My Lords, I find myself in a rather unusual position. On most defence issues, it is very easy for the Liberal Democrat defence spokesperson to agree with the Official Opposition, and to find that the Minister will also be saying very similar things. On most issues, we find ourselves saying how vital the defence of the realm is, and that we are broadly on the same page, with a few minor differences.
On this issue, however, there seems to be such a clear difference of opinion between the Official Opposition and the Government Benches that I will ask only a few clarificatory questions for those of us who are not Privy Councillors, have not been briefed on Privy Council terms and are therefore unable to express the effusive views on the importance of Diego Garcia that the noble Earl, Lord Minto, mentioned the Secretary of State had expressed. For anyone who read the Statement delivered in the other place just before Recess, the Secretary of State was indeed crystal clear about the importance of Diego Garcia to the security of the United Kingdom.
The Secretary of State particularly made the point that the deal is vital because we retain control over Diego Garcia, but he also pointed out how important it is as a joint US-UK military base. So what role does the United States play on Diego Garcia? I realise that the Minister may feel that this is privileged information that he is not able to articulate in open session, but we need to understand what is going on with our relationship with the US in this regard.
The noble Earl, Lord Minto, said that the only people who are really in favour of this are the Chinese, yet the Secretary of State pointed out that none other than Pete Hegseth, Secretary of State Rubio and President Trump have said that this is a “very long-term” and “very strong” deal. So whose interests is it in? Is it in the UK’s national interest or is it primarily about the US’s interest?
Finally—because I want to give the Minister time to reply—this deal has apparently been two and a half years in the making. His Majesty’s Government have been in office for only 11 months. That means that, for over a year and a half, the negotiations were under the Conservative Government. What has changed between the two Governments to make one party now think that this is a vital deal, and the other implacably opposed?
My Lords, I thank the noble Earl, Lord Minto, for his comments and the articulate way in which he presented an opinion that I do not agree with. But that is the point of scrutiny and that is the point I am making back to the noble Earl. Whatever the process is, that he could stand here so that we can debate this—and others will debate it—is important to democracy and the way our country works. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for her comments.
The Government’s position is quite clear: none of us disagrees that Diego Garcia is of huge significance and importance to the geopolitical security of us and our allies, in particular the United States. The discussion is about the best way of securing that base for the future. The Opposition’s point of view is that there is no legal jeopardy, that we can carry on ignoring the ICJ’s judgment, because it was just advisory, and that we may reach a point when a binding judgment is made. The question then becomes whether we ignore only binding agreements, if we get to them.
That was clearly what the previous Government were wrestling with. In answer to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, it is clearly why, at some point, officials and Ministers under the previous Government—under Rishi Sunak if not before—decided that they needed to negotiate and discuss the future of the Diego Garcia base with Mauritius. Otherwise, what was the point of those negotiations? Were they just a delaying tactic: “We’ll just negotiate and pretend that we’re discussing something when we don’t mean it”. I can see the noble Earl’s noble friend shaking his head, but the consequence of what the noble Earl said is that the previous Government were negotiating with a country with no intention of coming to any agreement. I do not believe that. As much as I do not agree with much of what the last Government did, I do not believe that the lack of integrity in Ministers or officials was such that they would have done that. So I believe that negotiations were going on about the best way forward, and this Government have come to the conclusion that there is judicial or legal jeopardy in allowing the situation to continue.
I will try to cut my remarks short to make sure that Back-Benchers get a proper opportunity. We negotiated a treaty, which will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny when it comes before Parliament to be debated. That treaty guarantees, with many conditions, the security of Diego Garcia. Our international partners are far from disagreeing. I will read what Secretary Hegseth said for the noble Baroness—and yes, the US is a really important partner for us on Diego Garcia. Of course it is. We work really closely with the US on this, and we make no apology for that.
Pete Hegseth said:
“Diego Garcia is a vital military base for the US. The UK’s (very important) deal with Mauritius secures the operational capabilities of the base and key US national security interests in the region”.
Secretary Rubio said:
“Today, the United States welcomed the historic agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Mauritius on the future of the British Indian Ocean Territory—specifically, the Chagos Archipelago”.
Canada said:
“Canada welcomes the signing of the Chagos Archipelago sovereignty agreement”.
Australia said:
“Australia welcomes the signing of the historic agreement between the UK and Mauritius”.
I will tell the House what I would do if I were China: I would say what a brilliant agreement it is to sow confusion, upset people and cause people to debate it. I will tell the House what I want: I want this country and our allies to determine what we should do and to tell China that we are going to act in what we consider to be our own interests, irrespective of what it might say to try to disrupt us.
New Zealand said:
“As a strong supporter of the international rules-based system, New Zealand welcomes the agreement”.
India said:
“We welcome the signing of the treaty between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Mauritius”.
So, far from us being an international pariah because we have signed this agreement, many of the most important countries in that region have welcomed the deal because it confirms the security of that base.
We are worried about the law of the sea. The noble Earl asked about that situation. We do not have to share information about actions taken from Diego Garcia in advance of us taking any action. I say that on the record because the noble Earl specifically asked me about it. We do not have to let Mauritius know in advance about it and then potentially share that information.
The Government Actuary says that the cost of the treaty arrangements is £3.4 billion over the lifetime of the treaty. If the noble Earl and others want to take issue, let them argue with the Government Actuary, because that is the way that all Governments throughout the past few decades have costed government projects in this sense, so we are not changing that or moving any goalposts.
The noble Earl talked about the Chagossians. This was a UK-Mauritius state treaty discussion, but the Chagossian community itself is not united in its response. On 22 May, two prominent Chagossian groups—the Chagos Refugees Group and the Chagossian Committee Seychelles—said that they regretted the legal action that aimed to halt what could be a landmark agreement that serves the long-term interests of Chagossians as a whole. That is Chagossians commenting on this agreement.
The argument I put on behalf of the Government is that, far from undermining the base’s sovereignty in terms of its operational independence, and our ability to use Diego Garcia in the way we would all want—to protect our national security and defend our global interests—we have negotiated a treaty that is subject to parliamentary approval, which gives it the scrutiny the noble Earl would like, strengthened it and ensured that we protect our national interests and those of our friends and allies, including the US.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for the Statement. He is right that this gives a long-term future to a strategically vital base not only for this country but, as he read out with his quotes, for our Five Eyes partners. China is being used as an example of why this is a bad deal. Does he agree that Mauritius’s main interlocutor in the region is not China but India, and that if China were to do anything in that region, India would certainly have something to say about it?
I thank my noble friend. He is right. That is why I read out what the Indian Government said about the treaty and the agreement that has been reached. They say clearly:
“The formal resolution of the longstanding Chagos dispute through this bilateral treaty is a milestone achievement and a positive development for the region”.
I for one am pleased that the Indian Government have made such a positive statement, in the face of some comments.
My Lords, if the military base on Diego Garcia is just as important to the US as it is to the UK, was the US ever asked to split the costs of leasing it back?
I am not sure of the answer to that, but I suspect not. All I can say with respect to this is that, whatever the payment is that the UK Government are making, through the MoD and the FCDO, to the Mauritian Government for the use and protection of the base, we should be clear that the US’s ability to use the base, with its equipment, its facilities, and the soldiers, airmen and sailors of its military, is the massive contribution that the US makes to it. Whatever arrangements we have, the fact that the US and the UK are standing together on that base sends a massive signal to China, the rest of those who stand against us and our adversaries. We are a proud country. We are going to stand with our friends, and we will deter those who seek to undermine us.
My Lords, may I perhaps inform the Minister? He is, of course, right that the previous Government engaged on this in good faith to try to seek a resolution. The reason why it could not be agreed, as has been said before in your Lordships’ House, was the principal issue of security. I visited at the behest of a previous Prime Minister and directly met the Prime Minister of Mauritius. One assurance that he could not give me at that time was about the long-term security of both the maritime waters and the Diego Garcia base. Linked to that, my specific question is about the other islands that make up the British Indian Ocean Territory. What assurances and, indeed, guarantees are there that there will not be a separate negotiation on them?
My Lords, I know that the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, will have negotiated in good faith. I know too that if there had been an agreement that he felt was in the national interest then he would have recommended to his Government that it should be supported.
The point that I am making is that the principle was established that negotiations were happening to see what arrangement or agreement, if any, could be made between the UK and Mauritius with respect to Diego Garcia. This Government’s judgment is that we have reached such an agreement. The noble Lord is quite right to point out the security guarantees that we have. He will know that in the treaty there is a 24-mile buffer zone around the island, and the US and the UK can veto any development within that zone. He will also know that there is a further exclusion zone beyond that encompassing the rest of the islands, which means we can prevent development that we are opposed to there as well. That is why we felt we could sign an agreement containing the sorts of security guarantees that the noble Lord himself sought but did not manage to achieve, and therefore did not feel there was an agreement that he could come to or recommend we agree to. We feel that we have guarantees that will protect the integrity of the base by excluding others who would seek to undermine it.
My Lords, the Statement twice refers to guaranteeing the UK full continued control over Diego Garcia for the next 99 years and beyond. What is the exact legal position that the Government have negotiated regarding the situation beyond the year 2124, which, after all, is little more than a single lifetime away? What concerns me is that the wording available to the public suggests that any extension depends entirely on obtaining the agreement of the Mauritian Government at the time, which does not sound much like a guarantee of full UK control of Diego Garcia beyond 99 years.
The noble Lord will know that, in addition to the 99 years, there is in the treaty an option for a further 40 years. He will know the importance of respecting a treaty, which is a legally binding agreement between two Governments, whether through an international court, national courts or sovereign Governments themselves. The important principle is that what is in the treaty is what has been negotiated. As far as I am concerned, we will ensure that the treaty is respected, and that is the legal basis on which we go forward.
I support all that my noble friend has had to say about the significance of the islands to our defence and that of our allies, but these kinds of exchanges tend to be very much about high politics. We should remember—and even though it has been said before, it needs to be repeated, preferably from the Front Bench here—that this cannot be done without a reflection on the gross abuse that took place all those years ago to the people of the Chagos Islands. There were shocking stories about Chagossians who were on holiday when the takeover took place and the military base was established who were unable even to get back into their own homeland. I really feel that there should be some additional statement from my noble friend on precisely what this deal does for the people who inhabited those islands and their descendants. I know there are differences of opinion, but what exactly will the rights of Chagossians be as and when this deal is ratified?
On the rights of the Chagossians and what happened in the past, of course there is a lot to be regretted about the situation that occurred and what has happened with the Chagossians. The Chagossians in the UK, primarily in Crawley, receive support from the UK Government to facilitate their living here. The treaty provides £40 million for a trust fund to be set up for Chagossians living in Mauritius. Notwithstanding what I think is my noble friend’s point about resettlement and the opportunity to return, this was a UK-Mauritius agreement to protect the long-term integrity of the Diego Garcia base, and alongside that we have tried to provide some support for Chagossians whether they live in the UK or Mauritius.
Successive Governments of all political backgrounds have behaved disgracefully towards the Chagossians. I presided in a case for the Court of Appeal in which we were unable to help the Chagossians but learned a great deal—I am talking about 20 years ago—about what had happened. What the Minister has not said is whether any Chagossians will be allowed to return to the other islands.
Rather than misinform the noble and learned Baroness, let me check that—I am not 100% certain of the particulars on the return of Chagossians to other islands. If she will allow me, I will check that, write to her and, with due respect to everybody, put a copy of that in the Library.
My Lords, following on from that question, there seems to be no guarantee in this agreement that Chagossians will be able to return to any of the islands. I understood that that was going to be in the agreement. Perhaps the Minister can tell me where I can read up, because obviously I am ignorant on this as I can see nothing that shows why Mauritius has such a claim on the Chagos Islands.
I will copy the letter that I said I would send to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, directly to the noble Baroness. Diego Garcia has been regarded as part of Mauritius. It is something that Mauritius has links to. It is recognised through the international order. As part of the negotiations that have taken place, we have negotiated with that Government to come to an agreement around the future of Diego Garcia.
The noble Baroness will know, with the interest she takes in security matters, that it is important for the Government to ensure the future of the Diego Garcia base. That is protected under this treaty. That is a hard and difficult position, and sometimes Governments have to make those decisions. The alternative would be a situation of judicial jeopardy and the future of the base would be uncertain. People are quite able to oppose that deal, but their position would be to let us continue with a situation that is uncertain and where there is judicial jeopardy. We think and believe that an agreement that protects the future of one of the most important bases in the world for our geopolitical security is something that—if we can agree it, and we believe we have—is worth agreeing. It protects the base, and that is the all-important principle to which we have adhered.
My Lords, I came to this matter with an open mind. I have listened to the arguments on both sides, and I have some background in the region. I conclude that the Minister has made his case on this matter.
I thank the noble Lord very much for that. That means there are two of us in this Chamber. For any journalists reporting this, that is a joke—just to ensure we have clarity. Seriously, I thank the noble Lord. At the end of the day—this is the point about scrutiny—the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, has done nothing but shake his head the whole debate. There is a legitimate debate and discussion to take place. The noble Lord has articulated a point of view that says this is essentially a sell-out. I take the view that, on the contrary, it is nothing like that. It is a Government taking seriously their responsibility to try to come to an agreement in difficult circumstances, as we have heard from some of the questions, and negotiate with the Mauritian Government to protect a base of huge, vital strategic significance.
The noble Lord does not agree with the vital strategic significance, but we have sought to protect it through a treaty that we believe helps guarantee that and will guarantee it. For those who oppose it, I repeat that there is judicial jeopardy and no certainty that the base can be protected. The idea that we can just ignore international judicial opinion and not worry about where that may take us is not the right way forward. The challenge the noble Earl made, and the one I have heard time and again, is that nobody supports this and it makes us a pariah internationally. I read out statements from many of our most significant partners and allies, including the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and India. All those countries said they support the arrangement and the deal we have come to.
The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, may propose a fatal Motion—he is entitled to do it; I am not saying he should not, and he will anyway. My point is that Secretary Hegseth, Secretary Rubio, the Indian Government, the Japanese Government, the Australian Government, the New Zealand Government and many others all support it. Those who oppose the deal will have to say why they are opposed to something supported by all those. They will say, “Because China is the real voice”. Let me say this: China can say what it wants. This Government know the malign influence of China, as the previous Government did. None of us needs any lectures about standing up to the Chinese, and we will.
Perhaps I might take the Minister back to the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, about the wrong that was done to the Chagossians, and the agency and will of the Chagossian diaspora population. The Minister said at the beginning that they were divided, which is of course true—they are not a single block. I think it would address concerns on all sides of this House if this deal were made subject to a consultative referendum among the Chagossian population. Noble Lords may say that that is difficult to do because they are scattered—some are in the Seychelles and some are in Mauritius—but it is not logistically impossible. I voted not long ago on who should be the next chancellor of the University of Oxford—I voted for the noble Lord, Lord Hague—and there were people on five continents for that. You establish your credentials and then you vote, so I do not think it would be logistically unfeasible. If the Chagossian people voted for it, I think people would get behind it. Will the Minister consider giving a voice to the people who have more at stake here than anybody else?
I thank the noble Lord for his question. The answer is no. The British Government have made, and will make, their case. The treaty that has been agreed will be subject to parliamentary approval, and there will be a debate on it. No doubt the noble Lord will be able to put forward that point of view at some point. But the British Government have taken a decision on the basis of our national security and the geopolitical security of that region and beyond. Let us be clear: some of what happens at Diego Garcia has implications reaching far beyond the region, and the noble Earl, Lord Minto, the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, and many others here will know that. The geopolitical significance of Diego Garcia is not linked just to that region; it has a global impact. As the noble Lord will know, Governments sometimes have to make very real and difficult decisions and, in the interests of the geopolitical needs of our nation and those of our friends —to combat China and others—we have taken the decision to ensure, through this treaty, that we protect the integrity and future of the Diego Garcia base so that it can continue to operate in the interests that we all share: democracy, human rights and the international rules-based order.
The fact that the Minister has made this case so effectively raises a question about what happens next. With great respect, I do not think he has answered the question about what happens when the treaty comes to an end. I cannot imagine that the needs of security will come to an end. Are we to take it that the treaty says nothing about this? If so, what happens?
I will reflect on that—I note that the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, was shaking his head when I answered. I will see whether I can add anything further to the points made by the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley. Clearly, the treaty lays out 99 years, with the 40-year further option on that. If the noble and learned Lord is asking me what happens at the end of 139 years, I will reflect on that so that others who may follow me can consider their options in 139 years’ time.
I will clarify my question. My understanding, from what I read—which is available to the public—is that the Mauritian Government have to agree even to the 40-year extension, let alone what happens at the end of that 40 years.
I will clarify that. I tried to be open and frank in answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I will reflect on that and whether I need to write to the noble Lord to ensure that we have correct factual information. We may differ on opinions, but it is important that we have factual information in front of us. If I need to, I will write to the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, and put a copy of that in the Library, as well as giving a copy to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, just for clarity’s sake.