(1 day, 13 hours ago)
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17:11 - Division on Amendment 326 - Ayes: 41 / Noes: 181 - Amendment 326 disagreed.
Lord Lucas
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment introduces subsection (6A) inserted by another Lord Lucas amendment.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, before we go through the listed amendments, I would be grateful if I could make a short intervention.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has been called to move his amendment. The debate will proceed from there.
Lord Lucas (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 318 I will speak to the other amendments in my name. Amendment 318 is a revised and strengthened version of a proposal that was kindly spoken to in Committee by my noble friend Lord Blencathra. It has been modified in light of comments made then, particularly from the Government Benches. It bears on disqualifying persons convicted of a serious cycling offence.
I suspect most of us, particularly those of us who spend any time in London, have experienced the enormous discomfort of being ridden past on the pavement at speed by a cyclist who has absolutely no interest in your comfort. If one has spent any time outside this Palace, one will also have noticed that the police have no interest in enforcing the law in these circumstances. It is up to us to do something to tighten the screws on cyclists like this. They make life for pedestrians extremely uncomfortable. The practice of continual and open law- breaking just brings the whole of the law into disrepute. It is really important that we tighten things up.
Amendment 319 would insert a new offence of riding or attempting to ride a cycle while disqualified. Such an offence requires accompanying sanctions. A licensing system seems to me entirely disproportionate; it would be a heavy weight of bureaucracy. I prefer the solution adopted by the Government in their approach to cycling offences in the Bill, which is to leave them to be enforced if circumstances allow—for instance, where somebody has been involved in a serious incident that the police have taken an interest in, or a member of the public makes a complaint that the police choose to follow up. That would sit easily with current policing practices. Continuing enforcement along these lines, though limited, would, if and when a prosecution or conviction was reported in the media, send a warning message to disqualified cyclists generally.
Turning turn to Amendment 321, the thrust of Clause 121 is to bring cycling offences pretty much into line with those applying to motor vehicles, but it leaves out disqualification. This is a missed opportunity to provide a substantial deterrent to offending. Proposed new subsection (9A), to be inserted by Amendment 321, prescribes that the period of obligatory disqualification for the two most serious offences of causing death or serious injury by dangerous cycling will not be less than five and two years, respectively. As for the other two offences of causing death or serious injury by careless or inconsiderate cycling, where the culpability is less, they will be subject to obligatory disqualification for not less than 12 months.
Proposed new subsection (9B) extends the definition of “disqualified” so that it can apply to cycles in a manner that is in conformity with the wording of the new cycling offences already created by the Bill. Amendments 323 to 325 add “obligatory” to the entries inserted by subsection (11) in Part I of Schedule 2; without them the amendment of Section 34 set out in Amendment 321 would be of no effect.
Amendment 333 would prescribe the penalties and mode of prosecution for the offence created by Amendment 319, and it inserts a new schedule containing minor and consequential amendments to the Road Traffic Offenders Act which is fine-tuned as it applies to persons disqualified for riding a cycle. Sections relating only to mechanically propelled vehicles are omitted.
As someone who frequently obstructs and remonstrates with pavement cyclists, I very much hope that my amendments will attract the support of the Government. I approve of the other amendments in this group and will listen to them with great interest. I beg to move.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I rise to speak to the amendments I propose. There are three sets affecting two themes. Amendment 343 is about the registration scheme for cyclists, and the two other groups—Amendments 326 to 328, and Amendments 330 to 332—are about creating a system to award points for offences committed by cyclists against their driving licence. They have the same theme, which is trying to get more accountability for cyclists when they hurt people or commit offences.
I do not intend to take as much time as I did in Committee, because I think the argument is fairly straightforward and the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has made it. In 2015, 444 pedestrians were injured by cyclists; in 2024, that had increased to 603 and, of that number, those seriously injured had risen from 97 to 181. These numbers are based on police reporting, where the police attended. It is clear that these are minimum numbers. As a correspondent reminded me recently, it is not a legal requirement for the police to record an accident that occurs between a cyclist and a pedestrian, because it does not involve a motor vehicle. The numbers do not include incidents where the police did not attend a collision, where the pedestrian did not need medical treatment or attend their GP or a hospital— I think we have a serious gap in that information as well, because the data is not recorded well or collected at all—or where the police were not told.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I will speak in particular to Amendments 341 and 342 in my name but I support all the amendments in this group, which are on the same theme. Earlier today I met with the Motor Insurers’ Bureau, which takes this issue very seriously indeed and has made the point that privately owned e-scooters are illegal to use on public roads and spaces in the UK. They are classified as motor vehicles under the Road Traffic Act 1988 and therefore require insurance, registration and a driving licence, none of which is available for private e-scooters. That is why it is so important that we legislate for this area of the law.
The most recent figures show that fatalities and injuries caused by e-scooters and e-bikes increase year on year. Where there is no insurance for these vehicles, those of us with motor insurance all contribute to the Motor Insurers’ Bureau from which claims are made. While I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, for inserting two clauses from my Private Member’s Bill—it would be churlish of me not to acknowledge that; it shows that sometimes we Back-Bench legislators can achieve things—two outstanding clauses remain in my Bill.
A number of us have tried to insert insurance into the Bill to help this situation and have been told that it is not part of this Bill, so I am trying to do it in another Bill. In the context of that other Bill, the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill, I will just say in passing that there is a real issue here, because there is no definition of micromobility vehicles. It is incredibly important, for the purposes of motor insurance and of this Bill in creating criminal offences, that we are using the same definition in law. It is not acceptable to rely on one road traffic Act from 1988 for one definition and a later road traffic Act for another definition. When the Road Traffic Act 1988 came into effect, e-scooters did not exist. I am waiting to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, whether there is a definition that we can put forward in the context of that Bill.
The purpose of Amendments 341 and 342 is to fill the gap. At the moment, we do not know the extent to which e-scooters and e-bikes are being tampered with. It may be that a rented scooter could be perfectly law-abiding, but, although we have had endless pilot schemes, we have not had their results. Meanwhile, illegal e-scooters are being used for purposes for which they are not fit. That is why I urge the Government today to accept Amendment 341, which calls for a review to understand the way in which e-scooters are being potentially misused.
Equally, in Amendment 342, it is incredibly important that we have an annual report on cycling offences. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who has done a great deal of work on this and managed to achieve a level of enforcement, by going out in the City of London—and I pay tribute to the work that the City of London Police do in this regard. There are other police forces doing work in other parts of the country, but I find it staggering that the Metropolitan Police do not have a target of impounding or chasing illegal users in this way.
I am going to come forward with a proposal in a different Bill, possibly my own Private Member’s Bill in the next parliamentary Session. The police may not have the ability to do this, but if an e-scooter or souped-up e-bike is parked, or berthed, and it is clearly illegal, traffic wardens should be trained to slap a fine on them or even confiscate them and take them away, to make sure that these illegal vehicles are taken off the road.
What worries me at the moment is that the Government do not know what they are dealing with. Separate departments are dealing with this issue—for example, the Department for Transport is encouraging people to use e-bikes and e-scooters to get to work, without considering that that has an impact as the level of casualties goes up. According to government data, in 2024 there were 1,339 casualties involving e-scooters; 32% of the injuries were serious and there were six fatalities. The statistics have got worse every year since recording began. We can clearly show that fatalities, injuries and casualties are increasing every year. It could happen to one of us, being knocked down on a pavement or crossing the road, as my noble friend Lord Lucas referred to.
It is unacceptable that the Motor Insurers’ Bureau is left to pick up the pieces when it comes to insurance. If someone has been incapacitated through such injury, a claim can run to millions of pounds to make sure that that individual has the required care for the rest of their life.
The time is right to grab this issue, take it very seriously and plug the two remaining gaps that I have identified with Amendments 341 and 342, along with the other amendments in this group.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 344 on tackling the growing danger posed by food delivery couriers. There are moments in public policy when the evidence becomes so overwhelming, and so consistent across press reporting, academic research and lived experience, that Parliament has a duty to act. The dangers created by high-speed food delivery couriers, many riding illegally modified e-bikes, operating under intense delivery pressure, and too often treating pavements and pedestrian zones as racetracks, now fall squarely into that category.
The Department for Transport tells us that it will do a big consultation on this issue, lasting many months, if not years, but across the country the public can see what is happening. They see it on their high streets, in their neighbourhoods and, increasingly, in their hospitals. One of many published reports state that
“illegal or modified high speed e bikes + gig pay incentives = higher risk behaviours and more collisions, producing rising public complaints and a measurable clinical burden on hospitals”.
That is not rhetoric; it is the lived experience of communities across the whole United Kingdom.
The BBC’s reporting from Lincoln described the city centre as a Wild West, with delivery cyclists riding on pavements and through pedestrianised areas, leaving residents unsafe. Trauma surgeons have warned of a massive burden on orthopaedic services from e-bike injuries, with more severe fractures and complex operations becoming routine. Academic research from UCL confirms that gig economy riders—those working for the very companies that my amendment addresses—are more likely to speed, run red lights and use their phones while riding, and are more likely to be involved in collisions.
Lord Shinkwin (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 344A in my name, which neatly follows on from that of my noble friend Lord Blencathra. I begin by saying how grateful I am for the expressions of support from across your Lordships’ House when I introduced this amendment in Committee. I particularly appreciated the empathy from noble Lords, because it showed that the fear I have is real. It is a fear that is caused by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling to people who perhaps have a mobility impairment like mine, or a visual or hearing impairment, or even to people who are not necessarily in the prime of life.
I also thank my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower, who said in Committee:
“Holding companies responsible, or at least requiring a public review of their practices, would help deter irresponsible riding and shift the burden back on to the companies that profit from high-speed delivery models. A review … would also allow us to examine the employment models used by these companies, the incentives placed on riders and the adequacy of training, supervision and enforcement mechanisms. It would provide a valuable evidence base for any future legislative change”.—[Official Report, 17/12/25; col. 747.]
I agree, and I am grateful for his support, as I am for that from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who in Committee made the important point:
“At the very least, this review might want to consider that an employer”—
or indeed contractor—
“could do more positive things than just employ sanctions. They could start to educate their cyclists and reward them for better behaviour”.—[Official Report, 17/12/25; col. 742.]
I also welcome the insightful comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, who said in Committee that
“the challenge is that most riders and scooters … are not employees of these companies, whose legal advice is that they do not want to go anywhere near that, because then they may be responsible for their cyclists’ or motorcyclists’ behaviour”.
Surely that is all the more reason for a review that includes contractors, as my amendment proposes. I thank the noble Baroness for acknowledging that the group of committee amendments in which my amendment was placed
“raise an important safety point”.—[Official Report, 17/12/25; col. 746.]
It is wonderful to know that our Lib Dem colleagues are so supportive of disabled people, and I look forward to hearing that they will follow through on their warm and very welcome words by supporting my amendment.
My third point is that, like the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, I am avowedly pro cycling. I believe that cycling is a good thing: I just happen to believe that responsible cycling is even better for pedestrians, for all road users and, most importantly, for cyclists themselves. Responsibility is the issue that lies at the heart of my amendment. What right-thinking person would disagree with the theory that every cyclist should cycle responsibly? Yet we know that there is a widening chasm between theory and practice. We know that, in practice right now, there is a culture of “anything goes”. As we heard earlier in the debate on this group, a culture of complete impunity is taking root, with the most frightening but inevitable consequences.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the dangerous, careless and inconsiderate behaviour of bicycle couriers, who career through red lights and along pavements, and the wrong way down one-way streets, with increasingly reckless abandon. It is the behaviour of what some noble Lords have described as “the worst perpetrators”—bicycle couriers—that my modest and reasonable amendment seeks to address.
The amendment would require the Home Secretary to institute a review
“assessing the effectiveness with which operators of bicycle courier services ensure”—
or, for legal clarification, take steps to ensure—
“that their employees and contractors conduct themselves on the roads in such a way as to avoid committing the offences in section 121”.
The review, which must be published within a year of Clause 121 coming into force, would recommend any changes to the law that it determines are necessary. The rationale for this amendment is similarly simple. It seeks to probe how the law can be changed to ensure that companies that contract the services of bicycle couriers bear some shared responsibility for the conduct of these cyclists on the road.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I rise to reiterate the concerns I expressed in Committee about the havoc being created by speeding cyclists, e-cyclists and e-scooters—a Wild West, as I have said before, particularly on London streets. I was nearly run over again this week in the Haymarket, and my next-door neighbour was told yesterday by a speeding cyclist, whom she upbraided outside her house and on our pavement, that he was an undercover policeman. More must be done, and I hope the Minister will give full consideration to all the amendments in this group, of which I am supportive.
I hope noble Lords will understand that I will keep my comments extremely brief. I say to the Minister that I welcome the new offences already in the Bill, which, as we have heard, reflect my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering’s previous Private Member’s Bill, but she is right, with her Amendments 341 and 342, to seek a review of electric scooter misuse and an annual report on cycling offences. My noble friend Lord Shinkwin has also proposed a review. We must keep up the pressure on the often-helpful noble Lord, Lord Hendy, and his Department for Transport so that we can deliver safer streets and safer pavements.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, we covered these matters pretty thoroughly during discussion of a number of amendments in Committee. As we are now on Report, I shall get quickly to the nub of the issue that I should like to discuss, which reflects a lot of what my noble friends Lord Blencathra and Lord Shinkwin have already said. I say at the outset that I am pro-bicycle and pro-cycling, but I am anti-law-breaking. We have a very serious situation at the moment.
I support this broad group of amendments. In particular, we have a problem with the use of illegally powerful e-bikes and those used by professional delivery companies. There are real benefits from e-bikes being used; it is much better for the environment, for all sorts of reasons, that e-bikes or bicycles are used rather than mopeds and two-stroke engines and so forth. It is a big step forward. The debate should not be characterised as anti-cycling—it is pro-cycling—but the technology has moved so fast that the general public perhaps do not always understand what is a legal or an illegal e-bike. The evidence appears to be that the police either do not spend too much time thinking about it or do not see the enforcement of the use of illegal e-bikes as a priority.
Every speech that we heard in Committee and have heard on Report was very supportive of that—very few views were expressed that did not make it feel as if there was a particular problem, apart perhaps from the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Katz, when he summarised the debate on 17 December, saying:
“We of course recognise the concerns about the behaviour of delivery riders, but it is harder to find firm evidence to suggest that their behaviour is so demonstrably worse than that of other groups that it is necessary to single them out for review”.—[Official Report, 17/12/25; col. 748.]
If we took a straw poll around the Chamber right now, I am not sure that he would find a huge amount of support. If he came out with me and the noble Lords, Lord Shinkwin, Lord Blencathra, Lord Lucas, and others one evening to have a look, we might be able to provide him with evidence in person pretty quickly.
The law is being ignored. If these were mopeds without number plates, I feel that the police would intervene quickly. The vehicles used have the performance of mopeds but are not regulated in the same way—they do not carry registration—and they are used to ride the wrong way up one-way streets, for example, in a way that I fell motorcycles are not. The general public see the law being flouted, and that is being normalised, which is a difficult and dangerous situation. These riders are agents or contractors of large delivery companies, which need to take responsibility for the fact that people operating under their flag or banner and doing their business for their commercial gain are routinely breaking the law; that is being ignored by delivery companies and not pursued with vigour by the police. When we had this discussion in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Katz, was generally sympathetic but reluctant to take action.
A number of different approaches have been suggested by noble Lords, but the theme seems to be the same. Members of the House who have spoken are not saying that their particular solution is the be-all and end-all, but they recognise that there is a problem that needs to be addressed. The status quo is not working, so when the Minister comes to respond, the House would be very much in his debt if he were to give a clear indication of the degree to which he feels there is a significant problem. If he does not like the approaches being put forward in these amendments, he needs to be able to suggest what is going to change in order to give the House some comfort that the Government are actually taking this seriously.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I declare that I am a cyclist. I came in this morning and, as noble Lords can see, survived in one piece, miraculously. Secondly, I have to declare that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, saw me dismounting from my e-bike as I arrived, as he put it, prosaically, in front of our “prison gates” the other day. I actually dismounted when I was on the pavement, because I thought it was safer than doing it in the road, and he came towards me at considerable speed. I sometimes wonder if his own electric chariot is within the prescribed speed limit. One often thinks, “Is it a bird? Is it a plane?” and it is actually the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, going down one of our corridors at great speed.
I hate to interrupt this discussion because, from observation, your Lordships are most happy when discussing three particular issues: ourselves, which we enjoy enormously, and we go on at great length; potholes, which really gets your Lordships going; and dangerous cycling. At the root of this is behavioural psychology. The law is there. In repeated statements over the last 10 years, I have heard different Ministers—usually the junior ones, not the senior ones, because they get the short end of the stick—responding by saying, “Well, this is illegal; this is illegal; this is illegal”, which, of course, is a huge comfort to us all, particularly since it is clearly not actually being enforced.
I think back just a few days to the, I thought, rather good victory speech of the new Green MP, Hannah Spencer. She described the feelings of the people in the constituency that has elected her, and their experience of day-to-day life and how that made them feel, and there is an echo of that as one walks or cycles around London and sees open illegality happening everywhere we look. In large part, that is because we do not have a joined-up approach. I support the intent of all these amendments; however, we are never going to actually tackle this unless we have a joined-up approach.
I gently point out to the noble Lords who have put forward these amendments, of which there are a great many, that they might have had more power had they got together prior to Report, put their names together and tried to get some support from across the House to demonstrate the breadth and depth of feeling. When it comes to a joined-up approach, I am really saying that I hope the Government will acknowledge that there are ways of dealing with this, particularly if they look at international experience.
There are five elements, proven by international experience, to a joined-up approach to deal with the problems we are discussing. The first is clarity and adequate coverage of the rules. At the moment, we have a mixture of rules dating back many years in a variety of different laws, so it is not completely clear. The second is that detection and effective enforcement beats severity. Trying to put more rules and penalties in is not going to work if they are not enforced: it is the blind leading the blind. The third element is creating infrastructure in the right way. There is the phrase, “enforcement by design”. If you design roads, pavements, et cetera, cleverly—and some countries are rather better at that than us—you avoid a lot of this, because there is no need for it to happen; but it does require a joined-up approach.
The fourth element is operator and retailer controls. We have heard quite a lot about the operators, whether they are hire companies or food delivery companies. Again, that is not adequately covered by the hotchpotch of different laws we have. Indeed, in debate on a previous Bill, many of the Government’s own Back-Benchers, particularly those with a strong union background, were somewhat horrified to hear of the ways in which these delivery companies are able to avoid the law—by a designated driver, who is the employee or the contractor, actually asking somebody else who is not employed by the company or contracted to drive for them. If that driver is caught doing something bad, the company is not liable, because that individual is not connected to the company. That is done by most of these companies, which is clearly crazy.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, this group of amendments is focusing on penalties and other measures for dangerous cycling on our streets. These Benches support a proportionate and evidence-based approach to updating the law, whereby any changes do not discourage people from cycling—considerately, of course—which we believe is an important mode of sustainable transport. The amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, once again try to disqualify cyclists for dangerous cycling. None of us likes seeing inconsiderate cycling on our streets, just as we do not like seeing dangerous or inconsiderate driving. However, we do not think these amendments are practical; they are not easily enforceable, so we will not be supporting them.
The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, looking to add up to 12 points to a person’s driving licence for dangerous cycling, are an interesting proposal, given that many people who cycle also have a driving licence. However, fewer people are learning to drive, and this would not work for every cyclist. Whether this is proportionate and right is debatable. The issue remains, as we have heard throughout this debate, that traffic policing has been facing cuts across the country and it is not a prioritised area for policing; limited enforcement is also a challenge.
We do not support the other amendments from the noble Lord, Hogan-Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, to set up a licensing scheme for cyclists and reports on cycling. We do not think they are necessary. The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the new amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, try to tackle the many problems that have arisen with the rise in the number of delivery cyclists on our streets. We have been debating this here and on the devolution Bill. Most are picking up shopping from supermarkets or fast food and taking it to people’s homes. The amendments attempt to put some responsibility in law for the company the cyclist or driver may work for, but, as we have discussed, the challenge is that they may not actually be an employee.
We all acknowledge that there are real issues in this area with emerging micromobility modes and technology and their use. But the way forward is comprehensive legislation on e-bikes and e-scooters, addressing what is legally allowed on our streets, what safety standards we expect and the rules on their use. I therefore ask the Minister when the House might expect such legislation to address the many concerns we have heard expressed throughout the passage of this Bill. This is a real issue: we all see it day in, day out. I would like to understand how the Government plan to address it going forward, beyond this Bill. Specific legislation and a joined-up approach, as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Russell, are clearly needed, rather than amendments to the Bill today. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, we have spent many hours in your Lordships’ House debating the issue of dangerous cycling and the misuse of e-bikes. In Committee, I welcomed the Government’s measures to create offences to criminalise causing death by dangerous cycling, and it is right that offences relating to cycling are brought in line with those for driving. I am also aware that there are significant concerns about criminality arising from the use of e-bikes and that courier companies are not being held responsible for the actions of their riders. There is very evidently a problem here. It is for the Government to now come to Parliament with solutions to these issues. We do not need report after report, review after review and trial after trial. We need to need to know what the Government wish to do in this space, rather than simply what they do not want to do.
Fundamentally, there is a serious problem with enforcement. A large number of laws, rules and regulations already apply. E-bikes have legally prescribed specifications and cyclists are supposed to obey the rules of the road. The crux of this issue is enforcement—or the lack of it. Cyclists frequently flout the rules of the road with impunity and owners of e-bikes are illegally modifying them to go far faster than they were intended to. This presents real and very serious concerns for public safety. It is time for the Government to act and not prevaricate. I look forward to what the Minister has to say.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, so aptly put it, cycling is one of the issues that your Lordships’ House likes to debate at length. It is an important issue and I thank everyone who has taken part in this debate: the noble Lords, Lord Lucas, Lord Hogan-Howe, Lord Blencathra, Lord Shinkwin, Lord Russell of Liverpool and Lord Davies, the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe, Lady McIntosh and Lady Pidgeon. Some of them, though not all of them, were a very interesting supporting cast at a meeting in which I very much played junior partner to my noble friend Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill. I also thank them for that. There, we had a helpful discussion about some of the wider issues about the way that we frame some of the vehicles we have been talking about this afternoon.
We can all agree on the need for all cyclists, as with motorists, to obey the rules of the road so that our roads and pavements are safe for all users. As the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, put it, we can all say—at least, I hope we would—that we are pro-cycling but anti-lawbreaking. The issue is whether the proposals in these various amendments are workable, proportionate and do not have the unintended effect of deterring cycling and other forms of micromobility.
I will address the amendments in turn. Amendments 318 to 325 and Amendment 333, from the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, would allow for persons to be disqualified from cycling upon conviction of any of the offences in Clause 121. As we made clear in Committee, our fundamental concern is that such a disqualification could not be adequately enforced without some form of licensing for cyclists. Licensing for cyclists would be both costly and complex, and would mean the majority of law-abiding cyclists would face additional costs and barriers to cycling. It is a disproportionate response, given that these new offences are to deal with those rare cases in which cyclists have caused the death or serious injury of another road user.
I do not accept that the cycling disqualification would be an effective deterrent without effective enforcement. Moreover, it would place an unreasonable burden on the police or, alternatively, raise unreasonable expectations if your Lordship’s House were to give the courts the power to impose a disqualification without an accompanying effective enforcement mechanism. It may well be the case that the only way the police could identify whether such a disqualification was in force would be if the person was found to have breached it after being involved in a subsequent incident. This would entirely defeat the purpose of the disqualification and would not have prevented another incident. It would, in fact, likely be discovered only after another incident has occurred.
I turn to Amendments 326 to 332 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, starting with the amendments that would enable a person to receive up to 12 points on a driving licence upon conviction of any offences in Clause 121. Reaching 12 points on a driving licence would result in a person being disqualified from driving a motor vehicle. Section 163 of the Sentencing Act 2020 provides a general power for the criminal courts to impose a driving disqualification on an offender convicted of any offence. In addition, Section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2026 provides courts with the power to impose a driving prohibition requirement as part of a community sentence or suspended sentence. I hope these go some way to meeting the noble Lord’s objectives.
Amendment 343, again in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, would create a registration scheme for the purpose of enforcing the new offences in Clause 121. Although I accept that a registration scheme for cycles would make enforcement of offences easier, the absence of a registration system does not, of course, make enforcement impossible. As the noble Lord will know, the police would be expected to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry open to them. As he said in his own contribution, there are some forces that are very effective at this, in particular the City of London Police, which he has direct experience of.
As with the example of licensing for cyclists that I referred to earlier, we cannot escape the likely significant cost and complexity of introducing a registration scheme for cyclists. Around 1.5 million new cycles are sold every year. No data is collected on this, but some estimates say that over 20 million cycles are in existence. It would therefore be a gargantuan task to introduce such a registration scheme, or indeed a licensing scheme. It would, for example, require all existing cycle owners, potentially including children, as well as those making new purchases to submit their information to some form of central database, and for some form of registration plate to be produced and affixed to each individual bike. Even if that were deemed proportionate, it is not realistic to suggest that detailed regulations could be delivered on this within six months of Royal Assent, as the noble Lord’s amendment proposes.
Amendment 341, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, would require the Secretary of State to undertake a review of the misuse of e-scooters, including their impact on safety and an assessment of the appropriateness of the legislation within 12 months of Royal Assent. At this point, as others have, I pay tribute to the work that the noble Baroness has done previously in this area. The safety of all road users is, of course, an utmost priority, and no one should feel unsafe on our streets. It is essential that new transport technology works for everyone. That is why we must crack down on those using e-scooters irresponsibly and in an anti-social way.
However, I do not believe that, after more than five years of running e-scooter trials, the Government should tackle that issue by undertaking yet a further review. I remind noble Lords that private e-scooters remain illegal to use on public roads, cycle lanes and pavements. Rental e-scooters can be used only as part of the Government’s national rental e-scooter trials. Last year, we announced an extension to the rental trials until May 2028, to ensure we have the best possible evidence base to inform any future legislation. We have collected some evidence, but it is still relatively new technology and there remain things we need to learn. We will use this additional time from extending the review to supplement our evidence and draw on further experience.
As I mentioned in Committee, the Department for Transport has already announced that the Government will pursue legislative reform for micromobility vehicles. As the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, said, we want to pursue a joined-up approach. We will pursue legislative reform for micromobility vehicles, which will include e-scooters, when parliamentary time allows. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, tempted me to go down a path of speculating what might be in a forthcoming King’s Speech, which is several rungs above my pay grade. I am afraid I cannot do that but, as I said, this is something we wish to pursue when parliamentary time allows.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
I am very grateful to the Minister for his reply. I find it a little concerning that he does not agree to a review but the Government have now extended their own review for another four years. We had a very useful meeting with him and the noble Lord, Lord Hendy. We are approaching Report on the English devolution Bill. When are we going to get a definition of micromobility vehicles?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I again thank the noble Baroness for the meeting, which I found useful. On the definition of micromobility, I will take that back and write to her on where it will come during the passage of the English devolution Bill, because I am not sufficiently across the details now. I will get back to her on that. I can confirm that, as was mentioned in the noble Baroness’s amendment, the Department for Transport will consult on any new regulations before they come into force, so that all interested parties will have a chance to shape any new regime on micromobility.
Amendment 342, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, would require the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on the number of people charged with dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling, as provided for in Clause 121. I appreciate the noble Baroness’s concerns about the extent to which the police act on cycling offences—indeed, those concerns were expressed by many noble Lords today—but I reiterate that the offences in the Bill are the most serious in nature, including where a cyclist’s actions have resulted in the death or serious injury of a person. In such cases, we should expect the police to pursue them to the fullest extent possible.
I highlight to the noble Baroness that the Government already publish a range of statistics on criminal offences, notably the quarterly and annual reports on criminal justice system statistics, alongside annual statistics setting out information on those killed and seriously injured on our roads. That provides breakdowns by road user as well as some of the contributory factors such as speeding, the presence of drink or drugs, and non-seat-belt use. As this information is already available in the public domain, we are not persuaded on the merit of producing such a report for cycle offences.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
I am so sorry. I have just received from the Library the figures to which the Minister referred. There is not a separate category for e-scooters, which I find quite scary. There is a global category of “motorcyclists”. Does that embrace e-scooters or not?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I will have to go back to check the definitions. We spent some time in our meeting discussing these categories and definitions. As I understand it, that category does include e-scooters, but I want to go back to confirm that for the noble Baroness. As I said, these statistics are produced regularly. That does not mean that any future work on micromobility cannot allow for greater granularity in those statistics, if they are collected in a way that would permit that.
Finally, Amendment 344, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would allow for food delivery companies to receive an unlimited fine should their riders be convicted of any offence under Clause 121 and where those companies do not have sufficient procedures to prevent those offences occurring. Amendment 344A would require the Secretary of State to review the effectiveness of any such procedures within one year of Clause 121 coming into force. Although I absolutely recognise the very real concerns that we heard both in Committee and today about the rogue behaviours of food delivery riders, we need hard, documented evidence to understand this in detail. I understand the straw poll point that the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, made, but, with the greatest respect, I am not sure how it would hold up in terms of statistical reliability.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I am afraid that I really cannot let the Minister get away with that. I think that all Members who have spoken in today’s debate, and in previous debates, are absolutely unanimous about the degree to which there is a problem. I do not accept the Minister saying that the problem is that there is no data. He represents the Government. I have stood at the same Dispatch Box when I had some responsibilities for transport, so I know that it is the Government’s job to gather that data when there is obviously a problem. The Minister really cannot stand there and say that no action will be taken because there is no data showing a problem.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I think it will please the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, to hear that that is exactly not what I am about to do—I ask him to hold on a second.
As I was saying, we want to understand this in detail, including evidence on the extent to which the business practice of food delivery companies may influence the rogue behaviours of their riders—that is very much the case put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. To that end, the Department for Transport is commissioning research to look into that, which we expect to start at the end of this month. It will take about one year, and the DfT will publish its findings. This research will look at the impact of the business practices of food delivery companies on rogue behaviours and illegal bike use. In effect, it will be a non-statutory version of the review that the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, proposes in his amendment. I hope that that will satisfy his concerns—I will find out now.
Lord Shinkwin (Con)
I thank the Minister for that. Can he give an undertaking to the House that this non-statutory review will consult disabled people on their experiences? Can he write to me, and put a copy of the letter in the Library, saying which disability organisations will be consulted?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I will be very happy to write to the noble Lord and put a copy in the Library with further details of the research and how it is being commissioned by the DfT.
In addition, the DfT’s road safety strategy, which has been referred to already this afternoon and which was published on 7 January, makes a clear commitment to the Government piloting a national work-related road safety charter for businesses that require people to drive or ride for them, whether using cycles, e-cycles, motorcycles, cars, or light or heavy-goods vehicles. The charter will aim to promote good practice and improve compliance with current requirements. It will be developed in collaboration with businesses and industry and will be informed by existing schemes. The pilot, which is voluntary, will run for two years and will be monitored and fully evaluated.
Before I conclude, I want to pick up a point made particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in Committee and repeated this afternoon on issues around the employment status of some of these delivery drivers. The Government are absolutely clear that bogus self-employment is unacceptable. Employers should never seek to deny people their employment rights and avoid their own legal obligations by claiming that someone is self-employed when in reality they are not.
We understand that many delivery riders in the platform economy value the flexibility that that kind of employment status can bring, but new technologies and ways of working have made it more complex for businesses and workers to understand and apply the current employment-status framework. That is why the Government are committed to consulting on a simpler framework which allows to properly capture the breadth of different employment relationships in the UK and ensure that workers can continually benefit from flexible ways of working where they choose to do so without being exploited by unscrupulous employers. We understand that this employment space of delivery drivers is a particular issue, which is why this is very much an important issue to act on.
In conclusion, I am afraid that I cannot follow up the call of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for all-out vigilante action from pedestrians. I am not entirely sure that even he and his chariot—to use the phrase of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool—might expect me to. However, I want to take this opportunity to really acknowledge the frustration and fears of all noble Lords, and, indeed, many members of the public, about the abhorrent and dangerous behaviour of a minority—I stress that—of cyclists.
However, I come back to where I started. Any new legislation in this area must be proportionate and must be mindful of the potential adverse impact on law-abiding road users. I want to encourage micromobility to reduce congestion and promote healthy living— very much the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon. We need a clear evidence base, and, as I have indicated, we are undertaking research concerning the road behaviours of delivery riders. I just want to repeat what we were saying. We will pursue legislative reform for micromobility in the round, including on e-scooters, when parliamentary time allows. For now, therefore, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, to withdraw his Amendment 318 and other noble Lords not to move their amendments.
Lord Lucas (Con)
My Lords, that was disappointing reply, but it ended on a more encouraging note, and I am grateful for that. It is a simple thing. If a company sets terms for its riders that encourage, incentivise and reward law-breaking, we need to control that. My noble friend Lord Blencathra is quite right about that. He and I are going to have to continue our vigilante efforts to deal with the more ordinary personal misbehaviour of cyclists. There we are—that is something we have taken on—and, thanks to the Government, I shall have more time for it than I have had recently. For now, however, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Hogan-Howe
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I listened carefully to what the Minister said. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, is quite right that there is a need for a joined-up response, but I did not hear it. It is a fair challenge to the people who are opposing the Government to get their act together, but it is the job of the Government to deliver a strategy that might make a difference and I did not hear it. This has occurred quite a few times now. The noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, made the point about reduced traffic departments. She is quite right that it has nothing to do with this. The traffic departments of this country have never had much to do with cyclists. This is a problem of enforcement; it is not to do with the fact that traffic departments have reduced over time.
What am I asking for? I suppose I am asking for a protest vote. Every time I raise this issue, there is a rumble. People around me say afterwards, “I agree with you, we ought to do something”, but nobody can quite agree what. I am calling on the Members on the Government Benches and others to ignore their Whips. There will be a very marginal impact on their careers. I would never argue that my solution is the only one that will work, but the Government have a duty to do something. As we have all said, it is not just about older people like us complaining about cyclists. It is a general opinion among people whose views we represent.
I may lose, but courage is not measured by picking fights only that you are going to win. It is sometimes measured by picking those that you may subsequently discover that you do not have support on. With that in mind, I would like to divide the House on this amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Aggravated offences(1) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is amended as follows.(2) For section 28 substitute—“28 Meaning of “aggravated”(1) For the purposes of sections 29 to 32 an offence is aggravated if it is aggravated by—(a) racial hostility,(b) religious hostility,(c) hostility related to disability,(d) hostility related to sexual orientation, or(e) hostility related to transgender identity.(2) For the purposes of the following provisions an offence is aggravated if it is aggravated by hostility related to sex—(a) section 29,(b) section 30,(c) section 31(1)(a) and (c), and(d) section 32.(3) An offence is aggravated by hostility of one of the kinds mentioned in subsection (1) if—(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on—(i) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group,(ii) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group,(iii) a disability (or presumed disability) of the victim,(iv) the sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation) of the victim, or (as the case may be) (v) the victim being (or being presumed to be) transgender, or(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by—(i) hostility towards members of a racial group based on their membership of that group,(ii) hostility towards members of a religious group based on their membership of that group,(iii) hostility towards persons who have a disability or a particular disability,(iv) hostility towards persons who are of a particular sexual orientation, or (as the case may be)(v) hostility towards persons who are transgender.(4) An offence is aggravated by hostility related to sex if—(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the sex (or presumed sex) of the victim, or(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards persons who are of a particular sex.(5) For the purposes of subsections (3) and (4), it is immaterial whether or not the offender’s hostility is also based, to any extent, on any other factor not mentioned in that subsection.(6) In this section—(a) references to a racial group are to a group of persons defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins;(b) references to a religious group are to a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief;(c) “membership” in relation to a racial or religious group, includes association with members of that group;(d) “disability” means any physical or mental impairment;(e) references to being transgender include references to being transsexual, or undergoing, proposing to undergo or having undergone a process or part of a process of gender reassignment;(f) “presumed” means presumed by the offender.”(3) In the italic heading before section 28, for “Racially or religiously aggravated offences” substitute “Offences aggravated by racial or other hostility”.(4) In section 29 (aggravated assaults)—(a) in the heading for “Racially or religiously aggravated” substitute “Aggravated”;(b) in subsection (1) for “racially or religiously aggravated for the purposes of this section” substitute “aggravated (see section 28(1) and (2))”.(5) In section 30 (aggravated criminal damage)—(a) in the heading for “Racially or religiously aggravated” substitute “Aggravated”;(b) in subsection (1) for “racially or religiously aggravated for the purposes of this section” substitute “aggravated (see section 28(1) and (2))”;(c) in subsection (3) for “28(1)(a)” substitute “28(3)(a) and (4)(a)”.(6) In section 31 (aggravated public order offences)—(a) in the heading for “Racially or religiously aggravated” substitute “Aggravated”;(b) in subsection (1) for “racially or religiously aggravated for the purposes of this section” substitute “aggravated (see section 28(1) and (2))”;(c) in subsection (7) for “28(1)(a)” substitute “28(3)(a) and (4)(a)”. (7) In section 32 (aggravated harassment)—(a) in the heading for “Racially or religiously aggravated” substitute “Aggravated”;(b) in subsection (1) for “racially or religiously aggravated for the purposes of this section” substitute “aggravated (see section 28(1) and (2))”.(8) In section 66 of the Sentencing Code (hostility as aggravating factor in sentencing)—(a) in subsection (1), after “subsection (3)” insert “and subsection (3A)”;(b) after subsection (3) insert—“(3A) So far as it relates to hostility related to disability, sexual orientation and transgender identity, this section does not apply in relation to an offence under sections 29 to 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 committed on or after the day on which section (Aggravated offences)(2) of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 comes into force.”(9) In the Armed Forces Act 2006, for sections 240 and 241 substitute—“240 Increase in sentence for offences aggravated by hostility(1) This section applies where a court or officer dealing with an offender for a service offence (other than an offence mentioned in subsection (7)) is considering the seriousness of the offence.(2) If the offence is aggravated by hostility of one of the kinds mentioned in subsection (3) the court or officer—(a) must treat that fact as an aggravating factor, and(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.(3) The kinds of hostility are—(a) racial hostility,(b) religious hostility,(c) hostility related to disability,(d) hostility related to sexual orientation, or(e) hostility related to transgender identity.(4) An offence is aggravated by hostility of one of the kinds mentioned in subsection (3) if—(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on—(i) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group,(ii) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group,(iii) a disability (or presumed disability) of the victim,(iv) the sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation) of the victim, or (as the case may be)(v) the victim being (or being presumed to be) transgender, or(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by—(i) hostility towards members of a racial group based on their membership of that group,(ii) hostility towards members of a religious group based on their membership of that group,(iii) hostility towards persons who have a disability or a particular disability,(iv) hostility towards persons who are of a particular sexual orientation, or (as the case may be)(v) hostility towards persons who are transgender.(5) It is immaterial whether or not the offender’s hostility is also based, to any extent, on any other factor not mentioned in subsection (4). (6) In this section—(a) references to a racial group are to a group of persons defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins;(b) references to a religious group are to a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief;(c) “membership” in relation to a racial or religious group, includes association with members of that group;(d) “disability” means any physical or mental impairment;(e) references to being transgender include references to being transsexual, or undergoing, proposing to undergo or having undergone a process or part of a process of gender reassignment;(f) “presumed” means presumed by the offender.(7) This section does not apply in relation to an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is an offence under any of sections 29 to 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (offences aggravated by racial and other hostility).””Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause expands the grounds on which offences may be aggravated under sections 28 to 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (racial and religious hostility) to include hostility related to disability, sexual orientation, transgender identity and (except for section 31(1)(b)) sex. It also makes consequential amendments.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, I am very proud to introduce Amendment 334, as it delivers on a Labour government manifesto commitment by extending the existing statutory framework for aggravated offences under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
As noble Lords will know, under the existing provision, specified offences are aggravated and subject to potentially greater maximum penalties where it is proved that the offender was motivated by hostility towards the protected characteristics of race and religion. The relevant offences for these purposes are criminal damage, harassment, stalking and certain public order offences, as well as several offences against the person, including actual and grievous bodily harm, strangulation, assault and malicious wounding.
Through Amendment 334, the Government are not creating new criminal offences; rather, we are extending a well-established legislative model to ensure that it properly captures the full range of hostility-based offending that we know is taking place in our communities. I just happen to believe that individuals who are trans or have a disability have a right and a promise to live life free from hostility in our society today. I pray in aid that, in the last year for which figures are available, March 2024 to March 2025, 4,120 hate crimes were registered by the police against transgender people and 10,649 hate crimes were registered against people with disabilities.
The amendment fulfils the Government’s commitment to level up the hate crime legislative framework by extending the regime of aggravated offences under the 1998 Act to cover criminal behaviours motivated by hostility towards sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity. We are also adding behaviours motivated by hostility based on sex or presumed sex.
As a corollary to Amendment 334, government Amendments 345, 347, 349 and 353 separately amend the new offences on abuse towards emergency workers to provide for aggravation where these offences are motivated by or demonstrate hostility to the same range of protected characteristics. This ensures, for the first time, parity of treatment across these protected characteristics and provides the police and prosecutors with a broader set of tools for recognising and responding to hate crime offences.
This measure has received a broad welcome from a range of charities and organisations involved with disability or with transgender issues. Stonewall has described the measure before the House tonight as
“a powerful message that LGBTQ+ people deserve equal access to justice”.
Galop, the LGBT and anti-abuse charity, has described the amendment as a “landmark moment” for equality. Real, the deaf and disabled people’s organisation, has said:
“It reflects long-standing calls for equal protection under the law for all victims of hate crime”.
The Spinal Injuries Association has said:
“It sends a clear message that violence and hostility directed at disabled people will no longer be overlooked and must be treated with the seriousness it deserves”.
I concur with all those comments, and I hope that the whole House will do too in due course.
Aggravated offences are well established in our criminal law. By extending the scope of the provisions in the Crime and Disorder Act, we will help to ensure that criminal justice agencies identify and record hostility against protected characteristics where they take place and that perpetrators are appropriately punished for their offending.
These are not abstract virtues. They translate into better case-building, clearer communication with victims and, ultimately, more robust outcomes in court. I hope that they will also prevent people being attacked, abused and harassed for issues to do with their identity as transgender people or people with disabilities. It is simply not acceptable in the 21st century for those types of offences to take place. That is why we consider that the aggravated offences framework remains the right tool for recognising and responding to hostility based offending.
Recognising hostility based on sex within the aggravated offences regime complements our mission to tackle violence against women and girls. It will enable the courts to recognise on the face of the offence the serious harm caused when a victim is targeted because of their sex or presumed sex. Making it clear in law that offences motivated by hostility towards a victim’s sex will be treated just as seriously as those motivated by hostility towards the range of other protected characteristics in the hate crime regime reinforces our determination as a Government to confront these harms.
To ensure coherence across the statute book, the aggravated version of the existing Section 4A offence under the Public Order Act 1986 will not extend to cases involving hostility based on sex or presumed sex. That is because the behaviour targeted by that offence—namely, causing intentional harassment, alarm or distress—is already more than adequately covered by the new aggravated offence introduced by the Protection from Sex based Harassment in Public Act 2023, which will come into force on 1 April. This approach prevents duplication while ensuring the law remains both targeted and effective.
I will listen to what noble Lords say in their amendments, but I put a clear message down that this is a matter of principle for this Labour Government and people across this House. I believe and know that it will have the support of many others in this House, for which I thank them in advance. It is not right that transgender people or people with disabilities are singled out for offences. They need the protection of the law and today is the day for this House, and for the House of Commons when it is considered there, to stand up and say what is right. I beg to move.
Amendment 334A (as an amendment to Amendment 334)
Lord Young of Acton
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union. Between them, my three amendments address a single, straightforward question: should misgendering a trans person be treated as a criminal offence, still less an aggravated one? The answer is clearly no, and I hope the Minister will assure me that that is not the Government’s intention in moving their amendments to the Bill.
Let me begin with government Amendments 334 and 349. Amendment 334, as we have heard, extends the aggravated offences under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, currently limited to race and religion, to cover sexual orientation, transgender identity, disability and sex. Amendment 349 applies the same aggravators to the new offences relating to threatening or abusive behaviour towards emergency workers. My first two amendments would insert a clarification into both that evidence of misgendering alone would not be treated as adequate proof of any criminal offence nor of hostility on the basis of transgender identity.
Baroness Cash (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendments of my noble friend Lord Young of Acton and oppose the Government’s amendments in their entirety, on principle.
I did not expect to be beginning in the way I am about to begin, but I want to say this because the quality of debates around hate crime have become increasingly polarising. In my first year in this House, which has been a great privilege, I have grown to deeply admire the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, in particular for the way he has conducted the passage of this Bill and the many late nights and long hours he has put in. Indeed, I have grown slightly fond—if that is okay to say—of him and our exchanges in the corridors. Therefore, it is with some trepidation and fear that I get to my feet to say that I hope we can engage in a respectful debate. I do not agree that this is the right vehicle for the objectives but I do agree with the objectives.
The Minister used these words—I hope I have taken them down correctly; I think it is verbatim. He happens to believe that trans and disabled people “should be able to live without hostility”. I 100% agree with that, but I do not believe that this is the right vehicle. My noble friend Lord Young of Acton has already covered the existence, introduced in 2020, of the aggravating factors in sentencing which allow all those characteristics and categories to have increased sentencing as a result of hostility acted out on those people. I want to clarify that, because I do not believe there is a single person here, whether Peer or guest in the Gallery, who would disagree with anything that the Minister said. I hope we can have a debate on what the right vehicle is, which does not denigrate anything when it comes to what the principles should be.
Seeking to amend the Bill to add “aggravated factors”, alongside race and religion, introduced a quarter of a century ago, is a significant departure. It is an extension and expansion of the structure of our criminal law. The traditional structure is that conduct constitutes the offence: for example, he hit him and he meant to. The motive may aggravate the sentence; the law does not need to prove why. But once we subdivide offences by protected characteristic or identity, we depart from that principle. We know—because the Home Office itself says that only 7% of recorded hate crimes result in charging—that this becomes a complicated way of proceeding against this kind of conduct, particularly when we already have a vehicle for punishing it. The same conduct becomes a different offence depending on the identity of the victim and the alleged beliefs of the defendant. The motive for the crime moves from sentencing into the definition of the crime itself. It is, of course, more complex to establish, and harder to charge and then to prove. What better way to approach it than by the sentencing mechanism, where a judge has heard the evidence, and it has become quite clear and apparent during the course of the trial that this was an underlying motivation. He or she—I note, with deference, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, sitting opposite—can then increase the sentence accordingly.
This is not something I have just come up with today. Many respected academics and lawyers have questioned the aggravated defence regime. Professor Richard Taylor has argued that racially or religiously aggravated offences created by the 1998 Act are conceptually confused and duplicate what could be, and is now, more adequately addressed through sentencing law. The Law Commission of England and Wales has recognised this structural tension. In fact, the Law Commission goes so far as to comment on sex not becoming a characteristic at all. There have also been a number of reports by Policy Exchange, and I declare my interest as a senior fellow. These reports warn against the steady multiplication of identity-based criminal categories, and emphasise that the criminal law should focus on the conduct, rather than proliferating protected characteristic variants of an offence.
Others, including Lord Sumption, have cautioned that we should not push the criminal law from punishing harmful conduct towards adjudicating belief and motive. We do not need any reminder of the risks, because we are currently dealing with the failure of the non-crime hate incident reporting regime. Why, at the very moment that Parliament is moving to curtail the recording of non-crime hate incidents—recognising the problems created when policing becomes entangled in the recording of perceived hostility—are the Government proposing to expand hostility-based criminal offences themselves? I noted that the Minister said that this was a manifesto pledge, but it makes me very uneasy that we are coming to it only on Report. It is such a significant structural change in the criminal law and an expansion of the regime that I would have appreciated the opportunity to speak to it at Second Reading and to challenge and scrutinise it in detail in Committee.
We need to have an honest and evidence-led debate. It is too easy to reflexively say that this is the kind thing and the right thing. It will not produce change or the results that we want it to. The aggravated offence model has been operating for more than a quarter of a century as a large-scale behavioural and sociological experiment in using identity-based categories to address prejudice. It is taboo to question it and to question whether it has worked, but we must. If it had reduced hostility or strengthened social cohesion then there might be a case for expansion, but it has not, and no evidence of that has been produced.
Hate-crime legislation is not a demonstrably effective enforcement tool. It is wholly wrong to divert resources in this way, in an already overstretched criminal justice system, where we are challenging the very existence of the jury trial without a solid evidential base for doing so. I oppose the amendment.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I support the Government’s amendments. As I understand them, they do not create any new criminal offences; they are concerned only with sentencing for criminal offences that are proved and on the statute book. It is elementary that the sentence the court imposes for any criminal offence must depend on the circumstances of that particular offence. I cannot see the objection to the court being told that one of the things it should take into account is whether the defendant, who has been convicted of a particular offence, has acted by reason of hostility based on the victim being, or being presumed to be, transgender.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
The court can already take all the aggravating factors into account, save for hostility to sex. If a crime is aggravated by one of three of the four aggravators that the Bill would introduce into the charging regime, the CPS can flag those as aggravating factors and they can be taken into account at the sentencing stage, so what material difference would the government amendments make?
Lord Pannick (CB)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, but he is running two inconsistent arguments. He is saying first that the law already allows this, and secondly that this amendment to make the position clear is fundamentally objectionable on grounds of principle. He cannot run both arguments, nor say that it is objectionable for one of the factors that the court should take into account to be whether the hostility is based on sex. Why should we exclude sex? Why does the law currently allow the victim’s membership, or presumed membership, of a racial or religious group to be a factor that the court can take into account, but not sex or transgender status? That makes no sense whatever when the Equality Act deals with all these protected characteristics.
I emphasise that whether it is right or appropriate for the judge to take these factors into account in the circumstances of a particular case, and to what extent, will depend on the discretion of the sentencing judge, which will inevitably depend on the circumstances of the crime. Therefore, to exclude entirely the factor of the victim being, or being presumed to be, transgender, as the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, seeks to do, seems arbitrary.
Of course, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, that we must be very careful indeed to ensure that people are not punished for the exercise of free speech, but the law protects that exercise. It protects it by reference to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which the sentencing judge must take into account in all cases. I do not know the circumstances of the case that the noble Lord referred to, where there was an acquittal at the appeal stage, but I strongly suspect that Article 10 had something to do with it. I support the Government’s amendment.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have serious reservations about the Government’s amendments on aggravated offences. I appreciate that this puts me at odds with the Minister, but I knew that long before today, because in Committee he made a passionate speech, as he has today, telling us how proud he would be to move these amendments and claiming that they show a Government prepared to protect LGBT and disabled people.
If this is such an important change in the law for the Government, and a principled flagship for progressive Labour that appeared in its manifesto, we have to ask why the Government waited until Report in the Lords—so late in the Bill’s passage—to table the amendments. They must have thought that they were principled and important before, so why are we seeing them only now? I am afraid that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, explained, this denies this House the constitutional right to properly scrutinise and mull over the complex details of the amendments—let alone the fact that that was denied to the elected Chamber.
In the limited space that we have here, I will start by raising some general concerns I have with aggravated offences. Some people might say that this is a Second Reading speech; if it is, it is because the Government did not bring the amendments forward until now, so I will say it anyway. In my view, the state’s job, via criminal justice, is to prosecute material, clearly defined offences. When the authorities attempt to either infer or impute motivation for a crime, seemingly to signal its particular gravity, that is a dangerous move towards punishing ideas, beliefs or attitudes. Some of those ideas, of course, might be bigoted or abhorrent, but they are none the less ideas and opinions. We need to be wary of inadvertently stepping towards thought-crime solutions just to signal our moral virtue, and I am worried about expanding that regime.
This has consequences. Offences such as these carry higher maximum penalties when offenders demonstrate hostility, and this can mean prison. But hostility can be interpreted broadly in the law as ill will, antagonism or prejudice. Let me be clear: violence, harassment, assault or whatever against a disabled person, a trans person, a woman or anyone should be punished appropriately—severely, if that is your take—and certainly uniformly, regardless of motive. But aggravated sentencing can lead to some perverse outcomes.
On hate crime aggravators, in Committee I used an example from the CPS report Our Recent Hate Crime Prosecutions. A man was put in jail for 20 weeks for
“assaulting his father, sister and a police officer, and using racist slurs against his sister’s partner”.
But the CPS notes that, without the racist slurs, he would have only received a community order. So for the assault he would have retained his freedom but, with the racist words, he got 20 weeks in jail. What is more problematic is that many of the offences we are talking about are not actually those kinds of aggressions but often speech that is promiscuously criminalised.
This sentencing anomaly really hits home when it comes to the much boasted-of addition of sex into the aggregation. “At last”, people will say; “misogyny taken seriously”. But, during the Sentencing Bill, the Government refused to accept a perfectly reasonable amendment exempting sexual assault offences and domestic violence offences from the early release scheme. Surely, a real, material commitment to women would be to have accepted that amendment, not increased sentences for offences deemed driven by hostility to women.
Instead, my view is that we should prosecute actual offences committed against any woman. When those offences involve, for example, sexual violence or domestic abuse, we should give appropriate sentences to perpetrators and then not let the offenders out early to free up prison places. That would help women far more than this amendment, the wording of which says that the aggravators must be announced in “open court” to declare an offence aggravated—if ever there were an indication of the performative nature of this, that is it.
One worry is that many of the offences to which “aggravated” will be attached will be the tangled plethora of hate speech crimes, already leading to the scandal of Britain’s declining free speech reputation internationally, with so many arrested for speech crimes, as we have heard about. So many of these offences are wholly subjective, because hostility can be defined by the victim. We have seen the recent weaponisation of speech against those who do not share the same views, the whole cancel culture and toxicity that has proliferated, and identity groups and those with protective characteristics pitched against each other in grievance complaints.
Although it was not in the criminal law, we saw a gross example of this when John Davidson, a man with Tourette’s and the subject of an award-winning sympathetic film, involuntarily ticked and shouted out the N-word. Subsequent commentary refused to accept that there was no intent to offend. Race and disability were put at odds, rather than empathetically understanding the issues, and that is one of the problems with playing the identity politics issue. Increasing aggravated offences will just add to this toxic mix, and that, combined with public order and communications arrests—if not prosecutions for speech crimes, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton—will make this issue really difficult.
The issue of hostility to transgender identity is likely to stir up further tensions. I want to ask: what is transgender identity? At best, it is a subjective category. It is a self-defined description. That is not a criticism; it is just an observation. Transgender identity does not require a gender recognition certificate or surgery. By the way, the wording in the amendment is confusing here: it gives credence to the fact that surgery might be a key, but then it says “proposing to undergo” gender reassignment, which is a very odd phrase. That is why the amendments of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, are right to query and probe it, which is what we should be doing, even though it is so late in the day. How transgender people are defined will matter to how these amendments will be understood.
The clarification of the noble Lords from the Official Opposition, in Amendments 337, 350, 351 and 352, establishing what sex means in the Bill, is also helpful. Emphasising biological sex—sex at birth—is necessary to ensure that the cultural clash between gender identity and sex is not muddled up in this Bill or in these amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, in his Amendment 334A, also hopes to ensure that the proposed changes do not criminalise misgendering.
I just note that I hate the word “misgendering”. If a male identifies as a female, even if he has a certificate or has had surgery, he is still a man. Saying that is not misgendering; it is factually accurate. Asking me to call him a woman is compelled speech, asking me to repeat misinformation. But would that statement, which I am very nervous about making, be seen as evidence of hostility to someone based on their gender identity? Guess what: too often, those accused of, and punished for, so-called misgendering offences are women. Police criminalised Sex Matters’ Helen Joyce for some tweets referring to Freda Wallace by his former name Fred and using he/him pronouns, and the police recorded that as “criminal harassment” with “transgender aggravators”.
What about the young lesbian who says that she is not attracted to a male—a man who thinks that, by wearing stilettos and a dress, he is a woman and should be allowed into a lesbian-only group at a workplace—
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I do not wish to disturb the noble Baroness’s train of thought, but how we frame this debate is important. It is an aggravated offence if the individual has committed an offence that I outlined earlier, such as grievous or actual bodily harm, public order offences, harassment, stalking or criminal damage. It is not about the issues the noble Baroness is speaking to.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
To clarify, in the first example I gave, of Helen Joyce, it was called criminal harassment for the tweets and the aggravated factors. The police actually dropped it in the end, but they—not me but the police—called it criminal harassment with transgender aggravators. In the example I was giving, the lesbian in her work group was then labelled a bigot. In other words, it is the L in LGBT, not the T, that will often take the hit. I mentioned that because she was threatened by the person, who said they would go to the police, and then she was visited by somebody who said that the police would be involved. I am making this point because I am worried about it spiralling out of control. I would say that that is misogyny: demonising a biological woman for expressing her sexuality as same-sex attracted. I want to be sure that the amendments in this group navigate such clashes and do not avoid them.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I apologise but, a little unusually, this is a convenient time to break for dinner break business. It is mid group, but I assure noble Lords that we are taking a note of who is in the Chamber so that we can continue the group in an orderly fashion after the dinner break business. Before I hear some sedentary tutting, I note that this has been agreed through the usual channels.