Found: Office for screening foreign investment into the UK as part of decisions under the National Security and Investment Act

Found: about that is to have a process that is fairly transparent, so a framework like the National Security and Investment Act

Found: about that is to have a process that is fairly transparent, so a framework like the National Security and Investment Act

Found: about that is to have a process that is fairly transparent, so a framework like the National Security and Investment Act

Found: Secretary to the Prime Minister relating to the Government response to consultation on National Security and Investment Act

Found: Regimes that create uncertainty or deter investment National Security and Investment Act (NSIA): The

Found: Security Bill, instead relying on a patchwork of existing legislation, including the National Security and Investment Act

Found: Security Bill, instead relying on a patchwork of existing legislation, including the National Security and Investment Act

Found: responsibilities for scrutiny of government investment screening decisions under the National Security and Investment Act

Found: The National Security and Investment Act 2021 tries to solve that to a degree.

Found: 10 or in my capacity as CDL in the Cabinet Office, including, for example, on the National Security and Investment Act

Found: 10 or in my capacity as CDL in the Cabinet Office, including, for example, on the National Security and Investment Act

Found: capital firms have noted that the current definition of AI technology in scope of the National Security and Investment Act

Found: capital firms have noted that the current definition of AI technology in scope of the National Security and Investment Act

Found: under the Export Control Act 2002, investment screening decisions taken under the National Security and Investment Act

Found: under the Export Control Act 2002, investment screening decisions taken under the National Security and Investment Act

Found: We were able to use the new powers that had come in under the National Security and Investment Act

Found: We were able to use the new powers that had come in under the National Security and Investment Act

Found: 428/2009; Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018; Integrated Review 2021; National Security and Investment Act

Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:

To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what assessment he has made of the UK’s level of dependence on foreign manufactured Common Information Models (CIMs); and what steps his Department is taking to ensure the resilience and sovereignty of UK infrastructure that depends on CIM‑enabled connectivity.

Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)

Common Information Models are used across a range of UK CNI sectors. This includes telecommunications, where CIMs enable interoperability between different network management and operational systems. They support efficient operation and automation in complex, multivendor networks, but do not themselves control telecommunications networks.

The Government keeps under review the resilience and security of the UK’s telecommunications infrastructure, including potential dependencies on overseas technologies and suppliers.

As the government set out in its response to the Telecommunications Supply Chain Diversification (TSCD) Advisory Council report, security and resilience risks can arise when critical network functions may rely on a limited range of suppliers or technologies, including software based systems used for network monitoring, configuration and management.

The Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 and the National Security and Investment Act 2021 provide frameworks through which the Government can assess and address national security risks in the telecommunications sector, including risks associated with hostile state interference. The government response to the TSCD Advisory Council report also sets out the steps the government is taking to manage the risks associated with vendor concentration in UK telecoms networks.

The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill will strengthen the resilience of the UK's critical infrastructure, including by strengthening duties on operators of essential services to manage risks in their supply chains. The Bill will also provide the Secretary of State with a power of direction, enabling the government to act where necessary and proportionate to address national security risks to regulated entities.

The government works closely with the National Cyber Security Centre to assess and manage risks to UK critical national infrastructure, including those arising from dependence on foreign-manufactured technologies

The Government seeks to build sovereign capability in critical technologies, as set out in the June 2025 Modern Industrial Strategy and the accompanying Digital and Technologies Sector Plan.

More broadly, on the development of global digital standards, the UK supports an open, inclusive, multistakeholder approach and is actively engaged to ensure our interests and values are well-accounted for. DSIT, NCSC and other government departments and agencies engage directly in standards development where the UK has critical interests to seek to ensure that UK needs are met.

Question to the Home Office:

To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what (a) steps she will take and (b) powers she possesses to protect (i) military bases and (ii) other sensitive locations from the threat posed by the piecemeal purchase of properties in their vicinity by (A) Russian, (B) Chinese and (C) other adversaries.

Answered by Dan Jarvis - Minister of State (Cabinet Office)

The first duty of Government is national security. We take the protection of sensitive locations extremely seriously, and we work closely with the police and operational partners to ensure they have the powers they need.

The National Security and Investment Act 2021 provides the Government with powers to identify and, where necessary, intervene in acquisitions of entities or assets (including land) that may pose a threat to the UK’s national security. This can, under some circumstances, include properties near sensitive sites.

In addition, the National Security Act 2023 protects against activity that could be harmful to the UK in and around the most sensitive sites through new and updated criminal offences, police powers to protect these sites, and a power to designate new sites as prohibited places.

Question to the Home Office:

To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, how many incidents of espionage have been identified in British universities since 2015, broken down by (a) year, and (b) nationality of identified suspects.

Answered by Dan Jarvis - Minister of State (Cabinet Office)

The National Security Act 2023 provides the security services and law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to deter, detect, and disrupt state threats including new espionage offences. The Government is committed to transparency on the operation of these new powers and is considering a recommendation made by Jonathan Hall KC, in his first annual report as Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, calling for publication of official statistics on use of state threat powers. The Government will respond formally to this recommendation in due course.

The Government supports the Higher Education sector in managing security risks through the Research Collaboration Advice Team, and the NPSA and NCSC’s Trusted Research and Secure Innovation guidance. The UK also has a comprehensive package of legislative and regulatory measures in place – including the Academic Technology Approvals Scheme, Export Controls and the National Security and Investment Act.

Question to the Cabinet Office:

To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, whether he plans to use the National Security and Investment Act 2021 to restrict Chinese ownership of companies in (a) water, (b) electricity, (c) gas, (d) telecoms, (e) data centres and (f) nuclear.

Answered by Dan Jarvis - Minister of State (Cabinet Office)

The Government has powers under the National Security and Investment (NSI) Act 2021 to review and, where required, intervene in investments that may pose a risk to national security.

The NSI Act both facilitates investment into sensitive sectors with appropriate safeguards where needed, and provides powers to act in the interests of national security where necessary and proportionate.

Acquisitions considered under the NSI Act are reviewed on a case-by-case basis and the Government will not hesitate to use its powers where necessary.

Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:

To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of security risks resulting from critical public services provided with telecommunications by organisations that are not in the scope of the Telecommunications Security Act 2021, and which are instead regulated by other countries.

Answered by Baroness Lloyd of Effra - Baroness in Waiting (HM Household) (Whip)

The Government is committed to ensuring the security and resilience of the UK’s telecommunications networks and services. This includes regular assessment of security and resilience risks relating to such networks and services.

The Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 (TSA) amended the Communications Act 2003 to establish a robust security framework for UK public telecoms networks and services, placing new legal duties on public telecoms providers to identify and mitigate security risks.

Some essential services may use private telecoms networks outside the scope of the TSA. However, under the Network and Information Systems (NIS) Regulations 2018, operators of essential services are required to manage risks to those services resulting from their use of such networks. In addition, the National Security and Investment Act 2021 includes powers to scrutinise and, if necessary, intervene in foreign acquisitions or investments in the UK telecoms sector that may pose national security risks.

The UK government also works closely to promote the adoption of appropriate and proportionate telecoms security regulations by other countries.

Question to the Department for Education:

To ask the Secretary of State for Education, what assessment her Department has made of the relationship between UK universities and Chinese (a) military institutions, and (b) companies connected to the military.

Answered by Josh MacAlister - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Education)

The department has not received any representations from UK universities on funding partnerships with Chinese military institutions or companies connected to the military.

Universities are independent from government, and it is their responsibility to assess their arrangements. We encourage universities to pursue partnerships and engage internationally, provided they comply with UK security policies and regulations.

The government supports the sector in managing risks through the Research Collaboration Advice Team, and a comprehensive package of legislative and regulatory measures including the Academic Technology Approvals Scheme, export controls and the National Security and Investment Act.

The department provides grant funding through the strategic priorities grant to the Office for Students for distribution to providers in line with terms and conditions set by my right hon. Friend, the Secretary of State for Education. None of these terms and conditions relate to programmes involving Chinese military institutions or companies connected to them.

Question to the Department for Education:

To ask the Secretary of State for Education, how much funding her Department has provided for higher education programmes involving Chinese (a) military institutions, and (b) companies connected to the military.

Answered by Josh MacAlister - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Education)

The department has not received any representations from UK universities on funding partnerships with Chinese military institutions or companies connected to the military.

Universities are independent from government, and it is their responsibility to assess their arrangements. We encourage universities to pursue partnerships and engage internationally, provided they comply with UK security policies and regulations.

The government supports the sector in managing risks through the Research Collaboration Advice Team, and a comprehensive package of legislative and regulatory measures including the Academic Technology Approvals Scheme, export controls and the National Security and Investment Act.

The department provides grant funding through the strategic priorities grant to the Office for Students for distribution to providers in line with terms and conditions set by my right hon. Friend, the Secretary of State for Education. None of these terms and conditions relate to programmes involving Chinese military institutions or companies connected to them.

Question to the Department for Education:

To ask the Secretary of State for Education, what representations her Department has received from UK universities on funding partnerships with Chinese (a) military institutions and (b) companies connected to the military.

Answered by Josh MacAlister - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Education)

The department has not received any representations from UK universities on funding partnerships with Chinese military institutions or companies connected to the military.

Universities are independent from government, and it is their responsibility to assess their arrangements. We encourage universities to pursue partnerships and engage internationally, provided they comply with UK security policies and regulations.

The government supports the sector in managing risks through the Research Collaboration Advice Team, and a comprehensive package of legislative and regulatory measures including the Academic Technology Approvals Scheme, export controls and the National Security and Investment Act.

The department provides grant funding through the strategic priorities grant to the Office for Students for distribution to providers in line with terms and conditions set by my right hon. Friend, the Secretary of State for Education. None of these terms and conditions relate to programmes involving Chinese military institutions or companies connected to them.

Question to the Department for Transport:

To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, what assessment she has made of the National security risk posed by (a) ownership and (b) investment by Chinese companies in Heathrow Airport.

Answered by Keir Mather - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Transport)

The Government takes its responsibility for national security extremely seriously and balances this with its continued commitment to welcome inward investment in a way that provides investors with the certainty and transparency they need to do business in the UK.

We work across government to conduct due diligence and other assessments and ensure that any potential national security risk to the UK is handled appropriately. For any new qualifying investments in sensitive sectors, which include transport, we will use the powers in the National Security and Investment Act 2021 to scrutinise transactions and intervene if necessary to protect national security.

Question to the Department for Transport:

To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, what assessment she has made of the impact of (a) ownership and (b) investment in Heathrow Airport by Chinese companies.

Answered by Keir Mather - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Transport)

The Government takes its responsibility for national security extremely seriously and balances this with its continued commitment to welcome inward investment in a way that provides investors with the certainty and transparency they need to do business in the UK.

We work across government to conduct due diligence and other assessments and ensure that any potential national security risk to the UK is handled appropriately. For any new qualifying investments in sensitive sectors, which include transport, we will use the powers in the National Security and Investment Act 2021 to scrutinise transactions and intervene if necessary to protect national security.

Question to the Cabinet Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the effectiveness of the National Security and Investment Act 2021 in preventing hostile foreign influence on UK national infrastructure projects; and what safeguards are currently in place to prevent investment from countries with geopolitical interests and activities which conflict with the UK’s national security.

Answered by Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent - Baroness in Waiting (HM Household) (Whip)

The National Security and Investment (NSI) Act 2021 provides powers for the Government to scrutinise and, where necessary, intervene in acquisitions which could present a risk to the UK’s national security. If required, the Government has the ability to impose conditions, block or unwind acquisitions. The Act provides legally defined timelines and processes for decisions from the Government.

The Government welcomes investment as part of our mission to boost growth, but only where it meets our regulatory requirements and does not compromise our national security. We will not hesitate to use our powers to protect national security where we identify concerns.

The latest NSI Act annual report, published in July, can be found on GOV.UK, and shows that the National Security and Investment system is continuing to operate well to protect sensitive sectors, whilst supporting investment.

Question to the Department for Business and Trade:

To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, what assessment he has made of the potential impact of Chinese ownership of critical transport infrastructure on national security.

Answered by Chris Bryant - Minister of State (Department for Business and Trade)

Transport infrastructure is an integral part of the UK economy, moving people, goods and enabling economic growth, as recognised in the Industrial Strategy. The security of the sector is of the upmost importance to the government.

Transport is one of the 17 key sectors in the National Security and Investment Act (NSIA). The government has the power to assess, and intervene in, investments in the UK's key transport infrastructure for national security risks. The NSIA is actor agnostic and allows the government to act regardless of an entity's nationality. Each transaction is taken on its own merit.

Found: The National Security and Investment Act 2021 (Notifiable Acquisition) (Specification of Qualifying Entities

Found: required to have measures in place to manage risks, such as cyber attacks.305 Also, the National Security and Investment Act

Found: The National Security and Investment Act 2021 introduced new powers for the government to investigate

Found: • passing the National Security and Investment Act 2021, which introduced new powers for the government

Found: Operation of the National Security and Investment Act 2021: memorandum of understanding between the Cabinet

Found: The Framework and Pipeline are without prejudice to the application of the National Security and Investment Act

Found: critical sectors of the economy will benefit from clearer investment rules under the National Security and Investment Act

Found: The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has made a final order under the National Security and Investment Act

Found: The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has made a final order under the National Security and Investment Act

Found: The Framework is without prejudice to the application of the National Security and Investment Act 2021

Found: legislation5. 1 I do not review other national security legislation such as the National Security and Investment Act

Found: legislation5. 1 I do not review other national security legislation such as the National Security and Investment Act

Found: Cabinet Office16 Judicial review – challenge to final order decision under the National Security and Investment Act

Found: Cabinet Office16 Judicial review – challenge to final order decision under the National Security and Investment Act

Found: existing seventeen areas of the economy subject to mandatory notification under the National Security and Investment Act

Found: existing seventeen areas of the economy subject to mandatory notification under the National Security and Investment Act

Found: The National Security and Investment Act 2021 (Notifiable Acquisition) (Specification of Qualifying Entities

Found: of critical national infrastructure including energy, and the application of the National Security and Investment Act

Found: elements of critical national infrastructure including energy, and the application of the National Security and Investment Act

Found: contingencies, including: o COBR o Resilience policy o Cyber security o State threats o National Security and Investment Act

Question

To ask the Scottish Government what discussions it has had with the UK Government regarding any security concerns relating to MingYang entering Scotland's offshore wind supply chain.

Answered by Martin, Gillian - Cabinet Secretary for Climate Action and Energy

The Scottish Government recognises the importance of Mingyang’s potential investment to the growth and success of the offshore wind sector. The Memorandum of Understanding between the UK Government and Mingyang is a matter of public record.

The UK Government is responsible for national security, the regulation of international trade, elements of critical national infrastructure including energy, and the application of the National Security and Investment Act. The proposed Mingyang investment is subject to a national security decision by the UK Government and we await the outcome of that process.