Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I very much appreciated the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, although I see more value in this this Bill than the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, was prepared to admit. I agree with what they each said about hard topics that this Bill might usefully have tackled but did not.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights has produced another of its helpful and focused reports. I agree with the committee that the difficult issue of concealing identity at protests may need to be better calibrated. I agree with it also on the issue of universal jurisdiction, which was debated in the Moses Room on 9 September. To bring our law into line with our neighbours and allow perpetrators of the gravest international crimes to be prosecuted here would involve nothing more complicated than removing the requirement of citizenship or residency in the International Criminal Court Act 2001. I look forward to supporting proposed amendments along those lines.

The Constitution Committee raised two issues in addition to that referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower: the widening by Clause 4 of the categories of people who can issue on-the-spot fixed penalty notices—now of up to £500—and the need for parliamentary scrutiny of statutory guidance to the police on the child sex offender disclosure scheme, Sarah’s law. Like many constitutional issues, they may seem mundane, but I hope they will not escape our attention.

Turning to national security, I support the youth diversion orders, which will be used to disrupt, at an early stage, young people who are believed to be involved in low-level terrorist offending, such as the possession and dissemination of material, often online. The idea is to divert them from the criminal justice system for their benefit and for ours. As noted in my recent report, Lessons for Prevent, their availability might also help to increase the rate of consent to Channel interventions, which is currently running at about 75%.

Polygraph testing is to be extended: I should like to know more about how rigorously the use of this technology has been assessed, and with what result, since it was rolled out for sex offenders in 2014 and terrorist offenders in 2021.

Finally, Clauses 130 to 137 of the Bill extend police powers following the seizure of electronic devices to access information accessible from such devices but stored on the cloud. The logic of that extension is not hard to understand, but its sheer scale requires us to think about safeguards. That is so particularly in relation to Clause 135, which concerns the no-suspicion powers to search and to question that are exercised by counterterrorism police in ports and airports under the Terrorism Act 2000 and the National Security Act 2023. The utility of those powers has not been doubted by any of those who have been tasked with the close examination of their use, but the latest of them, Jonathan Hall KC, was moved to ask this week what will prevent excessive data from being extracted and copied, how journalistic and legally privileged material on an online account will be protected, and—given the quantity of personal data that members of the public hold on the cloud—whether merely travelling through a port or border should be considered a sufficient reason to surrender so much private data. Senior courts have expressed a degree of disquiet about the existing power, and a further case is under way. Nobody wants a regime of pointless box-ticking, but we need to rise to the independent reviewers’ challenge and satisfy ourselves that, if this strong and intrusive power is to be further extended, it is accompanied by the right safeguards.

Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as the author of a report, required by statute and published almost 10 years ago, on citizenship removal resulting in statelessness. It was a short report, since that power introduced by the Immigration Act 2014, which was always intended to be highly exceptional, had never been used at the time—there was therefore nothing to report on.

However, my crash course in citizenship deprivation—a concept with which this country seems notably more at ease than most of our European and North American neighbours, as the noble Lord, Lord German, said—prompted three reflections of a general nature that may still be relevant. First, the

“conducive to the public good”

threshold for citizenship deprivation—which, in 2006, replaced the previous threshold of

“seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom”—

is remarkably low. There is some comfort in the self-imposed guidance that governs the interpretation by government of this elastic and subjective phrase. However, that comfort may not survive the arrival of another Government less keen on self-imposed guidance. For my part, I hope that we will return someday to this threshold issue.

Secondly, as was pointed out by speakers as different as Kit Malthouse and Bell Ribeiro-Addy in Commons Committee, citizenship deprivation discriminates by its very nature against individuals and groups who have, or are entitled to, another citizenship. Jews and those born in Northern Ireland were mentioned, but of course there are also many others. The power to strip people of their citizenship, however sparingly used in practice, reminds naturalised citizens in particular that the citizenship that they went through so much to achieve is precarious in a way that my citizenship is not.

A few years back, in the Nationality and Borders Bill, the proposal to allow the removal of citizenship without notice was greeted with an outcry, including a petition signed by more than 300,000 people. That is a consequence not only of Clause 9 of that Bill but of the sense it conveyed to some people with dual heritage that they were second-class citizens. Thanks to your Lordships’ House, that outcry was channelled into the much-improved Section 10 of the Act.

Thirdly, there is a gap where review of citizenship deprivation should be. The Minister in the Commons pointed correctly to reviews by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration that were published in 2018 and 2024. But the purpose of those inspections was procedural, as it was described in the 2018 report, to examine

“the efficiency and effectiveness of the Home Office’s processes”.

Even that procedural exercise had its limits. The 2024 inspection looked only at the status review unit, which deals with deprivations prompted by fraud or related to serious organised crime. What were described as

“‘conducive’ cases where sensitive intelligence is relied upon to make a decision”

are handled by the special cases unit and were acknowledged by the independent chief inspector to be “out of scope”. Published figures are welcome, but do not answer all the pertinent questions. What was the intelligence case for the sudden surge of conducive deprivations from 14 in 2016 to 104 in the following year? What were the circumstances of those subjected to it, and why was deprivation used in preference to the many other tools in the counterterrorism and state threats armoury?

The reality is that deprivation of citizenship on conducive grounds is a power used for national security purposes. Like other such powers, its exercise should be reviewable by the security-cleared Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, as successive holders of that office, including me, have recommended.

Having got that off my chest, I turn to the Bill. It is one of a growing number of Bills that seek to change the law as it has recently been declared by the Supreme Court. Indeed, the next one will come along on Thursday: the Crime and Policing Bill. There is nothing constitutionally improper about that. The courts try to make sense of what we decide, which, in this field, has chopped and changed several times since 2002, as the Supreme Court’s judgment made clear.

It is also relevant, it seems to me, that both the High Court and the Court of Appeal, after consideration of all factors, including the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, declared the law to be as the Government now seek to clarify it by means of the Bill.

The Supreme Court took what it described as a “middle position”, under which the Secretary of State is bound by the result of a successful appeal for all purposes

“other than in respect of the validity of immigration enforcement action taken on the basis of the deprivation order up to the time the appeal against it is allowed”.

By doing so, the Supreme Court sought to banish the unwelcome spectre of damages claims in respect of past immigration enforcement action, while requiring the individual to be treated as having always been a British citizen for all other purposes, including in the hard case that was before it, by passing that citizenship to any child born during the currency of the deprivation order.

I am persuaded by the Minister, and I thank him for his time and that of the Bill team, that there are good reasons for preventing a person from regaining their British citizenship, even following a first-instance victory in SIAC until such time as the Home Office has exhausted its appeal rights. These are, in summary, the prospect of empowering a person who endangers national security to enter the United Kingdom, possibly forever; the risk that the tactical renunciation of other citizenships will render deprivation of British citizenship impossible; and the desirability of having immigration powers, such as detention and immigration bail, pending the resolution of appeal rights. Those are reasons enough for me to support the thrust of the Bill.

The Bill might be considered tough on infant children, such as ZA in the Supreme Court case. For that reason in particular, I see the case for a limited judicial discretion along the lines proposed by Kit Malthouse in the Commons and I will listen carefully to the debate if a similar or narrower amendment is tabled here. But I am not as struck by this as the noble Lord, Lord German. There is surely consolation in the fact that the appeal process is finite and can be expedited by the courts, and that the child’s citizenship will still be recognised if the Home Office is unsuccessful at the end of the day.

The Bill is retrospective in its operation, resembling in that respect court rulings, including the judgment of the Supreme Court that it seeks, in effect, to reverse. The Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, asked the Government why retrospectivity applied across the board and could not be limited to “conducive” cases. The Minister’s answer, that deprivation orders on other grounds are not made until the person has exhausted their rights to appeal, with the result that the Bill does not apply to them, sounds pretty conclusive to me.

Finally, I have in mind the fact that people may have their citizenship removed when inside as well as outside this country and that views on deportation, including in this country, appear to be hardening in some quarters quite alarmingly. I expressed to the Minister my concern that a Government less scrupulous than this one might take advantage of the Bill to remove a person’s citizenship on conducive grounds and then take advantage of their new status as a non-national to deport them, even after SIAC had declared the removal of citizenship to be unlawful. I was told that this fear was unfounded, in summary, as I understand it, because a deportation order does not come into force until in-country appeal rights, including on human rights grounds, have been exhausted, and because Section 78 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 prohibits such a person from being removed while any in-country appeal is pending.

On the face of it, that is reassuring, at least for as long as we have the Human Rights Act. But I would welcome the Minister putting his detailed explanation on the record, either from the Dispatch Box or in writing, so that it can be scrutinised by those more expert than me. This is not something that would have seemed worth worrying about 10 or even five years ago. But I am sure that your Lordships would not wish to pass a Bill that could facilitate the future use of unlawful citizenship deprivation as a means of effecting the arbitrary or large-scale deportation of British citizens who are objectionable or unwelcome to the Government of the day. Subject to that clarification, the Bill has my support.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have raised points in this Second Reading. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for their support from His Majesty’s loyal Opposition. I also welcome the broad support from the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile. I recognise that other noble Lords have made legitimate points, and I will try to respond to them.

I remind the House that the debate is about the very small amendment to the legislation. It is not about the principle or application of deprivation, or the numbers of people who have had their citizenship deprived. It is a response to the Supreme Court judgment and what that means in relation to individuals who could potentially return to or retain their status in the United Kingdom when the Government have, through the Home Secretary, determined, for whatever reason, that that individual needs to have their citizenship deprived. That is a very serious step for a Home Secretary to take. When the Supreme Court states, as it did in the recent case, that an individual can retain their citizenship during the appeal process, that means that the individual, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, just mentioned, will be free to remain a British citizen, with all the rights and privileges that brings, while the appeal is ongoing, unless this legislation is put in place.

The noble Lord, Lord German, in his introductory remarks, made a number of points about that. Essentially, I ask him whether he is willing to take the risk. That is the nub of the argument that we are putting to the House today—that the purpose of deprivation of citizenship being maintained during the course of the appeal procedure is so that the United Kingdom Government, the Home Secretary, accountable to the House of Commons, and me in this House, accountable for the Home Office, can take a decision and uphold it during the period of appeal. If the appeal is successful downstream then all bets are off and the individual’s citizenship is restored. For whatever reason it was originally removed, the Home Secretary’s decision has been overturned and the status quo for the individual remains. However, in the event of the individual remaining at the serious risk level that meant the Home Secretary brought forward the citizenship issue in the first place, that opens the United Kingdom to a risk until such time as the appeal is heard. This Bill deals solely with that issue. I heard what the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, said on this matter, but I put it to them and to the noble Lord, Lord German that the issue is about the management of risk by the UK Government in a limited circumstance, which I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, for raising.

This has been a fair debate about what we call the “Kit Malthouse amendments”, as a number of noble Lords have raised in their contributions. It is not appropriate to confer this discretion on the courts, because it is the Secretary of State who is accountable to this House and to Parliament, through the House of Commons, for matters of national security. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, mentioned, deprivation of citizenship and national security are matters for the Home Secretary. The Supreme Court itself emphasised that in its discussion and judgment. The Bill will align the approach to asylum and human rights appeals and extend it to appeals to the Supreme Court.

Decisions to deprive are taken in accordance with our international obligations and with consideration as to whether to give deprivation will expose the person to a real risk of mistreatment, which would constitute a breach of Articles 2 or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Home Secretary is the person responsible for that decision. I hear what noble Lords have said but that is the reason why my noble friend in the Commons, Minister Jarvis, rejected the Kit Malthouse approach, and the reason why I do so today.

Valid points have been raised. The noble Lords, Lord Jay, Lord German, Lord Anderson and Lord Verdirame, mentioned citizenship and the impact on the child. I pay great tribute to the private discussions —which are now public discussions because we have talked about them—that I had with the noble Lord, Lord Jay, because they raised an important issue. We have looked at that and reflected on it, and I hope I can give a satisfactory response to all noble Lords who have raised this question with me. It is simply this: the Bill does not alter the existing situation in relation to children born to deprived individuals, which is already established in law.

Where a child holds British citizenship, the deprivation of the parent’s citizenship has no effect on the child’s nationality status. Again, those points were mentioned across the House today. In cases where a child is born after the parent was deprived of British citizenship—another issue that the noble Lord, Lord Jay, has mentioned privately and in the Chamber today—their entitlement to British citizenship will depend on a number of factors, including the status of the other parent. The consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision in N3(ZA) is that if the child would have been British had their parent not been deprived then a successful appeal against deprivation by their parent means the child is automatically a British citizen. There are no changes in any of the principles that we have here, and I hope that reassures noble Lords on these points. Again, I am happy to reflect on that in due course.

The noble Lord, Lord Jay, made valid points on the question of the appeals procedure and the fast-track process that takes place. In answer to what I think was his pointed question to me, the Government are committed to supporting the expediting of these cases on a case-by-case basis, where appropriate, as quickly as possible. It is in no one’s interests to have long drawn-out appeals. What is the practical implication of that in relation to the courts determining the length of the appeal procedure where disagreements arise, now that courts have the power to order case management reviews to resolve issues? The current rules of court already permit the court to make directions to expedite cases if there are reasons for that to be done. The judiciary themselves are probably, dare I say it, better placed than the Home Secretary to determine and assess in each case how they can expedite those cases or not. All the factors that the noble Lord, Lord Jay, is concerned about are things that would potentially mean that a judge could determine, with “defence counsel”, that this needs to be done quickly. That is reasonable, and we want to see it over and done with as quickly as possible. We can look at the practical implications for the Government, but I hope I can reassure him on the principle.

Questions were asked about whether a person could be deported from the UK while they are appealing against the deprivation decision. In theory, it is possible for a person to be deprived of citizenship and deported before the deprivation appeal is resolved, but in practice that is going to be difficult because there will be the opportunity for people to make a human rights claim in response to the stage 1 deportation letter, and that means they would have an in-country right of appeal against the refusal of that claim if certified and a right of redress against the certification decision. It is a matter for the courts how those appeals are managed.

A number of other points were raised, including by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, about the role of the terrorism reviewer having oversight of these matters. The current situation is that the oversight for this aspect of public policy lies with the inspector of borders. They can determine their own inspection regime, if they wish to look at that. The terrorism reviewer does not currently have that role and responsibility—that is an argument the noble Lord might want to put down for debate. Should the inspector of borders wish to have an investigation on the performance of any matter to do with this—including the rights of the child, the length of the appeal procedure or the Home Secretary’s powers—they could do that, should they so wish, independently of government. So there is a sort of oversight there, but maybe not to the standard or type that the noble Lord wishes.

Ultimately, for this House—and, again, I am grateful for the support of His Majesty’s Opposition, in particular on this—it boils down to whether we are willing to take the risk. If the Home Secretary has taken advice from officials at a senior level and signed that order and taken the decision to deprive an individual of their citizenship, they have done that because there is a threat to the United Kingdom, in one form or another. If this Bill is not enacted, that threat will potentially materialise in another form as the individual will be able to restore their rights as a citizen when they appeal the original decision. This is the purpose of this Bill.

I recognise the range of points made by noble Lords from across the House on a range of issues, from the principle of deprivation in the first place to the numbers and so on, but that is the focus of the Bill and I put the question: are noble Lords willing to take that risk? I suggest that the Government are not and I am grateful to those Members who will support that position in this House today.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I have a question for the Minister about the possibility that perhaps in the future the deprivation of citizenship would be used as a prelude to deportation, even in circumstances where the first-instance tribunal had decided that the deprivation of citizenship was unlawful. It would be very helpful if the noble Lord could write to me about that.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I thought I had answered that, but if I have not answered that to the extent that I thought, I will reflect on what we have said in Hansard and will ensure that, before the next stage of this Bill, which I think is scheduled for a week today, a piece of paper in electronic or physical form lands on the noble Lord’s desk. With that, I commend the Bill to the House.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 8th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak in support of Amendments 146 and 147, tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel.

At the heart of these amendments is the principle of conditionality. Where an individual is granted conditional leave to enter or remain in this country, that permission is given on very clear terms. We need to be clear that these conditions are not arbitrary or frivolous. They are carefully set out to protect the fundamental interests of our economy, the integrity of our communities and the sustainability of our public funds. If those conditions are broken then the privilege of remaining in the United Kingdom should be forfeited. To do otherwise would render the entire conditionality regime meaningless. Rules that cannot be enforced are not rules at all; they are invitations to abuse and exploitation, and they undermine the trust of the British people in our immigration system.

The amendments before us are common sense. They would require that, where an individual breached the conditions of their leave, a deportation order must follow. That is a proportionate consequence, one that would reinforce the principle that with the right to stay comes the responsibility to comply. This is also about fairness to those who abide by the rules—fairness to the taxpayer who shoulders the cost of our public services, and fairness to our communities who deserve confidence that immigration is properly managed.

These are key aspects of government administration. Without robust enforcement, our borders cannot be effectively controlled and our laws risk becoming toothless. Through these amendments, we are providing the Government with the tools they need to deliver on their own stated objective of a firm but fair immigration system. The amendments are practical, enforceable and just. They would ensure that our conditionality regime had meaning, that our rules had effect and that the British people could have confidence that their borders were being properly secured.

On the question that Clause 43 does not stand part of the Bill, we on these Benches must disagree with the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I do not need to go into great detail on the point. Clause 43 pertains to conditions on limited leave to enter or remain, but we on these Benches are clear that, where this status is granted, it is vital that strict conditions are both met and enforced, and that anyone found to have broken those conditions should be deported. The Government have a duty to control and manage immigration in the interests of our country. We say that removing those conditions undermines the Government’s ability to do that, so I cannot support it.

The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, raises an interesting point in reference to the Immigration Act 2016 on the process of being granted bail accommodation. I too would be grateful, alongside the noble Lord, to hear from the Minister what the Government’s assessment of this is, whether it is a problem that they have identified and what plans they have to mitigate it. I beg to move.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I have tabled a notice to oppose Clause 43, which has been signed by a former immigration Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

I have listened with great attention to what the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has just said, so I shall make it clear what the amendment is about. We are not trying to stop the Government doing what they say they need to do, but we are objecting to a means of doing it that is arguably unnecessary and which is certainly exorbitant—indeed, dangerously so.

The provision that Clause 43 would amend is Section 3(1) of the Immigration Act 1971, under the title:

“General provisions for regulation and control”.


Section 3(1) is indeed general in its scope. It provides for conditions to be imposed on any person who is given limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom. That includes those who are here on a student visa, a business visa or a spousal visa. The conditions that can currently be imposed on the grant of such visas do not appear in the amendment. I remind noble Lords what they are: they include the power to issue visas for certain types of work only, and the power to require visa holders to maintain themselves and their dependants without recourse to public funds. They are fair conditions, and they are well understood by those who are subject to them. Those people include—and I declare an interest—one of my sons-in-law, who is on the five-year pathway to indefinite leave to remain. The happy couple have settled in Norwich, but I try not to hold that against them.

Clause 43, if we were to pass it into law, would allow the Secretary of State to impose on any of these visa holders such conditions as the Secretary of State thinks fit. No limit of any kind is placed on this power, and its potential severity is shown by the illustrative restrictions given in Clause 43(2): electronic tagging, a curfew to operate in a place specified by the Secretary of State for unlimited periods of day or night, and requirements on individuals not to enter a specified area—exclusion zones—and not to leave a specified area, so-called inclusion zones.

Such conditions are not entirely without precedent in our law. They will be familiar to your Lordships from the terrorism prevention and investigation measures, or TPIMs, introduced in the TPIM Act 2011 and echoed in Part 2 of the National Security Act 2023, for those believed to be involved in foreign power threat activity. It might be thought extraordinary enough if this clause allowed individuals whose only crime is to have studied here or married a British citizen to be treated like terrorist suspects, but it is worse than that. Clause 43 would introduce a materially harsher regime than TPIMs in at least three respects.

First, there is the threshold for their use. TPIMs require a reasonable belief on the part of the Secretary of State that the subject is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity. Clause 43, by contrast, is universal in its application. There is no threshold. Even the most blameless of migrants, whose only crime is to have come here for a wholly legitimate purpose, may in law be subject to its full rigour.

Secondly, there is the scope. The measures that appear in Clause 43(2) are all familiar from Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act, but the range of possible TPIMs is at least finite. Not even in respect of those believed to be terrorists did Parliament trust the Government with the unlimited power to impose, in the words of Clause 43,

“such other conditions as the Secretary of State thinks fit”.

Thirdly, there are the safeguards. TPIMs can be imposed only after the Home Secretary has obtained both the permission of the High Court and the confirmation of the CPS that it is not feasible to prosecute the subject for any criminal offence. No such safeguard exists in Clause 43, which would allow the severest restrictions on personal liberty to be imposed by the Executive without the intervention of a court on a potentially vast range of people, without any requirement for consultation, authorisation, automatic judicial review of the kind that exists for TPIMs, or oversight.

Clause 43 came late to this Bill. It was introduced in Committee in the Commons. No attempt was made to defend its breadth of application, but the Minister for Border Security and Asylum, Angela Eagle, did explain the limited circumstances in which the Government proposed to use the new powers for which they were asking. It was intended for use, she said:

“Where a person does not qualify for asylum or protection under the refugee convention but cannot be removed from the UK because of our obligations under domestic and international law”.—[Official Report, Commons, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Committee, 13/3/25; col. 265.]


It was intended to allow the same conditions to be placed on such persons as they might have been subjected to under immigration bail. She said:

“The powers will be used only in cases involving conduct such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, extremism or serious crime, or where the person poses a threat to national security or public safety”.—[Official Report, Commons, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Committee, 13/3/25; col. 268.]


Speaking for myself, that objective is entirely understandable, indeed defensible, though I pause to say that the definition of extremism is worryingly uncertain. Given the Government’s limited ambitions for the use of this clause, can the Minister explain why the existing powers to issue TPIMs, serious crime prevention orders and measures under Part 2 of the National Security Act 2023 are considered insufficient? They contain better safeguards and seem to meet precisely the cases that the Minister has in mind. Indeed, serious crime prevention orders are to be extended further by Part 3 of this Bill. If I am right about that, there is no need for Clause 43, but I am sure the Minister will explain.

Even if these existing powers are not sufficient, any new power must surely be tailored to its intended target, rather than to the vast range of innocent visa holders covered by Clause 43 in its current form. That is what the Constitution Committee had in mind when we recommended that the power be narrowed and that safeguards on its use be included in the Bill. The Joint Committee on Human Rights reported in similar terms. For anyone who is interested in more detail, I can recommend the useful briefings from Amnesty and the Public Law Project.

No one doubts for a moment the good faith of the Minister or his colleagues, but to legislate for unlimited powers and trust to assurances from the Dispatch Box about the narrow scope of their intended use would not just be poor legislative practice but an abandonment of parliamentary scrutiny at the very time when that scrutiny is most needed. The courts have no regard to ministerial assurances, save when the terms of an Act are ambiguous. That, as noble Lords know, is a rare eventuality.

No one who looks at the opinion polls can be confident that all possible future Governments would apply Clause 43 with the restraint to which this Government have committed. To enact Clause 43 would be a gift-wrapped present to any future Government who wished to threaten or erode the rights of immigrants across the board, without thresholds or oversight. If this clause is needed at all, I hope the Minister will agree that it should at least be confined in the Bill to the circumstances where that need arises.

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

I am very pleased to support the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and my name is on this amendment. I would just like to say to my noble friend Lord Davies that I was indeed the Immigration Minister, and I came forward with the term “being firm but fair” in relation to all immigration matters. I think that has stood the test of time. I have always believed in very strict conditions being attached not only to the Immigration Rules and their application but to our approach to those who seek asylum in this country.

My name is on this amendment because this is something of an example of a Government using a sledgehammer where it has been quite unnecessary to do so. This clause is so general and so wide in its effects that it seems to me to go against all propriety and balance. I will be very brief because I do not want to fall into the trap of repeating what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has said, but I want to tease the Minister out a little on those points.

We know that terrorism prevention and investigation measures, TPIMs, are already very effective, and as are serious crime prevention orders. They all have within them the necessary ingredients to be able to deal with virtually all the circumstances that we are debating in relation to this Bill. Therefore, I again suggest to the Minister that it is unnecessary for us to have these extra powers being sought by the Government. It is true that the Minister in the House of Commons gave a clear indication that the use would be only limited. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has given us the list of things where there might be interest here. However, in the circumstances, these intentions of the Minister do not necessarily make good law and I am sure he shares my concern that, if you allow extensions in this way, you are allowing future Governments to abuse the system and the situation unnecessarily.

Also, these new measures, unlike TPIMs or the SCPOs, do not seem to require any judicial approval. There is no such requirement, so far as I can see. As a fairly junior lawyer, but a lawyer nevertheless, I find that reprehensible and dangerous. I would like the Minister’s comments on that.

--- Later in debate ---

If Members are not happy, there is an opportunity either now or, I suggest, on Report to determine this by a Division and the other place can respond with Home Office assessment, or they can put amendments down that meet the concerns that they have. It is the Government’s position, however, to use this to respond to very low numbers of cases where there are specific identified serious threats. It is important that we have the power to ensure that we can deal with this for the safety of the British public. If we did not have the power and if those individuals exercised the threats that they pose, Ministers would be in a severely compromised position to argue to the British public why we did not use the powers to take strong action against these individuals.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister. He has really said just one thing, which is not in dispute across the House: he and his colleagues would use these powers on a case-by-case basis and in a very responsible way. However, with great respect, he has not answered either of the two points that were made to him in the debate. The first was the question of why serious crime prevention orders, TPIMS or prevention and investigation measures under the National Security Act 2023 would not be sufficient to deal with all the categories of people that Angela Eagle referred to. That is the question of whether Clause 43 is necessary at all.

Secondly—assuming he makes that case—how can he justify a power that is designed for such a narrow purpose being drafted in such an impossibly broad fashion? Although the Minister says, quite rightly, that we can put this to a Division on Report, I remind him that the TPIM Act, with all the safeguards that it contains, is 59 pages long. Drafting thresholds, proper provisions for scope, and safeguards is not a simple matter—not for a humble and unlettered Back-Bencher or Cross-Bencher such as myself.

I remember a similar case with the deprivation of citizenship, in which, under the last Government, a clause was put forward that allowed anyone who was subject to deprivation to be deprived of their citizenship without notice. It was seen that this was far broader than it needed be and the Government met with me and others and assisted with the drafting. We ended up with something much more tailored to the policy that the Government were seeking to advance, which nobody has questioned in this debate. Will the Minister meet with us in a constructive spirit and with a view to finding a clause that meets the Government’s policy but is not open to the sort of abuse to which the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and others have referred?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, knows from our 13 months or so of engagement with him that I am always open to meet with noble Lord and to have input into the legislative process to make sure that the Government’s objectives are workable and practicable. I will happily meet with him to reflect on those points. I have Members from the Official Opposition, the Liberal Democrats and the Cross Benches pressing me on this issue; it is important that I listen to those reflections with the policy Minister who has argued that case in the House of Commons.

Let us look at what has been said today in the cold light of day and reflect upon it. I will certainly arrange a meeting to hear his concerns further and look at the issues. The Government believe that Clause 43 is of sound policy and that it would be used in the limited circumstances that I have described. They believe that those circumstances can be defined and, even though new sub-paragraph (x) in Clause 43(2)(b) says

“other conditions as the Secretary of State thinks fit”,

I understand his concern on that matter. But I believe, again, that a responsible Secretary of State would be held to account, would have to explain and bring forward information on that, and would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, particularly in the House of Commons where votes from the governing party can take place, but also in this noble House.

So I say to the noble Lord: let us meet, but the Government have put forward a clause that they believe is appropriate. There are noble Lords in this Committee who believe it is not, so let us have that discussion in the cold light of day to reflect on those points.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

When the Minister goes back to the policy Minister, will he reassure her that nobody in this debate has questioned the policy that the Government are seeking to pursue? All we are questioning is the method they have chosen.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That point has been made, and I will discuss that with my colleagues in government. Clause 43 as drafted is before the Committee today, but there are opportunities to discuss it further if the noble Lord is not happy with any assurances that we can give outside the Committee to table amendments that can be debated and voted upon in due course. I will leave it at that.

Amendment 148 in the name of my noble friend Lord Bach seeks to clarify the eligibility criteria for bail accommodation under Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016. Under this provision, the Secretary of State has the power to provide accommodation to someone in exceptional circumstances only when they have been granted immigration bail and are subject to a residence condition that requires them to live at an address specified in that condition. The Home Office recognises that, where the Secretary of State is required to provide a person with accommodation to enable them to meet their bail conditions, a specified address cannot always be known at the time of the bail grant. Accordingly, it has been a long-standing policy position that bail can be granted with a residence condition to an address that is known at the time of the grant of immigration bail, or an address that is yet to be specified. In 2024, this was also set out explicitly in the relevant guidance. The policy is clear, and operational teams are already operating the legislation in this way, to ensure that someone can apply to the Home Office for bail accommodation without having been granted bail to a specific address. Therefore, the amendment—with its good intention—would make no material difference to the current operation of the legislation and is not necessary. I am happy to hear further from the noble Lord, but I invite him not to move his amendment.

On the amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, Amendment 146 would require the Secretary of State to make a deportation order against persons who breach the conditions attached to their leave in the UK. Such breaches of conditions may already be addressed by cancelling that leave and removing the person from the UK without the need to seek a deportation order. Mandating deportation in such cases is not therefore necessary. It will provide no guarantee that a person’s removal from the UK could be enforced if they were to make a human rights or protection claim against their removal.

Finally, Amendment 147 would replace existing criminal sanctions for offences under Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971 with a penalty of deportation. Overstayers and illegal entrants are already liable to removal from the UK. Where a person is convicted of an offence and sentenced to a period of imprisonment, consideration will be given to their deportation. With respect to the noble Lord, the amendment risks encouraging offending behaviour and would not result in an increase in removals from the UK.

This has been a serious debate that has raised a number of points. But I hope, given what I have said, that the noble Lord will not press his objection to Clause 43. I will meet noble Lords to discuss their objections further to understand their concerns better. I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments so that we can examine the clause together.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2025

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Thursday 3rd July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I will be brief. Invoking the terrorism laws has consequences and, although I do not object to invoking them in relation to any of these three groups, we need to understand properly what those consequences are. Many people want to speak, and I will make only one point, which is that the consequences of designation for individuals misguided enough to approve of, for example, Palestine Action are rather more draconian than the Explanatory Memorandum to this order suggests.

Paragraph 5.20 of that document states:

“It is a criminal offence for a person to belong to, or invite support for, a proscribed organisation. It is also a criminal offence to arrange a meeting to support a proscribed organisation”.


That is an accurate summary of Section 11 and Section 12(1) and (2) of the Terrorism Act 2000. If you are a member or a promoter of a proscribed organisation, you can face up to 14 years in prison.

However, since the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 introduced Section 12(1A) to the Terrorism Act 2000, you can also be looking at up to 14 years if you express

“an opinion or belief that is supportive of a proscribed organisation”,

without even needing an intention that your listener or listeners should agree—being reckless about that suffices. By our bringing Palestine Action, for example, within the ambit of the terrorism laws, anyone who is young and foolish enough to say that its heart is in the right place, or that the Government should listen to it, is committing a very serious offence for which they could be prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned as a terrorist. It is not their right to protest but the right of freedom of speech that is the issue here.

Does the Minister agree that this 2019 offence takes us on to more sensitive territory than the others? Can he tell us whether its potential impact was considered as part of the Government’s analysis of these decisions, even though it was not referred to in the Explanatory Memorandum? Might it be a good idea, for future proscription debates, to ensure that the Explanatory Memorandum template is updated to make reference to the full arsenal of proscribed organisation offences?

Product Regulation and Metrology Bill [HL]

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 26th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord Gardiner of Kimble)]

My Lords, I must inform the House that, if Amendment 2 is agreed to, I will not be able to call Amendments 3 and 4 by reason of pre-emption.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I rise not to support the noble Lord, although it is a pleasure to follow him, but to address government Amendments 44 and 61 in this group, which I have signed, together with government Amendment 55, which will be for another day.

The Constitution Committee has already been kindly mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt. As a member of that committee, I register my appreciation for the fact that the Government have not only listened to the committee’s concerns and to those developed with impressive persistence by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee but have reacted constructively to them. The Henry VIII powers have been greatly reduced in scope and a credible explanation has been given for the small remainder. While the Bill continues to contain uncomfortably wide ministerial powers to make significant policy decisions, the broad duty of consultation in Amendment 61 is a welcome mitigation. The third part of the package—an extension of the affirmative procedure—is another positive step.

It might have been possible to go further, as the Delegated Powers Committee has rightly said. But, for my part, I would not go so far as to support the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, in his—I am tempted to say “wrecking” —Amendment 2. How to avoid the unconstrained use of excessively broad delegated powers is a problem that will not go away. It was raised by this Bill in a particularly acute form. The Government have grappled with it conscientiously and they deserve credit for that.

I have one final thought. It is rather a dry one, I am afraid, but what do you expect from the Cross Benches? I hope that, some day, the relevant committees of this House might have occasion to discuss the constitutional issues around framework Bills and delegated powers with the Government, not only Bill by Bill, as we do at present, but in a more structured and strategic way. Such discussions would give proper weight to the constraints on government but could also draw on the guidance provided by our committees and bodies such as the Hansard Society over many years. Perhaps the Minister will agree, after his generous and productive engagement on this issue, that the goal of a more consistent and principled approach on both sides of the fence might at least be worth pursuing.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I shall speak to my Amendment 4 in this group, which, we are advised, would be pre-empted if Amendment 2 were to be passed, by reason of the deletion of the relevant provision in Clause 1(1), to which it would add an additional subsection. It would add to the overarching objective of making regulations, which is to secure safe products:

“In considering whether regulations should be made … the Secretary of State must have regard to the likelihood of the United Kingdom being seen as a favourable place in which to develop, manufacture or supply products”.


Of course, many of the debates that we have on the Bill will relate to the question of alignment, or otherwise. One of the reasons why we are considering this legislation is because there would be significant issues to do with the manufacture, distribution and supply of products in this country were we to diverge significantly from the standards that lie behind the CE marking from the European Union. Rather than continue, as we have done, with reliance on the retained EU law legislation, it is the Government’s intention, through this legislation, to enable us to accept CE marking. That is not necessarily on a dynamic basis—I agree that it is a matter of choice whether we do so—but the Bill’s structure is intended to enable that to happen. Because we seek to do that by reference to the adverse economic consequences that may flow from failing to be able to bring products here, which may drive some economic activity elsewhere, it seems important that Ministers making regulations under this legislation should consider whether, as a result, the UK is an attractive place in which to manufacture, distribute or supply products.

This is not a new concept. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, on the Government Front Bench will recall that the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021 includes effectively the same provision in relation to medical devices. Medical devices are outside the scope of this Bill but it is relevant to a wide range of other industrial products. I do not understand why it should not be an essential part of the way that Ministers consider making regulations that have such an impact to have regard to the positive benefits that can accrue to business from ensuring that we have the right product regulatory framework for them, so I commend Amendment 4 to the House.

I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that Amendment 2 is a wrecking amendment. Why not? Because, if the first subsection were to be removed by that amendment, the regulation-making power would be removed from the Bill so the Government would have to think again. However, the noble Lord and the House will note that later in this group is government Amendment 44. The original formulation in the Bill was to have consequential amendments to Parts II, IV and V of the Consumer Protection Act 1987. In response to the suggestion from the Delegated Powers Committee, which was unhappy with the sweeping power to amend that Act, the Government have instead said, “We’re going to omit Parts II and IV now”. Part II is the bit I am interested in; it is the part of the Act that relates to product safety. The Government simply propose to remove Part II of that Act.

I say to the House and to my noble friend on the Front Bench that if Amendment 2 were to be passed the Bill would clearly have no further regulation-making power in it. However, if at the same time the House were to resist government Amendment 44 then there would continue to be powers in the Consumer Protection Act 1987 for the purpose of making regulations for product safety. The House will be reminded that Section 11(1) of the 1987 Act says:

“The Secretary of State may by regulations … make such provision as he considers appropriate for the purpose of securing … that goods to which this section applies are safe”.


More detail follows, including the respective ways in which provisions can be determined.

The Government should tell us either how they are going to legislate using the powers in the 1987 Act or, if they want to get rid of them, how they are going to replace them in detail. They have done neither of those things. I know we are going to come back to talk about legislation on product liability at a later stage. The Consumer Protection Act is nearly 40 years old and we know it needs updating, but the Government are not doing that; they are sweeping it away and not giving us anything like the detail that was in that Act as to how the powers are going to be used. Nearly 40 years’ worth of scrutiny of the Section 11 provisions on product safety will also be swept away, because the language in this Bill is not the same as in that Act.

The House will have to forgive me: I am slightly anticipating the next group and Amendment 3, because if Amendment 2 is passed, Amendment 3 will not be debated; it will have been pre-empted. I want to make it absolutely clear that although I support my noble friend’s criticisms of the way the Bill is constructed, there is a route available to maintain the powers for determining regulations for product safety. That would force the Government to come back and amend the Consumer Protection Act in ways that are more substantive and clearer than what the present Bill offers us.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th February 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

21: Clause 5, page 4, line 19, leave out subsections (4) to (6)
Member’s explanatory statement
This would remove a Henry VIII Clause which will otherwise give the Minister power by regulation to alter (including by making more onerous) the range of public protection procedures in subsection (3) which were decided upon after full consultation and will after passage of the Bill have been endorsed by Parliament.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to the four amendments in this group, with thanks to the noble Baronesses, Lady Suttie and Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, who have variously signed them. I thank also the Minister, not only for being generous with his time but for his indication in Committee on Wednesday that he had some sympathy with these amendments. What form that sympathy will take we look forward to finding out.

Standing back, the Bill has two principal elements: it stipulates the capacity of events and premises that are subject to its provisions, and it stipulates the types of procedures and measures which must be followed by those responsible for such premises and events. Those things are not matters of detail—they define the policy that underlies Martyn’s law. We are asked, quite properly, to sign off on those provisions by giving our approval to Clauses 2 and 3 on capacity, and to Clauses 5 and 6 on procedures and measures.

The amendments in this group all relate to Henry VIII clauses: provisions in the Bill that allow the Minister, by the affirmative procedure, to amend provisions of statute. It is not just any statute: this statute, the one we are being asked to pass into law; and not just any provisions—the provisions in Clauses 2, 3, 5 and 6 that lie right at its heart.

Delegated powers are a fact of life and, although some of us may regret it, we are even seeing the normalisation of Henry VIII powers, which allow statutes to be amended in points of detail by regulation. But I suggest that these Henry VIII clauses simply go too far in giving Ministers the power to retake policy decisions that have been taken after much debate by Parliament.

The first pair of amendments in my name, Amendments 21 and 23, would remove the Henry VIII clauses in Clauses 5 and 6. These were singled out for concern by the Constitution Committee in the letter from the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, to the Minister of 14 January. As a member of that committee, fortunate to serve under the chairmanship of the noble Baroness, I will briefly explain why.

The lists at Clauses 5(3) and 6(3) dictate what may lawfully be required of those responsible for premises falling within scope. Clause 5(3) specifies the “Public protection procedures” to be followed if there is reason to suspect that an act of terrorism is occurring or about to occur. They are of limited scope: little more than procedures for evacuation and invacuation, barring entrances and providing information.

Clause 6(3) lists the public protection measures that must additionally be in place in enhanced duty premises or in qualifying events. These are potentially much more extensive: measures relating to monitoring, movement, the physical safety and security of the premises, and security of information. Unlike the public protection procedures that are the subject of Clause 5, they must be in place at all times and may have as their objective to reduce the vulnerability of the premises as well as risk to individuals.

Clauses 5(4) to (6), and 6(4) to (6), which these amendments would remove, allow both lists—the list of procedures and the list of measures—to be amended, not only by regulation but without meaningful precondition and without even the safeguard of consultation. What could that mean in practice? Take Clause 6, where the range of public protection measures is already almost limitlessly broad: anything relating to monitoring of a premises or event; anything relating to the physical safety or security of the premises; anything relating to the movement of individuals or the security of information. Clause 6(4) would allow yet further measures, not relating to the safety and security of the premises, monitoring, movement, and so on, to be introduced by regulations. What regulations could the Government have in mind? They sound as though they are well outside the normal range of protections that we might think useful and acceptable. If any such categories can be thought of, why can they not be brought forward and debated in the Bill? If they cannot be thought of, how can this power be justified?

The range of procedures in Clause 5 is much more limited, and understandably so, because these procedures are to be activated only once a terrorist attack is immediately anticipated or already under way, and because some of the venues to which they apply are relatively small. But, because the range is so limited, the potential for its expansion is commensurately large. What new and more onerous categories of procedure might be in prospect, what will be their additional cost and why are they not already in the Bill so that we can debate and decide on them now?

--- Later in debate ---

In conclusion, to the noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, I offer a sort of half-concession discussion and further examination in due course on Amendment 38. With regard to the other powers that have been included in the Bill, I hope that noble Lords, having listened today and potentially having read Hansard, will not pursue the amendments that are listed and will allow me to discuss Amendment 38 further with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate. I shall not try to summarise the excellent speeches that were made—they will come much more clearly in the form that they were made than they would from any summary of mine—but I will pick up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, who emphasised consultation. As I said at Second Reading, this Bill has in many ways been a model of careful consideration. Look at the work that the Home Affairs Select Committee did on it, the work that was done in another place, the way that this Government have listened, and the way that people right around the country were consulted before these measures, procedures and thresholds were reached. In previous groups, the Minister, quite rightly, has sought credit for the depth of that consultation and the care with which those crucial figures, procedures and measures were arrived at. So although I might not have used exactly the same words as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—she said that to introduce Henry VIII clauses and apply them to these central elements of the Bill when it has already been consulted on makes a mockery of it—I entirely understand where she is coming from.

I am very grateful to the Minister for what he has said. I think he described it as a half concession—and one must take what one can get—on Amendment 38 and the idea that changes to the thresholds should be motivated by a change to the terrorist threat. However, I urge him, while he is in that generous mood, to heed the very strong terms in which the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, expressed himself on Amendment 39. If you were seeking a Henry VIII clause in these circumstances, and claiming as your model the Fire Safety Act 2021 which has a duty to consult—I might say a very weak duty to consult only such people as seem to the Secretary of State appropriate—why can that not be followed through into the text of this Bill?

The Minister gave an assurance from the Dispatch Box that there would be appropriate consultation—I think he said that; I do not want to put words into his mouth—although he did say that, on some minor issues, it might be internal consultation only. If the Minister is prepared to say that from the Dispatch Box, let us hope that all his successors are as well inclined to the idea of consultation. But is it really a great stretch to put those words into the Bill as well? I hope that, just as we reflect before Report, the Minister will reflect as well.

If the consultation power is too wide—and I think the Minister took the point that perhaps Amendment 39 applies to a whole range of changes—it could of course be narrowed. Amendment 38 is restricted to specific aspects of the Bill and it would be quite possible to redraft a consultation power that was equally narrow.

While I am on my feet and we are all beginning the process of reflection before Report, might the Minister consider applying the logic that he has brought to Amendment 38 to the lists in Clauses 5 and 6? After all, if reductions in the threshold, as the Minister seems minded to accept, require a change in the terrorist threat—or that there could at least be debate as to whether that is an appropriate precondition—why should not an expansion of the lists similarly require a change in the threat?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The reason I would put is that a change in the threshold would involve bringing a large number of other potential businesses and outlets into the scope of the provisions of the Bill. The changes in Clauses 5 and 6 may tweak or look at the protections available or what other support and training should be given, but they do not bring into scope further premises.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I am grateful for that clarification and answer, but Amendments 38 and 39 are not just about a changing of the threat; they are also about consultation. While the Minister is thinking about consultation in relation to the thresholds, I wonder whether he might think about something similar in relation to changing the lists.

The Minister has offered me half a concession. What I was offering him just now was perhaps half an olive branch. It was a way of possibly coming back on Report with something slightly different from my amendments to Clauses 5 and 6. I think we all have reflecting to do. I am extremely grateful for what I think has been a most useful debate. For the moment at least, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 21 withdrawn.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 7th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, this Bill has been forged in reaction to a despicable terrorist attack, dignified by the name of one of its victims, promoted by his courageous mother and subject to a high degree of cross-party consensus. Those are all admirable things, but they also underline the need for serious and dispassionate parliamentary scrutiny.

It is sometimes said that the meaningful scrutiny of Bills is nowadays the province of this House only, and examples of that are not unknown. However, having followed the progress of this Bill through the Commons, with particular reference to the work of the Public Bill Committee and the Home Affairs Select Committee—the independence of which on this matter was notable— I have a lot of respect for the evidence they have taken and the work they have done. That is now reflected in the reformulated and, I must say, improved Bill. I particularly welcome the test of reasonable practicability, so familiar from health and safety legislation, and the changes to the lower threshold for qualifying premises, which is strongly supported by the National Association of Local Councils. It will take out of the scope of the Bill over 100,000 premises—including small parish churches, village halls and town centre cafes—that cannot reasonably be expected to host as many as 200 people.

I remember discussing with Tom Tugendhat, when he was the Security Minister responsible for the Bill, whether it was necessary to put the limit as low as a capacity of 100. He of course held the line at the time, but it was interesting to see that, once released from his responsibilities, he tabled an amendment in Committee that sought to raise the revised lower limit from 200 to 300.

I am grateful to the Minister for meeting with me on this issue. I hope he will forgive me if I remain slightly sceptical about the likely value of the obligations placed on the smallest standard duty premises. A £3,313 average cost over 10 years is not a trivial amount for a financially marginal business or a village hall struggling to raise funds. Yet compliance with the standard duty, as can be seen in Clause 1(1), is intended not to reduce the vulnerability of such premises to acts of terrorism, but to reduce only the risk of physical harm once an act of terrorism is imminent or has started. As the Minister covered in his opening speech, Clause 5(3) demonstrates what that will mean: guarding and locking doors, ensuring that people know where the exits are, and so on.

Bearing in mind the modest extent of the standard duty, I wonder how much the centrally available guidance, which operators are supposed to download, will add to the common sense of those who operate small venues and know them inside out, particularly when, as is thankfully the case in most places, the risk of a terrorist attack is almost vanishingly small. The Minister probably feels that by shifting the minimum threshold to 200 he has reached a widely acceptable compromise, and he may well be right.

However, I remain concerned by the ease by which, by affirmative regulation, 100,000 extra premises could be brought within the scope of the Bill, and many more made subject to the enhanced duties. After a terrorist attack, it can be tempting for any Government to be seen to take immediate action to tighten up the law. Of course, the noble Baroness, Lady May, to whom it was my great privilege to report as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, was made of stronger stuff, and so, I suspect, is the Minister. But others do succumb to temptation of this kind, and activating such a power would be an obvious and tempting response.

I make two suggestions. Just to concentrate minds a little, could the operation of Clause 32 not be made conditional on the Secretary of State being satisfied that changing the threshold is justified on the basis of the terrorist threat? That is in the Delegated Powers Committee memorandum; why not put it in the Bill? This would not prevent it being done, but it would make it more likely that it will be done for the right reasons. Secondly, the Delegated Powers Committee memorandum claims as a precedent for this power Section 2 of the Fire Safety Act 2021, which indeed provides for a similar affirmative power to change premises to which the fire safety order applies, but that section contains a statutory obligation to consult. Bearing in mind the extensive consultation that arrived at the figures of 200 and 800, surely at least some consultation would be appropriate before Ministers intervene to change them by regulation.

I have a couple of other points. Noble Lords will have seen a submission from LIVE, which describes itself as the live music industry body in the UK. LIVE makes the point that music festivals, venues and events are already regulated under the Licensing Act 2003, with, where appropriate, highly developed counter- terrorism measures secured by licence conditions. This is overseen, it says, by safety advisory groups which take advice from local police forces and local counterterrorism security co-ordinators. Is that a picture the Minister recognises and, if so, can he give us some more detail on what the regime in the Bill will add to what is described? I do not doubt it will add something. Will the mechanisms described by LIVE persist after Martyn’s law has entered into force? How will any overlap be dealt with, and how will the existing mechanisms be integrated into the approach of the SIA? It would be good to hear more about this since, as the Regulatory Policy Committee points out, the Bill’s impact assessment provides no evidence that a new regulator with national inspectors would be efficient compared with local authority compliance, and the new regulator is of course given very strong enforcement powers.

Finally, I noticed from Schedule 2 that certain premises are excluded from the Bill. Premises occupied by the devolved Administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are excluded, but those occupied by the United Kingdom Civil Service are not. I wonder if the Minister can tell us why. Also excluded from the Bill are premises occupied for the purposes of the devolved legislatures, the House of Commons and the House of Lords. I assume that these premises, or some of them, are considered to fall within Schedule 1; otherwise, no exclusion from the Bill would be necessary. No doubt other precautions are in place, but although we are frequently urged to do our fire safety training, I do not recall hearing anything about the threat of terrorism, which is perhaps rather greater here than it is in my village hall. I should be grateful if the Minister told us what difficulties there are in applying the standard and enhanced duties to Westminster as they are applied to Whitehall, and explained why parliamentary buildings are exempt.