Lord Frost (Non-Afl)

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My Lords, I congratulate the Minister on his promotion and thank him for his very clear opening statement. The problem we have today is that we are looking at a Bill that is important in its own right but is only one part of a much bigger problem: can we sustain a steel industry at all in this country and, if so, how? I am not quite such a fan of the Government’s March steel strategy as the Minister is. The problem is that what one thinks of this Bill really depends on what one thinks of this broader strategy and how viable it is.

I sympathise with the Government’s difficulties, even though they are in part self-generated, although not wholly. Even somebody as economically liberal as me recognises that we are hardly operating in a free market environment in this area and that some sort of government steering hand is needed. We all have an interest in maintaining a viable steel industry in Britain, after all. It is the design that is crucial.

I want to set out three contextual problems before talking about how we might find a way forward. The first problem has been alluded to before: the fact that there is no genuine market in steel globally. We know about the huge amount of structural overcapacity worldwide, the Chinese subsidies and the reaction—the wave of tariffs, quotas, anti-dumping measures and so on that has spread across the industrialised world. There is no sign that that is going to change any time soon. In that context I understand the Government resorting to tariffs. I certainly do not like them, but it is unreasonable to exclude them as a weapon. They could be better targeted on particular kinds of steel, stronger rules of origin and perhaps bigger TRQs for reliable suppliers. Maybe the Minister can say whether the Government have considered this or might consider it in the future as a way of reducing the downstream effect on our own producers.

The second problem is the need for resilience and the national security issues that go with that. That means maintaining a necessary sovereign capacity, as other noble Lords have said. The question is, what does that sovereign capacity actually mean? The UK currently consumes about 12 million tonnes of steel a year. It is going up slightly. Domestic production is about 30% of that and the Government say they want it to go up to 50%. It is never going to be 100%. Sovereign capacity does not mean producing everything you consume; it is about defining the capabilities you cannot afford to lose and the supply chains you cannot afford to depend on. Others will have different views, but my assessment is that the main capabilities we should be focusing on are: the defence-grade plate, forgings and specialist alloys that are broadly made in Sheffield, and the Government are committing to that; stockpiling and reliable contracts for the upstream supply chains; and rail and critical infrastructure products currently made at Scunthorpe but unprofitably.

The first of those three categories is largely state guided and in part state owned. As for the second, stockpiling, the Government have said nothing at all about this. On the third, Scunthorpe, the Government have not really been clear about the national security or resilience case for keeping Scunthorpe going. The Minister mentioned that it was about maintaining the ability to produce steel from scratch from raw iron, but an EAF plant with a DRI plant can do that as well, and that may well be the direction of travel. It is not in some particular resilience in the upstream supply chain either. After all, we no longer make coking coal in the UK, so we have to import that anyway to keep Scunthorpe going. As far as I can see, the only real case is transitional: to keep the UK as a main supplier to the rail industry while the new electric arc furnace facilities are built at Scunthorpe. I do not know whether this is the case or what mix of these things is the Government’s thinking on Scunthorpe. Perhaps the Minister can give us a bit more detail on that.

The third problem is this. If we are envisaging a modernised steel industry of some kind in this country and the capacity of specific types for specific purposes, can it be done profitably over the long term? Is it viable? I think our answer to that is yes. We can see it done in the US in the mini-mill industry and elsewhere—Turkey, for example, has a profitable steel industry based on EAF plants. Maybe this points to a UK model that is something like specialist capability for defence in Sheffield, two or three EAF clusters, perhaps including Scunthorpe, and this question of a DRI plant, which is touched on in the Government’s strategy but not brought to a conclusion.

Perhaps we could all agree to this as a viable destination. The problem is, how do we get there? As a destination, it depends on a cost and business environment that currently does not exist. Electricity is super expensive and getting more so. The business environment is poor and getting worse. As a transition, it involves somehow encouraging investment into this poor business environment, or else the Government coming up with the money themselves. This is why we have the problem that this Bill encapsulates. We are heading for a destination, however desirable it may be, that is probably unviable in current conditions without massive government help. This is the problem with rushing to nationalise Scunthorpe without thinking it through properly.

So where does that leave us? In the circumstances, there is clearly a case for the temporary nationalisation of Scunthorpe, on certain conditions. Temporary public ownership may be justified—and we wait to hear from the Minister on this—because closure might remove the UK’s primary iron capability overnight, with no clear succession plan. The problem is, as we know, that nationalisation always sets up terrible perverse incentives and poor management, which is why temporariness is really important. There must be a way out and a viable end point. It is reasonable to ask for something clearer on those conditions if we are going to proceed satisfactorily, and I give notice that I will probably put down some amendments to that effect.

We need three things. First, we need a clear exit strategy for Scunthorpe: the blast furnace run-out date if there is one, an EAF commissioning date if there is one and a target for return to the private sector. Without that, Scunthorpe risks becoming British Leyland—a permanent loss-making ward of the state where all the incentives are just to put in more money and hope that things turn out better, impossible to close but impossible to fix either.

The second condition—unfortunately, this is far from being fulfilled—is electricity and energy prices and a business environment that support a viable industry. We know the problem with electricity prices. It has been said that the British industrial competitiveness scheme exists and will hold down those prices, but that itself is only cross-subsidy. We are supposed to believe, and the Secretary of State for Energy has said, that our great net-zero project is going to bring prices down in the future, so why do we need the cross-subsidy if that is really the case? There is a real problem here with the strategy.

It is not just me saying that; plenty of people are. Dieter Helm, who is a pretty neutral commentator on this subject and has certainly supported net zero in the past, wrote on 3 June that the industrial consequences of the Government’s energy policy

“have been dire. High electricity prices have contributed to the closure of Grangemouth … the Exxon refinery in Scotland, one of the Hull refineries, the closure of most of the steel industry, the closure of the fertiliser and fibreglass industries, and severe problems for pottery and for glass-making. Car manufacturing is back to the 1950s’ levels. There is devastation amongst the SMEs … unfunded welfare spending has increased the cost of capital … Energy policy has reduced economic growth, not increased it”.

That is the problem. We are building a steel industry—we hope—in that environment but it is not clear to me how it is going to survive in those circumstances.

The third thing we need is a proper strategy for the industry as a whole, not just for Scunthorpe but something broader. What is the end point? Is there going to be a DRI plant or not? Do the Government recognise the need for the stockpiling of hard-to-source EAF kit and scrap? Do they recognise the need for strategic stockpiles of defence plate billets, HBI and so on?

The problem we have, to return to where we started, is that the March strategy covers only about half the ground. It commits on Port Talbot funding, on expanding Forgemasters and on one or two other things, but it is unclear on Scunthorpe—the subject before us today—non-committal on DRIs and silent on stockpiling. It says little or nothing about whether the future industry can be expanded further if we need to upgrade our defence effort. Above all, it does not tell us what the hierarchy of objectives is. What is the Government’s choice framework? When national security clashes with profitability, what is most important? When employment clashes with modernisation, do we protect jobs or do we fund the transition? When net zero clashes with the industrial base, do we change the plans or continue the charge of the Light Brigade to industrial suicide? That needs to be clear if it is a strategy. I would like to think the March strategy was interim but I do not know. Perhaps the Minister could say whether any thinking has been done on this broader approach and whether a broader strategy is needed.

Britain is not going to get back to a world of free trade in steel—that is not going to appear any time soon—but it can have a steel industry that is smaller, smarter, sovereign in the things that matter and capable of paying its own way. The problem is that putting so much of this in the hands of a Government relies on a Government who are capable of strategising for industries and running them, but history suggests that Governments are not good at those things. We are right to be sceptical about the approach and to ask for more information. Perhaps in winding up the Minister could start to give us some of that.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

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My Lords, I join the general approval of the Minister’s promotion. I wish him well and I am delighted to face-off somebody who has considerable business experience.

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this important debate. It is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Fox, who, when talking about hubris, was slightly selective with his times. The steel industry has had systemic issues for a couple of decades—and there was a Liberal Democrat Business Secretary for at least five of those years. Apart from that, I agreed with much of what he said.

There was a great deal of agreement in the House about the general strategic importance of steel, which is welcome. British Steel matters to Scunthorpe, jobs, rail, construction, manufacturing, defence and our national resilience more generally, as many others have noted. We do not deny that the Government may have had to act in April 2025 to prevent an immediate and disorderly closure of the blast furnaces, but the central question remains, and it runs through the debate. It is not whether steel matters; it is whether nationalisation is a serious strategy for making British Steel viable. On that question, the Government have still not provided convincing answers.

As my noble friend Lady Noakes noted, nationalisation, we were told, was not the Government’s original plan. When the emergency Steel Industry (Special Measures) Bill was brought before Parliament last year, the then Secretary of State, Jonathan Reynolds, told the Commons that:

“The Bill does not transfer ownership to the Government”.


He said that the Government’s aspiration remained

“a co-investment agreement with a private sector partner to secure a long-term transformation”.—[Official Report, Commons, 12/4/25; cols. 840, 841.]

I have absolutely no doubt that the Minister will say that private investment remains the goal—indeed, the Minister in the other place, Chris McDonald, said as much in a Written Statement—but where is the plan to achieve it? Where is the timetable? Where is the private partner? Where is the route back to commercial viability?

The noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, referred to the halcyon days of the 1970s—when state ownership worked so well that I have clear recollections of doing my homework by candlelight. In the 1970s, when the Labour Government last ran British Steel, the taxpayer was forced to carry staggering losses. We worry that the danger now is that we will repeat the same mistake, by not solving the underlying problem but moving it from the company’s balance sheet to the public balance sheet.

The central barrier is not ownership; the central barrier is competitiveness. Every speaker in the debate referred to high energy costs. It is the cost of doing business now more generally in Britain. It is the regulatory and taxation environment that makes heavy industry harder here than it is in competitor countries. Yet the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero appears more interested in driving forward an ideological net-zero agenda than in bringing industrial energy prices down dramatically. I cannot help thinking that, with his messianic zeal, he is doing more damage to the Government’s growth agenda than anyone else in Britain. Instead of cutting bills and taxes, abolishing the UK carbon border adjustment mechanism and giving energy-intensive industries a fighting chance, the Government seem preoccupied with regulating ever more aspects of economic life, from factories to household heating products.

We recognise that there has been a long-standing and serious problem with Jingye. We also recognise that there may now be legal proceedings. I do not ask the Minister to prejudice the Government’s position in litigation, but there are matters on which the House is entitled to clarity. Can the Minister confirm whether Jingye has asserted that, from 12 April 2025, the date on which the Government assumed control of British Steel, neither Jingye nor any company in the Jingye Group has any continuing obligation to British Steel? Can the Minister confirm whether Jingye intends to disaggregate British Steel from Jingye Steel (UK) Holding Ltd and remove assets, liabilities and other British Steel-related items from its own balance sheet? If that is correct, what is the Government’s assessment of the solvency position of British Steel itself?

If British Steel is continuing to trade only because the Government, directly or indirectly, are underpinning its working capital, does the Minister accept that this raises serious questions about the public accounts treatment of the support advanced since April 2025? Does it still make sense to treat that support as recoverable debt if the company cannot repay it without further taxpayer support? Do the Government now accept that, if British Steel continues to trade, the taxpayer may have to assume responsibility not merely for the working capital but for accumulated non-cash losses, balance sheet liabilities and forward obligations?

Will the Minister address the reported intercompany debt position? Jingye has been reported as quantifying outstanding British Steel debt to different Jingye counter- parties at hundreds of millions of pounds. If the Government acquire all the shares in British Steel and the company is not placed into insolvent liquidation, will the Government become responsible for those liabilities? Will the taxpayer be assuming the full built-up losses since 12 April 2025, losing the prospect of clawing back earlier support, and taking responsibility for future liabilities, including the eventual decommissioning of the blast furnaces?

In opening, the Minister talked about the premature closure of the blast furnaces, which the Steel Industry (Special Measures) Act was supposed to prevent. Have the Government commissioned a study of how much life the blast furnaces have left in them? It is important to ask that question and to know the answer, because it will have a material impact on the decommissioning costs, as and when they arise.

Can the Minister confirm whether our maths is correct on this? The National Audit Office has said that support for British Steel is expected to reach £615 million by June 2026, while Jingye is reportedly seeking compensation of more than £1 billion. Once potential compensation, operating support, working capital, administrative costs and future capital investment are taken together, is the taxpayer exposure now approaching £2 billion or potentially even higher? If that figure is wrong, will the Minister set out the Government’s current estimate of the total cost to the taxpayer, including any liabilities that may come on to the government balance sheet on day one of nationalisation? If the assets—a couple of 70 year-old blast furnaces—offset the liabilities, as the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, thinks likely, I have a couple of hats that I will eat.

As my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral set out so clearly, the Government came to office promising a £2.5 billion steel fund—a fund that was supposed to transform the sector, modernise production, support new technology and crowd in private investment. Yet there is now a real risk that this money will be consumed not by transformation but by rescue, as my noble friend Lord Redwood pointed out. Money that should have been used to modernise the sector, lower energy costs, support new technology and bring in private capital may instead be used simply to keep one loss-making business afloat. That leads to the question that has been asked repeatedly in this debate: where does this end? Will British Steel, under public ownership, be expected eventually to stand on its own two feet, or will taxpayers be asked year after year to fund operating losses, while Ministers promise that a solution is just around the corner?

The Bill says that the Secretary of State may exercise transfer powers only where he considers it necessary in the public interest. The noble Lords, Lord Sikka and Lord Fox, asked some good questions on what the public interest is and how it is defined. I look forward to the Minister’s answers to those. The Government say that public interest will include considerations of national security, the economy and critical infrastructure, but could Ministers be any more vague when they refer to the “economic interests” of the United Kingdom? Will taxpayer funding be limited or capped, or are Ministers asking Parliament to approve an open-ended commitment? Will the Government be required to show that they have made every reasonable effort to secure private sector investment before nationalisation proceeds?

It was uncomfortable and somewhat ironic to witness representatives of the Chinese ownership and the Chinese Communist Party lecturing the United Kingdom about abiding by market principles—although I note that the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, pointed out the irony of that as well. However, the Government must consider the signal that they are sending to international investors. If Ministers seize control, fail to secure a commercial settlement and then proceed to nationalisation without a clear compensation, exit or investment plan, how does that make Britain look to the next investor who is considering committing capital to a strategic industry here?

We also cannot ignore the wider business climate that the Government have created. As my noble friend Lord Hunt and others have made clear, the elephant in the room is the Employment Rights Act 2025. I know that Ministers are tired of hearing about it, but we are not going to stop raising it because it is helping to make the business environment less competitive and less investible. Combined with the increase in national insurance contributions, endless reporting requirements and carbon taxes, the Government are piling costs upon costs and burden upon burden on the very industries that they claim to want to support. For a steel sector that is already operating under intense global pressure, those additional costs are not abstract. They affect hiring, investment, margins, productivity and the ability of British steel-makers to compete. At precisely the moment when steel needs flexibility, lower costs and greater productivity, the Government are increasing the cost of hiring and handing still more leverage to trade unions.

It is no surprise that the unions have called for steel nationalisation. The concern is that the Government have given in to them. How will Ministers ensure that a national security asset is not left at the mercy of industrial action? The Government have removed important strike safeguards. What protections will exist to ensure continuity of supply for defence, infrastructure and critical manufacturing if British Steel is brought into public ownership? Are we seriously to place a strategic industrial asset under state control and then leave it vulnerable to the same union pressure that the Government have chosen to empower elsewhere?

The Government have had more than enough time to tackle the underlying problems—uncompetitive energy prices, rising employment costs, higher national insurance, excessive regulation, the burdens of the Employment Rights Act and the net-zero policy that too often ignores the realities of energy-intensive industry. The steel sector has been operating on a tight margin for years. Nationalisation does not make any of those problems disappear.

In closing, can I ask the Minister to answer the central questions: what is the total expected cost to the taxpayer? What is the plan for private investment? What is the timetable for restoring commercial viability? What is the exit strategy? What measures will the Government take to reduce the costs that made British Steel uncompetitive in the first place? Without answers to those questions, this Bill is not a serious strategy for steel; it is a costly exercise in papering over the cracks with nationalisation. We urge the Government to come forward with a serious plan—one that lowers costs, attracts investment, protects taxpayers and secures the long-term future of the British steel industry.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

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My Lords, Amendment 1, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, is very simple. It seeks to confine the powers in this Bill to genuine steel businesses. Those are undertakings consisting predominantly of the manufacture or processing of steel—or iron for the purposes of steel manufacture.

As drafted, the definition catches any business which merely includes steel-making as part of its operations. That is a very broad formulation. It could, in principle, sweep up a diversified business in which steel was only a minor part of what it does. Businesses with a limited connection to steel production should not face uncertainty about whether it falls within the reach of these nationalisation powers.

When this point was pressed in the other place, the Secretary of State was asked whether a business with only 1% of its operations in steel would be caught by Clause 1. He did not say that it would not be. However, a statement of intent is not a limit on the face of the Bill, and future Governments are not bound by the assurances of this one. The Government say that these powers are intended for British Steel, and British Steel is obviously and predominantly a steel business. Therefore, this amendment should create no difficulty for that purpose. If the Government’s intention is genuinely not to use these powers against businesses with only a peripheral connection to steel, they should have no difficulty in accepting this amendment. I beg to move.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade (Lord Leong) (Lab)

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My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their constructive engagement in advance of Committee, and for all the amendments and valuable contributions that they will make during it.

Amendment 1 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, seeks to introduce a narrow definition of a “steel undertaking”. I fully understand the purpose of the amendment, but the Government have no desire for these powers to extend beyond what is necessary. They are exceptional powers for exceptional circumstances and should be exercised only where Parliament intends.

I respectfully suggest that the amendment would not provide greater certainty; instead, it risks introducing greater ambiguity into the Bill. The proposed test, that a business must be “predominantly” involved in steel, immediately raises difficult questions, as alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on how “predominantly” is measured. Is it turnover, assets, employees, production, profit or some combination of these? The amendment provides no answer. That uncertainty would inevitably invite legal challenge, precisely when swift and decisive action may be required. Businesses with significant steel operations could argue that they fall outside the definition, because steel is not their primary activity. Equally, complex corporate structures could be organised to make the test easier to avoid altogether. In seeking to narrow the definition, the amendment risks creating loopholes that undermine the legislation’s very purpose. The Government’s drafting avoids these difficulties; it provides a clear and workable definition that gives legal certainty, while ensuring that powers are used only when genuinely needed to protect the public interest.

For those reasons, while I appreciate the spirit in which the amendment was tabled, I cannot agree that it improves the Bill. I know this is not what the noble Lords intended and I can accept that the current drafting is broad, but this definition follows closely that used in the Steel Industry (Special Measures) Act and it ensures that there can be no disputes about its meaning. In practice, we do not expect many companies to fall within the current definition, so the amendment would have minimal effect.

I will repeat the Government’s position expressed throughout the Bill’s passage so far: we are strongly minded to use the powers to acquire British Steel if it is in the public interest to do so, and we do not have any plans to acquire any other steel undertakings. It is therefore very unlikely that this would be used for any other company, let alone one that is engaged primarily in non-steel activity. I hope this helps clarify the matter and respectfully request that the amendment is withdrawn.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

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I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. It was remiss of me not also to thank the Minister and his team for their extensive engagement on the Bill.

This amendment is simple. I am afraid that I do not agree with the Minister’s comments or those from the noble Lord, Lord Fox. This is very straightforward. In fact, I refer noble Lords to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, which says that the word “predominantly”, in formal or technical usage, can denote a precise majority, such as more than 50%, or an even higher threshold, such as 60% to 80%, depending on jurisdiction. I am not an expert on which jurisdiction we are in, but it clearly means north of 50%. The way the Bill is written, as I pointed out, could allow for as little as 1%.

I have listened to the Minister’s objections to the wording of the amendment and am very happy to work on tightening it up, if he thinks that would help. The amendment is simple: it would confine the powers in the Bill to genuine steel businesses—that is, undertakings

“consisting predominantly of the manufacture or processing of steel, or iron for the purposes or in connection with the manufacture of steel”.

I think that answers most of the Minister’s objections, which, frankly, if they are relevant to my wording, are also relevant to the wording currently in the Bill, so I do not really believe in the ambiguity argument.

Businesses with a limited connection to steel production should not face uncertainty about whether they fall within the reach of these nationalisation powers. The present drafting does not provide that reassurance; it permits powers to apply to an undertaking that merely includes steel-making or related iron production, as I have already pointed out. I will not press the amendment for now, but I would like further discussions with the Minister, if he is amenable, to see whether we can find a way to tighten up the language so that it both suits the Government’s purposes and makes it clearer for all those undertakings that we are discussing. For now, I beg leave to withdraw.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Hunt, Lord Redwood and Lord Fox, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, for their contributions to this group. There are several amendments to the articulation of the public interest test in Clause 2. This is a key clause in the Bill; it is a necessary safeguard to ensure that the powers are used proportionately in response to a clear need.

Amendment 2 would limit the public interest factors that the Secretary of State may consider to those set out in the Bill. The Government agree that the three factors of national security, critical national infrastructure and support for the economy are likely to be the most relevant to the steel sector. Accordingly, the current approach ensures that they are given particular weight when assessing whether to pursue an intervention. However, circumstances may arise in which a case for intervention may not be clearly made on the basis of these three factors, yet it would clearly be in the public interest to take action. It is therefore pragmatic to build some flexibility into the Bill to address this issue.

I turn to Amendment 3. It has been suggested that the third public interest factor should refer specifically to

“economic growth and international competitiveness”,

rather than “supporting the economy”. With respect, this is a distinction without a meaningful difference. It is largely a matter of drafting rather than substance. The phrase “supporting the economy” is deliberately broad. It clearly encompasses economic growth and international competitiveness but also recognises that the economy is more than growth figures alone. It includes strengthening economic resilience, protecting strategically important industries, supporting employment, safeguarding supply chains, encouraging investment and ensuring the long-term productive capacity of the United Kingdom. By contrast, narrowing the text to

“economic growth and international competitiveness”

could unintentionally exclude other legitimate public interest considerations that any responsible Government should be able to take into account.

There may be circumstances where intervention is necessary to preserve critical industrial capability or economic resilience, even where the immediate effect on growth or competitiveness is less direct. The Government’s intention is to provide Ministers with a sufficiently broad framework to consider the full range of economic factors that may arise. The existing wording achieves precisely that: it is flexible, comprehensive and future-proofed, while fully capturing the objectives that the amendment seeks to emphasise. For those reasons, I do not believe that the amendment would improve the Bill. The Government believe that protecting our sovereign capability in what is a foundational sector for the economy will help to underpin our resilience and leave us less exposed to volatile international trading conditions. The Government therefore cannot support the amendment.

I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Hunt of Wirral, and by the noble Lord, Lord Fox. In different ways, all three noble Lords seek to require the Secretary of State to consider value for money or the impact on the public finances before exercising the principal transfer powers.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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I am referring to the noble Lord’s later amendment.

I fully agree with the principle that taxpayers’ money must be spent wisely. Any decision to bring a steel undertaking into public ownership would be among the most significant interventions that a Government could make. Such a decision should never be taken lightly, and it would not be. However, these amendments seek to place into statute an obligation that already exists as a fundamental principle of government. Every significant spending decision is subject to the rigorous disciplines of managing public money—as stated by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt—Treasury approval where appropriate, and the established accounting officer framework. Ministers are already required to demonstrate that public money is being used properly, proportionately and with due regard to value for money.

The question, therefore, is not whether value for money should be considered—it absolutely should—but whether it is necessary to restate an existing, well-established constitutional obligation in the Bill. I do not believe it is. Doing so would add no new safeguard, create no new accountability and impose no duty that does not already exist. More importantly, this legislation is intended to ensure that, where a vital national interest is at stake, the Government can act decisively. Decisions of this nature will always involve weighing immediate fiscal costs against the far greater economic and strategic costs of inaction. The loss of sovereign steel-making capability, thousands of skilled jobs and critical supply chains, and industrial resilience could ultimately impose a far greater burden on the taxpayer than timely intervention would. The Government will continue to ensure that every decision made under the Bill is subject to the highest standards of financial discipline and accountability. Those safeguards already exist; they are robust and will continue to apply.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

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My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 30, 31, 43, 44 and 46 standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Wigley—who I thought made a very powerful case—and Lord Fox, for their previous speeches.

Amendment 30 goes to the valuation of a steel undertaking and the need for that valuation to reflect the real commercial environment in which the undertaking will operate. That environment is not fixed; it is being shaped directly by government policy and, in particular, by the new steel trade measure coming into effect from 1 July. Only days ago, the Government changed the detail of that policy, relaxing the original proposals somewhat, with tariff-free quota reductions pulled back from the level first proposed. We will no doubt discuss that in more detail when the Statement is taken tomorrow, and I do not intend to rehearse that debate now.

However, the fact is that the Government’s choices on trade policy will have a material effect on the commercial position, and therefore the value of any steel undertaking. A tighter quota and a higher above-quota tariff will limit import competition. The way quotas are set will affect downstream industries, supply chains, customer relationships and the availability of particular steel products. The Government cannot, on the one hand, present their trade policy as central to the future of UK steel and, on the other hand, resist any requirement for that policy to be factored into what a steel undertaking is actually worth.

The need for clarity is made more acute by the uncertainty of recent weeks. Businesses have been trying to understand what the new quota levels will be, how quickly quotas may be exhausted, which products will be covered and what the practical effect will be for producers and steel-consuming industries alike. Do the Government accept that the new steel trade measure will affect the value of steel undertakings? If so, why should the independent valuer not be required to consider it?

On Amendment 31, electricity costs are among the central determinants of the viability, competitiveness and future value of steel. The position facing British industry is stark. The United Kingdom has had some of the highest industrial electricity prices in the developed world. UK industrial users pay substantially more than competitors in France and Germany, and—on the most widely cited international comparison—around four times as much as businesses in the United States.

For steel-makers, the gap remains significant. That is particularly serious as the sector moves towards more electricity-intensive production methods, including electric arc furnaces. A business may have the workforce, the plant, the orders and the ambition to modernise, but it cannot compete indefinitely if one of its principal inputs costs materially more than it does for its overseas competitors. These costs, I am afraid, reflect recent policy choices by the Government. The fact that the Government provided some limited relief from network charges to eligible energy-intensive industries rather demonstrates the point.

The Government now say that further measures will bring prices closer to those in competitor countries, but closer is not the same as competitive—and nor is a future scheme with questions of timing and eligibility still to be resolved an adequate basis on which to value a business today. This amendment would require the valuer to consider the prices paid by UK steel producers, the disparity with comparator countries and the effect of any support intended to reduce energy costs, including both the costs after existing reliefs and the risk that relief may be time-limited, incomplete or dependent on eligibility. It should also include a clear comparison with major competitor countries.

Is the Government’s objective genuine parity in industrial electricity prices with our principal competitors? If not, what continuing cost disadvantage do the Government consider acceptable for a strategic trade-exposed industry? How will the valuer assess the effect of support, which is prospective rather than guaranteed, particularly where broader measures are not expected to operate fully until 2027? The Government’s own impact assessment accepts the seriousness of this problem. It states that energy costs threaten the sector’s long-term viability and its ability to compete. It also acknowledges that UK steel producers face higher electricity prices than comparable countries, and that contributes to the uncompetitive production costs and pressure on margins.

On Amendment 43, as we raised at Second Reading, the Government’s impact assessment recognises the risk of a chilling effect on investment if businesses and investors perceive a greater risk of state intervention—a point very well made by my noble friend Lord Redwood in the last group. The United Kingdom has long depended on its reputation as a stable, predictable and rules-based place in which to invest. The risk is greater in the current climate. Steel businesses are already dealing with high electricity costs, rapidly changing trade policy and significant regulatory burdens. Adding an open-ended power of nationalisation can only increase the sense of risk for those considering whether to invest in the United Kingdom. If the Government are confident that their actions will strengthen confidence and attract private capital, they should have nothing to fear from transparency.

Amendment 44 addresses a basic point of fairness. If the Government take a steel undertaking into public ownership, that business must not receive selective advantages which place comparable privately owned steel businesses at an artificial disadvantage. Without this safeguard, there is a clear risk of distortion through subsidies, preferential access to public contracts, more favourable regulatory treatment or other support unavailable to private companies. The Minister in the other place stressed the need for flexibility and for the Government to act quickly, but flexibility need not mean unfairness. It is entirely possible to support a strategic undertaking in exceptional circumstances while maintaining a level playing field for the wider sector.

On Amendment 46, if we accept the Government’s central argument that British Steel is critical national infrastructure and that domestic steel production is essential to our national security and without it we cannot build our Navy, jets or submarines, they must accept the logic of what follows from that argument: you cannot declare something critical to national security then leave it defenceless. Amendment 46 states that, where the Secretary of State has exercised a principal transfer power where steel has been brought into public ownership precisely because it is in the public interest, the Secretary of State must have the power to prevent industrial action destroying the very thing that public ownership was meant to protect.

We have seen what happens when Governments are all too timid to act. We have watched the railways held to ransom by the RMT, and we have seen it in healthcare where the former Health Secretary himself felt compelled to call out what he described as “cartel-like behaviour”. The Government have made themselves more vulnerable still. The Employment Rights Act 2025 stripped away strike safeguards that existed for a good reason. The ballot thresholds are gone: the Government unlocked the door and then expressed surprise when it was pushed open.

If a steel undertaking is nationalised in the name of national security and a trade union then calls a strike that shuts down production, what will the Secretary of State do? Will he stand at the Dispatch Box and explain that our defence supply chains have been severed because he did not want to upset the unions? Do the Government seriously want domestic steel production halted because a union decides the moment of public ownership is the moment to press its advantage?

The Government cannot have it both ways: they cannot argue that steel is so vital to this country that it must be brought into public ownership and simultaneously argue that, once it is in public ownership, it should be just as exposed to industrial disruption as any other business. The whole point of this public interest test, if it means anything at all, is that some things matter too much to be left to the ordinary run of commercial risk. Industrial action that threatens critical national infrastructure is precisely such a risk.

I invite the Minister to tell the House that the Government have considered the risk. I invite him to explain what powers the Secretary of State would have on the day a strike is called at a nationalised British Steel to keep the blast furnaces lit. If he cannot answer that question satisfactorily, this amendment provides exactly the answer that is needed.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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My Lords, noble Lords have raised a number of amendments to ensure that there is a level playing field across the steel industry. I thank noble Lords for their commitment to ensuring that the Bill positively impacts the UK steel industry. A number of amendments have been tabled on this topic so, with this in mind, I will address those before turning to the new clauses proposed for the Bill. I will consider Amendments 29 to 31 together, as I believe they are intended to have the same effect.

Amendment 29 seeks to specify that compensation regulations under Clause 54(4)(b) allow the independent valuer to take into account external tariffs, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Redwood, and the carbon border adjustment mechanism when valuing the steel undertaking, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Fox. Meanwhile, Amendment 30 seeks to require that any valuation of a steel undertaking takes into account the steel import quota and tariff measure that is due to take effect from 1 July 2026. Amendment 31 would require any valuation to consider the anticipated effects of electricity prices.

I am sympathetic to concerns about the impact that these trade-related measures and electricity costs may have on steel undertakings, and therefore on any compensation determinations made by an independent valuer in relation to them under any compensation scheme regulations. However, I emphasise that the Government consider it unnecessary to add these amendments to the non-exhaustive list of examples of matters for a valuer to take into account under any compensation regulations. Any valuation would reflect the wider economic and market context, including the trading environment in which the steel undertaking operates, with or without tariffs, without the need to single out specific factors in primary legislation. This means that the valuer will ultimately have discretion to determine what they consider to be the relevant factors in making their determination.

Valuing a steel undertaking would be complex. The independent valuer would necessarily have, or be advised by those who have, expertise and experience in this area and would be well equipped to make informed decisions on their approach to valuation. For this reason, the Government do not consider these amendments necessary.

I turn to Amendment 43, which would place a duty on the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on the impact that any nationalisation of a steel undertaking would have on inward investment in the UK. I emphasise the commitments the Government have already made to support investment in the steel sector. The Government’s steel strategy set out commitments to removing barriers to investment and creating a more supportive business environment so that steel companies are better able to compete, are protected from carbon leakage and unfair trading practices, and have greater security and certainty. The Government welcome new entrants to the UK steel industry, which would foster a more competitive business environment. Government funding is available to support this.

I reassure noble Lords that the impact of nationalisation would be taken into account in any impact assessment on the use of transfer powers. This is the most appropriate mechanism for reporting on any expected impact on the economy. Given the complexity, interlinking and scale of investment trends, it would be difficult to report further on the exact impact of a single intervention. It is for this reason that we ask for this amendment not to be pressed.

Amendment 44 seeks to ensure that the powers in the Bill do not confer any advantage on publicly-owned steel undertakings which could distort competition and trade. I understand the concerns from the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, that the Bill may unfairly distort competition and investment across the steel sector. However, I reassure your Lordships that this is not the Government’s intention. Any financial assistance provided to publicly-owned steel undertakings will be time-limited, targeted and proportionate. Furthermore, we will continue to comply with domestic and international subsidy control obligations to avoid market distortions. I hope this clarifies that the Government are committed to ensuring a level playing field between state and privately-owned steel companies. This amendment is therefore not required.

Amendments 4 and 36 were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, who has raised concerns about what he considers to be the potential adverse impact of the Bill on local communities in steel-making areas. Amendment 4 would create an additional public interest factor for a Secretary of State to consider ahead of exercising the principal transfer power. This would be to support the local economy of any steel-making location adversely affected by the Bill.

The Government have introduced the Bill to support domestic steel-making, not to threaten it. Additionally, one of the three factors set out under the public interest test in Clause 2 is supporting the economy, including any part of the UK economy. The same applies to Amendment 36, which would allow financial assistance to be provided to compensate communities adversely affected by the Bill. I do not expect the Bill to have any adverse impacts on local communities, so I do not consider this amendment appropriate.

I emphasise to the noble Lord that the steel industry in Wales is the only part of the industry with a ring-fenced fund: £500 million for Port Talbot to transform the steelworks and secure steel production at that site and to secure the future of the south Wales steel industry. This is a significant investment that will benefit the local community in that area for years to come. This demonstrates the Government’s confidence in the Welsh steel community and the crucial role that Tata plays in it.

I understand the objective of Amendment 46, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe. We all want to ensure that any publicly owned steel undertaking can operate effectively, maintain production and continue to serve the national interest. On that objective I do not believe there is any disagreement within the Committee; where we differ is on the means of achieving it. The amendment would give the Secretary of State the power to prohibit or restrict industrial action where it is considered to pose a sufficient risk to the public interest.

The Government do not believe that curtailing workforce rights is either necessary or the right way to secure a successful and resilient steel industry. The people who work in our steel plants are not an obstacle to operational success; they are the reason it is possible. Their skills, commitment and professionalism keep furnaces running, fulfil customer orders and sustain a strategic industry on which our economy and national security depend. The long-term success of a publicly owned steel undertaking will be built on partnership with this workforce, not on restricting their rights.

Moreover, good industrial relations are an asset in themselves. Constructive engagement with employees and their trade unions is far more likely to ensure stable operations than legislation that risks damaging trust and co-operation. Indeed, imposing additional restrictions could prove counterproductive, making disputes harder rather than easier to resolve. The Government have established constructive relationships with the trade unions representing workers at British Steel and across the wider steel sector. We value the role they play in representing their members and in helping secure the future for this vital industry.

Existing industrial relations legislation already provides the legal framework for industrial action. The Government see no justification for establishing a separate and more restrictive regime merely because an undertaking has entered public ownership. Public ownership should not mean fewer workers’ rights; it should mean responsible stewardship of a strategically important industry, working with the skilled men and women whose expertise will determine its success.

I thank all noble Lords for their amendments, which aim to ensure that the Bill does not distort the market to create inequality between public and private sector steel companies. I hope I have reassured noble Lords that the Government remain committed to revitalising the steel sector, which should be achieved through co-investment from the private and public sectors. I respectfully ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Redwood, Lord Fox and Lord Hunt, for their contributions.

The noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Sharpe, tabled Amendments 5, 6, and 42 to provide for an independent person to assess the public interest. Further amendments tabled by the noble Lords would require the Government to publish both the criteria used to assess the public interest and their assessment on how those criteria are met, before exercising the principal transfer power. Amendment 42 would require an impact assessment to be published before any intervention or the exercise of any power under the Bill. As these amendments deal with similar issues, I will address them together.

I start by saying that I understand and sympathise with the desire for the greatest parliamentary and stakeholder scrutiny of a decision to intervene under the powers in the Bill. Stakeholder engagement is a key part of the Government’s policy approach to the sector, with Ministers regularly meeting key industry groups and representatives through the steel council and other forums. The Government have published an impact assessment alongside the Bill, explaining how the public interest test will be considered. A further impact assessment will be published alongside any secondary legislation exercising the transfer of power.

The framework for decisions to intervene will stem from what has been included in Clause 2, with regard to the three public interest factors. There is no attempt on our part to obfuscate or hide the criteria that will be applied in practice. The Government will not only consider whether a steel undertaking is engaged in activity that serves the public interest; they will also consider whether the activity is at risk of not receiving government intervention.

The Government cannot support these amendments as each would create additional hurdles and process pre-intervention. In the kinds of situations that the Bill envisages, speed will be crucial. Likewise, commercial and market sensitivities mean that swift action will, in most circumstances, be necessary to avoid uncertainty.

None the less, I am aware that there are strongly held concerns about this issue, and I can confirm that the Government will consider options for Parliament to scrutinise decisions taken either at the time of or after the exercise of the transfer of powers ahead of Report stage. I hope that this offers some reassurance to noble Lords, and I look forward to continuing further conversations with the noble Lord, Lord Fox, ahead of Report. With that, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

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My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for bringing forward these amendments. As he has observed, there are similarities with some amendments of ours and we are happy to work together to clarify them. He could also have said that Parliament will be acting at speed tomorrow on the National Security (State Threats) Bill from the noble Lord, Lord Hanson—so it can be done.

We have already raised significant concerns about the breadth of the public interest test in Clause 2. The amendments in this group go directly to those concerns. The noble Lord is quite right that, before such exceptional powers are used, Parliament should be told why nationalisation is considered necessary. It is also right that the Government should have to consider the effect on the public finances and whether the undertaking has any credible short-term and long-term prospect of being investable. A business may be capable of being kept open in the short term, but that is not the same as being viable, competitive or capable of attracting the investment needed for its future. The public interest also cannot be assessed without proper regard to the liabilities and continuing costs that may fall on taxpayers.

The Government’s approach so far has relied heavily on broad discretion and ministerial assurance. These noble Lord’s amendments would introduce greater transparency, discipline and realism into that process. For those reasons, we support them.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Sharpe, for their contributions. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for his constructive engagement over the past few weeks. I understand that he is trying to support the steel sector and the Bill while ensuring value for money, which is the Government’s objective as well.

Amendment 10 would require the Secretary of State to take into account the impact on the public finances when applying the public interest test. Of course, any decision to nationalise a steel undertaking should not be taken lightly, given the significant costs that could be incurred. However, the principle of securing value for money for the taxpayer is already well established and embedded in government decision-making, as I said on an earlier group. Any decision to exercise the powers in the Bill is subject to the usual Managing Public Money governance and the framework of accounting officer checks, which includes consideration of the impact on the public finances. I therefore respectfully suggest that incorporating the amendment into statute would not serve any particular purpose, but we are mindful of ensuring that costs associated with the Bill are well managed.

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, also proposes, in Amendment 11, that the Secretary of State should take into account the short-term and long-term investability of a steel undertaking when considering whether to intervene in the public interest. I understand the sentiment behind the amendment, but I do not think that investability should directly inform the public interest test.

If a steel undertaking is an investible prospect in the short term, it is unlikely that there would be a case for government intervention, as the need could be met by the private sector. The intention behind the Bill is not to crowd out private investment but to act where private ownership has failed. Whether a steel undertaking is investible in the longer term is highly speculative, so I do not think it would be particularly helpful for it to form part of the statutory framework for the decision. By intervening, the Government would hope to turn a steel undertaking that is not investible into something that may become investible. To the extent that this is what the noble Lord hopes to achieve, we share his ambition, but I do not think that the amendment is workable.

Amendment 7 would prevent the Secretary of State exercising the principal transfer powers until a statement explaining how the public interest test is met has been provided to Parliament. I am sympathetic to the desire for greater parliamentary and stakeholder scrutiny of any decision to intervene under the powers in the Bill.

As I said previously, the Government have published an impact assessment alongside the Bill, explaining how the public interest test will be considered. Any further impact assessment would be published alongside any secondary legislation exercising the transfer powers. The framework for the decision to intervene will stem from the three public interest factors included in Clause 2. The Government will consider not only whether a steel undertaking is engaged in activity that serves the public interest but whether that activity is at risk without government intervention.

The Government cannot support this amendment, as it would create additional hurdles and processes pre-intervention. In the kinds of situations that the Bill envisages, speed will be crucial, as I said previously. Likewise, commercial and market sensitivities mean that swift action will, in most circumstances, be necessary to avoid uncertainty; I take note of what noble Lords said about speed. None the less, I am aware that there are strongly held concerns about this issue and I confirm that, ahead of Report, the Government will consider options for Parliament to scrutinise decisions taken either at the time of or after the exercise of the transfer powers. I hope that this of some reassurance to the noble Lord and ask that his amendment be withdrawn.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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My Lords, in this group of amendments, the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, has raised important concerns about the ways in which the Bill includes the Welsh Government and legislature in decision making. Amendment 9 would amend Clause 2 on the public interest so that the Secretary of State would be required to consult the First Minister of Wales before exercising the principal transfer power in relation to an undertaking located in Wales.

The Government have been keen to engage closely with the devolved Governments throughout the passage of the Bill, and I am grateful for the approach taken by all parties in that engagement. I am delighted to inform your Lordships that the Scottish Parliament granted its legislative consent to the Bill on 23 June. I record my thanks to Ministers and officials who worked swiftly to complete the legislative consent process ahead of the Scottish Parliament’s Summer Recess.

I am happy to confirm that the Government will ordinarily consult the relevant devolved Ministers if it is likely that the principal transfer power will be used in relation to a steel undertaking with its principal place of business in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. If this is not possible because swift action in the public interest is required, Ministers will engage with their ministerial counterparts at the earliest opportunity following the exercise of the principal transfer power. I also understand that my colleagues, Ministers and the Secretary of State for Wales will meet their counterparts in the Welsh Government tomorrow to discuss the Bill further.

Amendment 19 would require the Senedd to give approval to any proposed use of the modification power that would relate to devolved regulations. Again, I am sympathetic to the sentiment of this amendment and reassure the noble Lord that the modification power in Clause 50 is targeted and limited to applications necessary to ensure that transfer powers can be exercised effectively. It is not a general power to amend legislation. The drafting does not permit any changes to other laws unless they are for the purpose of ensuring that the powers in the Bill can be exercised effectively.

Although I cannot agree with these amendments, I reiterate the Government’s desire to continue engaging closely with our partners in the devolved Governments. In particular, the Government are continuing to discuss the Bill with the Welsh Government, and I hope to be able to provide noble Lords with further updates later in the Bill’s passage. However, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

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My Lords, I hope that this outbreak of agreement means that the Government will accept my Amendment 12. The Government have repeatedly spoken of a long-term plan for steel—securing private investment, increasing domestic production, safeguarding jobs and creating a viable future for the industry. Against that background, Clause 3 comes as something of a surprise. Earlier, the noble Lord, Lord Fox, indicated that he was somewhat reassured by its presence, but I suspect that its actual terms have escaped his usual vulpine scrutiny. A sunset clause is intended to place a clear limit on exceptional powers, but the Bill allows the Secretary of State to substitute, by regulations, a different period for the two-year limit.

Subsection (4) makes it clear that this can be done more than once. Therefore, in practice, the powers could be extended again and again, which gives no reassurance at all. Two years could become five years, 10 years or longer. That is not a meaningful sunset clause; it is a potentially perpetual sunset clause. It is an indefinitely renewable power.

What does that say about the Government’s confidence in their own ability to secure a viable private sector-led future for British Steel? If Ministers genuinely expect these powers to be exceptional and temporary, why do they require the ability to extend them without any stated final limit? This goes directly to the concerns raised throughout our debates—the risk of open-ended liabilities for taxpayers, uncertainty for investors and a lack of clarity about the Government’s intended endpoint.

The Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House has considered this point and has been unequivocal. It said:

“The use of delegated powers to bypass sunset clauses undermines their purpose, and sets an unusual and unwelcome precedent”.


It recommended either that the final period of extension be set out in the Bill or that there should be a statutory time limit each time the power is used. This would not prevent the Government seeking additional time when there is a compelling case, but it would require Ministers to return to Parliament with a clear final boundary rather than retaining power capable of perpetual renewal.

Will the Minister accept the Constitution Committee’s recommendations and bring forward amendments before Report? Will the Government set a final limit on these powers and demonstrate that they have genuine confidence in securing a thriving, investible and private sector-led future for British Steel? I beg to move.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for his contribution. I note the Constitution Committee’s comments on this clause in its recently published report on the Bill. The inclusion of the sunset provision demonstrates the Government’s commitment to ensuring that powers remain on the statute book for as long as necessary to serve their purpose. Ultimately, we want to see the domestic steel sector return to a more sustainable and stable state in which government intervention is unnecessary.

As we have said, we do not currently see another use case beyond the possibility of British Steel. Therefore, we hope that noble Lords get their wish and there is no need to extend the sunset period. However, the current geopolitical landscape creates a volatile backdrop for this sector, making it difficult to anticipate what may transpire in the coming months and years. We have therefore built in some flexibility to extend or shorten the two-year sunset timetable if circumstances change. We consider this a reasonable precaution to take.

The drafting ensures that there will be full parliamentary scrutiny of any change to the sunset period through the affirmative procedure, meaning that parliamentarians will be able to test and debate any regulations brought by the Government to extend the sunset period. We anticipate needing to use this extension power only in extenuating circumstances. I therefore request that the amendment be withdrawn.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

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My Lords, that was a very brief debate, and I am grateful to the Minister for his response, but I am afraid I remain unconvinced. The Government say they want to secure a sustainable private sector-led future for British Steel. But a power capable of being extended repeatedly without any final statutory limit sends exactly the opposite signal. It risks making investors more, not less, cautious about committing capital to the sector. There must be a reasonable period that the Minister can identify and put in the Bill. If the Government genuinely regard these as exceptional and temporary powers, they should be willing to set out a clear limit.

The noble Lord cannot realistically blame external circumstances. There are always external circumstances. This has fallen foul of the Constitution Committee for very clear reasons, which it has set out. Speaking personally and from experience, I think it is unwise to fall foul of the Constitution Committee.

We urge the Government to take seriously the recommendation of the committee and either specify the final extension period in the Bill or impose a statutory limit on each extension. I think we will have to return to this matter at a later stage, but for now I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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My Lords, before I turn to the amendments in this group, I thank the members of the Select Committee on the Constitution for their report on the Bill, which relates to this grouping. The report recommended that in Clause 47 the provisions for dispute settlement should be set out more fully in the Bill. The approach to drafting here is in line with existing precedent under the Banking Act 2009 and reflects the approach taken for similar powers, such as enforcement powers. We think it is appropriate to provide for dispute settlement on a case-by-case basis through regulations.

Noble Lords have tabled a number of amendments relating to parliamentary scrutiny of and procedure on the transfer regulations. In particular, the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, have tabled amendments which would change the parliamentary procedure for the principal share and property transfer powers, continuity obligations and enforcement powers from negative to affirmative. I understand the concern expressed by the noble Lords. From the outset, I reassure all noble Lords that the Government take parliamentary scrutiny extremely seriously. For that reason, we have ensured that a number of substantial powers in the Bill, such as the compensation and tax powers, are subject to the affirmative procedure. However, the Government consider that changes to the procedure for transferring powers would adversely affect the Government’s ability to effect a smooth transfer where necessary in the public interest.

Steel is fundamental to the UK’s industrial base and our national resilience, making it critical to secure supply. Any delays, especially in a non-consensual transfer, would prevent the transfer from taking place, particularly if the transferer was unco-operative. I draw noble Lords’ attention to the recently published report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which did not raise any cause for concern about these powers, including the level of parliamentary scrutiny attached.

To set out the necessity for the negative procedure for these powers, I will discuss them in turn. I will address Amendments 13 and 14 together as they seek to amend the procedures for the share and property transfer powers respectively. It is important that the principal transfer powers can be exercised with speed and operational and legal certainty. The Government expect that, if these powers were exercised, it would be in a fast-moving, commercially sensitive situation. The affirmative procedure would introduce a substantial delay, creating a vacuum in ownership. Such uncertainty would significantly affect the business, particularly the supply chains and third-party contracts.

Amendment 15 seeks to amend the procedure for continuity obligations. The continuity obligations in the Bill are essential to ensure that the company continues to operate as normal following the transfer, minimising disruption and maintaining operations at the steel undertaking. This is achieved by imposing obligations on residual steel undertakings and their group companies to ensure that all services and facilities required by the transferred business continue to operate as normal. Any changes to the procedure would affect the effectiveness of the transfer. The Government’s primary objective with this provision is to ensure a smooth transfer of ownership. As I have set out, it is imperative that there be no delay to any transfer of a steel undertaking into public ownership.

Amendment 18, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, aims to amend the procedure for enforcement regulation. Clause 45 gives the Secretary of State the power to make provision in regulations for the enforcement of obligations under the share and property transfer regulations. As with the other amendments, if the Government consider it necessary to enforce obligations, they must do so at pace. Any delay in using these powers risks interrupting the transfer process and reducing its effectiveness.

For those reasons, the Government do not consider these amendments necessary. However, I have reflected on the argument made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. While it is critical that the Government are able to preserve their ability to enforce as necessary, there is a reasonable rationale for further parliamentary scrutiny. I cannot accept this amendment but I will consider this issue further, ahead of Report.

The noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, have given notice indicating their intention to oppose Clause 50 standing part of the Bill. That would remove the modification power in Clause 50. This power is not taken lightly, but it is a necessary measure to ensure that the transfer powers under the Bill can be used effectively. The clause has precedent because the same power was used in the Banking Act 2009 to resolve complex companies in the financial sector. Given that the transfer powers would be used only in circumstances where a public interest test was met, it is crucial that the Government have the necessary tools to ensure that any such transfers can be implemented effectively to deliver the intended outcome.

The powers in Part 1 of the Bill interact with commercial, company and insolvency law. This is the law that normally governs the consensual acquisition of companies or of their businesses. The legislative environment is therefore varied and complex and, because general legislation was not designed with compulsory transfers in mind, as the Bill envisages, there will be some tension between applying the Bill’s powers to a steel undertaking and the highly complex private law that it will inevitably cut across. The clause therefore provides a necessary power to modify other laws that may ordinarily interact with a transaction of this nature in order to integrate the Bill’s powers into the existing legislative and commercial landscape.

The use of the modification power is limited to the purpose of enabling the transfer powers to be used effectively. It is not a general power to amend legislation; it is targeted and limited. It cannot be used in isolation from the use of powers in respect of a particular steel undertaking to amend or disapply laws, and it cannot be used to amend the Bill—or Act—itself. In the absence of these powers, there is a real and significant risk that the Secretary of State could not fully and effectively implement a transfer. This could result in an ineffective or incomplete transfer to public ownership, affecting a company’s ability to continue operation. If a smooth transfer is not achieved, the public interest aims could be undermined.

I turn to the potential retrospective effect of the power. The Bill permits it to be applied retrospectively but does not require it. Preserving the possibility of applying this power retrospectively anticipates circumstances in which the transfer powers may need to be exercised at pace and in which there may be limits on the ability to conduct the level of due diligence necessary to support acquisition. Similarly, it may not be possible to identify all legislative interactions in the transfer scenario before making a transfer. This may mean that any secondary legislation made under the transfer powers may not fully affect the transfer that was intended. In such circumstances, it would be necessary to address this through the modification power, with the modification backdated to the time of transfer. The use of the power will be subject to the affirmative procedure unless there are particular circumstances that justify the Secretary of State proceeding on an affirmative basis, likely due to time pressures.

I hope that I have provided some clarity on the need to include the provision, and its retrospective effect. For these reasons, I respectfully ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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I am happy to give that commitment in our further conversations.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

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My Lords, my apologies: I was asleep at the wheel, much like the England defence. I rise to speak to Amendments 16 and 17 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral.

I thank the Minister for his letter on Clause 44 and for meeting us to discuss the Bill and the ways in which it may be improved. I welcome his confirmation that the Government’s intention is for workers’ pension benefits to remain unchanged, but where the Bill gives the Secretary of State powers to modify or apportion pension rights and liabilities, transfer accrued rights between schemes, and amend scheme terms, workers and pensioners need more than an assurance of present intent. They need a clear legal safeguard, which my Amendment 17 would provide. It would ensure that regulations made under Clause 44 could not reduce the value of accrued pension rights or benefits, nor make the terms on which benefits accrue less favourable in future.

Amendment 16 addresses consultation and engagement. It would require the Government to consult affected undertakings, pension trustees and managers, scheme members and beneficiaries, trade unions, the Pensions Regulator and the Pension Protection Fund, and to have regard to the interests of members and beneficiaries, including the protection of accrued rights and the security of benefits. The Minister suggested that full consultation before the use of these powers may not be realistic where urgent action is required. We understand the need to avoid delay where a transfer must take place swiftly, but urgency cannot mean that pension stakeholders are simply bypassed. If consultation cannot practically take place before a transfer, will the Minister commit to a prompt and meaningful consultation afterwards, and in any event before any further pension regulations are made? Will he also confirm that the Government will engage formally with the Pensions Regulator, the Pension Protection Fund, trustees, scheme members and their representatives, so that any necessary arrangements are made to protect members’ accrued rights and the long-term security of their benefits? I beg to move.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade (Lord Leong) (Lab)

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My Lords, before I start, I am sure all noble Lords want to join me in wishing the England team the very best for the rest of the match this afternoon.

First, let me thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for his contribution and his amendments. Amendment 20, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, would require the Government to provide a statement to Parliament outlining the value of contingent liabilities and the steps they would take to minimise taxpayer exposure to them before an intervention. As I have set out previously, the Government are somewhat constrained in the procedural steps they can take before exercising the power in the Bill. This is why the transfer powers are exercisable by regulations subject to a negative procedure. We will likely be operating in a fast-moving commercial environment where intervention needs to be done at pace, and negative procedure transfer regulations do not require prior parliamentary approval before they take legal effect.

It is not appropriate to publish details of a private company’s contingent liabilities prior to nationalisation. If a steel undertaking is brought into the public sector, its financial position will rightly be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, including the publication of its annual report and accounts. Of course, the Government will take steps to minimise taxpayers’ exposure to liabilities wherever possible. Any decision to exercise the transfer powers will be subject to the usual principles of Managing Public Money and government approval processes.

Amendment 17, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, seeks to prevent any pension regulations from reducing accrued pension rights or benefits or worsening future pension terms. I thank the noble Lord for his amendment and understand his concerns that the Bill may adversely affect pension rights, benefits or terms for employees. I reassure the noble Lord that any use of these powers would be considered on a case-by-case basis, with the primary objective of ensuring alignment across pensions. These powers give the Government the flexibility to achieve this. Any changes to the terms would likely be due to regulatory changes where pension terms may need to be standardised or contributions adjusted. The Government would seek to consult regulators, unions and employees, where possible, on any future changes.

Amendment 16 seeks to require the Secretary of State to consult with affected steel undertakings and affected pension stakeholders before exercising the pension powers. To address the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, perhaps it would be useful to set out the Government’s intent behind Clause 44. Clause 44 is essential for managing the consequences of a transfer for pension schemes and for employees’ rights under a pension scheme. It enables the Government to make provision for pension schemes where the steel undertaking is or was an employer.

These powers are necessary and give the Government flexibility on a case-by-case basis to make suitable provision for pensions during the transfer. For example, the provision would enable the Government to modify terms in the event of regulatory changes where pension terms may need to be standardised upon transfer or contribution minimums adjusted. It also gives the Government flexibility on a case-by-case basis, if needed, to consider a fair division of pension liabilities between the transferer and transferee in complex transfers.

In the case of British Steel, if, after Royal Assent, the Government decided that nationalising British Steel was necessary in the public interest, this power would not be required. To the best of our knowledge, British Steel has a defined contribution scheme, so there is nothing to transfer or leave behind.

In relation to the requirement to consult before exercising these powers, I reassure the noble Lord that, wherever possible, the Government would seek to consult with regulators. However, a statutory duty to consult could delay the transfer of the pension schemes, causing uncertainty and concern among employees. That is exactly what the Government are trying to avoid. For those reasons, I do not consider this amendment necessary and ask for it to be withdrawn.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

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I am grateful to the Minister for his answers and to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for correctly pointing out that I neglected to mention Amendment 20 on contingent liabilities. We will come back to that.

As regards Amendments 16 and 17, I am grateful for the Minister’s commitments, particularly on consultations where possible. Perhaps we could explore in another forum what potentially that will mean in practice. People’s pensions are their future and their security. It is vital that the Government ensure that workers’ pension rights are properly protected—I have no doubt at all that the Minister agrees with that—and that the relevant experts, regulators and representatives are fully consulted as these powers are exercised. We are merely trying to explore how that is done. I look forward to picking up that subject again in the future. For the present, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 16.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Hunt, Lord Fox, Lord Redwood and Lord Wigley, for their contributions. I am very grateful that the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Fox, are raising important questions about the future structure and operations of any steel undertaking that may be brought into public ownership under the Bill.

Before addressing their specific amendments, I should make this very important point: no decision has been made in relation to any particular steel company. Any decision to exercise the powers in the Bill can be made only after the Bill has received Royal Assent and only if the statutory public interest test is satisfied.

With that important caveat, I turn to the specific amendments before the Committee. Amendment 21, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, would place a duty on the Secretary of State to secure a private buyer for any nationalised steel undertaking at the earliest opportunity. As a matter of corporate governance, however, we would expect responsibility for exploring future ownership options to rest with the company’s board and chair, working closely with Ministers, rather than being imposed as a statutory duty on the Secretary of State. More fundamentally, I reassure the Committee that the Government share the amendment’s underlying objective. As we made clear in the steel strategy, the long-term future of the UK steel industry depends on attracting sustained private investment.

Public ownership is not an end in itself; it is a means of safeguarding a strategically important asset when exceptional circumstances require government intervention. The Government do not envisage a steel undertaking remaining in public ownership indefinitely. Our objective would be to stabilise the business, restore its commercial viability and place it on a sustainable footing so that it is well-placed to attract private investment in due course.

That said, timing is critical. A company requiring nationalisation is, by definition, unlikely to be an attractive investment on day one. It will first need financial stability and operational improvements, and in many cases a revised strategic direction, before credible private investors are prepared to commit significant capital.

Throughout that process, Ministers and the company’s leadership would remain in close dialogue about its long-term future, including the most appropriate ownership model and opportunities for private investment when the conditions are right. I hope this reassures noble Lords that the Government’s ambitions align with the intent behind this amendment. We are happy to consider further whether there are appropriate ways to make that position clearer, but we do not believe that placing a statutory duty of this kind in the Bill would improve its operation.

I turn finally to Amendment 23, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, which would require the Secretary of State to publish a jobs and industrial transition strategy after the exercise of the principal transfer power. I fully appreciate the purpose of the amendment. If the Government were required to intervene to safeguard a steel undertaking, Parliament would rightly expect a credible plan for its future. The Government share that objective. However, the success of any nationalised steel undertaking will ultimately depend on strong commercial leadership, not on a strategy prescribed by legislation.

One of the Government’s first priorities would be to appoint a board and an executive team with the expertise, commercial experience and vision to restore the business to long-term sustainability. The detailed strategy for the company’s future—including its workforce, investment, operations and industrial transition—should therefore be developed by that leadership team in close partnership with Ministers, rather than being imposed from Whitehall via a statutory reporting requirement. That approach provides the flexibility to respond to changing commercial circumstances while ensuring that the company is run on sound business principles.

That said, I recognise the importance of parliamentary scrutiny. When a steel undertaking enters public ownership, Parliament should have appropriate opportunities to understand the company’s strategic direction and to hold the Government to account for its stewardship. I am therefore happy to reflect further on the most appropriate mechanisms to provide that transparency. I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising these important issues. I hope I have provided assurances about the Government’s approach. For the reasons I have set out, I respectfully ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

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My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for this amendment. He is quite right to point out that decisions about the future of a steel undertaking affect a wide range of sectors that rely on secure domestic supply, including defence, construction, advanced manufacturing and critical national infrastructure.

National security has, rightly, featured prominently throughout our debates. If the Government are relying on that argument to justify the exercise of these exceptional powers, it is surely right that those with responsibility for defence and critical infrastructure should have a voice in the wider policy discussion. The number of workers potentially affected in the broader and wider supply chain, as cited by both the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and my noble friend Lord Redwood, is staggering.

It is difficult to argue that the steel-using community is really being consulted, as the noble Lord, Lord Fox, pointed out; that is certainly true of the representations we are getting from members of that community. I urge the Government on this occasion to have a careful think about what this amendment is trying to achieve. It recognises, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, has pointed out, the importance of the workforce and of local communities. Workers, their representatives and local authorities will understand better than most the consequences of a transfer for jobs, skills, supply chains and of course the local economy. It is difficult to see how the Government can judge properly what is in the public interest without hearing from the workers, communities, industries and strategic sectors most affected by the decision. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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My Lords, I am pleased to inform noble Lords that we have equalised—so come on, England!

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Redwood, Lord Wigley and Lord Sharpe, for their contributions. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for tabling Amendment 22, which would require the Secretary of State to consult a stakeholder advisory committee before determining whether an intervention under the Bill was in the public interest. I fully understand the motivation behind the amendment. Decisions of this significance should be informed by expert views, and I have considerable sympathy for the desire for strong parliamentary and stakeholder engagement.

However, as I said in relation to earlier amendments, the Government cannot support a statutory precondition of this nature. The powers in the Bill are intended for exceptional circumstances in which events may be moving quickly and decisive action is required. Introducing a mandatory consultation process before intervention could delay action at precisely the moment when speed is essential to protect jobs, safeguard strategic capability and secure the future of a steel undertaking. In some cases, a delay could undermine the very purpose of the intervention.

Nor do I believe that establishing a statutory advisory committee is necessary to ensure that the Government receive expert advice. My ministerial colleague, Minister McDonald, regularly maintains contact and extensive engagement with the sector through a wide range of established forums. This includes the steel council, the steel council working groups, the metals circularity group and a programme of industry round tables. Alongside those formal structures, Ministers and officials regularly meet with steel producers, downstream users, trade associations, trade unions, recyclers and other stakeholders throughout the supply chain. These relationships provide the Government with a detailed understanding of the opportunities and challenges facing the sector and ensure that policy is informed by those with direct operational experience.

I am also pleased to inform the Committee that we will shortly be inviting the UK Metals Council, which I understand is the largest downstream user group, to join the steel council, so we are reaching out to downstream users too. This will strengthen the representation of downstream users and ensure that their perspectives are fully reflected in future discussions about the sector.

The Government firmly believe that sustained engagement with industry is essential to delivering our steel strategy, but there is an important distinction between ongoing engagement and creating a statutory procedural hurdle that could impede timely intervention when the national interest requires it. For those reasons, while I fully recognise the amendment’s intent, I do not believe it would improve the Bill and I therefore respectfully request that the noble Lord withdraw it.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

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My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for tabling these amendments, which raise an important point of principle. Where the Government are taking a steel undertaking into public ownership, the environmental, pension and other contingent liabilities which may fall on the taxpayer should be clear to Parliament and, of course, to the public. The Minister in the other place suggested that further disclosure was unnecessary because the Government already had a reasonably good understanding of the potential liabilities and that the independent valuer would take them into account, but that is not the same as ensuring that Parliament can see the likely costs before compensation is paid and further public money is committed.

I was very taken with my noble friend Lord Redwood’s comments about the environmental impact. From memory—and I might have this date wrong—I think the oldest of the blast furnaces dates back to 1939, so it is inconceivable that that site is not contaminated in some way, which we probably do not have any accurate historical records for.

I have also recalled the reason why I was a bit lukewarm on my own Amendment 20. I hate to say this, and I hope I never have to admit it again, but it is rather because I preferred Amendment 27 from the noble Lord, Lord Fox—a shocking admission to have to make.

Environmental remediation, pension obligations and historic liabilities can amount to very substantial sums. The Government are using taxpayers’ money, and Parliament should be able to scrutinise the liabilities assumed alongside the compensation and support provided. For those reasons, the amendments make a valuable contribution to transparency and accountability, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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My Lords, just to update the Committee, we are 2-1 up.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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Harry Kane, thank you.

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, has several amendments in relation to the compensation provisions in the Bill. I appreciate his careful attention to detail, which is a key aspect of this Bill, and will respond to the points raised in order. I will preface these points by noting that, if introduced, compensation regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, thereby providing opportunities for parliamentary scrutiny.

Amendment 27 is on the approach to environmental liabilities in the compensation process. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, has indicated that this would prevent the payment of compensation until the independent valuer has delivered to the Secretary of State a written estimate of the environmental liabilities of the steel undertaking in question and the Secretary of State has published that estimate and laid it before Parliament.

It is important that the independence of the valuation process is maintained. It is not appropriate for the inputs to the valuation exercise to be disclosed before the valuer reaches their determination. This may risk exposing the independent valuer to undue pressure while they are still deliberating on an outcome, thereby undermining the independence and fairness of the compensation scheme. None the less, the Government would have the power to direct the independent valuer to consider environmental liabilities in their determinations of compensation. We also intend to allow the final compensation determinations to be made public, including any consideration of environmental liabilities carried out. There is an opportunity for further parliamentary scrutiny, as the compensation scheme regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, allowing all Members to debate the specific framework set at that stage.

Amendment 24 would prevent the payment of compensation until an estimate of liabilities arising from the environmental and health and safety matters under Clause 54(4) is provided to Parliament. An important principle of the compensation process is that it is assessed independently to ensure that affected parties are treated fairly. The proposed amendment would begin to erode this independence by making the payment of compensation contingent on parliamentary scrutiny of one of the factors that would inform the outcome. It is therefore not feasible to proceed with the proposed amendment. As a general point, compensation scheme regulations would require the independent valuer to consider environmental liabilities as part of the assessment. Additionally, in the event that a steel company is nationalised, we would expect it to publish an annual report setting out its financial position, including any liabilities.

I now turn to Amendment 28. The noble Lord has tabled a similar amendment that would require the Secretary of State to publish an estimate of the pension liabilities of the relevant steel undertaking before compensation is paid. I understand the concerns the noble Lord has about taking on unknown liabilities and putting undue pressure on the public balance sheet. If the Government decide to nationalise British Steel, subject to the public interest test, I can reassure the noble Lord that the Government would not be taking on a large contingent pension liability. The company’s pension scheme is a defined contribution scheme with a pot funded by contributions made by the employees and the company over time. In other cases, the pension scheme may be based on different arrangements, but we have built flexibility into the Bill to address these circumstances on a case-by-case basis.

The pension power in Clause 44 allows us to adapt to regulatory changes, standardise terms and adjust contribution minimums. Where necessary, it also allows for consideration of a fair division of pension liabilities between the transferor company and the government corporation. This follows the approach in the Banking Act. Where relevant, pension liabilities will form only part of the picture in the valuation exercise, and publishing them in isolation without the wider context would not be helpful. As I have already mentioned, following nationalisation we would expect contingent liabilities to be included in the company’s annual reporting.

I am more sympathetic to the noble Lord’s Amendment 25, which would require that the compensation regulations provide for the appointment of an independent valuer in all cases to determine compensation. The current wording makes it discretionary whether an independent valuer is involved in any given case. In practice, it is very likely that the Government will consider it fair to provide for an independent valuer to be established in compensation scheme regulations to consider any compensation for a transferor. The clause is currently discretionary because there could be situations where independent valuation is not required. For example, where the Government and the transferor agree on a sum, it would be unnecessary for the legislation to require that an independent valuer be engaged. However, I will reflect further on the noble Lord’s points and consider how I expect to return to this on Report.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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I will have to write to the noble Lord, because I do not have specific information on that particular pension scheme.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

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My Lords, in moving this amendment, I will speak to Amendments 33 to 35, 40 and 41 standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral. These amendments address a basic question: if the Government are to provide financial assistance under these powers, what limit is there on the liability being placed on taxpayers? I heard what the Minister had to say in the previous group, but I will carry on regardless and probe a little further.

Clause 58 permits financial assistance in an exceptionally broad range of forms. This could be grants, loans, guarantees, indemnities, the acquisition of shares or assets, contractual payments or other expenditure. It is additional to any other funding powers available to Ministers. Yet the Bill contains no overall financial ceiling, no requirement for advanced detail to Parliament and no explicit statutory value-for-money test.

We understand the need for urgent support, but the Government’s stated objective is not permanent public subsidy but a viable, competitive, private sector led future for British Steel. That requires a business capable of attracting investors with capital, commercial expertise and a long-term commitment. To achieve that, public support must be disciplined, transparent and as limited as is consistent with the securing of the strategic objective. Otherwise, the Government risk creating a perverse incentive: a prospective purchaser may conclude that it need operate the business efficiently enough only to maintain access to public support, rather than to establish a genuinely sustainable commercial future. This would be an indefinitely subsidised business model, with the taxpayer carrying the risk.

Amendment 32 would place a £2.5 billion limit on financial assistance until August 2029. That figure reflects the Government’s own stated steel funding envelope in the steel strategy. Amendment 33 would provide a further test of proportionality by limiting assistance over five years to £1 million per employee. It is intended to ensure that support is targeted at transformation and viability, rather than becoming a substitute for a credible business plan.

Amendment 34 would require a detailed statement to Parliament before assistance is provided. Parliament should know the amount, form and recipient of support, its intended purpose and expected effect, and any conditions, repayment arrangements, guarantees, indemnities or other liabilities attached to it. That is particularly important where exposure may not appear as a simple cash grant. Guarantees and indemnities may create significant liabilities that only crystallise later. Taxpayers should not be asked to accept those risks without clear disclosure.

Amendment 35 would ensure that the Secretary of State is satisfied that financial assistance represents value for money. Value for money does not just mean ignoring strategic capability, national security, skilled employment or supply chain resilience. Ministers must weigh those against the costs, the liabilities, the alternatives and the likelihood that support will lead to a competitive business capable of standing on its own feet. In the other place, it was rightly argued that, if the Government believe in this intervention, they should be willing to set limits on it. Without such limits, taxpayers are simply being asked to sign up to an unlimited liability. The Government have already been providing working capital support and have been in discussion with potential private sector partners. Therefore, they should now have a clearer understanding of the likely financial assistance required, the risks involved and the route to a sustainable outcome.

I turn to Amendments 40 and 41. The Government have been providing monthly updates on working capital being provided to British Steel since the passing of the Steel Industry (Special Measures) Act 2025, which is welcome. It should be the same for financial assistance if British Steel, or indeed any steel undertaking, is nationalised. I beg to move.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions on this group. I will address each of the issues raised in turn. Amendments 32 and 33, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, would impose a cap on the amount of financial assistance the Government could provide under the Bill. Amendment 32 seeks to place a statutory cap of £2.5 billion on financial assistance until 15 August 2029. Amendment 33 would apply a cap on a different basis, relating to the number of employees in a steel undertaking.

Imposing a fixed cap of any kind on financial assistance would risk constraining the Government’s ability to respond effectively to evolving circumstances. It could ultimately undermine the very objectives the Bill is designed to achieve, namely the protection of our domestic capability in a strategically vital sector. The Bill contains proportionate and robust measures to ensure transparency and accountability in the provision of financial assistance. Clause 59 requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament every 12 months on the use of financial assistance. Furthermore, as I am sure all noble Lords will know, any financial assistance provided by the Government will be subject to the established framework for managing public funds, including HM Treasury approval processes, departmental accounting officer responsibilities, and reporting to Parliament through the usual public spending controls.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

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My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response, and I agree with him that the focus must be on operational challenges. But I think the Minister will have agreed very much with what my noble friend Lord Redwood said about cash flow. The Minister is a businessman and will know exactly what my noble friend was talking about. Therefore, the focus should not be solely on operational challenges; there obviously also has to be a very keen focus on the cash position. I would have thought that the transparency we are suggesting would aid the Government in that.

If one month is not right, as per Amendment 40, I am happy to have a conversation about what might be. But we think that 12 months is far too long a gap between reports. Far be it from me to help the Government in this regard, but I would have thought that it would minimise the potential for political shocks if there was a more of an ongoing dialogue with the British public about the state of play in any entity that is nationalised, as opposed to one-off bombshells on an annual basis—but I will leave that for the Government to ponder.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for his helpful comments about asymmetry—he is correct. I believe the Government’s heart may be in the right place on all this. We want to see growth, we want to see investment, and we want to secure jobs in the steel sector, but we are ultimately talking about taxpayers’ money. That is why we think there must be clear limits and proper discipline around this financial assistance. Support should not be simply open-ended with no clear ceiling, no transparent statements of exposure and no statutory tests of value for money. We would welcome further discussions with the Minister on how the Bill can better reflect those safeguards but, for the present, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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My Lords, I am grateful for all the contributions in this group of amendments.

Amendment 38 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, would require the Secretary of State, before providing any financial assistance, to put forward a proposal to Parliament for doing so, setting out the underlying details. The amendment stipulates that a Select Committee would have 90 days to provide any recommendations on the proposal before it can proceed. I respectfully suggest that this amendment is not realistic, given that financial assistance may need to be provided immediately following a transfer. It is unlikely that there would be time for the parliamentary scrutiny envisaged by this amendment without imposing significant risk to the continued operation of the steel undertaking. I appreciate the noble Lord’s intention in tabling this amendment but, for the reasons I have outlined, I ask that he does not move it.

Amendment 36A would require the financial assistance power in Clause 58 to be exercised by regulations specifying the purpose and estimated costs. I understand the desire for further parliamentary scrutiny of the costs that might be incurred in relation to an intervention in a steel undertaking. The Government have been transparent about the costs incurred to date as a result of the intervention in British Steel under the special measures Act. Estimating future costs relating to nationalisation is more challenging because they would depend on decisions not yet taken about the future operation of a particular steel undertaking.

I hope I can provide reassurance by emphasising the extensive controls over expenditure that would apply by default. If these provisions are used, the Government would need to consider the potential range of costs and make the usual value-for-money tests under the accounting officer. These spending processes are subject to ongoing parliamentary scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee. The Permanent Secretary to the Department for Business and Trade appeared before PAC last week to discuss steel.

As with Amendment 38, I am concerned that this amendment does not reflect the operational realities of a potential intervention. It is likely that there would be urgent and immediate pressures to draw down on the financial assistance spending power to maintain operations in a way that would not be conducive to the set-up of the secondary legislation process. However, I understand that the noble Lord would like us to go further in this respect, and I appreciate the constructive engagement we have had on this and other issues. I will of course consider whether anything more can be done to give him the reassurance he desires.

Amendment 41A, also tabled by the noble Lord, would require the Secretary of State to make a Written Ministerial Statement every three months on the progress of any publicly owned steel undertaking. I am sympathetic to this amendment and recognise Parliament’s interest in the Bill’s impact on the steel industry, employment and public finances. That is why the Bill requires the Government to produce an annual report on financial assistance under it and the company will publish its annual report and accounts. I do not think reporting every three months for as long as a steel undertaking remains in public ownership is necessary. However, the principle is sound and the noble Lord made some excellent points. I recognise that our current reporting commitments may not encompass the full scope of his amendments. I ask him not to move the amendment, and the Government will consider this further before Report.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

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My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 47 and 48 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral. These amendments address two costs which bear directly on the viability and competitiveness of a transferred steel undertaking: the carbon border adjustment mechanism and the United Kingdom emissions trading scheme.

Amendment 47 would exempt a transferred steel undertaking from the carbon border adjustment mechanism in respect of iron and steel goods imported for use in its business. Amendment 48 would disapply the United Kingdom emissions trading scheme in relation to installations forming part of such an undertaking. These amendments go to a wider question which has run throughout our debates: whether the Government’s approach will genuinely secure steel-making in this country or simply add further costs to an industry already exposed to intense international competition.

The Government’s impact assessment on the free allocation review makes the point. It accepts that reducing free allocations increases businesses’ exposure to carbon costs. It accepts that energy-intensive industries producing globally traded commodities are particularly vulnerable because they cannot simply pass those costs on to consumers. It also recognises the danger of carbon leakage—production, investment, jobs and emissions moving overseas, rather than emissions genuinely being reduced. The assessment says that the traded carbon price could be approximately £25 per tonne lower by 2030 if free allocations do not fall in line with the industry cap.

This is a policy choice, and it has consequences for industry. The steel sector has warned of the effect of reducing free allocations. It has described the proposed changes as an “earthquake moment”. The Government must listen to that warning. CBAM can affect imports into the domestic market; it does not protect a United Kingdom producer competing in export markets. Moreover, higher costs can be passed down the supply chain to downstream manufacturers, reducing their competitiveness and risking the relocation of activity and jobs abroad.

We have now seen the Government introduce new trade measures with substantial tariffs and lower quota volumes. The Minister in the other place, Chris Bryant, said:

“We are determined to make sure that we have a proper steel production industry in the UK, and that means that we have to take some tough measures”.—[Official Report, Commons, 30/6/26; col. 767.]


But thus far the tough measures appear to fall on downstream manufacturers and therefore, inevitably, on British consumers. The Government cannot impose new trade barriers and costs on those who use steel while also increasing carbon costs for domestic producers, and then claim to have solved the competitiveness problem. When will they get tough on the ideological net-zero policies which are imposing substantial costs on the steel industry?

The Government need to make a clearer choice. Do they want a steel sector which can compete, invest and employ people in the United Kingdom, or do they want to continue a policy framework which makes domestic production more expensive and pushes activity overseas? This is particularly important as they pursue electric arc furnace production. If they want greener steel, they must ensure that the electricity required to make it is available at a competitive price. It is no good requiring industry to electrify while maintaining a policy environment in which power and carbon costs make that transition commercially unviable.

The Government should not use nationalisation to shield themselves from the consequences of their own industrial and environmental policies. They should instead create the conditions in which steel can be produced competitively in Britain, with lower energy costs, realistic carbon policy and a serious commitment to preventing industrial activity leaving our shores. I beg to move.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, for their thoughtful amendments on the UK emissions trading scheme and the carbon border adjustment mechanism and their impact on the steel sector.

A common theme across these amendments is the proposal that a publicly owned steel undertaking should be exempt from one or both of these measures. I understand the concerns that have been raised about the sector’s competitiveness and the costs faced by steel producers. However, I must be clear that the Government cannot support this approach. We remain firmly committed to industrial decarbonisation and to securing a competitive, sustainable and low-carbon future for the UK steel industry. The UK cannot build a resilient steel sector by exempting it from the very policies designed to support the transition to cleaner production and to create a level playing field against higher-carbon imports.

The UK emissions trading scheme and the carbon border adjustment mechanism are complementary policies. Together, they encourage investment in cleaner production, while ensuring that UK producers are not undercut by imports from countries with lower environmental standards. Exempting a publicly owned steel undertaking from these measures would not only undermine those objectives but create an uneven regulatory framework within the UK steel sector. With this in mind, I will turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt.

Amendment 47 seeks to exempt a publicly owned steel undertaking from CBAM. I understand the noble Lords’ concern that CBAM will increase the cost of imported products for steel undertakings. However, I emphasise that the CBAM’s purpose is to ensure that imported carbon-intensive goods face comparable carbon prices to those of domestically produced goods. It will give industry the confidence to invest in the UK, knowing that its decarbonisation efforts will not be undermined. CBAM makes no exemptions for particular UK firms. Its intent is to target the problem of carbon leakage and ensure that highly traded carbon-intensive goods from overseas, including steel, pay a comparable carbon price to that paid by UK manufacturers.

Amendment 48 seeks to exempt a publicly owned steel undertaking from the emissions trading scheme. I am sympathetic to the fact that this also imposes a cost on activities that have significant emissions. However, as with Amendment 47, accepting Amendment 48 would provide preferential treatment based on ownership and undermine a level playing field across the industry. The transition to low-carbon steel must be fair, credible and consistent across all operators, whether publicly or privately owned.

I emphasise that the ETS includes targeted protections for energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries, including steel. Further protections will be introduced through CBAM from 2027. It is for these reasons that I cannot support these amendments and ask that they not be pressed.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

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I am very grateful to the Minister, but I have to admit that I am very disappointed in his response, and I wonder if he is a bit disappointed in the response that he had to give. It seems to me that you can either have decarbonisation or have a competitive steel industry, but at this precise moment in time you cannot have both; at this precise moment in time, they are mutually exclusive. That is not to say that we should not pursue net zero in the future—of course, we should—but this is a particularly exposed industry at a particularly critical time.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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My Lords, the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, have tabled a number of amendments regarding the deregulation of the steel sector. These amendments focus on three core areas of regulation: industrial action, environmental regulations and reporting, and company reporting.

I recognise the concern from noble Lords that any publicly owned steel undertaking will face a significant array of reporting requirements. That is true, and the Government believe that these are necessary to ensure that any publicly owned company operates in a similar way to its privately owned counterparts. Any publicly owned steel undertaking must protect its workers’ rights, fulfil its environmental obligations and transparently report on its progress.

At the outset, I make the general point that a company under public ownership is ordinarily treated as a public corporation—that is, it is run as a private company with an independent board of directors, operating under broad strategic direction from Government Ministers. It is right, therefore, that such a company is subject to the regulatory frameworks within which any similar private company operates. I also emphasise to noble Lords that amendments seeking to level the playing field within the steel industry are inconsistent with that position. Instead, the amendments in this section seek to give preferential treatment to publicly owned steel undertakings.

I will now address the amendments directly. I believe that Amendments 50 to 52, 54 and 55 are intended to address the noble Lord’s concern that the Government’s industrial decarbonisation policies could impose additional costs and burdens on publicly owned steel undertakings. In summary, these amendments seek to exempt publicly owned steel undertakings from a number of statutory requirements, including greenhouse gas reporting, the energy savings opportunity scheme, energy and carbon reporting, forest-risk commodity due diligence, and climate-related financial disclosures. Although I recognise the noble Lord’s concern that there is a range of requirements on the steel sector with regard to environmental reporting, I cannot support these amendments.

The reporting requirements the Opposition have identified are integral to this Government’s commitments to decarbonising our industries. Our steel strategy set out a vision for a move towards green, decarbonised steel production. We are committed to supporting the sector in achieving those objectives, as evidenced by the £500 million of funding to Tata Steel for the development of its electric arc furnace in Port Talbot.

A public steel company, no more than any other steel company, should not be exempt from these important transparency requirements. Accepting these amendments would undermine the intent of the Government’s industrial decarbonisation policies, creating an unfair system for other domestic steel producers. The Government are committed to revitalising the entire UK’s steel industry, not only the companies in public ownership. Alongside this, the Government believe that these requirements are critical to industrial decarbonisation and to meeting net zero.

Finally, I will address Amendments 49 and 53 together, as both seek to exempt a publicly owned steel undertaking from existing corporate reporting requirements. Amendment 49 would disapply the strategic reporting requirements under Chapter 4A of the Companies Act 2006, while Amendment 53 would remove the requirement to publish information on executive pay ratios.

I recognise that the purpose of these amendments is to reduce the administrative burden on a publicly owned company. However, the Government do not believe that public ownership should entail lower standards of transparency or accountability. Indeed, if a steel undertaking is brought into public ownership, there is an even greater expectation that it should operate openly and be subject to appropriate public scrutiny. That is why the Government expect any publicly owned steel undertaking to comply with the standard reporting obligations that apply to comparable public corporations. Its annual report and accounts should provide Parliament, taxpayers, employees and the wider public with a clear and comprehensive overview of the company’s financial position, operational performance, governance and remuneration arrangements.

Transparency is not merely a regulatory requirement; it is an essential part of maintaining public confidence. It supports effective parliamentary scrutiny, promotes sound corporate governance and demonstrates that public assets are managed responsibly. It also serves a practical commercial function. Should the company seek external finance, strategic partners, or, in due course, a return to private ownership, prospective investors and creditors will rightly expect access to robust, reliable and consistent corporate reporting. Maintaining those standards will enhance rather than diminish the company’s long-term prospects.

For all these reasons, the Government believe that a publicly owned steel undertaking should be held to the same high standards of openness and disclosure as comparable public corporations. Public ownership should set the bar for transparency, not lower it. I therefore hope I have explained why the Government cannot support these amendments, and I respectfully invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

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I rise to speak to Amendment 11 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral. It is vital, as we have said throughout our consideration of this Bill, that there is clarity about the liabilities which may be acquired when the Government exercise a principal transfer power. That is particularly important in relation to environmental liabilities. Steelworks are substantial and long-standing industrial sites and any environmental liabilities associated with the transfer could represent a significant future cost to the taxpayer.

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for his amendments in this group, which rightly focus on the need to consider the public finances. We have consistently raised the issue of the costs associated with share and property transfers and pension liabilities when compensation is assessed. I thank the Minister and the Government for their engagement on these amendments, and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say and hope that at least some of these amendments will be accepted.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade (Lord Leong) (Lab)

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My Lords, before turning to the amendments before us, I begin by placing on record my sincere thanks to the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe, Lord Hunt and Lord Fox, for the constructive and collegiate way in which they have engaged throughout the passage of this Bill. We have not agreed on every point, but their contributions have been thoughtful, serious and rooted in a shared recognition of the importance of the UK steel industry. I am grateful for the time they have taken to meet with me to test the Government’s position and, for raising their concerns in such a fair and friendly spirit.

Responding to the points raised in this group, I will speak first to Amendments 7 and 9 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox. Over the course of this Bill’s passage, I have had ongoing and constructive conversations with the noble Lords, Lord Fox, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, about the cost of nationalisation and the importance of parliamentary scrutiny. The noble Lords and I agreed that the Government must consider the costs of any nationalisation before exercising the powers. As I have stated to this House previously, existing public spending governance controls provide for this, with cost and value-for-money considerations embedded in the Managing Public Money principles and the well-established process of accounting officer tests.

However, the noble Lords have sought a statutory requirement on the face of this Bill. Through our conversations, I have been persuaded by their arguments, and I am pleased to say that the Government will support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, which requires the Secretary of State to consider costs before exercising the share or property transfer powers in Clauses 4 and 15. We hope the House will agree. Our agreement on this issue reflects the commitment of noble Lords to ensure that this Bill is as comprehensive and effective as possible. It is an excellent representation of this House’s ability to work collaboratively, and I thank the noble Lords, Lord Fox, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, for their engagement on this issue.

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, has also put forward Amendment 1, which would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the public finances when considering exercising the principal transfer powers. Given that the purpose of this amendment is achieved through Amendments 7 and 9, I do not think this is necessary in addition.

The noble Lords, Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Hunt of Wirral, have tabled Amendment 11, which would require the Government to provide a statement to Parliament outlining the value of contingent liabilities associated with a steel undertaking, and the steps taken to minimise taxpayer exposure to them, prior to an intervention. As I have set out previously, I have concerns about creating additional hurdles that must be cleared prior to the exercise of the transfer powers, given the likely need to act at pace. There is also a practical difficulty in publishing the details of a private company’s financial information prior to a nationalisation. None the less, the Government share the desire of the noble Lords to minimise the taxpayer’s exposure to liabilities as far as possible, and that will inform our decision-making. If a steel undertaking is nationalised, we would expect its annual report to include details of its liabilities, where relevant. We will discuss liabilities again in later groups today, and I look forward to that discussion. I hope that that helps to clarify the matter and provides the noble Lords and the rest of your Lordships’ House with sufficient reassurance.

Amendment 24, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, requires that where the Government have exercised the transfer powers, the independent valuer must prepare a written estimate of a steel undertaking’s pension liabilities and provide that to the Secretary of State, who should then publish the estimate before Parliament. Pension liabilities will of course differ for different companies. If the Government were to decide that it was in the public interest to nationalise British Steel, I reassure noble Lords that our understanding is that there would not be significant pension liabilities, as the company has a defined contribution scheme and so pensions would be funded from an existing pot. In cases where pension liabilities are relevant to the value of a steel undertaking that is subject to the powers under the Bill, the independent valuer should consider that as part of their assessment. None the less, publishing this in isolation would be unhelpful without the full context. The Government have already committed to publishing the outcome of any compensation scheme. Therefore, I do not consider this amendment necessary.

I hope I have been able to reassure noble Lords, even though there are amendments in this group that I do not support.

Lord Leong (Lab)

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My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions to this debate. Noble Lords have highlighted that the public interest test in Clause 2 is a vital part of the Bill and I very much agree. It is important that we get it right. Noble Lords have tabled several amendments to this clause and we have had fruitful discussions on them at previous stages, but I am happy to return to them.

Amendment 2, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, would limit the public interest factors that could be considered by the Secretary of State to those explicitly set out in statute in Clause 2. As I have set out previously, the Government agree that these are likely to be the most pertinent issues in relation to an intervention in the steel sector. We have sought to strike a balance in the Bill between minimising the scope as far as possible and ensuring that we can adapt to evolving circumstances. That is why we think it is necessary to retain some flexibility to consider other factors that may be relevant to a particular case, which may be difficult to anticipate.

Let me be clear that the legal test in this clause places particular emphasis on the factors that are explicitly set out. Where the Government seek to rely on other factors, they will need to be satisfied that those factors mean that an exercise of the powers is necessary in the public interest. I therefore do not consider the amendment necessary and respectfully ask that it be withdrawn.

Amendments 3 and 5, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, would create procedural steps that would need to be fulfilled before the transfer powers are exercised. Amendment 3 would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent assessment of whether the public interest test has been met and for that assessment to be met prior to using the powers. Amendment 5 would require the Secretary of State to provide details of the criteria used to demonstrate the public interest. Both are difficult to reconcile with the likely circumstances under which the powers could be exercised. The Government will likely need to act at pace to deliver an effective transfer. However, the Government will commit to publishing a Written Ministerial Statement following an exercise of the principal transfer powers, which would include details of how the public interest test has been met. I hope that provides some reassurance to the noble Lords, even if we cannot meet the full ambition of their amendments.

Finally, Amendment 4, also tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, would require the Secretary of State to be satisfied that the exercise of the transfer powers would represent value for money for taxpayers. The Government are mindful of the potential costs that could be incurred in relation to the nationalisation of a steel company. This consideration is already taken into account in government decision-making under the usual public spending processes, as I have set out previously.

Additionally, as we discussed in the previous grouping, the Government are supportive of Amendments 7 and 9 from the noble Lord, Lord Fox, which would require the Secretary of State to consider costs prior to the exercise of the principal transfer of powers. These amendments go some way to addressing the concerns raised by the noble Lord Hunt, and I hope that will provide some reassurance.