is what I try to remember here.

As I pay tribute to a fantastic maiden speech, demonstrating all the passion that we knew the hon. Member for Batley and Spen had, let me say to her that she is taking up an extraordinary mantle. She carries with her the thanks, certainly of this House and, I am sure, of the whole country for demonstrating that courage is the willingness to come forward even when it is difficult, and particularly when it hurts.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons & Carry-over motion & Carry-over motion: House of Commons & Money resolution & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion & Programme motion: House of Commons & Ways and Means resolution & Ways and Means resolution: House of Commons
Monday 30th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I welcome both the Secretary of State’s direction and his much earlier than expected announcement of no new installations. Does he agree that this fundamentally changes the incentives on any boardroom for using any kit—in this case, Huawei—that is a risk? The cost is going to be laid with the company—that they will have to remove it anyway—which changes the pricing structure that any other company would have to bid for.

[Oliver Dowden]

My hon. Friend makes a very important point, and I will be coming on to that in a minute. It is actually happening now because telecoms providers and mobile network operators know three things. They have to remove Huawei equipment in respect of 5G by 2027 entirely. They cannot purchase any equipment from the end of this year, and—I will come on to this shortly—we have double locked that, as it were, by having the installation requirement. Mobile network operators are already working on that assumption.

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[Oliver Dowden]

I say to the hon. Gentleman—[Interruption.] I beg his pardon. It is the right hon. Gentleman. I stand corrected. I say to the right hon. Gentleman that, first, this Bill and the measures in it implement what we announced as a Government in January and July, which, in turn, was based on the advice of the National Cyber Security Centre and GCHQ. In relation to whether I, or any Secretary of State, has sufficient powers in the Bill, I refer him to clause 16(2), which inserts new section 105Z8(4)(a) to (l) into the Communications Act 2003, which sets out a very wide range of bases on which I can designate a provider as high risk and take measures, so I am confident that I have those sufficient powers.

We must never find ourselves in this position again. Over the last few decades, countless countries across the world have become over-reliant on too few vendors, thanks to a lack of competition in the global telecoms supply chain. While this is a global problem, today this Government are officially leading the way in solving it. Alongside the Bill, we have published an ambitious diversification strategy—the first such strategy to be published anywhere in the world. It sets out our vision of what an open, competitive, diverse supply market for telecoms will look like, and the measures we will bring forward to develop an innovative and dynamic market.

We want to make progress as quickly as possible, so today I can also confirm that we are committing £250 million to kick-start this work. That includes funding and building a state-of-the-art national telecoms lab, which will bring together suppliers from across the world to test the performance and security of their equipment. We are also running a 5G open radio access network trial with the Japanese supplier NEC in Wales to help the entire UK benefit from this exciting new industry. That, of course, comes on top of NEC establishing a global open RAN centre of excellence in the UK just last month. We also know that Vodafone has recently announced that it intends to deploy open RAN technology across more than 2,600 of its sites—the largest commitment of its kind across any European network.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The Secretary of State is rightly focusing on open RAN and the opportunity to partner with others in the democratic and law-abiding world. What has he done to reach out to countries such as South Korea, whose Samsung system could provide for the UK, and to encourage Nokia, Ericsson and Fujitsu in Japan?

[Oliver Dowden]

I am pleased to say that the Minister for Digital Infrastructure has met every one of the parties my hon. Friend named; indeed, I have met many of them. Essentially, we are working across three strands. First, we are working with the existing vendors—there were three, now to become two—to secure them and make sure we do not lose a further one. We are also working with new potential incumbents such as NEC and Samsung. In addition, we are working across a range of countries, in particular the D10, to ensure that we work together to improve standards in telecoms.

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[Jo Stevens (Cardiff Central) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to speak in this Second Reading debate on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill on behalf of the official Opposition. Labour will always put national security first, so we are pleased to finally see this Bill brought forward by the Government. All sides of the House agree that the first duty of any Government is to protect their citizens, and we have confidence in our national security services, which go to such lengths to keep us all safe.

I say I am pleased to finally see this Bill brought forward because it has been clear for a long time that there were serious questions over whether high-risk vendors, specifically Huawei, should be allowed to control large sections of our country’s telecoms networks. But let us be frank: until this year, the Government had failed to face reality. I agree with the shadow digital Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah), who said here in July that the Government’s

“approach to our 5G capability, Huawei and our national security has been incomprehensibly negligent.”—[Official Report, 14 July 2020; Vol. 678, c. 1378.]

As long ago as June 2013, the Intelligence and Security Committee report on “Foreign involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure” made it absolutely clear that risks had to be properly identified, assessed and managed, and that processes and procedures had to be put in place to achieve this, and those needed to be completely robust.

I am sure that Conservative Members will be keen to mention that Huawei first entered the UK network in 2006 under a Labour Government, but as is very clear from the ISC report, that decision was one taken by officers, and Ministers were not told about it at the time. In fact, they were not even told that a contract had been signed until a year later, seemingly because those officials felt that to invest in Huawei brought significant trade, financial and diplomatic consequences. Since that decision, much has changed with the situation of the UK’s relationship with China. The Conservative party have had ample time not only to begin that removal process, should it have wished to, but to invest in the diversification that could have meant we had a homegrown alternative ready to use. It is only today, after 10 and a half years in government, that this diversification strategy has finally been published.

We know that the political background to this Bill has much to do with the power of many Conservative Back Benchers—many are here today, and I am looking forward to hearing all the contributions to the debate in due course—but it is as much to do with what had been a desire to satisfy the now outgoing President of the United States as it is with the safety of our critical national infrastructure, and this political soap opera has been an unnecessary distraction.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Lady will forgive me for picking just a very small hole in her argument. One of the very few policies on which President-elect Biden and President Trump, and indeed even Speaker Pelosi, do absolutely agree is the challenge of China and digital infrastructure, and particularly Huawei, so I am not entirely sure this can be put down to satisfying the Trump Administration. Indeed, it is something on which we agree with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Germany, the Czech Republic—I can keep going—while France banned it in 2009. This is not just an American issue.

[Jo Stevens]

I accept that it is not just an American issue, but it was the right thing for the wrong reasons, essentially. As I say, this political soap opera has been an unnecessary distraction when it comes to the serious matter of extracting high-risk vendors from the network, which has been slow and fragmented.

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[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

This is one of those unusual moments when almost everything I wanted to say has been said, so I will be exceptionally brief.

The Minister has done a very good job in listening. There was a time earlier this year when many of us thought that this could become a very difficult issue for the Government. I have to say that the Minister and his entire Department have done a fantastic job in listening, not just to those of us on the Government side of the House but to those on the Opposition side, and making sure that the points we have raised have been addressed—and, if I may say so after the statement today, much sooner than I think many of us expected.

I would also like to say thank you to the Minister for the effort he has put into reaching out not just to companies around the world—Nokia, Ericsson, Fujitsu, Samsung and a few others—to replace Huawei, but to UK companies to make sure that, at some point, we will be talking not about foreign companies supplying UK markets but about UK companies supplying foreign markets. On that, I will merely say thank you and sit down.

Professional and Amateur Sport: Government Support

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Wednesday 30th September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Nigel Huddleston]

My hon. Friend raises the important point about the pyramid structure of football and the pivotal role that the Premier League plays at its top. Others put huge value into the pyramid, playing a pivotal role in developing talent across the board, in the numbers that she has explained. It is therefore vital that the Premier League understands that it has responsibilities. It is at the top of the pyramid and we expect and require it to help further down the pyramid. I have to say that that is exactly what the Premier League seems to understand, and I am confident that it will play its part and we will have an announcement very soon.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that national league south sides such as Tonbridge Angels, of whom I am sure he is a huge fan, are at the centre of the community but simply cannot survive without matches being played and fans allowed in? Longmead, the Angels’ stadium, has, I am sorry to say, plenty of room for the normal matchday crowd and could host even more, including with all the social distancing required. I know that that will change as soon as he comes to support the Angels and brings a whole new team of fans with him, but for the moment it could do this. Will the Government work with the Football Association and the national league to ensure that fans can return to grounds now where there is enough room to social distance, in order to support the work that clubs such as Tonbridge Angels do?

[Nigel Huddleston]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. Tonbridge Angels and many other sports clubs across the country have shown their pivotal role in their communities during coronavirus and much before. We will continue to work with all relevant stakeholders. We are continuing to have ongoing dialogue, we have working groups and we have day-to-day dialogue through Department officials—all the things he raises about making sure that all stakeholders work together so that we can come to a conclusion and get out of these difficulties as soon as possible. I completely agree, and I assure him that we are doing just that.

Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 10th March 2020 Commons Chamber

[Chi Onwurah]

I, too, look forward to the point at which we agree on something, but let us be absolutely clear about this: the telecoms infrastructure that the Labour Government oversaw was, in terms of competition and investment, an example for the world. If he does not believe that, the right hon. Gentleman can consult the figures.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

The hon. Lady is, of course, making her party point—I accept that—but in 2003 it was a Labour Government, under one T. Blair, who allowed Huawei into the UK in the first place.

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[Chi Onwurah]

I admire the fact that the right hon. Gentleman compares the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom with Back-Bench Labour MPs. I entirely agree that many Back-Bench Labour MPs contribute far more to the effective government of this country than the Prime Minister, who is not to be seen in our flood-devastated regions. I do not want to ask too much of Mr Speaker, so I will try to make some progress. First, though, let me say to hon. and right hon. Members that if they examine the record of the infrastructure competition that was in place until 2010—I was working for Ofcom at that time—they will see that there was far greater infrastructure competition then than there is now.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am very grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way on that point. In her time did she, by any chance, come across the Rifkind report that criticised the then Labour Government for the decisions that they had made? Did she read it in any way, or did she have any views on it when it was published?

[Chi Onwurah]

I have to say that I do not remember reading the Rifkind report, which suggests that it did not make a significant impression, as it was my job to look at the management of the network. The hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on the Conservative Benches—there are many of them—are trying to accuse the last Labour Government of neglecting in some way our telecoms infrastructure, but it is totally clear that, over the 10 years of the last Labour Government, we rolled out broadband infrastructure to 50% of this country. If that is neglect, we would like to see a little bit more neglect like that at the moment.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Lady knows that I have my own issues with various aspects of Government policy that I hope will be put right, but the idea that diversity and competition are not at the heart of the Government’s proposal is, I am afraid, simply not true. The Government are exactly trying to achieve the kind of competition that has fallen out of this market because of the domination of one particular player. While I welcome the Government’s intention, the only difference I have is on where we take the risk. So I think that welcoming a little bit of the Government’s competition strategy would be a good idea.

[Chi Onwurah]

In that case, I am sure that the Government will adopt this amendment, which means that the infrastructure that is put in place under the Bill has to be open to other competitors so that one operator cannot capture a building. That is the intention of the amendment; it is not the intention of the Bill. The amendment ensures that tenants are not locked into services provided by a single operator, requiring that the infrastructure can easily be shared.

Amendment 6 recognises the distressing recent reports of hacked baby monitors and suchlike, and poor cyber-security practices that leave many residential users open to cyber-attacks. The amendment is aimed at supporting customers and bedding in best practice for the era of the internet of things, which will increase citizens’ data trails exponentially, and therefore the opportunity for cyber-threats, digital surveillance and data exploitation. People, not technology and things, must be at the heart of the internet of things. Through this amendment, we want to ensure the distribution of materials on cyber-security education for new customers getting a telecommunications service as a result of the powers exercised under the Bill.

I started by saying that this is a mediocre Bill. On a scale of zero to 10, in terms of impact on our telecommunications infrastructure, it is about 0.5—with a good wind behind it. It does no harm, but it does very little good. Our amendments seek to change that, delivering for tenants, for competition and for national security.

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[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I am always flexible on the date, providing there is an intent and commitment to eradicate the involvement of high-risk vendors in our system across the board, full stop. I think that is a reasonable position, and I will wait to hear what the Government have to say; they will expect me to intervene to ensure that that is as clear as possible.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The position that my right hon. Friend is arguing for is one that many Government Members and many people in this country agree with—namely, that we should be supporting domestic industry and looking to partner with countries and companies that share not just the technology but the values that underpin that technology. The Government are right to be looking at investing in infrastructure, and we all welcome their investment in broadband, but should some of that investment not perhaps be in UK infrastructure?

Huawei and 5G

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2020 Westminster Hall

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. This relates to my earlier comment about the linkage with the Government. I will come back to Huawei’s ability to draw on support finance—which we might call Government support.

I am aware that you want me to make progress, Mr Paisely, so I shall. I will also ask others to restrain themselves slightly, although I will not refuse interventions. That will not win me points from you, Mr Paisley, but I will not defy my colleagues.

Perhaps most bizarrely, I think that the rush by the Government is being driven by the fear that we will be left behind by others. It is worth tackling that point. I find it difficult to comprehend their position, given that a growing number of leading western nations, many of them our competitors in many fields, intend not to use Huawei—in fact, they will depart completely from Huawei, even if that means a delay—or any other untrusted vendors. Surely, therefore, it is inevitable that the worldwide roll-out of 5G must slow down. Given that so many nations are saying no to Huawei, this should be an opportunity for us to prioritise national security over the breakneck speed with which the deployment of 5G is being pressed on us.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I, too, praise my right hon. Friend for making a very strong speech. Does he agree that the two successful roll-outs of 5G so far have been carried out in South Korea and Japan—by Samsung and Fujitsu respectively—and neither of them seems to have included Huawei?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

Yes, I agree. My hon. Friend makes a very good point. In fact, I have read a note from Samsung declaring that it is completely feasible to do this work without any involvement from Huawei. Indeed, Samsung made very clear its belief that Huawei is a direct threat to our national security because its system is not a trusted one.

Far from Huawei having some insurmountable technological lead, it seems, when one starts to investigate, that the quality of its work is no better than anybody else’s, and in some cases somewhat worse. I recall even Dr Ian Levy, the technical director of GCHQ’s National Cyber Security Centre, saying about a year ago that Huawei’s security was “very, very shoddy”. He also said that

“it’s engineering like it’s back in the year 2000”.

We need to take stock of this nonsense propaganda that Huawei is light years ahead as an organisation. Yes, it has a lot of people in research and development, but the reality is that its development has been about money.

The Government say that telecommunications companies are all reliant on Huawei. It was said earlier in the debate that telcos are absolutely reliant on Huawei, so delay would leave them significantly out of pocket. According to that line of argument, however, I would argue that reducing Huawei’s involvement to even 35% would leave telcos out of pocket, so we are already halfway there, as it were. It seems daft to try to make that argument.

Of course, the reliance on Huawei comes as a result of it having constantly bid well below other market competitors for UK and other business. After all, there is a long history of the China Development Bank providing low-cost financing for Huawei customers, and that approach is updated every few years. A recent report estimates that, when one takes in tax breaks, grants and low-cost land acquisitions, the subsidy comes to more than $75 billion. No western company in this sector will be able to compete on those grounds.

Despite all that, it is not common knowledge that at least one very significant UK service provider has contacted me to say that it has already made clear that it will not use Huawei in its 5G network. O2 suggests that the idea that these systems cannot be created without Huawei—my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) mentioned this earlier—is complete and utter nonsense.

The NCSC’s guidance does not even mention services. I understand that Huawei is now taking over the managed services for another operator, Three, which opens up yet another huge area to gather information from. If someone has a map of a radio network, they will also have a map of everything connected to that radio network. They will know what each piece is, what it does and how to attack it.

Yet our dependence on Huawei goes even deeper—much deeper than many people realise. I have just noticed that Huawei is present in the emergency services network, which is often referred to as the blue lamp or blue light service. The service is part of our critical national infrastructure, but the issue did not come out in the statements. I am astonished that that would be allowed. We can imagine how dangerous any form of disruption would be to that service. It beggars belief. Then I discovered that MI5 uses a systems provider that is heavily dependent on Huawei equipment. These decisions are barking mad.

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[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

There is no question that the US Administration are very exercised by the UK’s decision to go ahead with 5G and Huawei. In fact, I cannot think of any other time when we have been so separated from most of our allies that we respect. The thing I cannot get is that even Vietnam, for God’s sake—a communist country next door to China—will not have Huawei in their systems.

[Tom Tugendhat]

They knows their neighbours.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

Indeed. We are all neighbours in the global environment, as the dreadful coronavirus shows us.

The problem is compounded—this is not really spoken of in these debates, and the Government never make any mention of this—is a deeper and further problem. It exposes the degree to which western Governments, including our Government, to a degree—I am talking about successive Governments; this is not a shot at my Government, as the issue goes back further than that—have taken their eye off the ball. Much of the available equipment, including electronic sub-assemblies, is of unknown security provenance. At present, beyond existing contracted functions, we have little to no idea what else lies in our installed systems. UK Governments and others—I particularly want to focus on my Government—have done little to tackle the problem. Understanding what is inside the chips and processors is critical. Any malware needs to be detected. Surely, after all these years, we could have worked to ensure as much as possible that products deployed into secure or critical national infrastructure are auditable, so that we understand what is in them. What better way to do that than by collaboration with our Five Eyes allies, to ensure that we drive security much deeper? Nothing has happened, however.

We are in a mess, and the only way to get out of it, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Shropshire (Mr Paterson) said, is to ensure that Huawei’s involvement is reduced from the Government’s present position of 35% down to 0%. I recognise that may take a little time, but that should be the purpose of the Government over the next two years.

Successive British Governments—this is the point that my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) made—have tried to get close to China in the hope that we can take advantage of their markets. I recognise that that is not unreasonable, but in so doing, we seem to be playing a dangerous game. After all, this totalitarian regime is not an ally of ours, and we get confused about that at times, even if the Foreign Office is reluctant to admit that China poses a threat to us, for fear of upsetting the Chinese Government. That threat is not just in its cyber-attacks on our systems, but also in the way in which it does not obey the international rules-based order in trade. That point has been made today. By the way, no other country does a level of business proportionate to its population as much as Australia does with China. Australia is not frightened of saying no to the procedure, and I do not see anybody trying to beat it up on trade. Sometimes I wonder if we do not project the sense of power or force that we should.

As the UK leaves the EU, we should avoid kowtowing, as my right hon. Friend so rightly said—that wonderful Chinese act of placing one’s forehead on the ground in front of one’s respected superior—to China or anyone else. The British Government should commit to reducing and eradicating our dependence on Huawei, in line with our allies. That is really important. After all, defence of the realm is surely our first priority, and that goes for cyber-space as well. If defence of the realm is our first priority, what the Government are proposing today is not defence of the realm, but semi-defence of the realm, and that simply will not do.

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[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Paisley, for calling me to speak in this important debate. Many of the security questions have been covered, so while I do not resile from them I will not cover them again. We have not yet addressed what will be an important issue going forward, which is the simple fact that just as we write laws in this place to shape the culture of society, we shape the culture of our systems by writing code. The code that is being written today in places like Shenzhen is going to shape the culture of our communication systems and the way in which they act together.

This may sound like it is simply a question of noughts and ones—a mathematical process that is devoid of culture—but that is simply not true. Even supposedly neutral systems like accountancy rely on concepts of ownership, individuality, privacy, collectivity or state interference that are culturally specific. That is as true of accountancy today as it was when it was first created, several hundred years ago on these islands. The code that is now being written will have the same implications, so the real decision for us is not just “What are we looking at today in our 5G network, and how much influence will it have on the systems that we seek to operate now and in the immediate future?” but “What cultural norms are we embedding into our society that will shape the concepts of liberty and individuality”—concepts that I thought we held dear?

If we are arguing, as many of my right hon. and hon. Friends have done so successfully, that these islands have the right to determine their own future and take back control of their destiny, it seems odd to decide that having just done so, we are going to hand it over to Beijing. I fail to understand why government from Beijing is better than government from Brussels, or why cultural norms set in a collectivised state are better than those that arise among democracies with which, at least, we share values. When I hear colleagues on both sides of the aisle in the United States, Australia or New Zealand speaking clearly about the security implications for all of us, I also think about the foreign policy implications. Whatever we think about our security preparations, if our allies do not trust us, that undermines the alliance. If our allies do not believe that we can keep their data safe, that undermines the sharing of data, and if they do not think we are going to be reliable, that calls the alliance into question. China is already having some success in its geopolitical world, because the game it is playing—the game of dividing its opponents—is meeting with some success. I am very sad that our Government are allowing themselves to be the pawn in that game.

I understand that the Government must take risks in certain areas, and that the decisions they must take are difficult. The Government have to decide whether, if Nokia and Ericsson were the only companies in this space, the collapse of one of those companies would lead to a monopoly, and they therefore see a requirement for a third. However, instead of risking a monopoly, they are taking risks with security, which is a mistake.

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[Jeremy Wright]

I agree with my hon. Friend that it is sensible to make sure we do not undermine diversity through our own actions. However, as a matter of principle, taking suppliers out of the system does not assist diversity. The points he has made are substantially about security, and I agree that this debate must focus on that question. Whether we use market caps or bring along other suppliers in the market, diversity is a legitimate security objective, just as it is a legitimate economic objective. However, I am afraid that we do not have the luxury of inventing a domestic contributor to this market in a short space of time, so we have to deal with the market as it is.

There is a good reason why we focus on the security of the system as a whole and not on one supplier. If we are worried about China, as it is perfectly right for us to be, it is worth keeping in mind the fact that many of the competitor suppliers referred to in this debate use Chinese components in their equipment, or assemble their equipment in China. It is therefore important to recognise China’s potential to intervene.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Given that we are about to spend £100 billion on a train line, would it not be sensible to invest some of that money in our own infrastructure if we are so concerned about Chinese suppliers?

[Jeremy Wright]

My hon. Friend really should not get me started on HS2; we do not have time.

We should not just be worried about Huawei or about China, but about the security of the entire telecoms infrastructure. However, if we are going to talk about Huawei, let us not forget first of all that Huawei is already in the system. Sometimes these debates are conducted as though it were going to come in for the first time, but it is here already, managed differently to other suppliers. Secondly and most importantly, let us not disregard the advice of our highly respected intelligence agencies, which have said that the inclusion of Huawei’s equipment is consistent with our security requirements. I have had the privilege of working with those agencies, as I know many other Members present have. They are world class, and it is important that we do not disregard what they say.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)]

This has been an important and timely debate. I am glad that my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) has provided the Government with an opportunity to clarify some of their position.

As he knows, the Government’s first priority is to protect our citizens and their interests. That means that the security of our telecoms and critical national infrastructure is of paramount importance. That is why we undertook the telecoms supply chain review—to allow us to make hard-headed, evidence-based decisions.

The UK is a global leader in cyber-security. Our world-class security agencies have set out their security analysis of the telecoms sector in a level of public detail unmatched anywhere in the world.

It is because of the need to manage the risks to national security that we have made the decisions that we have on high-risk vendors, concluding that there needs to be strong restrictions on their presence in the network. It is because we need to improve the security of the network overall that we need a new security framework for telecoms.

Over time, our intention is to reduce our reliance on high-risk vendors, as market diversification takes place. We want to get to a position where we do not have to use a high-risk vendor in our telecoms network at all.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Will the Minister give way?

[Bob Seely]

Will the Minister give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Warman]

In a moment. Although it is driven by security, our decision making reflects the reality of the UK network and the global supply chain marketplace, and that is why diversification is key. I give way to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Can I be very clear on what the Minister said? He is saying that the Government’s aim is to reduce to zero high-risk vendors, of which Huawei is one.

[Matt Warman]

As I say, we want to get to a position where we do not have to use a high-risk vendor in our telecoms network.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Warman]

As I said, we are introducing the new regime because of some of the concerns that my hon. Friend addresses. I reiterate the Government’s offer to put at the disposal of any Member of the House as many experts from the public and private sectors that we can, so that colleagues can be in touch with the latest thinking on this issue.

We understand the threat from China and are robust with it when our interests are challenged. We will continue to publicly call out malicious cyber-activity, and the decision to categorise Huawei as a high-risk vendor took into consideration the potential links between Chinese companies and the Chinese state, including the fact that Chinese companies are subject to China’s national intelligence law. The UK has also been vocal in drawing attention to the systematic human rights violations against Uyghur Muslims and other ethnic minorities in China. The Government have set out our expectations of businesses in the UK national action plan on business and human rights.

The telecoms supply chain review, which was laid before the House in July 2019, underlined the range and nature of the risks, highlighting the risks of dependence on one vendor, faults or vulnerabilities in network equivalence equipment, the back-door threat, and vendors’ administrative access. We need to be alive to the totality of the risks that the telecoms network faces today and will face in the future. High-risk vendors are part of that security risk assessment, but they are not the sole factor.

I want to address some of the myths about how the network will develop. It is true that technical characteristics of 5G create a greater surface area for potential attacks, but it will still be possible to distinguish different parts of the network. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Ruth Edwards) said, what matters are the critical functions within the network. We need to ensure that critical functions, wherever they are, have appropriate security.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Will the Minister give way?

[Matt Warman]

I will come to the issue of the network’s core and edge, which will answer some of the questions that Members want to ask.

Ian Levy, the technical director of the National Cyber Security Centre, set out in a recent blog post that the notion that there is no distinction between the core and the edge cannot be true. He says that, with 5G networks,

“you need lots of smaller basestations as well as big ones, and the small ones will be on lampposts, bus shelters and other places that aren’t secure from physical interference by bad guys. So, if your network design means that you need to run really sensitive functions processing really sensitive data (i.e. core functions) on an edge access device on top of a bus stop, your choice of vendor is the least of your worries and you probably shouldn’t be designing critical national infrastructure. The international standards that define what a 5G network actually is allow you to do all sorts of things, and some of those things could lead to security or operational risks that can’t be mitigated. That doesn’t mean you have to do them.”

We in this country will not do such things.

[Matt Warman]

I will give way briefly to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Does the Minister recognise that it was not Tim Berners-Lee, but Rod Stewart, who foresaw the amazing power of the internet? It is not just the technical experts, but the imagination of people who will build on their technical skills, that will determine where the risks really lie.

5G Network and Huawei

Tom Tugendhat Excerpts

Monday 27th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Minister to make a statement on Huawei’s involvement in the UK’s 5G network.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) for this question. I know he has a deep interest in this issue, and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has corresponded with him about it over the past few months. She will address this issue herself in the other place later today.

New telecoms technologies and next-generation networks like 5G and full fibre can change our lives for the better. They can give us the freedom to live and work more freely, help rural communities to develop thriving digital economies, and help socially isolated people to maintain relationships, so the security and resilience of the UK’s telecoms networks is of paramount importance. The UK has one of the world’s most dynamic digital economies, and we welcome open trade and inward investment. However, our economy can prosper and unleash Britain’s potential only when we and our international partners are assured that our critical national infrastructure remains safe and secure.

As part of our mission to provide world-class digital connectivity, including 5G, my Department carried out a cross-Whitehall evidence-based review of the telecoms supply chain to ensure a diverse and secure supply base. That review’s findings were published in July 2019 and set out the Government’s priorities for the future of our telecommunications. Those priorities are strong cyber-security across the entire telecommunications sector, greater resilience in telecommunications networks and diversity across the entire 5G supply chain. It considered the UK’s entire market position, including economic prosperity, the industry and consumer effects, and the quality, resilience and security of equipment.

However, in July, the review did not take a decision on the controls to be placed on high-risk vendors in the UK’s telecoms network. Despite the inevitable focus on Huawei, that review was not about one company or even one country. We would never take a decision that threatens our national security or the security of our allies. The Government’s telecoms supply chain review is a thorough review into a complex area that made use of the best available expert advice and evidence, and its conclusions on high-risk vendors will be reported once ministerial decisions have been taken.

The National Security Council will meet tomorrow to discuss these issues. This work is an important step in strengthening the UK’s security frameworks for telecoms and ensuring the roll-out of 5G and full-fibre networks. I know that Members on both sides of the House feel strongly about this issue, and the Government will make a statement to the House to communicate final decisions on high-risk vendors at the appropriate time. We will always put national security at the top of our agenda.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Speaker]

I am aiming to run this urgent question for around 45 minutes.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Thank you, Mr Speaker. The interest shown in the House demonstrates the interest that many of us have in this question. As the Minister made clear, a decision will be made tomorrow which we will not have any further say on. That decision may or may not nest a dragon in our critical national infrastructure, and it will not be reversible by a future Government with any ease; we will live with this decision for the next 10, 15 or 20 years. That is why this question is so urgent and why I am so glad that you allowed time for it to be asked, Mr Speaker.

The question for us has to be: is the risk worth it? We know the stories about Huawei’s co-operation with the state apparatus of China in countries such as Uganda and Ethiopia. We know stories about its connections to the intelligence services and the police state currently running in Xinjiang. We know that there are strong accusations effectively of tech-dumping, with market subsidies allowing Huawei to compete against other companies on an unfair basis. That might be an example of charity by the Chinese Communist party, but if even the Communist party in Vietnam decides to reject Huawei and set up its own network, perhaps we should beware of strangers and the gifts they bear.

This is a really important decision not only for the UK but for our allies. Today, Germany is making a similar decision. New Zealand and Australia have already made decisions. The Czech Government have already rejected Huawei. Over the coming months, more Governments will be looking at our stance on China when considering the threats that some of their institutions face.

Of course, we must work with China and find ways of co-operating in areas such as environmentalism, energy policy and technology, but when we see China’s aggressive moves towards the UN bodies that control the regulation of information and the way in which subsidies are used to take control of important networks, we should be concerned. I hope that the Minister will understand the concern that the whole House feels about Huawei and the idea of nesting that dragon and allowing a fox into the hen house when we should be guarding the wire. I hope that he will see his responsibility clearly.

[Matt Warman]

I agree with some of what my hon. Friend says. He is right that this is a serious and important decision, and it will not be taken lightly by any means. I know that he does not think that I take this matter lightly, and neither does the Secretary of State. He is also right that Parliament should have its say. We are talking about this issue today, but the Intelligence and Security Committee has been writing reports on this since 2013 and made statements as recently as July last year. There have been UQs, and we have had debates in this Chamber and in Westminster Hall. It is right that Parliament expresses its view.

My hon. Friend is right to say that our agencies look carefully at how best we manage this situation and its effects on the global landscape. Britain is in a unique position, so comparisons with other countries can only go so far, but he is right to make those comparisons. I can only reinforce that this decision will be taken with the utmost seriousness.