Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Baroness Doocey and Lord Blencathra

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I think we all welcome the concept of Clause 82, because it provides a significant step forward towards justice for survivors of child sexual abuse. By removing the limitation period, the provision acknowledges the unique barriers facing victims in coming forward after many years of abuse.

Let us be clear: we all agree that child sexual abuse is a crime marked by profound trauma, secrecy and manipulation. As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, pointed out, survivors often require years, possibly decades, to process their experience and feel able to seek justice. The limitation periods, while serving certain legal purposes, have historically denied victims their day in court. The removal of this barrier is a recognition of the lasting impact of abuse and the difficulty in disclosing it. I therefore cannot understand this “get out of jail free” card to permit a defendant to avoid liability on the grounds of substantial prejudice. In my inexpert, non-legal opinion, it risks undermining the legislative intent and perpetuating injustice, and it would send a message contrary to the spirit of the clause.

While the possibility of prejudice to defendants—such as faded memories, lost evidence or deceased witnesses—is real, it must be weighed against the injustice suffered by survivors who have been unable to seek redress due to the limitation period. I think all noble Lords here of a legal bent would say that our courts are perfectly well equipped to assess evidence, account for gaps and determine credibility, even in historic cases. The link of prejudice can be mitigated through fair trial procedures and should not override the fundamental right of survivors to have their claims heard.

We as legislators must ensure that perpetrators of child abuse are held to account, regardless of the time elapsed. Dismissing claims on the basis of substantial prejudices would not only deny justice to individuals but would undermine public confidence in the legal system’s ability to deal with some of the most serious wrongs to our children that we have witnessed over the last 30 years. It would risk protecting abusers from scrutiny, contrary to the principles of transparency and accountability.

To conclude, courts must prioritise the rights of survivors and the public interest in accountability, ensuring that the defence does not become a loophole that perpetuates injustice. Therefore, I support the probing amendment in the name of my noble friends and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, on these Benches we recognise the purpose of time limits and we recognise the right to fair trial, but survivors of child sexual abuse should not be barred from justice simply by the passage of time. The difficulty lies, of course, in striking that balance. At the moment, too many claims with merit are rejected at the outset or, more often, not brought at all. Clause 82 is therefore welcome in principle, yet new Section 11ZB(3) then proceeds to undermine it, mandating dismissal if defendants can show “substantial prejudice”—a vague term undefined in the Bill, which, as my noble friend Lady Brinton said, may be appealing to defence lawyers. A court already has the power to dismiss a case if it believes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial, so we find it difficult to understand the justification for this extra layer of protection. The inclusion of this provision risks effectively undoing all the good work of the clause. Amendment 289 would close that escape hatch, ensuring that it brings meaningful change. I urge the Government to reconsider in the light of this amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Baroness Doocey and Lord Blencathra

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson; I was not referring to him. It was the Government Whip who was getting very agitated about my comments. I could have spoken for a lot longer if I had degrouped my amendments, but I am not going to do that.

Quite simply, Clause 56 lists all the crimes in Part 1 of Schedule 6 that are relevant to convicting someone of controlling another person’s home for criminal purposes. Schedule 6 is about two pages of big issues—very large crimes—which are completely inappropriate for a summary trial. This is about hijacking someone else’s home, where the homeowner is kept prisoner. That is such big stuff that it should not be triable by summary but only in a Crown Court.

I beg to move—after one minute and 21 seconds.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, we welcome government Amendment 262, which recognises that cases of cuckooing often involve a complex web of coercive control. The person who seems to be in charge may actually be being manipulated or exploited by somebody else, and this addresses that complexity. However, while I understand the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and recognise all too well the potential life-changing harm caused by cuckooing, we are not minded to support restricting the trial venue in that way.

Magistrates’ courts provide quicker access to justice for victims and less delay than Crown Courts, particularly given the current backlogs. This is particularly important as cuckooing is linked to ongoing exploitation, with offenders often moving on to repeat the offence elsewhere, so fast action to stop the creation of more victims may in some cases be the more sensible option. Magistrates’ courts can also be less intimidating for vulnerable victims, supporting them to testify. Many other exploitation and safeguarding offences can be tried either way, allowing the specific facts of each case to determine the appropriate court. Imposing a blanket restriction on trial venue risks delaying justice, undermines established practice, and limits judicial discretion.

The pattern of coercion and control is at the heart of all these issues, whether we are talking about the exploitation of vulnerable children or adults. The evidence shows that women—as well as children—who are coerced into offending, often by traffickers or abusive partners, are in practice more often punished than protected. Too many victims of coercive control are still unfairly prosecuted for offences linked to their own abuse. Many female victims do not report to the police for fear of being criminalised, and that concern is well-founded. If, for example, drugs are being stored or grown in their flat, it is all too often the woman who is prosecuted. The statistics bear this out: around 70% of women in prison are victims of coercion or domestic violence.

Turning to the issue of coerced internal concealment, Amendment 259 links the new offences of causing internal concealment and cuckooing, making it clearer and easier to prosecute these serious and often related behaviours. Coerced internal concealment, whereby a person hides items such as drugs inside their bodies, is a particularly stark illustration of the abuse of power. Anyone who puts another person’s life at risk in this way should be subject to the harshest of penalties, so we support the introduction of this new offence.

I take this opportunity to raise an issue which, regrettably and surprisingly, remains absent from the Bill. In the past five years in England and Wales, a child has been subjected to an intimate police search every 14 hours on average. Black children are four times more likely to be strip-searched compared to their proportion of the population. Half these searches lead to no further action.

In opposition, the Government promised stronger regulation, including a statutory duty to notify parents, which should be the bare minimum. Although a consultation began in April 2024, there have been no firm proposals since, which is disappointing given an earlier commitment from the former Home Secretary to new mandatory rules and safeguards being

“put in place as a matter of urgency”.

That pledge followed a series of recommendations from the IOPC, including a call to amend the law so that police forces are required to make a safeguarding referral for any child subjected to a search involving the exposure of intimate parts. It also called for clearer guidance, enhanced training, greater consistency across police forces and, again, for these reforms to be implemented “quickly”.

Some 18 months later, some forces have improved practice and made more safeguarding referrals, but there is still no legal requirement. The Children’s Commissioner confirms that poor strip search practice is widespread and is not limited to any one force or region; failures include not having an appropriate adult present. Can the Minister confirm that a timescale is in place for the implementation of these recommendations? If not, will the Government consider amending the Bill to reflect the need for urgent action?

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Baroness Doocey and Lord Blencathra

Committee stage
Monday 17th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend’s amendments. Every week, coming from the north of England to this House, I see literally miles and miles of repulsive gang graffiti. On the outskirts of every station, walls and buildings are plastered with it. At Crewe and near Euston, hundreds and hundreds of goods wagons are covered in it, and even the walls of residential buildings. We see it everywhere, so why worry about it? It is unsightly and destroys any beauty that may be left on the approaches to cities by rail, but it is much more insidious than that, as my noble friend on the Front Bench has pointed out.

Gang-related graffiti, which we see in all urban areas, is often seen as both a symptom and a catalyst of criminal activity. I suggest that there is sufficient evidence available to conclude that gang graffiti leads to increased crime in affected neighbourhoods and that it instils fear among local residents. Gang graffiti typically consists of symbols, tags or messages used by criminal gangs to mark their territory, send warnings or communicate with other gangs. It differs from other forms of graffiti, such as street art, due to its association with organised crime and territorial disputes.

Several studies and reports indicate a correlation between the presence of gang graffiti and higher rates of crime, particularly violent offences. Gang graffiti is often used to demarcate territory, which can lead to turf wars and retaliatory violence. Areas marked by gang symbols may experience an increase in robberies, assaults and drug-related crimes as gangs seek to assert dominance. A study published by the Journal of Criminal Justice found that neighbourhoods with visible gang graffiti reported higher levels of gang-related crime and violence, suggesting that graffiti serves as both a warning and an invitation for conflict. Police departments in cities such as London and Manchester have noted that the appearance of new gang graffiti often coincides with spikes in criminal activity, particularly when rival gangs respond by marking over existing tags.

Crime prevention experts argue that gang graffiti is not merely a symptom but a tool used to intimidate, recruit and claim control, thereby fostering an environment conducive to criminal behaviour. Although correlation does not necessarily imply causation, the consistent association between gang graffiti and increased crime rates supports the argument that graffiti can contribute to localised crime.

The visual presence of gang graffiti can have a significant psychological impact on residents and visitors, as my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel said. Research conducted by community safety organisations has shown that people perceive areas with gang graffiti as less safe, which can lead to heightened anxiety, avoidance behaviours and reduced community cohesion. Surveys by our local councils in the UK reveal that residents often cite gang graffiti as a major contributor to their fear of crime, even if they have not personally experienced gang violence.

Our own British Crime Survey found that the visibility of gang markers and threatening messages increases the perceived risk of victimisation, causing some individuals to alter their daily routines or to avoid certain neighbourhoods or streets altogether. Community leaders report that gang graffiti can erode trust in public institutions as residents feel that the authorities are unable to maintain law and order and prevent criminal groups operating openly. In summary, gang graffiti acts as a visual clue that can frighten people, negatively impact mental well-being and discourage positive social interaction within affected communities.

Last year, the Metropolitan Police estimated that there were 102 active gangs in London engaged in violence and robbery, and they were responsible for a significant amount of serious violence, including half of all knife crimes with injury, 60% of shootings and 29% of reported child sexual exploitation. I think those 102 gangs equate to about 4,500 individuals. It is not just London; the same is happening in all our major cities. Let us be clear: gang-related graffiti is not some kids with aerosol cans spray-painting walls for a bit of fun. Gangs are making powerful statements to their allies and enemies that this is their criminal territory. Therefore, the solution has to be the prompt removal of graffiti, expensive though it is, and that has to be part of gang prevention strategies. However, we also need increased penalties, as suggested by my noble friend in his Amendment 51.

I do not need to speak in support of Amendment 52; I think I have just made the point that gangs are highly dangerous organisations and there should be tougher sentences for any crimes that have gang connections.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, everyone is concerned about gang activity. The dark web means it has never been easier for people to source and buy drugs independently, contributing to the emergence of more loosely organised micro-gangs, as once an individual has a large supply of illicit drugs, they need to recruit others to help distribute them. I am sympathetic to the intentions behind the tabled amendments.

On Amendment 51 on graffiti, I entirely agree with some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, that this usually relates to gangs marking territory or expressing group affiliation. It can result in public spaces feeling unsafe, and the fear is that it could fuel turf wars between rival gangs. To many it is also an unsightly nuisance, with the clean-up cost high for home owners, businesses and local authorities. However, we remain unconvinced that this amendment is the way forward.

Graffiti without the property owner’s permission is already a criminal offence, classified as vandalism or criminal damage, with penalties ranging from fines to imprisonment. I am also concerned that measures such as this risk embedding racial bias in law enforcement and disproportionately affecting minority and marginalised communities. The courts have already found that using graffiti as a marker of gang identity can result in the unjust targeting of marginalised groups, especially people of colour.

In 2022 a legal ruling forced the Metropolitan Police to admit that the operation of its gangs matrix was unlawful, breached human rights and had a disproportionate impact on black people. The matrix used factors, including graffiti, to label people as gang members, leading to life-changing consequences for those who had been wrongly included. Over 1,000 individuals assessed as low risk subsequently had to be removed from the database. This demonstrates the danger of conflating graffiti, gangs and criminality. While I understand the intention behind this amendment, the risk of unintended consequences is clear.

The definition of a gang in Amendment 52 feels worryingly broad, so we cannot support it. As drafted, it raises significant concerns that outweigh its intended benefits. Prosecutors are already cautioned not to use the term “gang” without clear evidence because, used inappropriately, it can unfairly broaden liability for an individual’s offending while disproportionately affecting ethnic minorities.

This proposal also feels overly prescriptive. It is important that the courts retain discretion and the law allows for nuanced sentencing; for example, when someone was plainly being coerced, groomed or manipulated into gang activity.

On these Benches, we believe that sentencing must account for individual circumstances and be based on specific individual criminal behaviour. Simply being in with the wrong people is not the same thing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, as well as moving Amendment 53A, I will also speak to my Amendment 53B in this group. I completely support the comments of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel on the Front Bench, and I support his amendments.

I encounter this every day coming to this House, where beggars lie on the pavement, half blocking it. Possibly they think they are less frightening sitting down than standing up, but the nuisance is the same, as is the chant asking for money. I have not seen them for some months now, but for a couple of years we had different beggars every day; then I realised it was the same dog they had. I presume that the dog got passed around between them, since the public are possibly more sympathetic to the dog than to the beggar— a kind of Dogs R Us.

There was another one who, when I first encountered him, was really scary. He was a beggar, but he was shouting and screaming—not at the public, I realised, but more to himself or to the ether than anything else. Clearly, he had a mental health problem. After I saw him a couple of times, I had no problem; I just did not make eye contact. However, people who had never met him before, such as women coming out of the shops, were terrified of him. It was nuisance begging, but clearly there was a health problem behind it.

My Amendment 53A would merely add a little tweak to my noble friend’s new clause by adding “outside any residential building” to the list in subsection (6). In this Westminster area, I have seen them sitting not on the doorstep but right beside the entrance to a residential block of flats. Frankly, I think that is intimidating, and residents should not have to face that fear, whether misplaced or not, that they may face beggars as they come and go from their own property.

My Amendment 53B would amend my noble friend’s amendment after subsection (7), by inserting:

“The judgement that the begging satisfies the conditions in (a), (b) and (d) is one to be made by the person who is the victim of the begging”.


So what does subsection (7) say? It says:

“This subsection applies if the person begs in a way that has caused, or is likely to cause … (a) harassment, alarm or distress to another person, … (b) a person reasonably to believe that … they, or any other person, may be harmed, or … any property … may be damaged, … (c) disorder, or … (d) a risk to the health or safety of any person except the person begging”.


In other words, the purpose of my amendment is that I do not want a police officer to come along and say, “Oh no, guv, that’s not harassment or causing alarm. What are you worried about? There’s no risk to your health and safety”. I suggest that the judgment be made by the person who is the victim of the nuisance begging. Some people will not be worried or alarmed, as I was not worried after I saw that chap with the mental health problem a few times, but others may be.

I came across this in an accusation about bullying in the Civil Service. If a civil servant believes that someone is bullied, that is taken for granted because one person felt it even though others might have felt differently. I dealt with that in my capacity of serving on an ALB.

In conclusion, I want to make it clear that, if a person feels that begging is causing him or her alarm, distress or harassment, or is a risk to health and safety, then it is the victim’s view that must be considered, not that of anyone else applying their own test for what that alarm might be.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, there is a genuine problem around aggressive begging and the involvement of organised criminal gangs. That is why we support Clause 11, which rightly focuses not on individuals who are begging but on those who are orchestrating and profiting from this practice.

Lots of things in life are a nuisance, but that does not mean we should criminalise them. Where begging is causing a genuine nuisance, police already have a range of powers to deal with it under anti-social behaviour legislation. We think this amendment is the wrong solution at a time when charities such as Crisis say that the number of vulnerable people on the streets who survive by begging, including women and first-time rough sleepers, is rising. In these circumstances, we should be looking at how we can better reach and support those in such straitened circumstances. By contrast, criminalising begging would push people away from support, and it will not solve the problems of poverty, homelessness, addiction or exploitation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I rise for the final time tonight—the Committee will be pleased to know—to support the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel. I wish I had put down my own amendment to Clause 27 to draw attention to what I think is the complete disconnect between subsections (1) and (3) in the new section.

The Bill in its current form proposes in subsection (1) of the new section that it shall be an offence for any person to possess an article with a blade or point or an offensive weapon with the intent

“to use unlawful violence against another person, … to cause another person to believe that unlawful violence will be used against them”

and others, or

“to cause serious unlawful damage to property”.

That is fairly serious stuff.

However, the penalties in subsection (3) of the proposed new section, with a maximum of 12 months’ imprisonment in a magistrates’ court and up to four years on indictment, are insufficient given the gravity of the offence. I support the argument for a substantial increase in sentencing powers to reflect the seriousness of the conduct involved.

Possession of an offensive weapon with intent to use it for violence or to cause fear is a profoundly serious criminal act. Such intent demonstrates a premeditated willingness to inflict harm, intimidate or destroy property. It is not a spontaneous or lesser form of criminality but rather a calculated and dangerous escalation. The mere possession of a weapon with such intent poses a direct threat to public safety, undermines community trust and creates an atmosphere of fear and insecurity.

As the Minister will know, offences involving offensive weapons are often precursors to more serious crimes, involving grievous bodily harm right up to homicide. I maintain that actions that create an imminent risk of serious harm should be met with robust deterrence and sentencing. Allowing relatively lenient penalties for those caught with weapons and with criminal intent fails to deter potential offenders and signals a lack of seriousness in addressing violent crime. The psychological impact on victims—those who are threatened or believe they are at risk of violence—can be profound and long-lasting, as many reports say, even if no injury actually occurs.

When compared with other offences of similar seriousness, the proposed penalties appear disproportionately low. For instance, offences such as aggravated burglary or possession of firearms with intent to endanger life attract significantly higher sentences, often exceeding a decade in custody. This clause is about people going out with vicious knives or machetes, intending to use unlawful violence against another person—in other words, to attack them and possibly kill them. Why on earth should there even be a summary trial for that sort of offence? That is why I wish I had put down my own amendment to delete from the new section subsection (3)(a), which provides for trial in a magistrates’ court.

Of course, we must not look at this Bill in isolation; we have the Sentencing Bill coming along, which will aim to ban anyone—if I understand it correctly—going to prison for a sentence of 12 months or less. If one of these cases goes to a magistrates’ court, and the magistrates impose the maximum sentence of 12 months, it will be automatically suspended and the perpetrator will get away with it. What signal does that send? If these criminals were going out with a knife to scratch cars or vandalise property, summary might be appropriate, but they are going out with knives to attack people and possibly kill them. That is why, in my opinion, it has to indictable only and a 14-year maximum sentence—which, as we know, will end up as seven in any case, with automatic release at half-time. I believe the current proposal for a maximum of four years on indictment is markedly out of step with comparable offences and the seriousness of potential offences in subsection (1).

The criminal justice system must not only punish offenders but deter would-be offenders and reassure the public that their safety is paramount. Inadequate penalties such as this one risk undermining public confidence in the legal system. A more severe sentencing framework would send a clear message that society will not tolerate the possession of weapons in the street with intent to commit violent acts or grievous bodily harm to people. It would also be a stronger deterrent to those contemplating such conduct.

In conclusion, I believe the Government are absolute right to introduce this new power, but they have the penalties wrong since they are disconnected from the seriousness of the offence. Given the potential for severe physical and psychological harm, the premeditated nature of the crime and the need for effective deterrence, I also submit that the maximum penalties should be increased. Of course, this is not tying the judge’s discretion; I am suggesting no minimum sentence but a sentence of up to 14 years.

I should add that I have exactly the same view on the suggested penalties in the next massive group of amendments, but I have made my arguments here and I will not repeat them when we come to that group on Wednesday.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, nearly half the murders in the UK over the last three years are due to knife crime, so we recognise the vital importance of equipping police with the necessary tools to intervene when there is clear evidence of intent to commit serious violence. We give Clause 27 our full backing.

Before I turn to the amendment, I want to make a couple of points around the new offence. Will the Government ensure that robust guidance and oversight are in place to prevent unjustified or discriminatory use of this power? That needs to be accompanied by improved training for police and judiciary. The reality is that young black men are already significantly overrepresented in knife crime prosecutions, and we must be careful not to compound that position. Discrimination and justice are opposites.

I hope this may also help stem the rising number of incidents in which people suffer life-changing injuries after being attacked with acid or other corrosive substances. Reports of such offences increased by 75% in 2023, including 454 physical attacks. Half these victims were women, with attacks often occurring in a domestic abuse context, but only 8% of these cases resulted in a charge or summons, partly due to the victim’s fear of reprisal. The hope is that this new offence may allow prosecutions to be brought before harm is inflicted, since proving intent would not necessarily require the victim to testify. Can the Minister say how the Government intend to use the offence to this end?

On Amendment 56, the Liberal Democrats agree with Jonathan Hall that four years in prison in insufficient when there is clear evidence of the intention to cause mass fatalities. The court must have the full weight of the law behind it in the hopefully rare cases in which a lengthy sentence is thought necessary for public prosecution. I would expect the Sentencing Council to issue guidance around how to categorise levels of seriousness, and I hope this will guard against sentence inflation. Nevertheless, we are minded to support this amendment and I urge the Government to look again at the maximum penalty.

Welfare Reform and Work Bill

Debate between Baroness Doocey and Lord Blencathra

Wednesday 9th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, in introducing his amendment, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Patel, said quite early on that he wanted to put the proposal on hold until the Government could demonstrate that it would work. I think, therefore, that the problem with Amendment 50 is that it simply asking for the Secretary of State’s best guess or estimate. I suggest that we cannot demonstrate that it will work until it is implemented in practice.

The Government have already given an assessment of the policy change. In his Budget speech, the Chancellor said that ESA,

“was supposed to end some of the perverse incentives in the old incapacity benefit, but instead it has introduced new ones. One of those is that those who are placed in the work-related activity group receive more money a week than those on jobseeker’s allowance, but get nothing like the help to find suitable employment. The number of JSA claimants has fallen by 700,000 since 2010, while the number of incapacity benefits claimants has fallen by just 90,000. That is despite 61% of claimants on the ESA WRAG benefit saying that they want to work”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/7/15; col. 333.]

I simply say as someone with a little bit of experience of politics that, if that is the judgment that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has already made, I cannot see any assessment by the Secretary of State coming to radically different conclusions. Also, even if the Government employed 20 experts, I think we would end up with 40 different opinions of how it might work in practice. I believe that the policy is right in principle but it is crucial to make sure that it works in practice.

As far as saving money is concerned, I would simply say the following, although it may not be popular in all quarters. When I see, participate in and indeed benefit from some of the extraordinary medical improvements that are being made daily, I cannot understand why expenditure on disability benefits has risen so much—by £2 billion in the last Parliament. I cannot believe that as a country we are becoming more disabled, but maybe we are.

It is clear—and everyone agrees—that most people who are disabled want to work if they can. We have to ensure that they are correctly assessed and given the right incentives and help, and that employers are constantly reminded of their responsibilities. Despite some criticisms of the WCA, I think that it has been getting a little better under each Government. I know nothing about cancer or mental health but I have some experience of progressive illnesses, where one can move from being fit to work and able to do practically anything to having limited capacity for work or work-related activity, to being completely unfit for work.

Let us take as examples Parkinson’s disease and MS. I have been pretty lucky. Some people go downhill very quickly but there are huge variations, and we cannot have a policy of one case fits all. Some people may be able to walk okay but are hit by terrible fatigue, rendering them unfit to work, although they otherwise seem physically capable.

I had to retire as an MP in 2010 because I no longer had the stamina to do the phenomenal 80-plus hours a week which MPs have to do and are expected to do, as well as completing a phenomenal amount of travelling. Even though I got round all the flooded areas of Cumbria in 2005, I would not have managed it last weekend because I do not have the energy for that now. Of course, I accept that parliamentarians are not a very good test group for people in the country; nevertheless, there are tens of thousands of people who can work in some way but need to drop down a gear or two and do lesser work than they did in the past. Those in the WRAG must not be left to fester until they move inexorably on to the support group. Of course, there are many tens of thousands with a disability who have limited capacity but will not progress to the unfit-to-work-at-all category.

Finally, I want to comment on employers and their responsibility. I support the work of the Disability Confident campaign but we have to educate and pressure employers more. I do not think that employers are institutionally prejudiced against disabled people but they are a bit afraid—they are not quite sure what to do. The same could be said of many of your Lordships. When those of us in wheelchairs approach a door, most noble Lords want to jump and help to open it for us, but then they are slightly afraid. Will we get stroppy that they have tried to help us, because we want to be independent and do it ourselves? It is also a bit like men opening a door for a lady. Is it a nice gentlemanly gesture or is it some sexist put-down?

Employers are in a similar position. They want to help but they do not quite understand disability. They are afraid that there may be a drop in efficiency in the business or that their other employees will complain that they are “carrying” the disabled people. They are afraid that they may be more subject to industrial relations disputes or be taken to a tribunal if they have not tweaked the facilities in exactly the right way. They know that there is a wide range of disabilities but they think, “We’ll put in a wheelchair ramp and we might be able to employ someone who’s deaf, though we’re not sure we can employ someone who is blind or partially sighted”. It is much easier to find an excuse not to employ disabled people. I believe that we can do a huge amount more to educate employers that it is a safe risk to take and that people are capable of doing certain things—not every task in the company, but certain things.

I conclude by setting an example. I have a little bee in my bonnet about Parliament. We in this House are protected by the most wonderful doorkeepers, who will throw themselves in front of a speeding bullet to save our lives. However, there are guys and women coming back from Afghanistan with no arms or legs. When we see them running and winning marathons, it is clear that they are as fit as fiddles. We should employ some of those people in this House as well—perhaps as doorkeepers and in other capacities—because, if we in Parliament do not set an example and show that you can take on people who are apparently severely disabled but can do either a full-time or a part-time job, then we cannot harangue employers that they are failing in their responsibilities.

Without going into all the details of the work incentives and the £30 reduction—those have been given by the experts on all sides who have spoken today—I simply say that I think we can get the incentives right. If we can achieve the end result of making employers recruit more disabled people, then this policy is worth testing in the medium term.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, reading the text of Clauses 13 and 14, as with so much legislation, does little to reveal the huge impact that this change is likely to have, but the impact is going to be very severe for disabled people. The argument that cutting benefits for disabled people will incentivise them to work is, frankly, insulting. As many other noble Lords have said, disabled people want to work if they can. People with progressive illnesses would love to feel remission and resume their careers, and people struck down with serious illnesses or mental ill-health would give almost anything to be well again.

That is why it is so iniquitous to claim that this cut in support will somehow incentivise a return to employment. Surely it would be more honest for the Government simply to say, “If £73.10 a week is enough for people on jobseeker’s allowance, it’s enough for people on employment and support allowance with limited work capabilities”. But that is not correct.

First, if you are fit and healthy, unemployment is expected to be short-term, although for many sometimes it is not. For the majority it is possible to scrimp by on subsistence living for a few weeks or months while looking for a job, but if you are not fit for work and have a debilitating long-term condition, then it could, sadly, be years and years before you get back into work, if at all. Scraping by without buying clothes or replacing worn-out household items becomes increasingly difficult, as does dealing with increased prices. The further impact on physical and mental well-being is extraordinary and depressing for many people.

There are also costs associated with being sick or disabled: the costs of travelling to medical appointments, of extra heating, of specialised diets and of mobility aids—all the things that are required because of your illness or disability. These extra costs significantly impact on disabled people’s savings, which makes managing on low incomes for very long periods incredibly difficult.

Finally, there are the huge barriers faced by disabled people who try to find work once the Government have assessed them as able to return to work or to enter the workforce. The vast majority of employers, whether meaning to or not, look at disabled people and see only a problem. They seldom see the opportunity to benefit from their determination and talent. The Government have recognised this problem with their commitment to tackle the disability employment gap. Sadly, in Clauses 13 and 14 that commitment has been translated into a snatch-and-grab raid against sick and disabled people, who need support to find work when they can, not the threat of no food on the table if they cannot.

I sincerely hope that the Government will reconsider this proposal, which would have the most severe consequences for some of the most vulnerable people in our society.