Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting)

Torsten Bell Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 11th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[David Pinto-Duschinsky]

As ever, my hon. Friend is absolutely right and his intervention goes to a third point: this also feels a bit premature.

As my hon. Friend mentioned, we are in the midst of the incredibly important advice and guidance boundary review. For many of the groups that we want to help, advice might not actually be the right solution, but guidance might be, and we are in the midst of re-tooling that. Similarly, we are in the midst of rolling out dashboards, which will transform the landscape but not fix the problems on their own; we may need to layer new policy initiatives on top. It seems that we are at risk of putting the cart before the horse.

I also add that when I read new clause 1 in detail, I saw that it refers to “advice”. On my reading, that would constrict potential policy responses and force the Government to go down the advice route, rather than provide other services that might be on offer through the advice and guidance boundary review.

The intention is good. I think there is huge consensus on the need to tackle the problem, but the right way to do it is through sophisticated and proper policy making, rather than the blunt instrument of amending primary legislation. For those reasons, I oppose this new clause.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

I thank the proposers of these new clauses. I will take them in the way they were intended—to spark debate.

We have had quite a wide debate and I think there is consensus on the subject, but I want to put a slightly different spin on the problem statement we are talking about. We have come at a lot of the discussion on the new clause as if there is too little advice. I would slightly reframe the question when it comes to pensions, which is that there is too much complexity, and too little advice or guidance. I think that is the right way to think about the problem that we are confronting with the system as a whole.

I will broadly outline our approach to try to tackle that problem statement. The task is to reduce the complexity as well as to increase the guidance and the advice that are available. Having watched the pensions debate over the past 15 years, I have observed that we have too often made pensions more complicated, and then said, “If we only had this advice, it would all be fine.” I do not think that is the right answer. That is a mistake about the nature of the system that we are delivering.

Our job is to reduce the complexity, or to reduce the consequences of it being difficult for people to deal with. That is obviously what a lot of the Bill is trying to do. With small pots, the aim is obviously to reduce complexity. That is what the value for money measures are designed to do. Seen through that lens, they are also aimed at reducing the costs of that complexity. The value for money regime is there to reduce the consequences of it being difficult to engage with and members not choosing their own provider.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

The Minister raises an interesting point. We have talked about a lot of different bits and pieces with complexity and all the rest of it. We have not spoken about when we educate people about money.

In the olden days, when I was a newly elected MP, I was one of the chairs of the all-party parliamentary group for financial education for young people. That was about getting financial education into the curriculum. It is probably now more important than ever that we teach people of school age about the importance of financial planning, including pensions. Can the Minister assure the Committee that he will take up with his colleagues in the Department for Education the changes that could be made to bring this type of education into the curriculum for kids, who are all going to be adults soon?

[Torsten Bell]

I shall take that up directly with the new Economic Secretary to the Treasury, who I am sure will talk to her colleagues in the Department for Education. I can offer the hon. Member some entirely anecdotal optimism on that issue. Whenever I now do school events in Swansea, I am seeing very high levels of financial engagement. After I have given a very worthy speech, most of the questions are not about how to reduce inequality but instead are about personal financial advice. I think the youth of today are all over it—that is my lived experience.

I have mentioned small pots and value for money. I want to flag two other areas. Dashboards have been mentioned, and they are a very large part of how we provide support. The default pensions solutions are crucial to reducing complexity, and that is probably the biggest measure in the Bill. The need to provide more advice or guidance for people to access their defined-contribution pots is reduced significantly because of the existence of default solutions. We definitely still want people to have access to advice and the ability to opt out of those defaults, but default solutions help significantly. That is why the communication of those default pension solutions, which we discussed quite extensively, is so important for people. That is why that is in the Bill.

We have touched on making more support available. We have universal access for people of any age to free impartial support through MoneyHelper—that is what the Money and Pensions Service is providing—and we have a specific focus on support for over-50s in Pension Wise. Several hon. Members have said, absolutely rightly, that access to financial advice fell in the aftermath of the reforms over a decade ago, but there is some better news on Pension Wise. The 2024 Financial Lives survey showed that of those who accessed a defined-contribution pot within the last four years, 40% had accessed Pension Wise. I think that is probably more than most hon. Members in this debate would expect, though it may not be enough. However, those people had used Pension Wise when heading towards access; they had not used it as a mid-life MOT product, which is a different thing. That 40% was up from 34% in 2020, so some things have gone in the right direction. I am gently noting that, not claiming any credit for it because it predates the election. There is a lot of overlap between what those systems of advice are providing and the measures in new clause 1.

Regarding new clause 40, I absolutely agree on how we think about under-saved groups. The groups identified in the new clause are more or less the same groups of people experiencing financial wellbeing challenges whom MaPS targets, so that is a point of consensus, but I am absolutely open to suggestions of what more we can do to make sure that we are tackling that issue. The Pensions Commission is considering the wider question of adequacy, which is why we are looking at not just average adequacy but the fairness of the system.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

Will the Minister give a commitment that the commission will specifically look at groups that are less likely to have a sufficient pension, rather than just looking at an average and increasing that average?

[Torsten Bell]

I can absolutely give that guarantee, because that is in the terms of reference of the Pensions Commission. I will come back to the wider question of the commission in one second. I will not go into detail, but targeted support is a large part of providing more guidance, and we expect the roll-out of that early next year. There is more coming in that space; we are not relying solely on MaPS.

How should we think about the interaction of dashboards and bigger DC pots? At the moment, for lots of people entering their retirement, their DC pot may be a smaller part of their overall pension income, but as we move forward, it will become the large majority of their income. That will be very visible because of dashboards. One of the reasons MaPS has been reluctant —although I do not want to say “reluctant”—to promise to deliver the kind of automatic enrolment that is being discussed by the Committee is that a lot of planning work is under way to make sure that when dashboards come online, MaPS is ready and set up to deal with the significant increase in demand for help and in engagement that may come from that. The experience of some pension schemes in Australia is that as pension pots become bigger, there is much more demand for support and guidance. We should expect that demand to grow in the years ahead with or without dashboards, but definitely with dashboards and the other measures together.

[Kirsty Blackman]

When dashboards increase engagement, as we all expect they will, will the Minister report back to the House, or encourage someone to report back to the House, on how much engagement has increased by, so that we all have an awareness of it, rather than it being in stats kept in the background that we do not know about?

[Torsten Bell]

Absolutely. I think we will want to look at the impact across a range of measures of engagement. Do dashboards help consolidation of pots? Do they encourage people to save more? We also need to be aware of riskier behaviours that dashboards could trigger. We are currently engaged in significant user testing of the system to make sure that we have done what we can to make sure that when people have visibility of their pension pots, they do not adopt behaviours that we do not want.

On the question about the Pensions Commission from the angle of the advice and guidance sector, it is an independent commission so I cannot speak for it. However, I think the commission will have heard the focus of that question, and the length of this debate in Committee.

Turning to the specific question put by the hon. Member for Horsham on what he said was the purpose of this group of new clauses, I assure him that my mind has been entirely focused by him on this issue, and that I will continue to talk to MaPS about what further lessons there are to learn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

My understanding is that new clause 2 calls for a report. It addresses transparency. It is all well and good that stuff on competition regulations is published—I have no idea where it is published. We are asking for a report to the House, which we would all be able to access. I did not write the new clause, but it would be helpful if the Minister agreed to transparency and to review this in good time so that we can make better decisions on future legislation.

[Torsten Bell]

The first thing to say is that this is focused on scale. We appreciate that the Bill would lead to major changes to the pensions market—the hon. Member for Torbay is absolutely right—and we want to understand and monitor the consolidation and scale process over the coming years. To state the obvious, market changes such the scale measures we are talking about take time, and many of the measures in the Bill will not even be implemented within the 12 months. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not push the amendment to a vote.

I agree on the wider point about the Bill as a whole and the need for strong monitoring and evaluation. I would probably take a slightly different approach from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. The Bill contains a large number of measures, and the right way to monitor their implementation will be different for different parts of the Bill. When it comes to the questions of scale, which are the focus of this amendment, the monitoring—[Interruption.] That is not the response I was looking for. The monitoring is slightly more visible because we are talking about the number of workplace schemes, or at least workplace defaults, that exist.

Let me lay out a bit of what we have in place to monitor. We will be able to monitor scale, charges and, because of the interaction with the value for money regime, returns and asset allocation. Lots of the key success metrics that are meant to come with the scale changes, as well as the delivery of scale itself, will be visible. My honest view is that it is on all of us—obviously, it is particularly on the Government—to pay attention to that as we go.

On the wider question of whether we will consider further, I have already committed to do that and to come back and reflect on Report on how we do that. I put on the record my view that that is a reasonable thing to do, and I will do it, but we need to think about it differently for different parts of the Bill.

[Steve Darling]

I thank the Minister for putting his thoughts on the record. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 5

Report on fiduciary duty and discretionary indexation of pre-1997 benefits

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on whether the fiduciary duties of trustees of occupational pension schemes should be amended to permit discretionary indexation of pre-1997 accrued rights, where scheme funding allows.

(2) The report must consider—

(a) the impact of current fiduciary obligations on trustees’ ability to award discretionary increases to pre-1997 pension benefits;

(b) the potential benefits of permitting such discretionary indexation for affected pensioners;

(c) the funding conditions and thresholds under which discretionary indexation could be considered sustainable;

(d) the appropriate level of regulatory oversight and guidance required to ensure that discretionary increases are granted in a fair, transparent, and financially responsible manner;

(e) international approaches to indexation of legacy pension benefits;

(f) the legal and actuarial implications of amending fiduciary duties in this context.

(3) In preparing the report, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Pensions Regulator,

(b) the Financial Conduct Authority,

(c) representatives of pension scheme trustees, members, and sponsoring employers, and

(d) such other experts or bodies as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.”—(Steve Darling.)

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to report on whether the fiduciary duties of trustees of occupational pension schemes should be amended to permit discretionary indexation of pre-1997 accrued rights, where scheme funding allows.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

I want to follow on from the two powerful speeches by the Liberal Democrat and SNP spokespeople, the hon. Members for Torbay and for Aberdeen North, in highlighting the fact that this problem is—dare I say it—disappearing over time. This feels slightly similar to the ongoing contaminated blood debate, and it is a similar type of thing. The people who would be compensated for the contaminated blood are, for tragic reasons, disappearing. Indeed, I think there are now 86,000 pensioners who were caught up in this particular problem, and the longer this is kicked down the road, the smaller the problem will become, for obvious reasons.

The principle behind this is absolutely right. It is incredibly important that we as a country, society and community look after all these people. Where people have done the right thing and put money into their pension, but it has not followed through, that is a big problem.

One thing does bother me: I do not want to be too political, but the Government have dug themselves a freshly made £30 billion black hole in the last year. Although the SNP spokesperson is absolutely right that the £12 billion in the PPF is available to spend only on pensions, the problem is that because it appears on the country’s balance sheet, if the money to pay the price for this—I think it is £1.8 billion—came out of that, there would be a £1.8 billion increase on the country’s collective balance sheet. The argument would go that it would then reduce it. At some level, fiscal prudence has to come in to make sure we are not creating a deeper black hole. Because of the change of accounting at the back end of last year, this could turn the Government’s £30 billion fiscal black hole into a £32 billion one, even though that money is earmarked only for pensions.

I would like to hear from the Minister how the Government will resolve that. I would like him to make an undertaking that we will hear something about it on 26 November, and that there will be something in the Budget to resolve this fiscal conundrum. We need to know where the money will come from, and that the Government have set it aside. This is a perfect opportunity to deal with a problem that has been going on since 1997, and that becomes more profound every time the Office for National Statistics announces the rate of inflation. If the Minister gave us that assurance, I would trust him—being an honourable and decent man—that he could make his current boss get something done about this on 26 November.

[Torsten Bell]

Despite the hon. Member’s kind invitation, and as he well knows, I am not about to start commenting on the Budget—something I have heard him say himself many times over the years in his previous roles.

More seriously, the last 50 years tell us that the question of pension uprating is a big deal and very important. By “uprating”, I mean how pensions keep pace with earnings or prices. Obviously, on the state pension we tend to talk in terms of earnings. It is a big issue. The lesson of the 1980s and 1990s was about rising pensioner poverty at a time when the state pension was not earnings indexed but earnings were growing significantly. That is why we ended up with 30% or 40% pensioner poverty during those years. History tells us that those things are important. History aside, they are also obviously important for individuals, as we heard at the evidence session.

[Luke Murphy (Basingstoke) (Lab)]

I want to add my voice and the calls of my constituents for that issue to be addressed and tackled. I have been contacted by several constituents, one of whom has lost up to 70% of the value of their occupational pension. I add my voice to those calling for the Government to do what they can to address this issue, which I know the Minister recognises is having a huge impact on many people’s lives.

Roger Sainsbury, among others, raised the issue in the evidence session. He said that he had confidence that the Government would come up to the mark and find a way through the perceived difficulties. I seek reassurance from the Minister on behalf of my constituents that the Government will do all they can to ensure that that is the case.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank my hon. Friend for his questions. Let me come to the two halves; two different issues are actually being raised in these amendments and I want to make sure that we deal with them separately.

New clause 5 deals with discretionary increases for schemes that have not fallen into the PPF—those with solvent employers. Here, as I said in the surplus discussion, the changes on surplus provide a new route for trustees who do not have the power to make those discretionary increases off their own bat to discuss with employers discretionary increases on pre-1997 pension accruals. It is also clear that we need to understand this issue well. The Pensions Regulator has been engaging in surveys on this issue for exactly that reason and will continue to do so. Overall, my argument is that, for those schemes still operating, we are not going to be in the business of legislating to overwrite scheme rules when it comes to whether schemes had indexation in them pre-1997.

Questions of the PPF and FAS represent an important debate, as we heard last Tuesday—I answered questions about that then, and I will not pain everyone by repeating my answers.

New clauses 18 and 19 would not work. The new clauses as drafted would apply to subsets of the PPF population. Some pensioners would receive indexation, and some would not. The same flaws in the new clauses apply to FAS. We will definitely be opposing the new clauses, but that is without regard to the wider questions, which, as I said, I commented on last Tuesday.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Member for Torbay, who has just left us, for moving new clause 7. To clarify, it would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the police pension scheme on these particular issues. I know this will be a matter of cross-party consensus, but the most important thing is to stress the value placed on the contribution of police officers across the country. I see them every day, particularly in the centre of Swansea, and they play a really important role.

The rules providing for the cessation of survivor benefits, where a survivor remarries or cohabits, are typically features of legacy public service pension schemes, and we are discussing the 1987 police pension scheme in this case. Reformed public service pension schemes do not include these challenges, as we have moved away from a system with significant inheritable rights. The same also applies to the new state pension system introduced under the coalition Government, which does not include the same degree of inheritability as the basic state pension did.

I want to take a similar approach to the many issues that will be raised in such calls for reviews. It is really important for me to be clear about why we do not support reviews into these schemes—particularly in this case, where it closed 20 years ago—as I do not want to raise expectations that will not be met. That would be deeply unhelpful to people who have been campaigning on this issue for many years.

In this particular case, there is the principle that we will not retrospectively legislate to change the terms of pensions far in the past, around 20 years ago. I am saying this very gently, but the reality is that my position is shared by most parties in this House. If the coalition Government, made up of a Liberal Democrat Pensions Minister and other Conservative Ministers, had wanted to resolve these issues and take an approach different from the one I am setting out today, they would have done it in a previous Parliament.

The last thing I want to do is give false expectations to people who often face consequences from the terms of these pension schemes—terms I do not support, but that is why they have ceased to be part of modern pension schemes. I do not want to give false certainty that we will start reopening public service pension schemes from decades ago. That would lead to false expectations, and that is the last thing we should be doing.

On that basis, we will not be supporting the new clause, but I understand the case that people have made and why people are raising it in this place. As I say, that is our approach to this issue.

[John Milne]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 8

Independent review into pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review into the pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology who—

(a) transferred their accrued pension benefits out of the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) public service scheme to AEA Technology (AEAT) on privatisation in 1996, and

(b) suffered financial losses when AEA Technology went into administration in 2012 and the pension scheme entered the Pension Protection Fund (PPF).

(2) The review must examine—

(a) the extent and causes of pension losses incurred by affected individuals,

(b) the role of Government policy and representations in the transfer of pensions during the privatisation of AEA Technology,

(c) the findings of the Public Accounts Committee and the Work and Pensions Select Committee,

(d) the adequacy of safeguards provided at the time of privatisation,

(e) potential mechanisms for redress or compensation, and

(f) the estimated financial cost of any such mechanisms.

(3) The review must be—

(a) conducted by an independent panel appointed by the Secretary of State, with relevant expertise in pensions, public policy, and administrative justice, and

(b) transparent and consultative, including engagement with affected pensioners and their representatives.

(4) The panel must report its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of State and lay a copy of its final report before Parliament within 12 months of its establishment.

(5) The Secretary of State must, within 6 months of the publication of the report under subsection (4), lay before both Houses of Parliament a statement setting out the Secretary of State’s response to that outcome.”—(John Milne.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[John Milne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into pension losses suffered by former employees of AEA Technology. It focuses on employees who transferred benefits from the UK Atomic Energy Authority to AEA on privatisation in 1996, and who later suffered losses when the company went into administration. Many former employees experienced significant losses due to circumstances beyond their control, and this review would ensure a transparent, evidence-based assessment of what went wrong. It would also hopefully provide a structured way to explore redress or compensation options for affected pensions.

To summarise, the new clause would ensure that lessons were learned and safeguards were strengthened for future privatisations and pension transfers. We move it in the hope that the Minister will put his thoughts on the record, so that campaigners can at least see them—like them or not, they will know where he stands.

[Torsten Bell]

I reiterate my overall approach to the issues being raised in relation to historical cases, but we all recognise the difficult position that members of this particular scheme found themselves in. Many scheme members who move into the PPF receive a lower pension than they were otherwise expecting, and I think we are all sympathetic.

The hon. Member will be aware that there have been many reviews of this case, including by the Public Accounts Committee, the Work and Pensions Committee and, obviously, the Pensions Ombudsman. The coalition did not act on this particular case, and I do not want to raise expectations that we are going to reopen it now, given the number of reviews that have already taken place.

However, I can offer slightly more reassurance to the hon. Member going forward. He will be aware of changes in policy that mean that, when there are privatisations of the kind that sits behind this challenging case, workers will remain in public service pension schemes. They would not be moved across into another scheme. That is obviously what sits behind anxieties about the transparency of the advice provided in this case. I hope that that offers the hon. Member the kind of reflection that he asked for, but we are not in a position to support the new clause.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his observations, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 9

Independent review into state deduction in defined benefit pension schemes

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit pension schemes.

(2) The review must consider—

(a) the origin, rationale and implementation of state deduction in the Midland Bank Staff Pension Scheme,

(b) the clarity and adequacy of member communications regarding state deduction from inception to present,

(c) the differential impact of state deduction on pensioners with varying salary histories, including an assessment of any disproportionate effects on—

(i) lower-paid staff, and

(ii) women,

(d) comparisons with other occupational pension schemes in the banking and public sectors, and

(e) the legal, administrative, and financial feasibility of modifying or removing state deduction provisions, including potential mechanisms for redress.

(3) The Secretary of State must ensure that the person or body appointed to conduct the review—

(a) is independent of HSBC Bank plc and its associated pension schemes;

(b) possesses relevant expertise in pensions law, occupational pension scheme administration, and equality and fairness in retirement income; and

(c) undertakes appropriate consultation with—

(i) affected scheme members,

(ii) employee representatives,

(iii) pension experts, and

(iv) stakeholder organisations.

(4) The person or body conducting the review must—

(a) submit a report on its findings to the Secretary of State within 12 months of the date the review is commissioned; and

(b) the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament and publish the report in full.

(5) Within three months of laying the report before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish a written response setting out the Government’s proposed actions, if any, in response to the report’s findings and recommendations.

(6) For the purposes of this section—

‘state deduction’ means any provision within a defined benefit occupational pension scheme that reduces pension entitlements by reference to the member reaching state pension age or by reference to any state pension entitlement;

‘defined benefit pension scheme’ has the meaning given in section 181 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993;

‘Midland Bank Staff Pension Scheme’ includes all associated legacy arrangements and any successor schemes administered by HSBC Bank Pension Trust (UK) Ltd.” —(John Milne.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into clawback provisions in occupational defined benefit pension schemes, in particular, the Midland Bank staff pension scheme.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[John Milne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 9 would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit pension schemes. It focuses specifically on clawback provisions in the Midland bank staff pension scheme and associated legacy arrangements.

We believe that a review is needed because state deduction provisions can reduce members’ pension entitlements, sometimes in ways that are complex or unclear. There are concerns about fairness, transparency and disproportionate impact, particularly on lower-paid staff and women. A review would ensure that members, regulators and Parliament had clarity about the origin, rationale and effect of such provisions.

The review would examine the history and rationale for the deductions, assess the clarity and adequacy of member communications over time, analyse differential impact on pensioners with varying salary histories, and compare state deduction practices with other occupational schemes in banking and the public sectors. It would also consider the legal, administrative and financial feasibility of modifying or removing state deduction provisions. Finally, it would be an independent and consultative process. The clause would ensure transparency and fairness, and it would provide Parliament and Members with clear, evidence-based guidance on the way forward.

[Torsten Bell]

I am conscious that there was a debate in the main Chamber on this issue before the summer recess, when we were able to go into the issue in much more depth. The debate related to integrated pensions, but in that context people are usually referring to the HSBC historical pension scheme in particular. Without rehearsing everything I have said about our not being in the business of promising to change pension scheme rules, schemes have wide discretion about the nature of their rules and the entitlements that scheme members accrue. It is not for the Government to change those.

The law is very clear that the Government require transparency, just as the hon. Member for Horsham called for, and that includes clear communication of what the entitlement from any given pension scheme is, including issues to do with what is referred to as integrated pensions or clawback pensions. People do have to have received communication that spells that out. The role of the Pensions Ombudsman is to check that that has happened. That is where people can go if they feel that they have not received clear communication about what their scheme entitlements were.

I think we can all understand that if anybody started to receive a pension and was shocked to see a deduction in it when they went over the state pension age, that would be very significant for them. It is the job of the Pension Ombudsman to investigate cases such as that.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister and beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 10

Use of electronic mail for direct marketing purposes relating to pensions

“(1) Section 22(3) of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 is deemed to apply to unsolicited electronic communications relating to pensions when the sender is—

(a) a firm authorised to provide Targeted Support under Article 55A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 issuing a Targeted Support communication, or

(b) a qualifying pension scheme, as defined in section 16(1) of the Pensions Act 2008.

(2) Subsection (1) applies when the recipient is—

(a) a customer of the firm under subsection (1)(a), or

(b) a member of the pension scheme under subsection (1)(b).” —(John Milne.)

This new clause would require that the provisions relating to the use of electronic mail for direct marketing purposes under the Privacy and Electronic Communications *(EC Directive) Regulations 2003 would apply to communications from firms providing targeted support on pensions or from qualifying pension schemes.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[John Milne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 10 would require that provisions relating to the use of electronic mail for direct marketing purposes would apply to communications from firms providing targeted support on pensions or from qualifying pension schemes. That matters because pension savers deserve protection from unwanted or misleading marketing, especially when they may be vulnerable to scams. I used to work in direct marketing, so I feel a little bit guilty.

[Torsten Bell]

That is impressive honesty.

[John Milne]

Obviously, all mine were absolutely above board. Currently, the privacy and electronic communications regulations do not clearly cover pension-related marketing from schemes or targeted support firms. This new clause seeks to close that loophole. People should be able to trust that communications from their scheme or adviser are genuine and not just spam dressed up as guidance. We would position this as a balance, so that legitimate communications to scheme members remain possible, but only within clear safeguards. In summary, it is a simple consumer protection measure that would protect savers from nuisance emails and potential mis-selling.

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[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

I have a query off the back of the comments of the hon. Member for Aberdeen North.

We heard in the evidence sessions that there is a danger that overdoing the requirements for marketing will get in the way of providing guidance. That came up directly in the response to some of our questions, I think specifically from Legal and General and Aviva. Companies are already in a position where, if they are not careful, offering guidance is considered marketing. Therefore, they do have their hands tied by existing legislation.

I am slightly intrigued why this new clause has been tabled, given that Liberal Democrat colleagues will have also heard that evidence. More work is needed on this issue than just adding a new clause to the Bill; I heard from the hon. Member for Hendon that there is a consultation.

Although I understand the point about protecting vulnerable customers from scamming, I feel the evidence we heard demonstrates that more work is needed, work that is not included in the Bill, to make sure that pension companies are able to advertise in such a way that they can play their part in the guidance process that we have debated at length, and in how people get that financial education.

I understand the premise of the new clause, but we have many more questions to answer on this. If anything, I think we need to be making it easier for pension companies, the legitimate people in the room, to be able to communicate. There could be unintended consequential issues; we are trying to deal with scammers, but we might inadvertently stop people accessing information that we are trying to help them to receive.

[Torsten Bell]

Let me attempt to offer some words of clarification and then come to what the Government are doing on this issue.

To clarify, pension schemes are covered by the rules on direct marketing already. I think the new clause as drafted would probably have the opposite effect to what the hon. Member for Horsham intends, by carving out pension schemes from the limitations on direct marketing. That would be a loosening of the direct marketing restrictions for pension schemes. There are people in the industry that have been calling for exactly that, so that may be where the new clause is coming from, but I clarify that they are covered; the direct marketing rules prevent pension schemes from behaving in those kinds of ways.

What is the context here? We are obviously aware of concerns that the existing direct marketing rules, which apply to pension schemes, may limit providers’ ability to deliver the new targeted support regime that is being developed by the Government, exactly as the hon. Member for South West Devon has just set out. Under targeted support, FCA-authorised firms will be able to proactively suggest appropriate products or courses of action to customers. That could help people to make decisions about access to their pension, but it obviously needs to be done in the right way.

We have heard the feedback from stakeholders on the interaction between that wish for targeted support and direct marketing rules, which is where most of the debate on this area has been. Because targeted support involves recommending specific courses of action, it could be considered direct marketing. That is the cause of the tension.

There are particular issues for pension providers who administer auto-enrolled members, where the individual has not chosen the pension scheme or engaged with them. As a result of that, they cannot generally satisfy the requirements of what is called the soft opt-in, because the provider has not collected the information from the individual at the point at which they were enrolled—it has gone through the employer.

What are we doing about that? We are examining quite a range of policy options at the moment. That includes legislative change, which can probably be done via secondary legislation. I think that is the right way for us to proceed. When we do that, we need to get the balance between enabling targeted support and making sure that we do not have inappropriate direct marketing within the pension space. I definitely would not want to see a carve-out from all direct marketing rules for the pension sector as a whole, as there are risks that come with that. I hope that gives Members some clarity and an explanation of what the Government are doing to take this issue forward.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his clarification, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

[Kirsty Blackman]

On a point of order, Ms Lewell, I am aware that I cannot make a speech at this point, but will the Minister write to me on whether he is planning to do anything about pre-1997 indexation of the PPF and FAS? If he writes to me about that, I will be happy not to push new clause 18 to a vote.

[Torsten Bell]

I suspect that I have already written to the hon. Lady, because she has raised some constituency cases with me, but she can receive another one of those letters.

New Clause 33

Report of defined benefit schemes impact on productivity

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on the impact on corporate productivity of defined benefit schemes.

(2) The report must include an assessment of—

(a) investment strategies of defined benefit funds,

(b) the returns on investment of defined benefit funds, and

(c) the impact of investment strategies and returns on productivity.

(3) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.”—(Mark Garnier.)

This new clause would require the Government to commission a report on the impact on corporate productivity of defined benefit schemes.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

In summary, the new clauses collectively seek to address concerns about the impact of DB pension scheme deficits on business and economic productivity. By requiring Government evaluation, revising accounting recognition rules and providing alternative disclosure methods, the new clauses aim to balance the protection of pension members’ interests with support for business investment and growth. I am sure that at the very least when we press new clause 33 to a vote, there will be enthusiasm to support it from the hon. Member for Hendon, because it absolutely responds to the point he made on Tuesday.

[Torsten Bell]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for tabling the new clauses, and for his impressive consistency; he has spoken to this issue many times not only in this Committee, but elsewhere, and I have heard him. I agree on some of the wider issues he is raising, particularly his reflections on some of the impacts of decisions taken in the late 1990s. Before I come to the more technical responses to the new clauses, the hon. Member’s objective is to see different investment approaches taken by defined-benefit schemes. Many issues that were historically the case have been removed by the passing of time, because they are now closed schemes whose investments are now changing for other reasons, not because of the questions of regulatory pressure in the 1990s and so on. I leave that as an aside.

To give the hon. Member a bit more optimism, based on the Bill, I already have schemes saying to me that they may take different approaches on investments because of the option of a surplus release. That gives a different incentive structure for employers about what they wish to see their pension schemes doing, and for trustees, if there is a sharing of the benefits of upside risk that comes with that. I have had several large employer’s pension schemes raising that issue with me in the recent past. That is to give him some case for optimism to set against the long-term pessimism.

I will turn to the details of the new clauses. New clause 33 would require the Government to produce and lay a report before both Houses of Parliament, with an assessment of the investment strategies of defined-benefit pension schemes and their impact on productivity.

There is already a requirement for defined-benefit schemes to produce much of that information in their triennial valuation and to submit key documents to the Pensions Regulator, including information on investments and changes in asset allocations over time, so the regulator has much of the information already. In addition, multiple reports are already produced annually on defined-benefit schemes and their investments. The purple book is the most obvious example; it is produced by the Pension Protection Fund. I know that everybody here will be an avid reader of it; I promise people that it is reasonably widely read, including in the City.

New clause 34 seeks to change the arrangements for reporting defined-benefit pension scheme liabilities in the employer’s accounts. I am impressed by the wish of the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for us to engage in a Brexit from international financial reporting standards, but he will be unsurprised to learn that the Government are not about to do that. These are globally recognised financial reporting frameworks that allow comparability, and we are not in the business of changing them.

New clause 35 would require the Secretary of State to introduce an alternative basis to disclose schemes’ funding deficits. The Pensions Act 2004 put in place the current regime for valuations. Our view is that that approach has taken some time to implement but it is now well understood and well established, so leaving it in place is by far the best thing that we can do, while also considering in more detail the consequences of other things that drive the choices of pension schemes. On that basis, I encourage the hon. Member for Wyre Forest to withdraw the new clause, and I certainly do not expect to see my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon support it.

[Mark Garnier]

I am partially reassured by the Minister’s comments, but it really comes down to the kindness of my heart—I would not want the hon. Member for Hendon to be pulled off the Committee and put in an awkward situation. It would be unfortunate to force him to fall out with the Whips so early in his parliamentary career, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 37

Review of impact of this Act

“(1) Within five years of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must carry out a review of the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes.

(2) The review must consider—

(a) the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes, and

(b) whether further measures are needed to ensure that pension scheme members receive an adequate income in retirement.

(3) The Secretary of State must prepare a report of the review and lay a copy of that report before Parliament.”—(Mark Garnier.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to prepare a report on the impact of this Act within 5 years of its passing.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Under new clause 37, the review of the impact of the Act would focus on pensions adequacy. The current Government plan to delay the comprehensive consideration of pensions adequacy to future phases of the pensions review. Any resulting reforms from those future evaluations are projected to take several years to develop and implement, and there is widespread concern that without a mandated regular review process, inadequate pension outcomes will persist. Millions of people in the UK therefore risk having insufficient retirement income, particularly lower earners, ethnic minorities, the self-employed and those with interrupted careers.

Automatic enrolment has expanded workplace pension participation and now covers over 88% of eligible employees, but significant savings shortfalls remain. Recent forecasts and analysis warn of a retirement crisis, with many future pensioners expected to have less income than today’s retirees unless action is taken. The Government’s renewed Pensions Commission is due to report in 2027, focusing on the adequacy, fairness and sustainability of the retirement framework, but that report will only come in 2027.

The new clause would create a statutory obligation for the Secretary of State to conduct a full review within five years of the Bill’s passage, focusing on its impact on actual and projected retirement incomes. It would require an assessment of whether current policies and contribution levels are sufficient to ensure adequate retirement incomes. The Secretary of State would have to report the findings to Parliament, increasing accountability and transparency. That would formalise an ongoing review cycle to monitor pension adequacy regularly, preventing the consideration of the issue being indefinitely postponed.

As we all know, pension adequacy is vital to preventing poverty in later life and to ensuring quality of life for retirees. Despite expanded coverage through auto-enrolment, however, many people are still on track to fail to meet retirement income targets. Financial resilience frameworks show disparities in adequacy among lower earners, women and other vulnerable groups, and current retirement income depends on a number of variables, including contribution, sufficiency, investment returns, longevity and state pension level.

The new clause would ensure that the Government take responsibility to monitor and report regularly on pension adequacy outcomes. It would mandate a formal review mechanism, enhancing policy responsiveness and parliamentary oversight. Ultimately, it aims to safeguard millions of future retirees from inadequate incomes, and support a sustainable and fair retirement system.

[Torsten Bell]

We have now had a few discussions about the case for monitoring and evaluating the Bill and what is going on in the pension landscape more generally. I do not want to repeat everything I have said previously, so I will just address whether this is the right approach or whether it should be done through the Pensions Commission that is under way and looking at most of these issues. My view is that the Pensions Commission is focused on the headline issues that the hon. Member for Wyre Forest has just mentioned. I do not want to confuse that work by having another process consider the same issues at the same time. It is also valuable to have the independence of the commission when doing that.

My main message is that we do not have to wait long, because the Pensions Commission will report in 2027, which is earlier than the five years that we would have to wait for the Secretary of State’s inevitably excellent report as a result of this new clause. We should have faith in Baroness Drake, Ian Cheshire and Nick Pearce to deliver that.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I am not as au fait with the terms of reference of the review as the Minister. Is it possible that it will say, “We recommend that another review is undertaken in five, 10 or 15 years?” Will it look at whether the review is all we need at this point in time or whether we will need another review in future?

[Torsten Bell]

I do not want to speak for the commissioners because that would be to prejudge their work. I can tell the hon. Lady what the terms of reference require and they definitely rule out long-grassing in that they require actual recommendations for change to deliver a fair, adequate and sustainable pension system. It would certainly be open to them to say, “Do these things, and we also think that monitoring should be x and y.” That would be for them to say, and as it is an independent commission, I do not want to prejudge that. It definitely cannot be just that; it would have to include recommendations for change.

[Mark Garnier]

We tabled new clause 37 partly to try to get some reassurance from the Minister. Two years is still quite a long time, as is five, but it is incredibly important that we are on top of what is going on in the pension industry, not least because we do not want any of our constituents to end up with miserable retirements. However, I am marginally reassured by the Minister’s comments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 38

Guidance on the roles of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator

“(1) The Secretary of State must establish a joint protocol outlining the roles and responsibilities of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator regarding their regulatory responsibility of the pension industry.

(2) A protocol established under subsection (1) must include—

(a) an overview of the coordination mechanisms between the two bodies;

(b) a published framework for oversight of hybrid or work-based personal pension schemes;

(c) a requirement for regular joint communications from both bodies to clarify regulatory boundaries for industry stakeholders.”—(Mark Garnier.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

I asked questions earlier about the consultation processes that DWP and the FCA are undertaking and about ensuring consistency in that consultation. This is a similar issue. I like the way that the new clause has been written to ensure that there are protocols so that everybody knows what side of the line they fall on. That can be a particular issue for organisations that have responsibility for both trust-based and contract-based pensions. They may be trying to scale or make efficiencies through investing or having similar default products, even though we are talking about two different types of scheme.

It would be helpful if the Government would commit to ensuring that, where those issues arise, and people are having conversations with the FCA and the Pensions Regulator about what side of the divide they fall on, the Government are keeping a watching brief. If there is regular confusion, the Government should ensure that they clarify the guidance so that people know which side they fall on. Those schemes that are either hybrid or have some sort of umbrella that encapsulates both trust-based and contract-based regulation will then know which side they fall on. They will be able to comply with both regulators, if that is the requirement, or with one of them.

As we said earlier, it is incredibly important that scheme members—current pensioners and prospective pensioners—get an excellent level of service. The vast majority of people do not know, and do not care, whether they are in a trust-based or contract-based pension scheme; all they want is to get as good a pension as possible when they hit retirement. Anything that the Minister can do to ensure that companies have a huge amount of clarity about where they fall, and that scheme members get the best outcomes when they hit retirement, would be helpful.

[Torsten Bell]

We all agree that we want providers and, most importantly, consumers to operate in this landscape as easily as possible. Particularly in the case of consumers, we do not want them to know the difference between the two. I have been very clear with both regulators that that is the objective, and I have been very clear with both Departments that oversee them that that is what we are doing.

Delivering that in practice requires thinking about how we legislate, and that is what we have done with the Bill to make sure that we are providing exactly the same outcomes through both markets. It is about Government providing clarity to regulators—we are absolutely providing that—and then about how the regulators themselves behave.

I am very alive to the issue that is being raised. There is some good news about the existing arrangements, which need to continue, because they are examples of effective co-ordination between the FCA and TPR. I have seen that through joint working groups, consultations, shared strategies and guidance, and regular joint engagement with stakeholders. The value for money measures in the Bill are probably the most high-profile recent experience of entirely joint working between the FCA, TPR and DWP.

The wider collaboration is underpinned by what is called the joint regulatory strategy and a formal memorandum of understanding that sets out how the two regulators should co-operate, share information and manage areas of overlap. I think that that basically achieves the objectives that the hon. Member for Wyre Forest set out, even if it is provided not by the Secretary of State but by a memorandum of understanding between the two organisations. I can absolutely reassure him and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North that I am very focused on this issue.

[Mark Garnier]

I am highly reassured by the Minister’s words. The important point is to ensure that if the bodies are to work together and do this, we need to keep them held to account on it. The Financial Conduct Authority was set up as an independent regulator and reports back to such things as the Treasury Committee. Presumably, TPR reports back to the Work and Pensions Committee. Already we can see a potential problem there, because separate Select Committees are doing the investigation. That is an important point, but I am confident that the Minister and his civil servants are aware of the problem and will be resolutely super sharp-focused on this issue to ensure that we have regulatory clarity. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 39

Section 38: commencement

“(1) The provisions in section 38 shall not come into force except in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”—(John Milne.)

This new clause would require that the provisions in clause 38 could only be enacted once agreed through secondary legislation.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[John Milne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Overall, this Bill has wide cross-party support, as evidenced by the fact that we have been rattling through it at such a pace. However, the power of mandation is undoubtedly the most controversial aspect. To be briefly Shakespearean: to mandate or not to mandate, that is the question.

The new clause would require that the provisions in clause 38—the mandation powers—be enacted only through secondary legislation. It is an attempt to square the circle between two competing views. The Liberal Democrats have concerns about the implications of mandation, frankly, as has much of the pensions industry. For example, Pensions UK, which is a signatory of the Mansion House accords, has stated:

“We believe that the best way of ensuring good returns for members is for investments to be undertaken on a voluntary, not a mandatory basis. We also note powers being taken to specify required investment capability for schemes, and to direct LGPS funds to merge with specific pools. All of these powers will require careful scrutiny.”

Similarly, the Society of Pension Professionals has said:

“The SPP does not support the reserve power to mandate investment in private market assets and recommends its removal from the legislation. The mandation power creates significant uncertainty, including questions about legal accountability for investment underperformance and how eligible assets will be defined. The threat of mandation risks distorting market pricing and could reduce public trust in pensions, as savers may fear that financial returns are no longer the top priority.”

The Minister has stated on a number of occasions that mandation should not be necessary, that he does not expect to have to use it and that the Mansion House accord demonstrates the industry’s willingness to act voluntarily. The obvious response is that if that really is the case, and that UK private markets truly offer the best option for pension savers while meeting the fiduciary duties, the industry should not need any prodding and mandation will not be required. The Minister’s response on previous occasions, and no doubt today, has been to observe the history and point out that thus far, the industry has been slow to make that change.

We recognise that the Minister is wholly committed to the path of giving himself mandation powers, whatever we or anyone else says. Indeed, he sees it as core to the legislation. For that reason, we have proposed the new clause as a halfway house. The power would be put on the books, but it would require secondary legislation to be enacted. It would give the Minister the ability to have access to mandation powers at short notice if he deemed it necessary, without needing primary legislation, but in the meantime, it does not hang over the industry like a sword of Damocles. It may seem just a psychological difference, but psychology matters, and there are other advantages.

Somewhat counterintuitively, sometimes having too much of a stick can be a problem in itself. The Minister would be under pressure to use the stick for the sake of consistency in every case where any company went slightly over the limit or was under the limit, even when he might prefer to take a softer, more conciliatory approach. We therefore see this new clause as a way to help the Minister exercise the powers he needs, but without stepping too heavily on industry’s toes. As he has said, he does not believe that he will ever need to exercise the power, so let us keep it at arm’s length.

[Torsten Bell]

I will resist the temptation to relitigate the entire argument about clause 38, which we discussed at some length on Tuesday. I entirely agree with the thrust of the new clause, which is that there should be scrutiny of the use of any such powers—that includes the scale measures, not just asset allocation.

I can offer the hon. Member for Horsham some reassurance, because the Bill already provides that all significant regulations made under clause 38, including the ones he is referring to, are always subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure. That is the effect of the changes made to section 143 of the Pensions Act 2008 by clause 38(15). That should give him a lot of reassurance. It is true that the new clause could put a further vote in the system, but the effect is the same. I have bad news about Governments with majorities: whether they are asked to vote once or twice, the outcome will look quite similar.

For the sake of transparency, I should flag that there are some much less significant measures in clause 38 that are subject to the negative resolution procedure. I will spell them out: regulations made that require regulatory authorities to report information relating to asset allocation to the Secretary of State, regulations made in respect of new information provisions, and regulations made in respect of the regulator’s power to issue a risk notice. The negative procedure is never used for the major aspects of clause 38, which, as the hon. Gentleman set out, is a central part of the Bill. I hope that reassures him that Parliament would have to support any measures to bring in the regulations that will underpin clause 38. As I have said ad nauseam, we intend to bring into effect the scale parts of clause 38, but do not anticipate the need to use the reserve power elements.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his clarification. I emphasise that the new clause is as much for industry’s comfort as Parliament’s; nevertheless, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 44

Administration levy

“(1) The Pensions Act 2004 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 116 (grants), leave out from ‘expenses’ to end of section.

(3) Omit section 117 (administration levy).

(4) In section 173(3) (Pension Protection Fund), before subsection (3)(a) insert—

‘(aa) any sums required to meet expenses incurred by the Board in connection with the operation or discontinuance of the Pension Protection Fund,’

(5) In section 188(3) (Fraud Compensation Fund), before subsection (3)(a) insert—

‘(aa) sums required to meet expenses incurred by the Board in connection with the operation or discontinuance of the Fraud Compensation Fund,’.” —(John Milne.)

This new clause abolishes the administration levy and provides for the expenses of the PPF and the FCF to be met out of their general funds. It would enable FCF expenses to be covered by the FCF levy.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for the new clause. I acknowledge the concerns surrounding the abolition of the Pension Protection Fund admin levy. This is not a new issue; it has obviously been raised significantly by parts of the industry. I broadly support the intent of the new clause. It provides for the expenses of the PPF board and the Fraud Compensation Fund to be met by the PPF levy and the Fraud Compensation Fund levy, instead of the PPF administrative levy. The amendment to section 116 of the Pensions Act 2004 is unworkable as it is currently drafted, but more importantly, I give the hon. Member our assurance that we intend to lay amendments at a later stage that will achieve the same aim. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member will withdraw the new clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I am grateful for this new clause, which was tabled by one of my neighbours in south Wales, the hon. Member for Caerfyrddin (Ann Davies). It is obviously an important issue for many ex-mineworkers and for families across Great Britain. It is basically straightforward: I want to reassure the Committee that the Government have been discussing the transfer with the scheme trustees for many months. Those discussions are actively under way. We expect to be able to make an announcement about the way forward in reasonably short order.

I am glad that the new clause will not be pushed to a vote—because if anything, it would risk slowing down the implementation of an agreed outcome—and I totally appreciate the point that the hon. Member for Aberdeen North has made. Any proposal for change will need to be consulted on with the scheme’s trustees on behalf of their members, but that will be coming forward. I hope that provides the Committee with the reassurance it is looking for.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I appreciate the reassurances that the Minister has given me. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 46

Trustees: independence

“(1) The Pensions Act 1995 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 29 (Persons disqualified for being trustees), after subsection (d) insert—

‘(da) he has a personal or financial interest in the pension scheme, except for member nominated trustees.’”—(John Milne.)

This new clause makes pension scheme trustees truly independent of the sponsoring companies so that they can protect scheme members’ interests without any conflict of interest.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[John Milne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would have the effect of making pension scheme trustees truly independent of the sponsoring companies so that they can protect scheme members’ interests without any conflict of interest. Trustees should act solely in the best interests of their members, not those of the sponsoring employer.

Currently, conflicts of interest can arise where company-appointed trustees also have personal or financial ties to the scheme sponsor. The new clause seeks to strengthen independence, excluding conflicting trustees while still allowing member-nominated trustees. Members deserve trustees who are free to challenge employers and prioritise pensions over corporate interests. Having strong, independent trustees means stronger protection for savers’ retirement security.

[Torsten Bell]

I will remark briefly on the new clause. To state the obvious, the quality and independence of trustees is an integral part of our trust-based pensions system. It is very important, and it is right for the hon. Member to highlight it. Within those schemes, there are a range of trustee models. I would not want to put a blanket regime in place within the currently varied landscape. I want to give the hon. Member some different reassurance on this point. We are committed to strengthening scheme governance, including for some of the issues that he has raised. I have already announced my intention to consult later this autumn on measures to improve the governance of trust-based schemes. That work will consider again some of the exact issues that he raises. That is the right way forward, because there are lots of strengths to our current system. The quality of our trustees, their independence and everything they bring to their role are all valuable, but it is important that we maintain that as the best it can possibly be. I hope that the hon. Member will enjoy the consultation later this year.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his encouragement. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 47

Report on Pension Scheme Eligibility and Access

“(1) The Secretary of State shall, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a report into the operation of occupational pension schemes where certain categories of employees have been excluded on the basis of job classification or employment start date.

(2) The report must examine the case of employees and former employees of Fife Joinery Manufacturing (a subsidiary of Velux), including—

(a) whether affected workers were provided with opportunity to join existing pension schemes,

(b) the adequacy of record-keeping and employer accountability, and

(c) potential remedies to ensure equal access to workplace pensions.”—(John Milne.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to report on the Velux Pensions case.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[John Milne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would require the Secretary of State to report on the Velux pensions case. It would require him to report within 12 months on how occupational pension schemes exclude certain employees based on job classification or their start date. The report would specifically

“examine…employees and former employees of Fife Joinery Manufacturing (a subsidiary of Velux)”.

It would review whether affected workers were genuinely offered the chance to join the pension scheme. The report would assess

“the adequacy of record-keeping and employer accountability”

and explore possible

“remedies to ensure equal access to workplace pensions.”

The measure addresses concerns from shop-floor employees who joined before 1998 and were denied pension access despite repeatedly asking for it. The workers dispute claims that they declined pension membership and say they were told that they were not eligible. Attempts to engage Fife Joinery Manufacturing management have been unsuccessful. Workers have been advised to consider approaching the ombudsman, although none has done so yet. The new clause would hold the Government accountable to investigate and push for fairness and transparency. It is supported by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Fife and my Liberal Democrat colleagues.

To summarise, the new clause is a key step to ensure fairness and equality in workplace pension access and to prevent similar exclusions in the future.

[Torsten Bell]

I am grateful to the hon. Member, as always, for raising those specific issues in this debate. It has been a good opportunity to raise such cases, as he regularly does.

The hon. Member will be totally unsurprised that the Government cannot support the new clause, because it is the Pensions Regulator’s role to regulate occupational pension schemes and, as he mentioned, it is the Pensions Ombudsman’s job to investigate individual complaints from members. We do not want the Government to step over the top of those organisations. I encourage those who think that they have a case to approach the ombudsman, if they have not already—given the hon. Member’s remarks, it sounds like they have not done so. I should add that I am not aware of the details of that individual case.

To be clear, if individuals have concerns about their workplace pension scheme that relate to their employer and the running of the scheme, they should take the issue to the Pensions Regulator, which will investigate. Individuals who think that they should have been a member of a pension scheme can also go to the Pensions Ombudsman, if that makes sense. Depending on the nature of an individual’s complaint, two routes are available. I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his new clause.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his words. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 98

Regulations: general

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 99 stand part.

Government amendment 241.

Clause 100 stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

Clause 98 is a standard provision setting out how regulation-making powers in the Bill may be used. It confirms that all regulations will be made by statutory instrument and allows them to be tailored to different situations and scheme types. The clause ensures that the Bill can work effectively in practice.

Clause 99 sets out how regulations under the Bill will be scrutinised by Parliament, using either the affirmative or negative procedures—we were discussing a particular case relating to clause 38 just now. The clause also allows that regulations that would otherwise be subject to the negative procedure can be made as part of a joint package of regulations under the affirmative procedure.

Government amendment 241 is a technical amendment. The new provisions in chapter 1 of part 4 about changes to Northern Ireland salary-related, contracted-out pension schemes apply specifically to schemes in Northern Ireland. The rest of the provisions in chapter 1 apply to schemes in England, Wales and Scotland. Clause 100 is a standard legislative provision confirming the territorial extent of the measures in the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 98 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 99 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 100

Extent

Amendment made: 241, in clause 100, page 98, leave out line 10 and insert—

“( ) Subject as follows, this Act extends to England and Wales and Scotland only.

(1A) Sections (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) to (Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc : Northern Ireland) extend to Northern Ireland only.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment secures that the new clauses inserted by NC28 to NC30 extend to Northern Ireland only. Northern Ireland has its own pensions legislation, but in view of the retrospective provisions in those new Clauses it is considered appropriate to include material in the Bill for Northern Ireland corresponding to the new clauses inserted by NC23 to NC26.

Clause 100, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 101

Commencement

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move amendment 255, in clause 101, page 98, line 22, leave out “Chapters 1 and 2” and insert “Chapter 1”.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Milne]

I feel I ought also to thank everyone, and the Minister especially for a superb performance. I think we can all agree that this is a very good Bill, with lots of really good things in it. I am particularly interested in the investment side of it, with the greater resources to invest in UK plc, which we certainly do need.

Sadly, I expect the Bill will not receive the publicity that many do—it has not been in the headlines so far—and that is a pity. Much more trivial and ephemeral stuff, frankly, gets all the headlines, while something that is interesting and dynamic, like the measures in this Bill, will probably be displaced by the latest resignation.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank all Opposition Members for those reflections. I will come to my own after I have dealt with the remaining clauses and amendments—we must finish the job.

On the Opposition amendments, I am grateful to the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for his words. I am firmly committed to writing to both him and my hon. Friend the Member for Tamworth, which I shall do before Report. I am glad that the hon. Member will not press his amendments on that basis.

Amendments 225, 227 and 228 address the timing of the implementation of the provisions introduced by clause 38. Amendments 225 and 227 make it clear that the relevant master trusts and GPPs will not have to comply with the scale requirement until 2030. That is a point of clarification. In response to industry concerns, elements of the provision, such as the transition pathway, can be commenced and become operable prior to the scale requirement itself being active. We are responding to those concerns, and the amendment achieves exactly that. Amendment 228 provides clarification on the asset allocation elements of clause 38 by making it clear that those requirements will fall away if not brought into force by the end of 2035. Amendment 226 provides for the commencement of new chapter 3A, which will be inserted by new clauses 12 to 17.

On amendment 263, we have just discussed the PPF admin levy question. Given what we have just discussed about new clause 44, I ask the hon. Member for Torbay not to press the amendment.

Government amendment 242 introduces a commencement provision for the new chapter 1 of part 4 of the Bill on the validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes for both Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This measure means that two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent, effective pension schemes will be able to use a confirmation from their actuary obtained under this part of the Bill to validate a previous change to benefits—this is the Virgin Media discussion we had earlier today. Two months after the Bill becomes law, a previous change to benefits under an effective pension scheme will be considered valid if the scheme actually confirms that it met the legal requirements at the time of the change. This measure means that this part of the Bill will come into force two months after the Act receives Royal Assent and is a necessary accompaniment to new clauses 23 to 30.

Turning to the clauses, clause 101 is a standard commencement provision that details the timetable for bringing the Bill’s measures into operation and allowing transitional and saving provisions to ensure orderly implementation. Clause 102 is crucial, because it gives the Bill its short title. I commend those clauses to the Committee.

I will finish by adding my support to the comments made by all hon. Members about the proceedings of this Committee. I thank all hon. Members from all parties for their support—broadly—and also for their scrutiny, which is an important part of everything we do in this place. The Bill is important, but the debate around it is also important, both so that the legislation can be improved and in its own right. Such debate makes sure that issues are brought to the attention of the House and are on the record. I also thank this Chair, as well as several others, including those who have stood in at short notice at various phases of the Bill’s consideration. I am particularly grateful to one individual, and I am also grateful to the Clerks for all their work.

Most of all, I put on record my thanks to all the civil servants in the Department for Work and Pensions, His Majesty’s Treasury, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator. Many of them have been working on the content of this Bill for many years, far longer than I have been Pensions Minister and, as many hon. Members have kindly reminded me, far longer than I may end up being the Pensions Minister, given the high attrition rate over the past 15 years in modern British politics. I thank them for the warning, and will take it in the way it was hopefully intended.

To be slightly worthy at the end of my speech, it is probably true that pensions legislation does not get the attention it deserves, but looking back over the 20th century, nothing was more important to the progress that this country and others made in delivering leisure in retirement. That very big win was delivered not only by productivity growth, but by Government decisions and collective decisions made by unions and their employers. The Bill goes further in that regard and, on that basis, it deserves all the coverage it gets.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 225, in clause 101, page 98, line 24, leave out “after 31 December 2029”.

This amendment, together with Amendment 227, means that relevant Master Trusts and group personal pensions will not have to comply with the scale requirement until after 2030, but that Chapter 3 of Part 2 (including provision relating to the scale requirement, such as the application can otherwise be brought into force at any time in accordance with regulations.

Amendment 226, in clause 101, page 98, line 25, at end insert—

“(ba) Chapter 3A comes into force on such day as the Secretary of State and the Treasury jointly may by regulations appoint;”.

This amendment provides for commencement by regulations of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory statement to NC15.

Amendment 227, in clause 101, page 98, line 30, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

“(5) Regulations under subsection (4)(b) may not provide for the following to come into force before 1 January 2030—

(a) section 38(4), in respect of the insertion of Condition 1 in section 20(1A) of the Pensions Act 2008 (Master Trusts to be subject to scale requirement);

(b) section 38(8), in respect of the insertion of section 26(7A) of that Act (group personal pension schemes to be subject to scale requirement)

(but nothing in this subsection prevents section 38 from being brought into force before that date in respect of the insertion in that Act of other provision related to that mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b)).”

This amendment ensures that schemes will not be legally subject to the scale requirement before 1 January 2030. It allows, however, for provision relating to that requirement (e.g., provision around applications for approval) to be commenced before that date in anticipation of the requirement itself taking effect.

Amendment 228, in clause 101, page 98, line 34, at end insert—

“(5A) If section 38 has not been brought into force before the end of 2035 in respect of the insertion of—

(a) Condition 2 in section 20(1A) of the Pensions Act 2008 (asset allocation requirement: Master Trusts), and

(b) subsection (7B) in section 26 of the Pensions Act 2008 (asset allocation requirement: group personal pension schemes),

section 38 is repealed at the end of that year in respect of the insertion of those provisions.”

This amendment transposes and clarifies the provision currently in clause 38(16). It provides for the key provisions imposing the asset allocation requirement to fall away if they are not brought into force before the end of 2035.

Amendment 242, in clause 101, page 98, line 37, at beginning insert—

“( ) Chapter 1 of Part 4 comes into force at the end of the period of two months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.

( ) Chapter 2 of”.

This amendment provides for the commencement of the new Chapter relating to the consequences of the Virgin Media case .

Amendment 243, in clause 101, page 99, line 5, after “section 96” insert

“and (Information to be given to pension schemes by employers)”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment provides for the commencement of NC20.

Clause 101, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 102 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting)

Torsten Bell Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 11th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 52 to 56 stand part.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

It is a pleasure to serve under you today, Ms Lewell. As we come to the first clauses dealing with superfunds, I start by setting out the background. Superfunds provide a route for employers to secure the liabilities of closed defined-benefit schemes that are unable to afford insurance buy-out. Their purpose is to better protect members from potential losses in the event of employer insolvency, and to release employers to focus on and invest in their core business, helping to drive economic growth. Superfunds already operate within the framework of pensions legislation and the interim guidance issued by the Pensions Regulator. That interim regime has enabled us to learn what works well, but it is now time to put the regulatory framework for superfunds on a permanent footing.

Clause 51 provides an overview of part 3 of the Bill and sets out the structure and content of the legislative framework for superfunds. Clause 52 defines a superfund scheme as a

“trust-based occupational pension scheme”

that is

“not supported by a substantive employer covenant”

but by a “capital buffer” made of private capital instead. Clause 53 sets out that superfund sections are to be treated as separate schemes, meaning that any potential failure would be contained within that section. Clause 54 prohibits unauthorised superfund activities.

Clause 55 allows the Pensions Regulator to authorise superfunds if it is satisfied that they are likely to meet the ongoing requirements set out in chapters 4 and 5 of the Bill. It will enable the regulator to assess the superfund’s organisation, staff, plans, policies and procedures to ensure that it has robust governance and continuity arrangements. Clause 56 makes it clear that the Pensions Regulator must make an authorisation decision within six months of receiving a completed application, with the potential to extend that period by up to three months. The new legislative regime will protect scheme members and enhance the confidence of stakeholders and market participants.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

The Opposition support the clauses and welcome the action to legislate formally for defined-benefit superfunds. Securing this in a legislative framework will give trustees and sponsors greater confidence when considering this new consolidation option for defined-benefit schemes. The measures build on the consultation conducted under the previous Government, as well as the intention that the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt), laid out in his 2023 Mansion House speech.

Superfunds are capital-backed consolidators that allow defined-benefit schemes to shift liabilities away from the sponsoring employer, thereby enhancing the security of members’ benefits. By transferring pension obligations to a superfund, companies can reduce long-term liabilities and refocus on core operations, while maintaining strong protection for retirees. Superfunds offer a new endgame strategy for DB schemes unable to secure an insurance buy-out, helping to safeguard member benefits in underfunded or marginal schemes. These measures all seem reasonable, and as I said, this work started under the previous Government, so we wholeheartedly support it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 52 to 56 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 57

Prohibition of unapproved superfund transfers

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Torsten Bell]

Chapter 3 sets out the criteria for approving superfund transfers. The clause protects the integrity of the superfund regime that we are aiming to put in place through the Bill by making it clear that the penalty for committing an unauthorised superfund transfer may be a fine, imprisonment for up to two years, or both. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 57 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 58

Approval of superfund transfers

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 268, in clause 58, page 67, line 34, leave out subsection (a) and insert—

“(a) that, as at the date of the application, the financial position of the ceding scheme is—

(i) not strong enough to enable the trustees to arrange an insurer buy-out, or

(ii) not affordable for the next 36 months following an assessment, certified by the scheme actuary, of all funding options to become strong enough;”.

This amendment expands the onboarding condition to give an alternative to a single day snapshot of a scheme’s funding position.

The Bill tests a scheme’s funding position on a single snapshot day. We feel that is too rigid and could unfairly exclude schemes. A scheme might just miss the mark on that day, even though funding prospects over the next three years are realistic and affordable. The amendment would allow actuaries to certify affordability over a 36-month horizon, providing a fairer and more flexible test. It would protect members by ensuring viable schemes are not shut out, while still requiring strong actuarial oversight. That is especially important in an environment where economic conditions and markets can move significantly and take scheme funding positions with them.

Schemes have not always enjoyed the present funding levels, and today’s surplus is tomorrow’s deficit. We should have regard to that fact and approach the legislation in a manner that reflects it. In the assessment over a longer time period, the trustees would also be able to consider and respond to the situation in relation to dividends, changing investment strategies and expected scheme contributions, among other key factors. In summary, the purpose of the amendment is not to block the superfund option for schemes, but rather to ensure that the legislative framework is set squarely on the basis of protecting DB scheme member benefits and the security and soundness of the pensions system.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

We have discussed other parts of the regime—for example, new entrants and their ability to scale up, and the longer-term prospects for that—which were perhaps a bit more flexible than this part. Although I am not entirely convinced that the exact wording of the amendment provides the best way to go about it, if the Minister gives some reassurance and a commitment to consider the possibility of not just taking a snapshot day, and to look at the potential ability to scale up or grow, I would be more comfortable with the legislation than I am currently.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Members for Torbay and for Horsham for the amendment. It is sensible to discuss one of the key questions in the design of superfunds policy. My main reassurance is that this exact option, or options in this space, were part of the extensive consultation on superfunds. That is important to understand. They were in the consultation, and a wide range of views were expressed in the responses, many of them pointing to the clear practical difficulties of providing the legislative test to assess whether a scheme could afford an insurance buy-out in future, as opposed to its exact position at the time of the assessment.

For reasons I will come on to, that does not mean that it is not important to look ahead to whether a scheme is likely to be able to buy out in the future, but we have taken the view, following the consultation, that that should not be the test on the face of the Bill. That is because, when it comes to projections looking ahead, both the cost of an insurance buy-out and the scheme funding levels can fluctuate significantly. Forecasts ask for more judgment to be exercised compared with an assessment of what the buy-out market is offering at the time it is carried out. It is about the current funding levels. Clause 58 already states that schemes can transfer a superfund only when they are currently unable to secure members’ benefits with an insurer.

I will offer two elements of reassurance to the hon. Member for Horsham. First, we need to be clear about the role of the legislation, which is as I just set out, and the role of the trustees, who are the ones who would approve a transfer to a superfund. Trustees will absolutely be looking ahead and thinking about the kinds of issue that the hon. Member highlighted. Do they wish to see a superfund transfer or a buy-out transfer in future? Is it plausible that they would get one? They will be relying on the guidance of the TPR and the clear intent in the legislation, which is that superfunds will provide an additional option, not replace the core approach of most defined-benefit schemes’ goal, which is an insurance buy-out. I therefore do not support putting the proposed test on the face of the Bill. Also, as the hon. Member for Aberdeen North pointed out, there are issues with the drafting of the amendment, which requires trustees in legislation to do what they will, in practice, be doing anyway.

The second point of reassurance I can offer is that the Bill sets out a power to substitute another condition to replace this condition, if needed. We will consult the industry to assess what, if any, further requirements might be added to satisfy members before the regime comes into effect. I hope that on that basis, the hon. Member will be happy to withdraw his amendment.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his reassurance, but urge him to keep this in mind. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I beg to move amendment 277, in clause 58, page 67, line 34, leave out from “application” to end of line 36 and insert

“the Trustees agree, after due consideration, that it is the best option for their fund’s members;”.

This amendment would prevent a fund from having to carry out an insurance buy-out option.

The amendment asks a reasonable question about the duties of the trustees, and the possibility that they will be overwritten by the legislation and taken away from trustees. I would appreciate some reassurance from the Minister on whether the trustees will still have a duty to act in the best interests of scheme members once the legislation goes through, and whether the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Tamworth would make things better for trustees, with them better able to act in the best interests of pension scheme members.

[Torsten Bell]

I will answer the hon. Lady’s question directly, and then come to the amendment more broadly. The best way to think about this amendment is that it asks us to remove one of the core framings of the superfund regime, which is that it is not replacing buy-out, where that is available, to trustees. The amendment enables trustees to do what they like, including moving to a superfund even if they could have moved to an insurance buy-out. That is not the policy intention of this Government, nor was it the policy intention of the previous Government. It also does not align with most of the responses to the consultation.

As I said earlier, the job of the legislation is to provide clarity regarding the overall framework, which is that superfunds exist for those schemes that are not able to afford an insurance buy-out. Within that, it is for trustees to make wider judgments, as they do all the time. Directly to the hon. Lady’s question, trustees’ duties to take the decisions that deliver the best outcomes for their members, as a short hand, is totally unaffected by this. This is just a constraint on what the superfund regime is there for, and not because we do not want to see arbitrage between an insurance regulatory regime and a superfund’s regulatory regime. I hope that provides some clarity.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 215, in clause 58, page 68, line 1, at beginning insert

“that it is reasonable to expect”.

This amendment adjusts the onboarding condition in relation to the capital adequacy threshold. The Regulator now needs to be satisfied, as at the time it decides the application, that it is reasonable to expect that the threshold will be met immediately following the superfund transfer (rather than that the threshold definitely will be met at that time).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 216 to 221.

[Torsten Bell]

Amendment 215 simply clarifies the policy intent behind the clause. It reflects the reality that pension schemes’ funding is fluid and difficult to predict. Amendment 216 makes the clause clearer and ensures consistency with amendment 215. Amendment 217 introduces a power to enable the Government to consult industry and the regulator on an appropriate timeframe in which to assess whether the technical provision threshold has been met. Amendment 218 is consequential to amendment 217.

Amendment 219 allows the Secretary of State to make special provisions to modify or disapply the onboarding conditions, which we have just been discussing, in subsection (2) in the instance of a merger, division or restructuring of superfund sections. Amendments 220 and 221 set out parliamentary procedures for the powers introduced by amendments 217 and 219 respectively. I hope that hon. Members feel able to accept these amendments.

Amendment 215 agreed to.

Amendments made: 216, in clause 58, page 68, line 3, leave out

“there is a very high likelihood”

and insert

“it is reasonable to expect”.

This amendment adjusts the onboarding condition in relation to the technical provisions threshold for consistency with the change made by Amendment 215.

Amendment 217, in clause 58, page 68, line 5, leave out from “period” to end of line and insert

“specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State;”.

This amendment allows for regulations to set the period by reference to which the onboarding condition relating to the technical provisions threshold is assessed.

Amendment 218, in clause 58, page 68, line 22, leave out paragraph (b).

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 217.

Amendment 219, in clause 58, page 68, line 32, at end insert—

“(5A) The Secretary of State may by regulations modify subsection (2) in its application to a superfund transfer of a kind described in section 53(3) (merger of sections etc).”

This amendment allows for regulations to make special provision about how the onboarding conditions apply (or do not apply) in relation to a superfund transfer within clause 53(3) (under which a restructuring of sections within a superfund can itself be treated as a superfund transfer).

Amendment 220, in clause 58, page 68, line 42, at end insert—

“(7A) Regulations under subsection (2)(d) are subject to the negative procedure.”

This amendment provides for negative parliamentary procedure to apply to regulations made by virtue of subsection (2)(d) as amended by Amendment 217.

Amendment 221, in clause 58, page 68, line 43, at end insert—

“(8A) Regulations under subsection (5A) are subject to the negative procedure.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment provides for negative parliamentary procedure to apply to regulations made by virtue of the provision inserted by Amendment 219.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Torsten Bell]

This is an important clause whose role is to set out the criteria for the Pensions Regulator to approve each transfer to a superfund, having dealt with the authorisation of superfunds separately. Those include that the superfund has been authorised by the regulator and that the ceding employer scheme has no active members; we are talking about closed defined-benefit schemes.

The clause also sets out onboarding conditions, which are designed to ensure that members’ benefits are well protected. Superfunds are secure, but not as secure as an insurance buy-out. Schemes with sufficient funds to buy out benefits with an insurer may therefore not enter a superfund. Other onboarding conditions require that the trustees of the ceding scheme make the assessment in the interests of scheme members that the transfer to a superfund will make it more likely that the members’ benefits will be paid in full, and that the capital adequacy threshold is met—which is the main answer to the earlier question from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. Those and other measures, alongside a known and up-front capital buffer, will ensure that there is a very high probability that members’ benefits will be paid.

Affirmative regulation-making powers will allow greater specificity about the onboarding conditions, including the financial metrics of the capital adequacy threshold and the information that must be provided to the regulator to satisfy the onboarding conditions. I commend clause 58 to the Committee.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have a quick question, which may also be relevant to other clauses that we discussed earlier, but which I did not bring up at that point. It is about the consistency of consultations and regulations from the Department for Work and Pensions and the Financial Conduct Authority, particularly when consultations are taking place and there are scheme members and prospective pensioners who expect their pension to work in the same way as others and do not have a clue what the arrangements are—for example, whether it is regulated by the FCA or anyone else. Can we still expect parity of service and clarity?

I am aware that the different structures may require slightly different regulations. I want reassurance from the Minister on ensuring that scheme members see a consistent level of service that makes sense in the regulatory frameworks. I also want reassurance that larger organisations running different types of scheme can easily work within and respond to both types of consultation because there is enough consistency applicable across different regulatory mechanisms, within the constraints of the law and depending on the scheme type. I have been asked by insurance and pension industry professionals to raise that with the Minister, and any reassurance that he can give would be appreciated.

[Torsten Bell]

The first reassurance I can give is that this part of the Bill requires only one regulatory framework, because it all sits within the Pensions Regulator and within the defined benefit part of the landscape, as I am aware the hon. Member for Aberdeen North knows.

On the hon. Member’s wider point, which is relevant to many parts of the Bill, I absolutely agree and will offer a two-part reassurance—we will also come to a new clause later that directly gets at this issue. I entirely agree that having two regulatory regimes is no excuse for having different consumer experiences across the two halves of the regime. To address that, I have made sure that the Bill supports the same outcomes, and have stress tested that considerably, but also made it clear that, as a Government policy agenda, our goal is that that should be the case, full stop, including in some areas where it has not been historically. That is absolutely what we need to keep working towards. We should all have that in our heads.

When it comes to the regulations, it is also our clear intention that the FCA and TPR should be working very closely together, as we discussed with the value for money regulations, for example.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 58, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 59

Special provision for certain schemes coming out of assessment period

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 60 stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

Just to clarify, there is significant support from the industry for clause 59 in general terms. This is in part because of the successful rescue of the Debenhams pension scheme out of the Pension Protection Fund assessment—it had not entered the PPF; had it done so, there would have been a significant cut in members’ benefits—by the currently sole operating superfund, Clara Pensions. PPF assessment following employer insolvency is designed to ensure that member benefits are protected. Some schemes that come out of PPF assessment are too well funded to stay in the PPF, because they could achieve better member outcomes than might be offered by the PPF.

The clause amends the onboarding conditions in these instances, to allow trustees of a scheme in PPF assessment to seek to secure their liabilities with a superfund at less than full benefits, but more than would otherwise have been secured through a buy-out that was available, given the level of their assets at that point. Based on the evidence from the PPF’s purple book, we anticipate that, on average, five in 10 so-called PPF-plus schemes could benefit each year. Trustees can continue to buy out the level of benefits that the scheme can afford with an insurer, but this clause provides them with the option of entering a superfund, where they consider doing so to be in the interest of members.

Clause 60 specifies that an application must be made in the manner and form specified by the Pensions Regulator. The approval process enables the regulator to protect schemes and their members during the application process, and aligns with the regulator’s systems and processes and its experience with other authorisation and supervisory regimes. I commend clauses 59 and 60 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 59 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 60 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 61

Governance and structure

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 62 stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

One of the new features of a superfund regime is that there is a responsible body for the superfund that carries out key parts of its operations. Clause 61 sets out a clear framework of policies and procedures that the responsible body of a superfund must ensure is in place, so that the pension scheme is managed and administered effectively and members’ benefits are protected.

The clause will operate alongside the requirements for an effective system of governance and internal controls, which the scheme trustees are already subject to under the Pensions Act 2004. It places an overarching obligation on the responsible body to ensure that the appropriate governance-related policies and procedures are in place across the operating model of the superfund as a whole, to ensure that the responsible body upholds the same standards as scheme trustees in the interests of scheme members. This is in recognition of the greater potential for conflicts of interest than would be seen in a traditional defined-benefit scheme.

The clause further requires the responsible body to ensure that the superfund meets prescribed conditions as to its structure, including but not limited to its compliance with tax legislation. The detailed structural requirements for superfunds will be set out in regulations, following consultation and in response to innovations in the market.

Clause 62 sets out the management documents that must be prepared and maintained as part of the ongoing requirements for an authorised superfund. The documents include a business plan, a governance manual, a continuity strategy, and a fees and expenses policy. That suite of documentation is designed to ensure the good management of superfunds, and it builds on the requirements and learnings from other authorisation regimes, such as master trusts and collective defined-contribution schemes.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 61 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 62 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 63

Duty to monitor financial thresholds

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 64 stand part.

Government amendment 222.

Clauses 65 to 68 stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

This group of clauses introduces requirements for superfunds that concern funding and investment. Clause 63 places a duty on the responsible body of a superfund to protect members’ benefits by having robust policies and procedures in place to monitor the financial thresholds.

Clause 64 defines those financial thresholds, which are key components of the regulatory regime and follow the example of the Solvency II supervisory ladder of interventions, tailored to the unique characteristics of superfunds. That means that there is a series of clear and known consequences, both positive and negative, that could happen in superfunds as a direct response to changes to their funding levels. The financial thresholds are designed to protect the security of members’ benefits. When certain thresholds are breached, there are mandatory actions that must be taken to protect members.

Government amendment 222 is minor and technical, and seeks to provide certainty and clarity to the operators and administrators of superfunds that they can use the buffer funds both to invest the buffer in the hopes of generating growth, and to pay expenses, fees and—importantly, for the Treasury half of my job—any taxes that are owed.

Clause 65 requires that arrangements must be made to transfer capital buffer assets to the scheme’s trustees in specific circumstances. That is the important protection, because it is the capital buffer that provides the equivalent of the employer covenant protection that we see in traditional defined-benefit schemes. The release of the buffer to the trustees as part of an approved response plan—which we will come to in clause 81—is fundamental to the protection of members’ benefits.

Clause 66 ensures that the capital buffer cannot be released to anyone other than the scheme’s trustees, except where the liabilities of the scheme have been satisfied, or where the release is a permitted profit extraction. It is important that permitted profit extraction takes place only when the security of the scheme has been materially improved, above the superfund’s initial capital adequacy requirements, which are obviously significant.

Clause 67 requires the responsible body of the superfund to have an investment strategy for the capital buffer, prepared in accordance with any requirements specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

Clause 68 requires the responsible body of the superfund to appoint an appropriately qualified, independent person to verify the valuations of the capital buffer at least once a year.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 63 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 64 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 65

Capital buffer: compulsory release to trustees

Amendment made: 222, in clause 65, page 73, line 2, leave out “for market value consideration” and insert

“—

“(a) in the ordinary course of the investment of the capital buffer, or

(b) in payment of fees, expenses, taxes or other charges incurred (in each case) in connection with the management or administration of the capital buffer”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment clarifies the circumstances in which the capital buffer is regarded as “released” for the purposes of Part 3.

Clause 65, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 66 to 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 69

Key functions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 70 to 72 stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

This series of clauses sets out requirements for the approval or certification of key superfund personnel. Trustees and actuaries, among others, are already held to account by strict codes of practice and legislative frameworks. These provisions seek to ensure that those working within the responsible bodies of superfunds are also held to an appropriately high standard of conduct.

Clause 69 requires a superfund to have at least one individual responsible for each key administrative function. Clause 70 requires approval from the regulator for individuals looking to hold a key function. This is to ensure that the individual appointed to the role is suitable. A fit and proper test will be conducted to confirm that the named individual has the knowledge and experience for the responsibility that they are undertaking.

Clause 71 requires the responsible body of a superfund to conduct due diligence and be satisfied that any individual carrying out work associated with a key function is suitable. The responsible body must issue a certificate to the individual that it is satisfied with their suitability and must maintain a register of all such certificates. This approach intends to echo the responsibility that trustees assume when delegating tasks toward the carrying out of a key function in a pension scheme.

Clause 72 requires the regulator to approve the superfund scheme trustees. Regulations will specify the information and background checks that the regulator should undertake to ensure that the trustees are fit and proper. Members should note that civil penalties apply to any breaches of clauses 70 to 72. I commend clauses 69 to 72 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 69 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 70 to 72 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 73

Events to be notified to the Regulator

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 74 to 77 stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

We now come to the clauses relating to information and reporting requirements for superfunds.

Clause 73 requires the trustees of a superfund to notify the Pensions Regulator if certain events occur that might indicate the need for further investigation by the regulator—for example, a material deterioration in the investment performance of the scheme. Clause 74 requires the superfund trustees to regularly update the Pensions Regulator on the financial position of the superfund. This will enable effective monitoring by the regulator. These regular reports are additional to existing valuation and reporting requirements under the existing defined-benefit scheme funding framework.

Clause 75 allows the regulator to request information from the responsible body of a superfund to monitor its compliance with ongoing requirements that the regulator may specify. Similar powers to request such returns exist in the master trust and CDC authorisation regimes. Clause 76 allows the regulator to appoint someone to prepare a report about a suspected breach of the requirements. This provision is similar to both section 71 of the Pensions Act 2004 and the FCA’s arrangements for the procurement of a report by a skilled person. As in the 2004 Act, the responsible body—the “person” issuing a notice—must bear the cost of the report. Clause 77 requires the responsible body of a superfund to provide information to the superfund trustees to enable them to comply with relevant legislation, including their obligations to report under clause 74. This is about making sure that trustees have access to information that the responsible body may hold.

Members should note that civil penalties apply to the responsible body for breaches of clauses 73, 75, 76 and 77. I commend clauses 73 to 77 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 73 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 74 to 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 78

“Event of concern” and “period of concern”

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clauses 79 to 81 stand part.

Government amendments 223 and 224

Clauses 82 to 87 stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

We turn now to chapter 5, which is concerned with “events of concern”—events that require closer regulatory scrutiny. These are events such as breaches of financial thresholds, an unauthorised extraction of capital or a material risk of insolvency. An “event of concern” will result in a “period of concern”, which will end once it has been resolved by the regulator or the superfund winds up.

Clause 78 sets out the list of circumstances in relation to a superfund that give rise to an event of concern. Subsection (4) provides an affirmative power to adjust the period and circumstances of financial thresholds not being met. This is because different risks may emerge as the market evolves and further events of concern may be needed.

Clause 79 requires a relevant person to notify the Pensions Regulator when an event of concern occurs or is likely to occur. Members may find it helpful to note that this provision replicates existing measures for defined-contribution master trusts.

Clause 80 requires the superfund or the trustees to produce a response plan to address the event of concern. The response plan must be approved by the Pensions Regulator. If it is not satisfied that the response plan is sufficient, it can request a new plan. Clause 81 specifies the required content of any response plan.

Government amendment 223 is technical. It ties the direction-making powers of the regulator explicitly to the requirements placed upon a given member of the superfund group or trustee of the superfund scheme in clause 80. Clause 80(1) requires the submission of a response plan to an event of concern, while clause 80(3)(b) requires the revision of any response plan if the regulator is not satisfied. Government amendment 224 clarifies the limits of the regulator’s powers to direct superfunds to take corrective action during the event of concern.

Clause 82 lists the specific powers that will be granted to the Pensions Regulator during periods of concern to ensure the timely and effective resolution of any event of concern. A member of the superfund group must comply with a direction given to them by the regulator.

Clause 83 grants the regulator the power to make a direction to pause only if it is satisfied that doing so is necessary to protect the interests of superfund members. Members should note that this direction-making power is standard and reflects those in the regulator’s master trust and CDC authorisation regimes.

Clause 84 allows the regulator to issue a fixed penalty notice to a person if it considers they have failed to comply with some of these requirements. The penalty must not exceed £100,000.

Clause 85 allows the regulator to issue an escalating penalty notice for failure to comply with a requirement, if it has already issued the person a fixed penalty notice under clause 84 in respect of that failure. The penalty is to be determined according to regulations and must not exceed £20,000 per day.

Clause 86 enables the regulator to withdraw authorisation from a superfund if it considers that the superfund has failed to comply with its ongoing requirements. Superfund pension schemes are defined-benefit occupational pension schemes and will be subject to the employer debt provisions under section 75 of the Pensions Act 1995.

Superfunds will include a statutory employer. If that employer becomes insolvent or the scheme enters wind-up, a debt will be triggered from the employer in the normal way under section 75 if the scheme cannot secure member benefits through an insurer buy-out. That is an additional protection that matches how that is carried out in traditional defined-benefit schemes.

Clause 87 enables employer debt to be paid, or partly paid, by funds released from the capital buffer rather than directly by the statutory employer itself.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 78 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 79 to 81 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 82

Regulator’s direction-making powers during period of concern

Amendments made: 223, in clause 82, page 84, line 9, leave out

“if no response plan has been approved”

and insert

“if a person has failed to comply with section 80(1) or (3)(b) (requirement to propose response plan or revised response plan)”.

This amendment limits the direction-making power in clause 82(1)(c) so that it can only be exercised where a person has failed to produce a response plan or a revised response plan as required by clause 80.

Amendment 224, in clause 82, page 84, line 16, at end insert—

“(1A) A direction under subsection (1)(c) may not require the provision of financial support to the superfund scheme.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment provides that the direction-making power in clause 82(1)(c) cannot be used to require a person to provide financial support to the superfund scheme.

Clause 82, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 83 to 87 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 88

Power to extend superfunds legislation to similar structures

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 89 to 92 stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

This is the last grouping that covers the superfund regulatory regime. Clause 88 allows regulations to extend the superfund regime, with or without modification, to structures that share similar characteristics to superfunds. To fall within scope of the power, the structures must hold defined benefit liabilities and not be supported by a substantive employer covenant. The clause could be used, for example, to address schemes that provide benefit security through something other than a capital buffer, such as an insurance product.

Clause 89 is designed to ensure that superfund schemes, despite their special characteristics, fit within the legislative framework applicable to occupational pension schemes. Superfund schemes present particular issues because there is no traditional employer and it will not necessarily be obvious, when the scheme is established, who its eventual members will be. The intention, however, is for them to be regulated as occupational pension schemes and to be structured in a way that works with the relevant legislative frameworks.

Clause 90 makes two specified amendments to legislation in consequence of part 3. The first amendment clarifies how the employer debt legislation will apply where a superfund pension scheme is sectionalised. The second amendment will remove the requirement for a certificate of broad comparability when trustees transfer to a superfund after a scheme comes out of PPF assessment. In such circumstances, trustees will still be required to consider whether the transfer was in the interests of members, and the test in clause 59 will need to be satisfied. This will provide protection for transferring members.

Clause 91 enables transitional provision to be made in relation to a superfund that is already operating under the regulator’s interim regime, which I mentioned earlier. Clause 92 provides definitions for key terms. The Secretary of State may by affirmative regulations amend the definition of “superfund group”. This will provide the flexibility to deal with variation in those group structures and ensure that appropriate entities are captured within the regulatory regime. I commend clauses 88 to 92 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 88 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 89 to 92 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 93

Alienation or forfeiture of occupational pension

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 94 to 96 stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

Before a 2022 High Court ruling, it was widely accepted that the Pensions Ombudsman had the status of a competent court, so that a Pensions Ombudsman determination alone would be sufficient for a pension scheme to recoup an overpayment from a member’s pension. The ruling called that into question. Clause 93 simply reinstates the original policy intent that the ombudsman’s determination in pension overpayment dispute cases is sufficient. That is what was debated in Parliament when the ombudsman was established in 1931. Without this legislation, a large additional burden would be imposed on an already stretched county court system.

Turning to clause 94, being diagnosed with life-limiting illness can cause unimaginable suffering for a person and their loved ones. Those nearing the end of their life should be able to access the financial support that they need at that difficult time. I am pleased that we are now able to introduce this clause to amend the definition of terminal illness in the Pension Protection Fund and financial assistance scheme legislation.

Terminal illness is currently defined as where a member’s death from a progressive disease can be reasonably expected within six months. Clause 94 extends that to within 12 months. These new arrangements may enable a few more affected members to claim a payment, but they will mostly enable members to receive payments at an earlier stage of their illness. That small change could make a big impact for affected members at a very difficult time.

Clause 95 covers another aspect of the Pension Protection Fund: its levy. Improved scheme funding of the PPF means that it is far less reliant on the levy than it was previously. For the 2025-26 financial year, the levy has been set at £45 million, its lowest rate. However, the current legislation restricts the PPF board from increasing the levy by more than 25% of the previous year’s levy. That has made it risky for the PPF to reduce the levy significantly, even when it is not needed, because it could take several years to restore it to the previous levels if required. Clause 95 gives the board greater flexibility to adjust the levy by amending the safeguard. The new safeguard will be to prevent the board from charging a levy that is more than the sum of the previous year’s levy and 25% of the previous year’s levy ceiling.

Clause 96 focuses on pensions dashboards. Current legislation does not allow the PPF to provide to pensions dashboards information about the compensation that people can expect, or for the display of that information. The clause expands the scope of pensions dashboards to include information relating to compensation from the PPF and financial assistance from the financial assistance scheme, and it could benefit around 140,000 people. I commend clauses 93 to 96 to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

I will be incredibly brief. We have heard a number of details from the Minister. Clauses 93 to 96 contain what we believe are sensible and welcome amendments that reflect current market and scheme conditions. In particular, the changes related to the Pension Protection Fund are positive. With a strong funding position in many defined benefit schemes recently and the PPF’s healthy reserves exceeding £14 billion, these legislative changes are timely. The industry strongly supports the option for a zero levy, which reduces financial pressure on well-funded schemes. The Opposition wholeheartedly support these clauses.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I agree with the point that the Liberal Democrat spokesperson just made. The clauses represent good decisions both for those who work in the industry and for members of the public—people paying into pension schemes and hoping to get an adequate pension when they retire.

I want to comment on a few things included in the clauses. The Work and Pensions Committee report that was published a couple of years ago asked for several of the changes that are being made here, and I appreciate that the Government are now moving towards making a significant number of them in what is the most major piece of pensions legislation we have seen in years. I do appreciate the changes being made.

I am incredibly supportive of the changes to the terminal illness criteria, which create consistency with other Government legislation on the definition of terminal illness. As the Minister said, if this allows more people to access payments earlier and can improve their quality of life when they know how very short their remaining time is, it will be incredibly helpful. It will enable those individuals to access additional payments and funding more easily and quickly, so that they can make the most of the short time they have left. I appreciate that change.

The pensions dashboard changes are sensible, because people will be able to see the widest possible range of things when they log into the dashboard. It will do what it says on the tin, which is to bring everything together in one place, rather than people having to go somewhere else.

Lastly, I do not disagree on the PPF levy changes; I think this is the right decision. However, there is a significant surplus, and there are other things that could have been done with it; we will discuss new clauses 18 and 19 later. I thought the Government’s response to the Work and Pensions Committee report that I mentioned was sensible when it came to the PPF levy changes: “Yes, we agree this needs to be changed and we will look into it.” The response on the pre-1997 lack of uplift for members in the PPF and the FAS was not so helpful. It was more like, “Well, this is an impact on the Government’s balance sheet.” That is genuinely what the Government’s response says.

I am concerned that there are two very different ways of looking at the answers to those questions. In both cases, the answer could have been: “There is a significant surplus. We agree we should do something about it.” Changes could then have been made to support people who are in some cases really struggling to make ends meet, as was mentioned in last Tuesday’s witness session. That could have made a significant difference to their lives. If the Government had committed to allowing or encouraging the PPF to apply an inflationary uplift and provide support—even if they did so in a particularly progressive way, to support folk with the lowest earnings—that would have made the biggest possible difference to people who are genuinely struggling right now.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank all hon. Members for the consensus around these amendments. We will return to the question of indexation shortly with some of the new clauses. I also want to correct the record. In the exciting debate on the Pensions Ombudsman, I mentioned 1931 but meant 1991. It is not quite as old as I suggested, so I am glad that is now noted.

Question put and agreed to. 

Clause 93 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clauses 94 to 96 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 97

Amendments of Pensions Act 2004

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: 

Government amendments 229, 230, 232, 231 and 233 to 239.

Schedule.

[Torsten Bell]

Clause 97 introduces the schedule of amendments that are being made to the Pensions Act 2004. These amendments extend the regulatory functions of the Pensions Regulator to include superfunds and other matters in the Bill. Amendments 229 to 239 ensure that a similar effect is achieved in relation to the guided retirement, value for money, scale and asset allocation provisions, and the small pot measures.

I particularly draw Members’ attention to paragraph 16 of the schedule, which amends section 127 of the Pensions Act 2004 to extend the duty of the board of the pension protection scheme to superfund schemes. It is important that members of superfunds receive the same protection as members of other occupational schemes.

Paragraph 18 of the schedule amends section 224 of the Pensions Act 2004 to require that superfunds’ actuarial reports, produced in years between triennial valuations of scheme assets and liabilities, must be sent to the Pensions Regulator. This is an additional requirement for superfunds, which will allow for greater oversight by the regulator of their funding positions.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 97 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Amendments made: 229, in schedule, page 100, line 16, leave out “Part 2 or 3 of” and insert—

“Chapter 1, 2, 3A or 5 of Part 2 of, or any provision of Part 3 of,”.

This amendment confines the application of section 13 to specific Chapters of Part 2. The reference to Chapter 3A is to the Chapter referred to in the explanatory statement to NC15.

Amendment 230, in schedule, page 100, line 27, at end insert—

“(1A) Before paragraph (da) insert—

‘(dza) sections 28A to 28F of the Pensions Act 2008 (scale and asset allocation);’”

This amendment ensures that the powers of the Pensions Regulator to inspect premises conferred by section 73 of the Pensions Act 2004 are exercisable in relation to the Regulator’s functions under the new scale and asset allocation measure inserted in the Pensions Act 2008 by Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Bill.

Amendment 231, in schedule, page 100, line 31, leave out “(value for money)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 232.

Amendment 232, in schedule, page 100, line 31, leave out “Chapter 1” and insert “Chapters 1, 2, 3A and 5”.

This amendment ensures that the powers of the Pensions Regulator to inspect premises conferred by section 73 of the Pensions Act 2004 are exercisable in relation to Chapters 2, 3A and 5 of Part 2 of the Bill. The reference to Chapter 3A is to the Chapter referred to in the explanatory statement to NC15.

Amendment 233, in schedule, page 100, line 32, leave out “(superfunds)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 232.

Amendment 234, in schedule, page 101, line 16, leave out “any” and insert “or by virtue of any”.

This amendment, which relates to Amendment 235, ensures that functions under regulations made under the provisions mentioned in section 80(1)(c) are also captured by that provision.

Amendment 235, in schedule, page 101, leave out line 22 and insert—

“‘Chapter 1, 2, 3A or 5 of Part 2 of, or any provision of Part 3 of, the Pension Schemes Act 2025’”.

This amendment extends the offence in section 80 of the Pensions Act 2004 to false or misleading information provided in connection with the Pensions Regulator’s functions under or by virtue of Chapters 1, 2, 3A or 5 of Part 2 of the Bill. Chapter 3 of Part 2 is already covered, as it amends existing legislation already mentioned in section 80(1)(c). The reference to Chapter 3A is to the Chapter referred to in the explanatory statement to NC15.

Amendment 236, in schedule, page 101, line 25, leave out “any” and insert “or by virtue of any”.

This amendment, which relates to Amendment 237, ensures that functions under regulations made under the provisions mentioned in section 80A(2)(c) are also captured by that provision.

Amendment 237, in schedule, page 101, leave out line 31 and insert—

“‘Chapter 1, 2, 3A or 5 of Part 2 of, or any provision of Part 3 of, the Pension Schemes Act 2025’” —(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment extends the civil penalty provisions in section 8A of the Pensions Act 2008 to false or misleading information provided in connection with the Pensions Regulator’s functions under or by virtue of Chapters 1, 2, 3A or 5 of Part 2 of the Bill. Chapter 3 of Part 2 is already covered, as it amends existing legislation already mentioned in section 80A(2)(c).

Amendment 238, in schedule, page 102, line 10, after “legislation” insert—

“—

(a) after paragraph (d) insert—

‘(ea) Part 1 of the Pensions Act 2008 in relation to the scale requirement in section 28B or the asset allocation requirement in section 28C,’;”

This amendment ensures that the scale and asset allocation provisions in Chapter 3 of Part 2 can be the subject of a Regulator code of practice under section 90 of the Pensions Act 2004.

Amendment 239, in schedule, page 102, line 12, leave out “Part 2 or 3 of” and insert—

“Chapter 1, 2, 3A or 5 of Part 2 of, or any provision of Part 3 of,”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment confines the references in section 90(6) of the Pensions Act 2004 to specific Chapters of Part 2.

Schedule, as amended, agreed to.

New Clause 11

Sharing of database where FCA makes corresponding rules

“(1) This section applies if the Financial Conduct Authority makes rules, in relation to persons regulated by it, that correspond to value for money regulations.

(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the purpose of enabling or facilitating the use of the database mentioned in section 11(2)(d) for the publication or sharing of information—

(a) that relates to persons to whom the rules made by the Financial Conduct Authority apply, and

(b) that corresponds to metric data,

including provision conferring functions on a person appointed as mentioned in section 11(2)(d).

(3) Regulations under subsection (2) are subject to the negative procedure.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause, intended to be inserted after clause 17, allows for the same value-for-money database to be used for FCA-regulated schemes as for schemes regulated by the Pensions Regulator.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 12

Interpretation of Chapter

‘(1) In this Chapter—

“the appropriate authority” , in relation to the making of regulations, means—

(a) where the only pension schemes to which the regulations apply are FCA-regulated pension schemes, the Treasury;

(b) where the only pension schemes to which the regulations apply are not FCA-regulated pension schemes, the Secretary of State;

(c) in any other case, the Treasury and the Secretary of State acting jointly;

“the appropriate regulator” , in relation to a pension scheme, means—

(a) in relation to an FCA-regulated pension scheme, the FCA;

(b) in relation to any other pension scheme, the Pensions Regulator;

“approved main scale default arrangement” , in relation to a pension scheme, means a main scale default arrangement in respect of which the pension scheme is approved under section 28A or 28B of the Pensions Act 2008;

“consolidating” a non-scale default arrangement into an approved main scale default arrangement means ensuring that any assets held subject to the non-scale default arrangement are instead held subject to the approved main scale default arrangement;

“the FCA” means the Financial Conduct Authority;

“FCA-regulated” , in relation to a pension scheme, has the meaning given in subsection (2);

“main scale default arrangement” , in relation to a pension scheme, has the same meaning as in section 28A and 28B of the Pensions Act 2008;

“money purchase benefits” has the same meaning as in the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (see section 181 of that Act);

“non-scale default arrangement” , in relation to a pension scheme, means an arrangement—

(a) which is not an approved main scale default arrangement, and

(b) subject to which assets of the scheme must under the rules of the scheme be held, or may under those rules be held, if the member of the scheme to whom the assets relate does not make a choice as to the arrangement subject to which the assets are to be held;

“operate” , in relation to a default arrangement, has the meaning given in subsection (3);

“pension scheme” has the meaning given by section 1(5) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993;

“the provider” of a pension scheme means—

(a) in relation to an FCA-regulated pension scheme, the person mentioned in subsection (2)(b);

(b) in any other case, the trustees or managers;

“the trustees or managers” , in relation to a pension scheme, means—

(a) in the case of a scheme established under a trust, the trustees of the scheme, and

(b) in any other case, the persons responsible for the management of the scheme.

(2) A pension scheme is “FCA-regulated” if the operation of the scheme—

(a) is carried on in such a way as to be a regulated activity for the purposes of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, and

(b) is carried on in the United Kingdom by a person who is in relation to that activity an authorised person under section 19 of that Act.

(3) The provider of a pension scheme “operates” a non-scale default arrangement or main scale default arrangement if any assets held for the purposes of the scheme are held subject to the non-scale default arrangement or main scale default arrangement.’—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause makes provision about the interpretation of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory statement to NC15.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government new clause 13—Crown application.

Government new clause 14—Amendments of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.

Government new clause 15—Regulations restricting creation of new non-scale default arrangements.

Government new clause 16—Regulations about consolidation of non-scale default arrangements.

Government new clause 17—Review in relation to non-scale default arrangements.

[Torsten Bell]

These new clauses deliver proposals that are contained in the final report of the pension investment review by adding a new chapter in part 2 of the Bill.

Clause 38 set out the requirements for master trusts and group personal pensions to demonstrate that they have sufficient scale, and this new chapter merely supports that delivery. There are too many default arrangements without scale in some schemes, and this fragmentation does not benefit savers. To prevent further fragmentation, new clause 15 allows for regulations to be made to restrict the creation of new non-scale default arrangements. This is not a ban on new default arrangements; there will be circumstances where they will be in savers’ interests. However, any new non-scale default arrangements will need to obtain regulatory approval before they can accept any moneys into them.

We must also deal with the existing fragmentation, and new clause 17 requires a review to be established jointly by the DWP and the Treasury on non-scale default arrangements. This review will look at the scale of the issue and why action has not been taken to consolidate these non-scale default arrangements where it would benefit savers for that to take place.

We anticipate that the review will commence in 2029, once the value for money and contractual overrides are in place. They will provide the tools needed for providers to take action before the review commences. Those tools will help to reduce fragmentation. The FCA and the Pensions Regulator will be required to provide information and assistance to the review. Once the review has been completed, it will be required to publish its findings, and these will inform further steps to support consolidation.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I thank all Members for their patience. The new clause amends part 1 of the Pensions Act 2008. It is essential to address a current gap in the pension system to ensure that employers share timely and accurate data with pension schemes, beyond the current one-off requirement for employers to provide that information to schemes at the point when the employee is enrolled into the scheme.

Improving data records will help to improve member communications and will support pension schemes to operate more efficiently and effectively. Poor data contributes to wasted administration costs because it often requires manual interventions to verify identities and match records, which is especially important to facilitate the small pots framework that we have discussed previously.

Finally, the new clause extends the relevant pre-existing compliance provisions in the Pensions Act 2008 to these new duties, ensuring that the regulator will have suitable enforcement powers. In summary, the new clause supports better governance through improved data quality.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 20 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 22

Additional powers for certain scheme managers

“(1) Scheme regulations may make provision for the purpose of conferring any power or powers falling within subsection (2) or (4) on a specified scheme manager for a scheme for local government workers in England and Wales.

(2) Scheme regulations under this section may make provision conferring on the scheme manager (in relation to carrying out its functions as a scheme manager)—

(a) any specified power or powers of a local authority under Part 6 of the Local Government Act 1972, or

(b) any power or powers corresponding to one or more of the powers of a local authority under that Part.

(3) The power to make provision by virtue of subsection (2) is not exercisable if, or to the extent that, the scheme manager already has the powers of a local authority under Part 6 of the Local Government Act 1972 (otherwise than by virtue of scheme regulations under this section).

(4) Scheme regulations under this section may make provision conferring on the scheme manager (as part of its functions as a scheme manager) power to provide any administrative, professional or technical service for any other person who is a scheme manager for a public service pension scheme.

(5) In subsection (4)—

(a) ‘public service pension scheme’ means a scheme for the payment of pensions and other benefits to or in respect of persons of a description set out in section 1(2) of PSPA 2013, and

(b) ‘scheme manager’ (in the third place it appears) means any person who is, for the purposes of PSPA 2013, a scheme manager for any such scheme.

(6) The power to make provision by virtue of subsection (4) is not exercisable if, or to the extent that, the scheme manager already has the power to provide services referred to in that subsection (otherwise than by virtue of scheme regulations under this section).

(7) Scheme regulations under this section may amend or modify any Act passed before or in the same Session as this Act.

(8) In this section ‘specified’ means specified in scheme regulations under this section.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause enables regulations to confer additional powers specified in subsection (2) or (4) on a specific scheme manager. Most but not all of the scheme managers already have those powers, so the intention is to enable the others to be given any of the powers that they do not already have.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 23

Sections (Validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) to (Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc: Great Britain): interpretation and scope

“(1) The following provisions of this section have effect for the purposes of this section and sections (Validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) to (Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc: Great Britain).

(2) ‘GB scheme’ means an occupational pension scheme that was a salary-related contracted-out scheme in England and Wales or Scotland; and for this purpose an occupational pension scheme was a salary-related contracted-out scheme in England and Wales or Scotland at any time if the scheme was contracted-out at that time by virtue of satisfying section 9(2) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (as it then had effect).

(3) ‘Scheme actuary’, in relation to a scheme, means—

(a) the person for the time being appointed as actuary for the scheme under section 47 of the Pensions Act 1995 (professional advisers), or

(b) if there is no person so appointed, a fellow of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries appointed by the trustees or managers of the scheme to carry out the functions of the scheme actuary under section (Validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes).

(4) ‘Section 37(1)’ refers to section 37(1) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (prohibition of alterations to rules of contracted-out schemes in certain circumstances).

(5) ‘Regulation 42’ refers to regulation 42 of the Occupational Pension Schemes (Contracting-out) Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/1172) (requirements for alterations to rules of contracted-out schemes).

(6) An alteration purporting to have been made to the rules of a GB scheme is a ‘potentially remediable alteration’ if—

(a) by virtue of section 37(1) and paragraphs (1) and (2) of regulation 42 (as they had effect at the time), the alteration could not be made unless the requirements of paragraph (2)(a), (b) and (c) of regulation 42 (as they then had effect) had been met,

(b) it was treated by the trustees or managers of the scheme, after it was purportedly made, as a valid alteration,

(c) no positive action has been taken by the trustees or managers of the scheme on the basis that they consider the alteration to be void (and so of no legal effect) by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42, and

(d) it is not excluded from the scope of remediation under sections (Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) and (Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases) (see subsection (8)).

(7) In subsection (6)(c) ‘positive action’, in relation to a purported alteration, means—

(a) notifying any members of the scheme in writing to the effect that the trustees or managers consider the alteration to be void (by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42) and that the scheme will be administered on the basis that it has no legal effect, or

(b) taking any other step in relation to the administration of the scheme, in consequence of the trustees or managers considering the alteration to be void, which has (or will have) the effect of altering payments to or in respect of members of the scheme.

(8) An alteration purporting to have been made to the rules of a GB scheme is excluded from the scope of remediation under sections (Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) and (Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases) if any question relating to the validity of the alteration, so far as relating to the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42—

(a) has been determined by a court before this section comes into force in legal proceedings to which the trustees or managers were a party;

(b) was in issue on or before 5 June 2025 in legal proceedings to which the trustees or managers were a party, but has been settled by agreement between the parties at any time before this section comes into force, or

(c) was in issue on or before 5 June 2025 in legal proceedings to which the trustees or managers were a party, and remains in issue when this section comes into force.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause is intended to form part of a new Chapter 1 in Part 4 to address issues arising from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Virgin Media Ltd v NTL Pension Trustees. This decision called into question the validity of past alterations to salary-related contracted out occupational pension schemes. It appears that a number of schemes were purportedly altered without the prior actuarial confirmation required (under regulation 42(2)(b) of the Occupational Pension Schemes (Contracting-Out) Regulations 1996) being given. In other cases inadequate records mean that the current trustees or managers of some schemes cannot tell whether the necessary confirmation was given. The new Chapter will provide for the retrospective validation of such alterations where certain conditions are met, dealing with Northern Ireland pension schemes separately. The new clause also provides that alterations whose validity was in issue in legal proceedings commenced on or before 5 June 2025 are outside the scope of remediation under the new Chapter. That was the date on which a published ministerial statement indicated that the Government proposed to take retrospective legislative action to address issues arising from the Virgin Media case.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 24—Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes.

Government new clause 25—Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases.

Government new clause 26—Power to amend provisions of Chapter 1 etc: Great Britain.

Government new clause 27—Sections (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) to (Power to amend Chapter 1): interpretation and scope.

Government new clause 28—Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes.

Government new clause 29—Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases.

Government new clause 30—Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc: Northern Ireland.

[Torsten Bell]

These new clauses are intended to help schemes affected by the implications of the Virgin Media v. NTL pension trustees court judgments, which found that certain benefit changes could be void if a scheme cannot produce actuarial confirmation that they met the requirements at the time. That has created significant uncertainty about affected schemes’ liabilities and funding requirements.

The new clauses apply to private and public sector defined-benefit pension schemes that were contracted out between 1997 and 2016 under the reference scheme test, which imposed certain legal requirements upon them. The new clauses let schemes ask their actuary to confirm retrospectively that a past change to benefits would not have stopped the scheme from meeting these legal requirements at the time, rather than requiring the scheme to produce actuarial confirmation of the same facts at the time that the change was actually made. They will help members and schemes get the certainty they need.

I want to assure the Committee that these new clauses do not change the underpinning standards that were required. They are not a retrospective pardon for benefit changes that did not meet the legal standards within existing schemes. If a scheme did not obtain written confirmation at the time, and cannot obtain retrospective confirmation, the benefit changes can be held to be void, as provided for under current law.

New clause 23 defines the language and parameters of the other clauses of this section of the Bill. New clause 24 gives the trustees or managers of a scheme the power to ask the scheme actuary to confirm that a previous change to benefits would not have stopped the scheme from meeting legal requirements at that time.

New clause 25 introduces an approach for schemes whose liabilities have already been transferred to the Pension Protection Fund or to the financial assistance scheme. Any benefit changes will be deemed to have been made with actuarial confirmation in those cases. This different approach is needed because individual schemes no longer exist when they have entered the PPF, and there is no longer a scheme actuary. The PPF and FAS would also not have the information required on individual schemes to enable an actuary to provide retrospective confirmation. This ensures that the level of compensation or assistance will continue to be paid to members at current levels.

New clause 25 also introduces an explicit provision for wound-up schemes that deems that benefit changes made to the scheme were compliant with the requirement to have confirmation from an actuary. This will make sure that the benefits provided to members, for example through an annuity, will not be incorrect as a result of any historical failure to obtain a written actuarial confirmation.

The legal recourse for members would otherwise be against the former scheme trustees, because they cannot have recourse against the provider of the annuity. However, we think it would be unreasonable for these trustees to be potentially personally liable in a situation where they could not obtain a retrospective actuarial confirmation because the scheme and its records no longer exist.

New clause 26 provides a regulation-making power to provide for specified alterations to be excluded from the scope of the retrospective confirmation route and to make consequential amendments to the legislation. The power is not intended for immediate use but is included to future-proof the legislation. The clause also contains a separate power to amend existing primary legislation. I want to assure the Committee that the power is narrow, enables consequential amendments to be made, and is subject to the affirmative procedure.

New clauses 27 to 30 make mirroring provisions for Northern Ireland, at the request of the Northern Ireland Executive. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 23 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 24

Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes

“(1) This section applies to any potentially remediable alteration purportedly made to a scheme other than one to which section (Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases) applies.

(2) If the conditions mentioned in subsection (3) are met in relation to it, the alteration is to be treated for all purposes as having met the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42 before it was purportedly made, and so as having always been a valid alteration so far as those requirements are concerned.

(3) The conditions are—

(a) that the trustees or managers of the scheme have made a request in writing to the scheme actuary for the actuary to consider whether or not, on the assumption that it was validly made, the alteration would have prevented the scheme from continuing to satisfy the statutory standard, and

(b) that the scheme actuary has confirmed to the trustees or managers in writing that in the actuary’s opinion it is reasonable to conclude that, on the assumption that it was validly made, the alteration would not have prevented the scheme from continuing to satisfy the statutory standard.

In this subsection ‘the statutory standard’ means the statutory standard for a contracted-out scheme under section 12A of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 as it had effect at the time the alteration was purportedly made.

(4) A scheme actuary who has received a request under subsection (3)(a) in relation to a potentially remediable alteration to a scheme—

(a) may take any professional approach (including making assumptions or relying on presumptions) that is open to the actuary in all the circumstances of the case;

(b) may act on the basis of the information available to the actuary, as long as the actuary considers it sufficient for the purpose of forming an opinion on the subject-matter of the request.

(5) A condition mentioned in subsection (3) may be met by action taken before (as well as action taken after) this section comes into force.

(6) Subsection (7) applies to a scheme if —

(a) there is an assessment period in relation to the scheme within the meaning of Part 2 of the Pensions Act 2004, or

(b) the scheme is operating as a closed scheme under section 153 of that Act.

(7) The powers of the Board of the Pension Protection Fund under section 134 and section 155 of the Pensions Act 2004 to give directions includes power to give a direction to the trustees or managers of the scheme requiring them—

(a) to make a request under subsection (3)(a) above in relation to a potentially remediable alteration to the scheme, and

(b) to take any necessary action to enable or facilitate the making of a decision by the scheme actuary as to whether to give the confirmation described in subsection (3)(b) above in relation to that alteration.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause enables the trustees or managers of a scheme to ask the scheme actuary to consider the position of an alteration when it was (purportedly) made. If the actuary confirms that it is reasonable to conclude that at that time the alteration would not have prevented the scheme from continuing to meet the statutory standard for contracted-out schemes, then the alteration is retrospectively deemed by subsection (2) to have been validly made, so far as the requirements of regulation 42(2)(a) and (b) are concerned.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 25

Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases

“(1) This section applies to any potentially remediable alteration purportedly made to the rules of—

(a) a scheme which has been wound up before this section comes into force,

(b) a scheme for which the Board of the Pension Protection Fund has, before this section comes into force, assumed responsibility in accordance with Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Pensions Act 2004 (see section 161 of that Act), or

(c) a scheme which is a qualifying pension scheme for the purposes of regulation 9 of the Financial Assistance Scheme Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/1986) and in respect of which payments are required to be made under section 286 of the Pensions Act 2004.

(2) The alteration is to be treated for all purposes as having met the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42 before it was purportedly made and so as having always been a valid alteration so far as those requirements are concerned.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause deals with cases where it would not now be practicable for the confirmation described in NC24(3)(b) to be obtained in relation to a potentially remediable alteration. In such cases the clause retrospectively deems the alteration to have been validly made so far as the requirements of regulation 42(2)(a) and (b) are concerned.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 26

Power to amend provisions of Chapter 1 etc: Great Britain

“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend any of sections (Sections (Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) to (Powers to amend Chapter 1): interpretation and scope), (Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) and (Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases) for the purpose of providing for purported alterations of any specified description to be outside the scope of remediation under either or both of sections (Validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) and (Validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases).

(2) In subsection (1) ‘specified’ means specified in the regulations; and a specified description of purported alterations may be framed by reference to features of the alterations or of the schemes purportedly altered by them (or a combination of both).

(3) Regulations under subsection (1) are subject to the negative procedure.

(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations make incidental, supplementary, consequential or transitional provision in connection with any provision of this Chapter (other than this section and section (Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc: Northern Ireland)).

(5) Regulations under subsection (4) may amend any Act passed before or in the same Session as this Act.

(6) Regulations under subsection (4) are subject to the affirmative procedure if they contain provision made under subsection (5); otherwise they are subject to the negative procedure.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause enables regulations made for England and Wales or Scotland (a) to specify further categories of alterations in respect of which the clauses validating otherwise void alterations do not apply and (b) to make incidental, supplementary, transitional or consequential provision relating to any provision of the new Chapter addressing the validity of alterations to pension schemes.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 27

Sections (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) to (Power to amend Chapter 1): interpretation and scope

“(1) The provisions of this section have effect for the purposes of this section and sections (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) to (Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc: Northern Ireland).

(2) ‘NI scheme’ means an occupational pension scheme that was a salary-related contracted-out scheme in Northern Ireland; and for this purpose an occupational pension scheme was a salary-related contracted-out scheme in Northern Ireland at any time if the scheme was contracted-out at that time by virtue of satisfying section 5(2) of the Pension Schemes (Northern Ireland) Act 1993 (as it then had effect).

(3) ‘Scheme actuary’, in relation to an NI scheme, means—

(a) the person for the time being appointed as actuary for the scheme under Article 47 of the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 (SI 1995/3213 (N.I. 22)) (professional advisers), or

(b) if there is no person so appointed, a Fellow of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries appointed by the trustees or managers of the scheme to carry out the functions of the scheme actuary under section (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes).

(4) ‘Section 33(1)’ refers to section 33(1) of the Pension Schemes (Northern Ireland) Act 1993 (prohibition of alterations to rules of contracted-out schemes in certain circumstances).

(5) ‘Regulation 42’ refers to regulation 42 of the Occupational Pension Schemes (Contracting-out) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1996 (SR 1996 No. 493).

(6) An alteration purporting to have been made to the rules of an NI scheme is a ‘potentially remediable alteration’ if—

(a) by virtue of section 33(1) and paragraphs (1) and (2) of regulation 42 (as they had effect at the time), the alteration could not be made unless the requirements of paragraph (2)(a), (b) and (c) of regulation 42 (as they then had effect) had been met,

(b) it was treated by the trustees or managers of the scheme, after it was purportedly made, as a valid alteration,

(c) no positive action has been taken by the trustees or managers of the scheme on the basis that they consider the alteration to be void (and so of no legal effect) by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42, and

(d) it is not excluded from the scope of remediation under section (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases) (see subsection (7)).

(7) In subsection (6)(c) ‘positive action’, in relation to a purported alteration, means—

(a) notifying any members of the scheme in writing to the effect that the trustees or managers consider the alteration to be void (by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42) and that the scheme will be administered on the basis that it has no legal effect, or

(b) taking any other step in relation to the administration of the scheme, in consequence of the trustees or managers considering the alteration to be void, which has (or will have) the effect of altering payments to or in respect of members of the scheme.

(8) An alteration purporting to have been made to the rules of an NI scheme is excluded from the scope of remediation under sections (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) and (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases) if any question relating to the validity of the alteration, so far as relating to the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42—

(a) has been determined by a court before this section comes into force in legal proceedings to which the trustees or managers were a party,

(b) was in issue on or before 5 June 2025 in legal proceedings to which the trustees or managers were a party, but has been settled by agreement between the parties at any time before this section comes into force, or

(c) was in issue on or before 5 June 2025 in legal proceedings to which the trustees or managers were a party, and remains in issue when this section comes into force.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause makes provision for Northern Ireland corresponding to NC23. Northern Ireland generally has its own pensions legislation which is separate from the legislation applying to England and Wales and Scotland.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 28

Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes

“(1) This section applies to any potentially remediable alteration purportedly made to an NI scheme other than one to which section (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases) applies.

(2) If the conditions mentioned in subsection (3) are met in relation to it, the alteration is to be treated for all purposes as having met the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42 before it was purportedly made, and so as having always been a valid alteration so far as those requirements are concerned.

(3) The conditions are—

(a) that the trustees or managers of the scheme have made a request in writing to the scheme actuary for the actuary to consider whether or not, on the assumption that it was validly made, the alteration would have prevented the scheme from continuing to satisfy the statutory standard, and

(b) that the scheme actuary has confirmed to the trustees or managers in writing that in the actuary’s opinion it is reasonable to conclude that, on the assumption that it was validly made, the alteration would not have prevented the scheme from continuing to satisfy the statutory standard.

In this subsection ‘the statutory standard’ means the statutory standard for a contracted-out scheme under section 8A of the Pension Schemes (Northern Ireland) Act 1993 as it had effect at the time the alteration was purportedly made.

(4) A scheme actuary who has received a request under subsection (3)(a) in relation to a potentially remediable alteration to a scheme—

(a) may take any professional approach (including making assumptions or relying on presumptions) that is open to the actuary in all the circumstances of the case:

(b) may act on the basis of the information available to the actuary, as long as the actuary considers it sufficient for the purpose of forming an opinion on the subject-matter of the request.

(5) A condition mentioned in subsection (3) may be met by action taken before (as well as action taken after) this section comes into force.

(6) Subsection (7) applies to a scheme if —

(a) there is an assessment period in relation to the scheme within the meaning of Chapter 3 of Part 3 of the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 2005 (SI 2005/255 (N.I. 1)) , or

(b) the scheme is operating as a closed scheme under Article 137 of that Order.

(7) The powers of the Board of the Pension Protection Fund under Article 118 and 139 of the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 2005 to give directions include power to give a direction to the trustees or managers of the scheme requiring them—

(a) to make a request under subsection (3)(a) in relation to a potentially remediable alteration to the scheme, and

(b) to take any necessary action to enable or facilitate the making of a decision by the actuary as to whether to give the confirmation described in subsection (3)(b) in relation to that alteration.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause makes provision for Northern Ireland corresponding to NC24.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 29

Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases

“(1) This section applies to any potentially remediable alteration purportedly made to the rules of—

(a) a scheme which has been wound up before this section comes into force,

(b) a scheme for which the Board of the Pension Protection Fund has, before this section comes into force, assumed responsibility in accordance with Chapter 3 of Part 3 of the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 2005 (see Article 145 of that Order), or

(c) a scheme which is a qualifying pension scheme for the purposes of regulation 9 of the Financial Assistance Scheme Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/1986) and in respect of which payments are required to be made under section 286 of the Pensions Act 2004.

(2) The alteration is be treated for all purposes as having met the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42 before it was purportedly made and so as having always been a valid alteration so far as those requirements are concerned.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause makes provision for Northern Ireland corresponding to NC25.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 30

Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc: Northern Ireland

“(1) A Northern Ireland Department may by regulations amend any of sections (Sections (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) to (Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc: Northern Ireland): interpretation and scope), (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) and (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases) for the purpose of providing for purported alterations of any specified description not to be within the scope of remediation under either or both of sections (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) and (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases).

(2) In subsection (1) ‘specified’ means specified in the regulations; and a specified description of purported alterations may be framed by reference to features of the alterations or of the schemes purportedly altered by them (or a combination of both).

(3) A Northern Ireland Department may by regulations make incidental, supplementary, consequential or transitional provision in connection with any provision of this Chapter (other than section (Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc: Great Britain) and this section).

(4) Regulations made under this section are subject to negative resolution within the meaning given by section 41(6) of the Interpretation Act (Northern Ireland) 1954.

(5) The power of a Northern Ireland Department to make regulations under this section is exercisable by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1573 (N.I. 12)).”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause enables regulations made for Northern Ireland (a) to specify further categories of alterations in respect of which the clauses validating otherwise void alterations do not apply and (b) to make incidental, supplementary, transitional or consequential provision relating to any provision of the new Chapter addressing the validity of alterations to pension schemes.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 1

Universal Pension Advice Entitlement

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations establish a system to ensure that every individual has a right to receive free, impartial pension advice at prescribed times.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must provide for individuals to be offered advice—

(a) at or around the age of 40; and

(b) at a prescribed age, not more than six years before the individual's expected retirement age.

(3) The regulations must make provision about—

(a) the content and scope of the free, impartial pension advice, which may include, but is not limited to, guidance on—

(i) pension types (including both defined contribution and defined benefit schemes),

(ii) investment strategies,

(iii) charges,

(iv) consolidation of pension pots, and

(v) retirement income options;

(b) the qualifications, independence, and impartiality requirements for any person or body providing advice;

(c) the means by which individuals are notified of their entitlement to receive the advice and how they may access it;

(d) the roles and responsibilities of pension scheme trustees, managers, and providers in facilitating access to advice;

(e) the sharing member information with prescribed persons or bodies subject to appropriate data protection safeguards.

(4) Regulations under this section may—

(a) make different provision for different descriptions of pension schemes or different descriptions of individuals;

(b) confer functions in connection with the provision or oversight of the advice on—

(i) the Pensions Regulator,

(ii) the Financial Conduct Authority,

(iii) the Money and Pensions Service, or

(iv) other prescribed bodies;

(c) require the provision of funding for the advice service from prescribed sources.

(5) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”—(John Milne.)

This new clause makes provision by regulations for everyone to receive free, impartial pension advice at age 40 and again around five years before their expected retirement.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[John Milne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Pension Schemes Bill (Sixth sitting)

Torsten Bell Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

Division 11

Ayes: 3

Noes: 9

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

I beg to move amendment 92, in clause 38, page 41, line 8, leave out “of the totality”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 94.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 93 to 96 and 133.

[Torsten Bell]

It is wonderful to have you in the Chair, Ms Butler. Amendments 92 to 96 are minor amendments that clarify that any asset allocation percentage requirements should be calculated as a percentage of default funds, rather than as a percentage of the total assets of a scheme. That is how the Mansion House accord works and how these powers are intended to operate.

Amendment 133 simply ensures that the Government can remove redundant provisions from primary legislation should the sunset provisions—which as a result of Government amendment 228 will now appear in clause 101—cause the power we have been discussing to expire. I commend the amendments to the Committee.

Amendment 92 agreed to.

Amendments made: 93, in clause 38, page 41, line 9, after “in” insert “default”.

This amendment confines the application of the asset allocation requirement to default funds of a relevant Master Trust or a group personal pension scheme.

Amendment 94, in clause 38, page 41, leave out lines 10 to 14 and insert—

“(2) Regulations under subsection (1) may prescribe a percentage by reference to—

(a) all of the assets of the scheme that are held in default funds, or

(b) a prescribed description of the assets of the scheme that are so held.”.

This amendment clarifies that a percentage may be prescribed under section 28C(1) in respect of either all the default funds of a scheme or a particular subset of those default funds.

Amendment 95, in clause 38, page 41, line 15, leave out “or (2)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 94.

Amendment 96, in clause 38, page 41, line 18, leave out from “description” to end of line 19.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 93.

Amendment proposed: 275, in clause 38, page 41, line 31, at end insert—

“(5A) A description of asset prescribed under subsection (4) may not be securities in any UK water company.”—(Mark Garnier.)

This amendment would ensure that the prescribed percentage of asset allocation would not include assets in the water sector and fund trustees will not be compelled to allocate scheme assets to the water sector.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

This amendment removes the “common investment strategy” element from the definition of “default funds” to avoid confusion with how that term is used in section 28A and 28B.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 98, in clause 38, page 42, line 12, leave out “relevant Master Trusts or” and insert—

“the trustees or managers of relevant Master Trusts or the providers of”.

This amendment clarifies that legal obligations fall on the trustees or managers of relevant Master Trusts or on the providers of group personal pension schemes (rather than on the schemes themselves).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 99 to 105.

New clause 32—Impact Assessment for defined benefit schemes’ asset allocation changes—

“(1) Before implementing any regulatory or policy change for defined benefit schemes’ asset allocation, the Secretary of State must assess the impact of such a change on schemes’ asset allocations.

(2) To determine the impact of a change outlined in subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult with—

(i) the Debt Management Office,

(ii) industry stakeholders, and

(iii) such individuals or organisations as they deem appropriate.

(3) If the assessment under subsection (1) determines that a change could result in schemes shifting away from owning gilts to equities, the Secretary of State must publish an impact assessment before the implementation of the change.”.

This new clause requires an impact assessment for defined benefit schemes’ asset allocation changes.

[Torsten Bell]

I will start with the Government amendments and then turn to new clause 32. The amendments relate to proposed new section 28C and specify more detail about the role of the regulator in over- seeing the granting and withdrawal of approvals under this section, including a penalty-making power where a provider does not comply with the relevant requirements, and a clarification to ensure that subsection (14) on the interaction of these provisions with scheme documentation operates as intended.

New clause 32 would require the Secretary of State to conduct an impact assessment—and I appreciate, as I am sure the Opposition will come to shortly, that it is an impact assessment for a particular purpose—before implementing any regulatory or policy change for defined-benefit schemes’ asset allocation. First, let me reassure the hon. Member for Wyre Forest that the Government have no plans to make such changes to defined-benefit schemes’ asset allocation. I reiterate that the reserved powers contained in the clause only relate to defined-contribution workplace schemes. There are no plans to change defined-benefit asset allocations through the Bill. Therefore, the new clause is not considered necessary, and I encourage the hon. Member not to press it. I am sure he will want to make some wider points about the changes in asset allocation within defined-benefit schemes, and their impact on the wider economy.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

I rise to speak to new clause 32, which looks at the effects of some of the changes on the UK gilt market. Defined-benefit pension schemes are major holders of UK Government bonds, with pension funds holding around 28% of the gilt market —the UK Government bond market—as of early 2022. Those investments provide stable, long-term funding for the UK Government and are essential to the functioning of the debt market.

Significant shift by DB schemes away from gilts and into equities—which, in itself, is not a bad thing, as long as it does not happen in a disorganised way, which could be prompted by policy changes—may reduce the demand for gilts, potentially increasing yields and destabilising the market. At the end of the day, if 28% of the ownership of the gilt market is taken away, somebody else needs to be found to buy it. Otherwise, there will be a falling market. We all know what a gilt crisis looks like for pension funds. The 2022 gilt crisis highlighted the market’s vulnerability to large and sudden sales by pension funds, which triggered a fire-sale spiral and required Bank of England intervention to stabilise prices. It was not a good day. The Debt Management Office and market experts have noted that the gilt market is highly reliant on pension fund investment, and any structural reduction in demand could impact Government borrowing costs and market stability.

The Office for Budget Responsibility has highlighted concern about the impact of a low gilt allocation scenario, which is likely if the Bill achieves the outcomes that the Government want. A low gilt allocation scenario would mean that pension sector allocation of gilt holdings would drop to 10% of GDP by around 2040, down from around 30% today. That in itself, all other things being equal, would result in an extra £22 billion of debt interest payments on the current gilt market. We are highly concerned that a wholesale move from the gilt market by the pension industry places even more burden on the Treasury to manage debt payment. As the deficit continues to grow, the Government must have laser focus on the impact on the gilt market in relation to how they fund Government debt.

The new clause introduces a requirement for an impact assessment before any regulatory or policy changes that could materially alter DB schemes’ asset allocations away from gilt. It should mandate consultation with the Debt Management Office and industry stakeholders to monitor and mitigate risk to market stability. We are not trying to stop the Government persuading pension funds into equities or other alternative investments, but we need a proper conversation with the Debt Management Office about what that means for the cost of Government borrowing, which could potentially be significant.

[Torsten Bell]

I will not speak for long. The hon. Member is absolutely right to say that defined-benefit schemes have been material buyers of gilts over a long period. The market is perhaps deeper and more robust than what some of his remarks might imply. There is a range of participants in our gilt markets. However, I take the point that pension schemes are one of them. Contributions such as those from the Office for Budget Responsibility are valuable in that debate, and I reassure him on two fronts. First, I know that he did not mean it quite like this, but the deficit is not growing this year; in fact, it is falling by around 1% of GDP, marking us out from some other countries. Secondly, he is absolutely right to say that the DMO should and does engage with market participants across a wide range of matters. However, on that basis, and on the basis that the Bill does not envisage changes in DB schemes’ asset allocations, I ask him to withdraw the new clause.

Amendment 98 agreed to.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

I rise to support amendment 276. It is similar to some of the points that I brought up earlier, which were also brought up in the oral evidence session, about the consistency and existence of that pipeline and the fact that it needs to be there. Reviewing in advance of a decision being made on mandation would be the sensible thing.

I mentioned earlier the issue with chickens and eggs—which comes first?—and I think the amendment brings more of a focus in primary legislation on ensuring that the pipeline exists in order that these companies and organisations can meet their commitments under the Mansion House agreement. It is all well and good for them to have the Mansion House agreement, but if the opportunities are not there and are not investment-ready, it will be difficult for them to meet those targets. This is a sensible amendment, and I am more than happy to support it.

[Torsten Bell]

Before I come to the detail of the amendment, I should re-emphasise the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Tamworth about the volume of amendments to clause 38 in particular, which is why I asked for the amended clause with track changes to be circulated to the whole Committee. I hope that Members have found that useful.

Turning to the amendment, I have a lot of sympathy for what my hon. Friend is trying to achieve. It is important that we monitor progress on the Mansion House commitments and continue to stay focused on the strength of the pipeline. There are parts of the Bill that would already facilitate that, including data collection that is consistent with monitoring the Mansion House progress, and the strength of the pipeline, which was obviously relevant to consideration of the saver’s interest test, and thus left in the Bill. I suggest that, given our sympathy with the idea of this amendment but its interactions with several other existing parts of the Bill, we commit to reviewing it with a view to deciding whether we should come back with something similar on Report, if the hon. Lady is content with that.

[Sarah Edwards]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 105, in clause 38, page 43, line 7, at end insert—

“(and for that purpose, a provision of the trust deed or rules of the scheme is ‘in conflict’ with provision under this section so far as the former does not allow for the assets of the scheme to be managed in such a way as to meet the conditions for approval under this section)”.

This amendment clarifies the application of section 28C(14).

Amendment 106, in clause 38, page 43, line 8, leave out subsection (15).—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 129.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 107, in clause 38, page 43, line 9, at end insert—

“28CA Information

(1) Regulations may make provision about information that the trustees or managers of a relevant Master Trust or the provider of a group personal pension scheme must give to the Regulatory Authority about the allocation of assets of the relevant Master Trust or group personal pension scheme.

(2) The regulations may make provision about—

(a) the types of information that must be given;

(b) when it must be given;

(c) the form and manner in which it must be given.”

This new section would allow regulations to require the provision of information about asset allocation to the Secretary of State and the Regulatory Authority.

The amendment is supplementary to a provision in the introduced Bill, proposed new section 28C(10)(d), which permits the Government to make regulations about the provision to regulators of information relating to the allocation of assets by the relevant pension providers. The amendment ensures that, in the event that the regulator does not possess crucial information that the Government require in order to design the possible asset allocation framework, or to write the report on saver and growth impacts that they will be legally required to produce, the Government can obtain that information via the regulators.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I want to ask the Minister why the amendment has been tabled. Have the regulators asked for it so that they can get the information they need, or has the provision been identified by the Government? Basically, what consultation is being done to ensure that the amendment makes sense and is doing what people need it to do?

[Torsten Bell]

The direct answer is that, yes, the amendment comes from discussions with regulators, to make sure that the flow of information is sufficient to live up to Parliament’s intent and that meaningful reports on the saver and growth impacts can be provided.

Amendment 107 agreed to.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 108, in clause 38, page 43, line 19, at end insert “, and

(b) has a credible plan in place for meeting the scale requirement within the meaning of section 28A(2)”.

This amendment makes it a condition of approval for transition pathway relief that a Master Trust has a credible plan in place for meeting the scale requirement.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 109 and 131.

[Torsten Bell]

This group of amendments deals with the transition pathway relief, which we touched on earlier in the context of support for innovation within the pension landscape.

First, amendments 108 and 109 amend proposed new section 28D so that, to be approved on the transition pathway, a master trust or group personal pension scheme respectively must produce a credible plan for meeting the scale requirements, before the end of the pathway. I should clarify what I said earlier, sorry—this is the transition pathway; we are not talking about the new entrant pathway.

In addition, via amendment 131, we are inserting new subsection (15A) into clause 38, to ensure that the pathway will expire five years after the scale requirements come into force. We accept that in certain circumstances schemes may need more time to reach scale, but we want the end destination—going back to our conversation about scale and certainty that scale will be achieved—to be clear. I commend these minor amendments to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

I thank the Minister for talking through the amendments. We understand the intention behind them, but we are worried that, as can often be the case, there may be an unintended consequence: the creation of a closed shop for master trusts. We do not want suddenly to find that, in trying to make a transition pathway, we end up making things more difficult because it has been interpreted in the wrong way. We are minded to oppose the amendments, but perhaps the Minister could instead give us his thoughts on how we can ensure that they do not get used the wrong way and that we do not end up with a closed shop of master trusts.

[Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)]

I echo what the shadow Minister has just highlighted. We all want the reform that the Bill introduces, but we do not want what results from this process to be set up forever, with a lack of opportunity for change; I will talk a little further about that when we come to new clause 3. Some reassurance from the Minister that there is an opportunity for new entrants and innovation would be extremely welcome.

[Torsten Bell]

I apologise for my slip of the tongue at the start of my speech. This group of amendments deals with transition pathway relief. Here, in many cases we are talking about existing schemes that may not meet the £25 billion threshold, but which have a plausible path to that scale requirement over the following five years—I think that is a point of consensus across the Committee. That is what we are engaging with here. It is a reasonable approach to avoid a cliff edge, for exactly the reason that the shadow Minister set out.

[Mark Garnier]

I completely understand that. The question is, what is plausible? One man’s plausible might be another man’s impossible. That is the bit that we are worried about: how to ensure that someone is not squeezed out who otherwise could be in it.

[Torsten Bell]

I completely recognise that. Let me say a few words about how we have tried to balance those tests. We want to see the industry get to scale, and we want clarity about what the end point is, but we want to provide a pragmatic approach to how we get there. Balancing that is what drove us to the five-year approach, which is different from some of the earlier discussions in the pensions investment review about an earlier, harder deadline of 2030.

Within the Bill there is flexibility for regulators where people are just approaching the deadline or in other situations, to avoid difficult situations where people’s authorisation is put into question at short notice. That is important, but so is providing the clarity that they will be required to get to scale. It cannot be a never, never. It needs to be a pathway to a destination; it cannot just be a hope.

I think that we have taken a pragmatic, balanced approach, but I appreciate that others will have their views. There will be those in the industry who will worry that they may not be on track to meet those scale requirements, but that is in the nature of the beast of our saying that the industry needs to change. I appreciate that that will mean some change for some organisations. We have tried to be flexible and to take a pragmatic approach.

Amendment 108 agreed to.

Amendments made: 109, in clause 38, page 43, line 28, at end insert—

“, and

(b) has a credible plan in place for meeting the scale requirement within the meaning of section 28B(2).”

This amendment makes it a condition of approval for transition pathway relief that a group person pension scheme has a credible plan in place for meeting the scale requirement.

Amendment 110, in clause 38, page 43, line 33, leave out “authorisation” and insert “approval”.

This amendment is to ensure that new section 28D of the Pensions Act 2008 refers correctly to an approval under new section 28A or 28B of that Act.

Amendment 111, in clause 38, page 44, line 15, after “20(1A)” insert “or section 26(7C)(c)”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment corrects an omission so that new section 28E of the Pensions Act 2008 works effectively for group personal pension schemes.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 112, in clause 38, page 44, line 20, at end insert—

“(za) the scheme in question does not yet have any members,”

This amendment ensures that relief under section 28E is only available to schemes that are not yet operational.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 113 to 115.

New clause 3—New market entrants: scale and asset allocation—

“(1) In making regulations under Chapter 3, the Secretary of State must have regard to the need to identify and mitigate barriers faced by new market entrants in the defined contribution pensions market.

(2) The Secretary of State must consider how regulations will—

(a) foster a competitive environment that supports innovation among new and existing providers;

(b) ensure fair access to the market for schemes with strong potential for growth and an ability to innovate, including those not yet meeting prescribed scale thresholds.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to consider the effect of regulations under Chapter 3 on scale and asset consolidation on new market entrants.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

These amendments clarify aspects of the approval criteria for prospective new entrants into the multi-employer DC market after the scale requirements come into force. Amendment 112 requires that a new prospective provider must have no current members—it must actually be new to the market. We want to ensure that the route is used only by those for whom it is intended, rather than as a loophole around the main intent of the Bill.

Amendment 113 requires that new entrants have strong potential to grow in order to meet the scale requirements under section 28A, and that the prospective scheme in question has an innovative product design. I think we will come to the question of product shortly, but to skip ahead, the regulations would allow us to talk about innovation in the nature of the service, not just in the product. That is a question for us to take away in the design of those regulations. That is not in the Bill itself, but it is an important clarification.

The remaining amendments in this group are consequential on amendment 113. They will offer greater clarity to potential applicants to this pathway, and I commend them to the Committee.

I thank the hon. Member for Torbay for tabling new clause 3 and acknowledge his wish that the pathway for new entrants into the DC multi-employer market be as supportive as possible for new providers. We of course agree with that sentiment. We want to see fewer, bigger schemes, but not a lack of competition in the longer run, even though we are a long way from that.

From an innovation viewpoint, the new clause is not necessary to achieve that aim. Competition will come from the possibility of innovation, but must also flow into the building of scale, which is the overall intent of the legislation. Given that the spirit of the new clause is achieved by the new entrants pathway, I ask the hon. Gentleman not to press it to a vote.

[Steve Darling]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner.

Will the Minister put a little more flesh on the bone in respect of the ladder of opportunity for new entrants? We need to make sure that we do not end up with a system with large schemes and nobody being able to get into the super-league of opportunity that we have currently. We want to see innovation over time and hoped that, through the new clause, we could bake that into the system. We can have aspirations for how future Ministers deal with these matters, but we must give confidence to the industry in respect of future entrants, so that it continues to be a vibrant industry that drives investment and growth for people’s pensions. That is essential. We would be extremely grateful for some more flesh on the bone.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

To add briefly to the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay, I emphasise that with new clause 3 we are taking a non-prescriptive approach. It says that

“the Secretary of State must have regard to the need to identify and mitigate barriers faced by new market entrants in the defined contribution pensions market.”

It is a very gentle ask. We are all very aware of the issues today, but will they still be in everybody’s mind in the future?

[Torsten Bell]

I will come back on the question about the word “product” and definitions. I reassure the Committee that I will go away and make sure that is clear if it is not clear enough already.

The core Liberal Democrat question is, are we baking innovation in? It is a good question for us all to be asking. I think the answer is yes. To broaden the conversation out slightly, we want to see innovation from existing providers as well. We anticipate that there will still be 15 or so large providers in the 2030s. That is still a highly competitive market. Not just looking at costs but also at customer service and all the rest in the value for money regime should be a spur to that innovation. That is a key part of the set of clauses we were discussing last week.

I should explicitly note that the scale tests do not cover the most obvious innovation that is likely to come in the market in the coming years, which is CDC schemes. By their nature, if they are to be successful, they will get to scale anyway, but to make their path easier and to be clear that we do see a role for CDC innovation moving forward, those are not part of these requirements. The innovation pathway exists for exactly this reason, as we have discussed.

Several Members have raised a question about consultation. I confirm that there is a requirement for a public consultation, which should certainly learn lessons that go beyond the experience of the pensions industry to the wider financial services sector—lessons of competition entry. We talked about that in the banking sector earlier, but the same thing would apply, for example, to other parts of the insurance sector and others. We will take that away. We are very conscious at the moment, in our wider approach to regulation, of providing earlier authorisation, where that can be done. I suspect we may come back to that in the superfunds discussion later this week.

Amendment 112 agreed to.

Amendments made: 113, in clause 38, page 44, leave out lines 21 and 22 and insert—

“(a) the scheme in question has strong potential to grow so as to meet the scale requirement under section 28A,

(aa) the scheme in question has an innovative product design, and”.

This amendment ensures that the eligibility conditions for new entrant pathway relief are more precisely articulated.

Amendment 114, in clause 38, page 44, line 34, leave out from “of” to “(including” in line 35 and insert “ “strong potential to grow” and “innovative product design” ”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 113.

Amendment 115, in clause 38, page 44, line 36, leave out from “has” to end of line 37 and insert “strong potential to grow or an innovative product design”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 113.

Amendment 116, in clause 38, page 45, leave out lines 1 and 2.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 129.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 117, in clause 38, page 45, line 4, leave out “may” and insert “must”.

This amendment, together with Amendment 118, means that regulations about suspending the requirement for approval under section 28C have to have effect at any time when section 28C has effect as a result of regulations under that section.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 118 to 124.

[Torsten Bell]

This is a group of minor amendments, mostly aiming at improving the clarity of proposed new section 28F, for example by removing duplication. I draw Members’ attention to the most significant amendments, which are amendments 117 and 118. They make clear that the Government must introduce the savers’ interest exemption mechanism if they are to introduce asset allocation requirements. That is a “must” rather than a “may” because the Government’s intention is that there must always be a savers’ interest exemption.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have a brief comment on Government amendment 117. Because there were so many amendments, it was quite difficult to ensure that the Minister went through all of them with a fine-toothed comb. The explanatory statement for this one does not make any sense to me—it perhaps makes sense to other people. Reading the explanatory statement was deeply unhelpful, and I ended up being more confused than I was before. I appreciate the intention—what the Minister said amendment 117 was for—and the way that he described the rest of the amendments in this group, but I am pointing out for future reference that it would be helpful if we could understand the explanatory statements.

[Torsten Bell]

Noted.

Amendment 117 agreed to.

Amendments made: 118, in clause 38, page 45, line 9, at end insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State must make regulations under subsection (1) so that they have effect whenever regulations under section 28C(1) or (2) have effect.”

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 117.

Amendment 119, in clause 38, page 45, line 14, leave out “the scheme or”.

This amendment means the asset allocation requirement can only be suspended where it would cause material financial detriment to the members of a scheme.

Amendment 120, in clause 38, page 45, line 15, leave out from “the scheme” to end of line 17.

This amendment simplifies the description of what may be done by regulations under new section 28F(1).

Amendment 121, in clause 38, page 45, line 17, at end insert—

“(aa) may make provision about the basis on which the Authority may or must form such a view, including about the evidence which the Authority may or must take into account;”.

This amendment clarifies that the regulations can circumscribe the basis on which the FCA or TPR can reach a view on the material financial detriment test in subsection (2)(a).

Amendment 122, in clause 38, page 45, line 23, at end insert—

“(c) must provide for the Authority’s determination on an application to be referred to the Upper Tribunal.”

This amendment ensures that decisions on an application for the suspension of the asset allocation requirement will be referable to the Upper Tribunal.

Amendment 123, in clause 38, page 45, leave out lines 24 to 26.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 121.

Amendment 124, in clause 38, page 45, line 28, after “as” insert “material”.

This ensures that regulations under subsection (4) can also make provision about what kind of detriment is classed as “material”.

Amendment 125, in clause 38, page 45, line 30, leave out subsection (5).—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 129.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 127, in clause 38, page 45, line 31, at end insert—

“28G Risk notices

(1) The Regulatory Authority (‘the Authority’) may give a risk notice to the trustees or managers of a relevant Master Trust if the Authority considers that—

(a) there is an issue of concern in relation to the relevant Master Trust, and

(b) the relevant Master Trust will, or is likely to, cease to meet the conditions for approval under section 28A or 28C if the issue is not resolved.

(2) A ‘risk notice’ is a notice that requires the trustees or managers of a relevant Master Trust to submit to the Authority a plan (a ‘resolution plan’) setting out proposals for resolving the issue of concern.

(3) A risk notice must—

(a) identify the issue of concern;

(b) specify the date by which the resolution plan is to be submitted.

(4) If the Authority is not satisfied that the proposals in a resolution plan are likely to be adequate to resolve the issue of concern, the Authority may give a further notice to the trustees or managers requiring them to submit a revised plan by a date specified in the notice.

(5) The trustees or managers must implement the proposals in a resolution plan if the Authority—

(a) is satisfied that the proposals are likely to be adequate to resolve the issue of concern, and

(b) notifies the trustees or managers accordingly.

(6) The Authority may direct the trustees or managers to comply with the requirement imposed by subsection (5).

(7) Where the trustees or managers are required by subsection (5) to implement the proposals in a resolution plan, they must—

(a) submit to the Authority, before the end of a period specified in regulations, a report setting out what progress they are making in implementing the proposals (a ‘progress report’);

(b) submit further progress reports to the Authority at intervals specified by the Authority.

(8) Resolution plans and progress reports must be provided in the manner and form specified by the Authority.

(9) A reference to a resolution plan in subsections (4) to (8) includes a reference to a resolution plan as revised under subsection (4).

(10) Regulations may—

(a) specify information that a risk notice must contain;

(b) provide that the date referred to in subsection (3)(b) or (4) must fall before the end of a period specified in the regulations.

(11) Section 10 of the Pensions Act 1995 (civil penalties) applies to a trustee or manager of a relevant Master Trust who fails to comply with—

(a) a notice under subsection (1) or (4),

(b) a direction under subsection (6), or

(c) a requirement imposed by subsection (7).”

This amendment allows the Regulatory Authority to issue risk notices to the trustees or managers of a relevant Master Trust or the provider of a group personal pension scheme if there were an issue in relation to the scheme relating to the quality requirement.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 128 and 126.

[Torsten Bell]

These amendments relate to compliance and enforcement. Government amendment 127 allows the Pensions Regulator to issue risk notices to the trustees or managers of a relevant master trust or the provider of a group personal pension scheme if there were an issue in relation to the scheme relating to the quality requirement. This will require the relevant master trust to develop a resolution plan to address the regulator’s concerns. The regulator may then direct the relevant master trust to implement the measures in that plan.

Amendment 128 allows regulations to make provision for the imposition of penalties where a relevant master trust or GPP scheme accepts contributions from an employer when it should not. It will allow the regulator to issue penalties of up to £100,000 in relation to each employer from which contributions continue to be accepted. It will also give the provider the right of appeal against the penalty.

Amendment 126 enables the FCA to monitor and enforce compliance of any FCA-regulated person in scope of chapter 3 of part 2 of the Bill. It also provides that the Treasury may make regulations to enable the FCA to take action for monitoring and enforcing compliance of any FCA-regulated person with any provision under chapter 3. I commend the amendments to the Committee.

[Kirsty Blackman]

It looks like these amendments came up because of conversations with the regulator, which is looking to ensure that it can use the powers that the Bill intends to create. This is not the first time we have had amendments that have been suggested by the regulator. I would appreciate it if the Minister could go away, and, perhaps when he is making regulations or bringing forward future legislation on pensions, ensure that he has more in-depth chats with the regulator in advance, so the original legislation can be drafted in a way that will work for the regulator, rather than having to be amended after Second Reading.

[Torsten Bell]

Point noted.

Amendment 127 agreed to.

Amendments made: 128, in clause 38, page 45, line 31, at end insert—

“28H Penalties

(1) Regulations may make provision about the imposition by the Regulatory Authority of a penalty on the trustees or managers of a relevant Master Trust or the provider of a group personal pension scheme where the scheme—

(a) fails to meet the condition in section 20(1A) by virtue of not being approved under section 28A or 28C, and

(b) accepts contributions from an employer in relation to a jobholder on the basis that it is an automatic enrolment scheme in relation to that jobholder.

(2) Regulations may make provision about the imposition by the Regulatory Authority of a penalty on the provider of a group personal pension scheme where the scheme—

(a) fails to meet the condition in section 26(7A) or (7B), and

(b) accepts contributions from an employer in relation to a jobholder on the basis that it is an automatic enrolment scheme in relation to that jobholder.

(3) The regulations must provide—

(a) that a penalty must not exceed £100,000 in relation to each employer from which contributions are accepted as mentioned in subsection (1)(b) or (2)(b), and

(b) that there is a right of appeal against the imposition of the penalty.”

This amendment allows regulations to make provision for the imposition of penalties where a relevant Master Trust or a group personal pension scheme accepts contributions from an employer in relation to a jobholder on the basis that it is an automatic enrolment scheme in relation to that jobholder.

Amendment 126, in clause 38, page 45, line 31, at end insert—

“28I Enforcement by the Financial Conduct Authority

(1) The Treasury may make regulations to enable the Financial Conduct Authority to take action (in addition to any action it may otherwise take under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000) for monitoring and enforcing compliance of any FCA-regulated person with any provision of or under this Chapter.

(2) The regulations may apply, or make provision corresponding to—

(a) provision made by or under this Part in relation to the Regulator, or

(b) any provision of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000,

with or without modification.

(3) In this section, ‘FCA-regulated person’ means an authorised person (within the meaning of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000).”

This amendment allows monitoring and enforcement functions to be conferred on the FCA in relation to the compliance of FCA-regulated persons with provisions of or under Chapter 1 of the Pensions Act 2008, including the new provisions on scale and asset allocation.

Amendment 129, in clause 38, page 46, line 9, leave out subsection (14) and insert—

“(14) In section 99 (interpretation of Part)—

(a) the existing words become subsection (1);

(b) in that subsection, at the appropriate places insert—

‘“group personal pension scheme” means a personal pension scheme which is available, or intended to be available, to employees of the same employer or of employers within a group, but does not include—

(a) a stakeholder pension scheme (as defined in section 1 of the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999), or

(b) any pension scheme that requires all its members to make a choice as to how their contributions are invested;’;

‘“Regulatory Authority” has the meaning given by regulations under subsection (2);’;

‘“relevant Master Trust” has the meaning given by section 20(4);’;

(c) after that subsection insert—

‘(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations define “Regulatory Authority” for the purposes of this Part.’”

This amendment consolidates certain interpretative provisions. It also amends the definition of “group personal pension scheme” so that only schemes where all members select their investment approach are excluded.

Amendment 130, in clause 38, page 46, line 19, leave out “26(7A), 28E” and insert—

“26(7A), (7B), (7C) or (7E),”.

This amendment, together with Amendment 132, ensures that regulations relating to the new scale and asset requirements are subject to affirmative parliamentary procedure.

Amendment 131, in clause 38, page 46, line 20, at end insert—

“(15A) The following provisions of the Pensions Act 2008 (which relate to transition pathway relief) are repealed at the end of the period of 5 years beginning with the day on which they come into force—

(a) paragraph (c) of Condition 1 in section 20(1A);

(b) section 26(7C)(b);

(c) section 28D;

(d) the word ‘28D’ in section 143(5)(a).”

This amendment provides for transition pathway relief to cease to be available 5 years after the commencement of the scale requirement.

Amendment 132, in clause 38, page 46, line 20, leave out “28C,” and insert—

“28C (other than subsection (10)(d))), 28D, 28E, 28F, 28H, 28I,”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 130.

Amendment 133, in clause 38, page 46, line 21, leave out subsection (16) and insert—

“(16) If this section is repealed under section 101(5A) (repeal where asset allocation requirement uncommenced) in respect of the insertion of the provisions mentioned in that subsection, the Secretary of State may by regulations amend this section in consequence of that repeal.

(17) Regulations under subsection (16) are subject to the negative procedure.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is related to Amendment 228. It allows for regulations to be made tidying up the various references to the asset allocation requirement in clause 38 in the event that the power to commence that requirement is never exercised.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendments related to section 38

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 134 in clause 39, page 46, line 36, after “2008” insert—

“in relation to the scale requirement in section 28B or the asset allocation requirement in section 28C,”

This amendment, together with Amendment 135, ensures that provisions in or under the Pensions Act 2008 are added to section 204A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (meaning of “relevant requirement” and “appropriate regulatory”) only so far as they relate to the scale requirement or the asset allocation requirement.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 135 to 137.

Clause stand part.

Clause 40 stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

As amended, the clause introduces consequential amendments relating to clause 38 to ensure that the changes needed for the asset allocation and scale measures appropriately wire into existing legislation. The clause does this by making amendments to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the Pension Schemes Act 2017. The clause makes an insertion into section 1A and an amendment to section 204A of the 2000 Act. It ensures that the FCA’s statutory functions are extended, which would include its new enforcement functions for clause 38 in relation to scale and asset allocation.

The second part of the clause adds new authorisation criteria for master trusts into the 2017 Act. These new criteria will require trustees of a master trust to satisfy the Pensions Regulator that they have a sufficient investment capability and continue to have a main scale default arrangement. Introducing these criteria will enable implementation of the Government’s policy objective, set out in the final report of the pension investment review, to ensure schemes utilise the benefits of scale to deliver better investment outcomes.

The clause sets out factors that the Pensions Regulator will be required to consider in deciding that the master trust authorisation criteria are met and enables further detail to be set out in regulations. The effect of these additions to the authorisation regime are essential as they help to drive capability within master trusts. I commend clause 39 to the Committee.

Government amendments 134 and 135 ensure that the necessary extension of the FCA’s authorisation functions under FSMA encompass only its new role in overseeing the scale and asset allocation requirements and does not extend to other non-relevant requirements in the Pensions Act 2008. It has a constraining effect.

Government amendment 136 makes it clear that the addition to section 5 in part 1 of the Pension Schemes Act 2017 regarding decisions on application is about the scheme meeting the scale requirements under condition 1 of section 20(1)(a) of the Pensions Act 2008. Government amendment 137 gives the Secretary of State the ability to set out the meaning of terms in specific areas. I urge Members to support Government amendments 134 to 137.

Clause 40 deals with the application of scale and asset allocation measures to Crown schemes. The substantive provisions in chapter 3 take the form of amendments to the Pensions Act 2008, the Pension Schemes Act 2017 and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. These Acts already deal with application to the Crown in their own way, and it is not the intent of the Government to disrupt or confuse these settled positions. Accordingly, after consideration, we seek to delete this clause. To be clear, I do not commend the clause to the Committee.

Amendment 134 agreed to.

Amendments made: 135, in clause 39, page 46, line 38, after “2008” insert

“in relation to the scale requirement in section 28B or the asset allocation requirement in section 28C,”

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 134.

Amendment 136, in clause 39, page 47, line 10, leave out “quality” and insert “scale”

This amendment changes a parenthetical description so that it is clearer.

Amendment 137, in clause 39, page 47, line 27, leave out from “(2)” to end of line 32 and insert—

“(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations—

(a) make provision about the meaning of terms used in subsection (2);

(b) specify further factors that the Pensions Regulator must take into account in deciding whether it is satisfied about the matters mentioned in subsection (1).

(5) The first regulations that are made under this section are subject to affirmative resolution procedure.

(6) Any other regulations under this section are subject to negative resolution procedure.”— (Torsten Bell.)

This amendment expands the power currently in the new section 12A(3) of the Pension Schemes Act 2017, created by clause 39(11) of the Bill, so as to allow the Secretary of State to make provision about the meaning of terms in new section 12A(2) of the Pension Schemes Act 2017.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 138, in clause 39, page 47, line 32, at end insert—

“12B Scale requirement

(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about how the Pensions Regulator is to decide whether it is satisfied that a Master Trust scheme that has its main administration in the United Kingdom meets Condition 1 in section 20(1A) (scale requirement) of the Pensions Act 2008.

(2) The regulations may, among other things, specify matters which the Pensions Regulator must take into account in making its assessment.

(3) The first regulations under this section are subject to affirmative resolution procedure.

(4) Any subsequent regulations under this section are subject to negative resolution procedure.”

This amendment inserts in the Pension Schemes Act 2017 a power to make regulations about how the Pensions Regulator is to decide whether a Master Trust meets the scale requirement.

It is with some relief that I reassure Members this is the last amendment to this section of the Bill. Government amendment 138 amends one of the new authorisation criteria for master trusts that the Bill inserts into the Pension Schemes Act 2017, which provides that a master trust scheme must meet the scale requirement. It grants the Government the power to make regulations about how the pensions regulator should satisfy itself that a master trust scheme has met the scale requirements. I commend the amendment to the Committee.

Amendment 138 agreed to.

Clause 39, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 40 disagreed to.

Clause 41

FCA-regulated pension schemes: contractual override

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 140, in clause 41, page 48, line 22, after “2008” insert “or section 3(2), 5(2) or 7(3) of the Pensions (2) Act (Northern Ireland) 2008 (c. 13 (N.I.))”

This amendment extends the application of the contractual override measure to Northern Ireland pension schemes.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 141 to 146.

Clause stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

We now come to the contractual override part of the Bill. This group of amendments expands the scope of clause 41 to apply to Northern Ireland pension schemes. Just like in Great Britain, many pension scheme members in Northern Ireland will be in arrangements delivering poor value and outcomes. However, due to a lack of engagement from members, there is often little providers can do to address that. Extending these changes to Northern Ireland will help to solve that. These amendments will create better outcomes for pension scheme members in Northern Ireland, and I therefore ask the Committee to support these amendments.

Amendments 143 and 144 add another layer of consumer protection to the already rigorous consumer protections we have included in the Bill. Currently a provider is required to receive certification from an independent person with sufficient expertise that the best interest test has been met. To clarify, that test requires the provider that wishes to use the contract override to carry out an assessment that it is in the interests of scheme members that the override take place. That test then has to be certified by an independent person. This is about strengthening that independent person test. The amendments require the Treasury to make regulations defining “independence” by specifying requirements which must be met by an independent person before they can be appointed, and ensure that the independent person has no conflict of interest. The FCA is then required to include the provisions made by these regulations in its rules. The amendments make an important change to the Bill by ensuring there will be clear rules on who can undertake this important role, and I therefore commend them to the Committee.

Clause 41 inserts proposed new part 7A, on what we call the contractual override mechanism—referred to as a unilateral change—into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. This will enable providers of FCA-regulated, defined-contribution workplace pension schemes —note we are talking about FCA-regulated, defined-contribution workplace schemes only—to override the terms of a pension scheme without the consent of members and either transfer members to a different pension scheme, make a change that would otherwise require consent, or vary the terms of members’ contracts, but only when certain clear conditions, including most importantly the best interest test, are met. This will establish broad equivalence with the trust based market, where these changes are already available, so trustees already have these powers within the trust-based market. It will also create better outcomes for consumers, deliver on a long-awaited industry ask, and help drive scale and consolidation within the sector, achieving the consolidation we talked about in relation to the previous clause. It is an important enabler of those changes.

The clause also amends sections 105, 168 and 429 of FSMA to ensure that the contractual override mechanism can work as intended, and to ensure that the appropriate parliamentary procedures apply to regulations that are made under this part, and that amend or repeal primary legislation. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Amendment 140 agreed to.

Amendments made: 141, in clause 41, page 48, line 24, leave out from “member”” to end of line 25 and insert

“means an active member within the meaning of Part 1 of the Pensions Act 2008 (see section 99 of that Act) or Part 1 of the Pensions (2) Act (Northern Ireland) 2008 (c. 13 (N.I.)) (see section 78 of that Act).”

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 140.

Amendment 142, in clause 41, page 48, line 33, leave out from “arrangements”” to end of line 34 and insert

“means direct payment arrangements within the meaning of section 111A of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 or section 107A of the Pension Schemes (Northern Ireland) Act 1993.”— (Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 140.

[Sarah Edwards]

I beg to move amendment 278, in clause 41, page 49, line 26, at end insert

“and only after VFM assessments are available to the Trustees as part of the decision making process.”

This amendment would restrict external transfers until VFM assessments are available to ensure that Trustees can carry out their fiduciary duty.

The amendment relates to contractual override. It may have been covered in the new drafting of the clauses, as it was tabled on the previous text. The Minister may have seen this potential eventuality, and it may be provided for elsewhere, but we have spoken at length in Committee about the importance of pensions adequacy and about the landscape moving towards a higher membership of defined-contribution schemes.

The amendment is an attempt to bridge the gap presented by the delay between the regulations’ implementation, and to ensure that investments are made not on the basis of low-cost, low-risk funds prior to the regulations being implemented, which potentially would lock down investments. It is another small addition that clarifies the importance of the value for money framework, which the Bill is championing, and it adds to the requirement of consent in the provision by adding focus on ensuring that value for money assessments are available prior to the transfer, as an extra protection for trustees to carry out their fiduciary duty.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank my hon. Friend. She is right that it is important that we think through how to line up the value for money work with the question we are now turning to on contractual overrides. I will come back to distinguish between the data that comes through the value for money process and the actual formal assessments themselves, which is what is referred to in the amendment. We agree that the value for money data is vital for ensuring consumer protections, and it is why the implementation of the contractual override mechanism is already being timed so that it is in conjunction with the value for money framework. The very keen can read that in the road map we set out in June, which gets into exactly those questions.

To go into a bit more detail—and I appreciate that my hon. Friend already knows this—the data for the value for money assessment will be available ahead of the formal assessments, and it is on that basis that people will be able to go ahead with some forms of contract override—for example, when they are moving members within parts of the individual providers, so they would have all the information that they require.

My hon. Friend raised a specific question about when people are being transferred between schemes. Should that always wait for the full value for money assessments? I will give her another commitment that I will take that away and consider it. There may be some circumstances in which that information is available, and we do not wish to unduly constrain providers, but it is a reasonable point for us to be discussing. As I say, she is right to raise the point about the interaction between the value for money data, including its visibility to other people, and the contractual override. If she is happy to withdraw the amendment, I will consider whether we can provide further clarity on the point on Report.

[Sarah Edwards]

On that basis, I am happy to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move amendment 257, in clause 41, page 53, line 7, at end insert—

“117GA FCA guidance

(1) The FCA must issue guidance on contractual overrides.

(2) Guidance on contractual overrides must include—

(a) when and how overrides can be used;

(b) how to demonstrate transfers are always in members’ best interests; and

(c) how contractual overrides are independently certified.”

Amendments 255, 256 and 257 ensure that contractual override powers are operational in advance of the first value for money assessments.

The amendment is very similar to amendment 278, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Tamworth. The industry has highlighted to us a concern that the Government’s proposed sequencing will not provide enough time between contractual overrides becoming permissible and VFM assessments being conducted, which will totally undermine the effectiveness of consolidation and value improvement. Pensions UK has encouraged the Government to accelerate that and to bring forward the implementation to allow schemes to make progress on consolidation sooner, so that the override is in place well in advance of the VFM framework.

We drafted amendment 257 with the idea that if transfers took place before the VFM framework was implemented, further guidance from the FCA would be required on how and when overrides could be used. However, we welcome the compromise set out in amendment 278, which would ensure that external transfers do not take place until VFM assessments are available. Frankly, that amendment is better-crafted than ours. If we had done them the other way around, I would have deferred to the advice of the hon. Member for Tamworth on whether she wanted to move the amendment. She was right to withdraw her amendment, and we will withdraw ours, but I urge the Minister to write to us both on the outcome of this matter before Report. It would be useful to have his comments beforehand so that we can challenge him on Report, and possibly move the amendment again—who knows?

[Torsten Bell]

As the hon. Member has asked so kindly, I assure him that I will write to him and to my hon. Friend the Member for Tamworth ahead of Report.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 143, in clause 41, page 53, line 8, leave out “Powers to make” and insert “Treasury”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 144.

Amendment 144, in clause 41, page 53, line 25, at end insert—

“(1A) The Treasury must by regulations require the FCA to include provision of a description specified in the regulations in general rules made in compliance with section 117E(4)(a) (how to determine whether a person is independent), alongside any other provision included in such general rules.

(1B) Regulations under subsection (1A) must in particular require the FCA to include in such general rules provision designed to ensure that the independent person does not have a conflict of interest.”

This amendment requires the Treasury to make regulations about the requirements that need to be met by an independent person appointed under section 117E.

Amendment 145, in clause 41, page 53, line 38, leave out from “benefits”” to end of line 39 and insert

“means money purchase benefits within the meaning of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (see section 181(1) of that Act) or the Pension Schemes (Northern Ireland) Act 1993 (see section 176(1) of that Act);”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 140.

Amendment 146, in clause 41, page 54, line 3, leave out from “scheme”” to end of line 4 and insert

“means a personal pension scheme within the meaning of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (see section 1(1) of that Act) or the Pension Schemes (Northern Ireland) Act 1993 (see section 1(1) of that Act);”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 140.

Clause 41, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 42

Default pension benefit solutions

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 147, in clause 42, page 55, line 9, leave out “eligible members” and insert “each eligible member”.

This amendment clarifies that trustees or managers are required to make a default pension benefit solution available to every eligible member of the scheme.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 148 to 155.

Clause stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

We now move from the contractual override provisions of the Bill to the default pension benefit solutions. This is a material change to our pension landscape, as the defined contribution landscape has matured, as I will come to. Again, I am glad that there has generally been cross-party consensus on the issue.

Clause 42 is pivotal in ensuring that members of defined-contribution pension schemes are provided with default options for pension benefit solutions when they want to access their pension assets, thereby reducing the complexity for individuals of securing an income in and through later life. These solutions must be designed to provide a regular income to members during retirement. The clause makes provision for an exemption where that would not be appropriate. We intend to set out in regulations what is meant by

“designed to provide a regular income”

and by “retirement”.

Members will have access to pre-designed benefit solutions that are tailored to meet the needs of the scheme’s membership. The intention is that, normally, individuals need not make a decision about how they would take their pension benefits, except to confirm that they want to start receiving payment. The clause also provides for periodic reviews to be prescribed to ensure that the solutions remain appropriate.

Not only will this measure support our commitment to enhancing the pension system robustness and ensuring that members normally benefit from a later-life income with the necessary communications of governance alongside it, but it will potentially provide the trustees with a level of assurance in relation to the investment strategy, enabling decisions about investment in longer-term assets, which will support the opportunity for investment in productive assets, including in the UK. The Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, raised that point in another context, but in this part of the DC landscape in particular, this provision means that schemes will not need to move all assets into safer assets as people approach retirement, if they are clear about the product that people will be in during their retirement.

Government amendments 147 to 155 are minor. They provide clarity on what is a default pension benefit solution, who is an eligible member and what is a relevant scheme, and they provide for the negative parliamentary procedure for subsequent regulations relating to when, and in what circumstances, default pension benefit solutions need to be reviewed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

If you will give me a bit of leeway, Mr Turner, I promise to speak only once on default pension benefit solutions. I might stray slightly outwith clause 42.

I am looking for clarity from the Minister on default pension benefit solutions. We have heard a lot of concern about how communications cannot be made to members, how there are possible issues with advertising and how members are communicated with. Can the Minister confirm that he is taking that concern seriously and has ensured that, under the General Data Protection Regulation and other data protection legislation, schemes can communicate legally with members in order to provide pension benefit solutions without being traced by the Information Commissioner’s Office or marketing regulators? Providers have raised that concern regularly.

I made it clear on Second Reading and in the oral evidence sessions that I think this proposal is a good thing. It is a massive concern that so many people are taking a lump sum without any plan for what that might look like or how the rest of the money will enable them to continue to live their life as they would like. I am really pleased that we are moving towards a better situation. However, we have not asked providers to do this before; it is something new. Providers will have to upskill themselves to make this change, both in their conversations with scheme members and in assessing whether the solutions that they provide are the correct ones.

Pension providers and insurers are used to putting people in boxes and saying, “This is a box of people for whom this solution might work.” However, some providers may not be used to clumping people together like that and providing solutions that will work for as many of them as possible. I do not think that there is a different way to do it. However, I would appreciate reassurance from the Minister that this will be kept under review; that there will be a significant amount of conversation with providers, as well as with scheme members who are receiving advice or a direction to a default scheme; and that regulators will keep an eye on whether the suggested default pension benefit solutions are appropriate for as many people as possible.

Of particular interest to me is the review timescale. What will happen to ensure that the proposal is working as intended? As I say, I think it is the right thing to do, but I want to make sure it works. I want people to have the best possible outcomes in retirement. If the position is marginally better than it is today, that will be good but not great. It would be lovely if it were way better, and if people were being suggested or guided to the solutions most appropriate for them. We do not just want to move from people dumping everything in a bank account to some people not doing so. It would be great to know that the solutions provided were working for a majority of people.

I would welcome any comfort that the Minister can give me on the review period and on what reassurance Parliament will have that people are being offered the solutions. As I say, provided that I get decent answers from him, I will be quite happy not to talk again for this entire portion of the Bill. I am sure that people will be delighted to hear that.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Lady for rightly raising the important question of communication to members. I draw the Committee’s attention to clause 44, which explicitly aims, in quite some detail, to engage with that question. It contains requirements on providers—again, with the detail to come in regulations—about how they set out their general policy, but also how they communicate to particular individuals as they head towards retirement and, potentially, enrolment in a default solution.

It is absolutely right to say that this measure is new for providers, for regulators and for the industry in the UK, and we should always have that in mind. We should take some comfort from the success of automatic enrolment in doing something new. Other countries had moved to auto-enrolment solutions ahead of us, and the same is true here to a degree. In Australia, there is a similar pattern: it has got further ahead in terms of the average size of pots, has seen some of the negative outcomes that we can potentially see in the data in the UK, and has then moved to a version of this and is working that through. We will be able to learn from its experience, as well as just working this through ourselves.

The hon. Lady asked how the measure will be taken forward. We aim to launch a public consultation in the spring and summer next year. These requirements would come in earlier than some of the wider changes that the Committee has discussed—on small pots, for example, which will come far later, and on value for money. We think it is urgent that we get on with this, because we are approaching a situation in which DC pots will be significant for some members, but I completely appreciate her point that it is a large change for the industry.

Clause 44 requires some direct communications with members. I reassure the hon. Lady that there is nothing in the GDPR or other data protection requirements that would prevent providers from communicating in that way. They will not require consent from members to do it, which is important, because otherwise it would not be effective. There are wider questions about direct marketing—communications that are not about setting out the actual situation—in this space, and I am considering those. They are tied up with questions about targeted support and the rest, but it is important for us to continue thinking about this in the pensions space, where there is a history of downsides to direct marketing. We want to make sure that this is not that, but provision of information about the working of a scheme of which someone is a member.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Once this measure beds in—once we have people being moved to default benefit solutions, or those boxes and the solutions have been created—how will it be kept under review? Will there be a process for review five years down the line, when a significant number of people have been moved to default benefit solutions, to ensure that it is working as intended and that any potential problems that Australia perhaps did not come across can be ironed out?

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Lady for that question. There is not a formal requirement on the Secretary of State to carry out a review as we are going. My honest view is that any regulator and Secretary of State will want to actively monitor what happens. I very strongly expect that this will be discussed at great length at every single pension conference around those years, because all the providers will be talking to each other about how they are taking these things forward.

The hon. Lady will remember the discussion last Tuesday with some providers, including the National Employment Savings Trust and People’s Pension, about how they are already planning to bring these solutions forward. Although they are new for the industry, most providers had already been thinking about this, because they know that it would be the right thing to do even if there were not a Government requirement to do it, and because I have been clear with them for quite some time that this is the direction of travel in both the trust market and the GPP market.

I am not sure that we need a rigid, set date for a review, but I will take away the hon. Lady’s wider question about what reassurance we can offer that people will be actively monitoring what has happened rather than just watching and seeing what happens. I can certainly write to the regulators, for example, to make it clear that that will be our expectation.

Amendment 147 agreed to.

Amendments made: 148, in clause 42, page 55, line 11, at beginning insert

“at least in such circumstances or”.

This amendment allows for regulations to provide that particular events (as well as times or intervals) trigger a requirement to review default pension benefit solutions.

Amendment 149, in clause 42, page 55, line 13, leave out “relevant” and insert “pension”.

This amendment ensures that the definition of “pension benefit solution” is capable of operating in relation to a pension scheme that is not a relevant scheme (such as a collective money purchase scheme).

Amendment 150, in clause 42, page 55, line 25, leave out

“as a default pension benefit solution,”

and insert

“of the scheme as the pension benefit solution under which—

(i) the eligible members of the scheme generally, or

(ii) a subset of those eligible members,

will receive pension payments unless they choose to receive pension payments under a different pension benefit solution,”.

This amendment clarifies the definition of “default pension benefit solution”.

Amendment 151, in clause 42, page 55, line 40, at end insert

“;

(d) such other factors as may be prescribed.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment allows other factors to be added by regulations to the factors that trustees or managers of a relevant scheme have to take account of in determining what default pension benefit solutions the scheme should make available.

[Steve Darling]

I beg to move amendment 279, in clause 42, page 55, line 40, at end insert—

“(4A) The trustees or managers of a relevant scheme, in determining whether to adopt or vary a default pension benefit solution, must—

(a) issue a written notice of the proposal to all members of the scheme, including—

(i) the expected impact on benefits and investment strategy, and

(ii) a written attestation that a market-wide assessment of all available options was undertaken;

(b) ensure a consultation period of at least 60 days has elapsed;

(c) confirm that fewer than 10 per cent of eligible members have objected in writing.”

This amendment adds the “without member opposition” safeguard to defined contribution schemes when changes to default pension benefit solutions are considered. It also requires a whole of market assessment to ensure the best solutions are chosen for members.

It is a privilege to move the amendment, because as Liberal Democrats we want to make sure that pensioners are at the heart of the Bill, as do many colleagues of different parties in this room, I am sure. For us, it is about driving a positive culture of engagement. The expectations that these proposals would place on managers or trustees would drive a positive engagement culture, as well as putting guardrails and protections around investments. I would welcome the Minister’s reflections on how the Bill would tackle our aspiration for the positive engagement culture that I am sure all Members in the room wish to see achieved through the Bill.

[Torsten Bell]

The amendment is absolutely right that trustees should consider a wide range of options when they are developing their default pension benefit solutions. As I have just remarked to the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, I suspect that that will be a big focus for trustees and scheme managers in the years ahead. Clause 48 does make provision for trustees or managers to consider the needs and interests of scheme members. I would emphasise that as the priority, as opposed to considering every option already on the market, because we are looking for them to develop the right solutions. In most but not all cases, that will be in-house; we will come back to some of the cases where they will not be doing that. We do not want to make it sound like an off-the-shelf situation in lots of cases, although I appreciate that doing their job will require them to look across the market.

I have a slight worry about setting a hard 10% of membership expressing an objection as a way of vetoing an approach. First, in many cases, there will not be a single default solution for members within a scheme; there will be a number of them for different cohorts within that scheme, not least based on the size of pots or their wider situation. We do not want a subset of a scheme to be able to vote down the solutions for everybody within the scheme, which is what the amendment would allow. The amendment would also allow those who are a very long way from retirement to shape the outcomes for those who are about to come to retirement.

My most important point, however, is that individuals have an absolute right to opt out. Although we talk in terms of default, just as we talk about automatic enrolment, the purpose is that this is a softer default than automatic enrolment. That is partly because we are expecting multiple defaults, not a single one where everyone is required to save at least a certain amount, but also because people will be able to opt out and have a range of different defaults.

I hope that I have provided reassurance that the Bill already includes important safeguards, and that trustees and scheme managers will already need to consider the issues that the Liberal Democrat amendment rightly puts on the table.

[Steve Darling]

I thank the Minister for his positive feedback. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 152, in clause 42, page 56, line 1, leave out

“are to assess the needs and interests of its”

and insert

“of a scheme are to assess the needs and interests of the scheme’s”.

This amendment corrects a minor verbal inconsistency.

Amendment 153, in clause 42, page 56, line 14, leave out “money purchase benefits” and insert

“benefits falling within paragraph (a) of the definition of ‘money purchase benefits’ in section 181(1) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993”.

This amendment restricts the definition of “eligible member” of a relevant scheme so that it does not include members who are accruing or entitled to collective money purchase benefits.

Amendment 154, in clause 42, page 56, line 16, leave out “established under a trust”.

This amendment amends the definition of “relevant scheme” so schemes that are not established under a trust may fall within the definition.

Amendment 155, in clause 42, page 56, line 25, at beginning insert “(1)(b) or”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment provides for negative parliamentary procedure for regulations that prescribe when or in what circumstances default pension benefit solutions need to be reviewed.

Clause 42, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 43

Transferable members

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 156, in clause 43, page 56, line 29, leave out—

“a member of the scheme”

and insert—

“eligible members of the scheme (whether comprising the members of the scheme generally or a subset of those members)”.

This amendment clarifies how the exclusion in clause 43(1) operates.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 157 to 160 and 165.

[Torsten Bell]

We have now reached clause 43—the clause that deals with the situation I mentioned briefly earlier, which is where a scheme thinks that it is in the best interests of its members that the default solution is provided by another scheme or provider, and it sets out how that should take place. Amendments 156 to 160 and 163 and 165 all relate to the operation of providing pension benefit solutions via transfers to another scheme. The intention of the amendments is merely to provide helpful clarifications or to otherwise ensure that the clauses operate in line with the policy intent.

Amendment 156 clarifies that trustees or managers may choose to offer to transfer all the scheme’s members to another scheme for the purpose of providing a pension benefit solution, or just a subset of those members—as I said before, there may be a different cohort within each scheme with the right default for them. Amendment 158 clarifies that it will be for trustees or managers of a relevant scheme to determine whether it is reasonably practical for the scheme to provide a default pension benefit solution. Amendment 160 clarifies that trustees or managers of a relevant scheme may offer to transfer members to another scheme if they have determined that the other scheme would provide a better outcome for those members than they would provide within their own scheme—again, the interests of members should come first.

Amendments 157 and 159 are consequential amendments. Amendment 163 clarifies that trustees or managers of a relevant scheme must arrange for transfers to take place and not just facilitate them. That ensures that members should be supported through the whole process—we do not want schemes thinking their job is done as soon as they have set out that process, and leaving members to wrestle with it. These are minor but important technical amendments. They do not alter policy. I ask the Committee to support them.

Amendment 156 agreed to.

Amendments made: 157, in clause 43, page 56, line 30, leave out from “such” to end of line 31 and insert—

“members are referred to in this Chapter as ‘transferable members’.”

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 156.

Amendment 158, in clause 43, page 56, line 32, leave out from “that” to “to design” in line 33 and insert—

“the trustees or managers of the principal scheme have determined that it is not reasonably practicable for them”.

This amendment makes the first condition in clause 43(2) subject to the determination of the trustees or managers.

Amendment 159, in clause 43, page 56, line 33, leave out “that member” and insert “the members concerned”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 156.

Amendment 160, in clause 43, page 56, line 36, leave out from “have” to end of line 38 and insert—

“determined that a qualifying pension benefit solution of a qualifying scheme (other than the principal scheme) will provide a better outcome for the members concerned than any default pension benefit solution that the trustees or managers of the principal scheme could design and make available to them.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment clarifies the application of the second condition in clause 43(3).

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 161, in clause 43, page 57, line 1, leave out “and willing” and insert “to and agrees”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 174.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 162 to 164, 175, 174 and 176.

[Torsten Bell]

In cases where trustees or managers of a relevant scheme have determined that it is not reasonably practical to provide a solution themselves, or that better member outcomes could be achieved if another scheme delivered a solution, they can arrange for the transfers to be made. That is what clause 43 permits. Whether a member is receiving a default solution in-house or being transferred to another scheme to receive that solution, the policy intent is that the member experience should be broadly similar—there should not be a difference in their experience of it. Amendment 164 seeks to ensure that there is parity in the requirement placed on schemes. In particular, the amendment requires schemes to ensure that a scheme receiving transferable members is able to provide a pension benefit solution that meets the needs and interests of the scheme’s membership.

Amendment 174 aims to ensure that no scheme will be left in a position where it is unable to comply with the wider guided retirement provisions due to factors outside their control. There is a requirement on schemes to provide guided retirement under the Bill, but if there are factors outside their control that make that difficult, we want to have a backstop that is provided by introducing a power to designate schemes of last resort, which could be used to facilitate transfers from any relevant pension scheme for the purpose of providing a qualifying pension benefit solution. Hon. Members will think of the similar approach that NEST provided in auto-enrolment world—although we are not intending to need it in this case—where employers would always have a scheme they could go to, given that there was a requirement on them to enrol employees.

Amendments 161, 162 and 174 merely provide helpful clarifications or otherwise ensure that clause 43 operates in line with the policy intent. Amendment 176 applies the negative parliamentary procedure to regulations relating to highly technical aspects of the policy. These amendments, taken together, provide for small targeted changes to clause 43, and I encourage hon. Members to support them.

Amendment 161 agreed to.

Amendments made: 162, in clause 43, page 57, line 7, at beginning insert

“at such times or in such circumstances as may be prescribed,”.

This amendment allows for regulations to specify when transfer arrangements need to be entered into.

Amendment 163, in clause 43, page 57, line 8, leave out “facilitating relevant transfers” and insert

“effecting a relevant transfer to that scheme”.

This amendment clarifies that schemes will be required to arrange with receiving schemes to carry out relevant transfers (not just to facilitate them).

Amendment 165, in clause 43, page 57, line 9, leave out

“steps required by the regulations”

and insert “prescribed steps”.

This amendment corrects a verbal inconsistency.

Amendment 164, in clause 43, page 57, line 9, at end insert—

“(5A) In carrying out the step in subsection (5)(a), the trustees or managers of the principal scheme must have regard to the matters mentioned in section 42(4) (and for that purpose references in those paragraphs to “the scheme” are to the principal scheme).

(5B) Section 42(5) applies for the purposes of subsection (5A) as it applies for the purposes of section 42(4).

(5C) The trustees or managers of the principal scheme must, at least in such circumstances or at such times or intervals as may be prescribed, review the suitability of any qualifying pension benefit solution in respect of which they have identified a qualifying scheme as mentioned in subsection (5)(a).”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment ensures that schemes are subject to similar duties in respect of their “transferable members” to the duties to which they are subject in respect of other eligible members.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 167, in clause 43, page 57, line 10, leave out “In subsection (5)(a)(ii)” and insert “In this Chapter,”.

This amendment reflects the fact that “qualifying pension benefit solution” is, as a result of other amendments, now used more widely in the Chapter.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 166 and 168 to 173.

Clause stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

We now move to the substance of clause 43 and the proposed amendments. Clause 43 allows schemes to partner with another for the purpose of delivering a suitable pension solution to their membership—or cohorts of their membership. It allows those transfers to qualifying pension benefit solutions when either providing an in-house solution is not reasonably practicable, or a solution offered by another scheme is deemed to provide a better outcome for members. It requires trustees or managers of the principal scheme to identify qualifying schemes that provide solutions that meet the requirements of their membership. That could, for example, include transferring members to a collective defined-contribution scheme. Power is also taken to limit or prohibit the charging of transfer fees. This clause is vital overall, as it provides the flexibility that I have discussed in the course of debate on the previous group of amendments and allows trustees to deliver the best outcomes for their members.

Amendment 154 removes a drafting error and clarifies that all occupational pension schemes that provide defined-contribution benefits are included in the definition of relevant scheme, not just those established under a trust. Whether a pension scheme member is receiving a default solution in-house or being transferred to another scheme to receive a qualifying solution, as I said earlier, the policy intent is that they have a similar experience.

Amendments 166 to 169 and 173 ensure that there is a parity of requirements on schemes in those cases. Amendments 170 and 171 are consequential amendments, while amendment 172 corrects a minor inconsistency in language. I commend them and the clause to the Committee.

Amendment 167 agreed to.

Amendments made: 166, in clause 43, page 57, line 10, after “solution”” insert

“, in relation to a qualifying scheme,”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 167.

Amendment 168, in clause 43, page 57, line 12, leave out “receiving”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 167.

Amendment 169, in clause 43, page 57, line 15, leave out

“eligible members of the receiving”

and insert “members of the”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 167, and also reflects the fact that a qualifying scheme need not necessarily be a relevant scheme, so the reference to “eligible members” (which is defined by reference to “relevant schemes”) is not right in all cases.

Amendment 170, in clause 43, page 57, line 16, leave out “eligible”.

This amendment reflects the fact that a qualifying scheme need not necessarily be a relevant scheme, so the reference to “eligible members” (which is defined by reference to “relevant schemes”) is not right in all cases.

Amendment 171, in clause 43, page 57, line 17, leave out “eligible”.

This amendment reflects the fact that a qualifying scheme need not necessarily be a relevant scheme, so the reference to “eligible members” (which is defined by reference to “relevant schemes”) is not right in all cases.

Amendment 172, in clause 43, page 57, line 21, leave out “But”.

This amendment makes a minor verbal change in light of other amendments to clause 43.

Amendment 173, in clause 43, page 57, line 23, leave out “subsection (5)” and insert “this section”.

This amendment reflects the fact that, as a result of other amendments, “qualifying scheme” is used more widely in the section.

Amendment 175, in clause 43, page 57, line 35, at end insert—

“(9A) Regulations may make provision about the conditions in subsections (2) and (3), including about the basis on which the determinations mentioned in those subsections are to be made.”

This amendment allows for regulations to make provision elaborating on the conditions in subsections (2) and (3).

Amendment 174, in clause 43, page 57, line 35, at end insert—

“(9B) Regulations may require a pension scheme of a prescribed description to agree to receive a transfer in respect of the accrued rights of a transferable member where—

(a) the principal scheme has been unable, having used reasonable endeavours, to identify a qualifying scheme that is able and willing to do so, and

(b) any other prescribed conditions are met.

(9C) A requirement under subsection (9B) may only be imposed on a pension scheme that is one or both of the following—

(a) a Master Trust scheme within the meaning of the Pension Schemes Act 2017;

(b) a consolidator scheme within the meaning of Chapter 2 of Part 2 (consolidation of small dormant pension pots).”

This amendment allows for regulations to require certain schemes to act as schemes of last resort in cases where the principal scheme cannot find a qualifying scheme that is willing to receive a transfer.

Amendment 176, in clause 43, page 57, line 40, at beginning insert

“Regulations under subsection (5C), (10) or (11) are subject to the negative procedure; and other”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment applies negative parliamentary procedure to regulations under subsection (5C), (10) or (11).

Clause 43, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 44

Provision and gathering of information

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 177, in clause 44, page 58, leave out line 2 and insert

“Where only one pension benefit solution is available to the members of a relevant scheme,”.

This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 178 to 195.

Clause stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

Clause 44 relates to the provision of information to members about the solution or solutions that they offer them. We discussed the clause earlier with the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. The clause requires schemes to communicate and describe the default pension benefit solutions available and the circumstances for those for whom it would be suitable. Powers are taken to make further provisions in secondary legislation. The key policy behind the clause is to ensure that scheme members are well informed about their pension options. The Bill requires all communications issued by schemes to be in clear and plain language, which will help members to make better decisions regarding their retirement income.

The clause allows trustees or managers to request relevant information from their members to determine what an appropriate default solution would be for their membership. Pension schemes will also have the ability, and potentially be required, to gather information from their members to ensure that where a scheme has multiple default pension benefit solutions, the member receives communications about the one deemed most appropriate for them. For example, what wider pension provision people have is important when they think about what is the right solution for them.

Amendment 177, 179 to 181, 183, 186, 187, 190 and 192 to 195 ensure that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions, as well as default pension benefit solutions. That change will mean that the same communication requirements will apply irrespective of whether a scheme member is being transferred to another pension scheme to receive a pension benefit solution or staying with the same scheme. Amendments 178, 182, 184, 185, 188, 189 and 191 provide minor language changes to improve consistency across the Bill.

Clause 44 is essential for promoting informed decision making among scheme members.

Amendment 177 agreed to.

Amendments made: 178, in clause 44, page 58, line 3, leave out “the member” and insert

“each eligible member of the scheme”.

This amendment corrects a minor verbal error.

Amendment 179, in clause 44, page 58, line 5, leave out “member’s default”.

This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions.

Amendment 180, in clause 44, page 58, line 8, leave out “default”.

This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions.

Amendment 181, in clause 44, page 58, line 9, leave out from beginning to “the trustees” in line 10 and insert

“Where more than one pension benefit solution is available to the eligible members of a relevant scheme,”.

This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions.

Amendment 182, in clause 44, page 58, line 10, leave out “the member” and insert

“, each eligible member of the scheme”.

This amendment corrects a minor verbal error.

Amendment 183, in clause 44, page 58, line 12, after “solution” insert

“or qualifying pension benefit solution”.

This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions.

Amendment 184, in clause 44, page 58, line 14, leave out “option” and insert “solution”.

This amendment makes a clarificatory change to the tag used in clause 44(2).

Amendment 185, in clause 44, page 58, line 17, leave out

“the default pension benefit solution”

and insert “the specified solution”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 184.

Amendment 186, in clause 44, page 58, line 18, leave out “member’s default”.

This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions.

Amendment 187, in clause 44, page 58, line 27, leave out from “of” to “is” in line 29 and insert

“a default pension benefit solution or qualifying pension benefit solution and an explanation that such a solution”.

This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions.

Amendment 188, in clause 44, page 58, line 29, leave out “an” and insert “a regular”.

This amendment makes the language of clause 44(4)(b) consistent with clause 42(3)(b).

Amendment 189, in clause 44, page 58, line 31, leave out “eligible members” and insert “each eligible member”.

This amendment makes a minor clarificatory change.

Amendment 190, in clause 44, page 58, line 32, leave out

“the default pension benefit solutions offered by the scheme”

and insert

“the pension benefit solutions available to the eligible members”.

This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions.

Amendment 191, in clause 44, page 58, line 34, leave out paragraph (b).

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 190.

Amendment 192, in clause 44, page 58, line 38, leave out from “describing” to end of line 40 and insert

“a particular pension benefit solution that the trustees or managers consider to be suitable for the eligible member in question;”.

This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions.

Amendment 193, in clause 44, page 59, line 2, leave out “default”.

This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions.

Amendment 194, in clause 44, page 59, line 10, leave out “default” and insert

“, or in the case of transferable members identifying,”.

This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions.

Amendment 195, in clause 44, page 59, line 11, leave out “default”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment ensures that clause 44 operates in relation to qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions.

Clause 44, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 45

Information etc in connection with selection of benefit solution

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 196, in clause 45, page 59, line 27, leave out “offer” and insert “provide or make available”.

This amendment allows for regulations either to require information to be provided directly to members or to require it to be made available to them.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 197 to 202.

Clause stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

The purpose of the clause is to help improve pension engagement so that individuals can make better decisions themselves if they want to do so. As I said earlier, this is about softer defaults than we have in the case of automatic enrolment. The clause grants a power to make regulations requiring schemes to offer and provide information to assist members in the selection of their pension benefit solutions. The clause also includes a regulation-making power that could require schemes to monitor rates of decumulation —that is the drawdown of the pension pot used by members—and issue warnings if they believe that that should be changed. That could be used to help prevent individuals from inadvertently running out of money in later life, or it could even be used to recommend increasing withdrawals. Again, we have talked a lot about Australia. I do not know whether we are feeling patriotic at the moment, but one of the lessons from Australia is that in many cases one of the dangers is insufficient drawdown, and people under-consuming in later life. In either case, this approach could potentially help to prevent people from living in poverty during retirement, either because they are not spending enough or because they are drawing down too much early on.

The Government’s broader objective is that individuals need not make any decisions about how their savings are invested or how they should take their pension benefits, except to confirm that they want to start receiving payment. That is a big change from the status quo, which is very complicated at the point someone approaches retirement. However, I want to emphasise that individuals will retain their pension freedoms and are able to opt out of any default, should they wish to do so.

This provision allows for members to receive information to enable engaged and engageable members to make informed decisions. The clause includes a power to require that the information provided is based on members’ individual circumstances, where those are known to the scheme. The intention is that relevant general information will be provided to individuals. The policy behind this clause is to help bridge knowledge gaps and enhance members’ understanding of their options.

I turn to the associated amendments. Amendments 196 and 201 provide clarity that information may be sent directly to scheme members or made available to them, for example via websites. Amendments 198 and 199 clarify that schemes may be required to provide information to their members on any of the options available to them under pension freedoms, not just those available under the default scheme. Amendment 202 clarifies that schemes may tailor the information provided to scheme members using information already held by the scheme. Amendment 197 requires that information provided to scheme members under clause 45 must be

“in clear and plain language”.

Finally, amendment 200 removes some unnecessary wording.

The amendments are all technical in nature. They are not intended to change, but to enhance the deliverability of the policy.

Amendment 196 agreed to.

Amendments made: 197, in clause 45, page 59, line 28, after “information” insert

“expressed in clear and plain language”.

This amendment requires that information required by regulations under clause 45 be in clear and plain language, mirroring the requirement in clause 44(6).

Amendment 198, in clause 45, page 59, line 30, leave out “default”.

This amendment, together with Amendment 199, ensures that clause 45 operates in respect of pension benefit solutions other than default pension benefit solutions.

Amendment 199, in clause 45, page 59, line 31, leave out “default”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 198.

Amendment 200, in clause 45, page 59, line 32, leave out

“(for example as regards the rate of income withdrawal)”.

This amendment removes the suggestion that members would decide the rate of income withdrawal, since that would be determined by the scheme.

Amendment 201, in clause 45, page 59, line 33, leave out “given” and insert

“provided or made available to a member”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 196.

Amendment 202, in clause 45, page 59, line 35, leave out

“obtained under powers conferred by section 44”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment removes the reference to clause 44 from clause 45(2), so that information given by virtue of clause 45(1) may be based on information that the trustees or managers hold otherwise than by virtue of clause 44.

Clause 45, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46

Pension benefits strategy

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 203, in clause 46, page 60, line 8, leave out “default”.

This amendment ensures that clause 46 operates in respect of qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 204 to 208.

Clause stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

This clause is the one most relevant to the Liberal Democrat amendment 279 that we discussed earlier, because it requires trustees or managers of relevant pension schemes to formulate, review and, where appropriate, revise their pension benefits strategy. This is where they will need to show that they have considered the range of options set out in that Lib Dem amendment.

The production and review of such a strategy will hold occupational pension schemes to account for how they have identified the requirements of their membership and how they have used that information to design the default pension benefit solution, or solutions, that they have put in place, or to identify an appropriate qualifying pension benefit solution elsewhere.

Additionally, schemes will need to set out in their strategy their plans for how they will communicate effectively with their members—another issue that has been at the centre of our discussions today. There is also a requirement for the scheme to review their strategy, and Government have taken a power to specify minimum intervals for review. Regulations may also set out further requirements for evidence of how the scheme has complied with any of the requirements set out in this chapter. The strategy must be published and made available to both the regulator and members of the scheme, which will enable effective monitoring, analysis and evaluation at an aggregate level.

Government amendments 203 and 204 will ensure that clause 46 operates in respect of qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions. Amendment 205 adds effective communication to the list of things that must be addressed in the strategy. Amendments 206 and 207 correct an error in the Bill as drafted. Amendment 208 allows regulations to require that the information about compliance with provisions of the chapter be published alongside a benefit strategy. Amendment 210 removes a provision made redundant by other amendments.

Amendment 203 agreed to.

Amendments made: 204, in clause 46, page 60, line 9, leave out from beginning to “pension” in line 10 and insert

“design, or in the case of transferable members identify,”.

This amendment ensures that clause 46 operates in respect of qualifying pension benefit solutions as well as default pension benefit solutions.

Amendment 205, in clause 46, page 60, line 12, leave out paragraph (c) and insert—

“(c) communicate effectively with eligible members of the scheme with regard to pension benefit solutions and comply with any regulations under section 45.”

This amendment adds effective communication to the list of things that a pension benefits strategy must address.

Amendment 206, in clause 46, page 60, line 25, leave out “and” and insert “or”.

This amendment corrects an error.

Amendment 207, in clause 46, page 60, line 26, leave out “be authorised to”.

This amendment corrects an error.

Amendment 208, in clause 46, page 60, line 35, at end insert—

“(3A) Regulations may require the trustees or managers of a relevant scheme to publish, alongside a pension benefits strategy (or revised pension benefits strategy), prescribed information or evidence as to whether and how they have complied with the requirements imposed by virtue of this Chapter.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment allows regulations to require that information about compliance be published alongside a pension benefits strategy.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 209, in clause 46, page 60, line 36, leave out subsection (4).

This amendment leaves out a penalty provision that government amendments to Clause 47 would make redundant.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 211.

Clause stand part.

Clauses 47 and 48 stand part.

Government amendments 212 and 213.

Clause 49 stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

Clause 47 allows for a compliance framework to be developed to ensure that trustees or managers of pension schemes comply with the requirements of chapter 5 of the Bill and take their responsibilities seriously; hon. Members will by now be used to seeing parts of this at the back of sections of pension legislation.

It is worth noting up front that amendment 211 replaces the penalty provisions in clause 47 with a new mechanism for introducing enforcement powers via regulations. The regulations could allow for the Pensions Regulator to issue compliance notices, third-party compliance notices and penalty notices. These types of enforcement notice are not unusual, and they appear in other pensions legislation, such as the pensions dashboard regulations and the regulations on climate change governance and reporting.

Penalties will be limited to no more than £10,000 in the case of individuals and up to £100,000 in other cases, such as corporate trustees. We have introduced these changes to ensure consistency with other clauses in the Bill, including the provisions related to value for money and small pots consolidation; we discussed the size of those penalties recently.

Clause 47 will enable the regulator to remove and replace trustees in the event of non-compliance. Amendment 209 will remove a penalty provision in clause 46 that is made redundant by amendment 211. Clause 48 makes it clear that the measures in this chapter apply to pension schemes run on behalf of the Crown, another standard provision. Clause 49 provides the definitions for terms used in chapter 5 of the Bill, including many of the important ones I have run through today. Amendments 212 and 213 add the definitions of “pension benefit solution” and “qualifying pension benefit solution” to the list of defined terms in clause 49. They do not change the definition of these terms elsewhere in the clauses.

Amendment 209 agreed to.

Clause 46, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47

Enforcement and compliance

Amendment made: 211, in clause 47, page 61, line 4, leave out subsections (1) to (5) and insert—

“(1) Regulations may make provision with a view to ensuring the compliance of any person with any provision of or under this Chapter.

(2) The regulations may in particular—

(a) provide for the Pensions Regulator to issue a notice (a ‘compliance notice’) to a person with a view to ensuring the person's compliance with a provision of or under this Chapter;

(b) provide for the Pensions Regulator to issue a notice (a ‘third party compliance notice’) to a person with a view to ensuring another person's compliance with a provision of or under this Chapter;

(c) provide for the Pensions Regulator to issue a notice (a ‘penalty notice’) imposing a penalty on a person where the person—

(i) has failed to comply with a compliance notice or third party compliance notice, or

(ii) has contravened a provision of or under this Chapter;

(d) provide for the making of a reference to the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal in respect of the issue of a penalty notice or the amount of a penalty;

(e) confer other functions on the Regulator.

(3) The regulations may make provision for determining the amount, or the maximum amount, of a penalty in respect of a failure or contravention.

(4) But the amount of a penalty imposed under the regulations in respect of a failure or contravention must not exceed—

(a) £10,000, in the case of an individual, and

(b) £100,000, in any other case.

(5) Any penalty payable under the regulations is recoverable by the Regulator.

(5A) In England and Wales, any such penalty is, if the county court so orders, recoverable under section 85 of the County Courts Act 1984 or otherwise as if it were payable under an order of that court.

(5B) In Scotland, a penalty notice is enforceable as if it were an extract registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution issued by the sheriff court of any sheriffdom.

(5C) The Regulator must pay into the Consolidated Fund any penalty recovered under this section.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment replaces the provisions in subsections (1) to (5) of clause 47 about fixed penalty notices with a power to make regulations providing for compliance notices, third party compliance notices and penalty notices.

Clause 47, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49

Interpretation and general

Amendments made: 212, in clause 49, page 62, line 13, at end insert—

“‘pension benefit solution’ has the meaning given by section 42(2);”.

This amendment adds “pension benefit solution” to the list of defined terms in clause 49.

Amendment 213, in clause 49, page 62, line 19, at end insert—

“‘qualifying pension benefit solution’ has the meaning given by section 43(6);”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment adds “qualifying pension benefit solution” to the list of defined terms in clause 49.

Clause 49, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 50

Corresponding provision in relation to FCA-regulated schemes

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 214, in clause 50, page 62, line 33, leave out from beginning to end of line 8 on page 63 and insert—

“137FBD FCA general rules: guided retirement

(1) The FCA must make general rules for the purpose of ensuring that default or qualifying pension benefit solutions are made available to members of relevant pension schemes.

(2) In determining what provision to include in the rules, the FCA—

(a) must have regard to provision made by, and any provision made under, Chapter 5 of Part 2 of the Pension Schemes Act 2025 (guided retirement: schemes regulated by the Pensions Regulator), and

(b) must aim to ensure, so far as possible, that the outcomes achieved by the rules in relation to relevant pension schemes correspond to those achieved by that Chapter, and any regulations made under it, in relation to pension schemes to which that Chapter applies.

(3) In this section—

‘default or qualifying pension benefit solution’ means a pension benefit solution which—

(a) is designed for delivering money purchase benefits under a pension scheme to some or all of the members of the scheme,

(b) is designed to provide a regular income for the members concerned in their retirement (whether or not together with other benefits), and

(c) meets any other prescribed conditions;

‘FCA-regulated pension scheme’ means a pension scheme whose operation—

(a) is a regulated activity, and

(b) is carried on in the United Kingdom by an authorised person;

‘money purchase benefits’ has the same meaning as in the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (see section 181 of that Act);

‘pension benefit solution’, in relation to a pension scheme, means a contractual or other arrangement for making pension payments in respect of members’ accrued rights;

‘pension scheme’ has the meaning given in section 1(5) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993;

‘relevant pension scheme’ means an FCA-regulated pension scheme that is—

(a) an auto-enrolment scheme,

(b) a workplace personal pension scheme that is not an auto-enrolment scheme, or

(c) a pension scheme of a prescribed description,

and for that purpose ‘auto-enrolment scheme’ has the meaning given in section 117A(3) and ‘workplace personal pension scheme’ has the meaning given in section 117A(5).”

This amendment adjusts the requirement for the FCA to make rules corresponding to Chapter 5 of Part 2. It ensures that the FCA has the flexibility to make provision that is different from that contained in Chapter 5 of Part 2 provided that the FCA’s rules aim to achieve corresponding outcomes to that Chapter.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

We now turn to clause 50, the last clause in this part of the Bill. The overriding objective of this clause, together with amendment 214, is to make corresponding provision in relation to FCA-regulated schemes. Clause 50 inserts into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 new section 137FBD, which will deliver default pension benefit solutions to FCA-regulated pension schemes, ensuring that members on both sides of the market benefit from default solutions.

Amendment 214 is a technical amendment that refines the requirement on the FCA to deliver those solutions for members of FCA-regulated pension schemes and ensures consistency between FCA and TPR-regulated schemes—a key objective of the Government. It clarifies that the FCA must make rules to ensure that default pension scheme solutions are made available to members of FCA-regulated schemes and, in making those rules, must have regard to provisions made by the rest of chapter 5 of part 2, which we have been discussing and which sets the framework for the TPR to provide those solutions.

The FCA must also aim to ensure, as far as possible, that the outcomes achieved by its rules correspond to those achieved under chapter 5, and any regulations made under it regarding TPR-regulated pension schemes. The amendment therefore seeks to ensure that, from a member’s perspective, default pension benefit solutions are provided consistently across the market, whether they are a member of a TPR or an FCA-regulated pension scheme, while giving the FCA the flexibility to deliver that outcome in a way that suits its methods of regulating pension schemes. DWP, the FCA and The Pensions Regulator will work together to develop and deliver default pension benefit solutions, further boosting fairness and consistency across the market.

Amendment 214 agreed to.

Clause 50, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Taiwo Owatemi.)

Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting)

Torsten Bell Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 28 stand part.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

It is a pleasure to serve under you today, Ms McVey. We recommence our consideration of the small pots part of the Bill. I thank all Members for their engagement during the sittings last week.

Clause 27 is fundamental. It allows regulations to be made to create an authorisation and supervisory framework for pension schemes to become authorised consolidators. This framework will allow master trusts to apply to the Pensions Regulator to become authorised, on the basis that they meet certain conditions and standards, including the value for money test we discussed at length last Thursday.

The clause also ensures ongoing oversight. If a scheme no longer meets the standards, regulations can enable the Pensions Regulator to step in to require the trustees to take prescribed steps and, ultimately, to withdraw authorisation if necessary. That ensures better outcomes, not just fewer pension pots. The clause represents a vital safeguard in the small pots framework.

Clause 28 provides a definition of a “consolidator scheme” and “consolidator arrangement”. A “consolidator scheme” can either be an authorised master trust or a Financial Conduct Authority-regulated pension scheme that appears on a designated list published by the FCA. A “consolidator arrangement” refers to a specific part of the scheme that is intended to receive small pots.

This reflects the structure of pension providers that operate in the UK. Some pension providers offer multiple arrangements within their scheme whereas others may have a single arrangement or offering. The clause caters for both scenarios to ensure that regulators can focus on the particular arrangements that will require authorisation.

To simplify: in practice, all schemes will be authorised by specific arrangement, but there will be some occasions where schemes may only have a single arrangement so the whole scheme will be authorised. By having at least one authorised arrangement, schemes or providers will be authorised consolidators.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

This is a very uncontentious and highly technical part of the Bill. We have no objections to any of these provisions and so will be supporting them.

[Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)]

As the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, I echo that this is a direction of travel that we welcome. The vast majority of the proposals that are before us today are uncontentious. They follow the correct direction of travel in growth and change that we want to see in our pensions system in the United Kingdom.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29

Further provision about contents of small pots regulations

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 29, page 27, leave out lines 14 and 15.

This amendment clarifies that small pots regulations may confer rights of appeal more broadly than just in relation to the refusal of an application for authorisation.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 37 to 40.

Clause stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

Clause 29 will make the small pot consolidation framework work in practice, through allowing the small pots regulations to cover a range of operational, administrative, data protection and consumer protection matters. It enables the Pensions Regulator to charge a fee for authorisation and gives applicants the right to appeal if their application is refused. Regulations will be able to require trustees and scheme managers to maintain and improve records, and they will protect members from high transfer fees. The clause enables the delegation of functions and powers to the Pensions Regulator, the FCA and the small pots data platform operator. It ensures that data protection and privacy obligations are respected, while allowing necessary data processing to support the scheme’s efficient operation.

The clause will allow the Government to amend existing legislation to support the small pots consolidation framework. Examples of uses of the power include giving the Pensions Ombudsman new powers to investigate member complaints, and ensuring that the small pots data platform is properly funded through the general levy. Pensions law is complex and technical, and needs to evolve with time, so the Government need the flexibility to respond to those changes and regulators’ operational experience without having to table a new Bill every time.

The Bill clearly sets out the multiple default consolidator framework. With targeted amendments, the clause will allow us to fine-tune the framework over time, ensuring operational effectiveness. Any use of so-called Henry VIII powers will be subject to the affirmative procedure. The clause is essential for the practicality, reliability and integrity of the small pots consolidation framework to ensure it is fit for purpose now and for the future.

The Government amendments to the clause are purely technical drafting improvements. Amendment 36 clarifies that appeal rights for schemes are not limited solely to decisions regarding an application for authorisation, so one could appeal on other grounds. Amendment 37 provides further clarity on the liability framework that will be established to ensure that members are protected. It makes it clear that the small pots data platform operator or the trustees or managers of a relevant pension scheme can be made responsible for paying compensation to an individual who has suffered a loss as a result of a breach of the small pots regulations. Amendments 38 to 40 take account of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, which was passed by Parliament subsequent to the introduction of this Bill. The amendments do not alter the policy, and I ask the Committee to support them.

[Mark Garnier]

Again, this is all very technical and rather dry.

[Torsten Bell]

It’s very exciting!

[Mark Garnier]

Perhaps it is exciting for those who enjoy dry reading. We in the Opposition have no objections.

Amendment 36 agreed to.

Amendments made: 37, in clause 29, page 27, line 30, leave out—

“a relevant person, other than the FCA,”

and insert—

“the small pots data platform operator or the trustees or managers of a relevant pension scheme”.

This amendment ensures that the FCA cannot be required to pay compensation under small pots regulations.

Amendment 38, in clause 29, page 27, line 39, leave out “Subject to subsection (4),”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 39.

Amendment 39, in clause 29, page 28, line 3, leave out subsection (4).

This amendment removes provision that is no longer needed because of the general data protection override in section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and came into force on 20 August 2025.

Amendment 40, in clause 29, page 28, leave out lines 8 and 9.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 39.

Clause 29, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30

Enforcement by the Pensions Regulator

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 41.

Clause 31 stand part.

Government amendment 42.

[Torsten Bell]

Clause 30 seeks to ensure that the rules and conditions set by the regulations are, in practice, followed. These regulations can allow the Pensions Regulator to issue three types of notices: a compliance notice, requiring a person to take specific steps to comply; a third-party compliance notice, directing someone to ensure another party’s compliance; and a penalty notice, imposing a financial penalty for non-compliance or a breach of the regulations. If a scheme fails to comply with the regulations or with a notice issued under them, the Pensions Regulator can impose a financial penalty capped at £10,000 for individuals and £100,000 in other cases. The clause also enables regulations to provide for appeals to the first-tier or upper tribunal, ensuring procedural fairness and accountability. All those are standard approaches to pensions legislation.

Clause 31 gives the Treasury the power to make regulations to enable the FCA to monitor and enforce compliance with the small pots consolidation framework for contract-based schemes. It ensures that the FCA can act decisively to protect consumers and uphold the integrity of the system. Clauses 30 and 31 ensure consistent standards across the pensions market as we look to enforce these measures. Any regulations made under clause 31 must go through the affirmative procedure, ensuring parliamentary oversight.

Amendments 41 and 42 seek to clarify the definition of the term “FCA regulated” when referring to an authorised person in the context of the legislation. The amendments seek to provide greater clarity by ensuring harmony and removing any ambiguity between clause 30(1) and clauses 31 and 34. They ensure that the Pensions Regulator is not inadvertently prevented from regulating a trustee of a pension scheme solely because that trustee is also regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in a separate capacity. The amendments are purely technical clarifications, and I ask the Committee to support them. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

Again, I have no real comments, apart from to ask the Minister, perhaps when winding up, if he could explain how the Government came to the penalty levels of £10,000 for individuals and £100,000 for others. It would be useful to understand what the thinking was behind that.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

My question was not dissimilar to the shadow Minister’s question on the amounts of the penalties—£10,000 for an individual and £100,000 in any other case. There is no delegated authority to raise it beyond those levels. There is an ability to set the amounts, provided they do not go above those. Would the process have to be in primary legislation should the Government wish to raise it above those levels? I am not generally in favour of a level of delegated authority, but if we end up in a situation where inflation is out of control, £10,000 may not seem a significant amount for an individual and £100,000 may not seem significant for a larger organisation. They may not be enough to prevent people or create the level of disincentive we wish to see. Have the Government looked at whether £10,000 and £100,000 are the right amounts?

On the clarification about FCA regulation, and the fact that if somebody is FCA regulated in another capacity, it may stop them from being subject to this, it is absolutely sensible that the Government have tabled the amendments. I am happy to support the changes and the clauses.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Members for Wyre Forest and for Aberdeen North. The main question raised is about the level of the fines. To provide some context, the answer is yes—that would need to be amended by further primary legislation; there is not a power in the Bill to change that. It is an increase on previous levels of fines for individuals and organisations—from £5,000 to £10,000 for individuals, reflecting the high inflation we have seen in recent years. On that basis, it gives us certainty that we have seen a substantial increase, and we would not need to change it in the near future, but I take the point that in the longer term, we always need to keep the levels of fines under review, and we will need to do that in this case. I hope that provides the answers to hon. Members’ questions.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 31

Enforcement by the FCA

Amendment made: 41, in clause 31, page 29, line 38, leave out subsection (4) and insert—

“(4) For the purposes of this Chapter a person is ‘FCA-regulated’ if they are an authorised person (within the meaning of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000) in relation to the operation of a pension scheme.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment clarifies that the definition of “FCA-regulated”, in relation to a person, refers to the person being FCA-regulated in respect of the operation of a pension scheme (as opposed to in a capacity unrelated to small pots regulations).

Clause 31, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32

Power to alter definition of “small”

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 32, page 30, line 12, at end insert—

“(4) The Secretary of State must, at least once every three years, review the amount for the time being specified in section 20(2) to consider whether that amount should be increased, having regard to—

(a) the effectiveness, and

(b) the benefit to members

of the consolidation of small dormant pension pots.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to review and consider increasing the level of small pension pot consolidation every three years.

The purpose of the amendment is to require the Secretary of State to review at least once every three years the threshold for small dormant pension pot consolidation. It aims to ensure that the level set in clause 20(2) remains effective and relevant over time. The Minister will be aware that we have already considered the right level at which to set the consolidation; we tabled amendment 262 as a probing amendment, which would have changed the small pot consolidation limit from £1,000 to £2,000. As we have discussed, industry has a very wide range of views on what would be the best figure.

However, this amendment asks for a review, not a particular figure. As before, we do not intend to push it to a vote. To us, a formal review process seems sensible, but whether it should be set at three-year intervals or any other figure is open to question. Given the lack of certainty about what figure industry would like, it seems a good idea to review the threshold after we have seen the measure working in practice.

The pensions landscape evolves quickly, with more job changes and rising numbers of small inactive pots. Therefore, a static threshold risks becoming out of date and undermining the policy’s effectiveness, whereas a regular review keeps the system responsive to members’ needs. It would consider effectiveness—whether consolidation is working to reduce fragmentation and improve efficiency, and the benefit to members, so whether savers are seeing clearer statements, reduced charges and better value for money. It would also simplify retirement saving by reducing the number of scattered small pots, would help members to keep track of their savings and avoid losing pensions altogether, and would improve efficiency for providers, which could reduce costs for savers.

I stress that the amendment does not dictate that there should be an automatic increase. It simply requires the Secretary of State to consider whether the amount is still appropriate. Therefore, in our view, it strikes the right balance between flexibility and accountability. To summarise, this measure would keep consolidation policy up to date, effective and beneficial for pension savers. A regular, three-year review is a simple, proportionate step to ensure that the system works as intended.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Member for Torbay for tabling the amendment. The Government share his commitment to ensuring that the pot limit remains appropriate. As we have just heard, it is a matter of consensus, and it is good to debate how we best do that. The Government’s view is that the amendment is not necessary at this stage. Clause 32 already enables the Government to undertake a review at any time. That is a deliberately flexible approach that allows us to respond to developments in the market—not least reflecting on the question from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North about inflation—but also to any other material changes, and it empowers the Government to act when needed.

The amendment risks creating unintended consequences with a rigid cycle of Government reviews, which might mean that reviews do not happen when there is a good reason for looking at the matter, and that the Secretary of State is forced to carry them out when there is no rationale for doing so. We favour a more flexible approach. I take seriously the request for clarity that there will be regular reviews, and I can give that clarity. That is the intention.

A wider question has been raised about the success of the policy and its monitoring, which is separate from the level of the threshold. Changes to the threshold might be one response to success metrics, but others might be about the operation of the consolidation process more generally. I commit to actively monitoring those—not least what is happening to people’s pots as they are moved, how people are responding to that and levels of awareness. That is exactly what we need to be doing, irrespective of what happens on the scale of the threshold over time. There is cross-party consensus on the objective here. We have taken a slightly different view on the flexibility of that review and how often it happens, but I give all hon. Members a commitment that that will happen.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have just one more brief comment. It drives me completely mad that whoever is standing at that Dispatch Box seems to believe that they will be in government in perpetuity. Given that this is the second colour of Government I have faced across the Committee floor, it may be that the Minister and his Secretary of State—who has changed, by the way—are very keen on doing a regular review, and I appreciate the Minister committing to it. However, it is not that easy for him to commit a Secretary of State of a different political stripe. Therefore, to give us all certainty, it would be great if the Minister went away and considered the possibility of including a more regular review on Report, so that a Secretary of State of any party is required to conduct one more regularly.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Member for that comment. The nature of every piece of legislation means that a future Government can take a different decision. Thanks for the reminder of the nature of British politics—that is how it operates. I am slightly more relaxed than she is, because there will be significant pressure from the industry, and from everybody, to keep this under review. That is not a matter of controversy. It is conceivable that there may be a Government who are steadfastly against ever again looking at the small pots threshold, but having lived through the last 15 years, I would put that low down the list of uncertainties in British politics. However, I take the intention behind the hon. Lady’s point, and I promise never to assume that Labour will win every election from now until eternity.

[John Milne]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clauses 33 to 36 stand part.

Government amendment 43.

Clause 37 stand part.

New Clause 36—Automatically amalgamated pension pots—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations provide for the establishment of a scheme to ensure that an individual’s pension pot is linked to the person and upon a person’s change in employment the pension pot automatically moves into the pension scheme of the new workplace.

(2) All employees in the UK will be automatically enrolled into the scheme defined in subsection (1) upon its establishment but must be given the option of opting out.

(3) Where a person opts out, they are able to nominate their qualifying scheme of choice for pensions contributions.”

This new clause allows pension pots automatically to follow members from job to job, consolidating with each new workplace scheme rather than relying on a single lifetime provider.

[Torsten Bell]

The clause provides the flexibility, as I have just said, to increase or decrease the threshold without requiring new primary legislation, enabling the Government to move quickly and efficiently as developments—whether it be wage growth or changes in contribution patterns—change our pensions landscape. Under the clause, any change to the pot limit must always be approved by Parliament through the affirmative procedure, something that we also discussed last week.

The Government are committed to engaging with industry and consumer groups to ensure any adjustments are evidence-based and informed by the relevant data at the time, enabling us to consider wider impacts such as market competition. Under clause 32, the Secretary of State must undertake public consultation, publish details of the proposed amendments and the reasons for making the proposal, and consider any representations made—putting flesh on the bones on the kind of review that would take place, as we have just discussed.

New clause 36 seeks to introduce a new provision to the Bill, which would establish a “pot follows member” model for pension consolidation. The new clause proposes that, on changing employment, an individual’s pension pot would automatically transfer into their new workplace’s pension scheme. This proposal is not aligned with the Government’s established policy direction, and it would present significant practical and operational challenges, although I recognise that that approach has been discussed extensively over the last 20 years. The approach taken in the Bill has been shaped through extensive engagement and formal consultation with industry, regulators and consumer groups. As part of that policy development work, largely under the last Government, they and we carefully considered the “pot follows member” approach, including its potential benefits and risks. Our impact assessment shows that the multiple default consolidator solution in the Bill is projected to deliver greater net benefits. The evidence in the impact assessment supports our view that that route offers the best value for savers and for the system as a whole.

New clause 36 would require a fundamental overhaul of the current framework that the Bill seeks to introduce. It is not consistent with the rest of the Bill. It would introduce a parallel mechanism that risks duplicating effort, creating confusion and undermining the coherence of the consolidation system. Two of its main downsides are significant administrative barriers for employers, if employees choose to opt out, and the risk that pots are transferred into schemes that offer poor value for money—or, at least, poorer value for money than the ones they are sitting in before they move between employers. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Wyre Forest not to press new clause 36.

Clause 33 makes it clear that the small dormant pots consolidation measures in this chapter apply equally to pension schemes run by or on behalf of the Crown and to Crown employees, as we have discussed previously. Clause 34 provides clear definitions for key terms used throughout the small pots legislation to ensure clarity and consistency of interpretation, and clause 35 provides a definition of what constitutes a pension pot. That might be thought to be straightforward, but for the purposes of small pots consolidation we want to provide clarity on the accurate identification and treatment of individual pension pots. To provide an example, if someone is enrolled into the same pension scheme through more than one job and the scheme keeps the accounts separate, each is treated as a separate pension pot so that they can be consolidated together.

As Members will be aware, the Pensions Regulator oversees the trust-based schemes and the Financial Conduct Authority oversees contract-based schemes. Clause 36 amends the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to ensure that the FCA has the powers required to support the small pots consolidation framework through the existing financial regulatory system. This is a vital enabling provision to provide the FCA with the necessary statutory powers to regulate contract-based schemes that wish to act as authorised consolidators in the years ahead. It allows the FCA to make rules requiring pension providers to notify them if they intend to act as a consolidator pension scheme, and it allows the FCA to maintain a list of consolidator schemes and to apply appropriate regulatory standards to them.

More broadly, clause 36 ensures that members of FCA-regulated pension schemes benefit from the same level of protection, transparency and accountability as those in the trust-based system, while also avoiding regulatory gaps and ensuring that all consolidator schemes, regardless of their structure or legal framework, are subject to robust oversight.

Consistent with my arguments on clause 36, clause 37 repeals unused provisions of the Pensions Act 2014 related to automatic transfers, also known as “pot follows member”. This is tidying up the statute book. It was the previous Government who initially legislated for “pot follows member”, but they then decided that that was not the policy they wished to pursue and moved away from it between 2014 and 2024. The amendment recognises that and makes sure we do not have powers on the statute book that confuse the situation.

Finally, Government amendment 43 is a minor and technical amendment necessitated by the repeal of schedule 17 to the Pensions Act 2014 by clause 37(1)(b) of the Bill. The amendment is necessary to update the statute book and clarify a reference in section 256 of the Pensions Act 2004, which otherwise would have been unclear and was making hon. Members nervous. The amendment does not alter policy, and I ask the Committee to support it. I commend clauses 32 to 37 to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

I will speak to our new clause 36. I am grateful to the Minister for his comments; I will come to those in a minute. The Government dropped plans for the lifetime provider or “pot for life” model, which would have allowed individuals to direct all workplace pension contributions into a single, personally chosen pension pot throughout their career. That was first proposed by the Conservative Government. Although we appreciate that the initial lifetime pot model has not had support from the current Government or, to be fair, from the industry, we believe there is much merit in exploring a model that would allow for pensions to follow individuals between jobs. The new clause would ensure that fragmented small pots are not left as workers move between jobs. By changing our current proposals from a lifetime pot to a magnetic pot proposal where the pot follows the individual, we hope we can bring down some of the administrative costs of the initial lifetime pot proposal.

Our new clause 36 will provide for a pension pot that would follow members from job to job, consolidating with each new workplace scheme rather than relying on a single lifetime provider. This approach could reduce fragmentation while retaining the advantages of employer oversight and collective governance. This would have similarities with the Australian system, where a person can staple to their first chosen pension provider so that it follows them from job to job. That helps to reduce the administrative burden on individuals and the number of small pots, and that can reduce costs for consumers and help the overall consolidation of the market. These changes have been backed by some in the industry, including Hargreaves Lansdown, which has said that having a single pot would simplify someone’s pension investment, bringing transparency and clarity. It has said that for those who move jobs frequently, a single pension pot would be invaluable.

The Minister made a couple of points. The first was about the substantial overhaul of the system to be able to deliver reform. Although I appreciate that this may be outside the scope of the Bill, we should not worry about substantial overhauls to make things better for people who are saving for their retirement. It is incredibly important that we get this right. Just because it is a lot of work does not necessarily mean it is a bad thing to do, so I urge him to think about it.

The Minister made a very important point: somebody could move from one job to another and find that their pension moves from a fund that offers good value for money and is performing well to a fund that is performing worse. But exactly the opposite is also the case. If somebody frequently changes jobs, the law of averages and statistics means that over their lifetime they will get the average rate, which means they do not get stuck in one or the other. One would cancel the other out—it is a maths problem.

The Minister has made his points. This is not something we want to press, but we feel very strongly that the Treasury and Treasury Ministers should think very carefully about it, because, as I say, hard work is not a reason not to do the right thing. There is much more support from the industry for the magnetic pot rather than the lifetime pot, which stays with one provider.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey. I want to add a few things to what my hon. Friends have said, and to reflect on the Minister’s rejection of our new clause as a significant administrative burden. I think we are talking about two sides of the same coin, because to have to keep hunting out small pension pots is a little like looking for things in the dark.

First, we are effectively advocating for a “Who Wants to be a Millionaire?” approach, where someone banks at each stage. I have done that while moving jobs over my lifetime, but I am fairly financially literate. It would be helpful if there were a box to tick on a form when changing job to say, “Yes, I want to move it to this company,” a bit like we do with our P45—we are quite capable of taking our tax with us from job to job. If there were a way of taking our pension with us as well, that would be helpful.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Leicestershire said, that approach would put ownership in the hands of the employee, and it would mean that they did not have a niggling feeling in the back of their mind that they had missed a pot that they had forgotten about. Anything to enable people to have ownership of that pot, rather than be constantly on the back foot trying to hunt it down, would make significant sense. Allowing people to choose rather than having to accept what is offered to them would be incredibly helpful. Ultimately, it is up to them to do what they wish, but they would at least have the choice.

We heard a lot in the evidence sessions about the challenge of communication. We have seen that with Equitable Life and all sorts of other things to do with pensions. When someone changes employer, if there were a simple way to say, “I wish to take the pension with me to the new job,” that would reduce, not increase, the administrative burden. I appreciate what the Minister said, but although we are not looking to push our new clause to a vote, it is an incredibly pragmatic suggestion that warrants further reflection.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank hon. Members for their reflections. I agree with the sentiment of what everybody has put forward, including the hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire—apart from his worryingly weak patriotism.

[Mr Bedford]

Outrageous!

[Torsten Bell]

It was self-professed weak patriotism. But the hon. Gentleman is completely right to raise the adequacy issue, which is obviously the role of the Pensions Commission, launched in July, to take forward. He and several others are also right to say that making things easier for savers is a really important objective. That is what the pensions dashboard aims to do in the coming years as well.

Let me make a set of reflections directly on the question being raised. To be clear, the policy in 2014 was “pot follows member”. That is also the policy within new clause 36. The policy being more supported here is a lifetime pot, which is a different policy. The “pot follows member” is still that the employer chooses the pension scheme and the pot moves to the new employer’s scheme as the employee goes, so it is still an employer-to-a-single-scheme model. The lifetime provider model, also advocated by many in the industry but never part of Government policy—it was not in the 2014 Act—is that each individual holds a pension pot, and, on joining an employer, provides the details of that scheme to the employer, and the employer then pays to multiple pension schemes whenever it does its PAYE.

The comments I made refer to the “pot follows member” approach. There is a consensus across the industry that that is not the right way to go; I totally hear the points made in favour of a lifetime provider model. That is not the approach being taken forward by this Bill, but it needs to be kept under review in the longer term. I give hon. Members the reassurance that I will continue to do that.

[Mark Garnier]

I think the Minister has got this the wrong way round. It was the lifetime pot, which was being paid into as people went around, that the industry did not like, because that was administratively quite difficult. The stapled pot—stapled to the lapel, or whatever, to be dragged around like the Australian one—is what we are proposing this time round, which is the new version that the industry does agree with. I think the Minister might have got his notes upside down.

[Torsten Bell]

Never! No. We should clarify what we mean by “industry”: in a lifetime provider model, employers take on a significantly greater administrative burden, because they have to engage with potentially every pension scheme in the country. Admittedly, we are limiting the number of those in future, but still, that is what employers find burdensome about a lifetime provider model. That was the preferred model of the right hon. Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt) when he was Chancellor, but it was never actioned as Government policy.

As I said before, the 2014 Act was about “pot follows member”—for good reason, to try to address the small pots worry. I hope that that at least reassures the hon. Gentleman that my notes were the right way up.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I am now entirely confused. Can the Minister please clarify for all of us what the Bill actually does in terms of the consolidation?

[Torsten Bell]

I am glad we are all thoroughly confused. Three broad approaches have been set out to this small pots problem. The first is the one that the Bill takes forward, which is the multiple default consolidation solution—the automatic sweeping up of small pots into consolidated schemes to make everyone’s lives easier. Members would have one large scheme, or several larger schemes, but no really small schemes that they had to consolidate themselves. They could then choose to consolidate those larger schemes as they wished; there is a debate to be had about the size of the threshold in future. That is an automated approach.

One thing that is really important, about the point on average returns made by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest earlier, is that this is not about average. A scheme can only be a consolidator if it offers good value, so a pot cannot be swept into one that does not.

There has been much debate about other approaches over the years, and I have tried to distinguish between two of them. They aim to provide more of what has been debated here, which is slightly more ownership of one pot by the individual. However, “pot follows member” is, in practice, still maintaining the relationship between an employer and a single provider. It is not the individual but the employer who chooses the scheme. That is the approach we are rejecting today.

There is then a longer-term discussion about whether there are attractions to a lifetime provider. That is the case in some of the countries that have been mentioned—the “stapled to your lapel” model—where it is the individual who chooses their provider; obviously to some degree individuals can opt out now if their employer is happy. That is not on the table here. It needs to be considered, but it is a much more fundamental change to the relationship between the employers and the pension schemes.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I thank the Minister for that clarification. These are almost two different stages in the same process: we need to do the consolidation of the small pots right now, and then look at what we are going to do so that small pots will not ever exist and nobody will end up with a small pot, because we do one of the two options or some other option presented for the next step.

My understanding is that if we were to move to what the Conservatives have proposed in new clause 36, that would solve future problems but probably not deal with the situation where somebody has five small pots already. It does not schoomp them all together—I do not know how you are going to write that, Hansard; I am really sorry.

I appreciate what the Minister says about ensuring that the next step is kept under review and not automatically ruling out some of the options presented for the future. I tend to agree that we need to get this bit done—get rid of all those tiny pots that are dormant right now—and then move on to having that discussion, perhaps as part of the sufficiency and adequacy discussions, so that we have a pensions system that ensures that people are as well off as they possibly can be in late life.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34

Interpretation of Chapter

Amendment made: 42, in clause 34, page 31, line 1, leave out

“No. 42, ‘FCA-regulated person’”

and insert

“‘FCA-regulated’, in relation to a person,”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 41.

Clause 34, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 35 and 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37

Repeal of existing powers

Amendment made: 43, in clause 37, page 34, line 20, at end insert—

“(3) In consequence of subsection (1)(b), in section 256 of the Pensions Act 2004 (no indemnification for fines or civil penalties), in subsection (1)(b), for ‘that Act’ substitute ‘the Pensions Act 2014’.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment amends section 256(1)(b) of the Pensions Act 2004 in consequence of the repeal of Schedule 17 to the Pensions Act 2014 by clause 37(1)(b) of the Bill, including uncommenced amendments of section 256(1)(b) on which the reference to “that Act” in section 256(1)(b) relies.

Clause 37, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 38

Certain schemes providing money purchase benefits: scale and asset allocation

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 44, in clause 38, page 34, line 27, leave out

“‘other than an authorised Master Trust scheme’”

and insert

“‘that is not a relevant Master Trust and’”.

This amendment clarifies a verbal ambiguity in the amendment of section 20(1) of the Pensions Act 2008.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 45, 46, 50, 52, 56, 60, 65, 67, 73, 76, 77, 79, 81, 82, 86 to 89, 110 and 111.

[Torsten Bell]

We now come to the sections of the Bill that bring in the pensions investment review measures, particularly those on setting minimum scale levels required by schemes.

Before I briefly describe these amendments, I remind the Committee of the purpose of clause 38, which we will probably be discussing for a substantial period. The clause will insert new scale requirements, which we do intend to use, and asset allocation conditions, which we do not, into the Pensions Act 2008. Specifically, it inserts them into section 20, which deals with the quality requirements in UK money purchase schemes for master trusts, and section 26, which provides equivalent requirements for group personal pension schemes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

Thank you, Ms McVey—I was about to start by saying that I will not talk about clause 38; I will just talk about the technical amendments.

I have made the point before about the significant number of amendments. I do not know why the Government chose to table this number of amendments rather than submit a new clause that would replace the entirety of clause 38 and make all the changes that they wanted to make. I appreciate that the Government got in touch with us with some briefing information in relation to the changes to this clause, but we had that information very recently rather than significantly in advance. Given the huge number of technical amendments, it is very difficult to picture what the clause will look like with them all. Would the Minister agree that there could have been a better way to approach amending clause 38?

[Torsten Bell]

Let me first respond to the thrust of the comments from the Opposition; I will then come directly to that question. I am conscious that, having sat through Second Reading, most hon. Members have heard my views, and the Government’s views, on this, but let us set out the facts. It is the industry itself that set out the case for change. That is what the Mansion House accord does: it says that a different set of asset allocations is the right way to go in the longer term.

I support the industry’s judgment. The previous Conservative Pensions Minister has welcomed its judgment. I think it is the view of every senior Conservative ex-Minister sitting on the Opposition Back Benches that that change needs to come. [Interruption.] I am not speaking for the Opposition Front Bench; the hon. Member for Wyre Forest has just spoken eloquently for himself. I am speaking for former Conservative Ministers, including former Chancellors. If anything, they accuse me of being too timid—I am not sure what the characterisation of their current Front Bench would be in that regard. That is the status of the debate on this.

Why is there consensus? Leaving aside some of the points that have been raised, it is because this is in savers’ best interests. That is the motivation and the goal. It is also wrong to set out the conflict in terms as broad as the hon. Member for Wyre Forest has just used, because there is a clear savers’ interest test within the Bill that enables trustees or scheme managers to say that proceeding in a certain way would not be in the interests of their savers, and the asset allocation requirements would not bite.

Turning directly to the question about unreasonable Ministers—I have heard rumours of such things. They can exist, and there are protections against them: there are the usual judicial review protections, but in the Bill there are specific requirements to provide a report justifying any use of the reserve power and how it would play out. There are significant limits on the assets—it is broad asset classes—that can be set out in an asset allocation and there are limits to which assets can be covered.

There is the savers’ interest test, and importantly, there is a sunset clause for exactly the reason that we cannot predict what 2040 looks like today. I recognise that hon. Members will not support that part of the clause, but I hope they recognise that the goal is the same, which is that a change in investment behaviour is in savers’ interests. That is what the industry is telling us. As I said last Tuesday, the danger of a collective action problem—the problem that saw commitments made by the industry and the previous Conservative Government not delivered—is partly what this reserve power helps to overcome.

I have absolutely heard the points made about the volume of amendments. They are on the record, as will be all the points made during this process. To answer the question directly, the reason there are so many is that we had lots of useful feedback from industry over the summer, and I wanted to provide more clarity through the clause and make sure that we had the best version of it. We did not want to leave it until Report, so people have had a chance to see it as we go through Committee. I absolutely recognise the points made, and the specific point about the drafting choice of a large number of amendments versus an additional clause. I am sure the drafters will have heard that comment.

Amendment 44 agreed to.

Amendments made: 45, in clause 38, page 34, line 32, leave out “Conditions 1 and” and insert “Condition 1 and Condition”.

This amendment makes a minor verbal change to facilitate differential commencement of the scale and asset allocation conditions.

Amendment 46, in clause 38, page 34, line 37, leave out “of that scheme”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment reflects the fact that a main scale default arrangement may be used by multiple schemes.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 47, in clause 38, page 35, line 1, at end insert—

“(ba) has previously been approved under section 28D (transition pathway relief) and is to be treated in accordance with regulations as if it had approval under section 28A,”.

This amendment allows for relevant Master Trusts that have previously received transition pathway relief to be treated as if they had scale approval.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 48, 49, 51, 54, 55, 57 to 59, 62, 130 and 132.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

This group amends sections 20 and 26 of the Pensions Act 2008, which deal with the quality requirements that a master trust and a group personal pension scheme must satisfy. The amendments will improve the operability of the new sections. In particular they will allow, via regulations, relevant master trusts and GPP schemes that have previously received transition pathway relief—the relief that allows schemes that do not reach the £25 billion threshold in 2030, but are on course to do so soon—afterwards to be treated as if they had scale approval on a temporary basis once the pathway ends.

The amendments will also allow the Pensions Regulator to determine that a relevant master trust may be treated as meeting condition 2 of new section 20(1A) of the 2008 Act without a direct application from the master trust concerned. The effect of that is to allow the regulator to delay the impact of not meeting the scale or asset allocation requirements and to enable steps to be taken to protect members and support employers. A similar requirement for GPPs will be inserted into section 26.

Government amendments 130 and 132 amend the provision in the 2008 Act that deals with the parliamentary scrutiny process relevant to regulations made under the Act. These amendments make sure that all significant powers to make regulations as part of the scale and asset allocation measures are subject to the affirmative procedure.

Amendment 47 agreed to.

Amendments made: 48, in clause 38, page 35, line 16, leave out from “determine” to “Master Trust is” in line 17 and insert “that a relevant”

This amendment means the Regulatory Authority can determine that a relevant Master Trust is to be treated as meeting Condition 1 of subsection (1A) without an application from the Trust.

Amendment 49, in clause 38, page 35, line 18, after “1” insert “or Condition 2”

This amendment means that regulations can allow the Regulatory Authority to determine that a relevant Master Trust is to be treated for a period as meeting Condition 2 (the asset allocation requirement) as well as Condition 1 (the scale requirement).

Amendment 50, in clause 38, page 35, line 20, leave out from “Authority” to end of line 21

This amendment removes some unnecessary wording for consistency with the corresponding amendments to section 26 of the 2008 Act.

Amendment 51, in clause 38, page 35, line 28, at end insert—

“(c) make provision about the Regulatory Authority requiring the trustees or managers of a relevant Master Trust to give the Regulatory Authority a plan showing how they propose to meet or continue to meet the scale requirement under section 28A or the conditions for approval under section 28C.”

This paragraph allows regulations to give the Regulatory Authority a power to require the trustees or managers of a relevant Master Trust to give the Regulatory Authority a plan showing how they propose to meet or continue to meet the scale requirement.

Amendment 52, in clause 38, page 35, line 32, leave out “28A(1)” and insert “28A(12)”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment updates a cross-reference.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 53, in clause 38, page 35, leave out lines 35 and 36.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 129.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 61, 106, 116, 125 and 129.

[Torsten Bell]

The Committee is being very patient so I shall speak briefly to this group. This group is centred around amendment 129, which sets out the interpretation of a number of terms used throughout the clause and consolidates them in new subsection (14). Key among these is the interpretation of “group personal pension scheme”, which is amended after discussion with the Financial Conduct Authority to ensure that only schemes where all members select their investment approach are excluded from the application of clause 38, to ensure that the vast majority of workplace schemes are covered by the clause. The remaining amendments in this group are consequential to amendment 129.

Amendment 53 agreed to.

Amendments made: 54, in clause 38, page 36, leave out line 12 and insert—

“(a) has previously been approved under section 28D (transition pathway relief) and is to be treated in accordance with regulations as if it had approval under section 28B,”

This amendment allows for group personal pension schemes that have previously received transition pathway relief to be treated as if they had scale approval.

Amendment 55, in clause 38, page 36, line 15, leave out “(7C)(a)” and insert “(7A) or (7B)”

This amendment ensures that new subsection (7D) applies both to exemptions from the scale requirement and to exemptions from the asset allocation requirement.

Amendment 56, in clause 38, page 36, line 20, leave out “authorise” and insert “permit”

This amendment ensures consistency with the equivalent language used for Master Trusts.

Amendment 57, in clause 38, page 36, line 20, leave out “, on an application by the scheme concerned,”

This amendment means the Regulatory Authority can determine that a group personal pension scheme is to be treated as meeting the scale or asset allocation requirement without an application from the scheme.

Amendment 58, in clause 38, page 36, line 22, leave out “and sixth conditions” and insert “or sixth condition”

This amendment allows for a determination by the Regulatory Authority under subsection (7E) to be made in relation to one or other of the scale and asset allocation requirements (rather than only in relation to both).

Amendment 59, in clause 38, page 36, line 31, at end insert—

“(c) make provision about the Regulatory Authority requiring the provider of a group personal pension scheme to give the Regulatory Authority a plan showing how they propose to meet or continue to meet the scale requirement under section 28B or the conditions for approval under section 28C.”

This paragraph allows regulations to give the Regulatory Authority a power to require the provider of a group personal pension scheme to give the Regulatory Authority a plan showing how they propose to meet or continue to meet the scale requirement.

Amendment 60, in clause 38, page 36, line 35, leave out “28A(1)” and insert “28B(12)”

This amendment updates a cross-reference.

Amendment 61, in clause 38, page 36, leave out lines 36 and 37

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 129.

Amendment 62, in clause 38, page 37, line 4, at end insert—

“(c) in paragraph (c), at the end insert “, except so far as those requirements relate to Condition 1 or 2 in section 20(1A)””.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment ensures that the requirements mentioned in section 28(3)(c) of the Pensions Act 2008, so far as they relate to the new scale and asset requirements, are not a “relevant quality requirement” for the purposes of that section.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 63, in clause 38, page 37, line 11, after “requirement” insert

“by reference to the main scale default arrangement”

This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28A.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 64, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72, 74, 75, 78, 80, 83, 85, 90 and 91.

[Torsten Bell]

I offer reassurance, as we will shortly come to the end of the amendments for substantive debate.

This group of amendments deals with the main scale default arrangement, along with the scale test and penalties. The MSDA is the pool of investments against which scale will be assessed. As I mentioned, the definition of that is obviously central to the effective enforcement of the scale requirements.

Key among these amendments are Government amendments 72 and 91, which set out some of the details of the MSDA for master trusts and group personal pensions, including that it can be used for the purposes of one or more pension schemes, and that the assets held within it are those of members who have not chosen how they are invested. Regulations will be made that cover other matters, including the meaning of “common investment strategy”. The details we set out in these amendments reflect the invaluable input we received from pension providers and regulatory bodies.

The remaining amendments in the group relating to the MSDA largely clarify how it fits into the wider approval requirements in the new sections 28A and 28B.

Moving on to scale, Government amendments 69 and 85 clarify the circumstances in which assets held by connected master trusts and group personal pension schemes, or where the same provider runs a GPP and master trust, can count towards the scale test. This is to ensure that, where appropriate, assets managed under a common investment strategy where there is a family connection between the master trust and GPP scheme, and where they are used for the same purpose, can be added together to achieve the £25 billion requirement.

Government amendment 71 ensures that the provisions governing penalties are consistent between the TPR and the FCA. Government amendment 90 ensures that regulations can provide for appeals to the tribunal in respect of penalties under regulations under new section 28C(9)(c).

Amendment 63 agreed to.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move amendment 250, in clause 38, page 37, line 12, at end insert

“or

(c) the relevant Master Trust meets the innovation exemption requirement.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

Amendments 250 to 253, as well as Government amendment 113, which we will discuss later, clarify the word “innovation” and look at how best to define it. There are two different approaches from the Government and the Opposition to what innovation means. I raised the issue of defining innovation on Second Reading, so I am glad that both parties are trying to clarify it here, but I am not entirely happy with the way in which the Government have chosen to do so.

When we come to Government amendment 113, I do not feel that the chosen definition of “innovative products” is necessarily right. There could be a way of working that is innovative not in the product but in the way people access the product. For example, some of the challenger banks that we have had coming up are not necessarily providing innovative products, but they provide innovative ways to access those products, and in some cases, their pitch is that they provide a better interface for people to use. I think there is potentially a niche in the market for innovative services rather than innovative products. Government amendment 113 perhaps ties too much to products, although it depends on what the definition of “products” is.

Obviously regulations will come in behind this that define “innovative”, but I think the pitch made by the Opposition for the addition of “or specialist” is helpful. “Innovative” suggests that it may be something new, whereas there could be specialist services that are not of that size but are specific to certain groups of people who value the service they are receiving, one that is very specific to their circumstances, and who would prefer that operation to keep running and to keep having access to it because of the specialist service that is provided.

I am concerned about Government amendment 113. My views are perhaps closer to the Conservatives’ amendment, but thinking particularly about services rather than the products, and the way in which the services are provided to people and the fact that there could be innovation in that respect. Also, as the hon. Member for Wyre Forest said, there could be particular niche areas that do not need to be that size in order to provide a truly excellent service to perhaps a small group of people. It depends on how the Government define “innovative” and what the regulations may look like this, but I am inclined to support the Conservatives’ amendment.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for tabling these amendments. We all recognise the importance of innovation in the pension landscape, but I respectfully oppose the inclusion of the amendments in the Bill.

One point that is at risk of being lost from the discussion so far is the central insight that is the motivation for this clause, which is that scale really is important. Scale really does matter. It has the potential to unlock a wide range of benefits, from better governance to lower costs, to access to a wider range of assets. All of those are integral to improving member outcomes, and if we provide many carve-outs, every scheme will say it is a specialist provider that should not be covered because its members value its inherent difference from every other, and we risk undermining the premise that I think has cross-party agreement, which is that we need to move to a regime of bigger schemes.

One of our aims in this Bill, which is relevant to the asset allocation discussion we just had, is to provide clarity that the change will happen, people will not duck and dive around for years attempting to litigate what is and is not a specialist provider and so on. Innovation is really important, as is competition in the market, but we need to do this in a way that does not undermine the purpose of the scale requirements, which I think is a matter of cross-party consensus.

Having said that, while innovation in the market is important, the Government’s view is that it is not an alternative to achieving scale. That is why we have provided for a new market entrants pathway. There, the innovation grants a temporary exemption from scale requirements, not a permanent exemption as the amendments would enable. That is because scale is very important indeed. Applicants to the pathway will be able to enter the market if they can demonstrate they have strong potential to grow to scale, and if they have some kind of innovative design. That is not a permanent exemption from scale requirements, and there should be cross-party consensus on avoiding that.

To provide reassurance on some of the points that have been raised, I emphasise that the scale requirements apply only to providers’ default offers. Providers of specialist offers and the rest, and self-invested personal pensions, are all able to continue to offer those specialist services, but the main offer in the workplace market does need to meet scale requirements. I hope with that explanation, hon. Members will not press the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

I want to make a brief comment about the definition of “specialist”. I appreciate the Minister’s clarification about the default products provided, but there could be a sensible definition of “specialist” that included, for example, that if providers can demonstrate that over 75% of their members engage in the management of their pension fund every year, that would be a very specialist and well-liked service. I understand that the scale is incredibly important. However, if a provider can demonstrate that level of engagement in its pension scheme, because of its innovative product or service, I think it would be sensible to look at the scale requirements, even if that provider does not yet meet them.

The Opposition have kindly left it up to the Minister and the Government to define what “specialist” would be, so I will support the Opposition amendments on that matter. However, when we come to Government amendment 113, I will require some clarification from the Minister about the definition of “products”.

[Torsten Bell]

I am reassured that our agreement that scale is the desirable outcome is clear. It is great to have that on the record. I also put on the record that there is agreement about the value of innovation and about new entrants. I think that the only distinction is between a new entrant that then grows and a new entrant that does not. Our approach is to allow new entrants, but they need to be ones with a plausible sense that they can get to scale. Inherent to most of the innovation in the market—for example, in collective defined-contribution schemes—is that they would have to operate at scale to be effective. I think that the banking analogy is actually quite apt.

[Steve Darling]

Would the Minister be kind enough to reflect on a situation currently at play in the market, whereby Phoenix Group is withdrawing the management of billions of pounds from Aberdeen Group? These master products offer opportunities that could significantly impact on viability. Could the Minister reflect on that?

[Torsten Bell]

Let me just finish the point about the financial crisis, then I will come to the hon. Member’s question. The lesson from the financial crisis was that banks were too big, and the lesson that we all agree about is that pension schemes are too small. That is the distinction—that is why we are doing this Bill now and why the previous Conservative Government introduced different changes after the financial crisis. We are in a very different situation. That said, we need to prepare for the future and, when there are bigger pension schemes, we want a world where new entrants can come into them. I hear what has been said. I want to reassure the hon. Gentleman that we want to see new entrants offering innovative products. I take the point about services, which we will come back to when we come to amendment 113, but that needs to be a pathway, not a permanent carve-out that risks undermining the scale requirements.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

This amendment clarifies the circumstances in which assets held by a connected group personal pension scheme can be counted for the purposes of the application of the scale test to a relevant Master Trust.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 70, in clause 38, page 37, leave out lines 39 and 40 and insert—

“(b) what it means for assets of a pension scheme to be managed under a "common investment strategy" (including in particular provision defining that expression by reference to whether or how far the assets relating to each member of the scheme are allocated in the same proportion to the same investments).”

This amendment provides more detail as to how the power to define “common investment strategy” may be used.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 84 and 97.

[Torsten Bell]

I will be brief. The link between the definition of a main scale default arrangement and the common investment strategy is key to ensuring that the scale requirements apply to the correct elements of a pension scheme. Amendments 70 and 84 provide more detail on how the power to define a common investment strategy may be used to provide further information on the Government’s meaning when referring to that term.

Amendment 97 removes the “common investment strategy” element from the definition of default funds to avoid confusion with how that term is used in the main scale default arrangement approval in new sections 28A and 28B. I commend the amendments to the Committee.

Amendment 70 agreed to.

Amendments made: 71 in clause 38, page 38, leave out lines 32 to 38 and insert—

“(d) permitting the Authority to impose, on a person who fails to comply with a requirement under paragraph (c), a penalty determined in accordance with the regulations that does not exceed £100,000;”.

This amendment ensures that the penalties language used in section 28A is consistent with that used in new section 28B.

Amendment 72, in clause 38, page 39, leave out lines 1 to 4 and insert—

“(12) In this section ‘main scale default arrangement’ means an arrangement—

(a) that is used for the purposes of one or more pension schemes, and

(b) subject to which assets of any one of those schemes must under the rules of the scheme be held, or may under those rules be held, if the member of the scheme to whom the assets relate does not make a choice as to the arrangement subject to which the assets are to be held.”

This amendment defines “main scale default arrangement” for the purposes of new section 28A.

Amendment 73, in clause 38, page 39, line 7, leave out “relevant”.

This amendment removes an unnecessary tag.

Amendment 74, in clause 38, page 39, line 10, after “requirement” insert—

“by reference to the main scale default arrangement”.

This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.

Amendment 75, in clause 38, page 39, line 12, after “requirement” insert—

“by reference to a main scale default arrangement”.

This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.

Amendment 76, in clause 38, page 39, line 16, leave out “subsection (6)” and insert “subsections (5) and (6)”.

This amendment adds a further cross reference to new section 28B(4).

Amendment 77, in clause 38, page 39, line 17, leave out “held in funds”.

This amendment removes some unnecessary wording for the sake of consistency.

Amendment 78, in clause 38, page 39, line 18, at end insert—

“(ia) are held subject to the main scale default arrangement, and”.

This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.

Amendment 79, in clause 38, page 39, line 20, leave out “held in funds”.

This amendment removes some unnecessary wording for the sake of consistency.

Amendment 80, in clause 38, page 39, line 24, at end insert—

“(ia) are held subject to the main scale default arrangement, and”.

This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.

Amendment 81, in clause 38, page 39, line 27, leave out “held in funds”.

This amendment removes some unnecessary wording for the sake of consistency.

Amendment 82, in clause 38, page 39, line 27, leave out—

“one (and only one) relevant”

and insert “a qualifying relevant”.

This amendment corrects a reference to a relevant Master Trust in new section 28B(4)(c) to take account of new section 28B(8).

Amendment 83, in clause 38, page 39, line 30, at end insert—

“(ia) are held subject to the main scale default arrangement, and”.

This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.

Amendment 84, in clause 38, page 39, leave out lines 38 and 39 and insert—

“(b) what it means for assets of a pension scheme to be managed under a ‘common investment strategy’ (including in particular provision defining that expression by reference to whether or how far the assets relating to each member of the scheme are allocated in the same proportion to the same investments).”

This amendment provides more detail as to how the power to define “common investment strategy” may be used.

Amendment 85, in clause 38, page 40, line 3, leave out from “(4)” to end of line 6 and insert—

“(a) a group personal pension scheme is ‘qualifying’ in relation to the GPP if the provider of the GPP is also the provider of the group personal pension scheme;

(b) a relevant Master Trust is ‘qualifying’ in relation to the GPP if the provider of the GPP is also the scheme funder or the scheme strategist in relation to the relevant Master Trust (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Pension Schemes Act 2017).”

This amendment clarifies the circumstances in which assets held by connected Master Trusts and group personal pension schemes can be counted for the purposes of the application of the scale test to a group personal pension scheme.

Amendment 86, in clause 38, page 40, line 19, leave out “relevant Master Trust or”.

This amendment removes an unnecessary reference to a relevant Master Trust.

Amendment 87, in clause 38, page 40, line 25, leave out—

“managers of the GPP that their”

and insert—

“provider of the GPP that its”.

This amendment replaces a reference to the “managers” of a GPP with “provider” (reflecting normal usage in relation to personal pension schemes).

Amendment 88, in clause 38, page 40, line 27, leave out “the managers” and insert “the provider”.

This amendment replaces a reference to the “managers” of a GPP with “provider” (reflecting normal usage in relation to personal pension schemes).

Amendment 89, in clause 38, page 40, line 35, leave out—

“considered by the Authority to have failed”

and insert “who fails”.

This amendment ensures consistency with the new language in section 28A.

Amendment 90, in clause 38, page 40, line 38, at end insert—

“(e) providing for the making of a reference to the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal in respect of the issue of a penalty notice or the amount of a penalty.”

This amendment ensures that regulations can make provision for appeals to the Tribunal in respect of penalties under regulations under new section 28C(9)(c).

Amendment 91, in clause 38, page 40, line 42, leave out from beginning to end of line 3 on page 41 and insert—

“(12) In this section ‘main scale default arrangement’ means an arrangement—

(a) that is used for the purposes of one or more pension schemes, and

(b) subject to which assets of any one of those schemes must under the rules of the scheme be held, or may under those rules be held, if the member of the scheme to whom the assets relate does not make a choice as to the arrangement subject to which the assets are to be held.” —(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment defines “main scale default arrangement” for the purposes of new section 28B.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move amendment 248, in clause 38, page 41, line 4, leave out from beginning to end of line 9 on page 43.

This amendment would remove the ability of the Government to set mandatory asset allocation targets for certain pension schemes, specifically requiring investments in UK productive assets such as private equity, private debt, and real estate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

I am delighted that the hon. Member agrees with me.

[Torsten Bell]

I shall speak briefly because I am conscious that we need to adjourn shortly for Treasury orals, which I know everybody will be joining us for. I will not rehearse the arguments I have already set out against the purpose of amendments 248 and 249, other than to note that I do not agree with the characterisation by the hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire.

Amendment 275 seeks to prevent the Government from designating securities in UK water companies as qualifying assets for the purpose of the asset allocation requirement. I recognise the points that the hon. Member for Wyre Forest made, and I am not surprised to hear that Reform has not thought through its policies in this regard. The Government have set out the safeguards we have put in place around the use of this power. We do not think we should single out a particular sector in primary legislation, so I ask Members not to press their amendments.

I thank the hon. Member for Horsham for introducing new clause 4. The investment he references is exactly the kind that we think would raise financial returns and improve quality of life at retirement. That is the purpose of these changes. He rightly raises the bringing together of the demand side—that is, the Mansion House accord and the change in investment behaviours—with the supply side. That is exactly what the Government are doing via planning permissions and everything else, to ensure that the pipeline of projects is there, including via the British Growth Partnership work, which is intermediating all of that. On that basis, we think that the new clause is unnecessary, but I completely agree with much that it contains.

[Steve Darling]

Reflecting on events over the weekend, may I congratulate the Minister on being one of the few who remained in post? There is talk of the Prime Minister using all levers of power to drive forward work on certain wicked issues. One of the big wicked issues is the lack of affordable housing. In my constituency of Torbay, only 8% of our housing stock is social-rented, compared with a national average of 17%. I encourage the Minister to reflect again on this and take the opportunity of new clause 4—surely socialists should vote for clause 4. This is another opportunity to apply all the pressure we can to drive more social-rented housing, to support our communities and those most in need in society.

[Torsten Bell]

I just point out that many of the measures in the Bill will support exactly that kind of investment in social housing, including those on scale and the local government pension scheme. On that basis, I think these amendments are unnecessary.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Taiwo Owatemi.)

Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting)

Torsten Bell Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 4th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mark Garnier]

As we have heard, the amendment authorises the use of surplus pension funds to contribute to the provision of free, impartial pension advice and guidance services to scheme members. The age of 40 is very important, and I hope that the Minister, on his 42nd birthday—

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

Forty-third.

[Mark Garnier]

Forty-third! He looks 28. None the less, I hope he is getting plenty of pension advice; who knows when he may need it?

This is a very good provision. The more informed people are about their retirement opportunities, the better. I suppose I have to declare a bit of an interest, inasmuch as I will retire in five years’ time, hopefully. It is incredibly important that people are well prepared for their retirement, and the more information a member of a pension fund has, the better it is. If the amendment is pressed to a vote, we will support it wholeheartedly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Steve Darling]

I should start by saying that I do not recognise the purist approach that we have heard from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. This is an issue close to my heart, because my father, having seen the poverty that his father was in, saved significantly in his private pension scheme as a lorry driver. Sadly, however, he was extremely poorly advised, and as he approached retirement he put thousands and thousands of pounds into equities; then, in the late 1980s, there was a stock market crash. He might as well have burned half of his money. The further we drive the health of the pension industry, the better, and particularly knowledge for those who may not be very much in the financial world.

We heard in evidence from NEST that only 40% of people have even registered online to know what their pension is doing. For people for whom the financial world is a complete challenge—and even for many of us in this room, getting our head around it totally is a bit of a challenge—it is essential that we use every possible lever to make sure that quality advice is available. As Liberal Democrats, we will unashamedly use every opportunity in the Bill to provide high levels of education for those who are in receipt of pensions and to give them as much wind in their sails as possible.

[Torsten Bell]

I shall give a short speech, because there is a worrying habit developing of the hon. Member for Aberdeen North giving the Government Front-Bench speech for me. I should encourage that as we go on—she might be slightly traumatised by that, but we are where we are. Everybody in this room will agree on the importance of the principle that has been highlighted, and we have just heard a powerful point exactly along those lines.

Although the Government understand the intent behind amendment 3, there are two reasons why we will not support it. The first is a point of principle, which I have already set out: it is for trustees, not the Government, to decide how surpluses that benefit members should take place. We discussed the issue of discretionary benefits just now.

The second reason is less a point of principle and more a matter of reality. The amendment would provide advice only to existing members of specific schemes. I think we all agree, particularly in the light of the point made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, that the main problems are about the defined-contribution space and people coming up towards retirement. Lots of the people who are in schemes who would be coming forward for surplus release are already drawing down a very well-defined pension income.

It is not the ideal way to focus on the particular problem that we all agree exists, but we completely agree that robust guidance that assures that everyone has access to free and impartial advice is very important. That is the job of the Money and Pensions Service, but I completely hear what has been said about how it needs to go further. I am grateful for hon. Members’ contributions, but I urge the hon. Member for Horsham to withdraw his amendment.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his reply, and I thank hon. Members for their contributions. One thing we all absolutely agree on is the importance and centrality of this issue. If there is one area in which I feel the Bill could have gone further, it is this one.

It is a scary thing to look to the future and see all the trends in where we are heading with pension adequacy. The number of people who will have zero or a very small pension is deeply frightening, particularly when we lay alongside that the fact that many of those people will not own their own house and will still be paying private market rent. The state pension is not designed for that.

It is a crucial issue. I appreciate both the Minister’s objection in principle and the practical objections from him and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, but we will still push the amendment to a vote. That is more to lay a marker than anything else; I appreciate that our chances of winning the vote are small. We want to lay as much emphasis on the issue as possible. Whether or not it ends up as part of the Bill, perhaps under new clause 1, we want it highlighted.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

The Liberal Democrat and Conservative amendments are very different methods to achieve a similar outcome. Conservative amendment 258 is a bit wider, in the sense that it would require the affirmative procedure for a wider range of things, but both parties are concerned about the possibility of regulations allowing a surplus below the buy-out threshold level.

I think the amendments are reasonable asks. I am generally in the habit of supporting more scrutiny of regulations; upgrading the requirements for regulations from the negative to the affirmative procedure is very much in my wheelhouse, given that it is so difficult for Parliament to oppose regulations made under the negative procedure unless the Leader of the Opposition puts their name to a motion praying against them. In practice, that very, very rarely happens. Given that both amendments are asking for relatively small changes to ensure increased parliamentary scrutiny, particularly where the threshold drops below the buy-out level, I think that they are not unreasonable. I am happy to support them both.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Members for Torbay and for Wyre Forest for their amendments. On amendment 264, I hope that I have already reassured hon. Members that there are many safeguards built into the policy for surplus release, both at an individual scheme level and at a wider policy level, including the ultimate control of trustees, the need for prudent funding to be maintained and the actuarial certification.

The Government’s view is that it is not for the Secretary of State to assess every single scheme in the way that the amendment intends. To offer some more reassurance, however, TPR and the PPF have carried out scenario testing in this area; we heard the PPF chief executive’s reassurance in oral evidence on Tuesday. In that regard, I do not think the amendment is necessary. It would also involve the Secretary of State holding a lot of evidence about every single DB scheme in the country, which I do not think is a good use of resources.

[Kirsty Blackman]

The point is about the regulations on the surplus and the times at which schemes can pay it. It is not about looking at each individual scheme; it is about looking at the level that is set in the regulations. Much as I am sure that the Minister is having a lovely birthday, he would probably admit that he is not going to be the Pensions Minister in perpetuity. It is unlikely that he will still be the Pensions Minister in 50 years’ time. He may therefore not have control of these regulations. This is about putting guardrails in place so that, no matter who is in government, the level cannot be reduced below the full buy-out funding level.

[Torsten Bell]

I think I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her attempt to fire me. To clarify, carrying out the kind of prescribed stress scenarios and assessments set out in the amendment would require the Department for Work and Pensions to examine the DB landscape. In this specific area, that is the role of TPR and the PPF.

I turn to amendment 258. The first regulations on surplus will be subject to the affirmative procedure, for exactly the reasons that have been set out, and exactly because at that point they will be new but also comprehensive. As with every other pensions Bill, what we do not want to see is the affirmative procedure being used for small, technical changes that come to those regulations in the years that follow. However, our approach does allow for the necessary debate when those regulations are made. On that basis, I urge hon. Members to support the Bill as drafted.

[Steve Darling]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 258, in clause 9, page 9, line 21, leave out

“in subsection (2A), after ‘section’ insert ‘37(2A),’”

and insert

“in subsection (2), after ‘virtue of’ insert ‘(za) section 37(2A)’”.—(Mark Garnier.)

This amendment would make all regulations on DB surplus extraction subject to the affirmative procedure all times they were made rather than just after first use.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Torsten Bell]

Clause 9 will amend the safeguards on the sharing of surplus. The details will be set out in regulations, the parliamentary procedures of which we have just discussed. These safeguards will place the safety of members’ benefits at the heart of the policy.

Proposed new subsection (2B) of section 37 of the Pensions Act 1995 sets out the requirements, which are there to protect members, that must be set out in regulations before trustees can pay a surplus to the employer—namely that before a trustee can agree to release a surplus, they will first be required to receive an actuarial certification that the scheme meets a prudent funding threshold, and that members must be notified before surplus is released.

The funding threshold will be set out in regulations, which we will consult on, as discussed. We expect that release of the surplus will be permitted only when a scheme is fully funded on a low-dependency basis. Trustees are already required, through existing legislation, to set a long-term funding and investment strategy that targets exactly this funding level. These funding conditions will be set out in regulations made under the affirmative procedure and debated when first introduced.

Proposed new subsection (2C) will provide the ability to introduce additional regulations aimed at further enhancing member protections, where considered appropriate. Superfunds will be subject to their own regime for profit extraction; I am spelling this out, because we will come to it later in the Bill. The proposed new subsection will allow regulations to be made that are consistent with those provisions. Regulations may prevent payments from superfunds for a period, if surplus regulations come into force earlier than the superfund legislation, which we will debate later in the Bill. Crucially, decisions to release any surplus will remain subject to trustee discretion. I also note the removal of the statutory test in section 37(3)(d) of the Pensions Act, on the grounds that it does no more than reflect trustees’ existing duties.

The technical and consequential amendments at subsections (4) to (7) of clause 9 are to ensure that the new measures sit correctly in existing legislation but do not affect the overall policy. In summary, the clause will ensure that the release of a surplus is subject to strict safeguards. I commend it to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10

Relevant schemes: value for money

[Steve Darling]

I beg to move amendment 269, in clause 10, page 10, line 10, at end insert—

“(aa) make, publish and keep under review the consistency of—

(i) regulated VFM schemes, or

(ii) regulated VFM arrangements,

with the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change and clean energy;”.

This amendment, with Amendment 270, would require pension funds and managers to show whether their portfolio investments are consistent with the Paris Agreement.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Milne]

I rise to support what my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay said. As has been emphasised, we are not talking about making things mandatory. It is about making things possible, because there have been cases in which managers take a rather narrow view of fiduciary duty and almost deliberately exclude other considerations. It is about removing that blockage. We feel that the requirement in the amendment is of value and hope that the Minister will consider it.

It is also worth saying that very often one cannot definitively say that one investment will be better than another. There are all the projections and estimates. If it was that clear, every single fund would have the same 10 investments and that would be the end of it, and it would be a very small industry. It is often a matter of assertion, or a calculation. It is often not a case of choosing a lesser return; any return is conjectural in the first place.

[Torsten Bell]

My support for the Welsh Government’s Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 is on the record, so I get to disagree with the hon. Member for Aberdeen North on something, which will be a relief for everybody.

I thank the hon. Member for Torbay for tabling the amendments. Clearly, addressing climate change is absolutely central to this Government’s agenda. It needs to be done in the right way. Pension funds hold significant capital, and I am pleased to say that at every conference and every session I hold with people involved in the industry I see that investors and pension schemes do now use their influence on companies to encourage them to take responsible action. That has been a big change over the course of the last decade. It can lead to better risk management and potentially also improve returns on investments, as well as helping companies to perform better in relation to environmental targets.

My overall argument, though, is that trustees must already consider financially material risks, including ESG factors. The statement of investment principles and the implementation statement are key tools that are already in place for disclosing a scheme’s approach to ESG issues, including climate change. Ultimately, the amendment is about disclosures; that is what it aims to achieve. Additionally, large schemes with assets above £1 billion, which in future will be the majority of schemes because of the scale measures that we will come back to, must also report on climate-related risks and opportunities, in line with the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures.

We are looking to strengthen sustainability reporting, exactly as the hon. Member for Torbay wishes to see, through new UK sustainability reporting standards and our transition plan’s commitment, which the Government consulted on this summer. Taken together, our policy initiatives will modernise the UK’s framework for corporate reporting, giving pension schemes vital information about companies’ decarbonisation plans and about whether to escalate their engagement efforts with investee companies on environmental issues. The DWP is contributing to that work and will review the effectiveness of climate reporting requirements later this year, as part of our post-implementation review of the requirements of the Taskforce on Inequality and Social-related Financial Disclosures.

Given the existing reporting requirements, the Government’s position is that we will gently resist the amendments, to avoid duplication.

[Steve Darling]

Climate change is an existential threat to humanity, and although sewage may not be such a threat, it is still a significant issue; indeed, it is a wicked issue that needs to be tackled by our society as a whole. I wish to press the amendment to a vote, to show the Committee’s intent ahead of the Bill’s next stage.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

That is a very good question. Ultimately it means, “What is the performance of the fund?” Members’ best interests can include a lot of different things, but ultimately we need to see the fund grow with the best performance it possibly can, given all things brought together. When members start to receive their pensions, they will therefore get the best terms they possibly can.

We run the risk of trying to look at the wrong definition. For example, there has been an argument recently about the local government pension scheme—this came up earlier this week—with the Reform party talking about the fact that the scheme is charging 50 basis points. The argument is that reducing it to 10 basis points would save money. However, as I was discussing with a Government Back Bencher the other day, one of the problems is that if fees are too low, that reduces the ability of the managers to assess more complicated financial opportunities. If fees are kept at 50 basis points, the capacity to start analysing unlisted investments is retained. If fees are reduced to 10 basis points, the ability and skill of the managers to look into more than investing in other people’s funds or into simple listed equities is reduced. If we start to look at it as a cost-based issue only, we miss out the fact that we get quite a lot of extra expertise if slightly higher management fees are paid.

The Australian framework incorporates additional core metrics including service quality, investment performance and outcomes. There is a concern that the UK value for money framework overemphasises costs and risks discouraging investment in asset classes, as I discussed, that historically produced higher returns but that might have higher shorter-term fees or complexities. This narrow focus could also dampen innovation in pension scheme design and reduce member engagement, ultimately harming long-term retirement outcomes for scheme members. It may be valuable to learn from the Australian approach by developing a value for money framework that balances cost transparency with metrics that encourage good investment strategies and quality services, aligning regulators’ and trustees’ incentives with members’ long-term financial interests.

Our amendment tries to broaden the definition of value for money using the Australian model as a template. It would require the assessment of net benefit outcome, investment performance, quality of service and long-term member outcomes, not just cost. It would introduce a requirement for schemes to report and benchmark across these holistic measures, thereby enabling a more balanced and meaningful comparison of value.

[Torsten Bell]

I think there is more agreement than the hon. Member for Wyre Forest set out, because we all agree that we want to focus not just on cost and charges. I remind everybody that we were discussing the local government pension scheme this morning—

[Alice Macdonald (Norwich North) (Lab/Co-op)]

I want to take this opportunity to thank the Minister for his remarks on the value for money scheme, which I welcome, and to put on the record that I am a member of the local government pension scheme. I did not have an opportunity to do that earlier.

[Torsten Bell]

We are now turning to the value for money framework, which relates to defined-contribution schemes. As I said, we are aiming for a full spectrum of value to be considered by the framework.

I do not think I would normally say this, but I am worried that the hon. Member for Wyre Forest is lacking a bit of patriotism, because the Australian scheme does not take into account some of the wider metrics, such as customer service, that he is rightly encouraging the scheme to focus on, whereas the intention in the Bill is exactly as he sets out—that we should be taking into account not only those longer-term returns, which are ultimately what we should all care about, but also customer service. I completely endorse his objectives.

The value for money clauses have been drafted in a way that allows the Secretary of State the necessary flexibility to set out in regulations the categories of information for the VFM assessments of the kind that are set out in the amendment, such that we can adapt to changes in the pension landscape and learn from operational experiences, as we are already learning from the experience in Australia. There are things to learn from Australia that have gone well, and there are certainly things to learn from that have gone less well. Although the amendment recognises the importance of assessing value across all the pillars of value, it is vital that we do not restrict the framework by embedding the exact details of the categories of information in the primary legislation.

VFM metrics, benchmarks and the assessment process will be specified through regulations, providing clarity for industry on how to report on and assess value provided by in-scope schemes—which, as I said, are basically at this stage workplace defined contribution schemes. Over time, those will be reviewed to make sure that they continue to reflect market changes and the needs of savers. For those reasons, we believe that the clauses are spot on. I urge the hon. Member for Wyre Forest to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Division 9

Ayes: 5

---

Conservative: 3
Liberal Democrat: 2

Noes: 10

---

Labour: 10

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 28, in clause 10, page 11, leave out line 9 and insert—

“an occupational pension scheme that provides money purchase benefits.”

This amendment ensures that the value for money framework is capable of applying to hybrid schemes (that is, schemes that provide both money purchase benefits and other benefits).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 1, in clause 10, page 11, line 9, leave out—

“a money purchase scheme that is”.

This amendment, together with Amendment 2, would ensure that the value for money provisions introduced by this Bill apply to all occupational pension schemes.

Amendment 2, in clause 10, page 11, line 14, at end insert—

“(14) Value for money regulations may make different provision for different descriptions of relevant pension schemes and must make provision for the application of the value for money assessment with a VFM rating to defined benefit occupational pension schemes.”

This amendment, together with Amendment 1, would ensure that the value for money provisions introduced by this Bill apply to all occupational pension schemes.

Clause stand part.

Government amendment 35.

[Torsten Bell]

Amendments 28 and 35 introduce changes into chapter 1 of part 2 of the Bill. Amendment 28 ensures that the value for money framework is capable of applying to hybrid schemes—schemes that provide both money purchase benefits and other benefits. Amendment 35 is minor and consequential to amendment 28. The amendments are of a minor and technical nature and do not alter the policy. I commend them to the Committee.

On a point of order, Sir Christopher, should I proceed to comment on the other amendments or allow those proposing other amendments to come forward before I turn to the clause stand part?

[The Chair]

That is a matter for you.

[Torsten Bell]

On we go! I was going to thank the hon. Member for Torbay for his words on his amendments, but I shall move on to them anyway, and to clause stand part. Ultimately, value for money is a much-needed member protection measure for savers enrolled in a defined contribution scheme. I should remind the Committee why we have it and why it is so important: because the risk of poor value for money now lies in the defined contribution market to such a large extent with individual savers. That is what the Bill is ultimately, most importantly, about.

It is important to remember that members of defined benefit pension schemes already have protections and benefit from the sponsor employer shouldering all that risk, as was mentioned earlier by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. Those employers also have greater agency to deal with the value-related issues, such as the effective administration of their pension schemes.

Clause 10 sets out that certain pension schemes and arrangements will be in scope for the value for money framework. The clause provides regulation-making powers to specify the types of schemes and arrangements that will be in scope of the value for money requirements. We envisage that those initially in scope will be default occupational pension schemes offering defined contribution benefits. That is fundamental, given that the vast majority of defined contribution savers are saving into exactly those kind of pension schemes. To spell out what that means, we are not talking about non-workplace defined contribution pensions—that is, personal pensions. There is a regulatory power to extend in future if required, but initially we are talking about workplace defined contribution pension schemes.

With that explanation, I hope that the hon. Member for Torbay will not press his amendment, and I commend clause 10 to the Committee.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I rise to speak to clause 10 and the consultations that the Secretary of State will undertake in advance of making the value for money regulations. Subsection (7) says:

“The Secretary of State must consult with such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate before— (a) making value for money regulations; (b) issuing guidance under subsection (6).”

I appreciate that that is in there—it should be in there, as it is important. However, I do not know the road map off the top of my head, although the Minister might. Will the value for money regulations be published in draft in advance of the final decisions being made? I understand that they will go through the affirmative procedure when they do come before Parliament, but, in order to consult, will the Secretary of State publish the drafted regulations so that all of us can see them?

Also, on the right people to consult, I would always recommend that the Secretary of State runs those regulations before the Select Committee in advance of publishing them, so that it can suggest any changes. It is far easier for the changes to be made in advance of the statutory instrument being laid, when it is in draft form, than for there to be an argument in a Delegated Legislation Committee—I am sure that nobody on either side of the House wants there to be arguments in a Delegated Legislation Committee. We would all, I am sure, hope that there would be widespread agreement in advance.

The value for money regulations are really important, and it is important that they are got right. I am pleased that there is to be a consultation, but I push the Minister to agree that it will be significant—not just a couple of people in advance—so that potential problems with the value for money regulations are ironed out, and we do not see 273 amendments to them down the line.

[Steve Darling]

That had eluded me, Sir Christopher, so thank you for drawing me out on this one. Amendments 1 and 2 ensure that there is consistency and that there are no gaps where schemes could perhaps fall between the cracks of legislation. We feel that the amendments would give that continuity of support to schemes.

[Torsten Bell]

In response to the hon. Member for Torbay, I should say that I have already set out the case for the value for money framework not covering defined benefit pension schemes, which is what the effect of the amendment would be.

To the questions raised by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, broadly, the answer is yes: the regulations will be published in detail as part of the consultation. Significant consultations have already gone on with a very wide range of stakeholders, both by the TPR and by the Financial Conduct Authority. There are further consultations, and then draft regulations, to come. It is worth thinking about how a lot of the changes in the Bill reinforce each other. It is important that we make reasonably swift progress on the value for money regulations, because the value for money regime is a requirement for us to be able to then make progress on some of the other bits that we will come to discuss, such as contract override and, indeed, small pots.

Amendment 28 agreed to.

Clause 10, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11

Publication etc of metric data

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 29, in clause 11, page 11, line 34, after “publication” insert “or sharing”.

This amendment ensures that information on the database mentioned in clause 11(2)(d) can be made available to (for example) the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions for the purpose of internal review, as well as made available for publication.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Government new clause 11—Sharing of database where FCA makes corresponding rules.

Let me explain: although we often debate new clauses as parts of a group, the decisions on the new clauses will be taken after everything else. If Members look at the amendment paper, they will see that that is the situation.

[Torsten Bell]

Thank you, Sir Christopher. A central part of assessing whether a pension scheme or arrangement is providing value to the saver is how it performs in terms of investment, the quality of the service provided and costs. Having standardised performance metrics and a consistent measure of value will allow for easy and better comparisons across arrangements, which in turn will drive schemes to address poor value.

That is why clause 11 provides the powers necessary to ensure that schemes disclose value for money data on areas such as investment performance, including the types of assets being invested in, the quality of the service provided and charges on members. This information will have to be submitted within specified timescales. It is crucial that the metric data is open to public scrutiny, so clause 11 provides powers to require that the metrics are published and available on an electronic database. To ensure standardisation, regulations may also require the Pensions Regulator to set out the format that information should be submitted in. The powers taken in this clause will enable the creation of consistent, transparent and comparable VFM data to allow us to better understand which schemes are providing best possible value.

I turn to new clause 11, which will be inserted into chapter 1 of part 2. It provides clarity on the use of the electronic database mentioned at clause 11. Where the Financial Conduct Authority has made rules for contract-based schemes that correspond to VFM regulations, it will be permitted to use the electronic database. The new clause therefore facilitates the work of the FCA by facilitating schemes to provide that data to the electronic database. It provides for regulations to permit the use of the electronic database for the publication or sharing of information relating to contract-based schemes. The regulations will be subject to the negative procedure.

The context is that we have been clear from the outset that, for the value for money framework to work effectively, it must apply consistently across both trust-based and contract-based sides of the market. The new clause enables that to happen. It is purely technical in nature and will ensure that value for money data is treated consistently across both those two parts of the market. It does not alter the policy. I commend it to the Committee.

I turn to Government amendment 29, which introduces a change to chapter 1 of part 2. The amendment ensures that information on the database can be made available to, for example, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions for the purpose of internal review. A large amount of high-quality data is being collected via that process, and it will be able to be made available to the Secretary of State or others, as well as being used for its main purpose under the Bill, which is obviously publication. The amendment is of a minor and technical nature and does not alter the policy. I commend clause 11 and the amendment to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

This seems like a very technical clause, and we certainly have no objections to it. I also have no doubt that we will not be voting against the Government amendment. I think we are very happy with it.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have a similar question to the one I had earlier. We need to ensure that those responsible for generating the data are kept in the loop and that they have enough of a timeline to create the correct data. The Government must listen if they say, “We’re very sorry, but we can’t this bit of data in the way that the Government want.” I seek reassurance from the Government that this would be a conversation, so that the Government get the data they want, but that an unreasonable burden will not be placed on the trustees or managers who have to provide that data. That conversation needs to continue as time goes on.

[Torsten Bell]

The answer to the hon. Lady’s question is that that conversation is going on to a huge degree. Because there are so many lessons to be learned from abroad and so many technical questions to be worked through, including about the provision of data—these are important technical questions for the scheme to work and be operationalised—there is a high level of consultation on the value for money framework. It is absolutely an ongoing conversation. It was happening for some time under the previous Government, and it is continuing now. Another phase of that discussion will be launched in the near future and will continue as we move to the operational phase.

Amendment 29 agreed to.

Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12

VFM assessments

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 42—Holistic Value for Money Assessment—

“(1) The Secretary of State must make regulations to require that any value for money assessment framework for defined contribution pension schemes includes holistic indicators beyond cost and return.

(2) The framework must include consideration of—

(a) whether the scheme offers access to free or subsidised pension advice or guidance;

(b) the frequency and impact of pension transfer delays for members;

(c) other qualitative indicators as may be prescribed, including those related to member engagement and support services.

(3) Regulations under this section may require that—

(a) schemes are rated according to both quantitative and qualitative indicators of value;

(b) schemes publicly disclose their performance against these holistic criteria;

(c) the frequency of assessment is sufficient to ensure up-to-date information for regulators and members.

(4) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause ensures that the value for money framework for defined contribution schemes includes whether schemes offer free or subsidised advice, and the extent to which pension transfer delays occur and affect member outcomes.

[Torsten Bell]

To ensure effective comparability across arrangements, it is necessary to have a clear and standardised assessment of how value is determined. Clause 12 will enable those undertaking the assessment to be clear about the method that they should follow and the criteria to be used. It will allow regulations to detail how a VFM assessment is to be made, the factors that need to be taken into account when making comparisons, the metrics to be used and, importantly, how such comparisons should be made. The clause also gives the flexibility for VFM regulations to introduce benchmarks that schemes should compare their arrangements against. That is necessary to improve comparability and transparency, and to help drive competition among schemes. That will help improve returns for members.

I turn to new clause 42, tabled by the Liberal Democrats; I am grateful to them for their contributions to the debate. Measuring the quality of services provided to members is an important aspect of the VFM framework—I support that entirely. It ensures that we assess not only the quantitative value provided by pension schemes, but the qualitative. Under the VFM framework, the Secretary of State will have the power to require schemes in scope to report on and assess the quality of the services provided to their members; I just made the point about the absence of that in Australia but the fact that it will have a role within our framework. Clause 11 provides for categories of information that schemes may be required to disclose to include

“the quality of services provided to members of the scheme”.

Further detail on the metrics for measuring quality of services will be set out in regulations. It is crucial that metrics are set out in the regulations so that we have flexibility to respond to changes in the pensions market and to learn from operational delivery—again, that is something we have seen in Australia. For that reason, we believe that the current legislative framework is sufficient. I ask the hon. Member for Torbay not to press the new clause.

[Mark Garnier]

Clause 12 seems fairly reasonable in its approach. Liberal Democrat new clause 42 seems in the broadest sense to follow our amendment 254 in respect of the Australian model; should it be pressed to a vote, we would be happy to support it. I have nothing more to add.

[Steve Darling]

As I stated earlier, one of our key drivers is making sure that people are able to make quality, informed decisions about their financial long-term future. The debate on the new clause drives that agenda. I am sure that the Minister has the best intentions, but what we are discussing is still within regulations that have yet to break cover. We would be more comfortable if it was in the Bill rather than tucked away in regulations. We will seek to press the new clause to a vote when the time comes.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Member satisfaction surveys

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Torsten Bell]

It will be a great relief to everybody to hear that clause 13, although vital, is relatively small. Importantly, it enables requirements relating to member satisfaction surveys, of a kind that I know hon. Members are supportive of, to be set out in the value for money regulations. As I have just argued, quality of service is one of the key pillars of the value for money assessment, and member satisfaction is a key aspect within that pillar. These surveys will allow schemes to better understand their members’ experience and to gauge just how good a service they are providing for scheme members. Members’ experiences and views on the quality of service will provide inputs to the holistic assessment of value that this entire part of the Bill aims to offer.

[Mark Garnier]

We are very happy with this measure. One of the important points, which has been made on a number of occasions, is to do with the wider financial education piece. One would hope that the satisfaction surveys would ask not only whether members of pension schemes are being given sufficient information, but whether they are being taught how to understand what that information means. That is quite important. It is more of a cultural thing than something that should go into the Bill. When we start talking about the complexities of pension funds, it does not necessarily mean a huge amount to the vast majority of people out there, and customer satisfaction surveys should be constructed on that basis. We need to ensure action on that financial education piece, but aside from that, we are very happy to support the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14

VFM ratings

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Torsten Bell]

Central to the value for money framework is the assignment of value for money ratings. We discussed that briefly during the evidence session on Tuesday, and some hard questions were asked of me by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest; this clause will help to explain more about it. Rating or scoring a scheme’s value is a major cornerstone of the VFM policy. It is essential to helping savers and employers make informed decisions; they would otherwise have to analyse a very large amount of data. The finer details behind the ratings, such as the conditions under which each rating will apply and when they should be used, will be provided in full in regulations. That will provide clarity and allow the framework to evolve with the market.

After a VFM assessment, trustees or a manager will be required to assign a VFM rating. The clause describes the three categories of ratings that will be used in the VFM regime: fully delivering, intermediate and not delivering. As I pointed out on Tuesday, there are multiple levels available within intermediate—it is not a one-size-fits-all box.

Arrangements rated as fully delivering are those deemed to be providing best value for their members. At the opposite end of the scale, we have the “not delivering” grade. For those arrangements rated as not delivering, trustees will have to draw up an action plan of next steps to move pension savers to an arrangement that is providing value, thus avoiding persistent underperformance affecting members for long periods of time.

Arrangements given an intermediate rating will be those that require more work to improve their value to members. They may be required to inform employers of a “not delivering” rating and to produce an improvement plan that outlines the steps they plan to take towards improvement. That, in turn, will help employers to be better informed of the status of the schemes or arrangements that their staff are enrolled in and allow businesses to make better informed choices when it comes to workplace pensions.

The clause provides flexibility for multiple subcategories of the intermediate rating, meaning that the rating system is not limited to three ratings. To help tackle potential gaming of the VFM regime, we will tighten the rules on how some schemes choose comparators, so that schemes are not able to self-select the comparators they are able to use. That will be done by defining what a scheme should be comparing itself against and detailing the metrics that will determine whether a scheme is providing value. We will of course consult on the draft regulations.

[Mark Garnier]

In a broad sense, we are very happy to support the clause. There are, though, a number of issues, and the point about benchmarking and what performance is being valued against can be rather complicated. We heard from the Liberal Democrat spokesman, the hon. Member for Torbay, a little earlier about his father’s experience of putting money aside and finding himself wanting to take it out in October 1987—I remember it well; I had been a dealer on the floor of the London stock exchange, so a stock market crash was a pretty hideous thing. However, if we look at a chart of the FTSE 100 from the early 1980s up to now and the 1987 crash, although I think it was down 37% at one point, looks like the smallest of blips in what was otherwise a very long-term bull market that continues to this day.

The one thing we do know for sure is that those wanting better performance are likely to be investing in slightly more volatile assets. That can come from investing in equities or higher-growth businesses. There is no doubt that some higher-growth businesses will go bust, because they are taking risks, but ultimately, how many of us wish we had put more money into Amazon, Google or Apple back in the late 1990s? At the time it was not necessarily seen as a brilliant thing, but some of these businesses have done unbelievably well. That said, how can anybody understand how a company like Tesla, which is really a battery manufacturer, is worth more than General Motors, Ford and Chrysler? It does not necessarily make a huge amount of sense, and yet people are still investing in it.

We can find ourselves looking at the value for money framework and come up with a load of benchmarks, which brings us to the point about the intermediate rating. We could find that an intermediate rating is done at a time when there are particular problems in the stock market, yet, looking at the long term, we could have what could turn out to be a stunning performance. We have to be very careful and not find ourselves throwing out the good in favour of the perfect. This will be something quite complicated; I do not necessarily think it is something for the Bill to worry about, but, as we continue the discourse of pensions performance and adequacy, we need to be very careful that we do not become obsessed with ruling out risk.

There is a big argument about risk in our economy at the moment, which, again, is not for this place, but we could find ourselves ruling out risk. The other thing worth bearing in mind is that, by ruling out risk, we could stop money being invested into businesses that may look absolutely bonkers today, but turn out to be the next Apple, Amazon or Google. We just have to be careful about that.

I suspect we shall have lots of debates over this. The Pensions Minister is on such a meteoric career progression at the moment that I am sure he will find himself as Chancellor of the Exchequer before very long—probably quicker than he imagines—but this is something that we need to keep an eye on. As I say, it is about making sure that we do not rule out the good in pursuit of the perfect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I always aim to provide words of wisdom—say one in 100. Let me engage directly with the points about the nature of the arrangement. The honest answer is that lots of it will be in regulations, but the exact issues raised by both main Opposition parties are ones that we have thought a significant amount about.

The hon. Member for Wyre Forest is right to say that risk aversion generally can be dangerous within the system, in just the same way that excessive risk-taking can be dangerous. He raised two specific issues. One was how short-term market developments affect ratings—that is why the benchmarking is a relative process. Relative benchmarking deals with the ups and downs of the stock market or other asset valuations—we are assessing the relative performance, not the absolute performance.

The hon. Gentleman raises a separate question on the nature of the investment we want to look at, where there may be returns over different timescales. That is why we need to look at different measures and metrics, some of which are backward looking—for example, more standard measures of value for money—and some of which might be forward looking—for example, looking at the costs and asset allocation strategy to come to a view about what forward-looking returns might look like relatively. We have thought about that in some detail.

We then had a useful discussion about life stages—when someone moves from higher risk, because they are confident that they will not be retiring in the middle of a 1987-style downturn. That is exactly what we should be thinking about. One of the objectives of the Bill as a whole is to drive higher returns on average. Later lifestyling, as it is called, into safe assets means that someone can be exposed to some growth potential for longer over their life. When we come to discuss the default pension solutions, that is exactly why, on average, that approach will drive safer outcomes.

At the moment, defined-contribution pension schemes often put people into very safe assets—almost entirely bonds—in the run-up to their retirement. That would not be necessary if we knew that they were heading for a default solution with annuitisation or lifetime income coming in their 70s or 80s. That is exactly the benefit of the changes that we will discuss later. I hope that was a useful discussion of the important points that hon. Members have raised.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Consequences of an intermediate rating

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 30 to 34.

Clause 16 stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

Clause 15 details the actions that may be required when an arrangement falls into an intermediate rating. That could be an arrangement that is at risk of not delivering value, or one that provides a certain level of value, but needs more work to improve the value it offers. It allows for regulations to detail the actions required of trustees and managers for schemes or arrangements rated intermediate. That could include producing an improvement or action plan, outlining their planned steps towards improved value for members or informing the employers currently paying into the arrangement of its value for money rating and ensuring that the arrangement does not take on new employers until it improves the value rating. That last point was raised at the evidence session on Tuesday.

As clause 14 provides the ability to set a number of sub-categories of rating within the intermediate category, clause 15 enables different consequences to be attached to those sub-categories depending on the value being provided. We are proposing to give schemes in the intermediate rating a period of up to two value for money assessment cycles to make the improvement needed to provide value to their savers.

It is important to differentiate between the intermediate and the “not delivering” rating. Schemes rated as not delivering are essentially not providing value to savers, with no identifiable improvements within a reasonable amount of time. Those schemes will be required to make an assessment of their next steps, which will most likely be to transfer the savers to a scheme that is providing value. That is the ultimate sanction within this framework.

Schemes that are rated intermediate will have identified where improvements can be made and will be required to complete an improvement plan. This would outline the proposed changes to improve their VFM rating within two years. As well as providing definitions of employer and participating employer in the context of the clause, it also allows for the content of an improvement plan to be included in secondary legislation.

[Kirsty Blackman]

When questioned on Tuesday, the Minister talked about the issues that had been raised about intermediate ratings, and the possibility of intermediate points within intermediate ratings. It would be helpful if he could confirm from the Front Bench that he will take action to ensure that the negative consequences that were raised, with people being so keen to avoid falling out of that, do not happen. The Minister will be aware that confirmation from the Front Bench is helpful in clarifying the intent of the legislation and would put some of our minds at rest.

[Torsten Bell]

Let me directly address that point, and then I will turn to the Government amendments. The answer is yes. I did not respond, but I should have, to the related point raised by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest in the previous grouping. The experience in Australia was that there was a binary cut-off, but with a very high-stakes outcome if people fell on the wrong side of it. That did lead to herding behaviour. That is one of the most well-established lessons from the Australian experience, and it is certainly central to the evidence that we have heard in the consultations. I can absolutely provide the confirmation that we will be avoiding that outcome, not least via these multiple levels of intermediate ratings.

Government amendments 30 to 34 introduce other changes. These amendments are of a minor and technical nature and clarify the policy intent. Amendments 30, 31 and 33 make drafting corrections. Amendment 32 clarifies that the Pensions Regulator’s assessment of a transfer solution is to be based on the trustees or managers’ assessment carried out for the purposes of the action plan. Finally, amendment 34 removes a power that we no longer need.

Clause 16 details the actions that must be undertaken when schemes or arrangements are rated as not delivering value for money. This is necessary to help protect pension savers from lingering in arrangements that are “not value” and allow them to be moved into arrangements that do provide value. These actions may include submitting an action plan to regulators, informing employers currently contributing to the arrangement of its “not value” rating and closing the arrangement entirely to new employers.

Clause 16 also enables regulations to set out further actions that will be required of trustees or managers, including the conditions under which a “not value” arrangement may not have to be closed to new members. The clause also allows the Pensions Regulator to require trustees or managers to initiate the transfer of members from the “not value” arrangement into another that does offer value. It outlines the conditions when this would apply.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Consequences of a “not delivering” rating

Amendments made: 30, in clause 16, page 16, line 20, leave out

“the responsible trustees or managers to transfer”.

This amendment corrects an error.

Amendment 31: in clause 16, page 16, line 21, leave out “(all or” and insert “all (or”.

This amendment corrects an error.

Amendment 32: in clause 16, page 16, line 31, leave out sub-paragraph (i) and insert—

“(i) based on the assessment carried out by the responsible trustees or managers under section 14(6)(a) in the action plan of the scheme or arrangement, transferring the benefits of all (or a subset of) the members of the scheme or arrangement to another pension scheme (or arrangement under a pension scheme) could reasonably be expected to result in the generality of the members of the scheme or arrangement receiving improved long-term value for money, and”

This amendment clarifies that the Pensions Regulator’s assessment of a transfer solution is to be based on the trustees or managers’ assessment carried out for the purposes of the action plan.

Amendment 33: in clause 16, page 16, line 34, leave out “the measures” and insert “any other measures”.

This amendment makes a minor clarification.

Amendment 34: in clause 16, page 17, line 8, leave out subsection (5).—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment removes a power which is no longer needed.

Clause 16, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Compliance and oversight

Question proposed, that the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 18 and 19 stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

To ensure consistency, comparability and transparency of the value that arrangements provide, it is essential that all arrangements undertake the same process in the same way and that there is sufficient oversight of the process by the regulator. That is why clause 17 sets out the range of ways in which the regulator may make provision for ensuring compliance with the value for money framework.

The Pensions Regulator will be able to issue compliance and penalty notices to trustees, managers and third parties in breach of their VFM obligations. These notices enable the regulator to set out the steps that must be taken to ensure compliance with the VFM requirements. Financial penalties can be imposed, to a maximum of £10,000 in the case of an individual and up to £100,000 in other cases. Those figures align with other powers we have taken in part 2. There is also provision for the withdrawal of a penalty notice and for the Pensions Regulator to challenge an incorrect VFM rating.

Clause 18 makes it clear that the provisions in this chapter apply equally to pension schemes run by or on behalf of the Crown and to Crown employees. This is the standard approach in legislation to ensure that Crown-operated schemes are covered by the same rules, unless explicitly excluded. Clause 19 is the interpretation clause, which sets out the meaning of the terms used in the VFM clauses 10 to 17. I commend these clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19

Interpretation of Chapter

Amendment made: 35, in clause 19, page 20, leave out lines 13 and 14.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 28.

Clause 19, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20

Small pots regulations

[John Milne]

I beg to move amendment 262, in clause 20, page 21, line 12, leave out “£1,000” and insert “£2,000”.

This amendment changes the value of small pot consolidation from £1,000 to £2,000.

The purpose of this amendment is to accelerate the consolidation of small, dormant pension pots and to enable more pots to be included. In other words, the amendment would support the Government’s intention to simplify retirement savings by reducing the number of scattered small pots and helping members to keep track of their savings and to avoid losing their pensions altogether. It would serve to improve the efficiency of providers, which in turn could reduce costs for savers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

The hon. Lady is not only telling me I am going to be fired, but then clearly angling for the job by again giving the speech I was going to give. I agree that there is broad consensus across the room that there is no perfect answer, but there is a balance of risks. We are attempting to introduce a large change to the pension system that will affect millions of people, and we need to do that in a steady and gradual way—yes, with the intention of considering going further in the future, but not in a rushed way.

Let me talk through a few of the issues and points that were raised. As I am sure those proposing the amendment know, our view is that we should stick with the £1,000 limit at this point and then come back to consider future increases once the system has been put in place. We want all hon. Members to have it in their heads that the implementation of this aspect of the Bill is on a slightly slower timeline than some of the other bits we have discussed—for example, because we need the value for money regime to be in place before we move to the small pots part of the picture.

Directly on the question of where the £1,000 limit came from, it came from extensive engagement and formal consultation with industry stakeholders over quite a large number of years. There is no academic answer to why it is £1,000 and not £900 or £1,100, but it does strike a balance between the pressures on a competitive industry and the level of administrative hassle, and the number of people who will be affected. We need to build a system that can manage the flows.

To give Members some idea of quantity, the evidence gathered from pension schemes last year showed that the £1,000 threshold would bring approximately 13 million pots into scope. I appreciate the logic behind calling for a higher threshold, but this one would mean a significant 13 million pots. The hon. Member for Wyre Forest is looking aghast at that number. I am just providing it as a bit of context. For further context, it already represents more than half of all deferred small pots, so it is not that we are trying to affect hardly any to start with; it is a significant number. That is in 2024 terms; the picture will look different in 2030 or so when the measure comes in, but that helps Members to have a sense of it.

On how to change the threshold, I can absolutely provide the reassurance that was asked for: that will be done in a public-facing way. An affirmative resolution is always required to change it. Unlike some other aspects of the Bill, where the first regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure but later changes can be made through the negative procedure, any change to the pot size requirement will always require the affirmative procedure, for exactly the reasons that have been discussed, which are that this would be a material change that affected the industry and individuals as they go through. Certainly, we would consult on that in the future.

For those reasons, I am glad that this is a probing amendment. I hope I have been probed, and we would like the clause to stand part.

[Kirsty Blackman]

On that point, perhaps I am reading the clause completely wrongly, but it says:

“Small pots regulations…are subject to the affirmative procedure if they…are the first such regulations…otherwise, are subject to the negative procedure.”

I am confused.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

That is for all regulations except for the setting of the threshold number.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his response—

[Torsten Bell]

To being probed.

[John Milne]

Yes, it sounds rather unpleasant. We will think more about this subject, and I am sure we will discuss further, but I thank him for the clarification. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move amendment 259, clause 20, page 21, line 23, leave out from “procedure” to end of line 29

This amendment would make all regulations on consolidation of small dormant pots in DC schemes to the affirmative procedure all times they were made rather than just after first use.

The hon. Member for Aberdeen North asked an interesting question about the application of the affirmative procedure to regulations on the pot size. Our amendment seeks to address the use of the affirmative procedure in the wider legislation that goes with this.

As we continue to table amendments urging extra parliamentary scrutiny, I feel myself becoming slightly depressed at the prospect of having to see too much of the Minister, even though he is undoubtedly a lovely chap, in Delegated Legislation Committees as we consider every single change. It is important though, because at the end of the day Parliament needs to scrutinise what is going on, so it is a good thing that the size of the pot is subject to the affirmative procedure.

It is okay, but not ideal that for anything that could be to do with the wider legislation, the negative procedure applies. Members having to look for a very material change going through in a written ministerial statement or whatever and then raise it is not necessarily such a good thing, given that this is fixing 13 million of these pots. That is an awful lot of them. If we increased the threshold to £2,000, would that number be 26 million? A lot of people that could be affected by this.

This was largely a probing amendment to see what the Minister has to say. We are unlikely to divide the Committee on it. None the less, I am very interested to hear what the Minister has to say about the affirmative procedure.

[Torsten Bell]

I understand why the hon. Member tabled the amendment. I think amendments like this one should be tabled in most Bill Committees by all Oppositions, as they have been over the years.

Let me make one general point and one specific point about the Bill. The general point is that there is always a trade-off between maximum scrutiny of every single part of any change that comes through secondary legislation and the risk of putting undue pressure on parliamentary time for what will be quite minor changes. In the case of the Bill, the pot size requirement is crucial. Lots of what the rest of the regulations deal with will, in fact, be very practical and detailed.

I am not sure that the Committee’s concern that we will be spending our lives together would be allayed by having our time clogged up by all of that detail coming through whenever anything is amended, but I understand the good, democratic reasons why the hon. Gentleman tabled the amendment. I hope that he accepts that as reassurance.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Torsten Bell]

The clause, as we have just discussed, will ensure that the Government have the power to introduce regulations to secure the consolidation of eligible small pots into an authorised consolidator scheme. The Bill enables us to address the growing problem of pension fragmentation, where individuals accumulate multiple small pension pots as they move between jobs. Fragmentation can lead to inefficiencies, higher costs for providers and savers, and poor retirement outcomes.

As we have just discussed, the clause creates the eligibility conditions for small pots to be consolidated, including the £1,000 limit. The pot must be classed as dormant, which means that contributions have not been paid into it for at least 12 months, so the individual is not actively saving into the scheme. In addition, there is a requirement that the individual has not, subject to any prescribed exceptions, actively expressed how the pension pot is to be invested. The prescribed exceptions are in part to ensure that the scope specifically targets those who are unengaged savers in default funds, but this will enable us to broaden the scope to include individuals such as those in sharia-compliant funds, who would otherwise be excluded from the automatic consolidation process.

We estimate that these eligibility criteria will bring into scope 13 million dormant pots. This multiple default consolidator approach will support improved retirement outcomes for savers, not least by lowering the charges that they pay on those pots over time, as well as reduce the administrative hassle for pension providers, alongside supporting our vision for a pensions market with fewer, larger schemes that provide greater value. Our impact assessment demonstrates that this solution is estimated to generate greater overall net benefits over the period than other options, including pot follows member.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have a question on the definition of “dormant”. The clause states that a pension pot is “dormant” if no contributions have been made for 12 months and if

“the individual has, subject to any prescribed exceptions, taken no step to confirm or alter the way in which the pension pot is invested.”

I am concerned that that definition is too wide.

If somebody has just said, “How much is in my pot?” and is confirming what is invested in it, are they considered to be somebody who is actively involved in their pot and who may not want consolidation? There is obviously a requirement to tell people anyway that it is going to be consolidated. What if they were actively involved, but only to the level that they checked the numbers?

For example, I have a small pension pot. I have tried to amalgamate it with another one, but it did not work because I have changed my name. I would love for it to be amalgamated; I cannot work out how to do it, but I have engaged with that pension pot in recent times and therefore it may not be considered a dormant pot.

Can the Minister give us some clarity or promise future clarity about what “dormant” means? If there has been a rough engagement with it, is that dormant? If people are very keen on their pension pot and have spent a lot of time saying, “Actually, it should be invested like this,” that is definitely not dormant, no matter how small it is. A lot of people will have had only a passing interest and would be delighted for it to be consolidated.

[Torsten Bell]

The hon. Lady’s last point is basically the right one. The policy objective is that where someone is not actively engaging in their pot, that is available for consolidation. The kind of minor administrative engagement—trying to access the website—is not what is envisaged by the clause. It is to make sure that somebody who has taken active choices about how their pot is invested is not treated as being disengaged when they have done something that is, it turns out, very unusual.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21

Small pots data platform

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 22 to 26 stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg the Committee’s patience, as a number of clauses are grouped here—Members can thank the powers that be for that—and I will run through them all.

Clause 21 enables the Government to introduce a small pots data platform. This platform will be responsible for determining where each small dormant pot should be consolidated. It will ensure that decisions about where pots should go are made consistently, transparently and with the members’ best interests in mind.

International evidence from other countries, such as Australia, with similar pension systems to the UK has shown that a central platform improves consolidation outcomes, rather than just putting duties on schemes to sort it out. This clause establishes the framework to allow for the necessary infrastructure to be built to support data matching and pot consolidation. The Government believe that the infrastructure will be required to support pension schemes to deal with the volume of small pots that left the hon. Member for Wyre Forest aghast five seconds ago, effectively and efficiently.

As Members may know, we recently worked with Pensions UK, who have undertaken a feasibility review to examine and assess the technical requirements of the small pots data platform. The Government will consider that work as part of our next stages in developing the necessary infrastructure and the underpinning legislation. However, before committing to how best to deliver this infrastructure, we must undertake that full and proper assessment of capabilities.

Clause 22 enables the Government to ensure that members are properly informed about any action that is taken to consolidate their small dormant pension pot. Transfer notices will be the key point of communication between the scheme and the member. We have not had the time to make this point yet, but obviously it will be up to members to opt out of consolidation should they so wish.

[Rebecca Smith]

How will members know that they have that opt-out? Will that be clear enough, given all the comments we have been making on financial education? People have got to be pretty engaged, and we know from the history that they are not always that engaged in their future.

[Torsten Bell]

That is an important question. The communication to members will be standardised, by providing the key information that has to be provided and the option of an opt-out—so it will be explicit that they have the option to opt out of the consolidation process—as well as their alternative options, for example moving their fund into another consolidator. I hope that that answers the question.

The notice is of high importance, because receiving that key information is basically the only point at which the member is informed about what is happening to the financial transaction—the Government are not generally in the business of legislating to change people’s financial arrangements without their consent. Clause 22 will ensure that schemes are bound by regulations to send prescribed information that will enable a member to make the decisions, for exactly the reasons that the hon. Lady set out.

Clause 23 will introduce an important safeguard in the broader framework for consolidating small dormant pension pots. It recognises that although automatic consolidation will benefit the majority, it may not be right for everyone and in all circumstances. The Bill aims to streamline pension savings and reduce fragmentation across the industry, but the clause ensures that members’ interests remain at the heart of the process.

Under the clause, a small dormant pension pot may be designated as exempt from automatic transfer if two key conditions are met. First, the pot must satisfy certain prescribed conditions, which will be set out in regulations. Secondly, the trustees or managers of the scheme must determine that it is in the best interests of the individual or a class of individuals in their scheme for the pot to remain where it is.

That is a vital member protection and safeguard. It recognises that although consolidation is generally beneficial, because it reduces administrative costs, there will be circumstances in which transferring a pot may not be in the member’s best interest. The clause provides the ability for the scheme to make that clear and not to transfer in those circumstances.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Does the Minister have any hypothetical examples? I am not asking him to commit to anything being a prescribed condition, but just to give us some examples so that we have an idea.

[Torsten Bell]

That is a fair question. The most prevalent example will be people whose existing pot, although small, has unusual and valuable guarantees attached to it, or benefits that they would lose if they transferred into the default fund of another provider. That is likely to be the most common use of the clause. The clause will provide for transparency by allowing regulations to be made to set out in more detail how those decisions and others will take place.

Given the admin costs and unprofitability of small dormant pots, we do not expect schemes to abuse this exemption. For the benefit of people who do not spend lots of time looking at these matters, I should say that lots of schemes are happy to see small pots go, because they are expensive for them to operate; they are neither in the provider’s interest nor in the saver’s. This clause strikes a careful balance.

Clause 24 will ensure that pension savings are not left idle, requiring all eligible pots to be held by a default consolidator. As Members will know, millions of workers accumulate small pension pots as they move between jobs. Specifically, the clause will allow for the transfer of those dormant pots without requiring active consent—again, that is something that Governments do not do lightly, but it is required by the best interests of savers in these cases—where a transfer notice has been issued and no objection received from the member, as I set out in relation to clause 22.

If a member does not opt out, the trustees and managers of the scheme are required to act on the transfer notice and transfer the pot to the designated consolidator. Clause 24 also provides legal certainty, because it will empower schemes to consolidate pots even if doing so breaches existing scheme rules. That removes administrative barriers and places the member’s interest at the heart of the system.

Clause 25 plays a role in providing legal clarity and continuity for individuals whose small dormant pots are transferred. The clause sets out what happens when a pension pot is moved to a different pension scheme or a different arrangement within the current scheme. This ensures that an individual’s membership status, rights and obligations are automatically and seamlessly updated at the point of transfer—so it is not just that a member’s pot has been transferred, but that they have become a member of the scheme that they are entering, even though they have not signed up to a contract explicitly in so doing. This means that they automatically acquire all the rights and responsibilities that come with that membership. In schemes where membership results in a new contractual relationship, the clause will deem that a new contract is formed at the point of transfer.

Clause 26 will play a critical role in ensuring that the transfer of small pots to consolidating schemes is undertaken in a legally robust and administratively efficient manner. By establishing clear timeframes for transfers, it will allow for the safe and effective consolidation of small dormant pension pots.

This clause introduces two key timing rules. First, it mandates the minimum 30-day notice period before any transfer or change of arrangement can take place. That gives individuals the opportunity to review the proposal and respond. That time period is aligned to the approach taken for members who wish to opt out of automatic enrolment.

Secondly, the clause sets out a maximum one-year deadline for completion of the transfer or change of arrangement. It provides clarity and operational certainty for pension schemes and savers. That also enables schemes to maximise the use of bulk transfers, supporting a lower-cost and more efficient transfer process, rather than having shorter deadlines that force them to move individuals in small batches. It also ensures that the small pots consolidation framework remains responsive and co-ordinated. If trustees and scheme managers are waiting for proposals from the small pots data platform, the transfer period can be extended. This clause strikes the right balance by protecting savers and making sure they have time to act, while also providing an impetus for timely action in the consolidation process.

I am grateful to members of the Committee for listening to all those points, and I commend clauses 21 to 26.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have a couple of questions on the small pots data platform. On Second Reading, I raised issues about the pensions dashboard and the fact that after a significant length of time, it has not yet appeared. I appreciate that lots of people have been doing lots of work on it, but we do not have it yet.

It is vital that the small pots data platform exists and works in order for small pots consolidation to happen. Can the Minister give us some comfort that it will materialise and work? If there is a possibility of any errors in the system or the data is not correct—if the platform is not absolutely spot on—there is the risk of significant problems being created. Is he convinced that enough investment will be made in the data platform for it to work, and that it will be incredibly safe, given that it will potentially have—like the pensions dashboard—significant amounts of data relating to individuals and money? It therefore needs to be as safe from cyber-attack as possible, if it is presumably in the cloud or another such system. I would appreciate any reassurance about that, and lastly, that it will have the required resources to work and that the Government will push to create the resources if they are not there and the timeline is beginning to lag.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Member for those questions. She is right to mention the dashboard, and I will say two things about that. First, although these are different systems, there are lots of learnings from the process—as we heard from Chris Curry on Tuesday—not least the impetus that it has provided to schemes to make sure they have put all their record keeping in order. For them to be able to engage with the dashboard, they now have a legal requirement to have that data in a standard format. It is also about how the central system works, but it will be a different system, so the hon. Member is right to raise those questions.

I do not want to offer her total certainty because that is not available to me for a scheme that is looking to be operational in the next decade. We have intentionally left that longer timeline for exactly the reasons that the hon. Member has outlined. I can reassure her that very extensive engagement has been going on with industry about this. I mentioned the feasibility study, but there has also been heavy engagement, including on the security element that she mentioned. That is absolutely key, and lessons definitely have gone through from the dashboard approach to make sure that we are happy with how that will take place. I hope that provides her with some—if not perfect—reassurance.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 22 to 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned—(Gerald Jones.)

Pension Schemes Bill (Third sitting)

Torsten Bell Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 4th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out “for England and Wales”.

The amendment would secure that Clause 1 applies to a pension scheme for local government workers for Scotland, as well as a scheme for local government workers in England and Wales. Clause 1 does not extend to Northern Ireland (see Clause 100).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 8, 10 to 12 and 16 to 24.

[Torsten Bell]

Before I turn to the amendments, I should briefly outline the reform of the local government pension scheme, for which chapter 1 provides the legislative underpinning. The LGPS is the largest pension scheme in the UK, with £400 billion of assets under management, projected to rise to almost £1 trillion by 2040. However, I think it is a matter of cross-party consensus that the LGPS has not realised its full potential, not least because it is too fragmented.

The first chapter of the Bill sets out the legislative basis for reform to modernise the LGPS’s investment framework and governance arrangements, setting robust new standards that all pools must meet, including Financial Conduct Authority authorisation, the capacity and expertise to manage 100% of their partner authorities’ assets, and the ability to deliver on local investment mandates. As part of the reforms, the LGPS will move from eight pools to six. We have set a deadline for the new pool partnerships to be agreed in principle by the end of this month, with new shareholder arrangements in place by March 2026.

The clauses in chapter 1 would mean that by this time next year we will see a world-class LGPS, made up of large pools of professionally managed capital, held to account by authorities who have confidence in robust and transparent governance structures, and who together are delivering the best value for members. I remind the Committee that LGPS members’ benefits are guaranteed in statute, and nothing that we discuss today will affect any of those benefits.

These amendments will extend the LGPS provisions to Scotland. There is a wide range of amendments, but they all have the same objective: to take the matters relating to England and Wales and ensure that those are provided for in the case of Scotland. The Government are making this provision following a formal request from the Scottish Government, and I have written again to the Scottish Government this morning for the legislative consent motion that they will need to put in train to go alongside it. Amendments will be needed in respect of clauses 1, 2, 4 and 7 to give effect to that objective, and that is what the Government amendments in this group do. I commend them to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

It is great to be starting what I hope will be quite a quick canter through today’s work, Sir Christopher. The Opposition welcome the broad grain of this entire Bill; it seeks to do a lot of very useful things in the pension industry across the UK. We have some contentious points, but those will not come up today.

Regarding clause 1, we welcome the creation of asset pool companies. These are sensible and pragmatic steps towards modernising the local government pension scheme, and much of the work had already been done under the previous Government. Consolidating funds represents a responsible approach that should deliver more effective management and investment of pension assets. The LGPS, as we have heard, is among the largest pension schemes in the UK, with 6.7 million members and £391 billion of capital. Before pooling, of course, it was 86 separate local authorities, which caused huge inefficiency, inequality of opportunities and, in some cases, poorer outcomes for pension beneficiaries.

I should mention at this point, Sir Christopher, that I am a member of the LGPS and also that, as a councillor on Forest of Dean district council, I was responsible for looking after some of this activity in terms of pension management. It was not an efficient way of doing things, so pooling is an incredibly good idea. We welcome the Government’s continuing our work to make these pension funds work more efficiently and deliver better returns for members, and ultimately we all want to see improved returns and lower employer contributions. Small funds, whether in local government or elsewhere, are rarely fit for purpose in the global investment environment.

We have some concerns. The broad framing of the powers contained in chapter 1, clause 1 could allow for the mandation of certain investments by Government. Pools should be investing in line with the investment approach set out by their underlying asset owners in order to deliver against the fiduciary duties of LGPS funds. Governments should not take powers that would erode fiduciary duty.

There are concerns about the costs of the Government’s decision to reduce the number of asset pools from eight to six. This is an administrative cost. We have heard from one council, Wiltshire, which is one of 21 LGPS funds in England now looking for a new pooling partner. Jennifer Devine, head of the Wiltshire pension fund, has said that the cost of closing its asset pool could come to as much as £100 million. There will be some costs incurred, but, none the less, the general thrust of the whole process is one that we support and we certainly would not stand in the way of these amendments.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

I declare an interest as a holder of deferred membership of a local government pension scheme in Scotland, which will come into scope should the Government amendments go through, as I imagine they will. First, I thank the Government for working with the Scottish Government to make these changes and for taking the decision to agree with the Scottish Government’s request for these changes to be made. It is appreciated.

While I am on thank yous, the people who manage local government pension schemes are managing an incredibly significant amount of money and are ensuring that benefits are provided to many millions of people in those schemes. The hard work they do to steward those funds appropriately cannot be overestimated, so I say thank you to all the trustees who take that action on behalf of so many of us. Those working in the public sector tend to get a lower salary than they would in the private sector, but they often get access to a defined-benefit pension scheme or a career-average pension scheme, which is better than many people in the private sector get. There is a bit of give and take there.

On Tuesday, we heard from the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board and also from one of the pension schemes. There was a commitment that came forward in the evidence to ensuring trustees are appropriately trained—I am not for a second saying that they are not appropriately trained right now, but we must ensure that level of training is provided when they have many other competing demands on their time. It is important that the Government ensure the correct monitoring, evaluation and also support of those organisations, so that if new training is required—for example, if environmental, social and governance provisions change, or decisions about where it is best to invest funds change—the Government commit to ensuring that trustees are given all the training they need. I believe that all pension trustees have a difficult job, but particularly those managing local government pension schemes, who are often local councillors—a task that, I know, is not a part-time job and is incredibly busy.

The other concern raised on Tuesday, and which was just mentioned by my Liberal Democrat colleague, the hon. Member for Torbay, is about the locality of the decisions made. It is important that the pooling of resources means more investment in important and key projects than would result from a smaller organisation. Hopefully, the reduction in administrative costs will ensure that those schemes are significantly more efficient, but I am keen that we do not lose the local voice within the pension schemes that we have now.

The case was made very eloquently on Tuesday that, while pension schemes take into account value for money—what we would have called best value in local government in Scotland—in decision making, they should ensure that they are not supporting projects that the community are absolutely up in arms about, because so many of their members will live in that community. Scheme members need that guaranteed return, but they also need their communities to be nice places for them to live.

I am slightly concerned that, with pooling, the ability for local projects to be put forward could potentially be lost. Although I am not asking for any specific changes, I would ask that the Government keep an eye on that. Should there be significant numbers of smaller projects that are not being supported because of the changes that previously might have been supported, the Government should consider whether they need to take action to ensure that those voices are better heard and that those smaller projects still have the opportunity for investment.

Thank you very much for allowing me to speak on this, Chair. I am assuming that we have also spoken on the clause stand part and are unlikely to debate that again at the end; I have therefore made most of my general comments here rather than particularly specific ones on the amendments.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank everyone who has spoken. I am grateful for the welcome for the Bill as a whole, for this chapter and for the amendments that particularly relate to Scotland. As the hon. Member for Wyre Forest pointed out, this Bill builds on progress that was put in train over the last decade, and I am glad to see that. It is only because of that progress that we are now able to accelerate quite significantly.

Questions were raised about mandation. I want to be absolutely clear that questions about asset strategy will sit directly with the administering authorities, as they do today. It is for them to set out those asset allocation decisions, which are, in the end, the biggest driver of returns for members. The investment decisions sit with pools, never with Governments. We will provide clarification, if we come on to one of the amendments later, to make clear that the Government will not be directing individual investment decisions of pools; that was never the intention.

Questions were raised about the administrative costs of transition. Those do exist, as they have in previous moves towards pooling, and will obviously need to be managed sensibly, but I think we all agree that those costs are small relative to the very large savings that will come from a much less fragmented system.

Points about the importance of trustees were powerfully made, and I absolutely agree. Stronger governance reforms have already been put in place for the LGPS trustees in England and Wales, and these reforms build on that through stronger governance more generally.

I also hear the argument about local voice. As I said, the administering authorities are responsible for setting the strategy in relation to local investments. Strategic authorities, because of a Bill that was passed earlier this week, will have a requirement to collaborate with the LGPS on those local investments. I take the points that were made, and I think there is consensus on these amendments.

Amendment 7 agreed to.

Amendment made: 8, in clause 1, page 1, line 12, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “responsible authority”. —(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment and Amendments 10 and 11 are consequential on Amendment 7. References in Clause 1 to the Secretary of State are changed to “the responsible authority”. That term is defined by Amendment 24 to refer either to the Secretary of State (as regards England and Wales) or to the Scottish Ministers (as regards Scotland).

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 1, page 1, line 16, at end insert—

“(ba) enabling the responsible authority, in prescribed circumstances, to give a direction to an asset pool company specified in the direction, or to all or any of its participating scheme managers, requiring the company or scheme managers concerned—

(i) to take any steps specified in the direction with a view to enabling or securing compliance by a scheme manager with a direction requiring it to participate in, or to cease to participate in, the company (see paragraph (b)), and

(ii) to take any other steps necessary to enable or secure compliance with such a direction;”.

The amendment makes clear that scheme regulations can provide for directions to be given to prevent a direction of the kind mentioned in clause 1(2)(b) (requiring a scheme manager to participate in, or to leave, a particular asset pool company) being frustrated by a failure by the company or its participating scheme managers to take steps necessary to enable or secure compliance with its terms.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 13 and 14.

[Torsten Bell]

We turn now to three technical amendments concerning the powers to direct asset pools, which I mentioned in my previous speech.

Amendment 9 ensures that a pool must comply with the use of the power to direct administering authorities to join a particular asset pool, matching powers brought forward in clause 1 of the Pensions Bill. These are powers of last resort. Amendment 13 responds to feedback and removes the power to issue directions to asset pool companies relating to specific investment management decisions. It was never the Government’s intention to intervene in those decisions by pools, so we are removing that sub-paragraph to provide clarity. Amendment 14 adds a duty for Ministers to consult the affected parties before issuing directions more generally. I commend the amendments to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

In the interest of speed, I will not speak to these amendments, other than to say that we have no objection to them.

--- Later in debate ---

The amendment requires provision made under clause 1(2)(b), (ba) or (e) (for the giving of directions) to include a requirement for the responsible authority to consult the persons mentioned in the amendment before giving a direction.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 1, page 2, line 34, leave out from “company” to end of line 40 and insert

“limited by shares and registered in the United Kingdom which is established for purposes consisting of or including—

(i) managing funds or other assets for which its participating scheme managers are responsible, and

(ii) making and managing investments on behalf of those scheme managers (whether directly or through one or more collective investment vehicles),

and whose shareholders consist only of scheme managers, and”.

The amendment revises the definition of asset pool company to clarify (a) that the company should be limited by shares held by scheme managers only and registered in any part of the UK and (b) that the mandatory main purposes described in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) need not be the only purposes of the company.

The amendment revises the definition of an asset pool company to clarify that they can be established anywhere in the UK and that only LGPS administering authorities can be shareholders of those pools. The amendment also removes limits on the purposes of an asset pool company, making it clear that asset pool companies are free to provide advisory services and perform other functions in addition to their primary purpose of providing management services. The Government do not want to stifle innovation from asset pool companies as they continue to evolve from strength to strength. The amendment makes sure that that is not the case. I commend the amendment to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

I have just one question for the Minister. How are the shareholdings to be decided? Will they be determined based on the size of the investment, and how will the Government decide between councils having shareholders or contracting with asset pool companies? That is my only comment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

It is for those forming the pooling companies to agree their own arrangements. The hon. Member rightly raises the question whether people are shareholders or clients of a pool. There is only one current administering authority that is a client rather than a shareholder of a pool, so in the overwhelming majority of circumstances we are talking about shareholders. However, the legislative basis for the pooling allows for that in future, if for some reason that was the way forward that some administering authorities and pools chose. Broadly, the same picture applies to most questions in this space: we expect administering authorities and pools to work together to agree their governance arrangements, and that is what they are doing.

Amendment 15 agreed to.

Clause 1, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Asset management

Amendments made: 16, in clause 2, page 3, line 5, leave out “for England and Wales”.

The amendment would secure that Clause 2 applies to scheme regulations relating to pension scheme for local government workers for Scotland, as well as scheme regulations relating to a scheme for local government workers in England and Wales. Clause 1 does not extend to Northern Ireland (see Clause 100).

Amendment 17, in clause 2, page 3, line 23, at beginning insert

“in the case of a scheme for local government workers for England and Wales,”.—(Torsten Bell.)

The amendment would secure that, despite the general extension of the scope of application of Clause 2 to Scotland (see Amendment 16), subsection (2)(c) will remain of relevance only to scheme regulations relating to England and Wales.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move amendment 246, in clause 2, page 3, line 33, at end insert—

“(4A) Scheme managers must publish a report annually on the local investments within their asset pool company.

(4B) A report published under section (4A) must include—

(a) the extent, and

(b) financial performance,

of these investments.”

This amendment provides for scheme managers to report back on the financial performance of any local investments that they might make.

Clause 2 places important requirements on pension scheme managers regarding how they manage pension funds for local government workers, requiring formulation, publication and review of investment strategies. The Bill encourages investment through asset pool companies and emphasises local investments. However, the Opposition’s key concern is that the primary purpose must remain the delivery of strong financial returns for pension funds. Those returns ultimately belong to the pension fund members, but council tax payers also have a responsibility, as they support these schemes. Investment decisions must prioritise financial performance that ensures sustainable pensions while safeguarding public funds.

Although we acknowledge that local investments can bring benefits to local communities and local economies, they should only be a secondary focus and should not compromise returns. Local investment should be considered as an additional benefit, but the overriding duty of scheme managers is to act prudently and in the best financial interests of the scheme members and taxpayers. We caution against overweighing local investment priorities if that risks undermining the long-term financial health of these pension funds. In short, financial returns must come first; local investments can follow, but must not take precedence.

Pensions UK has questioned the need for these new powers and believes that they are too far-reaching. LGPS reform is already progressing at pace, and pools and funds are collaborating in line with the direction set by the Government. Pensions UK would like to understand what specific risks the Government are seeking to manage through the introduction of these powers, and it is seeking amendments to the Bill to ensure that if these powers remain in the Bill, they will only be exercised after other avenues have been exhausted, to guard against adverse outcomes for the pools, funds and scheme members.

The Pensions Management Institute has highlighted that the administering authorities will be required to take their principal advice on their investment strategies from the pool. Given that an administering authority is required to invest all of its assets via the pool, this is a major conflict of interest and puts a significant burden on the administering authority or scheme manager to ensure that the pool is performing effectively, with no independent checks and balances.

The Bill makes it clear that co-operation with strategic authorities, such as regional combined authorities, on appropriate investments will be required. However, there is a risk of investment decisions being influenced by political and local interests. The fiduciary duty should always prevail when local investments are considered. We do not oppose the clause, but we call on scheme managers to maintain discipline in prioritising sustainable returns, with local investments as a welcome but secondary consideration.

We are considering three amendments with this clause. There is uncertainty about what qualifies as a local investment for LGPS funds, how such investments are defined and what assets or projects will meet the requirements under the new rules. In addition, we do not want to shift the focus away from the fiduciary duty of trustees to local investments that might not deliver the best-value returns on schemes. Amendment 246 provides for scheme managers to report back clearly on the financial performance of any local investments that they might make. Scheme managers at local councils should charge the asset pool companies with finding the best value.

Although we are not opposed to local investment, the focus of trustees must clearly remain on achieving best value, and the better performance of a pension fund means that local councils can already use their powers under regulations 64 and 64A of the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013. Consequently, we can argue that LGPS megafunds with a focus on best returns can lead to more a fully funded council and therefore to employer contribution holidays.

Sir Christopher, would it be helpful for me to speak to the other amendments?

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I will try to confine my remarks to the amendment and the points made about it; I am not going to encourage us to focus on the grouping provided. I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for the amendment. I agree with him on many points he made, including that the LGPS is a success story for local investment, with authorities and pools already playing a major role in their communities. We are committed to ensuring that continues, but we also need to ensure it is done in the right way, delivering the right returns for each scheme.

As I said, every LGPS authority will be required to set out its approach to local investment in its investment strategy, providing some of the transparency that the hon. Member for Aberdeen North just set out, including their target allocation. They will need to have regard to existing local plans and priorities. I want to offer the hon. Member for Wyre Forest some reassurance—this goes directly to the point made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North—that via regulations and guidance, we will already require each pool to report annually on local investments made on behalf of their authorities. The intention of the amendment will be delivered via those regulations and that guidance. On that basis, I am glad that he intends to withdraw his amendment, but I recognise his point.

On the wider question of pool advice, and whether there is a risk of pressure from strategic authorities to make investment decisions that are not consistent with their fiduciary duty, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest should see these reforms as supporting in that respect. Remember that these pools will now all be FCA-authorised. There are significantly improved governance arrangements. If anything, this should provide certainty. It should already not be the case legally, anyway, but the stronger governance arrangements will support that.

The hon. Member for Torbay rightly asked about how administering authorities and pools will think about the balance, weighing the impact on their local economy. As he will be aware, the fiduciary duties are clear about what the objective is, and the Bill is clear on the respective roles, both of the administering authorities in setting their strategic asset allocation, including to local investments, and of the pools in making those decisions, taking into account the available returns. I think that provides much of the balance that he rightly pointed out is an inevitable issue within this. I should also be clear that the LGPS will invest not just across the whole of the UK—rather than just in individual areas—as the hon. Member for Torbay talked about, but also around the world. That is what the LGPS does today and will continue to do.

[Mark Garnier]

I am reassured by the Minister’s comments. I beg to ask to leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

I was thinking about how the amendment would work in practice in my local area. I live in the Aberdeen city council area. We are landlocked. We are surrounded by the Aberdeenshire council area. If those local authorities were in separate local government pension schemes, the effect of the amendment would be that Aberdeenshire council could not class an investment in Aberdeen as a local investment despite the fact that its local authority headquarters are in Aberdeen. That is the only sensible place for them because Aberdeenshire goes all around Aberdeen, and it is the only place to which someone can reasonably get transport from all the areas in Aberdeenshire.

Although I understand what the hon. Members for Wyre Forest and for Mid Leicestershire are saying about the classification of local investments, I am not uncomfortable with the fact that the clause includes

“for the benefit of persons living or working in”

the area. If, for example, people in Aberdeenshire invested in a new swimming pool in Aberdeen city, I imagine that it would be used by a significant number of people in Aberdeenshire, and would absolutely be for their benefit.

We should remember that the local government pension schemes will have to prove that the thing they are investing in is for the benefit of local people living or working within the scheme area, although it may be slightly outside it. For example, if they invested in a small renewable energy project providing renewable energy to local people across a border, they would fall foul of this. It would not be classed as a local investment despite the fact that it would be very much for the benefit of people living or working within the scheme area.

The level of flexibility in the clause, and the fact that the schemes will have to justify their investments anyway, is more sensible than what the amendment suggests. I understand the drive to ensure that provision is made for local investment in local areas, but because of the nature of some of those boundaries, it makes more sense to keep the clause the way that the Government have written it.

[Torsten Bell]

I will give a very short speech because the hon. Member for Aberdeen North has just made every single point that I was going to make. I understand the motivation behind the amendment, but we do not support it because it would prevent investments that straddle boundaries—for example, investments in transport and infrastructure that would benefit people living in both Wales and neighbouring English counties. We have heard other examples as well. It would be wrong to limit authorities in where they could invest in this way. I ask the hon. Member for Wyre Forest to withdraw the amendment as it unnecessarily limits the remit of local investment.

[Mark Garnier]

I thank the Minister and wish him many happy returns. I hope that he has a happy birthday. We are satisfied with the Minister’s comments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 31— Guidance on utilising surpluses—

“(1) The Secretary of State must publish guidance on the utilisation of surpluses within the Local Government Pension Scheme.

(2) Guidance must include—

(a) information about maintaining scheme members’ financial security;

(b) how the surplus can best support local fiscal needs.”.

This new clause requires Secretary of State to publish guidance on how surpluses can be deployed to balance member security with local fiscal needs.

[Torsten Bell]

Clause 2 sets out how assets will be managed in the LGPS under the reformed system of asset pooling. It requires that asset-pooling regulations introduced under clause 1 include requirements for all LGPS assets to be managed by pool companies. The clause would therefore introduce a statutory requirement to consolidate all LGPS assets into those pools, delivering the significant benefits that I know all hon. Members present agree on.

The clause also sets out that the regulations must require administering authorities to formulate, publish and keep under review an investment strategy for their authority’s assets. It also stipulates that regulations may set out from whom administering authorities can take advice on their investment strategy, a point raised by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest. The Government intend to use regulations to require that the pool be the primary source of advice. That will ensure that advice is provided on a consistent basis and free from competing interests, given that pools exist solely to serve their administering authorities. That is an important wider point to remember: the administering authorities are the shareholders of pools and are working together to deliver for members; they are not competing interests.

Regulations must also require administering authorities to co-operate with strategic authorities to identify and develop appropriate investment opportunities. This requirement will soon see the LGPS involved at an earlier stage on local investment opportunities. For the purposes of this provision, for England the definition of strategic authorities matches that in the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill, while for Wales it includes corporate joint committees. Members may wish to note that there is a reciprocal duty on strategic authorities in the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill.

In summary, the Government are introducing the provisions to finalise the consolidation of assets into pools, and to codify the role of the administering authorities in setting investment strategies and how that engagement with strategic authorities will happen.

I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for tabling new clause 31, which would require the Government to publish guidance on how LGPS surpluses—of which there are now more, which is welcome—can be deployed to address financial needs in local authorities. I recognise that the hon. Member seeks to support local authorities in considering their financial positions against potential funding surpluses.

Decisions on employer contribution rates in the LGPS are rightly taken locally, not by central Government. Contribution rates for employers are set every three years as part of a valuation process—which hon. Members will know is approaching shortly—in which administering authorities will work with their actuaries and employers, including local authorities, to determine a contribution rate that is sustainable for employers and will allow the fund to pay out pensions in the future. As part of that process, a local authority is able to utilise a surplus in its funding position by reducing employer contribution rates. The LGPS is currently in a healthy funding position, as I said, and it is expected that some employers will follow that path. But crucially, again, that is a decision to be made locally on the basis of each employer’s needs.

The existing statutory guidance says that funds should set out in their funding strategy their approach to employer contributions, including a reduction of contributions where appropriate, and should carefully identify and manage conflicts of interest, including conflicts between the role of the particular administering authority and other local authorities that are participants.

[Kirsty Blackman]

This is a genuine question that I do not know the answer to. Is reducing the contribution made by employers the only way that the funds can currently utilise a surplus, or are there other methods by which they can spend it?

[Torsten Bell]

That is the only way that I have seen taken up by local authorities, and it is the main one that local authorities are discussing, although, as I have said, that is a decision for them. I hope that at least partially answers the hon. Lady’s question. I commend clause 2 to the Committee, and ask the hon. Member for Wyre Forest to withdraw his new clause.

[Mark Garnier]

On new clause 31, as we have heard, the local government pension scheme in England and Wales has reached a record surplus of some £45 billion, which is 112% of funding levels, as of June 2024, with some estimating that it will rise to more than 125% by the end of 2025. Despite that strong funding position, no measures have been introduced to make it easier to allow councils or employers to reduce contributions or take contribution holidays. The surplus could be used to create contribution holidays for local authorities, as we have heard, or potentially to reduce council tax or increase the money available for spending on local services.

The current Government focus remains on asset pooling and local investment strategies, rather than enabling the more immediate and flexible use of surplus funds. Councils can already reduce employer contributions under regulations 64 and 64A of the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013. The problem is that, in practice, actuaries and administering authorities hold the cards, and the guidance has been used to shut down reviews even when funding levels are strong.

The Minister needs to consider issuing better guidance to councils to make the process more transparent, to rebalance the power between councils and funds, and to ensure that actuaries properly consider reductions when the funding position justifies it. The mechanisms that are currently in place mean that the assumptions are overly prudent, reviews come only in cycles, and councils have no leverage in disputes.

New clause 31 seeks to introduce provisions to allow employers within the local government pension scheme to take contribution holidays or reduce employer contributions when surplus funding is confirmed, with actuarial valuations, subject to maintaining the security of member benefits. It would also require the Secretary of State to issue guidance on how surpluses could be prudently deployed to balance member security with local fiscal needs. That would enable councils to better manage budgets, support local services and stimulate local economies without compromising pension schemes.

However, the Minister seems to be working with the Opposition on trying to find ways to move all this forward, so for the sake of brevity we will seek to withdraw new clause 31.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

Clause 3 concerns how procurement law relates to the LGPS. New clause 21 is intended to replace clause 3, and I will endeavour to explain why it is a technical but valuable amendment. The existing clause and the replacing new clause are identical in their purpose and desired outcome. The reason for the change is technical: rather than stating in the Bill how procurement law affects the LGPS, new clause 21 will instead move the LGPS exemption directly into schedule 2 to the Procurement Act 2023, thereby future-proofing it against changes to the Procurement Act itself.

The amended clause has two aims. First, to broaden the scope of cross-pool collaboration, and secondly, to put client authorities, of the kind mentioned by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, on the same footing as share- holders. That is necessary because the Procurement Act effectively caps the potential for collaboration through joint ventures between pools, as the vertical exemption in schedule 2 to that Act requires demonstration that no more than 20% of a pool’s turnover can be generated on behalf of anyone other than that pool’s shareholders. That may limit the collaboration between pools that we expect to see more of.

Legislation should not act as a barrier to collaboration. The clause addresses that by exempting LGPS pools from the 20% limit, such that the relevant procurement rules are satisfied so long as a pool is acting in the interests of any LGPS authority. Furthermore, given that LGPS authorities can choose to participate in their pool as a contracting client or as a shareholder, the clause also enables all LGPS authorities to benefit from the exemption, regardless of whether they are a client only or a shareholder. This means that LGPS pools will be able to specialise as centres of excellence for particular asset classes and for other pools to access those services, thereby reducing duplication and enabling the investments at scale that we heard so much about in the evidence session.

I ask that clause 3 does not stand part of the Bill, but commend to the Committee new clause 21, which replaces clause 3.

[Kirsty Blackman]

The Government have requested to withdraw clause 3 and replace it with new clause 21. I am slightly confused as to how we got to the point where the Government did not make this decision in the first place, and how the Bill we discussed on Second Reading did not include the change being made to the Procurement Act, instead of the change being made directly in the Bill. Have the Government done significant consultation over the summer, or received input from various organisations that has made it clear that the new way they are now proposing is better than the original?

I can understand that there are two different ways and that there may be a toss-up about which one is best, but why have the Government come down on the side of changing the Procurement Act rather than making the change in primary legislation in the Bill? The Minister has made a little bit of that case, but if he could expand on why the Government have chosen to change their approach, it would be incredibly helpful.

[Torsten Bell]

I will be very straight with the hon. Lady, in answer to her fair question. It would obviously be preferable if the clause were not changing between Second Reading and Report, so it is a completely reasonable question to ask. The straight answer is that it is both because of consultation responses, or people’s feedback, and because the legal advice is that this is a more foolproof way to make sure that the intent of the Bill on Second Reading is put into effect.

As I set out earlier, the key change is that other changes to the Procurement Act will not have unintended consequences for the LGPS in future. I hope the hon. Lady understands that that is the motivation. There is nothing else going on here. The change has happened over that period because that is when comments came in and when legal advice was received.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 22—Additional powers for certain scheme managers.

[Torsten Bell]

Thank you for the learning, Sir Christopher.

Clause 4 enables the Government to make regulations that require LGPS administering authorities to undertake and publish an independent review of their governance arrangements at least once every three years. I am sure that Committee members will agree that good governance is critical to the healthy functioning of a pensions scheme. The clause will ensure that authorities face external scrutiny of their governance processes. Many authorities already carry out governance reviews of this form and this measure will merely ensure consistent high standards.

The clause also enables the Secretary of State to direct an authority to undertake an ad hoc governance review if they are concerned by significant weaknesses in an authority’s governance or suspect that an authority is not complying with regulations. As a result of the amendments we have already discussed, the power can also be exercised by Scottish Ministers in relation to the LGPS in Scotland.

New clause 22 enables the Secretary of State to give specified LGPS administering authorities certain additional powers, which most administering authorities will already have by virtue of being local authorities. The new clause allows the powers to be extended to administering authorities that are not local authorities, such as the Environment Agency. The new clause will simply create a level playing field for all administering authorities in England and Wales.

[Kirsty Blackman]

What is the Government’s rationale for not including Scotland in new clause 22? Is it because the Scottish Government looked at the original Bill and had not seen the amendments? Or is it because the differential structures between Scotland and the rest of the UK mean that it would not help in the Scottish situation? If the Minister is not clear on the answer, will he please commit to ask the Scottish Government whether they want to be included in the new clause and the relevant changes to be made so that it applies in Scotland? If the regulatory systems are the same, it seems sensible that a level playing field apply. It would be incredibly helpful if the Minister could make the commitment to check whether the Scottish Government want to be included.

[Torsten Bell]

I am happy to give that commitment. I am not aware of any administering authorities in Scotland that would be affected, but I am happy to take that point away.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

Mergers of funds

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move amendment 244, in clause 5, page 6, line 6, at end insert—

“(2) In the case of merger of schemes for local government workers, the Secretary of State must consider the geography of scheme areas and ensure these areas align with strategic authority boundaries before implementing the merger.”

This amendment requires the Government to explicitly consider the geography of new LGPS areas in any reorganisation.

The amendment would amend the Public Service Pensions Act 2013 to explicitly empower the Secretary of State to make regulations if there was a merger, including a compulsory merger, of two or more LGPS-funded schemes. The change in clause 5 would support flexibility for structural consolidation to enhance fund management and efficiencies; however, there is uncertainty about how the Government will confirm geographical boundaries for the local government pension scheme asset pools amid local government reorganisation.

Currently, LGPS reform aims to consolidate assets and strengthen local investment, but concerns remain about the implementation timescales and risks of disruption. Stakeholders highlight the need for clarity on new geographical boundary definitions and on alignment with new or existing local authority boundaries. Potential challenges exist in meeting asset-pooling and Government deadlines if changes coincide with wider local government changes.

Amendment 244 would require the Secretary of State to explicitly consider, for any LGPS scheme merger, the geography of scheme areas, and ensure alignment with strategic authority boundaries. This would help to provide clarity, promote smoother transitions and reduce disruption from concurrent local government reorganisations. The amendment emphasises the importance of integrating pension scheme boundaries with local government structures to support effective government and investment strategies. We hope the Government will reflect on this issue as the Bill progresses through the House.

[Kirsty Blackman]

If the hon. Member for Wyre Forest can confirm that he does not intend the change to apply in Scotland, because we do not have strategic authorities, I am quite happy not to vote for or against it and to leave it to those who do have strategic authorities.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for the amendment and for the points he raised. Amendment 244 would amend clause 5 to allow fund mergers only if the two funds are in the same strategic authority, so it would be a highly constraining power. I recognise the logic, but our view is that it is far too constraining.

I emphasise to Members that the Government do not have any plans to require the mergers of LGPS funds, and that our strong preference is that when mergers take place, that happens by agreement between the administering authorities. The Government would use the power to require a merger of pension funds only as a last resort, if local decision making failed to deliver satisfactory arrangements.

I reassure Members that during the reform process Ministers and officials have looked carefully at how local government reorganisation, which is ongoing and very important, as the hon. Member for Wyre Forest rightly pointed out, maps on to the existing LGPS geography, and we will continue to do so. There should not be any friction between the emerging unitary structures and the LGPS. I reassure the Opposition that the administering authorities that were in the Brunel and Access pools are already carefully considering their choice of a new pool in the light of local government reorganisation.

In summary, it is important that local government pension funds and Ministers retain flexibility in their decision making so that decisions can be taken in the best interests of the relevant scheme. I ask the hon. Member to withdraw amendment 244.

[Mark Garnier]

I am reassured by the Minister’s comments and appreciate that he wishes to make the measure work in the interests, geographically, of local government or local authorities as they undergo a transition through the reorganisation of local authorities. Obviously, this provision needs to work concurrently with that process, but I appreciate that it is up to the authorities in the first instance. We wanted to be reassured, and the Minister has made the point that there will be no or little Government interference unless they really do disagree with themselves. I am reassured.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Torsten Bell]

Schedule 3 to the Public Service Pensions Act 2013 has already conferred powers on the Secretary of State to make regulations about the administration, management and winding up of any pension funds. Clause 5 amends the 2013 Act to clarify and provide certainty that, in the case of the LGPS, the Secretary of State already has existing powers to make regulations about the merger of two or more LGPS pension funds. That includes compulsory merger. The purpose of the clause is simply to ensure that it is put beyond doubt that sufficient powers are in place to facilitate the merger of pension funds if needed—for example, as a consequence of local government reorganisation.

The power could also be used in the unlikely event that an independent governance review finds particularly grave issues with an administering authority’s governance of its pension fund. Members will note that, as I have just pointed out, the Government do not have any plans to require the merger of funds at present, and our strong preference is that when mergers happen, that is done on the basis of agreement between the administering authorities. These powers can also be exercised by Scottish Ministers in relation to the LGPS in Scotland. I urge that clause 5 stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Amendments of 2013 Act relating to scheme regulations

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 7 stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

The powers and duties to make local government pension scheme regulations under this chapter of the Bill are exercisable under the 2013 Act. Clause 6 sets out the amendments required to that Act to ensure that these powers operate effectively. Subsection (2) clarifies that the power to make scheme regulations under the Act is subject to the Bill’s provisions, and it ensures that scheme regulations can include any consequential, supplementary, incidental or transitional provision that is necessary as a result of the Bill. Subsection (3) further clarifies that the requirement to consult on scheme regulations made under provisions in the Bill, which must be satisfied before the regulations can be made under section 21 of the 2013 Act, can be satisfied by consultation carried out before or after the Bill comes into force. Just to spell this out, that is to say that consultation taking place before Royal Assent could contribute to the consultation required.

I hope that clause 7 provides a useful interpretation of the terms and definitions in chapter 1 as they relate to local government pension schemes. I urge that clauses 6 and 7 stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Interpretation of Chapter 1

Amendment made: 24, in clause 7, page 7, line 7, at end insert—

“‘the responsible authority’ means (in relation to a scheme for local government workers in England and Wales or Scotland)—

(a) the Secretary of State, in or as regards England and Wales, or

(b) the Scottish Ministers, in or as regards Scotland.”—(Torsten Bell.)

The amendment defines the term “responsible authority” for the purposes of clauses in Chapter 1 of Part 1.

Clause 7, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

Power to modify scheme to allow for payment of surplus to employer

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 25, in clause 8, page 8, line 2, leave out paragraph (b).

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 27. It removes the power to disapply the section in prescribed cases, as this is now contained in new subsection (5A).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 26 and 27.

Clause stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

Thank you, Sir Christopher, for the progress through the local government pension schemes part of the Bill. We now move on to the defined-benefit clauses. Clause 8, which amends the Pensions Act 1995, enables trustees of private sector defined-benefit schemes to modify their schemes to safely share surplus funds with the sponsoring employer. Through that change, trustees will also be better placed to negotiate with sponsoring employers to get additional benefits from surplus for scheme members.

I know that Members here—that is, hon. Members rather than scheme members—are keen to ensure that the security of pensions is not impacted by these changes. We have consulted on this point and several restrictions are in place that are outlined in clause 9. I will outline the core protections.

First, trustees will remain in the driver’s seat, deciding whether to modify scheme rules to allow surplus release from their individual schemes in line with their duty to the interests of the beneficiaries. Secondly, a prudent funding threshold for surplus release will be set out in regulations, on which we will consult. Surplus will be released only where a scheme is fully funded at a low dependency, which means that the scheme funding is sufficiently high to allow trustees to meet future liabilities with a very low risk of future employer contributions. Thirdly, trustees must obtain actuarial certification to demonstrate that the scheme meets these funding requirements and members must be notified before surplus funds are released.

The amendments clarify two points. First, the treatment of particular cases, such as sectionalised schemes—schemes that have multiple parts to them—is usually set out in regulations. Amendment 27 enables regulations to specify how the new powers to modify by resolution will apply in such cases—for example, to ensure that each section in a sectionalised scheme is treated as a scheme in its own right for the purposes of this power specifically.

Secondly, the power in the clause is not intended to affect schemes in wind up where the majority of schemes will have existing rules about how surplus should be distributed at the point of wind up. The amendment clarifies that when trustees consider the exercise of the power to modify, any separate power to repay surplus on winding up is disregarded. Equally, the new power in clause 8 cannot be used to introduce a power or to modify an existing power to release surplus on winding up.

[Mark Garnier]

I thank the Minister for his comments. We agree that the law needs to be updated to reflect current circumstances, and it makes sense to ensure that companies that have not made pre-2016 resolutions are not unfairly penalised. We broadly support the update to the law because it corrects an important imbalance. However, it is crucial, as we move forward, that we maintain the necessary guardrails and uphold the independence of trustees to protect scheme members’ interests. These important aspects will be further discussed in relation to clause 9.

I will raise a couple of points made by people we have been engaging with while looking at the Bill. First, the Pensions Management Institute highlighted its disappointment that the Government did not take the opportunity of this legislation, which broadly talks about defined-benefit funds, to make it easier and more tax efficient for employers and schemes to use scheme surpluses to fund contributions under defined-contribution arrangements, including those not held in the same trust. That would have opened up possibilities for many entities that have long since moved their ongoing DC provisions to a master trust or contract-based arrangement.

The Phoenix Group also highlighted an issue. To protect funding levels after surplus release, schemes may adopt more cautious investment strategies, reducing allocations to private and productive assets. That could undermine the Government’s growth objectives. Aside from those points, we are happy with the clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I welcome the broad consensus about the direction of travel from everyone who has spoken. I will come first to the remarks from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, who made some key points. She understandably makes the direct comparison with the LGPS. To a large respect, that reflects the fact that the LGPS is an open scheme where the ongoing contributions are much more of a live question, but I take her point.

I will make a few remarks on her more controversial points about the role of trustees and what funds are used for. The powers of trustees are very strong. Trustees have an absolute veto on any surplus release under the clause, as they do currently, and they have fiduciary duties about how they should use their powers. That is stronger than was implied in some of the remarks that we have heard.

As for the wider point about pressure on trustees from employers, that can affect lots of issues and is not specific to the one we are discussing today. That is what the fiduciary duties of the trust system exist to protect against and what the regulatory work of the Pensions Regulator ensures does not happen. If there was inappropriate pressure on trustees, it would be a very serious issue. That is not specific to the surplus question—that applies to trustees just doing their job. My strong impression with every trustee I talk to is that they take that duty very seriously indeed. I agree that we should always keep that under review.

[Kirsty Blackman]

There is an absolute veto power—a yes or no—but it is also about the power for trustees to be able to say to employers, “This is how we would like you to use the money.” There is less flexibility for trustees there. Once the money is handed over to the employers, there is no comeback for trustees if employers do not use it as suggested.

[Torsten Bell]

That is a factually accurate description of the situation. The hon. Lady is not the first person to have raised that point with me, and I understand the wish for greater certainty about how funds will be used. My view is that looking for that certainty through legislation is wishful thinking. Funding sitting within companies is fungible. The monitoring and enforcement of those things would not be practical in any sense. I am sure that part of the discussion between trustees and firms will be about exactly the kind of points that the hon. Lady is raising, particularly for open schemes, where there is a large overlap between employees and scheme. Members will be part of the discussion, but I do not think that that is practical for legislation. I am liberal enough, although I am certainly not a Liberal Democrat, to think that that is quite hard for legislation to manage, and that it is the role of trustees and employers to work through that.

On the hon. Lady’s wider point, I offer her some reassurance that the Pensions Regulator is taking very seriously its job of providing guidance for trustees about how they think about the questions of surpluses. I think that will offer her quite a lot of reassurance, particularly about how members benefit—she has focused on how employers benefit—from release.

Amendment 25 agreed to.

Amendments made: 26, in clause 8, page 8, line 2, at end insert—

“(4A) Any power to distribute assets to the employer on a winding up is to be disregarded for the purposes of subsections (2) and (3); and a resolution under subsection (2) may not confer such a power.”.

This amendment ensures that the scope of section 36B is confined to powers to pay surplus otherwise than on the winding up of the scheme.

Amendment 27, in clause 8, page 8, line 6, at end insert—

“(5A) Regulations may provide that this section does not apply, or applies with prescribed modifications, in prescribed circumstances or to schemes of a prescribed description.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment, which inserts provision corresponding to section 37(8), allows for the application of section 36B to be modified in particular cases (for example, in the case of sectionalised schemes).

Clause 8, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Restrictions on exercise of power to pay surplus

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 9, page 8, line 18, at end insert—

“(2AA) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (2A), regulations made under that subsection must include provision that takes into account the particular circumstances of occupational pension schemes established before the coming into force of the Pensions Act 1995 which, prior to that Act, possessed or were understood to possess a power to pay surplus to an employer.”.

This amendment would allow schemes where people are affected by pre-97 to offer discretionary indexation where funding allows, with appropriate regulatory oversight.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

I will not say much just now. I would like to hear what the Minister says, and I might bob again after that, Sir Christopher.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Members for Torbay and for Horsham for their amendments and for giving us the opportunity to discuss the matter of defined-benefit members and pre-1997 accruals. I should be clear that clause 9 and the related amendments refer to defined-benefit schemes, not to the questions of the Pension Protection Fund and financial assistance scheme compensation, which were discussed at such length—and, as several hon. Members have said, powerfully—at the evidence session on Tuesday.

The Government understand the intent behind the amendments. It is crucial that the new surplus flexibilities work for both sponsoring employers and members, for example through discretionary benefit increases where appropriate. That point was raised several times on Second Reading before the summer recess.

On pre-1997 indexation, it is important to be clear that most schemes—as I said, these schemes are not in the PPF or receiving FAS compensation—pay some pre-1997 indexation. Analysis published last year by the Pensions Regulator shows that only 17% of members of private sector defined-benefit pension schemes do not receive any pre-1997 indexation on their benefits, because different scheme rules specify whether someone receives that indexation.

Under the Bill, decisions to enable the scheme to release a surplus will always rest with trustees, who have a duty to act in the interests of scheme beneficiaries. Trustees, working with the sponsoring employer, will be responsible for determining how members should benefit from any surplus release, which may include discretionary indexation. My personal view is that, in lots of cases, it should, but that is where the discussion takes place. The Government are clear that trustees’ discretion is key to this policy. Trustees are best placed to determine the correct use of the surplus for their members, not least because that will involve making some trade-offs between different groups, particularly of members, and it is trustees who are in the position to do so.

It would not be appropriate for the Government to mandate that schemes provide uncapped indexation, in line with the consumer prices index, to all members prior to the making of a surplus payment. Where trustees plan to award discretionary increases, they are best placed to identify what increase is affordable and proportionate for the scheme and its members.

Although scheme rules may require an employer to agree to a discretionary increase—this point was made by several Members who were anxious about it on Second Reading—the trustees will have the final say when deciding to release surplus, and they are perfectly within their rights to request such an increase as part of any agreement that leads to a surplus release. That is a powerful power for trustees to hold on to.

The Pensions Regulator will publish guidance for trustees, as I previously mentioned, and for their advisers, noting factors to consider when releasing surplus and ways in which trustees can ensure that members and employees can benefit. That will happen following the passage of the Bill. These measures already give trustees the opportunity to secure the best outcomes for their members, which could include discretionary increases. I am grateful for the contribution from the hon. Member for Horsham, but on those grounds, I ask him to withdraw the amendment.

[Kirsty Blackman]

As I said, I wanted to hear from the Minister. I agree that trustees should be the ones making the decision on how to spend any surplus and whether to make an uprating. However, as some schemes are barred by their scheme rules from making such an uprating, my concern is about allowing them the flexibility to make it in any circumstances if they decide that that is the best thing to do. It is not about tying their hands and saying that they have to make an uprating; it is about allowing every single scheme the flexibility to make it if they decide that that is the best thing to do.

Where there are employer blockers or other issues in the scheme rules, can anything be done, in the Bill or anywhere else, to remove those blockers so that we can ensure that trustees have an element of choice and remove some of the unfairness that we heard about on Tuesday?

[Torsten Bell]

I think I can offer the hon. Lady some reassurance. It is true that within some scheme rules it will be clear that discretionary increases of the kind that we are debating would require employer agreement. I know that that has worried some hon. Members who think that that could be a veto against such releases in a surplus release situation.

My view—and the guidance to be released by the TPR will make this very clear—is as follows. It may formally be for the employer to agree to those discretionary increases. The scheme rules may apply to that, although in some schemes the trustees may be able to make that decision on their own—that will be a distinction that will depend on the scheme rules. However, even when the scheme rules say that the employers must agree, they will have a strong incentive to agree with the trustees if they are asking the trustees to release. That is why I say that the process of surplus release will change the dynamic of those discussions, which I recognise are currently not proceeding in some cases because employers are saying a blanket no to discretionary increases. We do not need legislative change to make that happen.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Would the Minister encourage those schemes that find that they want to release the surplus in relation to the uplift, but are struggling to get that process across the line, to go to the TPR, look at the guidance that is coming out and ask for assistance with making those discretionary uplifts?

[Torsten Bell]

I absolutely would. I have been making exactly those points to anyone who will listen.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his comments. Over the coming weeks, as he will be aware, we will be discussing several amendments that relate to the same issue. It will be interesting to see whether we can reach a satisfactory solution. In the meantime, we will press our amendment to a vote, because we feel that the issue has remained unresolved for such a long time that it needs everything we can give it to get it across the line, but we hope that in the next couple of weeks of debate we can find the best possible solution.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Bedford]

I rise to speak to amendment 260. I thank my hon. Friend the shadow Minister for outlining our rationale for the amendments. My comments regard informing members. I support the right to pay surplus to employers—I think that is the right thing to do, so long as the correct safeguards are in place—but it is right to inform members of that decision. Not only is it the right thing to do, but it will improve member engagement in the whole pensions process. I made a point in Tuesday’s evidence session on the importance of financial education, and a number of witnesses supported that position. By more actively engaging with members, we will ensure that they take part in their own pension provision and ensure that the right decisions are made in their own interests.

[Torsten Bell]

My overall reflection on the amendments is that in most cases what is being requested is already happening, or risks reducing flexibility for trustees. I will set that out in a bit more detail, but I am grateful to hon. Members for their contributions and for the amendments targeting important areas of concern.

Amendments 247 and 261 aim to maintain the buy-out funding threshold for surplus release from DB schemes. Member security is at the heart of our changes, as I have already set out. We are clear that the new surplus flexibilities must both work for employers and maintain a very high level of security for members, as we all agree. Under these proposals, surplus sharing will remain subject to strict safeguards, including the actuarial certification and the prudent funding threshold, which is the same threshold that the TPR under the previous Government had put in place for defined-benefit schemes to aim for more generally. The defined-benefit funding code and underpinning legislation require that trustees aim to maintain a strong funding position more generally, leaving aside the question of surplus release. They do that so that we have very high confidence that members’ future pensions will be paid.

However, the Government are minded to amend the funding threshold at which surplus can be released from the current buy-out threshold to the full funding on a low dependency basis, as I mentioned earlier. That is still a robust and prudent threshold that aligns with the existing rules, as I have just said. The goal here is to give more options to DB scheme trustees. Again, that is true across the Bill: we are aiming to provide trustees with more options about how they proceed.

Many schemes are planning to buy out members’ benefits with an insurer. In many cases that is the right thing for them to do, but other schemes might want to continue to run on their scheme for some time without expecting future contributions to be required from an employer. The low-dependency threshold will give flexibility to trustees to do so. It is right that they have a variety of options to choose from when selecting the endgame for their scheme.

The Government will set out the details of the revised funding threshold in draft regulations, on which we will consult. More broadly, we think it right that that is done via secondary legislation, not primary legislation.

[Steve Darling]

Can the Minister give us some timescales? I asked previously about timescales, regulations and secondary legislation. I would be grateful if the Minister could address that.

[Torsten Bell]

The hon. Member rightly returns to an important question. As I set out at the evidence session on Tuesday, our pension policy road map, published at the same time as the Bill, details exactly when we are planning to bring forward regulations. My understanding is that these particular regulations should be consulted on in the spring of next year—if that is not right, I will make sure we come back to him with further details. As I say, the road map provides the details of that timeline. It is a very important question for people to be clear on. In that consultation, I am sure the evidence we have heard will be taken into account.

Amendments 260 and 265 correctly aim to ensure that members are well informed and represented when it comes to their pension schemes and retirement. The new paragraphs would be inserted into clause 9 of the Bill, which amends section 37 of the Pensions Act 1995. Section 37 already provides that regulations must require members to be notified in relation to a surplus payment before it is made.

This is therefore not about the flexibility of trustees; it is redundant, given the requirements already in the Bill. It is similar to the existing requirement under section 37 of the Pensions Act 1995, and we will again consult on these draft regulations following Royal Assent. Furthermore, trustees already have a clear duty to act in all matters in the best interests of the beneficiaries of their scheme, and they are best placed to decide, in consultation with the sponsoring employer, what actions are best for members—I will not keep repeating that point as we go through the rest of this Bill.

Finally, I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for proposing amendment 261, with its requirement for actuarial confirmation that proposed payments from a DB surplus to employers will not adversely affect members’ benefits, and that members have been notified ahead of that release. Those are valuable objectives, but they are already achieved by the robust safeguards in place, including trustee discretion, the prudent funding threshold —on which we will consult—and the actuarial certification that a scheme is well funded.

In addition, the defined-benefit funding code and the underpinning legislation already require trustees to aim to maintain a strong funding position, and that is actively overseen by the Pensions Regulator. I believe the safeguards we have put in place put members at the heart of the policy, which is a point of cross-party agreement, and will allow trustees to continue to be the people who strike the correct balance between the benefits for employers and members. I hope this offers some reassurance to the Committee that, for the reasons I have outlined, these amendments are unnecessary; I urge hon. Members not to press them.

[Kirsty Blackman]

The Minister has said that trustees are required to act in the interests of and to the benefit of scheme members. However, they are required to act so that members will get the benefits that they are promised under the pension. They are not required to act to the benefit of scheme members. As I said earlier, there is a distinct possibility—particularly with surplus, which is not going into the pension scheme and which can only be paid if those benefits are already guaranteed—that the surplus is only a surplus in the case where members are definitely going to get those benefits anyway.

It is the case that trustees might not know what is to the benefit of members. Requiring them, or asking them, to consult members on what they would like, or to provide members with information about how money is going to be spent, could get better results for those members. It is not going to change the amount of pension they will get, which is the trustees’ requirement; however, it may change their lives in a more positive way. Whether or not they are people currently paying into the scheme and actively employed, there are ways that the surplus could be spent that would benefit or disbenefit their lives.

In making that case, I think there should be a consultation with members. The hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire made the point very well that we should encourage people to take more interest in and have more input into their pensions, so that they have a better idea of what is going on, of the possibility of surpluses and of how they are spent. I would appreciate it if the Minister, when he is considering the regulations and the changes being made, could think about how best to consult scheme members. Given that trustees have a duty to act not in the best interests of members, but in the best interests of members’ pensions, I would love to see, around the surplus, arrangements that benefit scheme members—whether they are currently paying, future or deferred members, or those already getting their pensions—rather than solely the employer and the employer’s intentions.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Gerald Jones.)

Pension Schemes Bill (Second sitting)

Torsten Bell Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Luke Murphy]

Q It does not appear to be easily definable. What the financial benefits to members of an investment will be is easier to define through the fiduciary duty, but what is popular locally feels like a bit of a value judgment.

Councillor Phillips: Like a lot of judgments.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

Q Since we have gone to mandation and surplus, I encourage you to clarify that the reserve power and the surplus measures in the Bill do not affect the LGPS in any way. Those are not within the remit of the Bill.

Councillor Phillips: My understanding is that it is a back foot.

[Torsten Bell]

indicated dissent.

Councillor Phillips: It is not a back foot?

[Torsten Bell]

Q The reserve power is about automatic enrolment contributions; it has no impact on the LGPS. It is the same for surplus: the changes do not apply to the LGPS. Could you confirm that I am correct in saying that?

Councillor Phillips: Right.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

That is very helpful; thank you very much.

[Torsten Bell]

Q Thank you both for joining us today. I want to ask you to reflect on the internal consistency of some of what you have said. Implicit in what you are saying is that pension schemes should have been investing in a wider range of private assets over the course of the past 10 years, and that that is what they should want to be doing in future—so in some ways we have not been living up to our fiduciary duties in the past, and we are now making changes to do that.

Given that that is your logic, the question is why that has not happened. If you go and ask actual pension providers why that has not happened, they will tell you they have a collective action problem and an industry focused exclusively on cost and not on returns, and that they struggle to deliver against that. If you have a collective action problem, you need to ask how we resolve that.

You then get to the fact that the Mansion House accord is entirely industry led, with numbers set by them—it is not about distortion to the market; you might want to reflect on that, given the comments you have just made. You also spoke about a lack of clarity, but the Mansion House accord provides clarity about the objectives: everyone can see them and they are set by the industry. When it comes to savers’ interests, you know that the Bill includes a carve-out for trustees to say, “This isn’t in my members’ interests, so we won’t be doing it.” Reflect a bit on the consistency of the argument you have made about the real progress you want to see on investment in a wider range of assets—because it is in savers’ interests and should have happened in the past but did not—and the changes in the Bill. I would gently suggest you might want to think about the consistency of that.

Sophia Singleton: We are not a mature industry—the defined contribution industry—and in the past we have not invested in these assets because there have been operational barriers, including the focus on cost.

[Torsten Bell]

That is not the view of the whole industry, which points to the collective action problem of an exclusive focus on cost, as much as it is a barrier—

Sophia Singleton: The value for money framework in the Bill is extremely helpful—

[Torsten Bell]

It is.

Sophia Singleton: —and we have said that we need to move the focus from cost to value, and we are seeing that very much come through in the culture within the industry, to be focusing on value. I have given evidence about funds recruiting investment teams to invest in these assets, because they are not simple to invest in for DC schemes. If you look at the experience in Australia through the covid pandemic, there were some real challenges that those schemes had to face relating to stale pricing, intergenerational fairness and cross-subsidies. They are not simple assets for DC schemes to invest in. The market is moving, going, and will get there. What we are saying is the mandation power is not needed to achieve that, because we are, with your help, getting to the right place.

[Torsten Bell]

Q Again, I would look at the actual history of what happened. The industry committed to private assets under the previous Government, and it is failing to deliver on that because of collective action challenges. You have to face up to this at the level of the sector as a whole; I am afraid you are giving answers that are very happy with the status quo, the way you are describing it. I would reflect that it is definitely a failure of fiduciary duty over the last 10 years not to have made more progress.

Helen Forrest Hall: Just to give my own perspective, there are a number of structural issues with the development of the sector. Defined benefit has been in run-off, which has driven a particular type of investment strategy. DC has not been at scale, and a number of us in the sector have been calling for consolidation for a long time. I think it goes without saying that we are having this conversation in the context of being very supportive of the vast majority of provisions in this Bill.

[Torsten Bell]

I was encouraging you to say that; you got there.

Helen Forrest Hall: Apologies; we are very, very supportive of the vast majority. This is basically the one substantive issue from our perspective. As Sophia has said, the value for money and consolidation elements in particular are incredibly helpful in removing some of the barriers that have existed, including for trustees. They technically have the ability to operate within their fiduciary duty, but sometimes the legislation and the structure of the industry get in their way. Things such as value for money and scale will really help with that. This Bill is incredibly enabling in the vast majority of its provisions. There are just a small number—mandation being one of them—where we have a bit of concern.

[John Milne]

Q Pension scheme funding ladders can go up, and they largely have done in recent years, but also they can go down. Do you think that the proposals and the framework in this Bill for surplus extraction have the right balance of risk versus actually achieving the objective?

Helen Forrest Hall: From a principles basis, yes, and just to address the funding point, they absolutely can. I know there will be a number of us in the room who have either experienced or been subject to the outcomes of what has happened when those significant events have taken place. In the context of where we are with DB now, a significant proportion of schemes are employing investment strategies that really do protect them against the kind of volatile market movements you might see.

The provisions in the Bill strike the right balance between, as I said earlier, giving trustees greater flexibility to exercise their fiduciary duty in discussion with employers, while also ensuring that they are considering the best interests of the members. One of the key considerations for trustees in that conversation is: how confident are we that our investment strategy would withstand significant market movements at the point when we might release a surplus? That is a key consideration.

We have seen that a number of pension schemes did not benefit from September 2022 in the way that others did, and that was because they had decided to protect themselves against that kind of market movement. There are things that schemes can deploy to give themselves that level of confidence.

Sophia Singleton: We were very pleased to see the stringent funding safeguards that are in the Bill in order to allow a surplus to be released. One thing I would say is that, as Helen says, it is giving the trustees the tools to properly exercise their discretionary power and, in a sense, fiduciary duty, but it has created an opportunity for trustees to negotiate and agree a win-win situation, in a sense. The conversations we are having with schemes is that they are now more likely to be able to feel comfortable in paying, and be able to pay out, discretionary benefits than they would have been before the Bill was in place. It gives schemes the opportunity to run on and for the employer to access the service, but also for members to have more access to discretionary benefits and to additional benefits.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

Q I completely agree: I think it is absolutely right that the more money you have, the more negotiating power you have and the more you can diversify risk and all the rest of it. But part of what I am worried about is this: how is anybody going to prove to the regulator that they will have £25 billion of assets under management by 2035? Surely that is an incredibly difficult thing to prove.

Patrick Heath-Lay: I do not want to be flippant in my response, but our scale already means that we are over that limit, so I have not really put too much thought into how they will do it. I believe that there is enough, within the business plans of entities that might be affected, to be able to make some reasonable assumptions as to what ongoing contributions will be coming through the door and how they will respond to some of the opportunities that may arise in this market over the next few years, from organisations that are choosing to move because of the extent of change that is coming.

I emphasise that I still think that the package of measures and that scale test is the right thing to instil that movement, because I think savers will be better off, provided that it is harnessed in the right way. That is why I come back to this: value for money is the proof point, and we need to make sure that we centre on that as an industry. Being able to evaluate how these changes have created a more competitive market in key areas going forward is really quite important.

[Torsten Bell]

Q This morning we heard from Legal and General and from Aviva on how they are planning to operationalise the requirements in the Bill on default drawdown products. I thought it would be good to give you the opportunity to answer the same question: how are you thinking about that within your organisation?

Ian Cornelius: It is one of the elements of the Bill that we very much welcome. I think guided retirement solutions are overdue. Certainly, our members have been opted into a retirement savings scheme, and they end up with a pot of money rather than an income. I think their expectation is an income. In fact, in the research we have done with our members, they say that the most important things for them are to have a sustainable income, confidence that it will not run out and an element of flexibility, because their circumstances can change very quickly in retirement. I think the guided retirement solution moves us in that direction.

At NEST, we have been working on this for some time, as we recognise that it is a core issue for our members. We therefore want to introduce a guided retirement solution—it is very much a work in progress—that delivers that sustainable income, but also gives them a guarantee that it will not run out. That will be some sort of deferred annuity, purchased probably when they are 75, to kick in when they are 85. We are actively working on that and will be looking to introduce it in 2027, aligning with the expectation in the Bill.

Patrick Heath-Lay: It is very similar from our perspective. We should not underestimate how much onus the shift from final salary to DC has put on individual savers, in terms of the decision that they have to make, in a very complex world that they really do not understand. Even if you surface a lot of information, your constituents will still struggle to navigate those decision points. We also should not underestimate the onus they have taken on, in terms of the risk of their own fund, when you think about the productive finance agenda and other things here. I think it is absolutely the right move. It is a good development for us to bring about guided retirement journeys in a way that is either “Do it for me” or “Do it with me” for policyholders.

Similarly, we are thinking about drawdown and how we can facilitate or help people to understand the implications of the actions they may take with accessing their funds, and then, when they get to later life, some sort of deferred annuity as an approach. The really important aspect is the guidance and how we can help, but have certain obligations on ourselves, as providers, to make sure that we are accountable for the help that we are giving as we go through the process.

[Torsten Bell]

Q You have both been involved in the discussions with the industry on the wider move to private asset investments. As you talked about earlier, you are further along the journey than most. You know the numbers in the Mansion House accord. In lots of cases, I know you are planning to be significantly above those de minimis levels. Tell us a bit—for the industry as a whole, not just for your individual schemes—about how we should think about those numbers, as de minimis or as targets, or where people are going to be in 20 years’ time. In the end, that is what we are always thinking about; we are not thinking about the next five years.

Ian Cornelius: It is difficult to speak for the industry, but I can speak for NEST. At NEST, we are very committed to investing in private markets: 18% of our assets are invested in private markets, and 20% of our assets are invested in the UK.

[Torsten Bell]

And that compares to the Mansion House benchmarks of 10% and 5%.

Ian Cornelius: The Mansion House commitment is 10% into private markets, with half of that into the UK, so we are already well ahead.

[Torsten Bell]

Q Are you already doing that because you think that that is what is in savers’ interests?

Ian Cornelius: Absolutely. It is providing attractive returns, it diversifies risk and it also invests in the UK.

[Torsten Bell]

Q Given that you think that it is in savers’ interests to be well above the Mansion House targets, why have some people not got to those targets? Are they failing in their fiduciary duties? Why have they not got there yet?

Ian Cornelius: It is hard to speak for others, but scale is an important factor, as we have talked about. You need scale and sophistication to access these investment opportunities. NEST has that scale and is building that sophistication. It often involves quite innovative solutions and partnering. Partners want to partner with someone who has got scale and assets coming in at pace, and we have those things. There are some unique circumstances that have made it attractive for us. I will let Patrick speak for People’s, but it is on that journey as well.

Patrick Heath-Lay: Yes, we are, although we are much nearer the start of that journey. Again, it comes back to the scale point. Why is £25 billion or £30 billion about the right amount? Because it is about the right part that you can economically start investing in those items.

To answer your question, and to pick up a more general point, it is incredibly important that we work collaboratively on the issue, because, as an industry, there is not much point in us all sailing our own little boats around trying to find the right harbour to invest. There is a degree of collaboration that the industry, together with Government, can do to open up the opportunities where that investment needs to go and how it can be executed in the most efficient manner. The biggest risk with investing in private markets is that they are expensive. If the vehicles that are being used on a commercial basis are not sharing the economics of that investment well enough with savers, it will certainly not be an investment that we are interested in pursuing.

The other point is that putting down the foundations for this to be a pipeline of repeatable investment activity is critical. Because of its scale, NEST has got ahead of where we are today, but that is the phase we are in at People’s at the moment. There is over £1 billion a year from our scheme alone that will be invested in those markets on an ongoing basis. Given the scale that we are both experiencing, in terms of how we are scaling up, that will be an ever-increasing number, so it is important that we have reliable and very cost-effective routes by which we can deploy that capital.

Ian Cornelius: Going back to your original question, I think that the industry is moving in the right direction. The Mansion House accord had 17 signatories and we are seeing the right moves.

[Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)]

Q Default solutions are an important part of the Bill. I suspect that, for the more modest savers, they will colour the outcomes for a lot of their pensions. How can the final offer in that area be enhanced so that we get the best outcomes? What tweaks would you make to the Bill to ensure that we are looking after those with more modest incomes, around these final solutions?

Ian Cornelius: There is no doubt that there is detail to work through across the whole Bill. One of the really interesting areas will be the interaction of targeted support and default solutions. There is now a consultation on targeted support, being led by the Financial Conduct Authority. That opens up lots of opportunities to provide an enhanced level of support to people who cannot afford to take advice. The fact is that financial advice is only available to about 9% of the population. Nearly all our members cannot afford to take financial advice, so they need that enhanced level of support, either to check that they are making the right choices—“Is the default solution the right one for me?”—or because they might have circumstances that mean that they want to explore something different. Targeted support is very welcome, and we look forward to engaging with the Pensions Regulator and FCA in making that a reality and making it work for low and moderate earners.

Patrick Heath-Lay: I am probably going to sound quite boring, but this is an area in which value for money and making sure the solutions are developed in the right way to support consumers can be really quite effective.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

If I remember rightly, the Bill allows for the detail to come in afterwards, so we will have a bit of work to do when this is all over. Thank you very much.

[Torsten Bell]

Q We all have work to do; it is never all over. Chris, this question is mainly for you, as I am conscious that you have done lots of work over an extended period on the dashboard. Obviously, there are elements of the Bill that relate to that—mainly relating to the PPF—but not many. However, is there anything you want to tell the Committee about the lessons from it for when we come to the small pots work, which obviously is a central part of the Bill?

Chris Curry: I listened with interest to some of the earlier witnesses talk about dashboards, and there certainly are some lessons that we can learn from the pensions dashboards programme, as it has been evolving over the past few years, for small pots in particular.

There are two issues that I would pull out. The first is on the technology front. I think someone suggested that the next five years or so could be quite a tight timetable to build a technological solution and get it in place. You have to be very careful—you cannot underestimate just how much complexity there is and how long it takes to do these things—but I would say that the work that we have done on pensions dashboards is giving us a bit of a head start. That is not to say that we necessarily need to build on or use parts of the system that we have already built, but it has helped us understand a lot about, for example, how you can find pensions—the way you can use integrated service providers rather than having to go direct to all the schemes, and use a syndicated model to find where people might have their pensions.

It has helped the industry get a long way down the path to where it needs to be, as well. One of the big challenges for pensions dashboards is the quality of data. Enabling individuals to find their pensions means data quality: it needs not only to exist and be there; it needs to be accurate and it needs to be up to date. When you are thinking about an automatic consolidator or default consolidator for small pots, that is even more important. You are not just transferring information, but transferring money, so it is really important that the data is high quality. The work that is being done on pensions dashboards will get people in the industry a long way to having part of that in place as well.

There are definitely lessons that can be learned from how we progressed on the pensions dashboards programme. It has got us much closer to where we would be if we had had a completely blank page to start from, but there is still a reasonable amount of work to do, because it is working in a slightly different way.

[John Milne]

Q The Bill makes the notion of using pension money for macroeconomic benefit—investment in the UK—an explicit objective. Other countries seem to have done this already. Did they do so explicitly and deliberately, or was it just an accidental outcome of good investment decisions? Did it take a conscious effort to make it happen?

William Wright: I think it is a mix of both. It very much depends on what sort of assets we are talking about. For example, if we are thinking about the UK stock market or domestic equity markets, we tend to see that markets such as Canada and the Netherlands have an even lower allocation to domestic equities, whichever way you look at it, than comparable UK pensions have to the UK market.

Ultimately, this comes down to what you might call the accidental design of the UK system. It has evolved over 20, 30 or 40 years, whereas the systems with which we like to compare the UK system, or large parts of them, were actively designed anything from 30 or 40 to 50 or 60 years ago. We are now seeing the benefits of that active design in those systems. Their focus on scale enables them to invest in a far broader range of assets at a lower unit cost.

Going back to the value for money point, UK pensions have ended up in the worst of both worlds. Fee pressure, particularly in terms of winning and transferring new business between providers, is driving down fees, but the average fees on DC pensions today are very middle of the pack: 45 to 50 basis points a year. That is much higher than much larger schemes in Canada, such as the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, the big Canadian reserve fund, and much higher than large UK schemes, such as the universities superannuation scheme, but they are stuck in the middle: they are actually paying higher fees, but because of the fee pressure they have a very vanilla, almost simple asset allocation. As Tim Fassam from Phoenix pointed out, that tends to steer people towards the lowest cost investment option. Active design, focusing on scale and sophistication, enables pension schemes to take a much longer term and much broader view of what they should invest in and where they should invest in it, whereas in the UK we have tended to accidentally move from one system to another.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

Q This is tricky, though, is it not? Because there is no geographical definition of those six pools, Cornwall could, as I mentioned earlier, find itself investing in Leeds. That would be lovely for you in Leeds, but it would not be so great for people down in Penzance.

Rachel Elwell: Border to Coast, if we do have those 18, will stretch from the Scottish border to the southern coast. Even today, we have partner funds who are right across England, which is brilliant because those are people who have actively chosen to come together, form a partnership and work together.

Time permitting, if it is of interest to the Committee, we could talk a bit more about local investment and the way of getting investment that is truly local for each individual fund but also a way of crowding investment from other people into the slightly larger opportunities that might be in a region. Every investment we make is local—it impacts local people.

You do not need to only have, for example, Durham council investing in Durham. You want all of the LGPS and all asset owners to feel that they can do that. Some of the ways that we are working through doing local investment with our partner funds have really got an eye to the different ways in which you can crowd in versus something very specific that needs to be addressed in the region or locality.

[Torsten Bell]

Q It is lovely to see you again, Rachel. Thanks for making the time today. A few people have asked questions about the LGPS through the lens of member engagement. There are obviously some implications with the move into greater pooling for that. Given that you are running that and seeing it up close, it would be good to hear your reflections on how that currently operates, as you have seen it over the last few years.

Rachel Elwell: Again, for all of us working in the LGPS, that sense of purpose is really important. I know my partner funds do a huge amount to make sure they are engaging directly with members, running events, as well as the importance of member representation on the pensions committees and on the pension boards, whether that is through union representation, pensioner representation or other scheme member representation.

We also have two fantastic scheme member representatives on our joint committee, which is the body that comes together across all of the partner funds to oversee and engage with what we are doing on their behalf. They are really bringing that voice into our considerations as a board and the wider organisation—the wider partnership.

[Torsten Bell]

Q The other thing to touch on is that all the pools are moving towards FCA authorisation. What is your experience of that? Obviously, you are further ahead than most.

Rachel Elwell: This is before I was employed to bring it to life. This is a decision our partner funds made really early, because they recognised the real benefits that can come from being FCA regulated. This is really important. We will hopefully be managing over £100 billion on behalf of the LGPS, and a good proportion of that is managed directly within my team. We are managing that for, hopefully, 18 different customers—effectively, investors and our owners. We need to have those disciplines in place, and we need to make sure that we are following those regulations. We do not need another regulatory set. There are already some very good, strong regulations that exist, so we, as a partnership and as a company, think that is the right thing to do.

[Steve Darling]

Q Thank you for coming today. Reflecting on the Bill as a whole, what would you particularly like to see weakened or strengthened in the Bill? What particularly leaps out at you?

Rachel Elwell: There are some fantastic provisions in the Bill, particularly around implementing the good governance review, and the clarity of roles and responsibilities between the different parties within the LGPS. About five or six years ago, we, along with some of the other pools, commissioned some work looking at good practice internationally, so talking to about 15 others—from Australia, the Canadians, the Dutch, the Norwegians—and looking at the journey they had been on with this. They are about 15 years ahead of us, really, with that policy. We wanted to learn from what they had done.

There were various success factors, some of which Michelle shared with you earlier, but one of those was real clarity about the Government’s policy intent, and I think the Bill really does help with that. That will help us, in turn, engage with our pensions committees and partner funds to make sure that we are providing a holistic joined-up view. There are some areas in the Bill where, particularly for the LGPS, the detail will be in the regulations. I would just make a plea, given the timelines we are working towards, that we see the regulations sooner rather than later, please. I have already said that I think it would be helpful to maybe get a bit more clarity on the circumstances in which we may be directed by the Secretary of State.

Pension Schemes Bill (First sitting)

Torsten Bell Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mark Garnier]

Or, indeed, when they first start to work. As somebody once said, compound interest is the eighth wonder of the world.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

Q I definitely agree about the eighth wonder of the world. Thank you for coming this morning. This is the Committee’s first sitting, and it is great to have both of you before us. One of the features on the DC side of our pension landscape is the two different regimes that we are operating. The Government’s policy intent is that, from the experience of the saver, they do not see a difference between the trust and the contract regime in so far as possible. That will certainly be true for their experience of the measures in the Bill on value for money and decumulation. Could you share a bit about how the FCA and the TPR are working together to make sure that is the case?

Patrick Coyne: Over a number of years, we have worked closely with the Financial Conduct Authority to ensure that when we deliver interventions within the pensions landscape, the outcomes are consistent. One way we have done that is through an update to a joint strategy. We also have almost daily calls with one another to ensure that when we consider interventions and how to enable the system to provide value for money and support people at retirement, we do so in a coherent and comprehensive way. We must really understand the different constituents of our marketplace, whether they be workplace versus non-workplace pensions, or, in the People’s Pension space, pensions analogous to the master trust offer.

Charlotte Clark: To add to Patrick’s point, we meet fairly regularly. There are various different forums and working groups. As you say, Minister, there is that sense that it does not matter where you save. Most people are probably saving in both the contract-based side and the master trust side, given that people have pots in lots of different places. It is important not that people understand where the regulation is, but that the regulation is consistent and there is no arbitrage between the two systems.

[The Chair]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, Steve Darling.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Smith]

Q Are there not going to be too many hoops to jump through to prove that the trustee is correct, if they have to prove it to a regulator? I suppose that is what the safe harbour means. Will the trustees have the benefit of the doubt, or are they going to have to be watertight in their belief that they are right, to make sure that they can stand up to the regulator?

Charlotte Clark: The level of that process would be something that we would put into secondary legislation and rules. We would really have to think through what that process looks like.

Patrick Coyne: Yes, absolutely. Implementation is critical here. This will be something that is done with wide consultation with the industry.

[Torsten Bell]

Q It is not right to say that mandation is at the centre of this Bill. There is one backstop power and there are a lot of clauses that we are going to spend a lot of the next few months—

[The Chair]

Order. We need questions to the witnesses.

[Torsten Bell]

The question to the witness is to expand a bit more on that point. In reality, this provides a “comply or explain” power. In terms of the point Charlotte was just making there, it is absolutely right about the ability of the trustees to say, “This is not in the interest of our members.” It might be worth talking a bit about how when we move forward the consultation will allow us to set out how that would work in practice.

Charlotte Clark: It is an area that we would need to work through in terms of the road map. At the moment, our focus is very much on getting the value for money framework right. How the mandation would work and the process around it—as the Minister says, first, we would consult on it. We would have to have a look to see what information was given and how we would monitor it in the period from now to 2030 or 2035. We would have to work through all of those aspects of the process. We would do that in conjunction with the industry, making sure that what we were asking for was information that it could readily provide and that we felt confident that we could make a good assessment around.

Patrick Coyne: Our engagement with the marketplace so far already shows that many are considering investment strategies that have significant proportions of diversified investments, so the market is already responding based on some of the Mansion House accord commitments.

[John Milne]

Q Do you think that the finance industry has a clear understanding of how to apply its fiduciary duty? Do you think the Bill makes that clearer or muddies the waters, or somewhere in between?

Patrick Coyne: I think that fiduciary duty is a powerful force for good. Across the Bill, this is about giving those trustees the tools for the job. I think there are a number of areas where that is true. Within the value for money framework, at the moment, it is very difficult for employers or schemes to effectively compare performance. As an anecdote, I was speaking to a provider recently. They were pitching for new business. They came in and pitched their investment data, and the employer said, “You’re the third provider today that has shown us they are the top-performing provider.” That cannot be right.

Then, when you are looking across the Bill towards the DB space, because of the funding reality that many schemes are facing at the moment, there is choice in end game options—so, “How do I enhance member outcomes at the same time as securing benefits?” Actually providing a statutory framework for super-funds as another option is a good first step, as is allowing the release of surplus, if it is in the members’ best interests to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

Q Christopher, do you have any thoughts on that, quickly?

Christopher Brooks: We do not work on final salary pensions, so I do not take a view on it.

[Torsten Bell]

Q As we have just heard, there is some cross-party agreement that the main purpose of the changes is ensuring that we drive up the returns to members—particularly financial returns, but also more generally. What do you think will make the most difference, from the perspective of the returns, particularly to DC savers? Balance between VFM; scale metrics; decumulation changes; small pots—all of these are about driving up returns for members. What are you most excited about?

Christopher Brooks: I think they all work together, so I would say it is a combination of them, but scale seems to be one of the main drivers. I am thinking about NEST in particular, which has been leading the way in terms of investing in private assets. It is able to negotiate a good deal, because of its scale. If you can drive that with similar outcomes across the marketplace, it will be really beneficial to members.

[Torsten Bell]

Q Could you explain a bit about what NEST has done in order to do that?

Christopher Brooks: NEST has essentially negotiated with the private finance industry, and is not paying the “two and 20” classic fee structure, so it is not paying the performance fees. It has incorporated it all into its existing charges. If the intention is to drive greater investment in private finance, that is the way to go about it. If that scale is replicated across the industry—across the 15 to 20, or however many, schemes remaining at the end of the consolidation process, which I fully support—then hopefully you would be in a position to replicate those types of outcomes for members across the board, in their DC savings.

Jack Jones: I would say something very similar. As a package, on the DC side, it is scale that potentially has the greatest power. It is probably important to look at the factors that would make sure that the scale results in the changes you want. It is interesting to look at NEST; it has scale, but it also has a business model and governance structure that incentivise it to go and build up its experience in investing in those markets, and to have an understanding of what its fiduciary duty is, which very clearly includes looking at the widest range of assets possible and investing in them. So I think it is scale, as long as you have everything else in place there to make sure that schemes are using that scale in ways that benefit members.

[The Chair]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, Steve Darling.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Can I ask for short answers now, please, because we need to move on to other Members.

Colin Clarke: It is an interesting question. It is not something I am a huge expert on, to be honest, and it needs careful thought, because there could potentially be some unforeseen consequences that I have not considered. If there were going to be any suggestions to change any rules in that regard, there would have to be evidence gathered to understand what the potential implications of that would be.

[Torsten Bell]

Q I want to move to DC pensions, not just DB, given what you do. One of the larger changes in this Bill for your providing to savers is on the default pension benefit solutions. Would you give us an update on your internal thinking about how you plan to operationalise those requirements, if this Bill receives Parliament’s support?

Dale Critchley: Obviously, this is dependent on regulations, but DWP people have been very open in conversations. That has been really welcome, and we have a good picture of where we are headed. We launched a “flex first, fix later” solution called guided retirement. We are now looking at flexing that guided retirement solution to offer different flavours to fit the different cohorts and the amount of risk people can take in terms of fluctuations in their income, dependent upon guaranteed income from elsewhere, or the level of their fund. At one end, you might have a cohort of people who almost need a guarantee. We could go down the route of an annuity, but we are reluctant to do that, because we think that an immediate annuity purchase might put people off. We need to ease people into the idea of an annuity purchase, and that is where we are going. For those people who want more of a guarantee, it might be lower-risk investments and in a drawdown phase for a shorter amount of time. For people who can take more risk, it may be higher-risk investments in the drawdown phase and in drawdown for longer, with an annuity purchase later. That is where our thinking is at the moment.

[Torsten Bell]

Q So when you are thinking about segmenting, your main segmentation is size of pot and other pensions.

Dale Critchley: It is the ability to take risk.

[Torsten Bell]

Your metric for that is just other income sources plus size of pot?

Dale Critchley: It is those main two at the moment. We are also working with a guy called Shlomo Benartzi, who is a behavioural science expert, to look at the whole concept of defaults in retirement. It is one thing defaulting people into taking £120 a month from their salary; it is a very different thing to say, “I am now going to take the biggest amount of money you have ever seen in your life and use that to purchase an income.” That is what we want to test, because if the default is strong and if inertia works, we will get people moving away from the poor solutions they are choosing at the moment, but if people still think, “Well, I do not like the look of that,” they will go on to make the same poor decisions they are making now, and we will not achieve the policy aim. So we think we need to deliver what is right for customers and members, but also what is attractive to them—so looking at their wants as well as their needs.

[The Chair]

Could we have shorter questions and answers? Does Mr Clarke have anything to add?

Colin Clarke: We have been working a lot on the FCA’s targeted support proposals, which are very supportive of the measures proposed in the Bill. We have been doing a lot of research around member segmentation and looking at the different scenarios and outcomes, so potentially going a little bit further than looking just at age and pot value, and also looking at what sort of questions we need to ask people to ensure that they are guided to the solution that is appropriate for them.

I agree with Dale that decumulation defaults and accumulation defaults are completely different things. In accumulation, there is more of a “one size fits all” approach, because it is all about delivering the best returns for members, whereas when you get to decumulation, it is very personalised, and you do not want to put people into something where they cannot change their mind. It needs to be flexible; people have a wide variety of different needs, and we are doing a lot of research on member needs at the moment.

Work and Pensions

Torsten Bell Excerpts

Monday 1st September 2025 Written Corrections

The following extract is from the debate on Women's State Pension Age: Financial Redress on 3 July 2025.

[Torsten Bell]

An important consideration in the Government making this decision was that evidence showed that sending people unsolicited letters is unlikely to affect what they know. That is why letters are sent only as part of wider communication campaigns. This evidence was not properly considered by the ombudsman. Another consideration was that the great majority of 1950s-born women were aware of the state pension age changing, if not of a change in their specific state pension age, as several hon. Members have pointed out. My hon. Friend the Member for Salford mentioned the statistic of 43%, referring to the 2024 rather than 2023 survey. However, as she will know, that refers to all women, including some women as young as 16; if we look at the cohort of women born in the 1950s, the figure is far, far higher. On those and other grounds, we rejected the ombudsman’s approach to injustice and remedy.

[Official Report, 3 July 2025; Vol. 770, c. 513.]

Written correction submitted by the Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, the hon. Member for Swansea West (Torsten Bell):

[Torsten Bell]

My hon. Friend the Member for Salford mentioned the statistic of 43%, referring to the 2004 rather than 2003 survey. However, as she will know, that refers to all women, including some women as young as 16; if we look at the cohort of women closest to those born in the 1950s, the figure is far higher. On those and other grounds, we rejected the ombudsman’s approach to injustice and remedy.

Oral Answers to Questions

Torsten Bell Excerpts

Monday 1st September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Christine Jardine (Edinburgh West) (LD)]

14. What steps she is taking to increase the uptake of pension credit.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

The Government are committed to ensuring that all pensioners receive the support to which they are entitled. That is why we have been running the biggest ever pension credit take-up campaign. We plan to continue promotional activity from September through to the end of this financial year, with the focus not just on eligible pensioners but on their friends and family too.

[Christine Jardine]

Earlier this year, a constituent of mine in Edinburgh West contacted me about the delay she had faced in getting the pension credit she was entitled to. She applied in September last year and was told that she would receive it in November, but it was March before she got her pension credit awarded. The delay meant that she went without extra support just when she lost her winter fuel allowance, so what steps will the Minister take to cut those delays and stop more vulnerable pensioners from being left cold this winter?

[Torsten Bell]

I hope the hon. Member will write to me with the details of the case she raised. On the more general picture, I can reassure her that we now have a lower backlog of pension credit cases to be processed than we inherited from the last Government, despite the record number of claims that have come through.

[Juliet Campbell (Broxtowe) (Lab)]

Boots has been a significant employer in my constituency since 1927, and many of my constituents have been proud to work for it. However, those close to claiming their pensions have been advised that they will be unable to withdraw their pension at an unreduced rate at the age of 60, contrary to what they were led to believe. Does the Minister recognise the frustration that many of the Boots pensioners feel, and does he agree that the Pensions Ombudsman should progress swiftly with its process?

[Torsten Bell]

My hon. Friend has raised this matter with me before, and the one thing I can confirm is that she is a powerful advocate for her constituents on this very important issue for them. As she knows, I cannot comment on individual cases—particularly as the matter is now with the Pensions Ombudsman—but more generally, it is important that promises made to pensioners about their pensions are lived up to. Making sure that happens is exactly why the Pensions Ombudsman exists.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

Thanks to our Conservative winter fuel payments campaign, thousands of pensioners have signed up to pension credit, and millions more pensioners will receive winter fuel allowance, now that the Labour party has admitted that its policy on winter fuel payments was wrong. However, the Social Security Advisory Committee recently concluded that the Government’s winter fuel plans fall short of delivering their objectives of fairness, administrative simplicity and targeted support. It seems that the Government have prioritised civil service bureaucracy over helping frozen pensioners. Does the Minister agree with the Social Security Advisory Committee’s conclusion about their policies?

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Member for his question, and I congratulate Members on all sides of this House who have run campaigns to drive up pension credit uptake. That is very important, and it is why we have seen 60,000 extra awards over the course of the year to July 2025 compared with the previous year. That work, which is very welcome, has been done by not just Members but civil society organisations and local authorities.

On the points that the hon. Member raised about the process for winter fuel payments this winter and going forward, I do not agree with the characterisation he chose to present. Particularly on the tax side, the process will be automatic. Nobody will be brought into tax or self-assessment purely because of that change; the vast majority of people will have their winter fuel payments automatically recouped through the pay-as-you-earn system; and anyone who wants to can opt out. I remind Members that the deadline for that is 15 September.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

[Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)]

Around a year ago, the Labour Government inherited from the previous Conservative Government around 3 million pensioners in poverty. Sadly, last winter’s cuts to the winter fuel payment saw many pensioners pushed into hardship. In the light of winter fuel price hikes, will the Minister reconsider the Government’s proposals and ensure that moneys are paid to pensioners who missed out on the winter fuel payment last winter?

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Member for his question, but would gently say that every time he opposes every single tax rise or any difficult choice in this House, he is saying that the Liberal Democrats are not a party that could deliver on commitments, for example, to the triple lock, which will increase in cost, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State mentioned earlier, by £31 billion by the end of this Parliament. There are things called “choices”, which are necessary if we are to provide for our top priorities—and for Labour Members, the top priorities, when it comes to pensioners, are making sure that we can increase the state pension, the bedrock of most pensioners’ living standards, and saving the NHS, and that is exactly what we will continue to do.

[Edward Morello (West Dorset) (LD)]

15. If she will make an assessment of the potential impact of increasing the number of remote personal independence payment assessments on claimants in West Dorset constituency.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Bool (South Northamptonshire) (Con)]

T3. One of the main benefits of saving into a private pension is the tax relief that people get from the Government, which is one of the smartest ways to save for later life. Any move by this Government to cut pension tax relief will devastate savings rates and the adequacy of pension provisions. I would hope that the Secretary of State knows that, so can she assure me that she has made it clear that when the Chancellor is looking to fill the fiscal black hole of her own making, she must not target pensions?

[The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Torsten Bell)]

The hon. Lady only had to wait till next week’s Treasury questions, when she could have asked her question, but she has the same answer. What we should do is look at the record of parties and what they have done. When I look back over the last 14 years of Tory Budgets, I see a party—[Interruption.] And the Lib Dems; thank you for pointing that out. I have seen parties chopping and changing pension tax relief left, right and centre, because they had no plan. Those were the same Budgets that drove child poverty up and wages down.

[Mr Luke Charters (York Outer) (Lab)]

T7. It is great to be back after taking paternity leave, and thank you for your support, Mr Speaker. I welcome the Government’s parental leave review, but currently partners only get unpaid time off work for two antenatal appointments. Does my hon. Friend agree that this is a gap, and can he confirm that the review is looking at how we can better support parents at that crucial time?

[John Lamont (Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk) (Con)]

T4. Cruel cuts to the winter fuel allowance by both this Labour Government and the SNP Government in Edinburgh left thousands of pensioners cold in their homes last winter. When will the Secretary of State apologise for the misery her Government have caused for vulnerable pensioners in the Scottish Borders and across the United Kingdom?

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Member for his question. We discussed this issue at some length in the statement before the recess. He knows that the priority for the Labour party has been to raise the state pension by committing to the triple lock throughout this Parliament at a cost of £31 billion a year. For the new state pension, that will mean an increase of £1,900 a year by the end of this Parliament.

On winter fuel payments specifically—and I thought this was the Conservative party’s position—most people think that we should not be paying hundreds of pounds to the very richest pensioners. We have listened to concerns and raised the threshold, but it is important to maintain that principle. If the Conservatives’ position is now that they want a return to universal winter fuel payments, they need to have a word with the Leader of the Opposition, who has not supported universal winter fuel payments or, indeed, a universal state pension.

[John Slinger (Rugby) (Lab)]

T8. I am visiting the jobcentre in Rugby next week, and I am looking forward to hearing more about its work with local businesses, and also with people with disabilities and special educational needs, to get people back into work. Will the Minister set out what further steps we are taking on that very important job for a Labour Government?

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Swallow (Bracknell) (Lab)]

T9. Can my hon. Friend set out how this Government are reforming pensions long term to help people in Bracknell Forest and across the country to save for their futures?

[Torsten Bell]

I thank my hon. Friend for his crucial question. That is exactly why we have revived the landmark pensions commission. We have to confront the reality that we are on track for tomorrow’s pensioners to be poorer than today’s. Auto-enrolment has been a huge success, with 88% of eligible employees now saving, but 45% of working-age adults, including 3 million self-employed and one in four low earners, are currently saving nothing. The commission will ensure that we build a pension system that is strong, fair and sustainable.

[Alison Bennett (Mid Sussex) (LD)]

The carer’s allowance overpayments review was due to report in early summer. It is now 1 September. In recent weeks, I have become aware of a case where the DWP has informed somebody that they now owe it £18,000. That is a scandal. When will the review report back?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Despite his new role in riding to the rescue of the Treasury, is the Pensions Minister still available to fulfil in principle the undertaking he gave me before the recess to have a meeting about the plight of ExxonMobil pensioners and the difficulties in them getting the discretionary surplus benefits to which I think they should be entitled?

[Torsten Bell]

Absolutely.