Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Geddes Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 9th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Geddes) (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, will be taking part remotely. I remind the Committee that, unless they are leading a group, remote speakers speak first after the mover of the lead amendment in the group and may therefore speak to other amendments in a group ahead of the Members who have tabled them.

Clause 1: Assisted dying

Amendment 25

Moved by

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome what the noble and learned Lord has just said, which I am sure will be welcome to most Members of the Committee.

Amendment 25 stands in my name and those of my noble friend Lady Hollins and my noble and right reverend friend Lord Harries of Pentregarth. As is obvious, Amendment 25 is part of a large group. I apologise for the number of amendments and clause stand part notices in my name in the group. I was given excellent help by the Public Bill Office, and many of those amendments and clause stand part notices are simply designed to fit my proposals into the architecture of the Bill as it arrived in your Lordships’ House from the other place.

Amendment 25 is entirely dependent on Amendment 120, which is the key amendment in this group. That is also supported by my noble friends Lady Hollins and Lady O’Loan and my noble and right reverend friend Lord Harries of Pentregarth. I suggest that they are a formidable Cross-Bench group of medicine, the Church and the law, to which all will wish to pay close attention.

Amendment 120 sets out a matter of some principle which, if not conceded by the promoters, will have to be determined on Report. The conclusion on Amendment 120 reached on Report may well affect how some noble Lords will vote if there is a vote at Third Reading, because Amendment 120 is all about the safety of the proposed legislation.

Early in my remarks, I want to mention a very important point that may shorten the debate on this group. The promoters have rightly enjoyed assistance from neutral officials, including parliamentary counsel, in the drafting and structure of their revised proposals. Before we reach Report, or shortly after if successful with the principle I am raising, I am sure that those of us who support these amendments will receive and welcome comparable access. I invite the Minister to confirm that there would be equality of arms in perfecting the proposed clauses and amendments.

The issue of principle is whether permission for assisted suicide should be given by the court or via a panel. The promoters’ original intention was very clear: it was to be a court-based process. But by amendment they moved their choice to the panel procedure that currently appears in the Bill. I believe that they had two main reasons. First, the courts may not have enough judges to deal with the volume of applications they expect. The court in question at that stage was simply the High Court of Justice Family Division. Secondly, it might prove more difficult to obtain permission from a court than from the panel as now described.

As to the judges, Amendment 120 offers a simple and sound solution that I am surprised had not been thought of before. It would broaden the range of judiciary who would be designated to reach these momentous decisions, which involve the deliberate participation of one individual in bringing about the death of another. That a judge should be involved is, I suggest, self-evidently appropriate and what we should expect, given that third-party participation in a death would otherwise involve the offence of murder. I remind your Lordships that murder is defined as being involved in bringing about the death of another with the intent to kill or do grievous bodily harm.

Decisions about whether life support should be switched off are regularly heard by judges of the Family Division of the High Court, as are other extremely important decisions concerning family life, including matters affecting contact between parents and their children. There are, however, only 20 High Court judges in the Family Division, including the president. But, around the country, there are more than 40 designated family judges: specialist circuit judges who deal with the most difficult and important cases. By adding those 40-plus designated judges into the cohort of judges who would decide cases envisaged by this Bill—they were not envisaged as part of the process originally—there would, I suggest, be an ample supply of skilled and diverse expert judiciary, who would provide confidence-inspiring judgment in this important and difficult new area of the law.

The training of judges is very important in this context. The Judicial College provides expert training for all judges, including in specialist jurisdictions. There are those in this Chamber who have acted both as students and tutors in the work of the Judicial College. I add that there is a cohort of recorders, who are part-time judges, who could fill any listing gaps caused by this new jurisdiction.

As to the second objection—that it might prove more difficult to obtain permission from a court than from a panel—I suggest four cardinal points. First, it should not be easy to permit third-party involvement in someone’s death—nor should it be impossible, which is not the aim of these amendments. These amendments are predicated on the assumption that assisted suicide becomes lawful. It should be the subject of a procedure proportionate to the great legal change involved. In some cases, that may make an application more challenging, but those are exactly the cases in need of increased scrutiny and protection.

Secondly, where do we expect difficult issues of this level of seriousness and complexity to be tested and adjudicated upon? Generally, the answer is: in the courts, of course. There is no comparable precedent in which a matter affecting life and death is handed to a panel, even one chaired by a senior or retired lawyer. There are good reasons for that expectation. The court has special powers, which include, importantly, ordering the disclosure of documents, such as relevant correspondence and medical records, and the power to examine in a balanced way the arguments and evidence of both sides of a question, and to make a reasoned decision about what evidence to accept or reject. An example of such an issue might be whether, for example, an applicant is ordinarily resident in England and Wales or the UK—not necessarily an easy question to answer.

The court procedure allows the intervention of what are called interested parties—close relatives, for example, between whom there may be important and relevant issues—if the court regards the interventions as of potential value. Every day of the week, courts consider whether interveners should be allowed in a particular case, on the merits. Another thing that courts do is produce reasoned judgments in which clear findings of fact and law are set out. This is part of the everyday work of judges in every court around the country.

My third cardinal point is the appeal process. An appeal process is well understood and would be available through the courts. The court has a very good reputation for efficiency and prompt action in cases that clearly require it. Where real urgency is required, the courts respond, in a familiar jurisdiction that does not have to be designed from scratch and commands as much public confidence as any process that we have in our polity in this country.

My fourth cardinal point is that courts are familiar with the concept of individual capacity, with hearing and deciding upon expert evidence, and—above all in this context—with dealing with allegations of undue influence. The greatest worry I have about this new jurisdiction is that undue influence, often financially motivated, may feature heavily in some cases. There is some evidence—from Canada, for example—that that has been a real issue in a significant number of cases. Rooting out undue influence after the event offers absolutely nothing in this jurisdiction because the individual whose life is being discussed will already be dead.

The experience of judges, honed in practice in which, from time to time, they all encounter examples of the most egregious and devious behaviour, together with the forensic nature of the court process, promises a reasonable prospect of fair and proper decision-making. It may be of interest to note that, yesterday, we welcomed into our House a new Member—the noble Lord, Lord John—who has spent his legal practice dealing with just that issue of undue influence as a distinguished probate lawyer. That is just an example of the way in which lawyers and the courts deal with these issues. In addition, the recruitment of judges is statutory, well tested and very successful. The recruitment process suggested for the panels has none of those known qualities. Indeed, it is an unknown quantity.

I promise your Lordships that I do not propose these amendments in a way that is intended to undermine the Bill. My aim is based on the presumption that a Bill of this kind will be passed. My amendments are intended to make it safe—an aspiration I know is shared by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. Confidence in his proposals would be greatly increased by his acceptance of the principles behind these amendments. I beg to move.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Geddes) (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, is taking part remotely. I invite him to speak.

[Lord Shinkwin (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 120 and the amendments consequential to it. I should explain at the outset that my remarks incorporate the concerns of my noble friend Lord Farmer, who regrets that he is unable to be here. We are both worried, as I know are many other noble Lords, about current capacity and other pressures on the family courts. We are particularly concerned that these amendments would increase capacity pressures still further by placing decision-making and sign-off for applications for assisted dying orders into the Family Division of the High Court.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, mentioned safety. Notwithstanding his reference to 40-plus circuit judges and a cohort of recorders, I fear that what is before us is a recipe for overwhelming a system that already shows grave signs of being overloaded. Noble Lords will know that, for some considerable time, my noble friend Lord Farmer has been pressing this and previous Governments to cite early legal advice and support in family hubs when families separate, to ease pressure precisely because of existing capacity issues.

Moreover, the National Audit Office recently said of the family justice system:

“The government … does not have an overall assessment of the main drivers of delays or the capacity required to manage the system efficiently and reduce delay. MoJ, DfE and others have carried out several reviews … to identify causes of delay in family justice, identifying more than 25 different contributing factors … but most of the reviews could not quantify the scale and impact of each issue on overall performance, or the resources required to deal with these causes efficiently, due to data limitations”.

Sexual Offences: False Accusations

Lord Geddes Excerpts

Thursday 10th March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am sure that the noble Lord will accept that this is a very delicate issue. Parliament in 1976 decided that there should be anonymity both for complainant and for defendant. Parliament then abolished that in 1988. In 2010, the coalition Government considered the matter and decided, in balancing the various public interests, not to take further action. The noble Lord refers to a well-known case, and of course legitimate criticisms can be made about the handling of that matter, although we must allow the police some operational freedom. But I can say that Sir Richard Henriques, a retired High Court judge, is looking into the matter, an IPCC complaint has been made, and in due course the Government will respond to any recommendations or publications on that matter. But one must remember how difficult it is to make these allegations, and while I entirely accept what he says about those people in high places, of course no one is above the law.

[Lord Geddes (Con)]

My Lords, to follow on from my noble friend and enlarge on his point about whether the accusation is ultimately proved true or false, and referring back to the 1988 decision, would it not be far more equitable if either both parties had anonymity or neither did?

FIFA

Lord Geddes Excerpts

Thursday 4th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I agree with the noble Lord. We provide mutual legal assistance to a number of countries in accordance with treaty obligations. There are always difficulties with criminal jurisdictions extending beyond one country to another, but I entirely accept that co-operation should be the order of the day where these matters are concerned.

[Lord Geddes (Con)]

My Lords, would the Minister join me in congratulating my noble friend Lord Courtown on persuading Mr Blatter to resign when he did?

[Lord Faulks]

I suppose there might be some slight dispute over cause and effect, but nevertheless I join my noble friend.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Amendment of Schedule 1) (Advocacy Exceptions) Order 2014

Lord Geddes Excerpts

Monday 1st December 2014 Grand Committee

Motion agreed.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Geddes) (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister, for quite explicable reasons, is not yet here for the Question for Short Debate. With apologies to those who are to take part in the debate, I suggest that the Grand Committee stands adjourned until—your guess is as good as mine.

The Minister appeareth—no sooner said than done.

Tribunal Security Order 2014

Lord Geddes Excerpts

Monday 10th February 2014 Grand Committee

Motion agreed.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Geddes) (Con)]

My Lords, the Grand Committee is not quorate at the moment so I suggest that it adjourns for a few minutes.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

My Lords, the Grand Committee is now quorate.

Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Conditional Cautions: Code of Practice) Order 2013

Lord Geddes Excerpts

Tuesday 12th March 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, yesterday in this Committee we debated a report from the noble Lord, Lord Goodlad, in relation to the Government’s procedures for consultation. Considerable concern was expressed by the committee that he chairs, shared by those of us who spoke in the debate, who were either members of the committee or, as in my case and that of the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, not members of the committee, that the period for consultation had been arbitrarily changed by the Government last year. Quite apart from the merits of today’s statutory instrument, today’s business confirms the criticisms that were made about the consultation period. As the Minister has pointed out, consultation on these changes took place in only a four-week period, beginning towards the end of October, before the newly elected police commissioners, for example, were even elected. So all 43 of them have had no opportunity of commenting on these changes in an area in which it might be thought that they have a significant interest. It clearly crossed nobody’s mind—and I am not blaming the Minister for this—

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Geddes)]

My Lords, there is a Division in the Chamber. The Grand Committee stands adjourned for 10 minutes to recommence at 5.44 pm.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

It is now 17.44. His Lordship was in full flow, and perhaps he would like to continue.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I will. I was making the point that this case exemplified the arguments that are being made about the Government’s defective consultation procedure, but that is a preliminary point and does not go to the substance of the matter, and I do not expect the Minister to accept any responsibility for what seems a flawed process. I suspect that it is not a matter to which he would have given any material consideration.

On the other hand, the Minister will be aware that there is considerable concern about the number of cautions now being offered in lieu of possible prosecution and a feeling that this is to some extent being used by some police forces as a device to, shall we say, depress the level of recorded crime. There is at least that concern. Whether it is justified is another matter, and I would not for a moment suggest that all police forces are succumbing to that temptation, but there is a feeling that there is an issue, and one has to bear that in mind as we look at extending the system in the way that these proposals do. A cynic might indeed wonder whether this might be another way of reducing the criminal legal aid bill, about which the Minister and his colleagues are so exercised, but heaven forfend that I should be susceptible to such a cynical standpoint.

However, there are a number of points to be raised about these proposals. In terms of conditional cautions, they shift the responsibility entirely on to police officers, at least if they chose to exercise the power given to them. Will the Minister indicate what follow up there will be in terms of consultation about the way the new system is working? Now that we have elected police commissioners—which is not something that I or my party have ever favoured—presumably they will be involved in any consultations, as chief constables would be. Will the Minister indicate whether it is intended to set up a process to monitor the way the new powers are being used and how frequently those consultations will be carried out?

There is also a question about the guidance which the Director of Public Prosecutions is to issue. Once again, we have secondary legislation without the accompanying guidance on how matters are to be used. That is a most unfortunate defect in the procedure. The potential problem is that this new system will be carried out in different ways in different areas. Surely there ought to be a degree of consistency, which, no doubt, the guidance would seek to promote, between what happens in different police authority areas. Again, the question arises of what steps the Government will take to ensure as far as possible that there is a degree of consistency.

On foreign defendants—of course, they will not be defendants because there will not be a prosecution, so let us call them foreign offenders for the purposes of the debate—I invite the Minister to respond to the possible doubt that this may be a convenient way of dealing with foreign offenders without the expense of a trial, but possibly at the expense of visible justice so far as victims are concerned. Will the guidance indicate the level of offence that it would not be deemed appropriate to be the subject of a conditional caution, with the condition of deportation attached to it? Deportation may well be desirable, but it may also be desirable for an offence to be dealt with through the courts in the normal way.

We do not oppose the principle of the order. It is certainly worth pursuing the option of conditional cautions but, as the Minister recognised, we have some reservations about how the system might work in practice. It is new, and I hope that we can have an assurance that there will be a proper review of progress, perhaps in a year or two, to see how the system is working in practice and, in particular—I repeat—whether there is consistency in practice across the country which one would think would be desirable, if only to retain public confidence in the new process. I reiterate the request that in future guidance that will be crucial to the operation should be available for consideration before the secondary legislation goes through your Lordships’ House and the other place.

Defamation Bill

Lord Geddes Excerpts

Thursday 17th January 2013 Grand Committee

Relevant documents: 7th Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 8th Report from the Delegated Powers Committee, 9th Report from the Constitution Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Geddes)]

My Lords, it is now 2 pm. I have to start the proceedings as usual by saying that in the event of a Division in the House, which is extremely unlikely, the Committee will adjourn for 10 minutes. Before we come to the first amendment, the noble Lord, Lord McNally, has a statement to make which is not debatable.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)]

My Lords, at the beginning of the Committee’s discussions on Tuesday, the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, raised an issue in relation to legal advice which had been given to Rutland County Council. It suggested that the general powers given to local authorities in Section 1 of the Localism Act 2011 had overturned the bar on them suing in defamation, which was established by the House of Lords in Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers.

My officials have explored the issue with officials at the Department for Communities and Local Government, which is responsible for the 2011 Act. The Government are in no doubt that if a case were brought, the courts would still find that local authorities cannot bring action in defamation. The decision in Derbyshire was reached on public policy grounds, which we considered remain compelling. The House of Lords found that it would be contrary to the public interest for organs of government to be able to sue in defamation, and that it would be an undesirable fetter on freedom of speech. It must be borne in mind that Derbyshire was decided before the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998. Consideration of Article 10 would only bolster the reasoning of the House of Lords in Derbyshire.

In any event, I can reassure the Committee that even if the issue was brought before the court and found to the contrary, the situation could be remedied by way of a statutory instrument under Section 5(3) of the Localism Act 2011. The power allows the Secretary of State to prevent local authorities using Section 1 powers to do anything specific in the order. In this case, an order could be made preventing any action being brought in defamation. I have already indicated in earlier debates our view that it is preferable for the courts to have the flexibility to continue to develop the Derbyshire principle, rather than to attempt to prescribe rigid boundaries in statute. That remains our view. In the unlikely event of any difficulty arising as a result of the provisions in the Localism Act, prompt action can be taken to address that without any need for primary legislation.

Clause 7 : Reports etc protected by privilege

Amendment 39

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[Lord McNally]

Probably not, but I will defer to the chairman.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

It is unusual to speak after the Minister, but there is nothing to prevent any noble Lord speaking.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I am grateful to the deputy chairman. I am sorry to be unusual, but I normally am. Not only do I agree with what has been said but, in my mind, extending statutory qualified privilege in the schedule is one of the most useful things that the Bill does. We are dealing there with clearly prescribed situations, of which this is one, where, if the press gives a fair and accurate report, it will be protected, as will the public interest. The fact that this has been extended extremely broadly, as my Bill sought to do, whereas the 1996 Act did not do so, is a matter for congratulation.

Defamation Bill

Lord Geddes Excerpts

Monday 17th December 2012 Grand Committee

For the most part we have adopted the analysis, workings and suggestions of others and have applied them to the Bill on the basis that they will send a strong message and provide significant reassurance to those people who we seek to reassure by the revision of this legislation. Before sitting down, I would remind the Minister of a conversation in which Members on our Benches argued with him. I am glad that we seem at least to have contributed to the Government’s change of mind; namely, that the use of the county courts may be part of the answer to this problem. If some of the work we have commissioned bears fruit, and we can expose that work to the Committee, we may seek to amend the Bill at a later stage. Perhaps this is an issue that we can discuss as we have a little time between the beginning and the end of the Committee stage. We should look at whether we can make common cause on this issue, given that we have been told that the present Lord Chancellor favours this sort of development too.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Geddes)]

Somewhat unusually, the noble Lord begged to move his amendment at the beginning rather than the end of his words. However, I am prepared to take it that he does wish to move his amendment.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, it is true that my Bill had a similar provision in it, but it did not have a serious harm test. The big difference is that the Government’s Bill now has Clause 1. Therefore, one of the problems with the amendment is that it does not take account of the shift from my Bill, without a serious harm test, to what we now have. The second problem is that there is a right of access to justice guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and therefore we have to be extremely careful that we do not fetter that right with an excessive strike-out power. Probably that is not the most significant problem because the third problem concerns EU law and the Lugano convention. If noble Lords look at Clause 9, they will see that there is complicated stuff about:

“Action against a person not domiciled in the UK or a Member State etc”.

One of the problems—luckily I do not have to deal with this because the Minister will have behind him a whole battery of those who can—is that under EU law, one has to make sure that there is access to justice in this country in the defamation field, and that is because of a case of Shevill. As a result of that case, the European Court of Justice has made it clear that one must be able to bring one’s cause of action in defamation here in respect of a tort that has been committed elsewhere within the EU. Without making too much of a meal of it, I do not think the way that this is worded would pass muster under the Shevill test, and in any case it is not necessary because of the substantial serious harm test coupled with proper case management. Finally, the idea of the county court is something that I have always espoused. I do not think that needs much on the face of the Bill, but that is for another day.