Commons Chamber

Tuesday 16th June 2026

(began 1 month, 3 weeks ago)

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John Healey Portrait Rt Hon John Healey MP (Rawmarsh and Conisbrough, Labour)
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speak in this House as I take my seat, as I take my seat on the seat, as I take my seat on the backbenches for the first time for more than ten years, I took the decision to resign with the very decision to resign with the very greatest regret and reluctance. I continue to be certain about this continue to be certain about this decision. In time, I believe it will be seen as necessary in will be seen as necessary in securing the future of our armed forces and of our alliances.

It's been the privilege of my life to work alongside the exceptional people who serve this country in defence, military and civilian alike. They work 24 over seven, so often unseen. They are the very best of Britain. They and the new

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Defence Secretary have my fullest support. Yes. Mr. Speaker, I've been a Labour

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Mr. Speaker, I've been a Labour MP for nearly 30 years, a Labour member for 45 years, a trade member for 45 years, a trade unionist for longer. Still, it is my family, literally. Jackie, my my family, literally. Jackie, my wife worked for Labour HQ. We met at a union conference two weeks at a union conference two weeks later. We were engaged. We only ever wanted. Look, we are so much. All of us, of our partners in politics.

But we only ever wanted a successful Labour government leading a stronger Britain here. And my decision last week was about our country, not career. I loved the job. I won't miss going to bed with three phones or 3 a.m. phone calls, and I'm proud of what we've done in less than two years as a Labour government, we stepped up international leadership for Ukraine. We've raised defence investment three years earlier than anyone expected. One record defence export deals, given the armed forces, their biggest pay rise for 20 years, brought 36,000 forces family homes back into public ownership.

And we've signed major defence agreements with Germany, Norway, France and the European Union, delivering for defence, delivering for Britain and the Prime Minister has led this drive, rightly earning respect at home and abroad. He and I jointly commissioned the first of its kind strategic Defence review, which has set the vision to transform our armed forces to make our military more war fighting ready, better able to deter. And we've been doing exactly this. In the 12 months since the SDR was published, delivering in a different way investment with deep reforms to get a grip of budgets, procurement and delivery, investment for every taxpayer's pound works twice, once for national security and once to back British industry, create British jobs.

Investment in new defence, tech, drones and AI that draw lessons from Ukraine for our own UK forces. And I will always seek cross-party common ground on defence. But I won't let the Conservatives forget their record

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in government. Yeah. Or the hollowed out legacy they left in our armed forces. Amen. Mr. speaker, since the SDR, we've seen the world changing still faster, with threats increasing and demands on defence, rising conflict in the Middle East, new NATO missions in Middle East, new NATO missions in the High North, the US moving forces away from Europe, forces away from Europe, intensifying attacks in Ukraine and increasing Russian aggression towards the UK. NATO has now said we must prepare for war with Russia within the next five years.

This is the age of hard power and rising
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Al Carns Portrait Al Carns MP (Birmingham Selly Oak, Labour)
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threat. This is not the moment for calibration or incremental change. calibration or incremental change. This means bigger politics, bolder This means bigger politics, bolder priorities, harder choices. And Britain's challenge now is the Britain's challenge now is the transformation and the rearmament of our armed forces. The Prime of our armed forces. The Prime Minister knows what the country needs for defence. He spelled out the threat this month when he said it is our intelligence assessment and the assessment of other countries in NATO, that there could be an attack by Russia on NATO as soon as 2030.

So Britain must set the head mark of spending 3% on defence in 2030 and a clear path to 3.5% in 2035. The commitment all NATO nations have made to each other and to their people, and I believe this would command wide cross-party support. Mr. speaker, our predecessors in this House experienced what happens when deterrence fails. Our predecessors in this House entrusted us with institutions like NATO that they created to keep us safe. We don't choose the circumstances in which we serve or the responsibilities that fall upon us, either in this House or in government.

And it's the duty of our political generation now to ready Britain for the uncertainties of the years to come and the decisions that we make in the months ahead will be judged by those who follow us. At this dangerous time. I see the current defence investment plans falling well short of what is required. A rise of 0.08% from next year to 2030. No date for reaching 3%. No path to 3.5% by 2030. Well over half of NATO members will be spending 3% or more.

And when allies are looking for British leadership, we must not fall behind. When NATO needs European nations to step up, we must not fall short. Our adversaries don't follow timetables set by the Treasury. I appreciate how hard this is for Cabinet colleagues, and I'm very grateful to those who support what's required. But not all needs to be done by cutbacks elsewhere. There are credible ways of meeting the mid-term funding challenges, working multinationally and as other nations in Europe are doing, that could allow us to protect the ability to deliver our labour missions across government.

Beyond this, Mr. Speaker, we need a bigger view of national security. It's not just the job for defence or the agencies. Every department has a part to play in national security and national resilience, from energy to transport to health. Security must run through the government like letters, through a stick of rock, and security must be felt in the communities right across Britain, reversing long term decline and bringing new jobs and new hope. For now, Jackie's just grateful I no longer carry three phones in my bag, although I do

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still have my bottle of HP sauce. We now come to the next personal

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statement. Al Carns. Mr. speaker, with. Your permission, I'd like to make a speech on my resignation. I make a speech on my resignation. I want. To start by echoing the remarks of so many in the House on the 10th anniversary of the death the 10th anniversary of the death of Jo Cox. Whilst I did not know Joe, I know what she stood for. Her unwavering commitment to equality unwavering commitment to equality has left a lasting legacy, and her words still ring true.

More in common than divide us. Still true and still worth fighting for. I would also like to pay tribute to my right hon. Friend from Rorschach and Konigsberg. This is the second time I have followed you this week and it's a privilege to do so. Last week I resigned as a Minister for the Armed forces. It was an exceptionally difficult decision. I have never quit anything in my life and my mother will confirm that. She tried to get me to quit the Marines for 24 years, but she failed many times.

But I spent those 24 years in uniform. I served in operations around the world. I commanded men and women in combat and carried responsibility for their lives. I buried friends and stood beside families receiving the worst news imaginable. So when I accepted ministerial office, I did so with a simple purpose to serve those that serve us. I remain grateful to the Prime Minister for the opportunity to do so. I thank my ministerial colleagues, the individuals on this side of the House, civil servants and above all, the servicemen and women who have had the privilege to represent.

But there comes a point when honesty requires action. And for me, that point came last week. As hon. Members know, I came into politics for one reason, and that was to enact change. But to be able to work out where you're going, we must realise where we have come from. The Labour Party I joined is one that was chiselled out of the minds of the North East. It was hammered out of the shipyards of Govan, Liverpool and Belfast, and it was forged in the factories of the Industrial Revolution.

Calloused hands, sore backs, people who did a hard day graft and asked for one thing in return. A
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Victoria Collins Portrait Victoria Collins MP (Harpenden and Berkhamsted, Liberal Democrat)
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comprehend that 12,000 drones in the air and 90% of all casualties are from drones. Not the rifle, not the grenade, not the tank, not the artillery, but from drones. What will it take? I ask the house, what will it take to realise these will it take to realise these figures are not fiction, they're not an embellishment of the truth, not an embellishment of the truth, but a hard fact borne out of the blood and the steel of a hot war. That is the maths of modern war.

Millions of drones against high end, sophisticated systems that deliver late, with huge levels of inflation and, importantly, cannot be reproduced at the pace required to sustain a conflict against a major adversary. What will it take to learn this lesson? Do we need to rerun the Snatch Land Rover? Do we? Do we need to rerun the lack of body armour? Do we need to rerun the lack of protected vehicles in Afghanistan that I saw impact men and women in the in the front line? We do not and we should not.

Moreover, as the clouds of war darken Europe's border once more, do we need to learn the lessons our forefathers learnt in World War Two, or indeed the Cold War? This is not about individual items of equipment or bespoke defence funding lines, but about preparedness, about unity of purpose, prioritisation and national resilience. We are no longer packaging up our military to deploy to a foreign field, but being ready to fight from here, fight from the home base for democracy, for the right to self-determination, and for European security.

The reality is, we are spending too much time preparing for last year's war, not tomorrow's. And I urge the House to push for transformation. Push hard and push for delivery this side of 2030. Secondly, because even if the plan had been right, it was not adequately funded. I do not lay all the blame at number ten or number 11. We failed. I failed to make that conversation and argument. But national security and economic security are not competing priorities. They are the same priority.

A country that cannot defend itself will not stay prosperous for long. Put simply, a country that cannot defend itself will struggle to protect its prosperity. And thirdly, I left because I could no longer ignore the continued failure to address the treatment of our veterans in Northern Ireland. It is a difficult issue, and I cannot describe how difficult this fight has been. Whatever the view people have of the troubles, a country owes a duty to those sent into harm's way under lawful orders.

That duty does not end when that uniform comes off. The labour movement was built on a simple idea that the people who do the hard work this country asks of them deserves the backing of the state in return. Too many veterans have carried uncertainty for too long, while others have benefited from political accommodations that were never available to those who served. And I could not reconcile that with my own understanding of duty. But, Mr. Speaker, in slightly more detail, the IRA failed to achieve its political ends through the use of terrorist tactics.

We must be exceptionally careful that

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we do not help them achieve those ends through other means. Yes. Constant, never ending legal wranglings that undermine the contract between the nation and those that serve is neither good use of taxpayers money nor an use of taxpayers money nor an effective execution of strategy. Inquests, inquiries and an independent commission creates a hierarchy of truth. It will cost us hundreds of millions for 15 years, hundreds of millions for 15 years, painting the state as an aggressor, supporting our adversaries political objections and causing untold anguish for those that only ever deployed to protect us.

We have neither the political capital nor the resources to spare for this unjust journey. In broader terms, in 2026, security means more than military strength alone. It means secure borders, secure energy, secure jobs and secure communities. It means knowing that if you work hard and contribute, one unexpected bill will not push your family into crisis. It means knowing your children will have opportunities you did not. These things are connected. They absolutely are. The cost of living is shaped by conflict.

Thousands of miles from here. Hostile states target our infrastructure, our supply chains, our democracy, energy security shapes, economic security, economic security, shapes, social cohesion and importantly, above all else, social cohesion shapes national resilience. The old line between domestic policy and national security is breaking down in front of us. But, Mr. Speaker, our history points the way. In 1945, Britain was exhausted. We were in debt, our cities had been bombed. Rationing went on for years, and yet Attlee's government did not conclude that Britain could afford one priority.

It built the NHS. It expanded the welfare state, it invested in housing, and it took the decision that Britain would become a nuclear power. Those decisions came from the same understanding of what this government, for, what Labour is for a country worth defending, should look after its people. A country that wants to look after its people must be secure enough to do so. That is the Labour tradition. It is also, I would argue, the British tradition at its very best. But somewhere along the way we stopped thinking like that.

We begin treating defence, growth, energy, public services and social mobility as separate conversations. They are not. They are different parts of the same challenge. Whether Britain can still provide security, opportunity and resilience for its people in a more dangerous world. That is why I ultimately concluded I could no longer remain in government. The issue was never simply a defence Budget. It is whether government was moving with the urgency the moment demands. We know nearly a million young people outside education, employment or training.

We know that poor mental health cost this country hundreds of billions. We know our armed forces need modernising. We know our adversaries are becoming more aggressive. We know our energy system remains exposed. We inherited a mess, but the population is fed up of pointing the finger. They are looking to us for courage, clarity and conviction to make the changes at scale and importantly, the speed that the nation requires. But, Mr. Speaker, I have seen what our country can do. I've seen it in uniform.

I've seen it in the communities across the nation. I've seen it on these benches where we are at our very best the talent, the ideas, the passion, the courage. It's all here. Indeed, we have it all. I resign because I believe Britain and this Labour government can deliver. I believe we can think longer term. I believe we can act earlier. And I believe we can once again build a country that provides security in the broadest sense of the word security for our nation, security for our communities, security for our working families, security for the next generation.

That is the debate. I am confident this resignation has started. Thank you.
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Chi Onwurah Portrait Dame Chi Onwurah MP (Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West, Labour)
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We'll let the Frontbenches

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Point Point of Point of order. Point of order. Sarah Point of order. Sarah Owen. Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.

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Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. In February, the Women and Equalities Select Committee concluded an inquiry into the concluded an inquiry into the health impacts of breast implants and harmful cosmetic procedures. We sent our report to the Department sent our report to the Department of Health for their response on the 18th of February, expecting a response on the 18th of February, response on the 18th of February, of 18th of April. We're four months on from sending that report. The official response is now over two months overdue, and we are still waiting on government.

Madam Deputy Speaker, I seek your guidance on what we can do to address this grave delay, which is a significant disrespect not just to my committee members and to the House of Commons staff who worked on the report, but to the victims of harmful cosmetic procedures. People like Sasha, who nearly died, who gave brave, vulnerable testimony publicly only to be ignored by the Department of Health and Ministers.

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I am grateful for the hon. Member for giving notice of her point of order. There is a long point of order. There is a long standing and well understood convention that the government responds to Select Committee responds to Select Committee reports within two months. Where that is not possible, the Department should engage with the committee to explain why I have no power to compel the Department to produce a response, but the table office will be able to advise her office will be able to advise her on how she might pursue the matter further.

The clerk will now proceed to read the orders of the day.

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Cyber Security and Resilience Network and Information Systems Bill, as amended in the public Bill. Committee to be considered.

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Committee to be considered. We will begin with new clause two, with which it will be convenient to consider all of the new clauses and amendments as listed on the selection paper. I call the Liberal Democrat

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spokesperson to move new clause two. I just start.

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Yes. As the director of the National Cyber Security Centre said, every organisation delivering the every organisation delivering the UK's critical services relies on uninterrupted digital operations, and disruptions to these operations are not simply an IT issue, it's a national resilience issue. This is national resilience issue. This is a point that the Liberal Democrats wholeheartedly support, and is why we welcome the measures introduced we welcome the measures introduced in this bill, which strengthen existing cyber protections to enhance national security.

However, as the Liberal Democrats have made clear throughout all stages of this bill, there are many missed opportunities to truly future proof our country's cyber security to protect our democracy, economy and national security. I therefore speak today to the National, to the Liberal Democrat amendments of this bill, which we think would truly achieve this. First of all, in the scope, last year we saw the costliest cyber incident in UK history with the financial damage caused by attack on Jaguar Land Rover, estimated to cost between 1.6 and 2.1 billion, a cost shared between JLR directly and its supply chain.

In the public sector, cyber attacks are causing eye watering costs to. We just need to look back to Redcar cyber attack, which cost them a staggering £10.4 million. Yet this bill takes no consideration of the significant economic cost that such cyber attacks have, excluding both retail and manufacturing industries, as well as local government. From the scope of this bill, NC and NC five address this crucial gap. NC four would bring the manufacturing of critical transport equipment and the retail of food and essential goods, where they form a part of the large scale distribution chain within the scope of essential categories.

Under this bill, that means companies like Jaguar Land Rover would finally receive the protections and their strategic importance, demand and protect their supply chains to NC five extends that same recognition to local authorities, whose digital infrastructure underpins the delivery of services that millions of people depend on. The government's own industrial strategy recognises that sustainable and secure growth requires strong levels of cyber resilience across their economy, but their own cyber bill does not live up to this. If a cyber attack brought JLR s production lines to a halt or crippled the digital infrastructure of a council, the damage to our economy and to people's daily lives would be enormous.

And these are not the only issues within the scope of this bill. Safeguarding our democratic processes must be treated as a national security priority. And here, too, the bill falls short at a time when foreign interference in our elections is not a hypothetical, but a documented and growing threat. The government has chosen not to act. NC eight and NC nine would begin to change that. NC eight would designate the administration of elections and voter registers as essential services within the meaning of the NIS regulations, a straightforward recognition that the machinery of our democracy is as critical as any power grid or hospital network.

NC nine would designate political parties as essential services for the purposes of cyber security, extending meaningful protection to the organisations through which the British people exercise their democratic voice. I understand that this bill is not a silver bullet for cybersecurity, but these amendments make a modest, targeted and entirely reasonable ask that vehicle manufacturing, food, retail, supply chains, local authorities, our elections and our political parties are brought within the scope, and we can see the impact of the lack of action to secure online and cyber spaces by turning to online generated fraud and scams.

Fraud makes up 44% of all UK crime and online technologies, especially, and online technologies, especially AI, are supercharging this, according to reporting in The Times. A few weeks ago, research by Lloyds Bank found that metres social media sites are a starting point for 76% of purchase scams in the UK, with the value of losses to the UK customers estimated at around £66 million in the last year alone. Not only does the government's fraud strategy completely overlook the role of social media giants and big tech in the proliferation of online scams, but this bill fails to explicitly address the risks that fraud and scams pose to critical infrastructure and organisations.

This is especially striking considering the government's official statistics on cyber security breaches, showing that phishing attacks, aka scams, remain the most prevalent type of breach or attack by far in the UK. Amendment one would change this amending clause eight to explicitly add risks arising from forward to the list of security threats facing relevant digital services, so that they can identify and manage these threats. That's also why the Liberal Democrats are calling for
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Iain Duncan Smith Portrait Rt Hon Sir Iain Duncan Smith MP (Chingford and Woodford Green, Conservative)
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social media giants to be financially liable for scams originating on their platforms, from online crime agency to tackle from online crime agency to tackle these issues and standardise AI labelling. And we must not forget that these threats do not fall that these threats do not fall solely on large institutions and critical infrastructure. Small and medium sized enterprises are on the medium sized enterprises are on the frontline of cyber crime, disproportionately targeted and too often without the resources or often without the resources or expertise to defend themselves.

Many of the businesses caught up in the supply chains of our critical industries and exposed to the fraud and cyber risks I've described are SMEs. And yet there are no provisions in this bill to help potentially under-resourced SMEs cope with the increasing threat of cyber attacks. Cyber attacks NC two would require the establishment of a dedicated cyber security support services for those businesses. For the Liberal Democrats, backing British small businesses means making sure they are not left to face these threats alone.

The Liberal Democrats have also tabled a series of further measures that would make this legislation fit for purpose. Over the long term, a law is only as good as its enforcement, which is why we are pressing for broad board level accountability for cyber resilience. Under NC ten, regular proportionate testing of systems under NC 11 and more frequent government reporting every three years rather than five under amendment two. Last week at London Tech Week, when surrounded by experts across the industry, one thing became clear we think technology is moving quickly now, but with the growth and development of AI Madam Deputy Speaker.

This is the slowest we will ever see change happen again. And that is why we need this framework to evolve, which means reviewing the security risks posed by foreign linked critical suppliers under NC three. Modernising the Outdated Computer Misuse Act under NC six and assessing whether regulators have the resources they actually need to do their job under NC seven. These are not radical tasks. They are basic conditions for a cyber security regime that works today and will continue in the future.

But if there is one amendment that cuts to the heart of this bill and what that should be about, one that asks the fundamental question about Britain's place in a contested digital world, it is the question of digital sovereignty, because all of the protections we have discussed today for our industries, our democracy, our small businesses mean very little if we do not answer first. Who controls the digital infrastructure on which all of them depend, and question that every critical level of the stack, that we have critical control over that.

This is something echoed loudly by the industry itself. A study by a UK sovereign sovereign cloud provider found that 83% of IT decision makers in the country worry about the impact of geopolitical developments on their data sovereignty. And when you look at the numbers, it is not hard to see why around 55% of central government organisations report that over 60% of their estate is on the cloud, and the vast majority of that is with just two providers, both of them American.

We have handed the keys to significant parts of our national digital infrastructure, to foreign corporations subject to foreign laws and exposed to foreign decisions entirely outside our control. This includes our public services. The Liberal Democrats are alarmed at the NHS growing reliance on complex, opaque digital systems set up by Palantir, with Palantir as background in security and surveillance. That marks a divergence from the traditional relationship between the NHS and firms with specialised medical knowledge and the procurement for the procurement process.

For the federated data platform awarded to Palantir in 2023, is worryingly opaque. We are pleased that the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee has called on the government to exercise the break clause, and we also call on the government to use this break clause and provide a clear timeline for Palantir's removal from the NHS, even carp and from Palantir themselves, said the limits of soft power, of soaring rhetoric alone have been exposed. The ability of free and democratic societies to prevail requires something more than moral appeal.

It requires hard power, and hard power in this century will be built on software. Now just look at anthropic. Last week they launched their new AI model called fable five. Almost as soon as it was launched, the US government intervened, shutting it down for foreign nationals both inside and outside the country. Let me put that more clearly. Anthropic closed access to its tools under the direction of the US government. This is a wake up call. The reliance on the technology that fuels our economy and underpins our services shows we desperately need a sovereign digital strategy.

Fable 5th May have just been a feature that only launched for about a day, but imagine if this had been powering processes and public services when it was suddenly cut off by the US government. Crucially, this is also about backing British tech as well as working internationally. A collaborative sovereignty would make us stronger partners globally. That is why we've tabled NC 13 and while we urge this House to vote in favour of it today, this new clause would require the government to establish a digital sovereign strategy, one that sets out clearly how Ministers will assess and manage and mitigate risk, the security and resilience of our critical systems, and one that places British tech procurement at its centre.



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The hon. Member. Give way. I am happy to give way. Thank you. I do.

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Thank you for giving way and I recognise the importance of sovereignty. But there are real challenges. So if the member considers something like Taiwanese

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considers something like Taiwanese chips, how would we deal with their prevalence in our tech market? I thank the hon. Member for his question, but I think this is why we need a strategy. We need to be clear about what priorities the government is making in terms of government is making in terms of procurement. We've heard from the National Audit Office that it's often cost, but cost at what cost? What actually do we value when the British government are looking at their suppliers? It has to be a real strategy around that.

And that conversation has to be had. So that direction is clear, whether it's hardware, software and of course, working internationally is vital. But being clear about what is important for us, especially in that tech stack, is also an important question. And that's the thing. It is about our security resilience but also our economy. So strengthen those developing technology as well as using technology. It's about working together internationally, knowing we have the resilience to look after and to trade our technology stack. I will.
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Matt Western Portrait Matt Western MP (Warwick and Leamington, Labour)
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Thank the for giving way. And it is about our security. It is about our cyber security. It's about our our cyber security. It's about our resilience. It's about the fact that Belfast, for instance, within a three mile radius of Belfast, we a three mile radius of Belfast, we have some of the best cybersecurity resilience in the whole of the United Kingdom. It's about that. United Kingdom. It's about that. And it's about the 2750 employers. It's about the £258 million direct GVA. So does the hon.

Lady agree as well in relation to our amendments? I think we've got to also recognise that powerhouses like Belfast must be fully integrated into our national cyber strategy. Doesn't really agree with that. And will she put on record that that's the

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for? I thank the hon. Member for his intervention and absolutely, this intervention and absolutely, this is the thing. Across the United Kingdom, including in Northern Ireland, there are incredible tech firms and British tech firms, many firms and British tech firms, many who have said to me that we are they're being they're procured by they're being they're procured by other governments and around Europe, around the world, but yet they find their own British government is not using their services or getting the using their services or getting the value out of that British technology here, developing our skills jobs.

So absolutely agree with that. And we also welcomed the government's hardware strategy allowance last week, which at least acknowledges the importance of British procurement. But acknowledgement is not a strategy. NC 13 would make it one, and I am pleased to say that it has drawn support from across this House in an increasingly unstable world. The case for British digital resilience, British technology and British sovereign capability has never been stronger, and so I urge members to support this and vote for this clause today.

Madam Deputy Speaker, cyber security is no longer a technical matter confined to server rooms and IT departments. It's a question of national resilience, economic strength and democratic integrity. The bill before us takes important steps, but important steps are not enough in today's digital age. With these amendments, we have the opportunity to close the gaps, broaden the protections and build a framework that is genuinely fit for the digital age. Thank you.

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The security. Support for SMEs. The question is that new clause two be read a second time. I call two be read a second time. I call the chair of the Select Committee, Dame Chi Onwurah. Thank you, Madam. Deputy Speaker, and it's a pleasure Deputy Speaker, and it's a pleasure to follow the Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted. Now, I would like and Berkhamsted. Now, I would like to start by making two relevant declarations of interest. I worked for the Office of Communications before entering Parliament, and I before entering Parliament, and I am currently a fellow of the of the of the Institution of Engineering and Technology.

And, Madam Deputy Speaker, you may have heard me mention on occasion that I was an engineer before coming into Parliament, and as such, in 2010, I was desperate for issues around technology to come up in Parliament, you know, a subject I actually knew something about, but they rarely did. So in the intervening 16 years, however, things have changed and now technology is technology issues such as online safety, such as Wi-Fi on trains such as sovereign technology such as Infowars, are raised regularly.

And I welcome the increasing role of technology in all our constituents lives. But this must go hand in hand with rigorous cyber security to protect against threats from both state and non-state actors. As I highlighted in my speech at Second Reading of this bill, currently, the UK's only cross-cutting cyber security legislation is that inherited from the European Union. The previous conservative government failed to update these regulations, leaving us working under an outdated framework. So I really welcome this bill, which seeks to expand the scope of existing cyber security regulations to new sectors, strengthen the role of regulators and grant the government new powers to respond to the threats posed by cyber security breaches.

We are only as secure as our weakest link, but I'm afraid we still have a number of weak links left. Cyber attacks are having a real financial impact on the UK and are happening at an increasing rate. Last year, according to the Institution of Engineering and Technology, cyber attacks cost UK businesses an estimated £64 billion annually,
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Alex Sobel Portrait Alex Sobel MP (Leeds Central and Headingley, Labour )
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with 37 billion in direct costs and 26 billion in indirect costs. And 26 billion in indirect costs. And last year, we also saw the well documented cyber attack that hit Marks and Spencer's, which left Marks and Spencer's, which left shoppers unable to buy for to buy online from the company. For months, online from the company. For months, the company's profits were almost wiped out, down from 390 million to 3 million for the first half of 200 and of 2025. Now, as a sparks card holder myself, I was unable to use my card for six months and I fear I may have contributed to those figures.

This brings me to my First Amendment New Clause 20, which seeks to designate retail businesses as an essential activity, bringing it in within scope of part three of the bill. Retail is the UK's largest private sector employer. It holds large amounts of consumer data. It relies often on dated IT systems. Yet, as I noted during the bill's Second Reading, the existing scope of this bill would not have prevented or even impacted the attacks on Marks and Spencer or Jaguar Land Rover.

Despite the significant distribution disruption they caused to our constituents and our economic activity. Indeed, in November, the Bank of England cited the cyber attack on JLR as a factor in its decision to hold interest rates. So while I do believe that the government's plan to promote the new Cyber Governance Code of Practice to improve preparedness in sectors like retail is welcome, you know, voluntary measures alone will not deliver consistent adoption of good cyber governance across economically significant sectors such as retail.

So according to the government's figures, only 9680 cyber essentials plus certificates were issued to small and medium sized businesses between November 23rd and October 24th. There are an estimated 6 million small and medium enterprises in the UK, so this is not going to address that challenge at a at at the rate at which it needs to be addressed. And I welcome the amendment from the opposition benches to bring retail businesses within the scope of the Bill, but I am concerned that it might be too extensive in bringing small and medium sized businesses into its remit and placing an unnecessary or disproportionate burden on them.

So the revenue threshold of £12 billion within my new clause 20 provides the necessary specificity to ensure that only large retail businesses, including Marks and Spencer's and Jaguar Land Rover, would fall under the expanded NIS regulations 2018. This. This would lead to faster incident reporting responses and customer notification, and this would be alongside stronger powers, including to deal with non-compliance. Now, turning to my Second Amendment new clause 18. And we have already heard the concentration of the UK's public sector data within a small number of US owned providers, Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure specifically presents a structural risk to national resilience.

Indeed,
15:04
Graeme Downie Portrait Graeme Downie MP (Dunfermline and Dollar, Labour)
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combined, AWS and Microsoft account for 70 to 80% of the public cloud market, according to the Competition and Markets Authority. Now, part of the issue is that that figure is an estimate. You know, I figure is an estimate. You know, I have put down a series of written parliamentary questions over the parliamentary questions over the last five, seven years to find out just how dependent government is on just how dependent government is on AWS in Microsoft. And this data is not tracked across government.

So can I ask the Minister to say how he intends to assess, assess a threat that the government is not measuring now, as set out in my committee's report entitled Rewiring the State Delivering Digital Government and National Resilience is put at risk by the strategic lock in that these companies have in many of our public services and administrations, major departments, including HMRC and the NHS, as we heard, are under multiyear agreements that further entrench these cloud infrastructures within the Whitehall ecosystem.

Included within my committee's report was evidence we heard from the Open Cloud Coalition, who suggested that DSIT should carry should consider a period of overcorrection, including mandatory recomposition of high risk or large scale contracts to bake to break cycles of vendor lock in. The government is rightly seeking to coordinate cloud contracting, but I believe that this should be done in a way as to ensure more, not less, competition. We would also like to see the detail of how the all of government cloud contract will prevent vendor lock in, and I would like the Minister to outline his engagement with the CMA on the development of the contract.

Not only does our reliance on these two cloud services raise practical issues, as seen with the AWS outage in October, but there are questions around data protection under the cloud and Patriot Acts. The US government can compel US companies, including AWS and Microsoft to hand over data if held overseas. That is in the UK. Now, I'm aware that the Minister may reference our sovereign hosting capability, Crown hosting, but it only hosts 4% of government legacy services. Would the Minister please outline how the government intends to ensure protection, that the that the public sector makes better use of the services provided by Crown Hosting? Could.

He also set out how we ensure the government's digital transformation ambitions cannot be derailed at any time by decision. Based on the narrow interests of a foreign, commercial or state actor. Now, the Minister may choose to argue that this is highly unlikely, but I would point him to the recent decision of the US government to withdraw access to anthropic Fable five model from foreign nationals. Now to my final amendment, new clause 819, which calls on the Secretary of State to consider a review to conduct a review into the risks provided by foreign state ownership or control of providers of cellular Internet of Things modules.

Now, Madam Deputy Speaker, I do always like to mention that I was the first member of Parliament to to to speak about the Internet of Things in my debate back in 2011, having, as I already mentioned, worked in technology as an engineer, the threat posed by cyber attacks on the Internet of Things was very real to me. From the start of my parliamentary career. Indeed, in 2017, I wrote an article highlighting the threat of cyber attacks on sex toys in a vain attempt to raise the profile of this issue.

Common Internet of Things modules, or iots are widely embedded across telecommunications and other critical national infrastructure, as well as in consumer products. In telecoms. Sims underpin interoperability, monitoring, configuration and automation automation in complex multi-vendor networks, including those supporting cellular IoT at scale. While Sims do not directly control networks dependent on foreign manufactured SIM enabled software and tooling poses risks relating to resilience, security and sovereignty, Chinese attempts to corner the global market in Sims could have significant national security implications, you know, embedded in cars.

When they're embedded in cars, they transmit the location, route, and even passenger video. And I do not, I hope, need to elaborate on the implications of them being switched off or turned them being switched off or turned to hostile uses. I'm very happy to give way.
15:14
Melanie Ward Portrait Melanie Ward MP (Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy, Labour)
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Very grateful.

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To her. She was very prescient then and it's got worse. There are lots of talks about Downing lots of talks about Downing Street's cars under the previous administration being searched for administration being searched for Iots. We know about this huge import from bad actors, which is really where we should be worried, such as China and other countries, such as China and other countries, and that they also know that many of these contain kill switches in them, which would have devastate them, which would have devastate some of our industry in generating energy, which would be a disaster.



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But it's she's right to have raised it and continue to raise it now. Thank you. I'd like to thank the hon.

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I'd like to thank the hon. Member for his intervention, and he does well to to remind us that the impact of hostile action with these Sims, such as turning on a kill switch, would be devastating across multiple sectors, potentially the multiple sectors, potentially the consumer sector, but also security, automotive, transport, finance. And that is why it is so it is so important to consider it. And I would particularly like to draw the minister's attention to the list of the the the US Federal Communication Commission.

That's their equivalent of Ofcom, their list of equipment and services covered by section two of the Secure Networks Act. Now this list dictates what technology is legally permitted to be authorised for import and sale in the US. Many companies on the list are owned or controlled by the Chinese state, and I would like. I'd like to thank the the Minister and the other place for meeting myself and my hon. Friend, the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar, whose amendment I am also supporting and hearing our concerns around the supply of IoT devices.

But it was unfortunate that the Minister did not see the need for action. And this is particularly true given that, as I've just said, the US has taken action against Chinese made goods and during the recent trip of the British American parliamentary group to the US just last week, we heard that there's likely to be further action taken against cellular IoT specifically, and that could see UK products therefore banned from import into the US if they. If they contain these cellular IoT modules and we've seen a rapid growth of devices across.

We've talked about transport, but also energy. Water should have an important to mention and also health really important medical. I'm concerned about the ability of our domestic British businesses to export into the US given

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Needs restrictions as well as the impact on our security. So I could be great. I would be grateful could be great. I would be grateful if the Minister could set out whether he is looking into this whether he is looking into this concern. So in conclusion, Madam Deputy Speaker, as we as was Deputy Speaker, as we as was eloquently emphasised in the personal statements made by the past, the recently resigned Secretary of State for Defence and Veterans Minister, the first duty of government is the security of its citizens.

That is true when it comes to our armed forces and our defence in the real world, as it were. That is also true when it comes to our security in the virtual world. And those two overlap so much more than in the past. I welcome this bill, but I have real concerns around the need to bring retail businesses such as M&S under its within its scope. The concentration of the UK's public sector data within a small number of US owned providers, and the implications for technology sovereignty, which it raises, and also the risks posed by foreign state ownership of providers of cellular Internet of Things modules.

I hope the Minister will address these concerns and deliver the cyber security and resilience our constituents deserve.

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Yes, sir. Iain Duncan Smith here. Madam Deputy Speaker, it's

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Madam Deputy Speaker, it's always a great honour to follow the hon. Lady who talks common sense. hon. Lady who talks common sense. Most of the time she gets up, which may be one of the reasons why she's still on the backbenches is not still on the backbenches is not much. She. It's not much. We listen more to those who know something about things. We'd obviously be about things. We'd obviously be better off in this Parliament than talking as though we know things which isn't terribly wrong, and it is the greatest threat that we face that that bad actors out there are using now this level of technology to get across countries like the UK, but other countries as well.

But we somehow here and it's not a party political point. Both governments have failed to face up to this the degree they have, which is why this bill is welcomed. But it's not everything. As she says, it's because we think we can treat the bad actors as though they were
15:25
Chris Vince Portrait Chris Vince MP (Harlow, Labour )
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normal actors in a commercial sense. But you have a country like China that is using slave labour to that is using slave labour to undercut markets, that regularly puts iots into cars that are manufactured and gets away with it in a way, because we need them. We think more than they need us, and that's the big problem. So she's right to raise it. And I congratulate her for yet again making an excellent speech. Now, making an excellent speech. Now, Madam Deputy Speaker, I, I beg to move in due course.

My amendment on anti refoulement to the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill. The reason I do is because, you know, there are a good bill, but there are bits missing and others skated over. And I think this is one of the areas that we will come again and again to regret that we haven't done more about this, which is essentially British citizens abroad ending up under the under the rule of governments that do not believe in the concept of freedom in front of the law, or for that rate, anyway, a fair trial as part of that process of habeas corpus, which is, as I say, an English common law, right, that has gone around the world.

So this amendment of mine seeks data sharing with jurisdictions that cannot. A fair trial should be prohibited as maintains the current legal approach, which generally restricts sharing sensitive information outside the EU. And currently the information shared of type enabled by clause six, which is in the Bill, is prohibited outside the EU. So clause six is weaker than what is going on in the European Union. And I say clause six paves the way. Sadly for such sharing, rather than restricting it.

This amendment seeks, therefore, to prohibit information sharing to places where the Secretary of State believes that a fair trial simply cannot be obtained. It requires the Secretary state to consult civil society human rights experts to identify jurisdictions. Universal, not just China. Although China is a big player in this, where the right to a fair trial cannot be guaranteed, with all decisions subject to mandatory annual reports to Parliament. And that is important. Parliament should be part of this and make decisions about whether it agrees with government.

Now Beijing is a very good example. Has frequently used seemingly legitimate criminal complaints to toggle target dissidents and clause six, if unamended, therefore raises transnational repression risks
15:30
Luke Myer Portrait Luke Myer MP (Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland, Labour)
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rather than solving them. The amendment is necessary, I believe, to close that loophole in the bill that currently fails to anticipate that currently fails to anticipate political, politically motivated requests from such totalitarian requests from such totalitarian states. I often say that we should stop speaking about countries like stop speaking about countries like China, Russia, Iran, North Korea as authoritarian states. They are not authoritarian states. They are not authoritarian states, they are totalitarian states. Why do I say totalitarian? Because everything in those countries is owned and run by the state.

Authoritarian states are often dictatorships, etc. but they are not the same. They are brutal, nasty. But this is a complete system. And so this is about totalitarian states in clause six, I'm afraid, is predicated upon helping other governments obtain justice. The argument of the amendment is that, quite apart from the PNR risks, justice, as we understand it, cannot be served in a country where there is no essential rule of law, no right to a fair trial, and a judicial system which serves the party, it is a matter of pride.

I often say that perhaps the greatest gift that this country has given to the world is the concept of freedom in the face of the law. And that is the point I made earlier. Habeas corpus came from English common law and dominates so many of the free world's thinking. I mean, it wasn't until the 1970s that some countries in Europe actually practice habeas corpus. So it wasn't just a case that it was produced by Britain, but also owned by many other countries. And that is what is at risk here.

And we should be the greatest defenders of that right to a fair trial anywhere in the world. Let's just take a few of these countries, for example, as to why this is needed. Let's look at China. Requests were made by authoritarian states, totalitarian states. In this particular case, as has been the recent pattern. For example, regarding Interpol notices, this is what happens a lot. The People's Republic of China and other
15:34
Ben Spencer Portrait Dr Ben Spencer MP (Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
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countries have a troubling recent history of very significant transnational repression, hounding transnational repression, hounding dissidents in the UK and cloaking their political persecution in their political persecution in superficially legitimate criminal charges. The PRC is not alone in requesting information on political requesting information on political opponents in the UK. They do it a lot. We can confidently speculate that China will make requests of that China will make requests of the UK should this bill be passed almost immediately. Let me look at the single biggest case that confronts us in China at the moment Jimmy Lai.

He is a British citizen. I cannot tell you, Madam Deputy Speaker, how endlessly in debates, even under the last administration, we had to fight to get the. The government to state that he was a British citizen, not a dual nationality citizen. He was a British citizen, proud to be British, had been British all his life, only ever owned a British passport, had never been a Chinese citizen with a Chinese passport. And so the special rapporteur rapporteur on torture, Alice Jill Edwards, in the 2024 and 25 reports there specifically flagged concerns that evidence obtained through torture is still widely admitted in Chinese courts.

She also expressed concerns in late 2024 regarding the case of Jimmy Lai in Hong Kong, noting that evidence allegedly secured through torture in mainland China is and was being used in the trial. And on the 15th of November 24, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention published its opinion that Jimmy Lai is, and I want to quote here unlawfully and arbitrarily detained and called for his immediate release clause. The clause that we are talking about here will not go far enough and does not therefore deal with this.

And that is what this amendment is really all about, and the risk of extradition to China from safe third countries. Currently, the UK does not have a bilateral extradition treaty with the People's Republic of China and suspended its bilateral extradition treaty with Hong Kong, something that many of us were calling out for at the time. In 2020, in 25 proposed changes to the Extradition Act 2003 would allow cooperation between UK and Hong Kong authorities on a case by case, ad hoc basis.

And the trouble with that is it begins to open that door. The risk of sharing NIS data is not confined to the physical removal of individuals. It also poses a profound threat to national security. The safety of the diaspora within the UK. How often have we heard about that? These totalitarian states do not only seek to extradite dissidents, they seek to silence them through transnational repression and to compromise the UK's own digital resilience. Sharing NIS data with an adversarial jurisdiction is akin to providing a road map for a state sponsored cyber attack for dissidents and human rights defenders living in the UK, NIS data can be used to demonise their activity and de-anonymize their activity too, and this information is frequently used to a identify and harass family members remaining in their home country.

B conduct targeting phishing and surveillance against the individual's private devices and c coerce the individual into becoming an informal, rather an informant under the threat of criminal charges. Based on the shared technical data. Let me just deal with another case. Ryan Cornelius in the UAE. Ryan Cornelius is yet again a British citizen who has been arbitrarily detained in Dubai for 18 years, despite well documented evidence of an unfair trial and inhuman treatment. Ryan's detention has been found arbitrary by the UN working Group on Arbitrary Detention.

His case arises from a high profile financial dispute involving loans connected to a major Dubai development project. Although he and his associates had reportedly complied with restructuring agreements, the Dubai Islamic Bank. He was arrested without warning, transferred by plainclothes officers to a police facility where he was held incommunicado, denied access to a lawyer and subjected to aggressive interrogation. During this time, he was coerced into signing documents in Arabic, a language he does not understand under a false premise that this would give him his release.

Mr. Cornelius. His trial proceedings were marked by violations of his right to a fair trial. He was not provided with an interpreter, could not understand the proceedings. While the appointed lawyer did not speak English, rendering effective communication impossible. In 2011, Mr. Cornelius was convicted and sentenced to ten years imprisonment and ordered to pay a billion in penalties. He served the full sentence without the routine reduction for good behaviour, despite being a model prisoner, further underscoring the arbitrary and punitive nature of the detention and the profound deficiencies in the judicial process against him.

And he was then to face the fact that they changed the law, and he is now continuing to serve his ten year sentence. It is now 18 years since he was given that sentence. That is hardly a fair trial. I just want to touch on Jagtar Singh Johal detained in India. Another issue here. He's a British Sikh activist who's been held without trial in India for eight years. The United Nations says he's being held, and I quote, on discriminatory grounds owing to his status as a human rights defender and based on his political activism, religious faith and opinions.

And this is the problem. Again, another example of somebody in with a country that we seek to have alliances with, but at the same time is not facing a fair and reasonable process to the law. And that is the point that this amendment makes. And I just praise one particular character, one person who I think should at least suggest that the government should vote for this. For while still Leader of the Opposition, Sir Keir Starmer wrote both to Boris Johnson and to Rishi Sunak, calling on them to officially request Jaguar's immediate release.

In his letter, Starmer made clear that his detention is arbitrary and that he had been gravely mistreated with no legal basis. I bow before the ex head of the prosecution service in the United Kingdom, but the point that is being made in a specific is in a wider case for this amendment. The reason why this amendment, at the end of the day today is important, and I wish the government would would accept it rather than take this to a vote. But the reality is, I think it is necessary for us to make this point is that too often we cooperate rather lazily at times with administrations where we know those foreign countries will never give a
15:48
Kanishka Narayan Portrait Kanishka Narayan MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology) (Vale of Glamorgan, Labour)
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fair trial to a British citizen sitting in them. They don't have a fair trial for many of their own citizens. And if I just take the citizens. And if I just take the UAE, the UAE has been brutal in its behaviour in fomenting violence and behaviour in fomenting violence and war in Sudan and getting away with it simply because they happen to be wealthy enough and we want their investment. But we should never turn our head away from the single greatest thing that we have given greatest thing that we have given to the world, and which we should constantly recognise, that we should maintain to the rest of the world, which is habeas corpus, the right to a proper and fair trial is an inalienable right of every individual who is a British citizen, and we should defend that right.

And to defend that right. We should not give cause to those courts that will not give them a fair trial by giving them information, support or help at any time. That is the amendment we bring forward. And if

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called, I will move that amendment. Madam Deputy Speaker. Matt Western thank.

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Matt Western thank. You, Madam Deputy Speaker, and it's a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Chingford and hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green and absolutely concur with the points he's making concur with the points he's making or several points he's making on Jimmy Lai and Jagtar Singh Johal. Jimmy Lai and Jagtar Singh Johal. But but the point more widely about the Internet of Things and thinking of the cases in Norway and Denmark, where they had their hundreds of buses that they'd imported from China that they suddenly recognised actually had these kill switches and their potentially their entire network of public transport system could have been disabled just like that.

And these are the realities of the new technologies that we need to face up to and be absolutely eyes wide open in some of the contracts and deals that we sign. Madam Deputy Speaker, five months ago, Second Reading, I welcomed the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill. But of course, even since then, in that short time, the world has become an ever more dangerous place and cyber threat only intensified. Now, I wish to commend the government on its hard work in the intervening period and in my remarks today.

I just want to focus really on the landscape, the cyber threat landscape. My two amendments, new clause 21 and 28, and the need for a national conversation on national security, which of course includes cyber security. So starting with the cyber threat landscape, the UK is the most cyber attack nation in Europe. It's the third most cyber attack nation globally, with three and four businesses having suffered a cyber attack in the past year. And my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne, Central and East was talking about the attack on Jaguar Land Rover and Marks and Spencer's Co-op and others, and having spoken and met with them both committee, but also individually.

I know of the scale of an impact that was felt within the operation and how how rendered they were by these attacks. And it is unimaginable, even for the most seasoned of, of, of business and industry leaders to suddenly find themselves under such attack. And, and of course, the repercussions for the economy have been very significant. In April, the CEO of the National Cyber Security Centre, Richard Horne, laid out laid out the scale of cyber attacks.

And he said on average, they deal with around four nationally significant incidents a week. That's significant. OK. Not the hundreds that are going on every day, but the really serious significant ones. Madam Deputy Speaker the threat of cyber attacks is only going to intensify continued state backed cyber attacks from Russia, China and Iran, either directly or via proxies, are being fuelled by technological advancements in AI and quantum computing, increasing the complexity and sheer volume of such attacks. The reality is that cyber attacks are no longer rare one offs, but an operational reality facing every business and organisation, public and private across the UK as they are globally.

But it is the importance of securing our systems to make them more robust, to deter such attacks so that those who wish to do us harm would go after others. And it is in this context that the Bill has been introduced and it takes serious, robust steps to increase the resilience of the UK that I want to to talk. However, the escalating threat picture, I continue to have certain concerns about the scope and breadth of the bill. That is why I have tabled two amendments New clause 21 and 28, which I hope the Minister will reconsider.

New clause 21 would bring those in the food supply chain within the NIS regulations and regulate them as, and I quote, operators of essential services, while excluding smaller businesses to avoid unnecessary administrative burden. Now, I understand that the Minister addressed this at Committee stage, explaining that essential services would only apply to those sectors whose failure of network and information system systems poses an imminent threat to life to the British public. Now, I would just gently suggest that the collapse or disruption of the food supply chain would pose an imminent threat to life.

And I and I, and I say that in a in an honest and not patronising way. But those of us who've had conversations behind the scenes about what happened during the pandemic, and colleagues, perhaps on the other side of the chamber who are far closer to that winning government, will realise that the health threat was one element. But the collapse of society, not just the economy but society, the potential for civil unrest, rioting with food, lack of food on shelves and so on, toilet rolls that would have been really the most urgent and pressing issue.

So it's worth noting, Madam Deputy Speaker, that the European Union's NIS 2 Directive does indeed include food distribution in its regulation, so it is feasible and recognised internationally as important. Now, the Bill does grant the Secretary of State powers to bring in new sectors. So could the Minister give reassurance that the Department will give this due consideration today and in the future? Secondly, amendment 28 ensures that relevant managed service providers do not provide services to manage the technology systems for a number of customers that exceeds a critical risk threshold within the same sector or subsector.

Now, the rationale behind this is simple. It is about building resilience and ensuring that if one fails or is breached, a whole sector is not hamstrung by it. And I can envision a situation whereby one particular MSP dominates a large category or small subsector that may be a crucial part of a supply chain, thereby crippling the whole chain. Indeed. Again, my hon. Friend the Member for the Newcastle under Newcastle on Tyne, Central and East cited the UK government dependency on AWS and Microsoft as such an example.

So again with the Minister, please consider this going forward. Away from these two specific amendments, it is clear that the bill in itself is not the only answer to our cyber resilience. Multiple approaches are needed, and given the Bill does not include large swathes of the economy or local government, it is even more important that we explain to businesses and the public the very real threats that we face. Which brings me, Madam Deputy Speaker, to my final point. That is the need for a national conversation on national security, because you can have the best crafted and tightest legislation and regulation.

But unless you have a real cultural shift, an acknowledgement of the cyber threat and its impacts from board level to entry level positions, all of this will be wasted. So I once again encourage the department and the whole machinery of government to go further and faster in explaining the threat posed and the steps that we can all take to boost resilience, because resilience starts with that mobile phone in our pocket. A cyber security is only as strong as its weakest link, the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, which of course I chair, has begun its inquiry into building national resilience through a national conversation.

And it is clear from our evidence from others such as Taiwan and Netherlands and other European nations that I've spoken to, that we do need to explain the threat to people and build a stronger cultural sense of resilience to explain that we all have a role to play. It is not simply the state's responsibility, and I will update the House in due course on our findings, and I hope the Minister and the government will find it useful when considering their plans for national resilience.

So to conclude, Madam Deputy Speaker, this is a substantial and serious step forward in protecting the UK from cyber attacks. It makes us more resilient and strengthens our collective security. But I genuinely believe there are areas where I would encourage the government to be more ambitious, namely by bringing the food supply chain into the essential services classification. As I said, as Europe is doing, setting critical risk thresholds for MSPs and expanding the scope of the bill to incumbents encompass more of the incumbents encompass more of the economy.

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.
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Alex Sobel thank.

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You, Madam Deputy Speaker. It's a pleasure to follow such esteemed colleagues in this debate. My only declaration before I start my speech is that I'm. I hold a degree in information systems at the in information systems at the University of Leeds. But before I start my speech on the Cyber Security Network bill, I have been sat here for the last two hours looking at the memorial plaque to Jo Cox. Ten years after the absolutely horrific day that we lost Jo, I was a West Yorkshire candidate alongside Jo in the run up to the 2015 election.

It's to my detriment that I never got to serve with her here and today for so many colleagues. It's such a difficult day and I know that many of the things that we debate, many of the things that Labour are doing in government, are things that Jo would have dearly liked to have seen. And, you know, today reminds us, incumbent on us, to try and push forward all of the things that Jo strive for, for us to make this place better, to make the country better and to make the world better.

Yeah. So cyber security data centres are warehouse like facilities that house the information technology equipment in which almost all digital activity relies. The UK government says that they underpin almost all economic activity and innovation, including the development of artificial intelligence and other technology, public service delivery and overall modern day communications. Europe's largest data centre market is Greater London, where most of the UK data centres are concentrated. There are four types of data centre, one being AI data centres, which facilitate specialised high performance computing needs of AI development and AI models.

Having data centres based in UK allows our government to regulate them, such as by requiring them to meet cybersecurity standards and reduce their environmental impact, which is obviously very important. Data centres are essential parts of our critical national infrastructure. They have huge environmental impacts, so it must be managed carefully. But the benefits of having them on our home turf is that we can regulate them. In our current state of hybrid war with Russia, it is vital to protect these data centres from any nefarious actors cyber warfare and strengthened protections for them from cyber attacks spawned by AI.

Otherwise, the impact on public safety, the economy and society could be catastrophic considering how important these data centres and the speed of development of AI systems are, shouldn't the Secretary of State hold last resort powers to hit the kill? Switch the big red button to direct the show down? Shut down of data centres or AI systems deployed at significant scale in the event of an AI security or operational emergency, these powers would be strictly reserved for catastrophic risk scenarios, which are defined in line with the national Risk Registers high impact threshold.

It is a significant decision to shut down a data centre, so a decision must come from someone with the national security and public interest at their core of their decision. The Secretary of State, I would therefore like to move my new clause NC 12, entitled Last Resort Powers in respect of data centres and AI models. This new clause ensures the government can intervene in case an emergency caused by AI used or deployed by a data centre, which can cause large scale harm.

It's well recognised that today the UK finds itself in a new threat landscape which poses unprecedented security challenges. As per the Strategic Defence Review, we face threats more serious and less predictable than at any time since the Cold War. We have seen that cyber attacks are now a daily reality and the real world costs are substantial as as colleagues have already spoken about, the 2024 NHS Synovis ransomware attack, for instance, disrupted over 11,000 outpatient appointments, a direct cost of at least £32.7 million.

We have moved on at speed in terms of data sets, AI models since 2024. The risks only become exponential as innovation in sector charges on more recently, AI models like Claude mythos showcased unprecedented autonomous cyber hacking and cyber offensive capabilities to the point that it was not released publicly. If implemented, the bill would require data centre operators to maintain technical infrastructure, secure communications and regular emergency exercise, ensure powers can be used quickly and effectively. The new clause also mandates regular parliamentary reports on the causes and potential causes of AI security emergencies, including adversarial and non-state actor use and autonomous cyber attack capabilities, which have seen growing evidence of which could lead to tragic consequences.

There is clear legal precedent for such powers. The Civil Contingencies Act, for instance, confers significant intervention powers in extreme harm scenarios. The new clause bakes in robust checks and balances to constrain government overreach. Parliamentary reporting within seven days of any direction, followed by debate in each House at the earliest opportunity. High court review any operator served with direction has immediate right to apply for relief, with a court empowered to confirm, vary, cancel or award compensation. Post-incident accountability, incident reporting and mitigation measures required before operations resume.

Compliance costs are expected to be minimal. Only a small upfront investment in technical infrastructure for a handful of data centres, some of which already possess this infrastructure. By definition, the powers are designed to be used sparingly only in genuine emergencies. The cost of inaction vastly outweighs the compliance burden. A single major AI driven cyber incident can dwarf the total cost of implementing these powers across all affected operators. These last resort kill switch powers for AI systems and data centres underpin the overall concept of cyber resilience.

The final backstop the UK needs to remain proactive rather than reactive. We need to be ready in these unprecedented times, as AI companies race towards superintelligence, becomes ever more important to have the right safeguards in place to avoid catastrophic outcomes. This amendment proves an urgent, legally sound, proportionate mechanism to stay ahead of real world threats to our critical national infrastructure. I just want to ask the Minister to consider adopting my new clause into the legislation, as I will not be pushing it to a division this evening.

I just want to conclude by referencing the hon. Member from Chingford and Woodford Greens amendment three. And just to say very shortly, how can we think that if a country cannot guarantee a fair trial, we can, for any reason, at any time, disclose data that could result in an unfair conviction? It undermines our whole idea. And today of all days, I cannot imagine why we would not enact something to protect our citizens rights when abroad. Thank you.

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Graeme Downie thank. You. Madam Deputy Speaker. Can I begin by referring members

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Can I begin by referring members to my register of interest, where I am the parliamentary chair of the campaign Secure for Secure Technology and to thank them for Technology and to thank them for their work in preparing my two amendments as well as speech today. Can I just begin by echoing the Can I just begin by echoing the comments of the hon. Members for Leeds Central and Headingley and Newcastle upon Tyne, Central and Newcastle upon Tyne, Central and West regarding the scale of the threat that we face from cyber attack, something I think we need to make sure that we are having is a national conversation referred to by my hon.

Friend about the nature of the threats that we face and who we face them from. In many ways, this country is already in conflict with Russia and in a more than what you would call competition with China. This is something that the public are not fully aware of. We must do more to ensure that they are fully aware of that threat and to make sure that they hold our feet to the fire and the government's to make sure that we are taking the kind of measures that are seen in this bill and going beyond that, we must surely take to protect our economy, our military and our democracy more widely.

Madam Deputy Speaker, I will limit the rest of my remarks to my amendments four and five in my name, and it is always difficult going at this point in debate, where most of the people who have far more experience and knowledge than myself have said a lot of the things that I was planning on saying, but saying it was far more eloquence and knowledge than I have. But my amendments four and five will look to deal with part of our digital infrastructure that is almost entirely invisible to the public, rarely discussed in Parliament other than this afternoon so far, but absolutely essential to our national security.

And that is cellular Internet of Things modules, as described by my hon. Friend. Cellular IoT modules are small electronic components about the size of a credit card that allows the device to connect to the internet over a mobile network, and they sit inside everything from smart metre CCTV cameras, traffic lights, industrial sensors, medical devices and parts of our energy grid. They are the connective tissue of our modern digital economy, and we all rely on them every single day.

And yet, despite that importance, very little is known in more publicly about what they do and the potential harm that they can cause us. Today, more than 70% of those cellular IoT modules used globally are manufactured in China, and that dominance dominance creates strategic vulnerabilities that I believe this bill must address. Amendments four and five make clear that the bill covers the risks created by embedded communications components manufactured outside the UK. Amendment four ensures the Secretary of State can treat the provenance of those components as a cyber security risk, and amendment five allows Ministers to require operators of critical systems to identify and mitigate those risks.

In short, these amendments together give the government clear, clear authority to act where foreign made modules create non vulnerable abilities. Madam Speaker, why is this necessary? Because these modules present three major security threats. The first is dependency. When one country controls the overwhelming supply of a critical technology, it is by its nature a structural risk. If supply is disrupted, whether for geopolitical leverage, commercial pressure or energy systems, transport networks and emergency services could be left without essential replacement parts.

And we have already seen this threat with Huawei and our 5G network. Our mistake we must not repeat. The second reason, Madam Deputy Speaker, is disruption. As other hon. Friends and colleagues have mentioned, that increasingly is referred to as kill switches. These Internet of Things cellular modules contain firmware that can be updated remotely if a manufacturer is subject to state influence, and in China we know that they are. They could insert a kill switch or a back door that allows them to disable devices at scale and at will.

They could push out malicious updates, insert malware, or remotely disable devices. That could mean vehicles being turned off. Cranes and industrial machinery halted mid operation, financial terminals suddenly going offline. You could even see disruption to areas such as NHS refrigeration affecting drugs and blood supply. And Madam Deputy Speaker, the concern with this type of module is that it might not happen overnight. It might not be something that you immediately see. This is something that could be hidden for a number of weeks or months in different technologies and across different parts of our economy.

It would be incredibly difficult, nigh on impossible to prove exactly what had happened, who had done it, and to tie that to any one state actor with certainty, and certainly not something that could be done quickly, allowing for a full response, as was referenced by my hon. Friend earlier on, there are a number of examples of this from around the world. Perhaps the best known example of this was when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 and tried to steal more than two dozen John Deere tractors and ship them off to Chechnya.

Now the US company at that time, it was a US company which intervened to switch them off. It remotely, locked them out of the equipment, rendering the tractors useless. But that is the kind of action we could see China take in the event of a future crisis closer to home. My hon. Friend mentioned Norway testing two of their Chinese designed electric buses, one of them manufactured in the Netherlands and one built in China to discover exactly the same kill switch. Technology existed. I am

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happy to oblige. Does the hon. Member agree that,

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Does the hon. Member agree that, given that London Transport has now 500 Chinese buses ordered and on 500 Chinese buses ordered and on the streets of London, that there could. There is a glaring could. There is a glaring opportunity for huge embarrassment to this nation if those kill switches were ever used on the

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switches were ever used on the buses in our capital city. Can I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention? I think this proves why we need more awareness of the threat that we face. It is not necessarily a case of banning certain components or banning technologies, but we must be more aware and make sure that the government has the powers it needs

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to respond where possible. I thank my hon. Friend for giving way, and he is absolutely giving way, and he is absolutely right to say in his very, very eloquent speech that raising awareness is important and having a debate of this, because in debate of this, because in listening to him, I just thought that it is not necessarily the case that it is not necessarily the case that it would be hostile actors, but if the if the providers of the but if the if the providers of the modules were to stop providing the software updates, then the modules in themselves themselves would be more likely to fail and to be the subject of, of, of hostile attacks.

So it's not only that they could be killed by a hostile actor. It is also that the increased dependency on software updates puts us at risk. And an.

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Hon. Friend for her intervention. As ever, she is absolutely correct. How many of us have had some bit of technology break because the technology break because the firmware is no longer allowed to be updated, something no longer works, it's not supported any more and it breaks down immediately. I think the other threat to to add to what she just said as well, is that by she just said as well, is that by nature of something that is not updated regularly, it is therefore more vulnerable to attack by by other hackers that might not be state sponsored, but are taking advantage of a weaker part of technology as well.

And on a recent visit to Taiwan, that was something that was pointed out there as well, that their semiconductor industry is incredibly strong, but it builds the more high tech elements of, of, of semiconductors. And when I asked them about this, they said they wouldn't bother commit manufacturing, these types of technology because they were too cheap and simple to make. So it was something that could be mass produced at large. And on that, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will refer to my members of interest again to the trip to Taiwan recently taken.

It was not something I'd intended to raise during the speech, but there was an opportunity to do so there. Madam Deputy Speaker, the third element of risk is data extraction, as was mentioned by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green. Under Chinese national Intelligence law, companies and organisations are legally required to assist state intelligence agencies and handover data upon request, creating a systematic, systematic risk in the UK that any data accessible through a cellular Internet of Things module could ultimately be accessible to the Chinese state.

Modern vehicles, especially electric and autonomous vehicles, are effectively computers on wheels, continuously collecting data on drivers, surroundings and infrastructure. The US Select Committee on China recently warned that Chinese EVs are, and I quote, rolling data collection devices and argued that restricting Chinese made components is a national security imperative, and the US Department of Commerce has now moved to limit the deployment of software and communications equipment sourced from adversary governments in connected vehicles. Madam Deputy Speaker, those that are worried about China's reaction to such measures should be aware that they have already taken precisely those steps against the West.

Tesla cars have been banned not just from entering Chinese defence bases, but from various government agencies and authorities. Madam Deputy Speaker, I was concerned in the meeting mentioned by my hon. Friend that there was a suggestion by one of the officials that there was no need to concern ourselves with the threat of Chinese Internet of Things modules, because the threat threat was merely theoretical. Madam Deputy Speaker, as myself and others have shown today, these examples are not just theoretical, and frankly, most

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threats are theoretical until they. Are not. Until Madam Speaker this is happening now. It is happening across critical sectors and national infrastructure and other countries such as the US, the EU and Australia are all moving to and Australia are all moving to toughen up their legislation, specifically on cellular Internet of Things modules, and I believe of Things modules, and I believe the UK must take action as well. The amendments I proposed today ensure that the Cybersecurity and Resilience Bill explicitly covers those risks and gives Ministers the clarity and authority to act when necessary.

If this bill is truly strengthened the UK's cyber resilience, it must not leave one of the most serious threats to our modern and increasingly digital world outside its scope, and I would ask the government to work with me to address this threat of

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madam. Mr. Melanie Ward. Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. And to begin.

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And to begin. I hope you won't mind if I take a moment to reflect on the fact that today is the 10th anniversary of the murder of our dear friend, Jo Cox. I was lucky to serve along alongside Jo on the board of the alongside Jo on the board of the Labour Women's Network, and we had also done some other work previously. And I often sit here previously. And I often sit here and look at Jo's shield and wonder what she would have made of the state of our politics and our country and our world today, and think about how much better we would be if she was still here to contribute to it.

And I think Jo's most famous words, that we have far more in common than that which divides us, matters so much today. And as my friend the hon. Member for Midlothian has said today, holding on to Jo's words and keeping her spirit going, matter always, but they matter even more when it's difficult to do that. And I hope Jo's family and her friends, those closest to us, know how much

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she is missed and that we strive to carry her light forward with us. Yeah. Madam Deputy Speaker, the

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Madam Deputy Speaker, the threats that cyber attacks pose increase every year, and the nature of cyber threats we face is of cyber threats we face is continually developing. Last year, the UK faced 204 nationally significant cyber incidents attacks which threaten large organisations, local and central government or our local and central government or our other essential services. This represents an increase of more than double compared to 2024. The attacks are speeding up and so must regulation. I am glad that this bill brings data centres into the scope of network and Information Systems regulations, given that they underpin nearly all economic activity and public services.

Current NIS regulations are limited to sectors deemed critical. In 2016, a year after OpenAI was founded and five years before the foundation of anthropic, it is high time that our cybersecurity regulations caught up with the pace of threats, including those from Russia who are already seriously targeting our country. As we have learned more about just this week. But this is where I believe we need to go further, particularly in limiting the threat posed by AI to our cybersecurity and our critical national infrastructure.

I will focus my speech on UK data centres and the scope to maintain cyber defences around them. In this bill, AI has the power to bring enormous benefits to our society and economy, from healthcare to productivity, AI growth will rely on having the
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Kanishka Narayan Portrait Kanishka Narayan MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology) (Vale of Glamorgan, Labour)
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right infrastructure to support it. Of course, this means the installation of data centres across installation of data centres across our country. These data centres should be located in appropriate places, making use of former industrial sites and brownfield land wherever possible, in locations and settings that are as discreet as possible. My constituents in a small village in my constituency are right to state that the fields beside their village are not an appropriate setting for a large data centre, as is currently proposed in Scotland.

There have been no changes to planning law to take account of the advent of data centres and the resources that they require. I hope the Scottish Government will recognise this and rapidly change planning law so that villages like OCHA Bootle are not put in this situation. Residents in Och2ch2oh are also right in their concern that Fife Council does not at this stage, appear to be taking full account of the environmental impact of a huge data centre like this, and that is why I have challenged this with the council.

Scottish law must be brought up to date, as has already been done in other parts of the UK. We have an abundance of former industrial sites in Scotland and in Fife, which would be much more appropriate for locations for infrastructure like this. AI will do incredible things while transforming society, and there is no point in anyone denying that or trying to turn back the clock. Indeed, it is incumbent upon us to ensure that the UK is a world leader in AI and the good that it can do.

I know that is a point that the Minister will agree with, but the pace at which the technology is developing and the pace at which safety regulation is developing, are vastly different. Powerful models like Anthropic's mythos are redefining the cybersecurity landscape with potentially catastrophic effects for our critical national infrastructure. Mythos has exposed previously undiscovered flaws in every major
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Julia Lopez Portrait Julia Lopez MP (Hornchurch and Upminster, Conservative)
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operating system and every major web browser, putting at risk our social and economic security. In social and economic security. In the past week alone, the Trump administration, not exactly known for its heavy handedness in regulating the tech sector, imposed an export control directive on an export control directive on Anthropic's fable five and mythos five, citing national security five, citing national security concerns. This means that the administration felt so concerned about the model's effect on national security that it decided no.

No one outside the US should have access to it. Here in the UK, the National Cyber Security Council has predicted that it is highly likely that cyber attackers will be able to use AI to help them find zero day vulnerabilities. What that means is that powerful models like mythos would be able to aid cyber attackers in exploiting vulnerabilities in defence systems that our experts had not previously been aware of. Similarly, as the race to AI superintelligence quickens, where the capabilities of AI models surpass the capabilities of any human, it is crucial that we have control over our data systems, as well as over AI.

More widely. For all of our history, humans have been the most intelligent beings on this planet. Yet superintelligence means that AI systems could begin acting outside of our control and in ways that are currently beyond our understanding. This will have extremely dangerous consequences for humanity. We must be able to switch it off if we need to. Currently we cannot. This is clearly unacceptable and must change. That is why I am speaking in support of New Clause 12. In the name of my friend, the hon.

Member for Leeds Central and Headingley. This amendment would provide the Secretary of State with a kill switch on data centres in case of a catastrophic risk posed by a UK data centre. The national risk registers most serious level of risk. The government must have control over data centres in the UK. The innovation in AI is spectacular, but all too often its developers live in a world of their own without government regulation, particularly in the United States, where they have been given carte blanche to press ahead with AI development despite any security risks.

This week I was proud to see our Labour government announced a ban on under 16 seconds accessing social media, which many of us have campaigned for since we were elected to this place. Many of my constituents across Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy, especially teachers and parents, told me that they want this to happen. But the complexity and implementing the ban shows how hard it is to use rearguard action to regulate a technology that should have had more attention over a decade ago. While social media has many positives, the damage that it's able to do to our democracy and our young people has been and our young people has been driven, of course, by many of the same tech bros who are now telling us that they need a regulation free environment to develop AI.

I will. environment to develop AI. I will.
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Russia and Iran, are seeking to exploit loopholes, and I do believe that this is something that the government has to take further action on, that's for sure. We should not wait to find out whether AI has the potential to damage our AI has the potential to damage our critical national infrastructure. We know in some cases that it does, and we should be prepared for it. Catastrophic risk includes harm to critical infrastructure, national security or a severe large scale harm to human life.

Governments should have the power to prevent these risks from coming to pass. It is our number one duty to keep our citizens safe. In a speech in April, the Secretary of State argued in favour of greater AI sovereignty in the UK. These kill switches would provide exactly that. Sovereign control over the most dangerous risks posed by artificial intelligence. New clause 12 includes proportionality and accountability, and the costs of implementing kill switches on data centres is minimal, particularly in comparison to the financial losses associated with major cyber attacks, and we have heard more about that from many of my hon.

Friends in this debate. This amendment would ensure that there would be parliamentary reporting within seven days of any direction from the Secretary of State and a debate in this House at the earliest opportunity. Any operator served in the direction would have an immediate right to receive a High Court review. Madam Deputy Speaker, we are elected to this House first and foremost to keep our nation safe. AI developers are moving at a pace far, far faster than governments, and they are racing towards superintelligence.

It is crucial that if or more likely, when that is achieved, we have the right safeguards in place to avoid catastrophic outcomes. That is a crucial part of our national resilience, an issue which I and others also present today continue to speak about because it badly needs more attention. This amendment does not seek to stymie the development of AI systems that could bring radical benefits to our society. Instead, it provides the government with a suitable mechanism to stay ahead and in control of real threats to our critical national infrastructure.

That is why I support New clause 12, and I hope the government will do the same. If not, then I ask the Minister to set out how the government plans to ensure that we

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have these powers, which are so clearly needed. I call Chris Vince.

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I call Chris Vince. Thank you, Madam. Deputy Speaker, and. I thank. All those. On friends and all members who

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On friends and all members who have contributed to what has been a really good, and, I think, very really good, and, I think, very well-meaning debate. I intend to keep my contributions fairly brief. People will be relieved to know. I People will be relieved to know. I say to the hon. Member from Chingford, I don't pretend to be an expert when it comes to cyber security and resilience, although other members across the House will say that's never stopped me talking before.

However, it was a pleasure to be on the bill committee for this particular piece of legislation, in part because I think of the very constructive nature across the House, in the Committee stage, where, as members will know, the shadow Minister. Now, I sat very passively throughout and said very little, which was, you know, common for me. But because this is actually a really important piece of legislation. And as members across the House have said rightly, it is the first duty of any government to protect its citizens.

And as we move forward into a more technological, advanced world, there are obviously huge benefits to that, but there are real challenges as well, and we need as a country to be ready for them. It was also a pleasure in the Committee stage to have the opportunity to mention my father in law, Professor Robin Bloomfield, who is professor of cyber security at the City University, London. Not least because I need all the brownie points I can get, but also to reference the fact that I have a data centre in my constituency of Harlow, the cow data centre named after Charlie Cow, who along with George Hockham, created the fibre optic cable within Harlow.

So it's fair to say I've got some skin in the game in terms of the importance of this legislation. When I looked through the list of amendments, the first thing I thought was the Liberal Democrats have been busying themselves, although I do say to them genuinely, I welcome the conversations about the need to protect local government and also electoral services, although I don't think they necessarily need to be covered in this legislation. I hope that the Minister has listened to the comments made by the Liberal Democrats, and this is a conversation that absolutely we can come back to about this House, because clearly, it's hugely important that our particularly our democratic services, are protected in this country and not eroded by bad state actors, as have been discussed previously.

I will give

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way. Thank you. On the point of local government, clearly there are government, clearly there are hundreds of local authorities and many of them are busy in to upgrade their systems. But one thing that their systems. But one thing that isn't spoken about enough is the human capacity to actually do the work. And I think many local authorities, like government itself, authorities, like government itself, finds a real difficulty in recruiting the talent that it needs. Does he agree with me that the Does he agree with me that the central government can provide a greater role in almost like a centre of excellence for cyber security that can assist local

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government? I thank my hon. Friend for that. As a former councillor in a As a former councillor in a district council that was bordering London, I know of the particular London, I know of the particular challenges we had recruiting those those, those those really decent council officers. We had some council officers. We had some fantastic council officers in Harlow District Council. I should put that on the record. But it was always more difficult to recruit because they were drawn particularly to London.

So I recognise the challenges that he suggests, and I obviously want to see more support given to those professionals to understand the risks of cyber security. I'm just going to give my my my father in law is very much retired. So I'm not, you know, giving him a job, but I'm sure he would be very keen to see that as well. And actually, it brings me quite nicely on to the point I was going to make reference to my hon. Friend from Warwick and Leamington who who spoke very well with a great deal of expertise on this topic.

But he, he, he referenced something that I referenced in the Committee stage was the fact that this legislation, you know, whether we think it goes further or not, even if we think this legislation is perfect, it's this legislation won't be enough. And we do really need to think about that culture shift when it comes to cyber security. So I welcome his comments on that, and I would ask the Minister to reflect on those in his final words. I did say I wouldn't give a very long speech, and I've been on my feet longer than I thought I would, which is typical of me.

Just to finish then, Madam Deputy Speaker, last year, over a 1000 11,000 NHS appointments and procedures were lost due to the cyber security attacks, and for too long, successive governments have failed to properly address the growing threats from cyber criminals and hostile states. I am pleased that this government is addressing it by giving regulator's new powers to designate which suppliers are
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Richard Quigley Portrait Richard Quigley MP (Isle of Wight West, Labour)
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and UK security. I, the chair of the Select Committee, earlier raised the interconnectedness raised the interconnectedness between data security and national security, and I endorse her amendments. When it comes to amendments. When it comes to Internet of Things modules and the potential threat of hostile states to act, to switch off various to act, to switch off various pieces of infrastructure around our country. I'd also urged Ministers to keep pushing further on the threat of hostile state threat of hostile state disinformation on social media, which has been referenced in this debate as well.

This is a fundamental security issue. Russia and others do not only try to knock systems offline, they also try to rot public trust, spread falsehoods and undermine democracy. So the technical threat and the information threat are part of the same hostile playbook. I do wonder whether regulators have sufficient resources to act, and I'll listen carefully to the minister's response on new clause seven on that. Ultimately, this bill doesn't solve every problem, but it is a serious and a necessary step forward.

It strengthens resilience, it widens responsibility, improves reporting and gives government clearer partners a clearer powers where national security is at risk. And so I support the bill.

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Shadow Minister. Ben Spencer. Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker And before I begin, I'd also like to make some remarks in commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the murder of Jo Cox. I never met Jo Cox. I never knew Jo Cox. And I'm very sad that I didn't, because seeing the impact that she's had on our politics in this place and the people who knew her, place and the people who knew her, she was clearly an incredible person. And I don't think anyone can disagree with what she stood for, and in particular, more in common in our politics.

And our politics is worse off without her. And yet again, we return to this government's vacant vacillation regarding our national security. And today, I urge the Minister again to take this opportunity to strengthen UK cyber security from the threat posed by foreign state actors. Protecting the UK and its citizens is the primary responsibility of government and still, in the face of clear evidence of increasing threats, this government fails to act. The risks of physical threats and the need to invest in defence are clear to all.

And yet the government prioritises increasing welfare spending over the safety and security of armed forces, personnel and our country. The situation is so serious that the Defence Secretary had to resign, as he could not defend the inaction of this government or the risks they are taking. And while the dangers presented to our cyber security may be less visible, they are no less real hostile. State actors are working every single hour of every single day to undermine our democracy and our security.

These are risks every member across this House will be aware of. It's chilling to know that when Iran shut down its internet access, social media accounts purporting to be pro-independence, Scottish people stopped tweeting. Expert analysis has estimated thousands of similar accounts could originate in Iran, and as much as 26% of such accounts could be fake. Social media is now a weapon. We know hostile state actors have sought to attack and undermine Parliament, and just last week we were told that spyware had been discovered in government buildings linked to recent high profile decisions regarding China's controversial mega embassy project in London.

Thank you. Very happy to give way.

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But I've often said about the device that we find in MCHLG. But of course, unless you're a member of staff, you can't get to that side of the building without going through the Home Office, which obviously raises a very serious obviously raises a very serious questions about the complex Marsham Street, I think, more broadly. But does the accept that there is a does the accept that there is a pattern here of foreign malign forces impacting our institutions, whether it's our Parliament,
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Preet Kaur Gill Portrait Preet Kaur Gill MP, The Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Health and Social Care (Birmingham Edgbaston, Labour )
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whether it's our Parliament, whether it's even the sovereignty of the United Kingdom itself, and unless there is resolved by governments and all parties in this place, we aren't going to face it with the scale of the response

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that's needed. Yeah. Well, I thank him very much for his intervention and the knowledge and experience which he brings to and experience which he brings to some of the background of that particular case. And I entirely agree that it is incumbent on all agree that it is incumbent on all parties across both sides of this House in terms of strengthening our national security and being clear national security and being clear eyed of the threat of hostile state actors, which is something I'm going to continue to develop in my going to continue to develop in my wider speech at this Report stage, the evidence is clear that we face an increasing threat from foreign state actors.

We need to take action to recognise these risks and prevent such attacks. Cyber security should be at the forefront of our defences and for this reason, His Majesty's loyal opposition have focussed again on amendments listed today as in clause 15 and in clause 14, in the hope that the government will not squander another opportunity to act in this Bill. New clause 14 requires the government to directly identify the threats we face, ending the prevarication we have seen in recent months by obliging the Secretary of State to establish and maintain by regulation a list of foreign powers presenting a significant cyber security risk to the UK.

The amendment was strengthened. Link between intelligence agencies and policy enforcement, ensuring that decisions by the Secretary of State to deploy special national security direction powers or based on Gchq's verified risk assessments regarding hostile states and state affiliated groups not reacting after an attack occurs, but creating a proactive framework to evaluate and mitigate threats built directly into the UK supply chains. Ensuring the UK is better prepared to deal with cyber threats and attacks from hostile state actors. With the risks continuing to grow, these decisions cannot remain at the political whim of a government that is reluctant to act.

So let's talk about the Dragon in the room. In 2024, the NCSC confirmed that China state affiliated actors were responsible for cyber attacks on the UK Electoral Commission and Parliament in 2021 and 22. Yet this government continues to refuse to recognise China as a threat to the UK. New clause 14 would compel the government to formally recognise what is readily apparent to those on these benches, to our security services and to so many members across both houses who have spoken with urgent concern regarding the security risks China and other foreign state actors pose to the United Kingdom.

New clause 14 would force the government to acknowledge that China is a threat. I turn now to our new clause 15. In view of this established and growing threat, new clause 15 compels the Secretary of State to review state sponsored cyber threats to the UK's infrastructure, including, amongst other areas, the cyber security risk to surrounding critical networks and the vicinity of the super embassy site in the City of London. As I said during Committee stage, there is simply no point in granting the Secretary of State powers to issue directions on the basis of national security.

If the government is not willing to be clear eyed about the most critical national and cyber security threats to this nation, this amendment also strikes an important balance between ensuring parliamentary scrutiny and recognising and protecting the sensitive nature of some of the material, which may be unearthed. By making provision for such information to be sent to the Intelligence and Scrutiny Committee of Parliament. Despite resisting calls to address this risk during previous stages of this bill's progression through the House, I am pleased that the government have now taken some action to address risks from foreign state actors.

The publication last week of the government's National Security State Threats Bill comes in response to a sharp spike in state backed intelligence operations, sabotage and proxy violence. The government's own explanatory notes state threats to the UK from foreign states are persistent and take many forms, including espionage, foreign interference in the UK's political system, sabotage, disinformation, cyber ops and even assassinations. Collectively, these are referred to by the government as state threats. Yet the bill itself does not want mention cybersecurity and contains no provision to require assessment of the risks posed.

It does not apply to states themselves and therefore can only be complemented and strengthened by the amendments I put forward today on behalf of His Majesty's opposition. These clauses, new clause 14 and 15, are clauses that no responsible government or member of this House could vote against. I turn now to amendment three. In the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green. Exemption from disclosure and rights to fair trial. I am really proud to call him both a friend and to work with him on this issue, especially for his fight for the rule of law and fair trials.

As the Member of Parliament for Runnymede and Weybridge. This amendment would prevent the sharing of information with overseas authorities for the purpose of prosecuting crimes not committed in the UK. If the Secretary of State determines that the receiving country is one in which the right to a fair trial cannot be guaranteed, it would address a genuine human rights concerns and would close a loophole in the bill that currently fails to anticipate politically motivated requests from authoritarian states. It will help block hostile state actors such as Russia, China or Iran from probing our systems to detect firmware backdoors or vulnerabilities within the UK's utility networks, healthcare systems, data centres and more.

The amendment also creates a statutory duty for the Secretary of State to submit an annual report to Parliament, just justifying which foreign jurisdictions are trusted or barred from intelligence sharing. This alone would be invaluable, and would prevent the many fruitless hours of questions in the business Chamber from these benches. Seeking to get a clear answer as to whether the government sees countries such as China as a threat. As per my earlier remarks, I am therefore pleased, on behalf of His Majesty's opposition, to be supporting the right hon.

Member's amendment today. Before I finish up, I'd just like to pay tribute to the chair of the Select Committee and the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne, Central and West and her comments, which were also shared by others regarding the risk from Internet of Things and cellular modules. I think this is a very important area which we need to get right. Madam Deputy Speaker, I want to conclude by addressing the amendments tabled by colleagues on the benches to my left regarding digital sovereignty and the impact this approach could have on the UK.

Nuclear 13 is the clearest demonstration to date that the Liberal Democrats do not understand the tech sector or global supply chains. Of course, it is right to support British business, but it is not feasible or possible in a global market or supply chain to achieve full sovereignty. Rather, we should prioritise capacities and capabilities and ensure the UK has

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an indispensable role in global supply chains. Very happy to give way and. I thank the hon. Member for

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I thank the hon. Member for giving way. I would just clarify that I don't think the hon. Member has understood our amendment, which is about having a strategy which is is about having a strategy which is not saying that everything is sovereign, but we need to look at our tech stack and actually have a strategy over what is sovereign and strategy over what is sovereign and what is the procurement of elements. So I would just remind the member

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to look at that amendment again. I thank the Member for her intervention. I refer the member to amendment 13, particularly subsection three, part C, where she makes it very clear the burden on companies to deviate from foreign technologies, which I think would be quite a burden. We need to back Britain in key sectors from quantum photonics, chip design, innovation. In so many areas. We lead the world not to try and fail to restrict influence and the access of global markets, not protectionism, but leverage to back Britain and position us.

So we are indispensable in the modern global tech sector and supply chains. So no, we have to give way.

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The hon. Member agree that if we are to excel, we must excel in a UK are to excel, we must excel in a UK wide basis. Therefore, would he agree that it would be a very retrograde step to allow part of retrograde step to allow part of the United Kingdom, subject to, in other jurisdictions, AI regulations other jurisdictions, AI regulations rather than those of the United Kingdom? And does he agree with me Kingdom? And does he agree with me that it is imperative that the AI regulations which govern our digital sector are those of this

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Parliament and not those of the European Parliament? I thank the hon. Member for

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I thank the hon. Member for North Antrim for his intervention. I do not want any part of the UK to I do not want any part of the UK to be subject to the awful AI act, which has been passed by the European Union, and I just want to European Union, and I just want to reflect that Northern Ireland and in particular Belfast really, really is a technological really is a technological powerhouse that we should be very proud of and make sure it continues to go from strength to strength as part of our fantastic union.

And in conclusion, when I'm Deputy Speaker, I repeat, we will not be backing new clause 13 because we understand on these benches how markets and global supply chains work because we believe in Britain. I beg to move new clauses 1415 and amendment three.

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Minister Kanishka Narayan. Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.

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Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. And can I foremost start by echoing the thoughts of many members across the House and in particular, my hon. the House and in particular, my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley and my hon. Friend the Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy. I do not know Jo Cox, Kirkcaldy. I do not know Jo Cox, but I admired her deeply, and I think as we talk about resilience for our country, her central for our country, her central message there is no deeper root for resilience than in the unity of our country and community is a message top of mind for all of us in this House.

It is a pleasure, Madam Deputy Speaker, to bring this important bill back to the House this afternoon. It is a bill which will increase our cyber defences and resilience, making the UK an even safer place to live and do business. Let me first begin by thanking members on both sides of the chamber for their valuable contributions to this debate, the expertise they brought to it, as well as throughout the passage of this bill to date. In particular, I would like to thank them for the recognition they have made of my core belief, which is that the central question for our national security and resilience is the question of our technological and AI capability.

We tested the bill's measures carefully before introduction, but we have also since listened to feedback. There are a small number of minor technical drafting improvements that I'll briefly go through and tabling government amendments as follows. Government amendments 16 and 17 ensure that regulators can ask for the information they need to fulfil their obligations under the NIS regulations. This does not give regulators any new powers. It simply confirms the current reasons for requesting information under the regulations will still apply under the updated regulations.

Amendments seven and eight make changes to align with the information gathering amendments made at amendments 16 and 17. Government amendment 11 makes consequential changes following an amendment passed at public Bill Committee. That amendment enables information sharing between NIS Regulations regulators and other public authorities for cyber matters outside the scope of the regulations in NIS government amendments 14 and 15 clarify the safeguards for information sharing gateways and amendments nine, ten, 12 and 13 make necessary changes to ensure the rest of the clause is consistent with the change made by amendment 14.

Government amendments 18 to 26 to clause 57 allow regulators and the Secretary of State to issue notices related to the powers of direction to nominated representatives of regulated entities. I have also tabled Government Amendment 27, which corrects minor drafting errors to ensure the bill works as intended. Members have raised a series of questions and I will thematically address them in course. First, the question of scope that has been raised by new clauses for 2021, five, eight and nine. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and and West, the chair of the Select Committee, who brings consistent expertise and experience to these questions, as well as the chair of the Select Committee, the hon.

Friend for Warwick and Leamington, as well as hon. Members for Harpenden and Berkhamsted and Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe. They have made amendments on the services in scope of the Bill. All organisations, from high street shops to manufacturing giants, should take steps to increase their cyber security and resilience. The Government and National Cyber Security Centre are making sure the right tools are available for every part of the economy. I am sympathetic to their intent and in particular to the intent of my hon.

Friend the Member for Middlesbrough South, when he talks about the impacts on local communities of cyber security incidents. This government has committed to reviewing whether new activities need to be brought into scope of the NIS regulations, but it is. It is essential that any such decision is based on a systematic and specific assessment of carefully considering whether the regulation in these particular parts of statute are the most appropriate response. The NIS regime has been put in place to protect the most essential parts of our economy, often those whose disruption would cause an imminent threat to life.

It is focussed on a specific set of tests where sectors have little or no alternative service provision in the in in the event of disruption, and reflects the latest systematic evidence of the threats that each sector faces. And so in that context, all government departments with sectoral responsibility work with their sectors on broader cyber resilience. DEFRA does so with food, DVT on retail and automotive and so on. The National Cyber Security Centre also has strong relationships across sectors, actively working with them to share best practice incident insights, strengthen overall resilience, such as engaging through the British Retail Consortium following incidents affecting the sector last year.

The food sector specifically is unique amongst other critical sectors because of its high levels of diversity. In the analysis underpinning the judgements made in this bill, there are approximately 20,000 small and medium food manufacturers in the UK alone and many more farms, distribution centres, retailers, other types of businesses that form the UK's food supply chain. Given the lack of a single point of failure, we think that there are more proportionate levers to pull rather than bringing food in scope of the NIS regime. We have made similar judgements about other sectors on the basis of that systematic analysis, as I have shared across both previous stages and committee stages of this bill.

Could you give where the. I'm very happy to give way.

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I thank my hon. Friend for giving way, but just specifically on that, I do accept the point on that, I do accept the point about the great number and plethora of businesses in the food supply of businesses in the food supply sector, lots of SME businesses, but the point that the amendment that I was putting forward is there to was putting forward is there to push is, is, is simply seeking commonality with that which the commonality with that which the European Union has pushed for.

And why can it not be the right thing for the UK government to do as well?

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Well, I'm happy to write to the chair of the Select Committee about comparisons with the EU, but the comparisons with the EU, but the broad thrust is we have undertaken a specific analysis of whether the burdens of this Bill should apply in a systematic and proportionate in a systematic and proportionate and coherent way to sectors, and as a result, as I've mentioned, that analysis suggests that food supply analysis suggests that food supply is not in scope for the reasons I've mentioned, which is primarily of diversity of supply.

But if he's of diversity of supply. But if he's happy to engage, I'd be delighted to engage with him. On the question of why Europe took a different decision. We have based it on the basis of our particular analysis here. On the question of local government, the government's cyber action plan, I might make a slight bit of progress if I can come back to the chair of the Select Committee. Surely the government's cyber action plan is the overarching strategy to raise public sector standards across government, including local government.

Mhclg has taken action to strengthen local authorities cyber resilience, backed by £29 million of cyber grant funding, technical support and the adoption of the Cyber Assessment Framework for local government. And can I, in that spirit, also take my hon. Friend from Oldham, West Point, particularly seriously on supporting capacity even further, with centralised capacity support from the government, digital service and other parts of cyber capability in central government to the Joint Election Security and Preparedness Unit, or JSP, also works to protect UK elections and referendums raised by members of the House today, co-ordinating across government for response to threats, including cyber risks.

Jeff works very closely with the National Cyber Security Centre, producing guidance for organisations involved in delivering elections, electoral infrastructure, in particular local authorities. Jess and NCSC regularly engage with political party representatives to the question of a register of foreign powers has been raised as part of two amendments tabled by the shadow Minister. The first would require the creation of a register of foreign states that pose a risk to the UK, based on GCHQ advice for the purpose of exercising powers under part four, I would like to assure the Shadow Minister, as I did in committee, that the use of these powers will always be underpinned by robust intelligence.

This includes, where relevant information about state actors involved in cyber threats. As a result, it is unclear what additional support this register would provide the Secretary of State. The second would require the government to annually report on risks posed by foreign powers. Drafting a report of vulnerabilities would simply duplicate existing assessments and risk distracting government from more effective measures to protect the UK from hostile foreign actors. The shadow Minister also proposes that information, which cannot be included in the report for national security reasons, is sent to the Intelligence and Security Committee.

I made it clear to him, and the government has done so, both the Committee stage and broadly, that, of course, we value the independent and robust oversight that the Intelligence and Security Committee provides on behalf of Parliament. We do not consider the report described in this amendment to sit within the ICC's current oversight remit, as outlined in the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the committee's Memorandum of Understanding with the Prime Minister. The government is actively reviewing that committee's existing Memorandum of Understanding with the Prime Minister and will, of course, update the House in due course.

The government tabled the amendment tabled by the Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted would require the government to assess how many entities regulated by the NIS regime are owned in part or full by foreign states, and the risks that these poses. Publishing a review identifying national security risks caused by foreign state ownership would provide valuable insight for our adversaries. Furthermore, conducting assessment of the ownership structure of every in-scope entity within six months would be disproportionately resource intensive. It would distract government from more effective measures to protect our services.

I thank my hon. Friends, the members. I'm happy to give way.

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Thank the Minister for giving way, and I'd like to take him back to the question of bringing in the to the question of bringing in the retail sector to the provisions of this bill. In his comments, he seems to be saying that cyber security in resilience only requires government intervention when there is an immediate an when there is an immediate an immediate threat to life. Could you clarify if that is what he's saying? Because my understanding is that we Because my understanding is that we need to keep our economy and citizens secure in all circumstances.

And on the question of proportionality, my amendment seeks to only bring in very large businesses so that so that the requirements of cyber security on them are proportionate. But we know that they are not taking the measures to keep cyber secure, as

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they've seen from M&S and JLR and others recently. Well, it's very rare for me to

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Well, it's very rare for me to seek a point of divergence from the chair of the Select Committee, given her experience and expertise. But on this particular question, first, I'm absolutely not saying that government support is only limited to a certain number of sectors covered by this bill. There sectors covered by this bill. There are a range of other ways in which government acts to support sectors outside of the scope of this bill. I think that is the right thing to I think that is the right thing to do.

The scope of this particular bill, the only horizontally applicable bill to large parts of the economy, is very systematically and specifically set to sectors which are both significant as essential services, where there is significant disruption and particular threat to life and where alternative supply is limited. And for those reasons, we have excluded retail. The consideration of scale of business is not currently in that rubric, because there are businesses that are small in scale but very material in life threatening impacts as well. I hope that is satisfactory, but can I thank my hon.

Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar and Newcastle upon Tyne Central and the chair of the Select Committee for amendments about risks posed by communications modules made or controlled outside the UK. I'm sympathetic to their concerns. However, the bill's approach is intentionally technology and incident agnostic. Instead of reacting to individual components in isolation, we focus on structural checkpoints and systematic dependencies. In this context, there are a range of other levers investment scrutiny screening through National Security and Investment Act, telecoms and cyber data security requirements to protect data and networks supply chain measures such as those in the Procurement Act, diversification requirements to reduce dependency and build resilience, all of which I think are important levers to respond to the deeply significant concerns raised in that context.

I might make a slight bit of progress if that's all right. Can I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley for his amendments relating to AI emergencies. I recognise his concern and those of my hon. Friend the Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy. Technology is evolving rapidly. Government must be equipped to respond. That is why the Bill grants a power to enable the Secretary of State to direct regulated entities. If the compromise of their network and information system, or the threat of it gives rise to a national security risk.

This could, for example, require an entity to cease using or isolating an AI model. These powers are a backstop to an effective cyber security regime, enabling government to act swiftly in the face of unexpected national security threats. They are also designed to be proportionate, recognising the need for stability amongst regulated entities and the importance of proper accountability. And so, whilst I share my hon. Friend's concerns, can I encourage both of them to work with the government on a systematic range of ways in which we can mitigate some of the risks that they have rightly highlighted as well? I'm very happy to give way in the first instance,

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and I can come back just there. Is there is obviously a level of complexity here in relation to the complexity here in relation to the data centre AI development, the network in the UK and more broadly. So will the Minister commit to So will the Minister commit to meeting with myself and the honourable colleague from Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath to discuss this further?

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further? Later to. Thank my hon. Friend for giving way. I would be more than happy to work with the than happy to work with the government on something which will provide specific protections against Internet of Things modules. Can I can I ask him, though, just to ask, what assessment he has made of the specific threat to Internet of Things modules and how that is protected? Exactly. In the legislation that he laid out. Minister. Can I suggest, given the specificity of his ask, that I come back to him, but the broad thrust is through the investment control legislation we have through procurement legislation, we have there are a series of responsibilities on government departments to look at it.

And so, given Madam Deputy Speakers encouragement, I will move on. Can I very importantly, just finally, Madam Deputy Speaker, respond to the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green, who raised a very important point as well. I share his diagnosis. That's the most important thing to say. For reasons of mostly technical drafting. I disagree with his prescription. I hope he'll take it in the spirit intended. In particular, the amendment risks creating undue uncertainty in law for many other areas in which we don't have an explicit requirement.

And so whilst I share his diagnosis, I share his objective. I hope we can work together in considering how to best give it effect, including through the Fco's overseas security and justice mechanisms for information sharing as well. Madam Deputy Speaker, can

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I thank all hon. Members for their consideration and comment? I'm happy to give way. Can I draw the Minister back to

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Can I draw the Minister back to a point I raised with him at an earlier stage of this bill, when he gave me what I would call a holding reply. The point is, when this legislation goes through, is the legislation goes through, is the whole United Kingdom going to be subject to it, or is my part of the United Kingdom Northern Ireland United Kingdom Northern Ireland going to be subject to the EU AI laws as they affect the digital sector? Such industries in my constituency want to know, are they going to be governed by this act, or are they going to be governed by the EU's AI? In other words, is the EU's AI law and the EU Cyber Resilient Act going to be added to annexe two of the Windsor framework, which would give them superiority and direct application to Northern Ireland.

Could we have an answer?

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Are they going to be added or not? Well, the hon. Member will be aware, in my response to a recent question from him, that both the question from him, that both the complexity of the act and its interaction with the Windsor framework are under consideration. framework are under consideration. At the moment. The EU has made a proposal, we are working with them on it, and I will be happy to engage with him on that particular

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engage with him on that particular question in due course as well. I'm very happy to give way. I'm grateful for giving way. I I'm not quite certain that I understand his reasons why he cannot accept the amendment, tweak it or work with it in the other place. The reality is that we are opening the door in this bill in a way that we wouldn't have done otherwise to the use of information which may predicate a failure for some British citizens sitting in a in a country where the rule of law does not protect them in the courts.

And I think this is a risk that the government is taking by making it worse, not better. So whilst he has some agreement with my principle of this, surely this is the time to

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put it right in the bill. I thank the right hon. Member. As I say, I agree a lot with his As I say, I agree a lot with his diagnosis, but let me let me state in further detail the reasons for objecting on the mechanism. One, because the provisions for information sharing are deeply discretionary for UK regulators to the subject in which they can the subject in which they can pursue that information sharing are restricted to matters which are significant for national security and domestic crime prevention in and domestic crime prevention in the UK.

Three, because the amendment is drafted, risks creating undue uncertainty in law. If this is the only regime where there is a specific reference to fair trial explicitly on the face of the bill, it calls into question how other information sharing regimes are interpreted. For example, the Online Safety Act, section 114. In other words, drafted as it is, it could invite legal challenge where a regulator exercises their discretion not to disclose this on on the basis in other regimes, because there is no explicit exclusion.

So for those reasons, whilst I totally agree with his diagnosis and his objective, I'm afraid the amendment in question risks undermining that objective. Madam Deputy Speaker, I'm afraid I am testing your patience, and for those reasons, I'm delighted with the support of this House. I think. Well, with your permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will very happily take another intervention.

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I thank Madam Deputy Speaker and I thank the Minister for for generously giving away. Again, I generously giving away. Again, I have no desire to test the House by pushing my amendments to a vote, so pushing my amendments to a vote, so I would be happy if I could receive his assurance that I take his points on not having technology points on not having technology specific regulation where possible, but could I receive his assurance that he will work with me and my committee and other hon.

Members to look at the needs to safeguard where there are technology specific risks?

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Yeah. As ever, I'd be delighted to work with the chair of the Select Committee on a range of technology questions, including this one. Madam Deputy Speaker, I am delighted with the support this House has shown for the intention House has shown for the intention and principles of this Bill and for their consistent, principled scrutiny and on those grounds, I

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scrutiny and on those grounds, I commend this bill to the House. Alex Sobel I just want to refer

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Alex Sobel I just want to refer the hon. Member for Chingford Right Honourable Greens amendment. I think we have made some progress now on the front bench, but it's clear that that trying to isolate the issues around fair trial from other matters are complex. So repeating my earlier call would would the Minister meet with myself, the hon. Member for Chief Whip Green and others who signed his

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amendments to try and explore the complexities of this after this division. Now. Madam Deputy Speaker, I can

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Madam Deputy Speaker, I can confirm the government will be very happy to work with the hon. Member and the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford to engage on Chingford and Woodford to engage on this question further. I commend the Bill to this House.

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the Bill to this House. Victoria Collins and thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. Just before I withdraw new clause two, I'd just like to put on the record and like to put on the record and reference to my earlier speech to ask members to refer to my register of interests. I would like to

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formally withdraw new amendment, new clause two. Is it your pleasure that new

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Is it your pleasure that new clause two be withdrawn? Amendment clause two be withdrawn? Amendment by. Leave withdrawn. New clause 13 has been selected for separate decision. I call the Liberal Liberal Democrat spokesperson to move New clause 13 formally.

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Formally. Digital sovereignty strategy on risks posed by foreign interference and reliance on foreign technologies. The question is that technologies. The question is that New clause 13 be read a second time. As many as are of that opinion, say I of the contrary. No, no. Clear The The question The question is The question is that The question is that New clause 13 be read a second time. As many as are of that opinion, say I, I of the contrary.

No, no. The tellers. For the eyes are Claire Young and Charlotte Cane. The Tellers for the noes Imogen Walker Order, Order, order.

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The ayes to the right of the 77. The noes to the left 255.

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The noes to the left 255. The ayes to the right were. 77 the noes to the left. 255 so the the noes to the left. 255 so the noes have it. The noes have it unlock. New clause 14 has been selected for separate decision. I call the opposition spokesperson to move new clause 14 formally.

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I beg to move 1314 formally. Register of Foreign Powers for

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Register of Foreign Powers for the purposes of part four. The question is that new clause 14 be question is that new clause 14 be read a second time. As many as are of that opinion say aye. Of the Is Is that Is that new Is that new clause Is that new clause 14 Is that new clause 14 be Is that new clause 14 be read Is that new clause 14 be read a second time. As many as of that opinion say aye.

I of the contrary. No, no. The tellers. For the eyes are James Wild and Rebecca Smith. The Tellers for the noes Imogen

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Order. Order. Order!

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Order. Order! Order. Order! The Order. Order! The ayes Order. Order! The ayes to Order. Order! The ayes to the

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Order. Order! The ayes to the right 151. The noes to the left. right 151. The noes to the left. 258. The ayes to the right were 151. The noes to the left 258. So the noes have it. The noes have it unlock. With the leave of the house. I will put a single question on government amendment 7 to 14. I call the Minister to move

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formally. Take to move formally. The question is that Government

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The question is that Government amendment 7 to 14 be made. As many as are of that opinion, say I, I of as are of that opinion, say I, I of the contrary. No, I think the ayes have it. The ayes have it. have it. The ayes have it. Amendment three has been selected for separate decision. I call Sir

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Iain Duncan Smith to move the amendment formally. I beg to move the amendment standing. My name and that of 23

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other members across all parties. The question is that amendment

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The question is that amendment three be made, as many as are of three be made, as many as are of that opinion say aye. Of the contrary, no. no. Division. Clear Is Is that Is that amendment Is that amendment three be made as many as are of that opinion say aye. Of the contrary, no. no. The tellers. For the eyes are James Wild and Rebecca Smith. The Tellers for the noes Mark Ferguson and Imogen Walker.



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Order, Order, order!

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Order, order! The ayes to the right 162. The

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The ayes to the right 162. The noes to the left. 246 100.

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93. The ayes to the right were. 162 the noes to the left 246. So the noes have it. The noes have it unlock. With the leave of the house. I will put a single question on government amendments. 15 to 27. I call the Minister to move government amendments 15 to 27 formerly.

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To move formally. The question is that government

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The question is that government amendments 15 to 27 be made, as many as are of that opinion say many as are of that opinion say aye. Of the contrary, no. I think the ayes have it. The ayes have it. Consideration completed Third Reading. No. King's consent.

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Reading. No. King's consent. Yes. Hear. Minister to move. Third Reading. Kanishka Narayan.

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I beg to move. Madam Deputy Speaker, that the bill be now read a third time. It has been a privilege to take this vital piece privilege to take this vital piece of legislation through the House. I would like to thank everyone who has played a role in getting the has played a role in getting the bill to this stage. The noble Baroness Lloyd of EFRA, who has been instrumental in driving the policy in this bill and will lead passage in the other place.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for science, Innovation and State for science, Innovation and Technology. The officials who have worked tirelessly since the bill's inception. The bill team, led by Shona Lester, policy teams led by Nick Dodd and Liam Harkin, legal team led by Alicia Swannell, my private secretary, Ben Holloway. I would like to also thank parliamentary counsel, clerks and chairs of the public Bill committee and, of course, every member of the House who served on the Bill committee, as well as members who have provided important input today and at all previous stages.

Madam Deputy Speaker, this country is subject to daily and unrelenting cyber attacks. This is no longer the stuff of science fiction, but a daily reality that threatens public services, businesses, even our ways of life. As Doctor Richard Horne, CEO of the National Cyber Security Centre, said the real world impact of cyber attacks have never been more evident than in recent months. This bill delivers on the government's commitment to drive secure growth and make the UK more resilient to the threats we face. It recognises how things have moved on since 2018, with data centres playing an increasingly important role in our digital lives and supply chains continuing to diversify.

It also recognises that things will continue to change with a deliberate, technology agnostic approach and proportionate powers to enable government to close regulatory gaps or respond to imminent national security threats. Since introduction, I have tabled a small number of amendments to refine the bill's drafting and ensure achievement of intended purposes. These include designating Ofcom as the sole regulator for data centres to reduce administrative burdens and strengthen accountability in this key sector, enabling NIS regulators to share vital information with other regulators and public bodies overseeing sectors and vice versa, enabling more coordinated and strategic oversight without unnecessary business burdens.

Updating the definition of cloud computing to respond to important feedback from the sector, and making several minor and technical corrections to ensure the bill can be practically implemented. The version of the bill that stands before us now is an ambitious, practical and proportionate piece of legislation. It is the result of engagement with industry, with important regulator feedback, with international dialogue and tireless work from officials. I wish Baroness Lloyd the best with moving the bill forward in the other place,

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and I commend it to the House. The question is that the bill be

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The question is that the bill be now read the third time. Shadow Secretary of State Julia Lopez. Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.

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Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I begin by also thanking members across the House for their contributions to this bill over many months and, of course, their many months and, of course, their relentless scrutiny. I have never known a Minister to be in such a rush. With three hours left of rush. With three hours left of protected time, and I am also grateful to officials, both in the Department and in Parliament, for their hard work in getting this legislation to its final stage.

I particularly want to recognise, if I may. The hard work of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge and his team in providing such top notch scrutiny of the Bill in its passage through the House. We have, as opposition remained at all times supportive of the principles behind this Bill. It was the previous government that recognised the need to increase cyber resilience standards for critical digital infrastructure and services, including managed service providers and data centres. It is welcome that those entities, so vital to the functioning of the economy, public services and our daily lives are now covered.

However, I said at the Second Reading that opportunities to legislate in this area are few and far between, and we need to ask two questions to assess whether this law is fit for purpose. Will it work and is it enough? There was already an urgent need to strengthen our cyber defences. However, AI is equipping hostile states, criminal gangs and opportunists alike with tools capable of eroding our national defences at speed and at scale in ways that will affect businesses, the public sector and our infrastructure.

It is right that Parliament legislates to raise the collective security bar, but the nature of the cyber security risks that necessitated this bill have developed rapidly in the period that we've been taking it through this House. It demonstrates the difficulties we all face as legislators in dealing with the constantly shifting sands of the digital age. We may need to be ready to return to the subject sooner than we hoped. It's right that critical digital infrastructure, such as data centres, will fall within the scope of regulation, but we need to recognise that no security measures or standards are 100% effective.

Government and businesses need to ensure that essential data and workloads are stored and processed in a way that keeps them secure and operational, even when under attack. Resilience is key. The IRGC s apparent targeting of Amazon Web Services sites in the UAE and Bahrain earlier this year has shown that digital infrastructure is becoming a prime target in times of conflict. It would be irresponsible to assume that these facilities will not also be targets for cyber warfare. It's why we have to look closely at concentration of risk and our overall resilience in any leverage we can build in maintaining access to the best technology going forward from work on the security of our telecoms infrastructure to scrutiny of the platforms on which critical government services run.

We must be thinking extremely carefully now about our procurement of digital technology. A further significant developments in this bill was introduced is the rapid advance of AI systems capable of identifying cyber vulnerabilities, particularly in poorly protected legacy IT across government and public services, including the NHS. It highlights the urgent need to address the government's extensive legacy estate, which is especially exposed to exploitation. There's nothing in this act for this, and yet the government is creating a broader digital architecture for hackers to attack with its plan for government issued digital IDs.

If public trust is to be restored, especially after the government's abortive attempt to introduce mandatory ID last year, still a risk, I fear, via the back door. Such systems must always remain both optional and secure. It's therefore concerning that the Public Accounts Committee felt compelled to write to the DSIT permanent Secretary in April, criticising the lack of urgency in reviewing legacy IT equipment. Given both the sensitivity, sensitivity of the data involved and the scale of the cyber risk. Earlier, my hon.

Friend for Runnymede and Weybridge set out one of the most significant threats this bill fails to address, which is the intensifying cyber security risk posed by the Chinese Communist Party and its affiliates. It is regrettable that the government has for a second time voted down amendments which would have compelled the Secretary of State to create a register of hostile state actors, threatening the cyber security of essential networks and information systems. These concerns are not restricted to these benches, which is why my right hon.

Friend for Chingford and Woodford Greens amendment attracted cross-party support. The risks of the of cellular IoT modules have been set out with expertise today in the chamber. Those ITIO modules supplied by Chinese manufacturers are now embedded in nearly all internet connected products and devices, from smart TVs to electric cars. They can be used to intercept data, track location, and even be controlled remotely. And the scale of the cyber and physical security threat from IoT modules is the tip of the iceberg, with components that can be used for espionage, cyber attacks, or disabled remotely.

Woven into countless aspects of our critical national infrastructure, this, Madam Deputy Speaker, has an issue that is not going away. In summary, while this bill is necessary and goes some way towards enhancing our cyber resilience in critical areas, it will not be enough in isolation. It heaps all the burden on the private sector, and yet would have been insufficient to protect to prevent the Jaguar Land Rover incident. It does not address public sector vulnerabilities, and it falls far short of meeting the moment that the now former defence secretary lamented this government for missing in its approach to collective defence and security.

It speaks to this government's continued inability to grapple with and address the red lights now flashing on the national dashboard. The corrosive complacency that Lord Robertson called out in the government's approach to investment in defence can also be seen here. In the government's ongoing refusal to address the urgent threat to our national cyber security, caused by our reliance on technology and components from nations that have demonstrably malign intent. We are living with the uncomfortable reality that the end of history was a dangerous illusion, which has led to us gradually outsourcing our critical industries to our geopolitical rivals and competitors, only to have their wares sold back to us in the form of latent time bombs.

It is why this legislation, which we support, can only be a discrete tool in addressing a much wider challenge. Cyber security is no longer a niche compliance exercise. It is about protecting the fundamental economic and defence interests of our nation. And that is why I suspect we shall be returning in this House on cyber issues before too long and with greater urgency.

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Hear, hear. Liberal Democrat spokesperson

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Victoria Collins. Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I would just reiterate the importance of that digital importance of that digital sovereign strategy and our cyber security. It's about our resilience. It's about security and also our economic strength as a country, about collaborative sovereignty. But we very much welcome the extended scope of this cyber bill and supporting it moving forward. Thank you.

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The question is that the bill be now read the third time. As many as now read the third time. As many as of that opinion say aye. I Of the contrary, no. I think the ayes have

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contrary, no. I think the ayes have it. The ayes have it. Point of order point of order. Calum Miller. On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. May I seek your guidance? There are reports that a Russian warship has today fired warning shots near a UK registered warning shots near a UK registered yacht in the English Channel, south of the Isle of Wight. If verified, this action would be of grave concern to the House and represent a significant escalation in the hostility shown by Russian actors towards UK interests.

Madam Deputy Speaker, can you guide me as to how the House might seek to be urgently updated by a Defence Minister on this development, and guided us to the government's proposed response

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here? Can I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point of order this evening? for his point of order this evening? I have had no notice that the government intends to bring a statement, but I'm sure the statement, but I'm sure the frontbench has heard him. And should that change, we will doubtless hear before the doubtless hear before the adjournment. Which brings us to

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adjournment. Which brings us to motion number two. On Environmental Protection. Minister. To move. I beg. To move.

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The question is, as on the Order Paper, as many as are of that opinion say aye. Of the contrary, no. no.

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The The question The question is, The question is, as

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The question is, as on The question is, as on the The question is, as on the Order Paper, As many as of that opinion say aye. Country.

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No. The Tellers for the ayes are Mark Ferguson and Imogen Walker. The Tellers for the noes Rebecca

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Edinburgh Edinburgh South Edinburgh South West

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Edinburgh South West Edinburgh South West North Paul Paul Holmes.

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Order, Order, order!

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Order, order!

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Order, order! The ayes to the right 262. The noes to the left. 86.

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Thank you.

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The ayes to the right were. 262. The noes to the left 86. So the ayes have it. The ayes have it.

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Unlock. Motion number three on move. I beg to move.

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I beg to move. The question is, as on the Order Paper, as many as are of that Paper, as many as are of that opinion, say I Of the contrary, no. I think the ayes have it. The ayes have it. Motion number four on food

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Minister to move. I beg to move. The question is, as on the Order

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The question is, as on the Order Paper, as many as are of that opinion, say I Of the contrary, no.

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I think the ayes have it. The ayes have it. Motion number five on sanctions, Minister. To move. I beg to move.

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I beg to move. The question is, as on the Order

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The question is, as on the Order Paper, as many as are of that opinion say aye. Of the contrary, no. I think the ayes have it. The

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ayes have it. Motion number six on delegated legislation. Social Security Minister to move. I beg to move.

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I beg to move. The question is, as on the Order Paper, as many as are of that opinion say aye. Of the contrary, no. I think the ayes have it. The ayes have it.

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What about the other. Point of order? Matt Western. Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I just wish to raise with you my I just wish to raise with you my concern over comments which have been attributed to the right hon. been attributed to the right hon. Member for North West Essex, who I understand has described the right understand has described the right hon. Member for Houghton and Sunderland South as acting as if she were a member of or the. A she were a member of or the.

A Gestapo officer, I think is the term that she used. I think this is extremely alarming, particularly on this day of days. And so in recognition of Jo Cox's assassination, I would just ask that all of us around this place should temper our comments and calm down the rhetoric. So I just simply ask Madam Deputy Speaker your advice on how to take this forward.

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Can I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point of order this evening? He will know that comments made outside the chamber are not a matter for the chair, but he has this evening put that on the record. Which brings us to petitions. Miss Which brings us to petitions. Miss Julie Minns. Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am pleased to present a petition on behalf of residents of the village of Wetheral calling for traffic calming measures, including a 20 mile per hour zone to improve the safety of pedestrians and other road users.

The issue of traffic calming was raised with me by local residents at a coffee morning I held in Wetheral a few months ago. The introduction of a 20 mile per hour zone and other measures would build on the excellent work of Weatherall Parish Council, who have recently funded the installation of a speed camera in the village. However, whether residents remain concerned by the speed of traffic through the village and the lack of pavements on stretches of road, 298 residents signed the petition that local people, members of the parish council and I took door to door around the village.

The petitioners, therefore, request that the House of Commons urges the government to work with the relevant local authorities to introduce traffic calming measures, including the establishment of a 20 mile per hour zone in Weatherall. Following is the full text of the petition. The petition of residents of Wetheral and the wider Carlisle constituency declares that traffic calming measures, including the establishment of a 20 mile per hour zone, should be introduced in the village of Wetheral. The petitioners, therefore, request that the House of Commons urges government to work with the relevant local authorities to introduce traffic calming measures in Wetheral, specifically, the implementation of a 20 mile per hour speed limit through the village to improve road safety and the petitioners remain, etc.



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Petition, road safety and Weatherall. Petition.

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Weatherall. Petition. Frank McNally. Thank you very much, Madam Deputy Speaker, I rise to present Deputy Speaker, I rise to present this petition on a national strategy for motor neurone disease. I do so on behalf of my constituent, Mark Somerville, diagnosed with MND Mark Somerville, diagnosed with MND in 2023, and who, along with his foundation, have been doing tremendous work to identify new treatments and a cure. The petition declares that MND is a fast acting terminal illness that currently has no cure, and further declares that the UK government should act to create a national strategy that is led by research experts and partnership with patients and patient organisations.

Includes a national task force, supports research with enhanced access to clinical trials, accelerates novel drug discovery and access to innovative treatments, and improves specialist multidisciplinary care. The petitioners, therefore, request that the House of Commons urges the government to work in partnership with devolved administrations to deliver a national strategy for MND, with the emphasis on finding effective treatments and a cure. And the petitioners remain. ET

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cetera. Petition National Strategy for

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Motor Neurone Disease. Petition Victoria Collins. Thank you very much, Madam Deputy Speaker. The people of Tring have spoken. This petition, joined by over 500 residents, rejects the top down, developer led approach to top down, developer led approach to planning from this government, which threatens to impose significant large scale development on their community, little regard for its character, infrastructure or precious environment. This has been made even worse by the latest power grab from Whitehall, who will now take over large planning applications.

Residents are not opposed to housing, but they are rightly alarmed by the burden being placed on their town, and deeply frustrated by the lack of meaningful voice in shaping proposals that would define Tring for generations to come. The petitioners, therefore, request that the House of Commons urges the government to schedule a debate in the House of Commons on the government's review of the National Planning Policy Framework, and how communities like Tring can better be protected from inappropriate overdevelopment, and how local residents can be given a genuine and effective voice in the planning, decisions and infrastructure provision that shape their towns and affect their daily lives and

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the petitioners, etc. Petition, National Planning

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Policy Framework and Tring. I beg to move that this House do

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I beg to move that this House do now adjourn. The question is that this House do now adjourn. Richard Quigley thank.

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Richard Quigley thank. You, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am really grateful to have secured my what is my first adjournment debate what is my first adjournment debate as an MP on an issue that has resonated so deeply with many residents across the Isle of Wight, where they are directly touched by dementia or not. I want to put on record my thanks to those across the island who have contacted me and are passionately fighting for their family member or friend during their time of need.

It really shows the best of our island. It makes me even more proud to represent the Isle of Wight West in this place. I would also like to thank the Minister for her engagement to date with myself, as well as my neighbouring constituency. The hon. Member for Isle of Wight East. On the wider issue of patient discharges off the island, and I will continue to do all I can to work across the island

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and government to help find a solution. The hon. Member give way. I will Mike Martin.

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Mike Martin. I want to thank my friend and neighbour for securing this debate, and I strongly support the issues that he's talking about. People living with dementia and their living with dementia and their families deserve close to home and not having to cross ocean seas and not having to cross ocean seas and get on trains as well to get the support they need. I want to recognise, Madam Deputy Speaker, the dedicated workers from the people across Portsmouth North who support their families.

But in Portsmouth North we had cuts to dementia nursing, which has led my constituents and my team to visit the Isle of Wight and where we saw Parklands Dementia Resource Centre. It's an excellent example of what can be done. So can I ask my friend to expand on parklands work and join me in urging the Minister to consider more dementia hubs in underserved communities?

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I thank my friend for that timely intervention. And before I get into the deeply troubling accounts that have brought me accounts that have brought me brought to me, I must pay tribute to Maggie Bennett of the Parklands Alzheimer's Cafe and her team. Alzheimer's Cafe and her team. Whilst the cafe can't offer overnight accommodation, it does offer vital respite for carers. offer vital respite for carers. Loved ones can spend a great day at the centre and the café doing activities, chatting over tea and cake, even getting their hair cut.

cake, even getting their hair cut. But for dementia sufferers, that is where the happy story ends. The issue of mainland discharges has struck a real chord across the island, because I believe it goes to the heart of many of the other inequalities. My constituents have been expected to simply accept as part of island life. We are the only English island where the sole means of transport, on and off is entirely privately operated. Coupled with that, we have only a very small specialist dementia in inpatient ward and no dedicated long term NHS dementia provision.

And so there is a very real fear that when you're at your most vulnerable, where you live will determine how you are treated and whether you are afforded the dignity you deserve. The dignity of being close to family, have continued continuity in care and have remaining in the place you call home. For those unfamiliar, the recent closure of three care homes on the Isle of Wight, including one in fresh water in my constituency, has led to 44 residents being displaced, with ten already placed in care homes on the mainland.

The niece of one resident living with dementia contacted my office to say she is terrified that her uncle will die in his proposed placement in Horsham, 70 miles away. In her words alone, confused and feeling that no one cares. Worse still, the family have been told that if they do not accept this placement, they will be liable to pay £500 per day for the hospital bed he will need to occupy. For Adam and Rob Snow's 87 year old Ireland born mother, Phyllis. Other than a few brief periods away, the Isle of Wight is the only home she's ever known.

But Phyllis now requires round the clock care due to the brutal combination of dementia and Parkinson's, and her family are absolutely terrified by reports of patients, like patients like her being relocated to the mainland. With Phyllis already stuck on a hospital ward for months, her family are in a lose lose situation as they watch her become more vulnerable to infection the longer she spends in hospital or push for care home release, only for her to be relocated miles away from the only home she has ever known.

It is also important to understand how dementia care is currently funded on the Isle of Wight. Much of our provision relies on a limited number of block book beds commissioned by the local authority, layered onto an adult social care Budget that is already under severe strain. I will indeed. Hon. Member for giving way, and he's giving a typically excellent and passionate speech. And no person living with dementia should be removed from their family or support network. So would he agree with me that as the NHS is restructured, there needs to be a proper focus on outcomes for dementia sufferers right across the country.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention and I couldn't agree more. I think a national dementia strategy is of the utmost importance, because what we see is a position that I will go into in more detail now, with people being moved away from home or the care just isn't available. Nationally, 87% of care services are now commissioned by councils or the NHS at rates below the true cost of care, and locally, contracts are being let at around £24 an hour, which is only 84% of the Homecare Association's minimum recommended rate.

Within that model, small island providers are often subcontracted by larger, mainland based organisations at even lower rates. And despite demand continuing to rise, the island is one of the only authorities inadvertently forcing local care providers to make staff redundant or even consider closure simply because the funding does not stack up, and because price increases are not being passed on to those small providers by first tier commissioning organisations. So I strongly urge the Minister to press the Isle of Wight Council to ensure that any funding uplift reaches the front line providers who are actually delivering care once again, with no dedicated long term NHS dementia ward on the island.

As soon as those block contracts are full, as they are increasingly are, there is simply nowhere else for people to go. At that point, decisions are no longer driven by what is best for the individual, but by whatever capacity happens to be available. The closure of three care homes this year has not occurred in a vacuum. In 22, the island lost six care homes and with one third of our population aged 65 and over alongside staff turnover rates, significant staff turnover rates significantly higher than the national average.

This is a system already under immense strain. While dementia care on the Isle of Wight is delivered across a mix of NHS council funded and private provision, the reality is that the capacity and the specialist care has not been enough for some time. And this isn't just an island problem, it is a warning of what lies ahead for the country as our population ages. And in making that point, I wish to strongly advocate that any measures the government considers adopting to confront this national challenge should be piloted on the Isle of Wight, where the need is greatest and where meaningful change can be delivered most urgently and most importantly, measured in almost real time.

But what makes the Isle of Wight a particularly stark case is the added cruelty of our geography, the reality that families must cross the Solent. But some estimates have placed as the most expensive stretch of water in Europe simply to visit a loved one who is sick and in need of care that simply can't be provided. Closer to home. 82 year old Graham Martin, who is living with dementia, is yet another example of the impact of this reality. In mid-April, he was moved to Southampton against the wishes of his family because of his complex needs separating him from his wife of 63 years, Carol, who is unable to travel to visit him due to her own health and cost of ferry travel, but moved being moved away from her home across a stretch of water is distressing enough, but to then be effectively cut off from your loved ones because they cannot afford or physically manage the journey borders on forced isolation during the very moment someone needs their family the most.

As the niece of another patient facing a mainland placement said to me, can you imagine a vulnerable elderly resident in Westminster being sent to a care home on the Isle of Wight? It simply would not happen and it would not happen because in other parts of the country the system would not tolerate separating vulnerable people from their families in this way. Yet for the Isle of Wight, that basic standard is simply not applied. MPs, Ministers all the way up to the Prime Minister, will have heard me talk relentlessly about how the island is a brilliant place to live, work and learn and despite my intervention today, I still believe this to be the case.

But this is despite the inequality and deprivation we face and which is hidden by neighbouring prosperity. Whether it be the school unable to take a trip across the Solent due to budgetary constraints, the young worker having to look for jobs elsewhere due to a lack of opportunity or, as I've demonstrated today, an elderly person ripped away from their home because of a lack of capacity. The Isle of Wight has been functioning with one arm tied behind its back, and the time has come to do something about it.

When capacity on the island runs out and without the necessary action, it inevitably will. People are not just delayed, they are displaced. What should be an absolute last resort for the most vulnerable people is fast becoming a routine response, with elderly people sent miles from their homes simply because the system cannot cope. This is neither sustainable nor dignified, and it cannot be allowed to continue. And I ask the Minister to take action for the benefit of my residents.

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Minister Minister Gill. Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising this very important issue, and I recognise the deeply concerning experiences that have concerning experiences that have been highlighted, including those reported by families on the Isle of Wight and sharing stories of Maggie Wight and sharing stories of Maggie Bennett and the cafe she runs. We know that for people living with dementia or with complex disabilities, being moved away from their homes and their loved ones can be profoundly distressing.

Familiar surroundings, routines and relationships are often central to their wellbeing, and it is entirely understandable that families feel anxious when those links are disrupted. The government is clear that people should be discharged from hospital safely, promptly and with appropriate care and support in place. This is essential not only for patient outcomes, but also to ensure hospitals can continue to treat those in greatest need. Local authorities have a statutory duty under the Care Act 2014 to shape their local care markets, ensuring there is a sufficient range of high quality, person centred services available to meet local needs.

Decisions about care placements are made at a local level based on clinical need, the suitability of available services and the individual circumstances. Where a person requires specialist or higher intensity support. It is essential that the placement meets those needs in full. However, I do recognise that local capacity pressures, particularly in more geographically isolated areas such as the Isle of Wight, can mean that suitable placements are not always immediately available. My hon. Friend spoke about the impact of care home closures in his constituency, and also shared his story in the.

In those situations, temporary placements further away. Whilst necessary to ensure that a person is discharged safely and without delay, clearly have a huge impact on families on the Isle of Wight. Local partners are working to improve access to more seamless pathways across health and social care so that people can move more easily between services and receive the support they need. This includes strengthening coordination and expanding care in the community so that wherever possible, people can be supported at home or closer to home.

As my hon. Said, our hon. Friend said because of the island's size and physical isolation, this also requires close working with mainland partners to ensure residents can access the full range of care that they need, including specialist provision where it is not available locally. We will continue to explore and build upon opportunities to deliver services for the benefit of the Isle of Wight community, to enable care delivery in the right place at the right time, and we do expect local systems to plan for demand and work with providers to strengthen capacity, including for people with dementia and complex conditions.

It is vital, as we heard from my hon. Friend, that when a difficult decision is made to close a care home, the process is handled as sensitively as possible. Local authorities should have procedures in place to minimise disruption, with time allowed to support a safe transfer that supports the well-being of individuals, families and carers. Providers should also ensure proper arrangements are in place to support the transition of residents to their new provision. Our expectation is that every effort should be made to provide care as close to home as possible, and to take account of family connections and personal preferences wherever practicable.

It is also essential that individuals and their families are involved in decisions about discharge and ongoing care. The guidance is clear that planning should begin early, and that patients and carers should be supported to make fully informed decisions where appropriate. We know that people who are discharged in a timely way, with the right care and support in place, experience better recovery and health outcomes. That is why we expect local systems to work together to ensure discharge processes are as effective as possible, particularly for people with dementia and other complex needs.

That is why the government is working with the NHS and local authorities to strengthen the local health and care system, so that it can better meet those challenges. Through the Better Care Fund. Over 9 billion is being used to support integrated working between the NHS and local authorities, enabling more joined up services and improving the planning of care outside of hospital. We are also going to reform the Better Care Fund to support more effective joint planning and delivery between health and social care.

This will be focussed on improving how services are coordinated and supporting care that helps people regain their independence, reduce unnecessary hospital stays and enables people to receive care closer to home. We also recognise the importance of improving care and support for people living with dementia. And according to NHS data, NHS Hampshire and Isle of Wight Integrated Care Board recorded that more than 18000 people had a diagnosed form of dementia as of March 2026. This government wants a society where individuals with dementia and frailty receive high quality, compassionate care from diagnosis through to the end of life.

And that is why we will deliver the first ever modern service framework for frailty and dementia to deliver rapid and significant improvements in the quality of care and productivity, and this will be informed by phase one of Baroness Casey's Independent Commission into Adult Social Care, expected later this year. The framework will be informed by phase one of the Independent Commission into Adult Social Care, which is currently underway, and we are committed to feeding into the NHS and local government planning cycles in September, and will aim to publish the full framework by the end of this year, as recommended by Baroness Casey.

We intend to engage with a range of partners over the coming months, and will ensure that the voices of people with lived experience are at the centre of our work to develop the modern service framework, and I thank my hon. Friend for bringing his constituents voice to this House. In closing, Madam Deputy Speaker, I want to reiterate that we recognise the very real concerns raised by families on the Isle of Wight, particularly where people with dementia or complex needs have been moved away from their homes and communities.

And while there will be circumstances where temporary placements further from home are necessary, care should be provided as close to home as possible in a way that respects the individual's needs, preferences and

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connections to their family and community. Thank you. I didn't have time to congratulate the Minister on her promotion as a fellow Brummie. It's good to see those of us from Birmingham here in the chamber. The Birmingham here in the chamber. The question is this House do now adjourn, as many of that opinion adjourn, as many of that opinion say. I may say I, I the ayes have it. The ayes have it. Order, order!
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