Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I hope that the House will forgive a Front-Bench speech from the second Bench: it is for practical reasons and not out of disrespect. I knew that a one-clause Bill would not defeat the House in its determination to make varied, well-informed forensic points. For me, the phrase “deprivation of citizenship” brings back memories of my noble friend Lord Avebury—the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, is grinning. Eric was so forceful and so clear about statelessness not being used as a punishment. I have often thought of him as a role model to whom I have not been able to live up.

As we saw a couple of years ago with Bangladesh, our Government’s views about a person’s citizenship do not always, as a matter of practice, align with those of the other state involved. Of course, many argued at the time of the Begum appeal judgment that two-tiered citizenship had been created, downgrading citizenship for naturalised citizens and the children of immigrants.

I have to say that I am one of those who is troubled by the phrase “conducive to the public good”. It is not for us today, as the Minister reminded us at the start of the debate, to try to open up the 1981 Act, but the term requires a value judgment. It is capable of varying and wide interpretations, and it sets a low bar, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, described it. At one point during his speech he used the term “hard cases”. I was not sure whether we were being asked to think about bad law following on from that. Why not “threat to national security”? Indeed, Minister Jarvis in the Commons really seemed to use the terms interchangeably.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, suggested that we might be able to look at some change during the course of the Bill. The Long Title of the Bill is actually very short and very unhelpful in that sense, stating that the Bill is

“to make provision about the effect, during an appeal, of an order under section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981”.

I look forward to the noble Lord’s ingenuity in seeking to build on that.

Whatever the ground, as has been said, it is not only the subject of the order who is affected, and the consequences for a child may be extreme, as we know from recent and current history. The APPG on Trafficked Britons in Syria, of which I am a member, has pointed out the risks of statelessness and the concomitant risks of exploitation and extreme ill-treatment, so let us not lose sight of the best interests of the child.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights, under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, asked a number of specific questions—I have seen the Minister’s reply—one of which was about the national security point that I have made. The letter also argues against SIAC having powers to suspend the effect of a successful appeal. Not quite all cases, I think, are security matters—or perhaps they are. It seems to me that “conducive to the public good” might extend that. One of my concerns is about it being a little unclear. There should be consistent mechanisms for managing all cases. The JCHR also asked about expediting appeals and the Government have told us that determinations are for the democratically accountable Secretary of State. I do not think the JCHR was actually challenging that.

I have seen a paper prepared by ILPA, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, regarding seeking a stay while an appeal is pending or still possible and pointing out a number of procedural matters that I would have thought could be overcome. I assume that the Home Office has seen the briefing. If not, I wonder whether I might send it to the Minister. It raises points that are pretty technical, I think, and perhaps not appropriate for the subject of this debate. But, if I send it to the Minister, perhaps he could consider responding to it, via me if that is appropriate. It is not aggressive; it is pointing out problems.

Like other noble Lords, I thought that the Malthouse amendment had much to recommend it in the Commons. Kit Malthouse said that he hoped that the Minister would do the right thing. Well, if they could not, let us do so.

The Government maintain the position, not just in this situation, that it is possible, practicable and not disadvantageous to exercise legal rights from outside the UK. When I was in practice as a solicitor, from time to time I found it difficult enough to get a coherent picture from some clients with whom I was face to face—never this sort of situation. It takes time, trust, patience, skill and, of course, access, particularly with a person who has undergone, perhaps over a long period, some extreme experiences. Like others, I feel that our system, which operates on the basis that if a relevant court makes a finding in favour of an individual, that stands, unless it is stayed, until it is overturned, is the way we should continue to do things.

I have been told that the Home Secretary’s powers are used almost exclusively against individuals from ethnic minority backgrounds who hold or are perceived to hold dual nationality. I can see how that could come about. The Minister might like to comment on that because, in the current highly charged political atmosphere, we should be as clear as possible about the facts.

Apart from one point that strikes me as a very good basis for a possible amendment in Committee—my noble friend does not know this yet, because I did not know he was going to make the point, but we will discuss it afterwards—I remain with the basic principles: that no one should be made stateless; that the state’s response to allegations of threats to national security should be tried in the UK unless there are very good reasons to do otherwise; and that the best interests of the child are a priority. I use the term “a priority” as that is what is in other legislation; I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, about that—and it would be a great shame if his barony were challenged. Finally, I remain with the basic principle that the exercise of the power of deprivation should always be proportionate.