Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Wendy Morton Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Monday 20th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 1, page 1, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—

“(1A) The Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act do not come into force until the duties outlined in section [The additional period and right to extend: duty to publish legal advice and risk assessments] are discharged.”

This amendment together with NC2 would prevent the Treaty from coming into force until the Government has published any legal advice or risk assessments regarding the UK’s ability to extend its rights over Diego Garcia after the initial period specified in the Treaty.

[The Chairman of Ways and Means]

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Amendment 7, page 1, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—

“(1A) The Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act do not come into force until the Secretary of State lays before Parliament a memorandum on the obligations under international law which require the UK to cede sovereignty of the British Indian Ocean Territory to the Government of Mauritius.

(1B) The memorandum specified in subsection (1) must include—

(a) a summary of the legal advice received by the UK Government on this issue;

(b) an analysis of the status of UK's sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory under international law;

(c) the legal argument for the cessation of British sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory; and

(d) the risks which the UK Government may have faced had it not reached an agreement with the Government of Mauritius.

(1C) The report specified in subsections (1A) and (1B) must be laid before Parliament no later than two months after this Act receives Royal Assent.”

Amendment 9, page 1, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—

“(1A) Before sections 2 to 4 of this Act come into force, the Secretary of State must—

(a) seek to undertake negotiations with the Government of Mauritius on whether Mauritius will establish a right for Chagossians to return and reside in the Chagos Islands; and

(b) seek agreement to a referendum for Chagossians on self-determination within any negotiations which take place under paragraph (a); and

(c) lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on progress on establishing negotiations with the Government of Mauritius and the outcome of any that take place.

(1B) Within two months of the report being laid before the House of Commons under paragraph (1a), the Secretary of State must table a substantive motion in the House of Commons on the contents of the report.”

This amendment requires that the Government must undertake negotiations with Mauritius on a Chagossian right of return and on a referendum, with a report laid before Parliament on the outcome of the negotiations. The Government must subsequently table a substantive motion in the House of Commons on the content of that report.

Amendment 10, page 1, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—

“(1A) The Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act do not come into force until the Secretary of State establishes a public consultation of Chagossian people residing in the UK on the Treaty.

(1B) The public consultation under section (1A) must be established within two months of this Act receiving Royal Assent.”

This amendment requires the Government to establish a public consultation with the Chagossian people residing in the UK, before the Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act can come into force.

Amendment 11, page 1, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—

“(1A) The Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act do not come into force until the Secretary of State makes a statement before Parliament outlining proposals for a public consultation on the Treaty.

(1B) A statement made under subsection (1A) must be made within two months of this Act receiving Royal Assent.”

This amendment requires the Government to make a statement before Parliament outlining proposals for a public consultation on the Treaty within two months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, before the Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act can come into force.

Amendment 14, page 1, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—

“(1A) The Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act do not come into force until the Secretary of State lays before Parliament an impact assessment detailing the benefits and costs to the United Kingdom, including in financial and security terms, of the Treaty.

(1B) The Secretary of State must lay the impact assessment under section (1A) within 2 months of the passing of this Act.”

This amendment requires the Government to publish an impact assessment detailing the benefits and costs to the United Kingdom, including in financial and security terms, of the Treaty within two months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, before the Treaty and sections 2 to 4 of this Act can come into force.

Clause stand part.

Amendment 13, in clause 2, page 1, line 17, leave out subsection (b).

This amendment removes section 2 (b) of the Bill which aims to remove citizens of the British Indian Ocean Territory from the list of British Overseas Territories recognised under the British Nationality Act 1981, thus preserving British Chagossian’s nationality and associated rights.

Clauses 2 to 4 stand part.

Amendment 3, in clause 5, page 3, line 29, leave out subsections (1) to (4).

Amendment 4, page 3, line 36, at beginning insert—

“With the exception of the subject matters listed in subsection (3A),”.

Amendment 8, page 3, line 40, leave out subsection (3) and insert—

“(2A) An Order under this Act may not be made unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.”

This amendment provides that any order made under the Act would need to have the approval of each House of Parliament.

Amendment 6, page 3, line 40, leave out

“is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament” and insert “may not be made unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House”.

Amendment 5, page 4, line 3, at end insert—

“(3A) An order under this section relating to Diego Garcia, or the rights of Chagossians residing in the United Kingdom, may not be made unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.”

Clause 5 stand part.

Amendment 2, in clause 6, page 4, line 17, leave out “see section 1(2)” and insert “see section 1(1A)”.

This amendment is consequential on NC2.

Clause 6 stand part.

New clause 1—Approval of payments to Mauritius by the House of Commons—

“(1) No payment may be made by the Government of the United Kingdom to the Government of Mauritius under Article 11 (1)(a) of the Treaty without the approval of the House of Commons.

(2) No development framework under Article 11 (1)(c) may be agreed by the Government of the United Kingdom with the Government of Mauritius without the approval of the House of Commons.

(3) No payment may be made under any development framework agreed between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Mauritius without the approval of the House of Commons.

(4) The approval required by subsections (1), (2) and (3) must be in the form of a resolution of the House of Commons.”

This new clause requires parliamentary approval for any payment by the UK Government to the Government of Mauritius under the Treaty.

New clause 2—The additional period and right to extend: duty to publish legal advice and risk assessments—

“(1) Within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament any legal advice and any risk assessments given to the Government relating to—

(a) the ability of the United Kingdom to extend the duration of the Treaty’s provisions for the additional period of 40 years (“the additional period”) specified in Article 13(2) of the Treaty, including—

(i) any advice pertaining to the automaticity, or otherwise, of the UK securing the additional period;

(ii) any obligations placed on both parties to negotiate the additional period;

(iii) any risk assessment of the impact on the United Kingdom’s strategic interests of not securing the additional period; and

(b) the ‘right of first refusal’ offered to the United Kingdom should the additional period not be negotiated at the end of the Treaty’s initial duration under Article 13(5) of the Treaty, including whether such a right exists if the additional period expires without a further extension being agreed.”

New clause 3—Written instrument on the Marine Protected Area: approval by the House of Commons—

“(1) No written instrument on the establishment and management of its Marine Protected Area in the Chagos Archipelago provided for by Article 5 of the Treaty, including any changes to current restrictions on fishing, commercial and extractive activities, may be agreed to by the Government of the United Kingdom unless—

(a) a Minister of the Crown has laid before Parliament a copy of the written instrument,

(b) the written instrument and an explanatory memorandum has been published, and

(c) period A has expired without the House of Commons having resolved, within period A, that the written instrument should not be agreed.

(2) Period A is the period of 21 sitting days beginning with the first sitting day after the date on which the requirement in subsection (1)(a) is met.

(3) ‘An explanatory memorandum’ has the meaning given in section 24 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.”

This new clause provides that any written instrument on the Marine Protected Area will be subject to the approval of the House of Commons in a process equivalent to that required for treaties under section 20 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.

New clause 4—Ecological status of the Marine Protected Area—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within two years of the passing of this Act and within every subsequent two years, lay before both Houses of Parliament and publish a report on the status of the Marine Protected Area (the ‘MPA’).

(2) Any report made under subsection (1) must include, but not be limited to—

(a) numbers of different species of coral, fish and molluscs in the Marine Protected Area;

(b) coral reef resilience;

(c) fish stocks;

(d) ocean acidification;

(e) any degradation of the marine or terrestrial environments; and

(f) a complete record of the vessels (nature and flag) that enter the MPA.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to report regularly on the status of the Marine Protected Area.

New clause 5—Reports to the Intelligence and Security Committee—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within twelve months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, and every year subsequently, report to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, established under section 1 of the Justice and Security Act 2013, on the security of the military base on Diego Garcia and the buffer zone.

(2) The report in subsection (1) must include, but shall not be limited to—

(a) the security of the buffer zone;

(b) the management and use of the electromagnetic spectrum;

(c) the presence of any foreign security forces on the islands, whether civilian or military;

(d) a complete record of the vessels, including their nature and flag, that enter the Marine Protected Area;

(e) a complete record of the notifications the United Kingdom has given the Government of Mauritius about activity on Diego Garcia;

(f) a complete record of any information passed from the United Kingdom to the Government of Mauritius, including any military operations, personnel movements, infrastructure development, communications, and logistical support.

(3) For the purposes of this section, ‘buffer zone’ has the meaning of the 24 nautical miles surrounding the island of Diego Garcia.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to report annually to the Intelligence and Security Committee about the security of the military base on Diego Garcia and the security of the buffer zone.

New clause 6—Report on the impact of UNCLOS on the operation of the Treaty—

“(1) The Secretary of State must report to Parliament within one year of the passing of this Act, and each subsequent year, on the impact that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’) has had on the operation of the Treaty.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament annually about the impact that the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea has on the operation of the Treaty.

New clause 7—Rights of Chagossians—

“(1) The Secretary of State must consult the Chagossian community based in the United Kingdom on the implementation of the Treaty.

(2) The matters the Secretary of State must consult on shall include, but not be limited to—

(a) the Government of the United Kingdom’s response to any consultation by the Government of Mauritius on the regulations to establish a Trust Fund under Article (11)(b) of the Treaty; and

(b) any areas of dispute concerning the rights of the Chagossian people that arise between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Mauritius, before such disputes are formally discussed in the Joint Committee under the dispute settlement process established in Article 14 of the Treaty.

(3) Within six months of the passing of this Act, and at least once every subsequent year, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report containing an assessment of the efforts of the UK Government to uphold the rights of Chagossians under the terms of the Treaty.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to consult the Chagossian community in the UK on the discharge of the UK Government’s obligations under the Treaty, and to report annually on how the UK Government has upheld the rights of Chagossians.

New clause 8—Report on compliance of the Treaty and the Act with UN General Assembly Resolutions on Decolonisation—

“(1) Within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must produce a report on the compliance of the Treaty agreed with the Government of Mauritius, and the provisions of section (2) of this Act, with the following Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly—

(a) Resolution 567 (VI),

(b) Resolution 648 (VII),

(c) Resolution 742 (VIII),

(d) Resolution 1514 (XV).

(2) The report specified in subsection (1) must be laid before both Houses of Parliament and, within two months of its publication, the Secretary of State must ensure that a substantive motion relating to the report is tabled, and moved, in both the House of Commons and House of Lords.”

New clause 9—Marine Protected Area: Progress Reports—

“(1) Within twelve months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, and every twelve months thereafter, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on—

(a) the progress made in establishing; and

(b) managing a Marine Protected Area in the Chagos Archipelago.

(2) The reports required under subsection (1) must include—

(a) a list of any meetings held during the twelve-month period between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Mauritius in which the Marine Protected Area was discussed;

(b) a summary of the non-financial support and assistance provided by the Government of the United Kingdom in the establishment, and management, of a Marine Protected Area; and

(c) the costs incurred by the United Kingdom, including any money paid by the Government of the United Kingdom to the Government of Mauritius, in connection with the establishment, and management, of a Marine Protected Area.

(3) Within two months of a report being laid before the House of Commons under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must table a substantive motion in the House of Commons on the contents of the report.

(4) Within twelve months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must seek to undertake negotiations with the Government of Mauritius to secure additional guarantees of its commitment to the development and preservation of a Marine Protected Area.”

This new clause requires the Government to produce an annual report on progress in establishing and managing, and to seek negotiations on securing further guarantees of Mauritius’s commitment to, a Marine Protected Area in the Chagos Archipelago.

New clause 10—Annual report: Treaty implementation—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within twelve months of commencement and every twelve months thereafter, publish and lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on—

(a) the expenditure of public funds made under the Treaty during the most recent financial year; and

(b) progress on the UK’s implementation of the Treaty.”

This new clause requires the Government to publish an annual report on the expenditure of public funds made under the Treaty and on the progress of the UK’s implementation of the Treaty.

New clause 11—Annual Parliamentary Oversight and Approval of Expenditure—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, once every financial year, lay before the House of Commons, for its approval, an estimate of the expenditure that is anticipated to be incurred by the Government of the United Kingdom in connection with the commitments made under the terms of the Treaty, including, but not limited to—

(a) any payments made or to be made, or financial commitments entered into, with the Government of the Republic of Mauritius in accordance with the Treaty; and

(b) the costs associated with the continued administration, maintenance, and operation of Diego Garcia.

(2) If the payments incurred by the Government of the United Kingdom are greater than those anticipated in the estimate specified in subsection (1), the Secretary of State must lay before the House of Commons, for its approval, a supplementary estimate.”

This new clause provides for an estimates and supply scrutiny process for expenditure to be incurred by the UK Government as a result of the Treaty and the UK’s continued involvement in Diego Garcia.

New clause 12—Review of the welfare and needs of Chagossians residing in the UK—

“(1) Within a year of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must undertake, and publish the findings of, a review of the welfare, integration, and general needs of Chagossians residing in the United Kingdom.

(2) In undertaking the review specified in subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult representatives of Chagossians residing in the UK, including community organisations.

(3) Within a month of publishing the report specified in subsection (1), the Government must make time available for a debate in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords on a substantive motion relating to the report.”

This new clause requires the government to undertake a review of welfare and integration of Chagossians in the UK within a year Act receiving Royal Assent with a substantive motion relating to the report of the review tabled in both Houses of Parliament.

New clause 13—Impact of this Act and the Treaty on Chagossians residing in the United Kingdom—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, consult with—

(a) Chagossian persons residing in the United Kingdom; and

(b) bodies representing, or working with, the Chagossian community residing in the United Kingdom regarding the impact of this Act and the Treaty on the Chagossian community residing in the United Kingdom.

(2) The terms of reference for the consultation specified in subsection (1) must include, but not be limited to the impact of this Act and the Treaty on—

(a) the socio-economic status of Chagossians residing in the United Kingdom;

(b) the family life of the UK based Chagossian community; and

(c) any implications for the Chagossian community residing in the United Kingdom, of changes to British nationality law.

(3) Within twelve months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must lay a report before Parliament summarising—

(a) any findings from the consultation; and

(b) any steps the Government intends to take as a result of those findings.”

This new clause requires the Government to consult the UK based Chagossian community on the impact of the Act and the Treaty, and to publish the findings of the consultation.

New clause 14—Duty to produce proposals for a referendum of Chagossians residing in the UK—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, lay before both Houses of Parliament proposals for an advisory referendum of Chagossians residing in the UK, seeking their opinions on the Treaty signed with the Government of Mauritius and the provisions of this Act.

(2) Within a month of publishing the proposals specified in subsection (1), the Secretary of State must make time available in both Houses of Parliament for a debate on a substantive motion relating to the proposals.”

New clause 15—Review of the operation of the Treaty—

“(1) Within five years of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must commence a review of the operation of the Treaty.

(2) The review must include, but need not be limited to, an examination of whether it is in the UK’s national security interests to continue being a signatory to, or to seek the termination of, the Treaty.

(3) A report summarising the findings of the review must be published and laid before both Houses of Parliament.”

This amendment would require the Government to undertake, within five years of the Act receiving Royal Assent, a review of the operation of the Treaty and publish its findings, including whether it is in the UK’s national security interests to continue to be a signatory to the treaty.

New clause 17—Access to the archipelago under the Treaty—

“In any discussions with the Government of Mauritius relating to the provisions of Annex 1(3)(d) of the Treaty, the Secretary of State shall not give consent to the presence of any Indian or Chinese security forces, either civilian or military in nature, in the Chagos Archipelago.”

This amendment would require the Government to withhold consent, in any discussions with Government of Mauritius held under the provisions of Annex 1 (3) (d) of the Treaty, to the presence of any Indian or Chinese civilian or military security forces in the Chagos Archipelago.

[Wendy Morton]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Madam Chairman, and to speak to the amendments that stand in my name and in the names of other right hon. and hon. Members, as we open this Committee of the whole House to debate Labour’s Chagos surrender Bill.

It has been more than a year since the surrender of the Chagos islands was announced, with the Prime Minister, the then Foreign Secretary—now the Deputy Prime Minister—and the Attorney General waving the white flag of surrender and putting the demands of their left-wing lawyer friends above the British national interest. Since then, Labour has denied this House a vote on the whole treaty under the 21-day process in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, and has kept details secret from us.

Over in Mauritius, the Prime Minister of that country has been bragging about how he squeezed concession after concession after concession out of Labour. It is shameful that we have found out more about the treaty from debates in the Mauritius Parliament and statements by its politicians than from Ministers accountable to this House. It has been five months since the Prime Minister of this country signed away £35 billion of British taxpayers’ money, stumbling through a press conference rather than coming to this House to face scrutiny and challenge.

At a time of serious fiscal challenge for the public finances, Labour has imposed a £35 billion surrender tax on our country—money that could fund public services here in Britain or support an easing of the tax burden. Instead, it will be handed over to a foreign Government who are using this resource to cut taxes for their citizens. Not only is it shameful, but Ministers have tried to pull the wool over the eyes of the British people by using accountancy methodologies and valuations to try to show a far lower cost. Even then, it is an extraordinary figure of £3.4 billion. The Chancellor may struggle with numbers, but the British people do not. They can add up, and they see what the real cost of this is. On top of that, Ministers still cannot tell us from which budgets in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Ministry of Defence the money will come.

[Phil Brickell (Bolton West) (Lab)]

Is the simple truth not that this deal is cheaper than what was proposed by the Conservative party in government, and actually has more protections baked into it?

[Wendy Morton]

I think the hon. Gentleman needs a little memory check, because we did not propose a deal.

The British Chagossians, some of whom are watching from the Gallery—I pay tribute to them for their dignified and strong campaigning over many, many years—have been betrayed by Labour. Their rights have been ignored, as have their fears, leading to hundreds fleeing Mauritius and coming here. Labour’s surrender Bill, as presented, does nothing for them. It does nothing for the marine protected area—one of the most important and largest marine environments in the world—which has been protected while under British sovereignty and has become a centre for scientific research and development. That is at risk, and promises and aspirations announced by Ministers to ensure that it continues are not reflected in the Bill.

Shockingly, Labour’s surrender Bill as drafted does nothing to safeguard, defend and protect our national security. Labour is surrendering British sovereignty and territory to a country that is increasingly aligned with China.

[Graeme Downie (Dunfermline and Dollar) (Lab)]

The right hon. Lady describes this as a surrender Bill. Can she please tell me which flag will be flying over the Chagos islands if this is a so-called British surrender? It will be a British flag that is flying. Is that a point she understands?

[Wendy Morton]

There will be one flag that is flying, and that is the white flag of surrender.

Thousands of Mauritian public officials are being trained—or should that be “indoctrinated”?—by China on courses the Chinese are paying for. Both Russia and China are signing partnerships with Mauritius, but Labour’s surrender Bill fails to protect our interests.

[Paul Holmes (Hamble Valley) (Con)]

Reports today suggest that China and India are entering into negotiations to sign leases to islands surrounding those on which British military operations will continue under the proposed lease agreement. Does she think that connection to China would be a risk and pose a threat to national security?

[Wendy Morton]

My hon. Friend is 100% right, and that is one of the reasons why we oppose this Bill and have done so from the very start.

The promises given by Ministers that nothing can happen in the Chagos archipelago that threatens our interests are already being undermined. Mauritius is in discussions with India about a security role that it can play in the archipelago, and the UK is not even in the room. If these discussions with a friendly country are taking place without the UK, one can only wonder what discussions are taking place in secret with China and Russia. There has been a report that China is already negotiating with Mauritius for Peros Banhos. When he speaks, perhaps the Minister can tell us what he knows about that.

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Stephen Doughty)]

I want to say on that point that this is absolute nonsense. Is the shadow Minister willing to provide any evidence that that is going to take place? This treaty protects the security of the outer islands and expressly prohibits foreign forces building bases on them—something on which her Government did not succeed in their negotiations.

[Wendy Morton]

I am grateful to the Minister, but can he actually give me the reassurance that no discussions are taking place? Perhaps he can answer that question when he responds to the debate later.

The promises given by Ministers that nothing can happen in the Chagos archipelago that threatens our interests are already being undermined. If these discussions with a friendly country are taking place without the UK, I can only wonder what discussions are taking place in secret. If such discussions are taking place, that would undermine the assurances Ministers have given to this House and be an act of bad faith on the part of Mauritius. The House knows that this Government kowtow to the Chinese Communist party, leading it to threaten our interests here. Now, they are failing to take seriously the warnings about China, and the threats it poses to Diego Garcia, our military assets and our interests in the Indo-Pacific.

[Graham Stuart (Beverley and Holderness) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend has highlighted the Prime Minister misleading—perhaps I have to say inadvertently misleading —us about the cost of this, when the Government Actuary’s Department has shown that it is £35 billion. More than that, he was suggesting in his press conference that China, Russia and others—

--- Later in debate ---

[Graham Stuart]

Oh, I cannot say “misrepresented”. Having inadvertently confused the £35 billion that is actually going out with the £3.5 billion he claimed was going out, the Prime Minister, equally inadvertently, Ms Nokes, made out that China, Iran and Russia were in the column—he used the word “column”—of those opposing this deal, although I think each and every one of them came out publicly to say how much they welcomed it. Can my right hon. Friend share any knowledge about that with us?

[Wendy Morton]

I think my right hon. Friend makes some very interesting points, and perhaps not surprisingly, one might ask the question: are the Government sleeping with the enemy here?

[Stephen Doughty]

Will the shadow Minister give way?

[Wendy Morton]

If the Minister will allow me, I will just finish this point. The key thing we are asking for is a reassurance from the Minister, and he will have more than ample opportunity later to respond to the points I am making.

[Stephen Doughty]

I thank the shadow Minister for giving way, but she and the right hon. Member for Beverley and Holderness (Graham Stuart) have raised China, Russia and Iran. Why does she think that the United States, our closest security ally, backs this deal if there is any possibility of any of the fantasy things she is suggesting taking place. They cannot take place, because the treaty prevents them. She clearly has not read it.

[Wendy Morton]

It can be very easy to back something when you do not have to pay for it, but let us move on.

Now, the Government are failing to take seriously the warnings about China, and the threats it poses to Diego Garcia and our military assets and interests in the Indo-Pacific. Labour’s surrender Bill is bad for British taxpayers, bad for our national security, bad for the marine environment and bad for the Chagossians. It also grants Ministers huge powers to make further decisions and avoid parliamentary scrutiny.

Amendment 1 would in effect block Labour’s surrender treaty coming into force and the dissolution of the British Indian Ocean Territory unless and until Ministers reveal the legal advice they have received about Britain’s ability to extend and exercise sovereign rights over Diego Garcia after the initial 99-year period. The Government constantly claim they have secured the military base, but they have totally failed to do that. All they have done is pay Mauritius £35 billion to lease back a base we currently own, but only for 99 years. We have no certainty whatsoever about the fate of the base after the 99-year period. After paying Mauritius £35 billion, it would kindly give us the option to extend the treaty for another 40 years, but on what terms? If we extend it, will Mauritius make it conditional on more extortionate payments? What if we are outbid by a hostile power? In fact, what is to stop China putting in a bid? If no agreement is reached before the specified deadline and the base is offered to another country, what will happen to all the fixed assets belonging to Britain? We have had no answers from the Government on any of these vital points, which is unacceptable, and the terms of the treaty and the Bill, as they stand, are reckless.

Amendment 7 is necessary because the Government’s legal justification for surrendering the Chagos islands constantly shifts, because it has no legal basis. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) explained on Second Reading, the Government’s entire legal case is spurious. Many of us have been asking where the binding judgment we are constantly told is inevitable would actually come from. No credible answers have been forthcoming. We know it cannot be the International Court of Justice, and we know that a case at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea would see the UK able to put forward a decent legal argument. Then the Government completely contradicted their own argument about the electromagnetic spectrum. They are planning to dissolve a strategically invaluable British overseas territory, and they cannot even tell us on what legal basis they are doing so.

It looks as though this is part of a wider sinister picture—the Government’s relationship with China. We know that the Government are desperate for Chinese investment to help grow our economy, which they are trashing with their reckless economic policies. The Deputy Prime Minister of Mauritius has credited China for its support in enabling Mauritius to gain sovereignty over the Chagos islands. Why? Because China wants to deepen its strategic partnership with Mauritius, which it believes to have strategic advantages. Once again, the Prime Minister does not have the backbone to stand up for our strategic interests against China. Amendment 7 would flush out the truth once and for all.

Taken together, amendments 3, 6 and 5 would delete a huge and unacceptable Henry VIII power that the Government are brazenly trying to award themselves, and would give this House the oversight it is entitled to on the implementation of the treaty. It is wholly unacceptable—in fact, it is quite outrageous—for the Government to give themselves such a sweeping power that they could, through an Order in Council,

“make any provision that appears to His Majesty to be appropriate as a result of the Treaty”.

This is a totally open-ended power. The military base itself is in scope, and so are the rights of Chagossians. The House should not be deprived of a voice on these matters of huge concern. Our amendments would ensure that this House has a voice and a vote. That is totally right and proper.

Turning to our new clauses, the Government could have inserted a money authorisation clause into the Bill. They chose not to and no wonder. The Government want to spare their own disgruntled MPs the ugly spectacle of having to vote in favour of spending tens of billions of their constituents’ money to Mauritius, as Britain’s economy sinks under the weight of the Chancellor’s inflation, unemployment, debt and taxes. Labour is asking the hard-pressed British taxpayer, already struggling under the weight of the Chancellor’s punitive tax rises, to stump up £35 billion to lease back a territory we already own and which we are not legally obliged to give away. As it leaves pensioners vulnerable and cold, destroys family farms and crushes businesses, the Minister is content to send our constituents’ hard-earned money to Mauritius with no strings attached, allowing the Government there to cut taxes—tax cuts over 6,000 miles away and tax rises at home. And Labour is inflicting this surrender tax on the British people because of its abject failure to negotiate. We all know that when Labour negotiates, Britain loses, but this is a new low. At seemingly every twist and turn, this Government have rolled over and capitulated to the demands of the Government of Mauritius.

[Graeme Downie]

The right hon. Lady mentions that she does not believe there is a legal basis. What was the legal basis for the previous Government, when they conducted 11 rounds of negotiation and achieved absolutely nothing?

[Wendy Morton]

I am not sure where the hon. Gentleman has been for the past year and several months, but we have gone over this time and again in this Chamber. There was no legal basis. We stopped—[Interruption.] Maybe I will repeat this very slowly for his benefit: we stopped the negotiations.

[Stephen Doughty]

I thank the shadow Minister for giving way, but I must, Ms Nokes, correct the record here. This has been a repeated argument, by the shadow Minister and others, claiming that the then Government stopped the negotiations. They did not. In fact, they carried them on. There was a gov.uk statement on 24 February reflecting the continuing of the negotiations by the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak). Indeed, they carried on into May, just before the election. It is there in writing on the previous Government’s own website.

--- Later in debate ---

[Wendy Morton]

We have made it very clear, repeatedly, at the Dispatch Box. Lord Cameron, the then Foreign Secretary, stopped the negotiations.

[Mr Calvin Bailey (Leyton and Wanstead) (Lab)]

rose—

[Wendy Morton]

I am going to make some more progress.

[Sir Andrew Mitchell (Sutton Coldfield) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is doing a very good job of forensically demolishing the Government’s case, such as it is. May I just correct what the Minister has said from the Dispatch Box? There is a very great difference between carrying on and discussing negotiations, and doing a deal. As I was the Deputy Foreign Secretary under both my right hon. Friend the Member for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly) and my noble Friend Lord Cameron, I can tell the House that the then Government would never, ever have done this deal. Secondly, I do hope my right hon. Friend will probe the Minister further on where this extraordinary amount of money is coming from. Is it the defence budget or is it the development budget? Since the Labour party—a Labour Government—has slashed development spending from—

[The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Caroline Nokes)]

Order. That is a very long intervention. Perhaps the shadow Minister should take over.

[Wendy Morton]

My right hon. and gallant Friend and constituency neighbour makes some very, very important points. He adds a certain weight and clarity to these discussions, and I urge Labour Members—certainly the newer Members—to listen to his wise counsel.

The House of Commons should be given a vote on the payments and that is the purpose of this amendment. In scope will also be the Chagossian trust fund, which, inexplicably, British taxpayers capitalise and Mauritius then distributes. We pay and Mauritius has total control over how it is spent. We will have no say over its governance and British Chagossians have no guarantees that they will benefit from it. How can that be right? The least this House and British Chagossians deserve is a vote on sending the money. What possible explanation could the Government provide against that?

[Mike Kane (Wythenshawe and Sale East) (Lab)]

The former Government set up a trust fund of £40 million for the Chagos islanders. After four years, only £12,000 had been spent. That is how they treated Chagossians under the last Government.

[Wendy Morton]

The point, though, is where is this money coming from? This House has not had a vote. Where is the transparency? Where is the democracy ?

Turning to new clause 2 and amendment 2, as we have already discussed, the duration of the agreement is a matter of serious national security concern. There are too many unanswered questions about what could happen to the base. We need to understand the basis on which the Government have settled that, especially as the then Foreign Secretary told this House on 7 October 2024 that the Government would have a right to extend the lease, which we do not, and the Mauritian Government claim the UK gave up a unilateral right of extension at their request. If that is true, it would be a scandal. No wonder we never get straight answers from Ministers. But then, it was also a scandal for Labour to sign the agreement with a previous Mauritian Government just before that country went into an election, only for there to be a change of Government who then wanted to change the deal and extract more money. Extending the agreement is essential, because we simply cannot lose the base. The House deserves to see the advice that the Government are relying on when they ask us to sign this £35 billion blank cheque.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that under the Bill, if there is no agreement, although we can be first offer, Mauritius can decide simply to close and fold the base, leaving it completely void, so there is no protection against that?

[Wendy Morton]

My hon. Friend is 100% right. This goes to the heart of the Bill. There are so many unanswered questions, which Conservative Members have been raising time and again. For example, how likely are we to be able to extend the base? What will the structure of the negotiations be? What conditions could Mauritius impose, given that it will have our negotiators over a proverbial barrel? How watertight is the first right of refusal?

[Phil Brickell]

Will the right hon. Lady give way?

[Wendy Morton]

I will make a little more progress.

What happens if the base is not secured? Will it need to be decommissioned? How could we prevent an adversary inheriting our fixed assets? What is the role of the United States in all this? These are serious matters, and the House needs serious answers. The purpose of the amendment is to secure those answers.

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

In this House, there is often talk about millions of pounds for this and billions of pounds for that. It is difficult sometimes to get in one’s mind the scale of the money. Last year, the Chancellor said that she was going to raise national insurance and lower the threshold. We know how much damage that has done to the country, yet it was said at the time that it would raise £25.7 billion. That would not even pay for this deal. That is the amount of money they are going to give away today.

[Wendy Morton]

My hon. Friend makes a really valid point by putting that into context. There is only one thing that will result from the Government insisting on pushing this through: tax rises. I reiterate my earlier point that we still do not know which budget the money is coming from: FCDO or MOD. Who is going to pay for it?

New clause 3 will give Parliament a vote over the agreement on the Chagos marine protected area. The Chagos MPA is one of the jewels in the crown of the Blue Belt programme, a magnificent achievement of the last Conservative Government and a globally significant contribution to marine protection. It should not be altered without consent. At present, we apply among the strictest criteria to the Chagos MPA and it has been very well preserved, unlike much of the Indian ocean, which has suffered terribly in recent years.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Ind)]

Will the right hon. Lady give way on that point?

[Wendy Morton]

I will make a little more progress.

We are not talking about a small area. The British Indian Ocean Territory spans 640,000 square kilometres of ocean. The Government’s treaty with Mauritius compels the UK to help Mauritius to establish and manage a new MPA, but we are being asked to fly blind with this Bill, because no agreement has been reached on what the MPA managed by Mauritius will look like.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

The marine protection zone was agreed by all parties. It is a sustainable protection zone. There has never been any debate or dispute about it; Mauritius has fully supported it all along and guaranteed its continuation. I do not understand why the shadow Minister is raising these matters. Does she believe that Mauritius will not look after the area properly? It seems to me that there is an attitude that is disrespectful of Mauritius and its determination to preserve the pristine nature of the ocean around the islands.

[Wendy Morton]

I have to disagree with the right hon. Gentleman on many of those matters. We have raised questions about this issue time and again, and we have simply not received the answers from Ministers.

[Dr Luke Evans]

This issue has been disputed. Is it not the point that the United Nations convention on the law of the sea cannot pass judgment on sovereignty because of the ruling that was made between Mauritius and the UK on marine protection back in 2015? That was under annexe VII, which was tried and tested. Britain was found wanting on that, because we had not properly talked through what should happen with the Mauritians. What the Mauritians actually wanted to do was to open it for fishing. How can we assure the protection for this area? That is why we need to amend the Bill.

[Wendy Morton]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is exactly why we have continued and will continue to probe the Government on the MPA. We have not had answers to our questions; we have not had the transparency that I think this House deserves.

It is very possible—in fact, it is very likely—that Labour has committed Britain to helping Mauritius dismantle an MPA that we ourselves established. There are no assurances that we will not be committing British resources to actively harm our own interests and undo our work. Mauritius does not have the capability to manage, monitor or enforce an MPA. It does not have the infrastructure at sea or any such experience. It would leave the stocks in those waters exposed to real risk of pillaging, including by Chinese vessels. It is not likely to have the will to do so either, as we know the economic potential of the waters is of interest to Mauritius.

Despite the Government’s ludicrous and insulting claim that those who oppose this deal side with Russia and its friends, Mauritius has been developing closer ties with Russia on marine matters, announcing as recently as May 2025 that the two countries are strengthening their ties on marine innovation, including marine research, while Mauritius’s close relationship with China—a strategic partnership, no less—opens up the possibility of Chinese fishing trawlers in these waters. It is therefore absolutely right that this House gets a say over the fate of the MPA, and the CRaG-equivalent process set out in our new clause would provide for an appropriate level of scrutiny.

New clause 4 would require regular reporting on the ecological status of the Chagos MPA, which is necessary for the same reason as new clause 3. The Government have bound us to support Mauritius to manage the MPA, so there must be scrutiny of what the Government are doing and the ecological consequences. There are widespread concerns across the House on the future of the MPA, and Ministers have so far failed to give any answers or any assurances; when asked, they have said that they do not know about the future and cannot tell us what resources and costs will be incurred to meet these obligations. Given our role in managing the MPA, the UK should be able to access the data required for this report. This new clause reaffirms our commitment to the MPA.

We recognise the sensitive nature of the military arrangements on Diego Garcia, but oversight of the agreement is none the less essential. New clause 5 would allow for appropriate parliamentary scrutiny while respecting the need to protect critical information. The new clause covers the key areas of security consideration and will act as a catalyst for the Government to maintain their own monitoring of each area. We believe that that is critical as there are holes in the provisions. There must, for example, be agreement on upgrading infrastructure in the buffer zone, such as sensors—but what if there is no agreement? Likewise, the treaty stipulates that Mauritius and Britain must jointly decide on the management and use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Of particular importance in new clause 5 are paragraphs (d) and (e). On (d), we must ensure that only vessels that should be in the area are in the area, and that Russian and potentially even Chinese vessels are deterred from entering—I have already mentioned the closer ties and partnerships between Mauritius and those countries, which should concern all of us.

With reference to paragraph (e), the treaty states that the United Kingdom agrees

“to expeditiously inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third state directly emanating from the base on Diego Garcia”.

Given the huge range of security threats in the Indo-Pacific and the middle east, it is far from impossible that in future this mechanism may need to be used. It is important that the notifications are presented to the Intelligence and Security Committee, as once again it would force the Government to log and monitor the mechanism, including any operational impacts it might have. We know that there are genuine concerns that third countries—potentially even China—might try to establish themselves in the archipelago, and the arrangements in the treaty must be monitored to ensure that they are sufficiently robust to stop that happening.

New clause 6 probes the Government’s argument that a legally binding ruling under UNCLOS would have an impact on our ability to operate the electromagnetic spectrum, and impede air and sea access as well as the ability to patrol the area around the base. We take issue with that assertion, not least because there is an argument that provisions under article 298 of UNCLOS allow for exemptions relevant to disputes concerning military activities. The Government have not addressed this issue when we have probed, including on Second Reading, so we have had no choice but to table this new clause to test the Government’s assertion.

I turn finally to new clause 7. The British Chagossian community have been treated appallingly by this Labour Government. Twice the deal has ended up in the courts because of the way Labour has ridden roughshod over their concerns. This Bill sells them short, too. The resettlement programme for the Chagos islands under this treaty is entirely in the hands of Mauritius—a country to which, I should add, Chagossians feel little affinity. Indeed, we have seen many Chagossians arriving in the UK from Mauritius in recent weeks. I hope the Minister will respond to that from the Dispatch Box, because it is clearly concerning that they have been moved to take this action.

The Bill also stops British overseas territories citizenship being awarded on the basis of descent from a person born on the Chagos archipelago. Sadly, we cannot amend the treaty through the Bill; it just is not within the parliamentary rules. However, new clause 7 would require the Government to consult the Chagossian community on the implementation of the treaty—including on the establishment of the trust fund, which we capitalise and Mauritius distributes—and on areas of dispute arising between the UK and Mauritian Governments prior to their being discussed at the joint committee created by the treaty. It also requires the Foreign Secretary to present a report to Parliament within six months of the Act becoming law, and in every subsequent year, on how Chagossian rights are being upheld under this agreement. We have a national obligation and responsibility to the Chagossian community, and the Conservatives will always stand up for their rights.

To conclude, taken together, our amendments and new clauses will hold the Government to account. Let us be clear: the Conservatives oppose this surrender Bill, its colossal costs and the adverse impact on our defence and security. Accepting these amendments and new clauses will simply strengthen accountability and transparency.

[Mr Calvin Bailey]

I have set out the security and geopolitical importance of the treaty many times in this place, and would therefore have appreciated the opportunity today to engage with detailed scrutiny of the treaty and the defence arrangements it enables. Sadly, that is not the line that the Opposition are going down. Instead, we are faced with a series of wrecking amendments that do not attempt to improve the Bill in any way. They are designed to force the Government to let our allies down, undermining our international credibility and reputation, and creating greater geopolitical risk and legal and security risks to our base on Diego Garcia.

If Opposition amendments were passed today, it would be impossible for us to meet our commitments in a timely way by implementing the agreement with Mauritius that Ministers have completed—an agreement that the Conservative Government started and carried through 11 rounds of negotiations but now want to throw back, no matter the damage that it would do to our nations. At no point have they made clear the legal basis for starting the 11 rounds of negotiations in the first instance.

I fully understand and sympathise with the motivation behind amendment 9. The creation of the Chagos islands as a separate territory created a deep injustice, because it was bound up in the dispossession of the Chagossians, but that historical injustice cannot simply be undone. We cannot turn back the clock, however much we might want to do so. The question of a right to return is not remotely simple, because access to Diego Garcia is inevitably a serious question of security. People obviously cannot return to exactly where their families lived, because of the highly sensitive military facility that now stands in their place. Perhaps a limited right of return could be negotiated, but that would engage security procedures that are secret and involve the UK and the US as well as Mauritius, as was acknowledged by the right hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Wendy Morton). The amendment imagines that if the negotiations were rejected by even the narrowest of margins, the entire treaty would fall apart and would need to be renegotiated afresh, significantly increasing geopolitical risk to the base and our interests. Perhaps the Minister could invite some assistance on this point from those who conducted the first 11 rounds of negotiations.

Let us get real: there are reasons why international treaties are negotiated by the Government and subject to democratic scrutiny in this House and through these procedures. What the Liberal Democrats are proposing amounts to making a UK foreign and defence policy dependent on a referendum, and that includes vital defence interests that are shared with the US and other allies. That referendum would apparently comprise non-UK citizens just as much as it would British Chagossians. Frankly, I would have thought that the Liberal Democrats more than others would have learned from the disastrous experience of Brexit that making foreign policy by referendum is not the wisest course of action.