Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Ashcombe Excerpts

Friday 5th December 2025 Lords Chamber

The particular problems that the provisions of the Bill present for decisions relating to the capacity of young people with eating disorders will be discussed in future groups. But there is an age-related aspect that we should note here, because we are likely to find that it is impossible to find drafting amendments to capacity provisions that will mitigate or solve the problem. These disorders most commonly begin in the mid to late teens. For those who recover from them—which is, sadly, not all, but many do—recovery typically takes seven to 10 years, so by their mid-20s, most people who are going to recover from anorexia have done so. This simple increase in the minimum age may well be the most pragmatic and effective adjustment to mitigate a serious risk. For all those reasons, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Berger.

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, I take noble Lords back to when they were young; we have all been there. I suspect that we all remember the odd and what may now seem very troubling ideas that sometimes passed through our minds during those years. Many of us have also watched our children—and for some of us, I dare say, grandchildren, though I am not there yet—navigate that turbulent stage of life. These formative years are full of experimentation, confusion and growth. They are not the years in which irreversible decisions should be entertained. Therefore, I am very much in favour of increasing the age limit to 25, as the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, suggests.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a really good discussion showing the range of views and expert opinion that we have here. I think I heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that he was willing to look at the age question. I think he said that he was more likely to add safeguards—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

I will speak briefly to raise attention to Amendment 170, which has recently been added to the group. In an effort to short-circuit, we will come to the issues of interpreters much later on.

I have laid Amendment 174, which quite simply says that an interpreter must be over the age of 18. It will not surprise the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, that I have a whole cluster of amendments to deal with what may be inadvertent situations that are not covered off for under-18s. I invite the noble and learned Lord to look at that amendment to see whether it can swiftly be clarified and dealt with, along with the others that relate to children.

In this group, I will also speak to the noble and learned Lord’s Amendments 332, 417 to 419 and 425, which I believe are a genuine attempt to deal with the report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It advised the sponsor of the Bill to remove the Clause 15 power and to align the other clauses, because there were inconsistent wordings. I want to reiterate that reassurance was given in the other place that there would be one second opinion by another doctor. This goes back to the noble and learned Lord’s opener: when we talk about “cannot”, we need to cover that off in the Bill. The Bill was covering death or illness—obvious situations where the function cannot be fulfilled—but “will not” is obviously a different scenario.

Unless the doctor is unable to perform that function, for whatever reason, if we do not stick to the word “cannot”, we will potentially get the opening up of the ability to choose a number of doctors and maybe having some kind of discussion. Then they may not want to act, which may be for the reasons outlined by the noble Baronesses, Lady O’Loan and Lady Goudie. Then we might have a number of assessments or discussions that do not become a formal refusal which is then documented. I do not think the noble and learned Lord intended, by changing Clauses 10 and 13, to broaden the scenarios where a further referral could be made to any situation in which the doctor is unable or unwilling to continue; I think this has happened inadvertently. I know that my noble friend Lord Harper has laid amendments regarding particular scenarios beyond “death” and “illness”, and I think that the Minister in the other place, Mr Kinnock, mentioned family circumstances or emergencies. Perhaps the way ahead here—I am trying to pre-empt a further group, when we get to it—is that we could have a clause that outlines more circumstances than the two that are in the Bill.

Obviously, as lawyers, we know we can never cover every circumstance that would justify a doctor saying, “I can’t do this function any more”, not “I won’t”. Perhaps there could be a system whereby a doctor who wants to withdraw, and his or her circumstances are not in the paragraphs, should have to go to the panel and say, “I’ve got a situation that isn’t within the framework of the legislation, but I can’t for these reasons perform that function”. So I hope the noble and learned Lord will not move those amendments, as he has promised, but we could come back to this in the group that deals substantively with exploring scenarios where the doctor cannot act.

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to express my particular concern regarding Amendment 416. The question I must put to the noble and learned Lord is, why should an independent doctor tasked with providing a second opinion not have access to the notes of the first? Is the intention to prevent any influence on the second medical professional, even when the first has identified grounds for dissatisfaction and declined to proceed with the possibility of assisted death?

We have already engaged in lengthy debates on the crucial matters of decision-making capacity and the risks of coercion. What if the first independent doctor had uncovered evidence of precisely such concerns? This situation inevitably calls to mind the troubling prospect that a patient, or indeed another party exerting influence upon that patient, might seek out a doctor willing to endorse the view of the co-ordinating physician. Surely the medical notes generated throughout the process are of fundamental importance to all involved in the medical profession, and it cannot be right that they should be withheld from any participant in the decision-making claim. I therefore earnestly ask the noble and learned Lord to give me his thoughts on this, as I do not really consider this to be a straight drafting issue.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I would like to refer to Amendment 6 from the noble and learned Lord the sponsor of the Bill, because I have concerns with it. In inserting the words

“has a preliminary discussion with a registered medical practitioner”,

Amendment 6, which is described as a drafting change, adds to the uncertainty about what discussion takes place with the patient and when. It is a dangerous uncertainty as, if the Bill was so amended, it would be left open for one or more such discussions to take place before the person is 18, so long as the discussion that is required as a preliminary discussion takes place after the person has reached 18.

In particular, the amendment would do nothing to restrict the scope of Clause 5(3), which permits a medical practitioner to engage in preliminary discussion about assisted dying with a patient who raises the subject. Since there is nothing to tie the discussion referred to as “a preliminary discussion” to be inserted in Clause 1 with “a preliminary discussion” in Clause 5(3), the amendment will not stop these discussions taking place with under-18s.

Grammatically, a “such and such” refers to any “such and such”, and the word “preliminary” does not imply a restriction on number; there could be one or 100 preliminary discussions. Although Clause 5(3) does not oblige the registered medical practitioner to discuss assisted dying under the Bill’s provisions with any patient who raises it, Clause 5(6) obliges the practitioner concerned to direct the patient to

“where they can … have the preliminary discussion”—

and that is the preliminary discussion. Therefore, even as amended, the Bill requires that any patient, whatever their age, who raises the possibility of assisted dying under the Bill is enabled to have a discussion about it. It cannot be objected that in Clause 5(6), the reference is to “the”, not “a”, preliminary discussion, since here “the” refers back to the preliminary discussion in Clause 5(3) to Clause 5(5), where the phrase used is “a preliminary discussion” or “such a preliminary discussion”—that is to say, any preliminary discussion of the matter.

These points may seem technical and pernickety, but consider how the Bill, even as amended, might lead a young person to end their life prematurely without proper adult consideration of the matter. Take a 16 or 17-year old who is suffering from a disease that makes their life expectancy uncertain, or who has been warned that they might die rapidly or deteriorate and die at any time. We may all try to imagine, but we can hardly know how such a young person might feel: isolated, lonely, afraid, and perhaps hypersensitive to remarks or innuendo, real or imagined, or indeed to some of what we have heard today about social media and pressures from peer groups in the Netherlands. They might share not only the worries about the illness, but the normal doubts of people of that age that even those in the best health who are depressed and unsure of themselves have. How easy for the unfortunate young person to say, “I wish I were dead”.