Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Jackson of Peterborough
Main Page: Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Jackson of Peterborough's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(1 day, 14 hours ago)
Lords Chamber
Baroness Cass (CB)
My Lords, I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that my mother held doctors in great esteem and reverence until the day that I and my rowdy friends qualified, and then the whole mystique was exploded overnight.
My serious point is that I am still mystified by Clause 5, because it remains completely unclear who is having this preliminary discussion. Even if we safeguard against the doctor raising the subject of assisted dying without it being initiated by the patient, none the less this clause is still opaque about who this person is. If, fortuitously, the patient has a good relationship with their GP and is able to raise the matter and have a full discussion, they may be able to cover all the things that are listed in this clause—diagnosis, prognosis, palliative care, hospice, available treatments and so on—but, if it is not their GP, who is the medical practitioner supposed to direct them to? Unlike the co-ordinating doctor and the independent doctor, they do not have the right written into the Bill to access the patient’s records or make inquiries of the person who is looking after them, so I am unclear about how they are supposed to discharge all these duties.
Also, it does not reflect reality. If somebody is starting to think about possibly seeking an assisted death, they may ask their GP about one part, their priest about another aspect, their next of kin about another aspect, and they will gradually form a view. But to lay it down in statute seems to be putting an additional hurdle in the patient’s way. Surely, at the time when they want to ask about the detail of assisted death, what it might entail and its feasibility, the person to seek advice from is the co-ordinating doctor or the first doctor within the voluntary assisted dying service, who will have had the training and will have some knowledge to be able to say with confidence what the individual should expect. So I strongly support my noble friend Lady Hollins’s view that Clause 5 should not stand part of the Bill, because it seems to be a complete muddle that we have been discussing various aspects of for some time now.
My Lords, I think the debate that we have had for the last two and a half hours shows this House in a very positive light. It goes to the very essence of what some of us who are sceptical about the Bill believe to be the most crucial issue: how the Bill will impact the most vulnerable people in society. I say in passing how moved I was by the wonderfully powerful and emotional speech from my noble friend Lady Monckton, as well as by my noble friend Lord Shinkwin’s speech on his amendment.
Noble Lords might ask a rhetorical question: why are we spending so much time on this particular group? I will offer an anecdote to your Lordships on why it is important that we have spent this time talking about people with disabilities and learning disabilities, and particularly people with Down syndrome. In the summer of 2024, my 91 year-old father was admitted to Peterborough hospital and spent a number of hours in what is euphemistically called “ambulatory care”—which is the back of an ambulance—before being able to access a trolley for a number of hours. As it happens, he was terminally ill. He died a few weeks later from bladder cancer that had metastasised to the rest of his body, but he did not have a diagnosis of terminal illness.
When I reached the hospital, his belongings were adjacent to where he was. At the bottom of the Sainsbury’s carrier bag that held all his personal belongings was a “Do not resuscitate” form that had been filled in. In fact, I think it was what they call—again, euphemistically—a “respect form”. It had been countersigned by a doctor without any discussion with myself or my two brothers. As your Lordships know, none of us are shrinking violets. My brother is a decorated police officer and my other brother is a world-leading scientist and a professor of psychology. We are all quite smart people, but this form had been completed without any discussion with the family.
Indeed, it was alleged that my father had had capacity to sign that form and had agreed to it being countersigned by a doctor. That was a very significant development. I found myself having to front up a difficult conversation with the clinicians in accident and emergency and the geriatrician who was on duty that day. I thought to myself: what if my father had a learning disability? What if he could not read or write properly? What if he was anxious about dealing with bureaucracy and professional people? I thought about how much more difficult it would have been if he did not have a family: if he had not had three sons watching out for him and protecting his interests. How much difficulty would there have been in him challenging the professional bona fides and authority of a clinician—a medic who is well educated and articulate and knows their profession.
I posit that that is the reason we have spent so much time debating these issues. It is not for people such as my father, who, as I say, was terminally ill, but for the many people who have great difficulty: people who are already in a position where they are sad, lonely, depressed, bereft and distraught after a diagnosis of a terminal illness. Those people need assistance in primary legislation to protect their interests, because otherwise no one else will look out for them. That is not to say that those doctors were in breach of the Hippocratic oath, or that they were not compassionate, empathetic, caring and feeling for my father and many thousands of other people in similar situations, particularly old people. Nevertheless, they are busy and stressed and that form was filled in in good faith.
In the modern NHS—not the NHS of five, 10 or 20 years ago—a patient can be in the back of an ambulance for hours outside the hospital, and then be put in a corridor before they get to a ward; and they might see a consultant on the ward round only once or twice a week for a few minutes, if they are lucky, and may not see the same consultant again for weeks. That fundamental change in the nature of our health service over recent years, with the huge additional pressure and demand, makes these protections all the more important.
As usual, the noble Lord makes a very apposite point and reinforces my arguments.
Time is pressing, so if I can beg the indulgence of your Lordships’ House, I will just develop slightly my support for the points that my noble friend Lord Shinkwin made at the beginning of this debate. The danger that terminally ill patients, accustomed to trusting medics who care for them, will sense that they should do what their doctor is telling them when they are only suggesting the option of assisted suicide is greatly heightened where, for instance, learning disabilities are in the mix. My noble friend made reference to Ken Ross of the National Down Syndrome Policy Group, who was quite right when he said:
“People with Down syndrome have a very complex and unique speech and communication profile. They are highly suggestible. Even someone wearing a uniform could suggest a position of authority to them and something they should show acquiescence to. The acquiescence bias risk from people with Down syndrome is extraordinary.”
This was mentioned by my noble friend.
“They could have a seeded view around what they think that person wants to hear and talk about without fully understanding the position”.
I assume that by “a seeded view”, Mr Ross means that the idea is planted in their mind, by a doctor mentioning assisted suicide, that this is what that doctor would prefer. Others, more expert, might put me right.
Other similar points were made by my noble friend Lady Monckton, in her superb speech, about the dangers of someone such as her daughter Domenica, who has Down syndrome, being advised by a doctor new to her that a terminal condition might mean it is best to have her life ended—without any legal obligation to discuss this with parents, other family members or someone independent, as the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, propose. As she said, fear, terror and a total lack of comprehension would sit alongside her daughter’s highly suggestible disposition.
The Commons, in fairness, did ensure that the Bill now has extra safeguards for those with learning disabilities, but these are focused on training and an advocate from the first declaration—far further down the road than the preliminary discussion. Actually, the experience in Australia is that training around the specific bespoke issue of coercion is very limited, and that needs to be looked at. Perhaps the noble and learned Lord will address that in his concluding remarks. This is when framing effects will occur and will be the starting point for vulnerable people misunderstanding the options or feeling pressure. By the time an advocate is in place, the person they are working for might have a fixed idea, which the advocate will not want to ride roughshod over. Clause 5 therefore needs strengthening to address this inconsistency, which is a key concern of experts in learning difficulties.
Hence the question that some noble Lords may be asking, about the need for prohibition, particularly where Down syndrome and learning disabilities are in play, because these might be the patients most likely to provoke cost concerns but least likely to discern that this motivation, not their best interest, is the main reason for raising the possibility of assisted suicide. I have to say that that would be a minority of cases, and I am not making that point about the vast majority of clinicians.
In conclusion, it is for these reasons that I strongly support Amendment 162 and others in this group.
My Lords, I have two amendments in this group. We have heard a lot of comments about the real world and what is actually going on now, today, out there in healthcare. It will be very interesting to hear how the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, responds to all the criticisms and to the way the inherent dangers in Clause 5 have been highlighted.
My Amendment 201 concerns children. A little boy with advanced malignancies said to me, “I'm going to die when my goldfish dies”. He went on to talk through what he wanted when he was dying and how he would play football in heaven with another boy who had died recently. Not long after, his goldfish was found floating. My strenuous attempts to resuscitate his goldfish failed, and he gently died soon after.
That was some years ago. Today, children live off the internet, not just off what they hear from other children. They know about the debate on this Bill—some raise it in “Learn with the Lord” sessions. If a child is asking questions about this, they must be able to express their fears if they are already ill. They often speak with remarkable frankness. Children’s awareness is phenomenal. They deserve gentle, honest planning of their care that also explains why they are ineligible for assisted suicide. Hence my wording, but the wording of the noble Lord, Lord Rook, provides much clearer guidelines for clinicians involved, to allow them to listen but in no way to hint that the child will be eligible.
Assisted suicide is not a medical treatment. It falls outside McCulloch and Montgomery rulings, hence my Amendment 159. As has been said, if a doctor raises assisted death unprompted, the implication is that this is something you should consider—a tacit implication that this might be your best option. Addressing the comments by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, it is a doctor’s duty of care to sensitively explore with open questions and careful listening, to discuss whatever the person wishes to discuss at their initiation. That is patient autonomy and control. Mencap, the Association for Palliative Medicine and the Royal College of Psychiatrists have all warned how patients’ trust gives doctors a dangerous ability to steer decisions if the suggestion comes from the doctor.
Listening with undivided attention is crucial in gentle, honest communication in the face of patients’ anguish. Patients hang on to our every word, so suggesting it as an option signposts them in that direction. It abandons suicide prevention duties under the Mental Health Act and the state’s duty under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The amendments overall have a common theme of making the autonomy of the patient paramount in these discussions, their being able to raise assisted death in their own time, at their own pace and at their instigation. I hope these amendments will be taken heed of.