Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament: China Report
Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts(6 months, 1 week ago)
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Baroness Goldie (Con)
It is important that we have a coherent approach to the Indo-Pacific, and I strongly suggest that this is exactly what we have. We work bilaterally, minilaterally and multilaterally across a range of fora, with a range of countries in the region, some of which are Commonwealth countries and others which are not. The important thing is that we have a strategic united vision, which was demonstrated when I was at this defence dialogue in Seoul. It was uplifting and encouraging to see a unity of purpose, for everyone to stand together and, by doing that, to recognise the strength that this unanimity represents.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, going back to the question of the Chagos Islands, what steps are being taken to ensure that the views of the Chagossians, who were thrown off those islands, are being taken into account in negotiations about the future of the islands?
Baroness Goldie (Con)
I do not have any specific knowledge about that. It is very much a matter for the FCDO but I will make inquiries, as I said to the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and respond to the noble Baroness.
Armed Forces Bill
Baroness Lister of Burtersett ExcerptsMonday 8th November 2021
(2 years, 5 months ago)
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The Lord Bishop of St Albans
My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendment 61 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, to which I have added my name. I have done so because of my concerns about the well-being of young people and because I am not convinced that there are sufficient benefits in allowing the enlistment of young people of 16 or 17 rather than 18. Evidence and personal experience tell me that there is not.
I speak because of the experience of a member of my own family, so I know a story inside out, but I have also spoken to a number of parents whose children were recruited under the age of 18—and I have heard some very similar stories those described by the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, in her speech. I have no doubt that, for some early leavers recruited below the age of 18, the mental damage can take years to recover from. These recruits have the legal status as children and are entitled in law under safeguarding legislation to be protected from harm as far as possible.
There are a number of other reasons why I question this policy. Younger recruits suffer from very high drop-out rates. Official statistics show that, once enlisted, 30% of the Army’s under-18 recruits leave or are dismissed before they finish their training. They can find themselves out of work and education within months of joining, and these discharged recruits are not tracked, so we cannot speculate on how they fare after they leave the military. That being said, it would not be unreasonable to say that, had the option of joining up not been available, they would have stayed in full-time education, taken an apprenticeship or worked part time while undertaking a qualification. We are talking about not some small, troubled minority who failed to adapt adequately to military service, but nearly a third of all junior recruits. That is affecting some 700 young people a year, according to the Child Rights International Network.
According to data from 2011 to 2014, of those junior recruits who stay on to complete their training and enlist fully, an additional 10% drop out at the age of 22, the minimum length of service. This gives a total retention percentage beyond the age of 22 of around 63% for all those who enlisted below the age of 18. Furthermore, data from 2017 to 2019 shows that only one in five recruits enlisted under the age of 18 are still in the Army 10 years later, compared with one in four adult recruits.
Surely this makes little sense for the Army, which allocates huge amounts of time and resources to recruit so many under-18s only for such a large proportion to either leave prematurely or complete just the minimum required service. The Ministry of Defence’s own data shows that adult recruits aged 18 or above are more likely to finish their training. Hence, it makes economic sense apart from anything else for the Army to focus its efforts on older recruits, especially given that the MoD admits that adult recruits cost half as much to train.
As I have mentioned, there are also concerns surrounding the long-term mental health outcomes of those who join up early. A recent study led by Glasgow University comparing the long-term outcomes of junior entrants with civilians of the same age and background found that junior entrants since 1995 were between two and three times more likely to develop long-term PTSD. This is significant because PTSD has been found, in a range of studies, to co-occur with depression and addictive behaviours, including substance and alcohol misuse and gambling disorders. This point is reinforced further by a study led by King’s College London, which reviewed the mental health of veterans who had originally enlisted as junior entrants. Since 2003, junior entrants were twice as likely to develop alcohol misuse and twice as likely to report episodes of lifetime self-harm compared with veterans who had enlisted at older ages.
Even if these are afflictions that affect junior recruits in adulthood, any reasonable duty of care must consider the long-term consequences of a particular policy. Since around the turn of the millennium, the youngest recruits to the Armed Forces have been substantially more likely than older recruits, and more likely than civilians of the same age and social background, to develop mental health problems in the longer term.
I am sure that some might prefer to focus on the fact that this problem has emerged since the late 1990s. The slur “snowflake” has been used to tar a generation some believe are overly sensitive and unable to overcome adversity. But the reality surely is that, regardless of our approach to young people, the problems young recruits face are real and have serious long-term impacts. In an age of heightened awareness about mental health, old mantras such as “toughen up” fail to alleviate the damaging consequences of junior enlistment.
The evidence I have been trying to outline in favour of these amendments points to a real problem with the policy of recruiting at such a young age. Seeing as most other countries can manage by recruiting adults, surely the UK should have no problem either. For those 16 or 17 year-olds who would have eagerly joined the military, if they are still passionate about doing so at 18, the option is still available to them. They will be entering with greater life experience and a greater chance of success both in the military and in their subsequent civilian life.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, the last time I spoke on this issue was in support of my late noble friend Lord Judd, who, as my noble friend Lady Massey said, was much admired and loved—and, I would add, is much missed. He brought to issues such as this his passion for social justice, which was unrivalled in your Lordships’ House. That said, my noble friend has made a powerful case today in introducing these amendments. Like her, I come to the issue from a children’s rights perspective and am grateful for the briefing from the Child Rights International Network.
I apologise that I could not attend the Second Reading debate but, reading it, it seemed that the Minister was rather flippant in her response to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, when she raised this issue. The Minister dismissed the term she used, “child soldiers”, as
“a term that few of us in this Chamber recognise”.—[Official Report, 7/9/21; col. 775.]
Perhaps so but it acts as a reminder that we are talking about children, as defined by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, as has already been emphasised. The Minister may wish to point out that the convention does not prohibit enlistment of children under the age of 18. But the body which monitors compliance with the convention, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, has repeatedly called on the UK to raise the minimum age of recruitment to 18. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has in the past, including when I was a member, also questioned government policy on this matter from a human rights perspective.
The UN committee will be reviewing the UK’s progress on children’s rights again next year and has already flagged up Armed Forces recruitment in the list of issues that the review will examine. It has asked the Government to explain what steps they have taken to raise the enlistment age since the last review in 2016. The committee has also asked whether the minimum period of service for recruits aged under 18 is still longer than for adult recruits—a discrimination that Amendment 62 seeks to end. Surely we wish to be able to point to progress in this area since the last review.
As my noble friend underlined, it is important to remember the international context. She pointed to a clear positive trend: half a century ago, it was normal for state armed forces to recruit children; in most parts of the world, including Europe, it is now abnormal. This is a seismic shift at a global level that has already safeguarded countless adolescent children from the harm associated with joining the armed forces too early. Increasingly, the global consensus that children should be safeguarded from military work is denying political cover to less scrupulous countries than our own and armed groups which otherwise have no qualms about sending child soldiers into combat.
We have an opportunity here. A global ban on the use of children for military purposes used to be a pipe dream. Now, it is at least imaginable. At the moment, the UK follows the lowest legally permissible standard in the world by allowing enlistment from age 16, lagging behind others when we could be helping to lead the way—and it can be done. Noble Lords here will know much more about this than I do but, in contrast to the Army, the RAF and Navy do not recruit many under-18s. Historically, the Army has said that it needs younger recruits just to fill the ranks and when the issue was last debated, the then Minister—the noble Earl, Lord Howe—explained that the under-18s represented 15% of the Army’s inflow, which I found rather shocking. Given that the Army has downsized and, as I understand it, is continuing to do so, surely it does not need underage recruits any more. Can the Minister give us some up-to-date information on the trends in recruitment of those under 18, including what proportion of inflow they represent now?
It would seem that the transition to an all-adult Army could now be within easy reach. For the protection of children’s rights, here in the UK and globally, it is a step we should take.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to support the amendment of my friend and fellow member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the noble Baroness, Lady Massey. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, I apologise for not speaking at Second Reading. At that point I had not had the irresistible invitation from the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, to support her on this. She and I have form when it comes to working on children’s rights. I put on the record that I am a governor of Coram, the oldest children’s charity in the United Kingdom, dating from 1739.
Armed Forces Bill
Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts(8 years ago)
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Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, I apologise for speaking at this late stage of the proceedings on the Bill but I have been fairly busy on other Bills. However, I want to support my noble friend Lord Judd, who has been pressing this issue consistently and has done much to keep it on the agenda of this Bill.
Whatever one’s views about the principle of the enlistment of under 18 year-olds, the amendments raise two important issues. The first we have just heard about from the noble Baroness, Lady Howe. This clearly is a children’s rights issue, a fact which was also underlined in Committee. Despite the considered response of the Minister in his letter of 20 April to my noble friend, it is debatable whether the current policy is always in the best interests of the child.
As already noted, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has called on the UK to raise its enlistment age to 18, as have the UK Children’s Commissioners. The Joint Committee on Human Rights questioned current policy in a report a few years ago and, in its most recent report on the UK’s compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child—I was a member of the committee when it published its most recent report—expressed hope that its successor committee would scrutinise the issue in the light of the UN committee’s concluding observations, to be delivered this year.
As my noble friend said, these amendments are not aimed at changing the age of enlistment. However, the concerns of the human rights and children’s rights lobbies underline their importance in helping to protect the rights and best interests of children who are enlisted.
My second point concerns children’s life chances. In his letter, the noble Earl states that there is no reliable evidence that those who serve in the Armed Forces while under the age of 18 suffer any significant disadvantage compared with their peers in the civilian population. I have not done any research into this matter but certainly, the evidence provided by Child Soldiers International questions that statement. It suggests that in too many cases there is a detriment rather than a benefit from early enlistment.
Given the concerns raised and the Government’s confidence that all is well, what is to be lost by accepting my noble friend’s amendment? All it does is require a regular report so that the position of children in the Army can be kept under review. If it shows that the situation is as the Government say it is, then good, all is well. However, if it confirms the concerns raised by my noble friend and by organisations outside, I am sure the Government would want to take appropriate action, not least as part of their overall life chances strategy, the importance of which the Prime Minister emphasised in his life chances speech earlier this year.
On Amendment 8, the Government surely want to ensure that under-18 recruits have the necessary literacy skills to, at the very least, read and understand their enlistment papers. It is not too much to ask, and I hope the noble Earl can give the House some assurance on this matter.
Baroness Jolly
I support the amendments. As the noble Baroness has just said, what is there not to like?
Children joining the services at 16 and 17 come in all shapes and sizes: from those embarking on technical or engineering careers to those joining the infantry and, possibly, the Royal Marines. Their wish is to be physically rather than mentally active, and they are required. The first group, at the start of an apprenticeship, will continue their education and will require a high standard of literacy and numeracy. The second group will not require such high standards and will not be comfortable with reading formal documents. There needs to be awareness that currently, these recruits do not study the same GCSEs as the technical recruits, but another curriculum. There is an issue here, because young men and women who enlist under the age of 18 can leave the Army at any stage up to 18, but if they have dipped out of the standard curriculum and are not studying a GCSE curriculum, their life chances will be affected. We need to be aware of that.
If the Minister cannot answer this question perhaps he will write to me. When was the readability of the documents the amendment refers to last examined? If the required reading age is greater than 10, as is being suggested—bearing in mind that the average Sun reader has a reading age of between eight and 10, so it is nothing unusual—perhaps these documents should be revised.
Immigration Bill
Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts(8 years ago)
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Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, briefly, I support Motion A1. I have participated in a number of debates in this House on this issue and I have yet to hear a convincing argument against providing this most basic civil right to asylum seekers.
As the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, made clear when he moved the Motion so ably, we are yet to see any serious evidence in support of the current policy. But there is plenty of evidence of the demoralising impact it has on asylum seekers. For example, a woman quoted in the most thorough research that I have seen into the reasons people choose to seek asylum in this country said:
“Sometimes I just cry. It’s like I am worthless, like I am just this piece of junk”.
No human being should be made to feel like that, and that is why I support the Motion.
Lord Green of Deddington (CB)
My Lords, I am rather puzzled. If conditions for asylum seekers are so difficult in this country, why are there literally thousands of people camped around Calais who appear to want to get into this country in order to claim asylum? And why is it that, of those who claim asylum, 60% have already been working before they make their claim?
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Dear) (CB)
I should inform the House that if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment C2 by reason of pre-emption.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett
My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendment D1, but as a member of the all-party inquiry into detention I also want to make clear my support for Amendments C1 and C2.
I should first acknowledge that the Government’s Motion D represents progress on the status quo ante. However, it does not reach Shaw’s recommendation of an absolute exclusion of pregnant women embodied in Lords Amendment 85B. I can do no better than echo the Conservative MP, Richard Fuller, who said yesterday that for him it was a matter of principle that we should never detain a pregnant woman when we have the choice not to do so. That principle was also voiced recently by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe.
However, in a spirit of compromise—and with some regret—I will not insist that we stick to our principles today. Instead, my alternative to the Government’s amendment does three main things, all of which are designed to meet the Government’s own intentions and strengthen their amendment through the addition of safeguards. The first would write in,
“the over-riding principle that no pregnant woman shall be detained … save in the most exceptional circumstances”.
This is exactly what the Government say happens now, but all the evidence suggests that this is not the case, as confirmed by Stephen Shaw and those who gave evidence to him. However, if, in the noble and learned Lord’s view the inclusion of “most” makes this measure too restrictive, I would be open to the Government removing “most” and just saying “in exceptional circumstances”. However, at Third Reading, the noble and learned Lord was unable to give me any assurances that “exceptional” will truly mean exceptional in future. When scepticism was raised about Home Office procedures yesterday, the only assurance given was that this was something Stephen Shaw could look at when he reviews the measures. Welcome as this commitment to this further review is, we cannot wait another 12 to 18 months, during which time pregnant women could continue to be detained in other than exceptional circumstances. Therefore, it is crucial that we write this principle into the Bill.
Secondly, the amendment would change the meaning of “the relevant time” from which the 72-hour clock starts ticking from the later to “the earlier” of either,
“the time at which the Secretary of State is … satisfied that the woman is pregnant”,
or,
“the time at which the detention begins”.
Otherwise, 72 hours’ detention could in practice very easily become, say, 144 hours or more, if it takes time to establish that a woman is pregnant. Yet all the Government have said is that the period will be only up to 72 hours. If there are technical problems with the way I have done it, I am happy for those to be considered. However, “up to 72 hours” should be up to 72 hours. It may be that the power to redetain addresses some of the problems which the noble and learned Lord raised. Although I certainly would not want the power to redetain to be used as a norm, my amendment does not omit it—that is part of the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, which is designed to see what the Government’s intentions were. We do not want the kind of cat-and-mouse policy we had with the suffragettes where women are in and out, in and out. I am relieved that the Minister said that that was not the intention.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett
Leave out from “their” to end and insert “Amendment 85A, do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment 85B, and do propose Amendment 85C in lieu of Commons Amendment 85B—
“Limitation on detention of pregnant women
(1) This section applies subject to the over-riding principle that no pregnant woman shall be detained under a relevant detention power save in the most exceptional circumstances.
(2) This section applies to a woman if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the woman is pregnant.
(3) A woman to whom this section applies may not be detained under a relevant detention power for a period of—
(a) more than 72 hours from the relevant time, or
(b) more than seven days from the relevant time, in a case where the longer period of detention is authorised personally by a Minister of the Crown (within the meaning of the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975).
(4) In subsection (3) “the relevant time” means the earlier of—
(a) the time at which the Secretary of State is first satisfied that the woman is pregnant, and
(b) the time at which the detention begins.
(5) A woman to whom this section applies who has been released following detention under a relevant detention power may be detained again under such a power in accordance with this section.
(6) A pregnant woman may only be held under a relevant detention power in a short-term holding facility within the meaning of Part 8 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, or pre-departure accommodation within the meaning of section 147 of that Act, where her needs can be met and provision made for her medical care, except where the woman is being transferred to or from a short-term holding facility or pre-departure accommodation in a manner which makes provision for her care and where the journey does not exceed one hour.
(7) This section does not apply to the detention under paragraph 16(2) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 of an unaccompanied child to whom paragraph 18B of that Schedule applies.
(8) In this section—
“relevant detention power” means a power to detain under—
(a) paragraph 16(2) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (detention of persons liable to examination or removal),
(b) paragraph 2(1), (2) or (3) of Schedule 3 to that Act (detention pending deportation),
(c) section 62 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (detention of persons liable to examination or removal), or
(d) section 36(1) of the UK Borders Act 2007 (detention pending deportation);
“woman” means a female of any age.
(9) The Immigration Act 1971 is amended in accordance with subsections (10) and (11).
(10) In paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 (detention of persons liable to examination or removal) after sub-paragraph (2A) insert—
“(2B) The detention under sub-paragraph (2) of a person to whom section (Limitation on detention of pregnant women) (limitation on detention of pregnant women) of the Immigration Act 2016 applies is subject to that section.”
(11) In paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 (detention or control pending deportation) after sub-paragraph (4) insert—
“(4ZA) The detention under sub-paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of a person to whom section (Limitation on detention of pregnant women) (limitation on detention of pregnant women) of the Immigration Act 2016 applies is subject to that section.”
(12) In section 62 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (detention by Secretary of State) after subsection (7) insert—
“(7A) The detention under this section of a person to whom section (Limitation on detention of pregnant women) (limitation on detention of pregnant women) of the Immigration Act 2016 applies is subject to that section.”
(13) After section 78A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 insert—
“78B Restriction on removal of pregnant women etc
(1) This section applies in a case where a woman who is pregnant is to be removed from or required to leave the United Kingdom other than in cases where a woman has arrived in the United Kingdom but has not yet entered the United Kingdom within the meaning of section 11(1) of the Immigration Act 1971.
(2) During the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the relevant appeal rights are exhausted the pregnant woman may not be removed from or required to leave the United Kingdom.
(3) The relevant appeal rights are exhausted at the time when the pregnant woman could not bring an appeal under section 82 (ignoring any possibility of an appeal out of time with permission).
(4) Nothing in this section prevents any of the following during the period of 28 days mentioned in subsection (2)—
(a) the giving of a direction for the removal of a person from the United Kingdom,
(b) the making of a deportation order in respect of a person, or
(c) the taking of any other interim or preparatory action other than detention under Immigration Act powers.
(5) In this section references to a person being removed from or required to leave the United Kingdom are to the person being removed or required to leave in accordance with a provision of the Immigration Acts.”
“(2A) The detention under subsection (1) of a person to whom section (Limitation on detention of pregnant women) (limitation on detention of pregnant women) of the Immigration Act 2016 applies is subject to that section.””
(15) After section 54A of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 insert—
“54B Cases of pregnant women
(1) The Secretary of State must consult the Independent Family
Returns Panel in each case where—
(a) a woman who is pregnant is to be removed on how best to safeguard and promote the welfare of the pregnant woman, and
(b) the Secretary of State proposes to detain a pregnant woman in pre-departure accommodation or in a short-term holding facility about the suitability of doing so, having particular regard to the need to safeguard and promote her welfare.
(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the constitution of the Independent Family Returns Panel in cases involving pregnant women, and such regulations must provide for the panel considering such cases to include persons with expertise in the care of pregnant women and in maternity care.
(3) Regulations under this section must be made by statutory instrument subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(4) In this section—
(a) “pre-departure accommodation” and “short-term holding facility” have the same meaning as in Part 8 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999; and
(b) references to a person “being removed from or required to leave the United Kingdom” are to the person being removed or required to leave in accordance with a provision of the Immigration Acts.””
Immigration Bill
Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts(8 years ago)
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Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling the amendment on behalf of us both. I was alerted to this issue by briefings at an earlier stage of the Bill from the JCWI and ILPA. As the noble Baroness said, the late and much missed Lord Avebury tried to resolve this issue during the passage of what became the 2014 Act, but to no avail. It falls to us to try to resolve it now.
I will not repeat the case in support of the amendment that has already been made so clearly by the noble Baroness. Instead, I draw your Lordships’ attention to a singular aspect of the permission-to-rent scheme that the amendment is designed to remedy. The UK has a strong tradition of upholding the rule of law. All of us can be sure in our interactions with the state that officials who make decisions that affect us are accountable to the law. Whether it is the person next door applying for planning permission, the imposition of a fine for speeding, the grant of a licence to serve alcoholic beverages or a local decision to cut council services, in every case the people affected are either directly notified of the decision or are able to access information about it that is available in the public domain. By informing people of the decisions that affect them, we ensure that government operates reasonably transparently. We ensure that power is exercised in a reasonably accountable way, and that any arbitrary or unlawful use of power is communicated directly to those that it affects. The system helps to ensure that Ministers and other public servants wield their considerable power within the law.
Here, though, we have a scheme under which the Home Secretary can decide whether or not a person—and, potentially, their entire family—is made homeless. I emphasise to noble Lords that this is no exaggeration. To take the example that the noble Baroness referred to, we have been made aware of the case of a man with a wife and two young children who have every right to be in this country and possess the right to rent but, because he does not have the paperwork to evidence that, he is unable to find housing for his family. They have come to the end of a tenancy and have now been forced, as a family of four, to live with relatives while the Home Office processes his paperwork.
The right-to-rent scheme has a huge impact on individuals who are caught up in it. But, despite the importance that the Home Secretary’s decision makes to an individual’s life in future, there is no right to be informed of that decision and of the grounds on which the decision was made.
The Government will tell my landlord whether or not I have permission to rent and therefore whether or not I might have a home to go to come tomorrow, but they will not tell me. This cannot be tenable in a country that operates under the transparent rule of law. People have a right to know whether they will be entitled to rent accommodation. Moreover, as the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe stated in his recent memorandum on the human rights of asylum seekers and immigrants in the UK, the right to adequate housing applies to everyone. Ensuring that right is essential to the inherent dignity of every person, irrespective of their legal or immigration status.
A simple administrative reform can resolve this issue, which, as I have said, has important human rights implications. I urge the Minister either to accept the recommendation or to make a clear commitment to sort this out once and for all.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
I, too, have received a briefing on the issue that has been raised, and I certainly do not wish to reiterate the points that have been so ably put. There seems to be a strong argument for at least clarifying the situation—I think that that is what is being asked for—and ensuring that we do not end up with people being made homeless as a result. I very much hope that in his response the Minister will be able to provide that clarification—and an acceptable clarification as well.
“( ) No person whom the Secretary of State knows, or could reasonably be expected to know, is pregnant shall be detained.”
Baroness Lister of Burtersett
My Lords, Amendment 6 would put into law the recommendation of the Shaw review into the welfare in detention of vulnerable persons, commissioned by the Home Office, that the current presumptive exclusion from detention for pregnant women should be replaced with an absolute exclusion. On Report, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, twice stated that the Government would reflect on the matter by Third Reading. However, he also made it clear that the Government did not consider it appropriate for there to be an absolute rule and gave the example of an irregular migrant—I deliberately do not repeat the term “illegal”, in line with the recent recommendation of the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights—who arrives at an airport and can be returned almost immediately. Six days later, the noble and learned Lord sent a detailed letter to me and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, in which, among other things, he addressed the specific questions that I had raised about the new guidance on the detention of pregnant women. I am grateful to him for that, in particular for his agreement to share a draft of the new operational guidance with detention-related organisations such as Women for Refugee Women, to which I pay tribute for its tireless work on behalf of women in detention.
However, on the underlying question of whether pregnant women should be detained at all, the noble and learned Lord in effect repeated what he said on Report, and I did not see any evidence of the promised further reflection. I had assumed that there would be a further statement giving the Government’s formal response to Shaw’s recommendation, but when none had appeared by yesterday, I realised that it was not to be and therefore thought it important that your Lordships should have the opportunity to consider this question, which inevitably got rather lost in the debates about the wider question of time limits. I apologise that, as a result, the amendment was tabled at the very last minute.
Stephen Shaw was clearly aware of the issue of pregnant women who might not otherwise be returned quickly to their country when appropriate to do so. Nevertheless, he concluded:
“I believe that the Home Office should acknowledge the fact that, in the vast majority of cases, the detention of pregnant women does not result in their removal. In practice, pregnant women are very rarely removed from the country, except voluntarily”.
He therefore recommended unequivocally that the presumptive exclusion from detention should be replaced with an absolute exclusion. In doing so, he cited evidence from the Royal College of Midwives, among others, which he said demonstrated the,
“incontrovertibly deleterious effect on the health of pregnant women and their unborn children”.
In a witness statement to the High Court, the director for midwifery at the RCM spelled out the medical reasons why detention is completely inappropriate, particularly for a group of pregnant women with significant or complex health and psychosocial problems in need of higher levels of care than the general population. I here call on the Minister to arrange for a discussion of the issues raised by the detention of pregnant women with the RCM, Medical Justice—which has produced a damning research report on the issue, endorsed by the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists—Women for Refugee Women and organisations working with those who have suffered torture.
Stephen Shaw stands by his recommendation; I heard him speak recently and eloquently in support of it. He spoke of detention’s “undoubted damage to mothers and unborn babies” at a meeting in Parliament hosted by Caroline Spelman MP, who together with me, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham—who I do not believe is in his place—were members of the parliamentary inquiry into detention which recommended that pregnant women should never be detained for immigration purposes. That inquiry’s recommendations were endorsed by a Motion in the Commons last September. In his address, Mr Shaw drew attention to the Prime Minister’s prisons speech earlier this year, in which he expressed particular concern about the position of mothers and babies in prison.
The argument that the absolute exclusion recommended by Shaw would tie the Government’s hands inappropriately might appear reasonable. The problem is that, in effect, it means no real change from the status quo so roundly criticised by Shaw and others, including HM Inspectorate of Prisons, which told Shaw that there is little to suggest that pregnant women are being detained only in exceptional circumstances, as is supposed to be.
Current Home Office policy already states that the only exception to the general rule that pregnant women should not be detained is when removal is imminent and medical advice does not suggest that the woman concerned will go into labour before her removal date. In spite of this clear policy presumption against detention, in 2014, 99 pregnant women were detained and, in 2015, 69. Of the 99 pregnant women detained in Yarl’s Wood during 2014, 30—that is nearly one-third—were held for between one and three months; four for three to six months; and only nine were deported from the UK. I understand that there is a pregnant woman who has been there for just over two months at present.
I ask the noble and learned Lord to explain what additional safeguards the new approach brings. How can he reassure noble Lords that the new policy will mean that pregnant women are detained in only the most exceptional circumstances when the current policy is already supposed to ensure that? I know that the Home Office believes that the new gatekeeping team to be introduced as part of the adults-at-risk approach will introduce a degree of objectivity into detention decision-making and so protect against inappropriate use of detention. However, given that this team will still sit within the Home Office—albeit in a different management chain from those making the decisions—the oversight it provides will clearly fall short of the independent element for detention decision-making that the Shaw review recommended the Home Office should consider.
Returning to the example of the pregnant woman who arrived at the airport with no right of entry, it is the only example we have been given of where an absolute exclusion would cause a problem. So it should be, because it is the only exception that exists at present. I have not seen any evidence as to how often this occurs at present. The fact that nine out of 10 pregnant women held in detention in 2014 were subsequently released back into the community rather than deported suggests that it is rare. ILPA makes the point that if a pregnant woman claims asylum she cannot be returned until her claim is determined in any case.
As Women for Refugee Women argue, refusing to accept Shaw’s clear recommendation of an absolute exclusion from detention on the basis of what would appear to be a small number of cases each year where swift removal might be possible, and when there is clear evidence that allowing decision-makers discretion results in significant numbers of pregnant women being detained in circumstances that are far from exceptional—just one pregnant women being detained when she should not be is one too many—is not sensible, effective or humane policy-making. I hope that even at this late stage the noble and learned Lord will accept Stephen Shaw’s recommendation, which has support across the political spectrum and from a wide range of civil society groups, none of which have been convinced by the Government’s argument against doing so. I beg to move.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I should like to support the amendment moved so well by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I raised this issue in Committee, and then my noble friend Lord Hylton and I took the trouble to go to Yarl’s Wood where we asked questions about the number of pregnant women who had been detained there in the past or might currently be detained. I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Bates, who did such wonderful work on this Bill in its earlier stages. He commented on a Channel 4 investigation into Yarl’s Wood, which was shown in March 2015, where staff members called the women being held there “animals” and “beasties”. Having watched the programme, the noble Lord said to the House:
“I watched that documentary on Channel 4, and quite frankly I was sickened”.—[Official Report, 28/1/15; col. 103.]
Having been to Yarl’s Wood, I was able to say to the House that many of the staff we met had learned the lessons of that experience, and certainly my noble friend and I were impressed by many of the standards that we saw, but nevertheless we could not be convinced that it could ever be right, as the noble Baroness has just said, to have even one pregnant woman detained in those circumstances.
The Royal College of Midwives has said that:
“The detention of pregnant asylum seekers increases the likelihood of stress, which can risk the health of the unborn baby”.
In the review referred to by the noble Baroness, the former Prisons and Probation Ombudsman for England, Stephen Shaw, says this:
“that detention has an incontrovertibly deleterious effect on the health of pregnant women and their unborn children … I take … to be a statement of the obvious”.
Alongside that, of course, there are long-standing concerns about the conditions in Yarl’s Wood. The Chief Inspector of Prisons has called it a “place of national concern”. Although I have tried, I hope fairly, to say that conditions have undoubtedly improved, nevertheless it is not a place where pregnant women should be.
The briefing material referred to by the noble Baroness from the organisation Women for Refugee Women poses the question that the Government frequently ask in these circumstances:
“If the government said they were going to stop detaining pregnant women, wouldn’t women lie and say they were pregnant—or get pregnant deliberately—just to avoid detention? And wouldn’t women abscond if they weren’t detained?”.
I agree with the response:
“Establishing if a woman is pregnant or not is very straightforward: she simply needs to take a pregnancy test! The idea that women would get pregnant as a way of avoiding detention is unfounded and based on sexist stereotypes about women and the way they behave”.
To illustrate the strength of that argument, which I agree with, it is perhaps worth mentioning to noble Lords the story of one woman, Priya:
“Priya was trafficked to the UK and forced into prostitution. She has been detained in Yarl’s Wood twice; the second time she was locked up, she was 20 weeks pregnant, and was held in Yarl’s Wood for seven weeks before being released back into the community”.
Picking up her story, she says this:
“I was released after three months in detention, and fell pregnant by my partner, but then I was detained again. Although I had a written report from an expert, the Home Office did not believe that I was trafficked, so my claim was refused and I found myself back in detention. This time around I was in Yarl’s Wood for about seven weeks, and I was 20 weeks pregnant when I arrived.
I only had one hospital appointment while I was there, for my 20 week scan, and even then I was escorted by officers who took me 40 minutes late for my appointment. I felt frustrated that I wasn’t able to speak to the midwife after my scan because there was no time. The officers just took me straight back to Yarl’s Wood instead”.
I will not read the entire testimony to the House, but let me pull out two more sentences:
“The first time I was detained in Yarl’s Wood, I was on medication for sleeping and depression, and I took an overdose because I felt so hopeless … I couldn’t eat the food in the canteen; that made me sick too. A lot of the time I could only really manage milk. It was too far for my partner to visit and, as an asylum seeker as well, he couldn’t afford the travel, but we spoke on the phone every day. I’ve been released now but I still feel depressed”.
Levels of depression in Yarl’s Wood and incidents of self-harm have been very high indeed. The prisons inspectorate report in 2015 found that more than half of women who were detained there felt depressed or suicidal when they first arrived, and that there had been 72 incidents of self-harm in the previous six months —a huge rise from the previous inspection. Surely these are circumstances in which we should never put someone who is pregnant.
Lord Keen of Elie
There is certainly a sense of urgency in this matter and that is why I expressed my apology to the House and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I had indicated that by Third Reading I would be in a position to confirm the Government’s position on this. However, it is a matter that requires detailed consideration. It is a matter that has ramifications. It is a matter that has to be considered in conjunction with Home Office guidelines. It is a matter that must be consulted on and finally approved before issue, and it is for that reason that, regrettably, there has been a period of delay in respect of this point.
I underline that it will not involve an absolute prohibition. It will, however, involve a very limited power of detention to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances and for a very limited period. That is what is anticipated at present. As I sought to point out on Report, it is simply not practicable to have an absolute bar in respect of pregnant women. There are circumstances in which, for example, a pregnant woman arriving at an airport or a port, clearly with no right at all to enter the United Kingdom, may present either a security risk or a risk of absconding, and without any power of detention it would be quite impossible to arrange her return at that time of arrival. Therefore, in these circumstances, I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. Many have spoken so eloquently, drawing attention in particular to the implications of this for unborn children, and have made the case very strongly.
I realise that the Minister is in a difficult position in that he is not able to make the statement to which he referred. I asked him for reassurance that the new policy will mean that pregnant women are detained genuinely in the most exceptional circumstances because the current policy is that they should be detained only in the most exceptional circumstances. While the hint of a time limit is encouraging, I have heard nothing to reassure us that the new policy will be different from the old policy.
I quite understand that it is not the Minister’s fault—if that is the correct word—that he is not able to make the statement today. But Stephen Shaw delivered his report to the Home Office on 24 September. The Government have had over six months to consider this crucial issue, which they know many people—organisations, individuals who gave evidence to Shaw and individuals who gave evidence to the inquiry—feel very strongly about. They must have known that people would want a clear answer on this by now and I am afraid that clear answer has come there none. I am quite sure that the noble and learned Lord understands why it is not good enough to say, when this is the last chance we have to discuss it in this House, that we should wait for a few days because the Government have not managed to get their act together to enable him to make the statement today.
Given that every noble Lord who has spoken did so very strongly in support of this amendment, I feel that I have no choice other than to test the opinion of this House.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, Clause 71 provides for the transfer of responsibility for relevant children. A relevant child is defined in subsection (9) as an unaccompanied child, while subsection (10) says:
“The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the meaning of ‘unaccompanied’”.
At the previous stage of the Bill, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, raised the concern that an accompanying adult might not be—I use this phrase non-technically—an appropriate adult. There were concerns about trafficking. The amendment would put into the Bill the definition that is in current Home Office guidance on processing asylum applications by children.
While the amendment is to Clause 71, the same issue might of course arise in respect of Clause 70, the clause that your Lordships agreed on Division regarding the figure of 3,000 unaccompanied children. We will have to see what happens to that provision. In any event, taking a rather narrow technical point about Third Reading, that clause was not the subject of the reassurance from the noble Lord, Lord Bates, that he would put in writing how the term “unaccompanied” would be defined and would operate, and that he would do so by Third Reading. Given the change of Minister last week, I contacted the noble Earl’s office to ask if there would be a letter, and at the point when I tabled the amendment there was not. It arrived around 6 pm yesterday and I read it some time later, and I thank him for it. The letter says that there is,
“no intention to alter the definition”,
for the purposes of this clause. In situations where an asylum-seeking child,
“is accompanied by an adult who is not a parent or relative”,
Home Office officials will,
“verify the identity of the adult and establish the relationship with the child”.
I am not sure whether the relative referred to there is one who by custom has responsibility for the child, otherwise there would be a change from current guidance, although I gather that Home Office guidance is currently being rewritten. What I am really not clear about is why the Bill needs to allow for any flexibility or change in the definition, so it is important to get the position on record.
I was concerned about the reason for leaving the matter open in the way that the Bill does. When I was looking into this at the weekend, I found that the definition used by the Committee on the Rights of the Child is slightly broader because it refers to “other relatives” as well as parents. It occurred to me that it is known that “other relatives” are sometimes traffickers, which is why the wording is not used in the Home Office definition. There may be issues around siblings or other family members. However, it is important that we get the position on the record. It would be preferable to get it into legislation, but at any rate we should understand what the parameters are of the regulations that the Secretary of State might make. I beg to move.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett
Once again, my Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling this amendment. With her usual lawyer’s quickness, she picked up the point that I raised on Report. As I said then, it is a point that was raised with me by an organisation local to me in the East Midlands, Baca. It was worried because it could not understand why that wording was there. It is perhaps not surprising if groups are worried and perhaps slightly cynical when they come across measures that they do not understand, given that there is so much in legislation that they do not like. So I am delighted that, at the last minute, the letter from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie—not the noble Earl—made it very clear that the definition, as in the amendment, is,
“separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult who in law or by custom has responsibility to do so”.
It is helpful to have that in Hansard because of course your average punter cannot read the letters sent between Ministers and Members of your Lordships’ House. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will repeat that for the record. Also, like the noble Baroness, I would appreciate an explanation of why this clause is necessary, given that this is, as the letter says, the,
“established definition in the Immigration Rules”,
and it is accepted by the UN. I am glad that through this organisation raising this matter with me, we have some clarity on what is meant by it.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Lister. As they have observed, there is already an established definition of “unaccompanied” in the present context. It is not in guidance alone; it is in the Immigration Rules, and that is important. The definition states that an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child is someone who—perhaps I may, as suggested, read this into the record—is under 18 years of age when the claim is submitted, is claiming asylum in their own right, is separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult who in law or by custom has responsibility to do so.
Following the commitment given by my noble friend Lord Bates on Report to explain how the definition would operate, I wrote to the noble Baronesses—albeit, as they observed, at the last minute—to confirm that there is no intention of altering the definition of “unaccompanied” as set out in the Immigration Rules for the purposes of the transfer provisions in the Immigration Bill. Furthermore, defining particular categories in primary legislation is not always desirable or even necessary. As your Lordships will appreciate, there are times, particularly in the context of the current migration crisis, when the Government need to respond quickly to changing circumstances.
I should make it clear that at present we have no intention of amending the definition of “unaccompanied”. We would do so only in response to a significant change in circumstances, but it is important that in such circumstances we are able to react swiftly and efficiently. Clearly, regulations subject to parliamentary scrutiny are a more appropriate way to achieve that result than placing something on the face of this Bill.
I reassure the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Lister, that safeguarding and promoting the welfare of vulnerable children is at the forefront of the Home Office’s work with the Local Government Association and the Department for Education to develop a transfer scheme for unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. I understand the concerns about the definition of “unaccompanied”—it may have unintended consequences and inadvertently place children in the hands of traffickers—but immigration officials working with these vulnerable children are trained to be alert to any signs that a child is at risk of harm or abuse or may have been trafficked. Where an asylum-seeking child is accompanied by an adult who is not a parent or a relative, Home Office officials work with local authority children’s services to verify the identity of the adult and establish the true relationship with the child. If that relationship cannot be verified or there are ongoing welfare or safeguarding concerns, the child will be treated as unaccompanied.
In the light of those points and our recent correspondence confirming that we have no intention of amending the already established definition of “unaccompanied” for the purposes of the transfer provisions, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.
Tax Credits (Income Thresholds and Determination of Rates) (Amendment) Regulations 2015
Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts(8 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
That is the arrangement that was proposed in the Tax Credits Act, which was passed by the Labour Government in 2002. It was thought to be the right way to do this particular thing, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Government have followed that. It is not a necessary consequence that the Commons or the Government should use a different procedure in order to secure the financial privilege of the House of Commons. The procedure was laid down in the Tax Credits Act, which is the main statute on this matter. For the Government to do anything other than use that course would be offensive to the way in which the system was set up.
The Leader of the House mentioned the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s attitude to considering more detailed material when it becomes available. That is a considerable consolation to me in light of what the right reverend Prelate said. I believe the right reverend Prelate’s approach to be the safest way to secure what a number of your Lordships have asked for.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, I have several points to make about the substance of these regulations. First, this represents a lamentable example of non-evidence-based policy-making, the victims of which are going to suffer greatly. Secondly, the arguments used to justify the policy—by reference to other policy changes and to how people could or even should work harder—betray a lack of understanding of policy and of people’s lives.
In its letter to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, the Social Security Advisory Committee criticised the “scant” evidence to support the policy changes. It thus encouraged the Government to make available to Parliament,
“more detailed information that clearly explains the changes and potential impacts to ensure that they can be subject to effective scrutiny”.
With due respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, SSAC clearly believed it possible to provide such information. Its advice was ignored, leading the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee to observe that the explanatory memorandum laid in September “contained minimal information”.
Getting an impact assessment out of the Government has been like pulling teeth. That which finally emerged is a travesty; much of it simply reiterates repetitively the rationale behind the policy. It certainly does not provide the information about potential impacts that SSAC sought. There is no information on the impact on different groups affected, including the self-employed, who, as we have heard, cannot benefit from an increase in the minimum wage. The information about the impact on protected groups is simply laughable. When I asked in a Written Question,
“how many people in receipt of Carer’s Allowance are also in receipt of Working Tax Credit”,
and are therefore vulnerable, I was told that the information,
“could only be provided at disproportionate cost”.
I know that Carers UK is very worried about the likely impact on all carers receiving working tax credit.
In the letter accompanying the impact assessment the Chancellor excused the delay on the grounds that the Government do not usually publish an IA for statutory instruments of this kind. I found this statement very revealing. It suggests that the Government made no attempt to assess the impact for themselves before going ahead with such significant cuts and that they see an IA simply as a tick-box exercise to pacify pesky parliamentary committees. Surely, given the Prime Minister’s pledge at his party conference of an “all-out assault on poverty”, the Government would want to know the impact on poverty. But no: it was left to the Resolution Foundation to point out that it could mean an additional 200,000 children falling into poverty next year, rising to 600,000 by 2020 when other summer Budget measures have taken effect.
Surely a Government who have promised to apply the family test to every measure would want to know the impact on low-income families—a point made by Heidi Allen MP in her passionate maiden speech demolishing her own Government’s policy. Surely a Government who go on constantly about making work pay would want to know the impact on low-paid workers. But we had to look to the IFS for that. In effect, the Government appear to be contracting out to the voluntary sector genuine assessment of impact. Of course, that is assessment after, rather than as part of, the policy-making process. That is one reason why it is so important that your Lordships’ House asks the Government to think again in the light of the evidence that has emerged of the damaging impact that the cuts will have.
I am grateful to all organisations that have exposed how the overall policy package that the Government constantly cite does not amount to an adequate defence of the policy, particularly in the case of lone parents, who will be disproportionately affected, according to Gingerbread. A key reason why the overall policy package does not provide adequate protection is that with the exception of childcare, which applies to only a very limited age range, the other policies—the increase in the minimum wage, welcome as it is, and in personal tax allowances, which is less welcome because it is wasteful and poorly targeted—cannot take account of the presence of children, a point made by my noble friend Lady Hollis. All the talk about tax credits subsidising low pay ignores the fact that child tax credits were introduced primarily as a child poverty measure. Wages cannot take account of the presence of children. That was one reason why family allowances were originally introduced and why an increase in child benefit, which also helps families below the tax threshold and is currently frozen, would provide more effective mitigation than further increases in tax allowances.
Finally, according to the Health Secretary, the cuts are intended to send a “very important cultural signal” about hard work. Leaving aside his denigrating suggestion that receipt of tax credits is somehow incompatible with “independence, self-respect and dignity”, he does not appear to understand that reducing the income threshold and the universal credit work allowances while increasing the taper rate penalises what he calls “hard work”. Likewise, the Work and Pensions Secretary suggested that the problem can be solved if those hardest hit are encouraged to work a few extra hours. Even if extra hours were feasible and available, the gain from doing so will be reduced by the very changes that they are supposed to mitigate. As the Children’s Society points out, every extra £1 in wages will provide a net income increase of only 3p for those also in receipt of housing benefit and only 20p for those not. What about those with family responsibilities, particularly lone parents and carers, for whom working extra hours could impact negatively on their and their families’ lives?
It is our job to scrutinise legislation. This legislation does not stand up to scrutiny. The policy-making process from which it has emerged does not stand up to scrutiny. It is not noble Lords, or Government Ministers, who will bear the cost of this. It will be people like the low-paid worker who emailed me to say that he was very scared about how he will manage next year. Hundreds of thousands of children will be pushed into poverty. We have a duty to defend them, our fellow citizens.
