Chinese Embassy

Debate between Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent and Lord Fox

Monday 26th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, listening to the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, I was reminded that it was only in 2015 that the then Chancellor George Osborne declared the creation of a “golden decade”. I wonder how long it lasted.

At the very least, this decision will relocate China’s comprehensive security and surveillance efforts on to one huge 21st-century site. We believe it will amplify the threat and potentially endanger the security of vital financial data. It seems a clear indication of political weakness that the Government have taken this decision in the hope of furthering our relationship with China. This concession, along with issues such as the Government’s consistent failure to place China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme and their total failure to invoke sufficient legal protection against transnational repression of Hong Kongers, reinforced this message of weakness.

The Statement talks about the Government’s desire for a relationship with China and it says that the Government do not trade security for economic access. I agree, because given the scale of the trade deficit we have with China, we are actually increasing our security risks while continuing to give China virtually unfettered economic access. It is a win-win situation for China. There seems very little on the plus side of this relationship for us, except perhaps allowing Chinese Government-controlled firms to take large financial stakes in our critical national infrastructure.

Having made this announcement, what, if anything, does the Prime Minister hope to bring back from his visit? It is a transactional world. If the Prime Minister was to negotiate the freedom of Jimmy Lai, secure the removal of the bounties from the heads of Hong Kongers and close the university-based Chinese police operations then perhaps the extra risk that our security services describe flowing from this super-embassy might be worth taking. However, if all he gets is a handshake with President Xi, then he will have conceded—we will have conceded—a lot for absolutely nothing.

I will say a final word on the scale of this embassy. The plans for the super-embassy include the provision of 232 flats. I believe there are currently 146 embassy employees, which means that there will be accommodation for nearly 90 extra people—an expansion of at least 60% in the number of embassy staff. So what realistically does the Minister expect all those extra people to be doing?

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord and the noble Baroness for their points and questions on this matter, which rightly concerns us all.

To reiterate, this was a quasi-judicial decision taken independently by the Secretary of State for Housing. I also remind noble Lords of the premise of the Statement made by the Security Minister in the other place, which focused on the national security considerations of China’s proposal to build a new embassy at the Royal Mint Court. This concludes a process that began in 2018, when the then Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson—who I believe may have been a Conservative—gave formal diplomatic consent for China to use the Royal Mint site for its new embassy, subject to planning permission, and welcomed it as China’s largest overseas investment. I think we have seen how much has changed in a few short years on the Opposition Benches. Nevertheless, I am aware of the significant interest that this issue has provoked in your Lordships’ House, and as such I am grateful for the opportunity to provide an assurance of the work that the Government have undertaken to ensure that UK national security is protected.

I am very fond of the noble Baroness, but her comments about the Government’s prioritisation of national security were outrageous. National security is our number one priority. The Home Office and the Foreign Office both provided views during the planning process on potential security issues around the build and confirmed in writing when these were resolved. We have engaged with key allies throughout, and our security and intelligence agencies have been integral to the process. As the director of GCHQ and the director-general of MI5 wrote in their letter,

“as with any foreign embassy on UK soil, it is not realistic to expect to be able wholly to eliminate each and every potential risk … However, the collective work across UK intelligence agencies and HMG departments to formulate a package of national security mitigations for the site has been, in our view, expert, professional and proportionate”.

They also judged that

“the package of mitigations deals acceptably with a wide range of sensitive national security issues, including cabling”.

Indeed, they noted that there were “clear security advantages” from consolidating China’s diplomatic estates in London.

I am also grateful for the close consideration and scrutiny that my noble friend Lord Beamish and the Intelligence and Security Committee have given this matter. His committee concluded:

“On the basis of the evidence we have received, and having carefully reviewed the nuanced national security considerations, the Committee has concluded that, taken as a whole, the national security concerns that arise can be satisfactorily mitigated”.


National security concerns that have been raised in media reports again in recent days are not new to the Government or the intelligence community, and an extensive range of measures has been developed to protect national security. We have acted to increase the resilience of cables in the area through an extensive series of measures to protect sensitive data. The Government have seen unredacted plans for the embassy and have agreed with China that the publicly accessible forecourt on the embassy grounds will not have diplomatic immunity, thereby managing the risk to the public. Based on all that and our extensive work on this matter, we are content that any risks are being appropriately managed.

On our approach to China, I note that it is a fundamental and normal part of international relations that countries agree to establish embassies in each other’s capitals. The Government are engaging with China confidently and pragmatically, recognising the complexity of the world as it is and challenging China where we need to. Of course, we recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security, from cyber attacks, foreign interference and espionage targeting our diplomatic institutions, to transnational repression of Hong Kongers and China’s support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Government have responded and will continue to respond to these challenges.

However, taking a robust approach to our national security also includes engaging with China. Indeed, it is only through engagement that we can directly challenge China on its malicious activity. By taking tough steps to keep us secure, we enable ourselves to co-operate in other areas, including in pursuit of safe economic opportunities that are in the UK’s national interest and in areas such as organised immigration crime, narcotics trafficking and serious organised crime. That is what allies do and what we are doing: delivering for the public, putting more money in their pockets and keeping them safe through hard-headed, risk-based engagement with the world’s most consequential power.

I would like to clarify some specific points raised by the noble Baroness and the noble Lord. The noble Baroness asked what this is for. She knows what this is for: as a result of a quasi-judicial process and a planning application, this is the consolidation of seven different sites into one. There are significant security benefits that come from that.

On the planning and building processes, I reiterate that this is a British planning application that has gone through a quasi-judicial process. The normal building inspections will apply as the building is developed.

As I said, national security is the first responsibility of any Government, and especially this Government. Any other suggestion is frankly appalling.

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, I say that we will see the results of the PM’s visit when he returns and I look forward to discussing it in your Lordships’ House at that point.

On FIRS, we are looking carefully at whether other countries should be added to the enhanced tier. Any decision will be brought before Parliament in the usual way. Countries are considered separately for specification, and decisions are made on the evidence. The Government have a range of capabilities to manage and mitigate threats emanating from foreign states. FIRS is one of many tools that we use.

I will touch on the number of diplomats who will be present at the embassy. Under the Vienna convention, having an embassy is not a reward for like-minded partners but a necessity for any country with which we have diplomatic relations. On the issue of pragmatism, I say that we are talking about a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the second-largest economy in the world and our third-largest trading partner, so a level of diplomatic relations would be wise. It is also a fundamental and normal part of international relations that countries mutually consent to other nations having embassy premises. However, as the Vienna convention states, the UK has control over the number of diplomats in the UK on diplomatic relations. Any diplomatic position at the Chinese embassy must be approved on a case-by-case basis by the FCDO’s protocol department. The FCDO will work with allies on any additional extensions of that. As I have said, the Government have seen the unredacted plans. It is based on this and our extensive work on this topic that I am content that any risks are being appropriately managed.

The noble Lord raised a very important point about transnational repression. Noble Lords may be aware that I ran Index on Censorship until the general election and spent a great deal of time campaigning on these specific issues. The Government condemn the Hong Kong police’s efforts to coerce, intimidate, harass and harm those living in the UK and overseas; these acts of repression will never be tolerated in this country. We have raised these concerns directly with Chinese authorities, reaffirming that the extraterritorial application of Hong Kong’s national security law is unacceptable and will not be tolerated in the UK. The safety and security of Hong Kongers in the UK, including those on the British National Overseas visa, is of the utmost importance. The UK will always stand up for the rights of the people of Hong Kong. This is demonstrated through the bespoke immigration route for BNO status holders and their eligible family members.

The UK’s response to tackling state-directed threats is world leading. Appropriate tools and system-wide safeguards are in place to robustly counter transnational aggression. Following the Defending Democracy Taskforce’s TNR review, we have strengthened our response by implementing the National Security Act 2023, which provides a comprehensive suite of powers to counter the threat of TNR. We have rolled out training across 45 territorial police forces, including the upskilling of 999 call handlers to improve front-line identification of and responses to state-directed threats. We have published practical guidance on GOV.UK for individuals who believe they may be at risk, with advice to help them protect themselves physically and online. We have deployed tailored support and security assistance for individual victims, where we have become aware of them, that are proportionate to the threat and varied in scope and approach.

This Government will always welcome the knowledge and experience of noble Lords and Baronesses in your Lordships’ House, particularly when they pertain to matters of national security. So let me again reassure your Lordships that upholding national security is the first duty of government and we will continue to take all measures necessary to disrupt these threats. Based on the extensive work on this topic, the Government are content that any risks to the UK’s national security are being appropriately managed.

China Espionage: Government Security Response

Debate between Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent and Lord Fox

Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I start by joining the Minister in paying tribute to the crew member of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Tidesurge lost off the coast of Ireland.

This is my first opportunity to welcome the noble Lord, Lord Alton, back to his place—he has been missed.

I thank the Minister for repeating this Statement, which we broadly welcome. It seems to represent a change of gear, certainly from the approach of the previous Government. The ISC report on China in 2023 concluded that China had been able to

“penetrate every sector of the UK’s economy”.

At last, this seems to be being taken seriously. However, clearly, with such a deep threat, there is an awful lot that needs to be done, and some of that is reflected in this Statement.

Any Statement like this begs questions that cannot be answered, so I am going to try to ask questions that can be publicly asked. I start with the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, around the failed prosecution of the two spies. There are many questions on this. Will the Government launch an independent inquiry into the collapse of that case and ensure that there are lessons learned from this appalling failure of national security?

In the other place, the Minister fully recognised that the Government know that China

“poses a series of threats to UK national security”,

yet when it comes to putting China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, yet again the Minister said that “no decision” on China has been made. What more has to be done for China to qualify to be put on this register? Given the reluctance to enact FIRS, what guidance is now being given to MPs, Select Committees and researchers on contacts with representatives of the Chinese Government and other Governments?

The Statement also specifically calls for co-operation with China on scientific research. Such engagement is extremely fraught. A huge amount of guidance and focus needs to be brought to this so that universities can safely engage in any co-operation. Clearly, they have raised the flag on this and there is an awful lot of work to do.

The Statement talks about a “low threshold” of what information is considered valuable, so are there plans to discuss how or whether to tighten the vetting and ongoing monitoring of researchers and staff, and how they access and deliver sensitive information? The Statement also says that the Government will

“strengthen the legislative tools available … to disrupt the threat”.

Is this solely going to be the cybersecurity and resilience Bill, or is there another piece of legislation looming for this? It would be useful to know. When will the elections Bill be introduced? We really welcome it and remind your Lordships that this is not specifically a China problem. With Russia waging a hybrid war against us, the sooner we can get this Bill out and discussed the better.

The removal of technology from sensitive sites is good news, but does the Minister accept that, beyond the locations mentioned, there is much to be done to remove Chinese-manufactured electronic components that put our national infrastructure at risk? Who is accountable for spearheading a programme for technology that has been manufactured by friends and not by China, which we know from this Statement does not have our best interests at heart? We should start with the electricity grid and power generation as a focus.

The economic security advisory service for business is a welcome idea. To which department will it report, and how will it fit in with other processes, such as the National Security and Investment Act?

Chinese dissidents and Hong Kongers are having bounties levied on them, including here in the UK. Will the Minister confirm that the Government will sanction those officials responsible for levying these bounties and provide a much clearer legislative protection against transnational repression?

Predictably, I will raise China’s new super-embassy, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, did. Given everything in this Statement, it should be unthinkable that the application succeeds. Under no circumstance should a hub for the network of spies that the Government have set out in this Statement be built. When will the Government rule out this embassy?

Finally, can the Minister update your Lordships on planned visits by Cabinet Ministers and the Prime Minister to the People’s Republic of China?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their points and questions on this very serious matter, and the tone in which they participated. As noble Lords have rightly acknowledged, matters of espionage, particularly those that relate to Parliament, are of the utmost importance to us in both Houses and to the whole nation. They merit careful consideration by government, decisive action by Ministers and appropriate scrutiny by Parliament.

When it comes to China, we have been clear that we will co-operate where we can but always challenge when we must, which is why today’s message to all noble Lords from the Lord Speaker was so important. Our action today is about challenging behaviour by China that this Government will simply not tolerate. We know the high cost of inaction when it comes to national security measures. This comprehensive package will help us tackle economic, academic, cyber and espionage threats that China presents. Its impact will be immediate and we will not hesitate to further strengthen our protections as the threat evolves.

I will now seek to address a number of the specific questions raised. I will also reflect on Hansard should there be any points that I miss. Noble Lords will appreciate that a number of points I will talk about concern national security, so if I do not necessarily respond I will speak to both noble Lords outside the Chamber about some of those issues. Before that, I also add my genuine joy at seeing the noble Lord, Lord Alton, back in his place. When I discussed with him the issues that we are about to discuss, I did not really think we would be discussing them in your Lordships’ House so quickly, but I am delighted he is here—probably to give me a hard time.

I am going to answer the specifics that have been raised broadly in order, but I think it would be helpful to detail some more of our plans. Regarding the Chinese embassy, which both noble Lords raised, it will not surprise your Lordships’ House that I will repeat the same statement that was made in the other place today and that I have made before. A final decision on the Chinese application for a new embassy will be made in due course by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. This is a quasi-judicial decision so I cannot comment on it in more detail. To reassure noble Lords, though, national security is the first duty of government and it has been the core priority throughout this process.

On the threat posed by China, which was raised by both noble Lords but specifically by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, this Government fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security, from cyberattacks, foreign interference and espionage targeting our democratic institution to transnational repression of Hong Kongers. Yet we are also alive to the fact that China presents the UK with opportunities, as the world’s second-largest economy and the UK’s third-largest trading partner. Not engaging is no choice at all. We will therefore continue to develop a consistent and pragmatic approach to economic engagement without compromising our national security.

On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, the foreign influence registration scheme came into being in terms of its operational action only on 1 July. No decision has yet been made relating to specifying China on the enhanced tier. The Government have a range of capabilities to manage and mitigate threats emanating from foreign states. FIRS is one tool out of many, and we will keep decisions on when to use these tools under continuous review. Any decisions will be brought before Parliament in the usual way in due course. Adding countries to the enhanced tier requires the consideration of a broad range of interests, including but not limited to security considerations. It is important that we get this right.

On the points around critical national infrastructure, which both noble Lords raised, last week the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology introduced the cyber security and resilience Bill to Parliament in the latest step towards strengthening our cyber defences across society. The Bill will increase UK defences against cyberattacks, better protecting services that the public rely on to go about their normal lives—to switch on lights, to turn on the taps, to save water, and to know that the NHS is there to support them. It is clear that the definition of critical national infrastructure under the forthcoming legislation will be amended to make sure that many of these areas are captured.

I turn to some of the other points, including those about a national campaign of awareness. There has been a great deal in the national media about issues pertaining to China, not least the reports leading the news today because of this security alert. The noble and learned Lord makes an important point about ensuring that the people on the front line have the tools available to them. It is, in part, about making sure that everyone receives the information that is relevant to them, which is why Members of your Lordships’ House received specific information today.

We will continue to make sure that the people who need the information receive it. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, made a point about the tools available to universities. We are hosting a private and closed round table for vice-chancellors, and universities and other entities will receive ongoing information through the Office for Students going forward.

There were several other questions, just a few of which I will answer very quickly; I am aware that I am over time. On our plans to work with allies and partners, conversations with them are ongoing, especially with our Five Eyes partners, with which we undertook a significant chunk of the China audit.

On publishing a long-term approach to engaging with China, we need to look at all the issues in the round. Our national security strategy and our SDR both reference China. We will continue to update your Lordships’ House as and when events change and through the normal course of our actions.

There will be an elections Bill when parliamentary time allows. I expect that to be sooner rather than later.

On security vetting, we will continue to work with parliamentary authorities. It is very important at this point to make it clear that planned visits will continue and engagement with the Chinese state will continue. That is incredibly important. Even 12 days ago, the Foreign Secretary made clear to the Chinese state our views on the issues we have discussed today. Conversations need to continue. We need to ensure that where we can co-operate, we do so, and where we can challenge, we will.

The collapse of the Official Secrets Act case is currently under investigation by the JCNSS and the ISC, and we look forward to receiving their advice.

Official Secret Act Case: Witness Statements

Debate between Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent and Lord Fox

Monday 20th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her question. It is our third such outing on matters pertaining—well, our second, but the third in a week. To confirm, the meeting on 1 September was a discussion with the National Security Adviser about the management of the court case as it continued. There was no discussion of anything other than what would happen during the progression of the court case. Although I am sure all noble Lords have had various dealings with the person who suggested that a Box note was provided, I am not sure how he would know of such a Box note, seeing as no Box note existed. No briefing note whatever was provided from the National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister, nor was there any conversation about the case.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, this case seems to boil down to the binary political question: conspiracy or cock-up? The Government vehemently deny conspiracy, so they must believe it is a cock-up. But where and how did this happen, and how will the Government find out this fact? A Joint Select Committee plans to investigate, and I am sure that the ISC will too. Will the Government co-operate fully and quickly with these inquiries and undertake to publish everything possible that arises from them?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Lord raises a very important point. Our Parliament is at its best when it scrutinises the Government, and I am very pleased that the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy is now undertaking its inquiry. The Intelligence and Security Committee, led by my noble friend Lord Beamish, will also undertake its investigation. How quickly those progress is obviously now a matter for Parliament. I promise noble Lords that both investigations will have our full co-operation and support. We expect this to be done quickly. All information will be given very quickly. I have met with officials today to make it very clear that Government Ministers expect full co-operation.

Security Update: Official Secrets Act Case

Debate between Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent and Lord Fox

Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I do not think that I have followed the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, in the past and it is a great pleasure to do so. I am happy to say that there are still one or two things left to say.

This Statement is clearly an attempt to put to rest the issue of these botched prosecutions, or non-prosecutions. So far, however, it has not only failed in that ambition; at the same time, it has resurfaced other issues regarding China and our relationship that generate increasing concern. Regarding the prosecutions, and given the Minister’s Statement and the Government’s adamant view that they have not concealed evidence or suppressed anything, it would be easy for the Government to publish all the relevant documentation. They have nothing to hide; we know that—they have told us, and we trust them. Will the Government publish all the relevant documents, as set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the correspondence between all officials, politicians and advisers involved with the CPS?

It is time for the Government to properly protect the interests of our citizens so, working with the CPS, will the Government look at all legislative options to make sure that these two individuals have their time in the court, face a jury and are able to plead their case? These are the ways that the Government can push this issue to rest: by openness and actually seeking to prosecute.

More widely, this case has exposed appalling gaps in the Government’s willingness to challenge China’s considerable espionage efforts, but I am pleased that they recognise that we have a problem. The Statement is clear:

“We fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security”,


it says, but their actions fly in the face of that reality.

A former director-general of the Security Service has warned that Chinese espionage is being carried out on an industrial scale, including by seeking influence over Parliament, as well as in industry and education. This has been clear for some time. That was why we warned that exempting China from the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme under the National Security Act was a terrible mistake by this Government.

Will the Government now undertake to include all Chinese officials, Hong Kong special administrative region officials and Chinese Communist Party-linked organisations in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme? More than that, the Government, supported by the Conservatives, exempted government administration and public bodies in their entirety from the FIRS scheme. Will the Minister now undertake to listen to the intelligence community and include people performing in these activities in the enhanced layer of FIRS?

Finally, as we have heard, it is now time for the Government to come to their senses and block the planning application for the Chinese mega-embassy. We know that, through its embassy in the UK, China has been co-ordinating the transnational repression of people who are carrying out normal and legal activities in the United Kingdom. Will the Minister confirm that the intelligence agencies were not consulted before the Government approved China’s new super-embassy in London, and will the Government now take heed and halt that project until a full national security review is completed?

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

My Lords, that is a significant number of questions, which I have written down and now lost—thank you—and I will endeavour to answer all of them. I will also review Hansard and make sure that I correspond on anything that I am unsuccessful in responding to. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for their participation and genuine interest in this. Let us be very clear that matters of espionage, especially those that have seemingly been conducted within your Lordships’ House, but also within Parliament, are of the utmost seriousness.

I want to begin by reinforcing that this Government remain extremely disappointed by the collapse of the Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry trial. During yesterday’s PNQ, I committed to update your Lordships’ House on the facts surrounding the collapse of this trial, as well as government actions to counter state threats—as my honourable friend Dan Jarvis, the Security Minister, also made clear yesterday. The decision not to prosecute was made independently by the CPS. It is a bedrock principle of our democracy that decisions of the CPS are independent of Ministers and the Government.

The Director of Public Prosecutions has written to the chairs of the Home Affairs Committee and the Justice Committee, setting out that the CPS decision not to take this case to trial was because the evidential test was not met. As the Prime Minister—who, if we are citing former DPPs, I remind noble Lords is also a former DPP—has stated, the policy position of the current Government was “immaterial” to the CPS’s assessment.

The legal test required consideration of the Government’s policy at the time the alleged offences were committed—between December 2021 and February 2023—when Members opposite were in Government. At that time, the previous Conservative Government described China as a “systematic challenge” in the Integrated Review 2021 and an “epoch-defining challenge” in the Integrated Review Refresh 2023. They did not designate China as a threat or an enemy; that is at the crux of the issue.

I want to be clear, and I am genuinely horrified by the suggestion, that accusations that the Government concealed evidence, withdrew witnesses or in any way restricted the ability of witnesses to provide evidence are entirely untrue. The Director of Public Prosecutions has given his assurance that the CPS was not influenced by any external party, any member of this Government or any senior civil servant or special adviser. As the Security Minister set out in detail yesterday, evidence was provided to the CPS by the Deputy National Security Adviser, who is highly respected and has the full support of this Government. All the evidence provided by the Deputy National Security Adviser was based on the law at the time of the offences and the policy position of the Conservative Government at that time. The DNSA did not materially change his evidence and was under no pressure from anybody to do so.

On the question raised by both the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox—which was also raised yesterday by the noble Lord, Lord Gove—it is not for me to make decisions about the publication of evidence that may be used in further ongoing legal processes. To do so, or not, would likely affect witnesses in coming forward and hamper the interests of justice.

I understand that many noble Lords are also rightly interested in the opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny of the facts around the collapse of this case. The Government’s approach will always be to make as much information available as possible through the appropriate processes, given the national security considerations. I welcome that the National Security Adviser will be giving a private briefing to the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy next month.

On our approach to China, this Government are unequivocal. China poses a series of threats to UK national security, from cyberattacks and foreign interference to the transnational repression of Hong Kongers. This Government fully recognise the gravity of these threats. However, we must also recognise that China presents opportunities. It is the world’s second-largest economy. To act in the UK’s best interests, we must adopt a long-term strategic approach, as the last Government did. This means a consistent and pragmatic approach to economic engagement without compromising our national security.

On some of the other specifics that have been raised, I want to respond to a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on the Chinese embassy. No such decision has been made. The noble Lord knows that, throughout the process, we have been clear that we have considered the breadth of national security considerations and have publicly outlined necessary security mitigations that we would need to see to support an application. National security has been our core priority throughout the process. A final decision will be made in due course by Ministers in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government in their quasi-judicial role, and we expect a decision imminently. We do not underestimate the impact of national security as part of that decision.

As I also said yesterday in response to the PNQ, no decision has been made on China regarding the FIRS scheme. We are talking about a scheme that has been undertaken for only three and a half months. No decision has yet been made to exempt or include China, but a decision will be brought forward to your Lordships’ House.

On the specific question of the 1911 Act, the legislation the CPS uses for arrests and prosecutions is a matter for that agency. I do not have access to that data; that would be for the CPS. To clarify for noble Lords, there is a reason why many hours were spent in your Lordships’ House debating the National Security Bill in 2023—which was supported by my colleagues too on a cross-party basis—to update the Official Secrets Act. It is unfortunate that the 1911 Act was the basis of this prosecution, but there is a reason why we had to update it, and that is because of the very definition of “espionage” and “enemy”. This is a piece of legislation that was written prior to World War I. The world has changed, the threat level has changed and how people undertake threats has significantly changed.

I think I have touched on all the evidence. The Deputy National Security Adviser operated within the confines and constraints of the policy direction of the previous Government. We are fully committed to his work. He can operate only within the confines of the situation of the moment and, on that basis, there is nothing more for him to answer.

I reiterate this Government’s unwavering commitment to our national security. Yesterday, MI5’s National Protective Security Authority launched new guidance, building on previous guidance—it was not brand new—to protect our democratic institutions from foreign interference. I urge all noble Lords to read this vital guidance. Furthermore, the Government continue to hold China state-linked actors accountable for cyber espionage. The National Cyber Security Centre recently co-sealed a US-led technical advisory calling out Chinese state-sponsored actors for targeting global networks, including in the UK. We will continue to take all necessary action to tackle state threats, including those from China. That is the primary responsibility of government.