Health and Social Care Bill
Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts(14 years, 3 months ago)
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Earl Howe
My Lords, I apologise to the noble Baroness if I skirted over the considerable number of questions she asked, and if it would be helpful to her I will write her a letter on all of them. Perhaps I may cover two at this point. As regards her Amendment 282ZC, our expectation is that Monitor’s licensing criteria will be light-touch and broadly drawn, to encompass a wide range of providers. The amendment she has tabled does not lend itself to that approach. Much as I understand the importance of this particular issue, requiring any and every licence applicant to meet a definition of,
“commitment to education, training and research”,
that Monitor has developed does not fit with the principles of proportionate and targeted regulation. But I will write to her with further reasoning on that.
As regards the noble Baroness’s Amendment 282ZB, which is about indemnity, if she will forgive me, again I think that I will have to write to her.
Lord Clement-Jones
I have another amendment on which the Minister might find a lacuna—Amendment 287A, which deals with the Nolan principles.
Baroness Thornton
I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, asked that, because I was waiting to hear what the answer would be. I look forward to the noble Earl’s response. I fear that the noble Earl will be spending the whole of the weekend writing letters to all of us about these matters.
I am not going to say very much about this. This has been a divided debate, but many of the questions asked have been similar. The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, was quite right to raise the issue of requirements. She and her noble friend Lord Clement-Jones were right to raise the issue of transparency, which is very important here.
I am not sure that we on these Benches would agree that the checks and balances are the right ones. At this stage, we will wait for the letters from the noble Earl. I will also read his remarks again in Hansard. We may return to discuss this matter again. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Thornton
We turn now to the very important matter of Monitor and accountability. I see that many noble Lords have amendments in this group, many of them echoing each other. The reason for that is that, given the powerful role that Monitor is to have—whether it will have this role under the regime proposed by the Minister or the alternative architecture proposed by myself earlier today—we think that accountability is very important indeed.
We propose two improvements to Monitor’s governance. We believe that its functions should be exercised in the public interest and therefore that it should meet in public, as the NHS Commissioning Board will. We should also no longer have a combined chair and chief executive post. I hardly need say to the House that this arrangement is totally against established good practice in the public or private sector. I rest that issue there and look forward to the noble Earl’s response.
When foundation trusts were set up, the idea was that they could earn freedoms from traditional NHS management and also bring an element of democratic accountability and community ownership. It must be said that much of this has not materialised. Some foundation trusts up north have made an effort to engage locally with the people they serve. Some have adopted a business model rather than a community ownership model. I am sure that all noble Lords are members of their foundation trusts—I hope that they are and that they take part when asked to do so. The target to push up membership numbers in the trusts seems to have been forgotten.
Being successful in becoming a foundation trust shows that a fairly high barrier was overcome but that represents only the position at one point in time. As with the share market, things can go up or down. Some big-name foundation trusts have had their bad patches. A few, surprising names have been at the edge of intervention. If you compare the list of foundation trusts flagged as being in difficulty by Monitor with the list of ratings from Dr Foster or, in its time, the ratings from the Healthcare Commission, there seems to be no pattern at all. Indeed, a double-excellent foundation trust came close to de-authorisation.
Every large, complex organisation can get into trouble. Past success is no guarantee of future performance nor is it necessarily even a good predictor. That is why we argue that the oversight of foundation trusts by Monitor should continue and its intervention powers should remain. We have long argued for shifting the balance of power and we fully support the idea of earned autonomy with the regulator as an independent judge. But if it is earned it can also be taken back. We shall see what transpires when one foundation trust is obviously unable to present a viable business plan. What will happen to its future?
Monitor has to continue in the role we gave it as the authoriser of foundation trusts as they earn their limited independence. In recent times, it toned down the role it took as the promoter of foundation trusts and as a trade body as a step too far. We argue that Monitor as a regulator should be neutral not a cheerleader. We can accept the principle that it is wrong to favour any type of organisation for arbitrary or political reasons, as is set out in the operating framework. We do not accept the convoluted and ultimately meaningless formulation contained in the Bill. Monitor should retain its intervention powers. We accept the case for autonomy and community ownership but in the final analysis we see foundation trusts as still part of the NHS and so, in the end, subject to the powers of the Secretary of State.
We accept that the governors should be a strong element in foundation trust governance but, as the Bill accepts, they need support and development in that role. Most foundation trusts will say that governor effectiveness takes at least five years but governors, no matter how effective under normal circumstances, may be completely ineffective in times of overwhelming crisis. It is then that the Secretary of State must have the power to intervene to ensure the overall functioning of the NHS and to protect the interests of patients and their communities. A major change here is that the Bill extends the concept of financial regulation to non-foundation trust providers—that is, the private sector. As I have said before, we can see the logic in that.
I am going to skip ahead and do what I said earlier in the Bill: you do every other page of your brief and see whether anybody notices. We have already had a lot of debates about these issues.
Finally, we come to reservations about the interaction between the licensing regime and the use of standard contracts. Actually, we have also discussed that so I will not ask those questions again. We have recently seen missives from the Department of Health and from Monitor exploring the ideas around regulation. It is slightly amazing that these are all coming out now, as helpful as they may be. The general idea, as we have said before about the Bill, is that you should consult on the legislation, allow Parliament its scrutiny role and then implement it. However, as we know, the Bill exhibits the principle of reverse engineering. When its progress was paused to allow consultation, the Government continued to roll out the implementation and the Bill is catching up with that now. We scrutinise the Bill alongside its implementation and the secondary legislation is written up in the form of documents coming out of the Department of Health.
I turn to our amendments in this group. Amendment 260EC provides that the chair and chief executive of Monitor cannot be the same person, Amendment 260GA provides that Monitor must meet in public and Amendment 267D would apply the mandate to Monitor. We think that Amendment 267D might be improved on and might even be better located in Clause 20 on the mandate itself, but the point of it is to raise the idea that the Secretary of State may be given a greater power of direction of Monitor and ultimately boost its accountability. I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I would like to continue the train of thought started by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, about the specifics relating to Monitor. I shall speak to Amendments 260F, 260G, 260H, 269A, 294BA, 294BB and 294BC.
First, I may not have got Amendments 260F and 260G, relating to the first chief executive of Monitor, completely right, because Monitor is already in existence, but in principle the chief executive of Monitor should surely be appointed by the Secretary of State in the same way in which the chairman and chief executive of the national Commissioning Board are. As we go through this debate, it will become increasingly obvious that Monitor’s role is as important as that of the NHS Commissioning Board, so I would have thought that having an appointments system on all fours with the board would be imperative. Then again, we come to the question of the provision of information to the Secretary of State. Amendment 260H mirrors the powers possessed by the Secretary of State in relation to the NHS Commissioning Board. It seems sensible that that should be in place as well.
Harking back to our debate on competition and the application of EU competition law, we come on to a rather different issue. This is an interesting place for these amendments to be put. In Clause 118 it is the Competition Commission that deals with the determination of methods of setting prices under the national tariff if there is a disagreement—the Competition Commission has that referred to it by Monitor. For all the reasons that we explored in the debate on the first set of amendments today, it is inappropriate, in my view and in the view of many others, for the Competition Commission to be so heavily involved in matters relating to the NHS. Substituting the Secretary of State for the commission seems to be sensible.
The objection is sometimes raised that we need an independent body in order to set the method. That is a fair point but it is an objection to the Secretary of State doing this entirely on his own, whereas an independent panel appointed by the Secretary of State could do the job equally well. That would ensure that there was some arm’s-length relationship with the Secretary of State in these circumstances. It is quite unnecessary for the Competition Commission to do what is going to be an extremely unfamiliar job for it in assessing the methodology of setting the national tariff—far better that others who will become familiar with it should undertake that task as advisers, consultants or whatever to the Secretary of State. All these amendments make good sense.
Lord Clement-Jones
The Minister said that he thought that the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Williams—Amendment 274AB, et cetera—would undermine the role of the Secretary of State and his ability to call Monitor to account. That seems a very far-fetched way to describe an attitude to conflict-resolution. The Secretary of State, particularly under Amendment 274E, is asked to resolve conflict. This is an addition. There is no other way, as far as I can see, of resolving conflict. A key issue, which has also been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, in this debate, has been the multiplicity of roles of Monitor. Therefore, there is a strong need to resolve such conflicts.
I ask the Minister to consider further whether that is really detracting from the Secretary of State's ability to monitor Monitor—in the words of the noble Baroness. We need a mechanism to resolve conflict. Faute de mieux, this seems to be the best one.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I hear what my noble friend says, but the fact is that the amendments he refers to would reduce Monitor’s independence from political interference. We are clear that we do not want political interference in Monitor’s activities. The intent of the amendment is clearly to give the Secretary of State increased accountability for the decisions around Monitor's functions. We believe that Monitor will be an effective regulator and able to deal with conflicts of interest. Clause 63 requires Monitor to resolve conflicts between its functions. If a failure to resolve conflicts between functions was significant, then the Secretary of State already has the power to intervene under Clause 67. Therefore, there is an intervention mechanism but we suggest that it should be triggered only in the circumstances to which I have referred.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Ullswater)
Perhaps I may clarify matters for the Committee. The group that we are now discussing begins with Amendment 265ZA, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, but which she did not move. However, the amendments in the group following that one were called in their place.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, we seem to have skipped a whole group, but for what purpose? I was planning to move Amendment 267ZF. Has there been some discussion between the usual channels?
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
We are on the group beginning with Amendment 265ZA, which was not moved. The next two amendments in the group were also not moved. I then called Amendment 266, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, which he is now addressing.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I think that that is inadvertent. We seem to have missed a whole group of amendments.
Baroness Thornton
Perhaps I may help. I think that the thing to do is to deal with this group of amendments and the noble Lord can then move his amendment. We will then take the group of amendments that we should have been taking out of turn. Am I right in that? I think that that is the best thing to do.
Lord Warner
Is the Committee happy for me to continue? I consider that research evidence as is available, such as that carried out by Dr Zack Cooper at the LSE, shows the benefits of competition and supports the view that competition, when used sensibly, improves services for patients and can indeed save lives. It is perfectly possible to support both competition and integration; they are not mutually incompatible. I shall not pursue the evidence base for my views today. However, I should like to clarify briefly the circumstances in which we should be supporting the use of competition in the NHS in the best interests of patients and why it is important to tackle barriers to entry to the NHS market. It is important to recognise that we already have an NHS market in which many NHS providers do indeed compete for patients against other NHS providers. The Bill does not suddenly inject competition into the NHS but merely tries to impose some better rules and a system for regulating that competition.
There are basically three sets of circumstances in which competition could—not should—be used. The first is that, as a matter of principle, all NHS providers should be subject to market testing periodically. The second is when there is clear provider failure and it seems sensible to test the market to establish the best set of arrangements for replacing the failed incumbent. The third is where there is a set of circumstances when the NHS itself—the commissioners in practice—wish to change significantly the way in which services are provided and it is not apparent that the current incumbents can adjust quickly to the patient’s needs. The first set of circumstances has often caused a great deal of angst in the discussion of competition. I certainly do not start from that position. I believe that it is the second and third areas that I have described where we need to examine whether there are real barriers to entry by new providers, irrespective of whether those providers come from elsewhere in the NHS—from the private sector, social enterprise or the voluntary organisations.
Amendment 266 is concerned to establish much more clearly than now what the barriers to NHS market entry are. We know from the work of the collaboration and competition panel that primary care trusts have behaved in anti-competitive ways and have frustrated the best interests of patients. We know from the experience of the East Surrey nurses when they tried to set up a social enterprise how frustrated they were at changing themselves from NHS employees into a social enterprise so that they could compete for NHS business. We know that across the voluntary sector, voluntary organisations have been frustrated over their attempts to compete for NHS services over a long period of time. We also know that many private providers of services find the tendering processes for providing NHS services prolonged and excessively expensive and that they are too often frustrated by shifting political opinions about the desirability of competition.
I could go on with examples of the way in which the NHS has effectively shut the door to new entrants. Some of the most recent examples are the ways in which many primary care trusts divested themselves of their provider services without any proper system of market testing when it was clear that many of those services were extremely inefficient. We need to take the NHS out of its comfort zone in a future where it faces a huge set of demographic and financial challenges. Keeping it in the NHS family is no longer acceptable or in the public interest. We need an independent, authoritative and robust analysis of the barriers to entry to the NHS market so that we can consider what action should be taken to remove those barriers. Amendment 266 proposes that Monitor does this within a year of Royal Assent. I believe that Monitor would welcome being given this assignment but I would be more than willing to consider alternatives if the Government thought, for example, that the Office of Fair Trading was a more appropriate organisation to do the job. It is important that we get this job done as speedily as possible. I also support Amendments 278 and 287 to which the noble Lord, Lord Patel, will be speaking and to which I have added my name.
Baroness Williams of Crosby
My Lords, I am very grateful that Amendment 265C has somehow managed to escape from the tsunami of amendments so that I can bring it to the Committee’s attention very briefly. It is again an amendment that seeks to make sure that when competition is allowed or encouraged—the noble Lord, Lord Warner, has spoken on these lines himself—it should be because it clearly improves the quality of health and the quality of provision within society as a whole. The purpose of Amendment 265C is to make it clear that competition is welcome when it improves the quality of the service; it narrows inequalities; it ensures, in particular, that there should be a better outcome as a result of that competition; and it is, therefore, a relatively qualifying condition to permitting competition to flourish.
We have heard a number of very well informed speeches in the House, not least from the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, to the effect that in some situations competition can clearly encourage innovation, can improve new approaches and can help in providing the NHS a way forward to deal with the huge problems that we all recognise exist. However, in large part we are also very worried about the idea of competition as the ruling principle of the health services in this country, and we heard a very moving set of evidence from the noble Lord, Lord Owen, and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, about the devastation that unrestrained competition can exercise on a health service.
However, having spent 10 years of my life in the United States, I absolutely corroborate that. I know far too many people, one or two of whom are National Health Service refugees to this country, of outstanding talent, who are not in a category where they can afford the huge prices that are charged for complex and chronic conditions in the United States. How do we achieve this difficult balance so as to have competition that improves the quality of the health service but does not bring about the devastation of a great many human beings because they simply cannot afford the cost of complex operations or looking after the chronically ill? The situation of the chronically ill in the United States is pathetic in very many cases.
Therefore, this amendment and several others in this group would enable us to walk this delicate line in a way that permits competition, but competition that is in the interests of the patients of the health service and not competition that could devastate the health service itself.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendment 287B. In his speech at the outset of today’s debate, the Minister said that there were four areas where he was considering amendments to Part 3, which deals with Monitor. If memory serves, he said there were areas where the Bill had not been completely amended to conform to the Future Forum report. This is a particular example of that.
Clause 96, the supplementary conditions, says it is possible for Monitor to include conditions that require,
“the licence holder to do, or not to do, specified things or things of a specified description … within such period as may be specified in order to prevent anti-competitive behaviour in the provision of health care services for the purposes of the NHS”.
Of course, that mirrors the duties of Monitor as set out in Clause 59, which says:
“Monitor must exercise its functions with a view to preventing anti-competitive behaviour”—
so far, so good. However, Monitor also has a duty to,
“exercise its functions with a view to enabling health care services provided for the purposes of the NHS to be provided in an integrated way where it considers that this would”
improve quality and so on. There is no mirror of that particular duty in the supplementary conditions in Clause 96, which is why this amendment adds the following wording:
“or for the purposes of encouraging the integration of services in the interest of people who use such services”.
A number of other examples are the subjects of amendments as well and will no doubt come up in the course of the Bill. It seems to me that the equal and opposite to the anti-competitive duty of Monitor, which is enshrined in the ability to set conditions and so on, is not mirrored in the integration of services, and this is an extremely good example of that. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to indicate that it is simply an oversight and it should be included in the Bill.
Lord Clement-Jones
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I am sure that this was well worth waiting for, but it could be the mouse that roared. We are back to other aspects of Clause 59 on the general duties of Monitor. This amendment and Amendment 267ZB simply aim to ensure that to discharge its functions Monitor has input from HealthWatch England. That is all about patient and public involvement. It seems to me and to my noble friends that Monitor should definitely insert such input into its deliberations. I cannot find in the rest of the Bill any other such duty on HealthWatch England, which after all will have an extraordinarily important role. Many noble Lords have welcomed the new enhanced role for patient and public involvement. I remember the demise of community health councils and the hard-fought debate that took place in about 2004—I cannot remember exactly when—and I very much welcome the new enhanced role for HealthWatch England. However, Monitor will need to be informed by it and I very much hope that the Government will take this on board. I beg to move.
Baroness Murphy
I realise that I have another amendment in this group, and I would have saved the Committee a great deal of disquiet over the numbers if I had spoken to this one in the first place, so my apologies all round. This group of amendments is about how Monitor discharges its functions and what it takes into account. Mine is a probing amendment on whether we have the objectives for Monitor and their number right. Experience from other sectors suggests that if too many policy priorities are set, the regulator can become confused about its primary objectives, which can reduce its effectiveness. I wonder whether we have the clarity of Monitor’s objectives right.
Monitor will find itself in the position of other regulators in having to devise policies, particularly on the tariff, to meet a wide range of objectives over and above its primary duties. The experience of Ofgem, in particular, suggests that the risk might grow over time as the Government seek solutions for new problems as and when they arise. Setting too many policy priorities carries the risk of confusing the regulator about its primary objectives. That might be inevitable, given the complexity of healthcare policy-making, but it means that the accountability of the regulator in discharging those various functions is critical.
For other major economic regulators, the Government have committed themselves to updating the objectives only once in a Parliament and ensuring that objectives are outcome-focused. Monitor's objectives, unusually, will be set in primary legislation. I wonder whether they would be better in secondary guidance, together with a clear process for agreeing changes with the Department of Health, to protect the regulator from political whim. Nevertheless, it has a number of primary duties in Clause 59. In Clause 62 it has to have regard to a number of other matters. Monitor might find it difficult to demonstrate that they are all taken into account when decisions are made, possibly making it open to legal challenge. I wonder whether it is possible to reduce the number of duties.
I have included just one or two as exemplars simply because I think that they duplicate existing duties. In Clause 62(b),
“the desirability of securing continuous improvement in the quality of health care services for the purpose of the NHS”,
which is crucial, duplicates a primary duty in Clause 59(1)(b), so I think it could be removed. Clause 62(c), on,
“the desirability of securing continuous improvement in the efficiency with which health care services are provided for the purposes of the NHS”,
duplicates a duty under Clause 59(1)(a). Surely that could be removed. These are minor, tidying amendments, but if we can clarify for Monitor what its objectives should be, that would be a help to the regulator.
Baroness Northover
I seem to have been inspired. We do not need primary legislation, it seems, we need regulations subject to the affirmative procedure. However, we are consulting on the best approach to using these. I am sure that that informs the noble Lord far better than my earlier answer, but I return to the point that it is extremely important that we get this right, because we certainly do not want to find ourselves in a situation where things are not as well protected as they were in this last instance.
I will now briefly address government Amendment 270A, which is a minor and technical amendment that makes clear that Monitor is concerned with services provided for the purposes of the NHS. On that basis, I hope that noble Lords will be happy to support it and content to withdraw their own amendments.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, this is a slightly disparate group of amendments so I will certainly not try to respond on any other amendments apart from my own.
I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for signposting where patient and public involvement come in, in Clause 59(7) and Clause 178, and her explanation that my amendment would “constrain Monitor’s flexibility”. I am always interested in the kinds of response that the department is able to come up with in these circumstances. After all, HealthWatch and the local healthwatch organisations are the creatures of this Bill and of the department, so it seems somewhat extraordinary that these are not specifically mentioned in Clause 59(7). I understand that in broad terms Monitor has the duty to,
“secure that people who use healthcare services, and other members of the public, are involved to an appropriate degree”—
that is a useful word as well—
“in decisions that Monitor makes about the exercise of its functions”.
However, of course, “appropriate” is determined by Monitor. It is not an objective test in those circumstances.
Baroness Northover
I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend, but perhaps I did not make it clear enough that Clause 178 of the Bill allows HealthWatch England to give Monitor advice and provides that Monitor must respond to that.
Lord Clement-Jones
Yes, my Lords, absolutely. I read that with great interest following my noble friend’s speech. However, of course it is still liable to be one-way traffic in terms of healthcare, HealthWatch being the demandeur, rather than being asked by Monitor to provide its advice at the very early stage. So it is not always possible for HealthWatch to know what is in train within the bowels of Monitor, if I may say so, and it will be up to HealthWatch to be extremely nimble in order to divine what is happening within the councils of Monitor, if I may put it that way.
I therefore take the Minister’s reply to be a rather less than whole-hearted endorsement of the role of HealthWatch. That may not be the right interpretation, but it seems a bit strange to be a bit mealy mouthed about HealthWatch when it is actually being created by this Bill. However, I will wait as matters unfold. No doubt we will get to Clause 178 in due course, and I look forward to it. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, Monitor has a range of duties which could potentially conflict with each other. Of course, we have discussed that previously, and it is recognised in Clause 63 of the Bill.
In specialised care, it is sometimes desirable to limit the number of providers to ensure that patient volumes are sufficient to support clinical expertise and high quality, safe services, an approach which was promoted by the Bristol inquiry and enshrined in the Carter report on specialised commissioning in 2006. This is entirely consistent with Monitor’s main duty under Clause 59(1), to
“protect and promote the interests of people who use health care services by promoting provision of health care services which is economic, efficient and effective, and maintains or improves the quality of the services”.
However, in terms of one of Monitor’s duties under Clause 59(3), to prevent anti-competitive behaviour, this could potentially be described as a restriction of competition. It is therefore important, I believe, to get a clear understanding that Monitor’s paramount duty should be towards the safety of patients, or, to put this another way, towards their welfare. In other words, it is legitimate for competition to be restricted in the NHS where it is in the interests of patient safety.
This amendment is designed to seek clarification that Monitor’s role in preventing anti-competitive behaviour will not debar the designation of providers of specialised services. I beg to move.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I have an amendment in this group which really builds on the amendment already spoken to comprehensively and efficiently by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones—that is, to not impose a burden on providers in the process.
One of the difficulties in any type of regulation or inspection is that it is very easy for those who are doing the inspection to require more and more data from a provider to support whatever they view as their outcome and their inspection processes. There is a real danger in here that sometimes the regulatory processes can develop a life of their own, and, quite inadvertently, become a burden on providers. We have already seen that occur with some of the current inspection processes in place, which seem to have collected an inordinate amount of data sometimes, but have missed out on real deficits in care.
It is a paramount duty towards the safety of people who use healthcare services, and built into that of course will be good clinical outcomes, because bad clinical outcomes will be unsafe in the process. However, it is also a suggestion—and this is therefore a probing amendment—that the regulatory burden on the providers must not be excessive. They must be able to deliver patient care without diverting resources away from it in order to meet requirements from a regulator.
Earl Howe
I refer the noble Lord to the remarks I made earlier. The provisions are partly transitional and partly not. It depends on which functions we are looking at.
I come back to the point I was making on the amendment tabled in the name of my noble friend. This provision says that in preventing anti-competitive behaviour that is against patients’ interests or in setting prices, Monitor must ignore the transitional functions it has as the regulator of foundation trusts. If the subsection were left out as the amendment proposes—although I know that it is only a probing amendment—when undertaking its anti-competitive behaviour or pricing functions, Monitor could also consider its transitional intervention powers. That could result in Monitor treating struggling foundation trusts preferentially by, for example, not subjecting them to its anti-competitive powers. I hope that that is helpful to my noble friend.
My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones spoke about the designation of specialist centres and expressed his view that that should not conflict with the prohibitions on anti-competitive behaviour and that, in essence, patients’ interests have to be paramount. I am with him on this and I would like to reassure him that patients’ interests would be the paramount consideration for Monitor in resolving conflicts that arise in the exercise of its functions in this way. Monitor need not take issue with decisions to designate specialist centres where this would improve quality and protect patient safety, even if it reduced competition.
I hope that those remarks are helpful and that my noble friend will feel content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that reply, which I have found very helpful. It was robust in one sense and has set out a robust framework in another. Although I was also interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, had to say, in that it would tie us all in knots, I think that the Minister’s exposition was clear in that it has set out a suitable conflict framework. Although I cannot speak for my noble friend Lady Williams, I thought that the Minister explained the necessity for Clause 63(3) very well. His reassurance on the aspect of patients’ interests was extremely helpful as well, although of course it does not mean that the spectre of EU competition law does not still haunt us somewhat and that it will continue to be the subject of discussion, perhaps outside this Chamber. After all, that could override everything else if we are not careful.
I took considerable comfort from the Minister’s undertaking to review Clause 62 as well, because that is quite a shopping list. If it could be clarified, that would be helpful. His general undertaking to the Committee on the conflict area was also very helpful. In the circumstances, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I want to make a brief comment in response to the Minister’s reply to my amendment in the group, Amendment 274ZAA. He said that he was minded to rationalise the items in Clause 63 and therefore I feel that I must put in a formal plea that research, education and training should not be deleted from the list in the process of rationalisation. Having said that, I shall not press my amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, we have gone on rather far. Amendment 276 has not been moved, but that amendment marked the beginning of a group which includes two amendments of mine. In that case, I shall move them when we come to them.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 292ZA, the question that Clauses 119 and 120 stand part, and Amendment 294M. I shall principally speak to Amendment 292ZA, which is designed to make sure that the national tariff recognises the varying costs associated with people who have experienced homelessness or have complex needs in respect of the full range of healthcare services.
The Bill commits Monitor to publishing a national tariff for services which are or may be provided for the purposes of the NHS. Within this, the Bill makes provision for this tariff to be varied to reflect certain circumstances in which it is provided. However, homeless charities believe that the Bill needs to go further and make provision for tariffs to be varied to reflect the level of complexity and disadvantage experienced by certain patient groups. People who have complex health needs can cost more to treat. Unless the tariff structure reflects this, there is a real danger that services will not wish to treat those patients for whom health outcomes can be harder to achieve—such as homeless people.
Why should this not be reflected in the Bill? There is evidence that health services can already be reluctant to work with homeless people because of the higher costs of treating them. Unless the higher costs of treating some patient groups are taken into account, there is a real danger that the new tariff system may discriminate against homeless people and others with complex needs. In the long term, this will also incur a far higher cost to the NHS and other public services. Failure to treat disadvantaged patients at a primary care level can result in higher rates of hospital admissions, greater demands on acute care and the wider costs of ongoing poor health such as worklessness.
Homeless people have some of the poorest health in our communities. People experiencing acute disadvantage can have complex health needs. As the Department of Health’s Inclusion Health report stated, in order to meet the complex health needs of socially excluded groups, we need,
“a sophisticated, coordinated and flexible response from services. The costs of failure are great not only to the individual life chances of socially excluded clients, but also to the taxpayer, services and the communities who pick up the pieces”.
Unfortunately, many mainstream services do not offer this and as a result are not accessible to disadvantaged patient groups.
Currently, some specialist homeless or vulnerable person’s health services have negotiated their own tariff system so that they are not unduly penalised for treating complex patients. However, this can be difficult to negotiate and such services are not widespread. Unless there is provision for this and the new tariff system takes the wider factors that affect disadvantaged patients into account, services may be disincentivised from treating them. This will lead to poorer health outcomes and make it harder for the NHS to achieve a reduction in health inequalities.
My amendment builds on the commitment to improve the health of the poorest the fastest. The intention to reduce health inequalities through the reform of the NHS has been embedded in the reform process from the first White Paper in 2010. It was revisited by the NHS Future Forum, which flagged up a number of concerns about incentives against cherry-picking at the expense of more complex and expensive patients. In their response, the Government said that services,
“will be covered by a system of prices that accurately reflect clinical complexity”.
My amendment would help to achieve that.
Amendment 292ZB is simply designed to make sure that when Monitor sets prices, and consults on whether to vary prices, it takes into account its duty to promote integration. That is the reason for the reference to Section 13M of the National Health Service Act 2006 and clinical commissioning groups’ duties under Section 14Y of that Act.
On the question that Clauses 119 and 120 stand part, these were referred to in my speech at the beginning of the day—that now seems a long way away. This relates to the reference to the Competition Commission under Clauses 119 and 120. This is also to do with the reference to the method of reaching a price under the national tariff. The Minister dealt earlier with the issue of why an independent body had been chosen for that purpose but it could equally well be the OFT, which I believe would be less provocative and probably more apposite. That was certainly the view of my noble friend Lady Williams when she spoke to her amendment, and I very much hope that the Minister and the department will revisit that issue and see whether it is possible for the OFT to be the body that actually looks at the method of setting tariffs in those circumstances where there is disagreement. That would be a lot less provocative and less liable to introduce EU competition law, along with all the other matters that are involved.
I do not currently have Amendment 294M to hand, sadly, but no doubt I will shortly if I keep talking for slightly longer. It ensures that all providers licensed under chapter 3 and operating in relevant clinical commissioning groups are paid the same price for the provision of services. This is designed entirely to make sure that there is a level playing field within clinical commissioning groups’ areas. I hope that it is the intention in the setting of national tariffs that they will be uniform and there will be no difference in tariff paid by one provider versus another within the same CCG area. With that, I think that I have completed all the amendments that I intended to speak to.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I am tempted to say, “Follow that”; I certainly cannot. The reason why my Amendment 294BZA in this group is a probing amendment is that the wording in Clause 117(1)(a) talks about the,
“differences in the costs incurred in providing health care services for the purposes of the NHS to persons of different descriptions”.
It seemed to be extremely elegant and important to have in the Bill a recognition of the wide variation in both physiology and pathology that different people will present with and that that should determine the tariff itself, not simply be part of the consultation.
I hope that the Minister will be able to provide some assurance that findings from the consultation may indeed provide the range. Is it correct that additional support to secure continued access to services could come through commissioners and providers or, if they cannot reach agreement, for providers alone to be able to apply to Monitor for a modification of the price determined in accordance with the national tariff? Is it correct that Monitor would have the ability to approve and/or set the level of the modification under certain circumstances, using a methodology agreed between Monitor and the NHS Commissioning Board, if a provider could not, at the tariff price, cover its cost with an efficient service? One of the difficulties that keep emerging as we discuss tariffs is the complexity of applying them in the enormously wide variety of clinical situations that will be dealt with across the whole of the health services.
Health and Social Care Bill
Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts(14 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Clement-Jones
“( ) The cases referred to in subsections (2) and (3) shall be (in so far they would not otherwise be) “relevant merger situations” for the purposes of Part 3 of the Enterprise Act 2002.”
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 278H. This is somewhat of a continuation of the debate that we had at the very beginning of the day, and comes back again to the application of EU competition law. However, it also has merit as an amendment which has its own rationale quite apart from avoiding the full rigour of EU competition law.
Under Part 3 of the Enterprise Act, which Clause 75 of the Bill applies to NHS foundation trusts, mergers are normally looked at by the OFT and the Competition Commission. They consider whether the merger would result in anticompetitive outcomes, governed by Sections 35 and 36 of the Act. However, the Secretary of State can intervene under Section 42 of the Act, where he considers that there is one or more relevant public interest consideration specified under Section 58 of the Act. Such considerations are then taken into account in deciding whether the merger should go ahead, even if there are no anticompetitive outcomes.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I thank the Minister for a totally convincing response. The trouble is that it was a response to an amendment that I did not put, although I could have. The amendment which was responded to would have eliminated the OFT from consideration of FT mergers. My amendment was about inserting an additional ground for consideration by the OFT or the Competition Commission, if it went as far as that, so that the public interest was taken into account, as it is in bank mergers nowadays.
I thought that the Minister’s arguments about why the OFT should be involved were wholly convincing—eliminating double jeopardy with the Co-operation and Competition Panel, providing confidence to providers and so on. Mergers are a specialist area. I am sure that the OFT is great at merger consideration. I deliberately did not put down an amendment about the OFT being eliminated from FT mergers—that was the House of Commons amendment to which I referred in the course of my speech.
The noble Baroness’s assertion that the OFT could ensure that patients’ best interests are looked after is precisely my concern. If ordinary merger principles are followed in terms of the OFT looking at the merging of two foundation trusts, I do not believe that it is in law able to take a very close view of what genuinely is in the public interest in terms of provision of a comprehensive National Health Service. I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Owen, thought that that was ingenious. Certainly, it seemed to be the logical way to try to get some sense into these foundation trust mergers. Therefore, I very much hope that—
Baroness Northover
I do not wish to interrupt my noble friend’s flow. If I have not covered all the areas that he wished to flag up, I will indeed write. However, I made the point that the OFT needed to consider the benefits and the negative sides of mergers in terms of how they would impact on patients. I hope that my noble friend was satisfied at least on that point, even if the leapfrogging and slipping of various amendments from the agenda this evening has tripped me up at this late hour.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, we could all be tripped up at this late hour, as, indeed, I was earlier. However, it is a question of what it is possible for the body that is judging the merits of a merger in competition terms to take into account. The reason for including the public interest considerations in the amendment was that the OFT would be extremely limited in the patient considerations that it would be able to take into account. The noble Baroness was pretty sanguine about that. There is still further work to be done in that respect and further consideration needs to be given to the matter. It seems to me that, if nothing else, the question of whether one’s local trust and local foundation hospital will survive as entities is of huge importance to local people and is something that needs to be judged properly with their benefit in mind when the time comes.
Unless I divine that my noble friend is going to give me further guidance or inspiration, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Health and Social Care Bill
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Lord Pannick
My Lords, I understand the wish of the Government to appeal against the decision of the commissioner because of the general issues of importance raised under the freedom of information legislation, but the issue raised today by the amendment does not depend on the proper answer to the question that was before the commissioner and which will be before the tribunal. That is because the issue before the commissioner and the tribunal was the proper balance of interests—a very difficult balance of interests, as the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, has said—between the public interest in having this information and the very real need to ensure that risk registers in general are not disclosed. But the issue before the House is different. It is the issue of whether the Members of this House should be given information that the commissioner in his judgment, having seen that information, has said will be of considerable importance in enabling the Members of this House to perform our scrutiny function in relation to this vital Bill.
I cannot share the opinion of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, that this is the same issue as will be before the commissioner. It is a matter for the judgment of this House how best we perform our scrutiny function. Whatever the balance may be, in general, between the public interest in disclosure and the very real interest in not disclosing confidential information that is on a risk register, the balance is surely very different in principle when we have before the House a Bill that we are scrutinising and considering. It would, I think, require an overwhelmingly strong argument to justify non-disclosure to this House of information that is relevant to our scrutiny function. I therefore hope that the Minister will be able to say today that he is prepared to disclose to this House at least the substance of the information that is contained in the risk register, so that we may fully perform our scrutiny function in relation to this vital Bill.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I am very interested in the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. He seemed to be setting a rather different standard, well above that imposed by the Freedom of Information Act 2000. I have no doubt that the Minister will deal with that argument when he comes to it. However, I believe that the question for the House today is whether we support the Department of Health’s right to appeal against the Information Commissioner’s decision. This has been a much more finely balanced decision than I believe the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, is prepared to credit, which I find somewhat surprising given her recent role in government. In this kind of situation, with a qualified exemption under the Freedom of Information Act, it is all about whether the balance of public interest is served by disclosure or non-disclosure. The arguments put forward to the commissioner were in relation to two essential aspects. First, there is the “safe space” argument: the importance of government having the freedom to debate policy and make decisions,
“without being hindered by external comment”.
Secondly, there is the “chilling effect” that disclosing information relating to a particular policy, while that policy is still being formulated or developed, could have on,
“the frankness and candour with which relevant parties make future contributions to that particular policy debate”.
These are perfectly respectable arguments and that is why the commissioner found that the factors are finely balanced, as my noble friend Lady Williams said. In the light of the particularly strongly held views of the department—and I believe that these are genuinely held—it seems that it is entirely valid for the department to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.
However, I agree very strongly with my noble friend that time is of the essence in this case. There is little point on a decision on appeal not being made until March or April; because, as my noble friend has pointed out, the Bill will probably have passed through this House entirely by then. To mitigate the possibility of that kind of delay, my noble friend’s suggestion is entirely right and sensible. The Department of Health and the complainants should apply to the First-tier Tribunal for an expedited hearing. This is well within the tribunal’s case-management powers under paragraph 5 of the procedural rules, which were last set out in 2009. Of course, this is a discretionary power, but I believe that any tribunal would recognise the need to resolve these matters quickly, particularly in the light of the debates we have had in this House. I believe it would be extremely helpful in the circumstances if the Minister indicated the department’s willingness to proceed along these lines. I hope that my noble friend can give a positive response today, even if further time is needed to prepare the case on both sides.
Lord Turnbull
My Lords, I was not involved in the earlier exchanges in this House on this issue. Coming to it new, my view is that first, there is a very important issue of public policy here; and secondly, the FOI process, still less the procedural devices in the course of this Bill, is not an effective way of resolving the issue.
The issue is this: in what way should public authorities report on risk ex ante and account for their management of it ex post? A ruling on a request for a specific document from a specific department is, in my view, incapable of addressing that issue adequately.
Let me declare an interest: I am a director of Prudential plc. This, in the jargon, is a SIFI—a significant financial institution—and, as such, it is now required to have a separate risk committee. In the rest of the plc world, risk is still dealt with as the work of the audit committee. I am a member of that risk committee. Looking at its experience, one can identify three categories of material. First, there is a definition in the annual report of the risk universe and the organisation’s risk appetite: capital risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, operational risk, and so on. In addition there is a definition of the organisation’s appetite for risk.
Secondly, the annual report has material on how risk is managed—the so-called three lines of defence: front-line managers, the risk function at the centre, and internal audit. There is then a third category of information. It might be about the risk of falling below a particular level of capital, or the danger of not finding enough liquidity at a crucial time, or the danger that the key supplier might fail or that IT systems might be interrupted. There are also watch lists: what banks or counterparties does one not want to increase one’s exposure to? This is often set out in the diagrams with which many Members of this House will be familiar, in red, amber and green, showing impact, likelihood, a combined score and then the mitigants.
Very little of this category of information is disclosed, for a very good reason. Discussing it can risk making it more difficult to manage the case in question and in some circumstances might crystallise the very event one is trying to avoid. The same should apply to public bodies. Mention has been made of the chilling effect—that is, officials being reluctant to give candid advice more or less in real time. There is also something that has not really been covered by the Act, which I call the “crystallisation effect”. Managers might be reluctant to be frank in public about operational difficulties if that would undermine their ability to make contingency plans or could trigger an event before their plans are ready.
In my view this is the wrong way to resolve this issue. Where the line should be drawn, what is reported and what is withheld should not be decided on a case-by-case basis. The Information Commissioner—indeed, the whole of the FOI Act, in my opinion—is afflicted by the fallacy of composition. Because something is desirable in case A, it will also be desirable in all cases, if all cases alike are treated in the same way. However, if I stand up to get a better view of a football match, I will improve my view; if we all stand up, none of us will. The fact that one cannot take cases in isolation is perfectly illustrated in this case. The Information Commissioner issued a decision on 2 December on a request from the risk register on the NHS reform programme. Yet only the day before, he issued a decision on a different request, I think from a different complainant, on the strategic risk register. It is fanciful to think that those things could be decided independently or that they could be isolated from what happens in the rest of the public sector.
How, therefore, should this issue be dealt with? Not, as I say, by requiring the release of a particular document originally written for a different audience. It would be better if the Information Commissioner had recommended that the Government should set in hand work involving the man known as HOTGAS—the head of the Government accountancy services—and the NAO, to create a framework of best practice on what should be provided in departmental reports, and what operationally should be withheld. It is normally the case that public accounting standards in the private sector have developed over time and the public sectors usually follow with a lag. The reporting of risk and of risk management is in my view the next area for improvement in the public sector accounts, and the role of the CAG should then be to police whether those principles are being followed. In the case of this Bill, I hope that the Minister can be as forthcoming as possible on what the risks are without creating any of the perils that I have indicated.
The Information Commissioner has made a decision so it goes to the tribunal, and the Government’s case would be greatly improved if they were able to indicate that they supported the kind of initiative that I have suggested. Meanwhile, I hope that the noble Baroness, in the light of any assurances and further information from the Minister, will not press her amendment, but if she does I hope that the House will support the Government, on the understanding that the reporting of risk is the next issue to be advanced across public bodies as a whole.
Health and Social Care Bill
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Lord Warner
My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendments 124, 125, 126 and 196, which are in my name in this group. These amendments are on slightly different aspects of patient involvement and patient choice in new Sections 13H and 13I in Clause 20.
Amendment 124 adds words to the duty under new Section 13H to promote the involvement of each patient. Nothing seems more likely to promote that involvement than ensuring that patients have easy access to their own medical records and, even better, hold their own medical records. The amendment puts those matters in the Bill as part of the duty of promoting patient involvement in decisions about their treatment and care. If patients are to be involved in decision-making, it is important that they can be confident about the information about them that is being held by clinicians and used by those clinicians in making decisions about them. We have moved a long way from a position in which doctors could say, “Trust me, I’m a doctor”. That is not to say that patients do not place a lot of trust in doctors, but the more examples of systems failure that patients hear about, the more I suspect they will want to be sure about what the system has on record about them. This is particularly true when we are dealing with end-of-life issues. Some of us are very keen to ensure that doctors and nurses observe our advance decisions in living wills that are placed in medical records rather than just make decisions on our behalf.
Amendment 125 literally follows on from Amendment 124 and reflects a number of conversations that several of us have had with National Voices, which speaks on behalf of many charities, especially those representing people with long-term conditions. National Voices, with assistance from the Health Foundation, has drawn on a lot of work to distil what it believes service-users expect from those commissioning care. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, referred to the work being done by the Health Foundation. This work with National Voices was born from the huge frustration of patients, service-users and carers about the way that they are often treated by those providing services. National Voices has also set out the results of this work in an excellent document called Principles of Integrated Care. Many Members of this Committee may well have a copy of it. If the Minister has not seen it, I commend it to him. I am certain that it has been sent to Sir David Nicholson. Around 50 chief executives or chairs of voluntary organisations involved with National Voices signed a letter to him, commending this piece of work.
Amendment 125 tries to ensure that there is a clear obligation on clinical commissioning groups to pay heed to patients’ and service-users’ voices in their commissioning of services and that the board issues guidance in this area to clinical commissioning groups. I hope that today the Minister will at least take away this amendment, discuss it in detail with National Voices and those of us who are involved in this area, and agree a version that can be included in the Bill and with which everyone is content. Of course, if he wishes to say “Snap!” to these words, we will be delighted. I emphasise that Amendment 125 does not come from the fertile minds of people in this Committee. It comes from the experience and views of many thousands of people with long-term conditions whose representatives have discussed and researched this very thoroughly within the ambit of the Health Foundation and National Voices.
Amendment 126 is on a different topic altogether. It tries to sharpen the duty of patient choice in new Section 13I in Clause 20, which in my view is pitifully vague. When they are exercising choice, people need to know what the speed of access to diagnosis and treatment is; where the location options and alternative providers of service are; and some information on the different levels of performance by those providers. Choice cannot be exercised in a vacuum. If people are to exercise meaningful choice, they need information that they can draw on to make their decisions about what is best for them. They should not simply be guided to local incumbents, which is too often the case in the system as it works now. Very often, those local incumbents may not be the best option for the patient seeking services for their particular condition at a particular time in their life.
I speak with some confidence on this, having spent two years as a Health Minister trying to advance the cause of patient choice. I have had a fair exposure to clinical views about patients not wanting it and just wanting a good local hospital. I have seen at close quarters commissioners in excessively close relationships with local providers. I have heard the voices of patients frustrated at being denied the information they need to exercise choice. I have experienced, at first hand, consultants declining to place their consultation slots on the Choose and Book system. I know that we need much more than the vague wording of new Section 131 in Clause 20 of the Bill. I hope that the Minister, who I know to be a strong advocate of patient choice, will throw away his brief and say yes, we do need more specific wording of the kind in Amendment 126.
I hope the Minister will do likewise in respect of Amendment 196, which applies the same increased precision to the duty as to patient choice and places it on clinical commissioning groups as well as the board. I will not go over the arguments again, as they are exactly the same as those I have deployed on Amendment 126. It is even more important to disturb the cosiness of provider incumbency when we come to clinical commissioning groups. I have added a little piquancy to the clinical commissioning groups amendment by a specific reference to end-of-life care, where we badly need more options for people to choose from if their preferences are to be delivered.
I have spoken for too long already, but I also wish to add my support to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, to which I have added my name.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 127B and 197B. As they relate to pharmacy, I declare an interest as the chairman of the Council of the School of Pharmacy, University of London. The intention of these amendments is to ensure that all relevant healthcare providers, including community pharmacists, are consulted when the NHS Commissioning Board and commissioning groups are discharging their functions and developing their business and communications plans. The essence of these amendments is to retain the long-standing arrangement whereby, under the 2006 Act, commissioning bodies have to consult widely and in good time with all relevant stakeholders, including local service providers or their representatives.
Under the current system, primary care trusts are required to consult widely in relation to their commissioning duties. There is concern in the pharmacy profession that the current provisions under Clause 20, new Section 13J, for the board, and Clause 23, new Section 14V, for clinical commissioning groups, to obtain appropriate advice are too vague. It is important that consultation with all local healthcare providers should be done via local representative bodies as well as directly with providers. Clinical commissioning groups should consult pharmacy professionals when making decisions in relation to the commissioning of relevant services in order that the professional skills, knowledge and expertise of pharmacists are used in planning, commissioning, delivering and evaluating NHS services. They should also demonstrate arrangements systematically to seek the views of all appropriate local clinical groups throughout the commissioning process, in general and for particular services. This would include ensuring that all local representative committees are fully engaged in the commissioning process and signed up to the outcomes agreed.
As part of their local leadership role, clinical commissioning groups also need open and transparent processes for reconciling different professional perspectives and contingency arrangements for seeking the agreement of non-GP professional groups in the case of urgent service change. These processes should be clearly set out as part of the CCG’s governance procedures for commissioning decision-making. The above will be of particular importance in the immediate term, given the influx of new commissioners into the market, to ensure commissioners commission services effectively. Without relevant healthcare providers being consulted, the different contributions that such providers, including pharmacy, can make to local healthcare could be lost.
If used effectively, pharmacy has the potential to deliver a great deal more both to patients and commissioners. For example, it is estimated that some 57 million GP consultations each year involve minor ailments which could be dealt with at a pharmacy. If these patients could be moved to a pharmacy, more than £812 million could be saved annually, and GP capacity could be freed up to deal with more complex cases.
In summary, it is critical that there is a duty on commissioning groups, when developing their commissioning plans, to consult primary care providers such as pharmacists as there is a danger under the proposed legislation that some groups may not do so, leading to ineffective commissioning of services. At the Royal Pharmaceutical Society Conference in September, the Minister said that pharmacists are pivotal to every aspect of the Government’s plans to modernise the NHS. I find those words very encouraging and hope that he can give further encouragement in the course of this debate.
Lord Patel
My Lords, I support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Warner, on patients holding their own records. Speaking from personal experience, I know that it was not uncommon in maternity services years and years ago for patients to be given their old, shared maternity card. The difference was that that card was extra to the actual notes, so what doctors and midwives wrote in those cards was probably an abbreviation.
For 25 years of my life, I allowed patients to carry their complete set of records, thus avoiding having to write another card. That meant that what you wrote and what you told the patient had to be precise, and clear thought had to be given to the purpose of writing it down. It also taught people not to use abbreviations that do not mean anything, or that might be misconstrued. It is not uncommon for doctors to use abbreviations such as SOB or NAD. They do not mean what you think they might mean. SOB stands for “Shortness of breath”, and NAD stands for “No abnormality discovered”. This also meant that when you were putting the results of diagnostic tests into the notes you were forced to explain to the patient what those results meant. If the results were ambiguous, then you had to explain to the patient what that ambiguity was. That improved the quality of record keeping, communication with the patient and the quality of care given to the patient. In 25 years of allowing thousands of my patients to carry their own notes—and some of the noble Lords sitting today are well aware of my habits—I lost only two notes. One was eaten by a dog in the patient’s house and the other was torn up after being left by the mother-to-be on a bus. Apart from that, there was no loss of notes, while in hospitals usually you can hardly find any notes.
There is a double issue here. How do we make notes that are compatible—easy to write and yet which communicate with the patient. An electronic version is better, but even a hand-written version works. I am convinced that allowing patients to carry notes is not a problem.
Health and Social Care Bill
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Baroness Thornton
My Lords, I wonder if I might speak to both of the amendments that are down in the name of my noble friend, but also to take a step back from the very competent and skilled amendments and presentations by my noble friend Lord Warner and the noble Lord, Lord Patel. All these amendments also reveal what might be called a profound lack of agreement about what “integration” actually is. It seemed to me that at this point it might be useful to go and scope what people think integration means, and then perhaps ask the Minister to say which of these meanings he prefers, or which he would like to use. For example, the Royal College of Nursing is extremely worried that the combination of a maximum tariff and any qualified provider means that delivering integrated services will become increasingly difficult.
The NHS Confederation confirmed that the definitions of “integration” and “integrated care” to be used by Monitor,
“will allow different kinds of integration. For example: bringing together specialist services like trauma at one site, or integrating a person’s health and social care into one package, or offering a ‘package’ of care across a large population”.
However, it also goes on to say that:
“Though extending the tariff is the best way to ensure competition is on quality”,
in some circumstances,
“it must be recognised that getting the tariff right is a highly complicated task”.
How will this deliver integrated care?
The King's Fund states that:
“Organisational integration appears to be neither necessary nor sufficient to deliver the benefits of integrated care, notwithstanding the achievements of integrated systems such as the Veterans Health Administration”.
It goes on to talk about the Kaiser example mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Patel. The fund also says that the Government’s reforms being centred on extending patient choice and provider competition includes encouragement to any willing provider to deliver care to patients and to complete separation of commissioning and provision with the NHS. However, the results could be a system in which there is commissioning from and choice between an “increasingly fragmented array” of competing public, private and voluntary sector providers. As a consequence, integration would be difficult to achieve.
The Nuffield Foundation says, on the tariff and incentive integrated care, that the payment by results tariff was designed primarily, as my noble friend said in his initial remarks, to support choice in competition and bring down waiting lists for elective treatment. It does not appear to be well suited to supporting integrated care for people with long-term and complex conditions.
I am sure that the noble Baroness, Lady Young, will talk to us about diabetes, but briefing to us said that people with diabetes already need at least 14 different sorts of NHS services for them to lead long and healthy lives. That seems to be a challenge.
Arthritis Care’s recent response to the Future Forum consultation on integrated services, published a couple of days ago, is very pertinent indeed. It says that:
“‘Integration’ should be broadly understood as providing patient-centred, joined-up care which meets the clinical and personal needs of the patient at every point of their pathway. Arthritis Care fully endorses and recommends National Voices’ Principles for Integrated Care as a key reference point for all discussions on this issue … There must, above all, be a firm focus on the patient. What ‘integration’ looks like is likely to vary geographically and by service, but the specific structures and arrangements matter less than whether services are successfully meeting patient needs and expectations. What it ultimately comes down to is better care for patients and smarter use of resources”.
I think that is absolutely right.
The amendments that my noble friend and I have tabled are Amendments 104A and 178A. Like others in the group, they seek to place a duty on both board and CCGs to take account of the interdependence of services and the impact that the arrangements might have on sustainability, both financial and clinical, of other services. We are concerned that the regime that has been outlined in the Bill places a risk on the coherence of those services. I ask the Minister whether that is on the risk register and what it has to say about the risks that that places on those services.
My noble friend Lord Patel of Bradford, who is unable to be here this evening—I am happy to make these remarks partly on his behalf—is concerned about the disadvantaged people in the care system who are detained under the Mental Health Act. By definition, this is a group of service users who have very little ability to exercise choice or control. In a way, I think that this is a group of people against whom the test of integration and the test of this system should be used. If it can work for this group of people, it may work for others. As they are in a highly vulnerable position, there is an absolute need for integration among health and social care providers that starts at the point of hospital admission and goes right through to the end of their aftercare in the community. The effective provision of such a care pathway requires multiple agencies to work closely together. We know that from many inquiries into suicides and homicides involving people with mental illnesses, and it is highly challenging. There is a very real concern shared by patients, carers, doctors and nurses that encouraging competition in this complex area, without checks and balances to ensure that integration is a primary driver, is very damaging indeed. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, will refer to her amendment, and we would support that; I could not have put it better myself.
This is a very complicated and complex issue. It is the first time that we have talked about it in Committee. One thing that the Minister needs to do at this stage is to focus on what the Government mean by different forms of integration and where they will apply and how the Bill will deliver them.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has given us a very wide range of views on what integration consists of. In putting forward Amendment 135A, perhaps I can add another perspective from the point of view of specialised commissioning.
On 14 November, the Minister lifted the veil, to some extent, on how specialised commissioning would work under the Bill. The Bill brings the budget and responsibility for commissioning specialised services together under the NHS Commissioning Board. That has been welcomed by many, including the Specialised Healthcare Alliance, and it gives a real opportunity to deliver the recommendations of the Carter report of 2006. However, the expected benefits of this new system will be fully realised only if there is effective and real co-ordination between the various parties involved in the commissioning, provision and use of specialised services. However, that increases the challenge of integration under this clause, given the gap that would open up between the board at national level and providers at local level, if no steps were taken to bridge it.
There is a danger that the board’s work would become isolated from local commissioners, providers, clinicians and patients and that proper involvement, collaboration and dialogue with those key stakeholders may not occur. In particular, that could lead to pathways of care becoming disjointed, resulting in a poorer experience for patients, inefficient care and higher costs. In addition, it will be imperative to ensure that clinicians and patients are at the heart of all aspects of specialised services, including specialised commissioning. However, although the full subnational offices of the board which, as I understand it, are proposed would nominally give it a more local presence, they bear no real relationship to where the specialist providers are based and patient flows. The patient organisations within the Specialised Healthcare Alliance, therefore, see it as essential that there should be a more local presence; in their view, four clusters would be inadequate.
At col. 541 of Hansard on 14 November, the Minister was not able to be specific when he spoke about this, but as I understand it there will be around a dozen major hubs. An assurance on the parliamentary record would be very welcome. What form of substructure will there be for specialised commissioning if that is not to be the shape of it? Can he give further clarification today? Will this be delivered by the board or will it be delivered in other forms by way of senate, networks or in other forms?
Having heard from the NHS Alliance yesterday about the need for local variation, I am very attracted by Amendment 197E in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, which to me seems to hit the spot in allowing that variation and giving the CCGs the final say in how they conduct themselves. That has been put to several of us by the NHS Alliance as being absolutely crucial in allowing the various innovations and initiatives to thrive at local level in the CCGs, which are already becoming an interesting and improved way of delivering healthcare.
Health: Cancer Drugs Fund
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Earl Howe
My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness for her work in this area. She asked what would happen when strategic health authorities are abolished. Arrangements from 1 April 2013, which is the planned abolition date, and beyond will be the subject of discussions between my department and the NHS Commissioning Board Authority. So I cannot give her definite news yet on that front.
I know that the regional clinical panels are using their own judgment to come to decisions, and it is entirely right that they should. At the same time, they are alive to apparent variations in the drugs that are being made available through the fund in different regions, and I understand that the SHA clinical panels are working collectively now to better understand the reasons for those differences.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I welcome the fact that thousands of cancer patients have benefited from the cancer drugs fund, but can the Minister give an assurance that those cancer treatments currently available through the fund will continue to be available when value-based pricing is introduced in 2014?
Earl Howe
One of our aims for value-based pricing is to give patients better access to innovative and clinically effective drugs, which, unfortunately, has not always been the case until now, hence the need for the cancer drugs fund. That is certainly one of our ambitions for value-based pricing.
Medicines Act 1968 (Pharmacy) Order 2011
Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts(14 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Collins of Highbury
As the noble Earl stated, a lot has changed since the derogation in the directive was put in place. Much has changed in pharmacy arrangements in other EU member states and in the evolution of domestic policy. The reasons, as the Minister stated, were commercial.
In England, for example, there has been a welcome change over the past few years making it easier for people to get to a chemist, given that there are new pharmacies with longer opening hours. Clearly, such market restrictions are not appropriate today, and their removal will assist by increasing the pool of available pharmacists and ensure improved continuity of service delivery. I note that the change has also been welcomed by the key representative bodies of pharmacies.
I of course recognise that the restriction affects a relatively small number of pharmacies—just over 10 per cent, and just over 5 per cent of all pharmacists registered to practise in Great Britain. I also understand and accept the reasons for the change in the Explanatory Memorandum. However, these changes in the legislation raise broader issues relating to the competencies of the pharmacist and the person’s ability to manage a pharmacy. For example, the report on the consultation noted that concerns were expressed by respondents on competency in English. The Department of Health in its response stated that in the UK a check on the language knowledge of a pharmacist from outside the UK who is seeking work within the NHS is applied by the prospective employer, but that there is no check made at the point of registration.
This leads to three specific questions to the Minister. First, are there plans to introduce a standardised competency test to ensure that any pharmacists from the countries mentioned in the order who are in charge of a new pharmacy have all the required skills and competences? Secondly, are there plans to ensure that those in charge of a pharmacy will have a sufficiently high standard of English to avoid all risk of a patient misunderstanding any advice given? Thirdly, how can an employer determine whether the pharmacist in question is qualified in their own country and has no pending fitness-to-practise cases to answer?
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I declare an interest as chairman of the council of the School of Pharmacy of the University of London. I thank the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for a crystal clear explanation. I suppose, perforce, it had to be crystal clear to clear up some confusion arising from the Explanatory Memorandum. This is precisely the kind of uncontroversial deregulation that is important in the context. From both professional and consumer perspectives one could say that it is a perfectly formed small regulation. It affects a limited number of people who could not be responsible pharmacists in certain circumstances, but will now be able to be so where there are no significant safety implications from deregulating in the way that this order does.
I want to raise the issue of reciprocity. The noble Earl mentioned that the reason for deregulation is that circumstances have changed. The noble Lord, Lord Collins, also referred to that. I am sure that in broad terms that is the case, but I should be extremely grateful to hear what the noble Earl believes the level of that deregulation would be. I remember doing a study of several EU countries, looking into what was permissible in pharmacy ownership and the level of regulation. That was about five years ago, when the level of regulation was extremely high—not just pharmacy regulation but the kind of licensing required to run a retail outlet, and so on. We have some extremely well run chains in this country, which would like to expand their offer in the EU more broadly. They have been largely frustrated from doing so by some of the regulation that applies. Therefore, reciprocity in these circumstances is extremely important. I am interested to hear just what the Minister believes to be the level of significant deregulation that has taken place.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for their support for the order. The noble Lord, Lord Collins, asked me three questions. The first was about whether there are any plans to introduce a standardised competency test to make sure that pharmacists from the various countries mentioned have all the required skills to do their job. Under directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications, which I mentioned, a pharmacist who holds a recognised qualification issued by one member state is entitled to recognition of that qualification in another member state, and would therefore be entitled to registration with a competent authority, such as the General Pharmaceutical Council.
However, employers of pharmacists should ensure that anybody they employ has the skills required to undertake the specific post. The General Pharmaceutical Council’s standards of conduct, ethics and performance, among other things, require the pharmacist to recognise the limits of their professional competence and practise in only those areas in which they are competent. Their continued registration is subject to adherence to the council’s requirement for continuing professional development—CPD—and standards of conduct, ethics and performance.
Secondly, the noble Lord asked whether there are plans to make sure that those in charge of a pharmacy have a high enough standard of English. The UK Government’s response to the European Commission’s consultation on the review of the directive on the recognition of professional qualifications clearly sets out the view that in the healthcare professions the ability to communicate with patients and service users is vital.
Health and Social Care Bill
Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts(14 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, it is a privilege to follow that superb speech by the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, and I agree with almost every word he said.
First, I declare an interest as a member of the College of Medicine advisory board and as chair of the council of the School of Pharmacy. What the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, has said reinforces my view that this is a classic “I would not have started from here” situation. After all the major structural changes under the last Government, I am more than ever convinced that constant structural change is damaging to the NHS. I believe that reforms designed to achieve changes of culture more than complex changes in structure are far more effective in the long run at meeting challenges.
With much improved treatments and longer lifespans, coping with long-term conditions in health and social care is now the greatest challenge for the NHS. As a result, we need a health system that is capable of meeting huge challenges such as diabetes and obesity. As the Future Forum says, we need a reassessment of the “old model” of hospital care, where domiciliary and community care are available and adequately resourced. Patients must be able to take more responsibility for their own health. They must have more power and choice in the system, both as citizens and consumers. There must be much better integration of health and social care.
The current NHS is by no means perfectly adapted to tackling these future health needs. This is compounded by a financial context in which we need to meet the Nicholson challenge of productivity savings of £20 billion over the next five years in order to be able to meet future patient needs. However, this has been poorly communicated. We need transparency about how and why money is being saved in the NHS. At present, to many in the health service, it looks as though cuts are being made rather than resources being redeployed.
However, let me be clear: I welcome many of the elements in the Bill, particularly the improvements conceded after the Future Forum report. I congratulate Professor Field and his colleagues on their work. I welcome the recognition that the paramount duty of Monitor as health regulator must be,
“to protect and promote the interests of people who use health care services”,
and that where appropriate Monitor must exercise its functions in an integrated way to achieve this both within the NHS and between health and social care.
On these Benches we have long supported devolving power to local communities. I welcome the fact that through health and well-being boards, health and social care will be brought together in local communities and local authorities will take on new responsibilities for securing and improving public health. I also welcome a less aggressive timetable for the reforms and commissioning closer to the clinicians.
Therefore, I believe that the Bill is heading in broadly the right direction but there are several elements that I hope to see examined very carefully during its passage. Are the new structures too cumbersome and complex? Will the CCGs and clusters have sufficient weight and expertise when commissioning from foundation trusts? How will CCGs work together in commissioning for less common conditions?
In particular, I want to probe the role that community pharmacists can play in these new NHS structures. There is absolutely no doubt about the contribution that community pharmacies can make. However, there is much untapped potential and many underused facilities, despite pharmacies gearing up to deliver enhanced services such as screening, health checks and medicines management. What will their place be within the new health and well-being boards? What representation of and consultation with community pharmacy will there be throughout the new commissioning system, at NCB and CCG level? Should there be a duty on these commissioning groups to consult widely as there is currently with PCTs? My noble friend the Minister recently told the Royal Pharmaceutical Society that pharmacists will be “at the heart of the new commissioning arrangements”—in what way?
There is the future place of the health networks, in particular their funding for cancer, cardiac and diabetes. Do they have a long-term future? Then there is the fraught area of competition. Generally I support the ambition of commissioning any qualified provider in appropriate areas subject to a system of local and national tariffs. Under the previous Government, procurement by PCTs from the private and voluntary sector was encouraged in a number of areas such as podiatry, psychological therapies and wheelchair services. The right sort of competition between providers can drive improvements in quality and efficiency and hence patient care and choice. However, this is definitely not the case in all services and the challenge is ensuring that this can happen in selected areas without opening up the NHS to legal action in a way that lets European competition law rip and dismantles the fundamentals of the health service as we know it.
European competition law could bite in unexpected ways. The application of competition law to the NHS under existing law has been a grey area for some years. It is not a new issue but we should not do anything to exacerbate it. It is crucial that for the purposes of EU law applied by the Competition Act and the Enterprise Act, publicly funded trusts are not regarded as “undertakings”, otherwise the full rigour of competition law will apply. The limited European case law seems to indicate that it will not if services are provided on a universal basis on the principle of solidarity.
Therefore, I welcome some of the changes that have already been made to Monitor’s duties, mentioned earlier. However, there are other aspects that I and others believe, and are advised, are less positive and will lead to the risks that I have described: the lifting of the cap on foundation trusts’ private patient income, which could set foundation trusts directly in unfettered commercial competition with the private sector and risk claims of cross-subsidisation; and the termination of foundation trust regulation in 2016. I also have my doubts about whether putting the Principles and Rules of Co-operation and Competition on a statutory footing will be a step in the right direction since this could amount to an admission that the full rigour of competition law is to apply. We need to examine all these matters in depth as the Bill progresses.
Finally, of course, we have the issue that has attracted the greatest attention in recent weeks. The Constitution Committee asked whether the change in the Secretary of State’s duties and powers under the Bill threatens the operation of a comprehensive health service. I do not believe in substance that it does but we will want to consider this extremely carefully during the passage of the Bill and in particular the autonomy provisions.
The House has yet to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Owen, but I am convinced that we absolutely do not need a Select Committee to examine this matter. A Committee of this House sitting in this Chamber is perfectly competent and capable of examining this issue with great care. On that basis, tomorrow I shall be firmly voting against the proposition put forward the noble Lord, Lord Owen.
NHS: Cost-effectiveness
Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts(14 years, 6 months ago)
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Earl Howe
My Lords, I must point out one thing about this report: it does not make any claims for how cost-effective our health system was at any given point in time. What it does is measure the improvement in mortality over a period and then assess the cost-effectiveness of that improvement, which is a very different thing. Yes, the NHS has made great strides in improving mortality rates, but that is the only metric that the report deals with. It completely ignores other measures of quality. It is also completely silent about anything that happened after 2005, so recent years are not covered.
Lord Clement-Jones
Is not the really difficult and vital context in which we find ourselves at the moment the fact that we need significantly to improve productivity in the NHS in line with the so-called Nicholson challenge, which was endorsed by both this Government and the previous one? Can the Minister remind us of the record under the previous Government and tell us what he expects to be the outcome of the current health reforms?
Earl Howe
I am grateful to my noble friend. A Written Answer was published in Hansard recently that tracked the changes in productivity of the NHS between 1996 and 2008. He will know if he read it that there was a decrease in productivity over that period of around 3.1 per cent. The pressures on the NHS are increasing. In order for it to respond to the needs of the future, including an ageing population and the cost of new technologies, it needs to adapt to new ways of working that reduce cost pressures while delivering improved outcomes. The measures that are before Parliament seek to do just that.