Lord Hanson of Flint
Main Page: Lord Hanson of Flint (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Hanson of Flint's debates with the Home Office
(1 day, 4 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, for introducing this large group of amendments. As noble Lords will appreciate, many of the amendments before us today concern matters of clarification or technical improvement to ensure consistency across the Bill and the amendments tabled so far.
We on these Benches are broadly supportive of these changes, particularly when they strengthen child safeguarding protections and improve clarity, which we hope will eventually result in more seamless practical implementation. In this regard, we welcome amendments extending the scope of child criminal exploitation prevention orders to Scotland and Northern Ireland, and those clarifying procedural matters, such as the form of notification requirements when oral notification may not be practicable. These are sensible adjustments that contribute to ensuring that the Bill operates coherently across the four nations and in real-world enforcement scenarios.
I briefly draw attention to Amendment 235ZA in my name, which would remove Clause 43(3)(a). That subsection currently requires that, when a court makes a criminal exploitation prevention order, the terms of the order must avoid
“conflict with any religious beliefs of the defendant”.
Although religious beliefs are, of course, an important individual right, the purpose of these orders is to protect children from very serious criminal harm. It is, therefore, my view that safeguarding and public protection must take precedence over all other concerns and that no such exemption should hinder appropriate and proportionate restrictions when a court considers them necessary. I hope the Government consider the matter carefully and take the recommendation on board.
Finally, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, for bringing forward Amendment 235A, which would give the courts an explicit ability to impose a prevention order to protect a child from being threatened, intimidated or coerced into criminal exploitation. The intention behind the amendment—to intervene earlier and more effectively to safeguard children at risk—is one that I hope all sides of the Committee can support. I look forward to hearing the Government’s response and clarification of how the Bill will ensure that those protections are fully delivered. These are complex issues, but our shared objective is simple: to ensure that vulnerable children are protected and that those who exploit them face firm consequences. I hope the Government will reflect carefully on the points that have been raised here today.
My Lords, if the Committee will allow me, I will begin by detailing the government amendments in this group. We know that criminal gangs conducting activity such as county lines drug dealing do not stop at internal UK borders, and children are criminally exploited across the UK. To go to the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned, this is why—at the request of the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice—we are making provision in the Bill for child criminal exploitation prevention orders in Scotland and Northern Ireland. That is at their request, and I hope that also answers the point from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. Since the Bill covers England and Wales, this means that the offence of child criminal exploitation will now apply UK-wide. These amendments have been tabled because, since the Bill was published, we have had those discussions and this is a way of making sure that we have a UK-wide approach.
These orders will give the police and courts across the whole of the United Kingdom powers to prevent child criminal exploitation happening in the first place, or happening again, by putting prohibitions and requirements on an adult who poses a risk of criminally exploiting a child. As I have mentioned, these provisions have been drafted in collaboration with the Scottish and Northern Ireland Governments and consequential amendments are therefore required for England and Wales to ensure that the orders function smoothly across the United Kingdom.
Finally, we have tabled some other amendments to put beyond doubt that assessment of whether an individual has engaged in child criminal exploitation, or associated conduct, in an application for, or imposition of, a child criminal exploitation prevention order is to be determined by the court on the basis of the civil standard of proof; that is, the balance of probabilities. This is appropriate given that there are civil rather than criminal proceedings in this case. The application of the civil standard of proof is well precedented in many similar preventive orders across the statute book and is important to ensure that an order can intervene earlier in the course of a child’s exploitation so that it can be prevented. I hope that I have wide support across the Committee for those measures—I think I do.
Amendment 232B is in the name of my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown. I welcome her moving her first amendment in such a positive way. She has secured the support of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which is a fairly impressive bunch on a first amendment, so I say well done to her on that. Her amendment seeks to create a further definition of child criminal exploitation.
I say to my noble friend—and I think that this was anticipated by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—that “child criminal exploitation” is already defined in Clause 40 by the description of conduct amounting to an offence. It is where an adult
“engages in conduct towards or in respect of a child, with the intention of … causing the child to”
engage in criminality. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, raised a number of issues for which I am not accountable, but which my noble friend may wish to respond to. That is the Government’s view on the purpose of Clause 40. Clause 40 captures activity online, through the use of technology and whether or not it is seemingly consensual. This definition also operates for the purposes of the child criminal exploitation prevention orders.
My noble friend has made a very strong case, through personal experience as a constituency MP in east London for almost 20 years, on the impact of county lines gangs on young people. I fully accept, understand and appreciate where she is coming from on those issues. That is why the Government introduced Clause 40 in the first place. It is also why the Government are introducing a bespoke stand-alone offence of CCE, along with the CCE prevention orders, to signal unequivocally that using a child to commit crime is against the law and that those children are victims of a crime. I also agree that any apparent consent of the child to involvement is irrelevant to whether they have been criminally exploited, and that criminal exploitation can occur online and through the use of technology. I understand my noble friend’s amendment, but these points are captured by the definition of CCE in Clause 40, which does not include a child’s consent and captures adults’ conduct by means of any method or control.
Obviously, I correctly anticipated the response that was coming, but I would be grateful if my noble friend would deal with this point about “enabling”, which is a substantive point of difference in the two definitions. Enabling is easier to prove than causing. “Causing” is closer to a child being used, which is reflected in my noble friend Lady Brown’s definition, but I do not think that “enabling” is in the Clause 40 definition as it stands.
I appreciate my noble friend’s comments. If she will bear with me, I will come on to that point in a moment. I am doing this in a structured order to try to address the points that are before the Committee today.
I say to my noble friend Lady Brown that, within the Bill, we are also taking the power to issue statutory guidance to chief officers. The noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and my noble friend have looked at that, and I will return to it in a moment. The guidance will include a descriptive definition of CCE, setting out in lay person’s terms the conduct captured by the offence, and will provide practical guidance on how the CCE offence and orders should be applied.
An important point, to go particularly to what the noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, said, is that in Clause 60—which we will come to in later considerations—the Secretary of State has power to issue statutory guidance to chief officers of police about the exercise of their functions in connection with the prevention, detection and investigation of CCE offences and CCE prevention orders. I hope that the Committee will recognise that, importantly, the relevant police officers will be under a legal duty to have due regard to that statutory guidance when exercising functions in relation to the CCE offences and the CCE prevention orders. On the question of the statutory guidance, which my noble friend and others have touched on, the guidance has not been issued yet because the relevant legislation has not yet received the consent of this House or indeed Royal Assent. On the applicability of both of those conditions, statutory guidance under Clause 60 will be issued, which will place a legal duty on police officers to adhere to it.
My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti mentioned a very important point. There is a clear difference in what my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown has put forward, supported by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I hope this helps: the forms of conduct that are likely to enable a child to commit criminality are expected in most cases to also meet the test of conduct by an adult intended to cause, or facilitate the causing of, a child to commit a future crime. The nature of the offence, which is broad and large, will ensure that it captures offenders who will use children for crime. I believe that that is the right format. Both my noble friends have said that “enable” is a critical word. I believe that a separate definition is unnecessary, as it would have no legal impact over and above what is already in the Bill. It could cause confusion among police and prosecutors about which definition they should be applying.
The statutory guidance, which I emphasise will gave a legal bass and will be issued under Clause 60, is the appropriate place to provide the extra detail to understand proposals that are covered by the amendment, but which are already in scope of the clear and simple legal terms of Clause 40. I know that that is the defence that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti expected me to use, but it is the defence: Clause 40 is what it is, and the guidance will also be statutory.
While statutory guidance is welcome, this particular case has similarities to other areas of the criminal law where the motivations and behaviours are complex, such as stalking and various areas of domestic abuse. In every case where regulation has been put in such a way that it becomes statutory, unless that goes hand in hand with appropriate and quite intensive training, you can have as many regulations as you like, as legally watertight as you like, but if the officials who are charged with implementing it do not understand the complexity that they are dealing with and cannot define and understand exactly how to apply the regulations, you are going to have confusion. We have a lot of history of that not happening. Good intentions are one thing; what actually happens when you put it out there and expect that everybody will understand and comply with it is another, and that is a concern that a lot of us have.
That is a valid point. I have considered with officials how we ensure enforcement of the guidance. I simply put it to the noble Earl—and we can debate this outside the Bill—that the statutory guidance is issued to chief constables of police forces under Clause 60 and they have a legal duty to ensure that statutory guidance is implemented, and officers have a legal duty to support and interpret that at a local level when they are faced with incidents of child exploitation as defined by the Bill. That requires a whole shift of culture and of training—I understand that. I will take from this comment and from the Committee generally that my colleagues in the Home Office need to look not just at the guidance but at its implementation. Ultimately, it has a statutory footing, and that is the key point for the Committee.
Will the Minister take on board the fact that countless inspections of police training, including by HMICFRS, have said that there has not been an independent assessment of police training since 2018, despite the fact that so many of the policing bodies themselves have asked for it? Taking the point, will he now say that there will be an independent assessment, so that police training can be much more appropriate and police will know exactly what they are supposed to be doing when we sit in this House and make legislation?
I will sound like I am repeating myself from Question Time, but, very shortly, we anticipate bringing forward a policing White Paper looking at a whole range of mechanisms to improve police performance. If the noble Baroness will allow me, I will wait for further detail on the policing White Paper, which I have already said to the House will be published before Christmas, to allow for further discussion on a range of efficiency and improvement matters for policing. The point she makes is worthy of consideration, but I will park it until a later date in the parliamentary calendar.
I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his detailed response, but will he reflect on the potential distinction between “enabling” and “causing”? Will he go back to parliamentary counsel and be clear that enablers will always meet this threshold of causation? I am really concerned about that. I understand that my noble friend has rejected the idea of a separate free-standing definition and is worried about confusion between the offence definition and a general definition, but in blending the intentions of the Government and those of my noble friend Lady Brown, it would be helpful to know that that language of “causing”, without specific mention of enabling, is watertight.
I am grateful to my noble friend for further pressing me on the issue. I have tried to explain to the Committee where the Government are on this. We always reflect on debates in Committee, because there are always opportunities for my noble friend and others to bring matters back on Report. I am giving the Committee today the Government’s view that the definition in Clause 40, plus the guidance issued under Clause 60, will be sufficient to cover the objective of ensuring that we have this offence on the statute book and monitored and enforced by authorities.
To the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, I have just remembered that we will have further discussions on police training in later groups in Committee today, but the White Paper will deal with a whole range of matters on improving police performance.
If the Minister can bear one more intervention, would he be good enough to take back the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Brown? I cannot quite understand why that amendment is not listed nearer to Clause 40, because it would have been helpful to look at the two together, as has not been done to any great extent. I say politely to the Minister that I prefer the noble Baroness’s interpretation of exploitation.
The other point I want to make is that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is absolutely right—it is a point I have not made, but I am well aware of it—that at the age of 18, people who may have been victims become perpetrators. Some of them become perpetrators because they have no choice, but others—the young thugs she spoke about—are genuine perpetrators. Therefore, to specify the age of 18 in Clause 40 may be misleading.
I am grateful for the further pressure on this issue from the Cross Benches. My job is to set out to the Committee the Government’s view on these amendments, which I am trying to do. The measures in Clause 40 and the guidance in Clause 60 are sufficient to meet the objectives of my noble friend and, at the same time, to ensure—let us not forget this—that this offence goes on to the statute book for the first time. It will have a big impact on county line gangs and on defining further criminal child exploitation. I have put the Government’s view; we will obviously reflect on what my noble friend has said and I am happy to meet her, with other colleagues, outside the Committee to discuss that explanation further. I recognise the great motivation my noble friend had in bringing this to the Committee. I hope she will reflect on what I have said and withdraw the amendment.
I believe I get another chance to speak. I am grateful to all contributors to my amendment today. I can tell the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that I tried, but obviously not impactfully enough, to talk about the complexities involved and the differences between an abused child and a perpetrator, and how difficult it is for the criminal courts—and all of us—to understand the distinction.
I say gently to my noble friend the Minister that given that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Doocey, the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—if I might pray her in aid—are all pressing on this issue, it would be a good idea for the Government to reflect properly on it.
I knew that the argument was going to be that my amendment is unnecessary. With 20 years’ experience in Parliament, I know that there have been many unnecessary clauses in Bills, and indeed that some Bills have become Acts that some people believe are unnecessary. I cheekily ask what harm it could do. It would be fabulous if my noble friend the Minister could humour us and bung it in. I genuinely believe that this is an important part of the protection of our children in the future. In hope, therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, for bringing forward this important amendment. It speaks to an issue that has been much discussed during the Bill’s passage: the urgent need to protect children who are coerced or manipulated into criminal activity by those who exploit them for profit and control.
Amendment 247 proposes a new clause to establish a criminal exploitation protection order. This would be aimed directly at safeguarding children who have already been subjected to criminal exploitation, preventing further harm. As the noble Baroness has eloquently explained, these children deserve support and a clear pathway out of exploitation. Undoubtedly, there is merit in exploring whether a new bespoke order focused on the safety and welfare of the exploited child could complement the existing prevention orders in the Bill which target the adult perpetrators. We recognise the intention behind ensuring that prohibitions and requirements are carefully balanced so as not to interfere unnecessarily with education, family life or existing legal orders. From these Benches, we are sympathetic to the objectives of the amendment.
We recognise that introducing new regimes raises practical considerations that must be considered. I therefore look forward to hearing the Government’s response and to further discussion as the Bill progresses. Protecting children from exploitation must be central to this legislation. I thank the noble Baroness for her continued leadership on this issue.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Armstrong for Amendment 247. I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay of Llandaff and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for their support for the amendment, and for the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I am sorry to have elevated the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool—obviously, I was transfixed by the “Liverpool” part of his title. I appreciate his gentle chiding of me for that rookie error, which I still occasionally make after 15 months in this place. I apologise for that.
I hope I can reassure the Committee that the Government are committed to tackling the criminal exploitation of children and to supporting children who are victims of criminal exploitation. There are a number of comprehensive provisions in the Bill. In early December, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, is meeting the Policing Minister in the Home Office to discuss these issues. I am grateful for her expertise and for the discussions that my noble friend Lady Armstrong has had with Action for Children and colleagues outside of the House.
I fully understand and agree with the desire to safeguard children from the horrific consequences of criminal exploitation. That is why the Government are delivering on the manifesto commitment to bring forward this order, under the clauses that we have discussed, and go after the gangs that are luring young people into violence and crime. Additionally, as the Committee will know, through Clauses 42 to 55 and Schedule 5 to the Bill, the Government’s criminal exploitation prevention orders will place prohibitions and requirements on adults who pose a risk of exploiting children into criminality.
This brings me to the central point of the amendment before us. The Government have considered the position but feel that the most effective way to manage the behaviour of those who have criminally exploited children, or who are at risk of doing so, and to protect children from being criminally exploited are the measures in the Bill. We should be restricting the conduct of the adult perpetrator rather than of the child victim.
I simply say to my noble friend—this is an important point—that for legislation to be effective, there needs to be a consequence for non-compliance. If the measure that she has brought forward was put into legislation, we would be focusing on the child victim and their behaviour. In the event of non-compliance, unless there is a consequence to that—and I am not quite sure what that consequence would be—the proposal would have no legal effect. If a child breaches the prohibition or requirements in an order, the first response could be a further narrowing of the prohibitions or requirements, or varying them. Ultimately, a breach of the order would require a consequence, and I am not sure that we have considered that matter in full.
The Government believe that the measures we are introducing in the Bill will create greater awareness of child criminal exploitation and increase identification of victims, and will ensure that we assist victims in receiving appropriate support. When victims are identified, practitioners will be encouraged to recognise vulnerability, first and foremost, and, I hope, to clearly signal that the children who are used by adults to commit crime are victims of abuse.
I hear what noble Lords have said. Everybody who has spoken has broadly supported the direction of travel. We want to draw on that wealth of experience and insight, which is why my colleagues, the Policing Minister and the Safeguarding Minister in the Home Office, are hosting a round table with experts before Christmas to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and look at how we can better support children who are victims of crime and potentially perpetrators of crime.
It seems fairly obvious to me that if the order were breached by the child, the child would end up in the family proceedings court preferably, rather than the family criminal court. That could be done by an order, and it might not do any harm for the child. There could be some innovative thinking in the Home Office as to other ways of dealing with this. The real point being made today, if I might remind Minister, is about helping the parents. At the moment, I do not see what else can help the parents. I would be very grateful to know what the Minister thinks about that.
The noble and learned Baroness, with all her experience, brings forward one potential output of a breach of an order, and I accept that that is a potential output. The point I am making to my noble friend is that we want to discuss what happens to the child and the range of consequences. That is why my honourable friend the Policing Minister and my honourable friend Jess Phillips, the Safeguarding Minister, are meeting agencies in this field to look at what is going to happen. That is planned for before Christmas. There is a separate meeting with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. Although the noble and learned Baroness has brought forward one consequence, I want to look at all the issues. I am not able to accept the amendment before us because that is one of the issues that is not resolved. Therefore, although I understand the desire behind this, I ask that my noble friend withdraws her amendment today and allows for reflection to occur.
I am most grateful to the Minister and look forward to the meeting. To pick up the point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, I wonder whether the Minister, in tackling this, recognises that many times, the so-called parents will be someone who has legal responsibility but who actually may not be helping the child. One of the issues with an order such as this would potentially be making sure that those who have legal responsibility for a child also have a duty to try to enforce the protection of that child. That may mean a change in their own behaviours. It is a complicated issue. I am grateful to the Minister for having listened so carefully and to the Home Office for recognising that somehow, something has to be done. This might not be perfect, but we cannot leave a big gap there.
I accept and understand that young children will be impacted by the potential behaviour of the parent, or indeed the lack of behaviour by the parent. The suggestion of the order may be a contributing factor which might assist with that. I have tried to point out to the Committee that there are a number of issues. First, this would be an order against the child, which is a big issue. Secondly, there would have to be a consequence for a breach. Thirdly, the Government’s focus in the Bill is on action on adults. Those are three issues that I put on the table for the Committee and which lead me to ask my noble friend to withdraw the amendment.
However, the engagement and discussions, both with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, and with the coalition of groups that have a concern about this, will continue before Christmas. That will obviously give the mover of the amendment an opportunity to reflect upon it. But in the meantime, I urge her to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I thank everyone for their contributions to this debate and to the previous one.
This is complex and we all want to have good outcomes. I appreciate that the Minister is saying that we need more discussion and to make sure that we address this issue in a way that safeguards children and young people but also deals with perpetrators and potential perpetrators and makes sure that the families of the children and young people are engaged in the way that we sort things out. The real problem is that it is much more than just Home Office business, which I appreciate. However, Members of this House have made great strides in at least beginning to identify the issues, reflecting our discussions and experiences from outside. That is important. I look forward to continuing to engage with the Government and the Minister in the next period of time so that we can come up with something that people will have confidence in. In that spirit, I therefore seek to withdraw the amendment.