Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Morrow Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 5th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I gave very careful consideration to the points raised in these amendments by both noble and gallant Lords. They raise significant issues, which I am very sympathetic to. I am also very keen to hear the Minister’s response, given her commitment in Committee, especially in relation to the consequences of Article 1 of the treaty, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, has indicated.

There are, however, elements of the amendments which I am perhaps not entirely persuaded by. They are the conditions within the bailiwick of the Mauritian Government that could give rise to the circumstances where we would seek to stop payments. They are not covered by this amendment, per se. They would, however, be covered in subsection (4) of the proposed new clause in my Amendment 50, which will be discussed much later during our considerations today and which would create the conditions where, if the Mauritian Government by their actions were putting at risk the consequences of our payments, Parliament would be able to pause the payments.

If there are reasons unspecified by Amendment 1 which are non-defence related, there is the potential for UK funding for resettlement support, the trust fund operations or Chagossian community-specific support to be put at risk, so it is worth while to separate out the defence interests from the other elements of the treaties. As the mechanisms in Amendment 50 are preferable in our view, we would find it difficult to support these amendments.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, Amendment 26 standing in my name states that:

“Sections 2 to 4 come into force only when the Secretary of State has assessed … the impact of the termination of all rights granted by the Treaty to the United Kingdom with respect to the entire Chagos Archipelago through Article 15 of the Treaty”


and

“the impact of the arrangements in Article 15 on the leverage opportunities at the Secretary of State’s disposal in negotiating with Mauritius after ratification”.

Article 15(1)(a) of the Mauritius treaty states that Mauritius can terminate the Mauritius Treaty in the event of

“a failure by the United Kingdom to make payment as required by Article 11”.

This means that if a payment is more than 22 days late, the entire Mauritius treaty is terminated, subject of course to the fact that sovereignty over the Chagos Islands will be in the hands of Mauritius. In that event, we would lose absolutely everything, and if the United States wanted to keep its Diego Garcia base, it would probably have to do so by force. While the United Kingdom could no doubt seek to achieve this, China, Russia and other countries could protest very loudly and have international law on their side. It would provide an excuse for any other power to try to take Diego Garcia and could lead to a major war.

Of course, the Government can respond by saying that this will not happen if we pay on time—and, no doubt, they will assure that we will pay. While we are protected from this eventuality by dutifully paying up completely and always on time, Article 15(1)(a) places the United Kingdom, and by extension the United States, in a formally intolerable, weak position.

To understand the problems arising from the very weak footing on which the treaty places us when negotiating with Mauritius, we must appreciate the huge concerns about what happens in relation to the Chagos Islands beyond Diego Garcia. Mauritius has a clear incentive, arising from the income stream we have promised, to seek additional income streams for leasing other islands or parts of islands. The Government have sought to make much of the fact that we have a veto on the deployment of security and defence forces beyond Diego Garcia, but the problem is that the real threats do not announce themselves as deployment of security and defence forces and are much more subtle. Something that begins as a non-security and defence deployment, in relation to which we have no veto, can evolve into something very different—an emergent risk, over which the treaty affords us no right of veto but only a right to object. The right to object can be resolved only on a consensual basis within the joint committee between the UK and Mauritius proposed by the Mauritius treaty and could no doubt take a long time if Mauritius wanted it to. It is here that our complete lack of leverage provided by paragraph 1(a) of Article 15 is a particular cause for concern.

Mauritius could generally adopt a very unco-operative approach on the joint committee, knowing that, if it resists one of our concerns and we counter by threatening to withhold payment, subject to satisfactory resolution, that will serve simply to renounce all our remaining rights in relation to the Chagos Islands, giving them completely to Mauritius. Of course, if ever a deployment of non-security and defence personnel from another country becomes an emergent risk, and one wherein those concerned in effect become security and defence personnel, the UK would have a right of veto. However, the difficulty is that, by that stage, they will be established in place, and if they did not want to leave, they could be removed only by force, threatening war and international instability.

If we look at other categories of emergent risk, in relation to which we have powers only to lodge objections on the joint committee, we are further confronted by the way in which the terms of the Mauritius treaty—especially paragraph 1(a) of Article 15—rob us of leverage. These risks would all be avoided if the UK did the right thing and corrected the historic wrong of the forced removal of the Chagossians from their islands and afforded them self-determination. While it is plain that not all would vote to be a separate jurisdiction from Mauritius—in the same way that not everyone on the Ellice Islands voted to become a separate jurisdiction from the Gilbert Islands—polling suggests that a majority would vote to become a resettled, largely self-governing British Overseas Territory, legitimately under British sovereignty. In that event, none of the above difficulties would arise.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, as we begin our proceedings on Report, let me reiterate our view, as the Official Opposition, that the treaty that the Government have agreed with Mauritius puts the interests of the British people last. It is an abject surrender that we would never have agreed to. It was mentioned nowhere in the Government’s election manifesto, and it stands in stark contrast to their manifesto commitment to protect the British Overseas Territories. The British people were not consulted on the treaty, yet it will see over £34 billion-worth of taxpayers’ money paid to the Government of Mauritius over the treaty’s lifetime. That is a political decision by this Government at a time when taxes to the British public are being hiked to an all-time high.

In stark contrast, the Mauritian Prime Minister said that the money from the Chagos deal will fund debt repayments and tax cuts as part of a budget package that will see 80% of Mauritian workers exempted completely from income tax.

However, it is, of course, not just the British people who have not been consulted but the Chagossians themselves, who have suffered so much over many years and have not had their voice heard in this process either.

I am pleased to say that the Government have rightly shared some more details about the Chagossian Contact Group they have set up, but it should not have taken forceful pressure from the Opposition to deliver that transparency. Even with those details, the Chagossian people have not been formally consulted by the British Government on this treaty. We have only to look at the recent report from the International Relations and Defence Committee on the opinion of Chagossians to know exactly what they think of this treaty.

In the other place, we opposed the Bill at Third Reading, and we still oppose it. But, of course, now that we are on Report, we will work constructively with noble Lords across the House to seek to improve the Bill today.

My Amendment 6 would require the Secretary of State to seek to negotiate a right to extend the length of the treaty beyond 99 years before it can be ratified. When we suggested this in Committee, the Minister explained that Article 13 of the treaty establishes the process by which the treaty would be extended up to a limit of 40 years. One of the problems with that process is that it would require a renegotiation, possibly including additional payments, leaving the British taxpayer exposed to potentially even higher bills at the end of this period.

Ministers tell us that the UK will have the right of first refusal of the terms offered to any third party for the use of Diego Garcia following the expiry or termination of the treaty, but how can the UK ensure that those terms are reasonable? We therefore seek clarity from the Government on what happens at the end of this 99-year period. I hope that this time, the Minister will be able to provide us with more information on the Government’s exact understanding of the workability of Article 13 of the treaty.

My Amendment 40 would require the Government to clarify their understanding of the status of the Chagos Islands should the treaty be terminated. In Committee, the Minister emphasised that the circumstances in which Mauritius can unilaterally terminate the treaty are extremely limited, and we accept that. She also told the Committee that it is

“highly unrealistic that Mauritius would agree to a reversion to British sovereignty in the event of termination”.—[Official Report, 18/11/25; col. 781.]

That leaves open the question of who might agree to a transfer of sovereignty with the Government of Mauritius. In a circumstance where Mauritius is sovereign and the treaty is no longer in effect, is there a risk that the Mauritian Government may choose to transfer sovereignty to a third party? What guarantees have the Government sought from Mauritius on this? Again, I hope the Minister will be able to provide us with some more detail on those points at this stage in our legislative process.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, for his excellent amendment in this group. He is right to continue to press the Government on this point, and we share his concerns about the position should the treaty be terminated. I look forward to hearing the replies from the Minister on these points.

Finally, I turn to the amendments in the name of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, which is supported by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton of Richmond—two well-respected Members of the House. It is unconscionable that British taxpayers should be forced to continue to fund the Mauritian Government under the terms of the treaty in circumstances where the military base, which the treaty relates to and secures, has therefore become inoperable. Therefore, we firmly support this amendment and, should the noble and gallant Lord wish to test the opinion of the House, we on these Benches would support him in that.

--- Later in debate ---

This amendment does not take sides in the litigation. It respects the court, respects Parliament and respects the principle that irreversible legislation should not be rushed through while its legality is actively being tested. I therefore urge noble Lords to support this amendment, not as a political gesture, but as a statement of constitutional responsibility. Let us pause, wait for the judgment and legislate with our eyes fully open. I commend the amendment to the House.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I wish to speak to the six amendments to which I have attached my name in this grouping—Amendments 23 to 25, 27, 52 and 53—and also in support of Amendment 32. I will begin with Amendment 24.

Since Committee there have been a number of critical developments, to which some noble Lords have already referred today. The rationale for the Bill and the treaty to which it relates was that they are essential if we are to uphold the international rules-based order. Yet on 2 December a key organ of the rules-based international order, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination issued a formal decision, the substance of which I must put on the record. The decision:

“Calls upon Mauritius and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to suspend the ratification of the bilateral agreement”,


and:

“Urges Mauritius and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to engage immediately with the Chagossian people … and to respect and guarantee their human rights under the Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including: Their right to return to their ancestral lands in Diego Garcia Island; Their right to self-determination while ensuring the full and meaningful participation of the Chagossian people in all decision-making processes impacting them and their land; Their cultural rights, including their access to cultural and spiritual sites and to preserve their cultural heritage; Their right to effective remedies and full repatriation, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition”.


Thus, we are confronted not simply by an organ of the rules-based international order criticising the Mauritius treaty and the Bill but by a call for the suspension of treaty ratification. It is particularly striking that this decision flatly contradicts what the Minister said on 18 November, when she asserted that self-determination does not pertain to the Chagossian people. From the perspective of the rules-based international order, it clearly does apply to them. That is why it is imperative that we vote for Amendment 32, eloquently spoken on by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster.

If the Government are intent on continuing with ratification, your Lordships’ House faces an immense responsibility because we constitute the one other means by which ratification can be suspended for 13 months if we refuse to give the Bill a Third Reading. In the intervening period there can be time for a rethink and the development of a response to the presenting difficulty that, rather than abstracting and thereby distorting one principle of international law above all others—colonial territorial integrity—places that principle in its proper relationship to self-determination.

Obviously, I hope that when the Minister responds, she will indicate that the Government will not pursue the treaty to ratification. If she does not, the responsibility we face will be very clear. Quite apart from all the other problems with the treaty and the Bill, the fact that they undermine the rules-based international order, rather than upholding it, demonstrates why this treaty and Bill must and should be abandoned.

On Amendment 23, quite apart from the fact that no territorial integrity is absolute in the sense that it is subject to self-determination—as the history of Czechoslovakia eloquently testifies—this point is greatly compounded in relation to territorial integrities that have been imposed by imperial powers, such as that pertaining to the colonial unit that covered Mauritius and the Chagos Islands prior to 8 November 1965. In this regard, it is quite impossible to understand the great wrong done to the Chagossian people if we have regard only to their forced removal. The root of the difficulty goes back to the decision to deny them the right of self-determination in 1965, which, if provided, would have made their forced removal between 1968 and 1973 unthinkable. In this context, neither the advisory judgment nor anything else in international law states that it is wrong for the territorial integrity of a colonial unit to be changed prior to decolonisation if this change is made to give effect to the principle of self-determination.

This point is eloquently demonstrated by the experience of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, which provide arguably the most relevant comparator to Mauritius and the Chagos Islands. Although the Gilbert Islands and the Ellice Islands were separated by 800 miles and comprised different people groups, they were in the same colonial unit. When the UK Government proposed decolonisation, the representatives of the Ellice Islands strongly objected to the notion of a new independent sovereign state consisting of the two sets of islands because, quite apart from the distance between them and the fact that they were from different people groups, the population of the Gilbert Islands was far greater than that of the Ellice Islands, such that the latter would be condemned to being permanently outvoted by what they regarded as another country.

The UK Government responded by suggesting a self-determination referendum, in which the options were the Ellice Islands remaining part of the same jurisdiction as the Gilbert Islands or becoming a separate jurisdiction in their own right. Although not everyone supported separation, a very clear majority did. The UK then detached the Ellice Islands in 1976, creating a separate colony that went on to become the independent state of Tuvalu in 1978, while the Gilbert Islands became the independent state of Kiribati in 1979.

The imperative for the provision of a self-determination referendum for the Chagossians in 1965 was even greater than that pertaining to the Gilbert and Ellice Islands because the distance between Mauritius and the Chagos Islands was significantly greater, as was the population differential, with the Chagossians standing at far greater risk of being permanently outvoted by the Mauritians. There was and is, however, an even greater imperative for the provision of a self-determination referendum for the Chagossians, which is testified to by the definition of the presenting difficulty by the advisory opinion, page 1 of which states:

“Between 1814 and 1965, the Chagos Archipelago was administered by the United Kingdom as a dependency of the colony of Mauritius”.


Crucially, therefore, the Chagos Islands’ relationship with Mauritius was never on all fours, rather giving effect to colonialism within a colony such that, rather than being a full part of the colony of Mauritius, the Chagos Islands were only ever

“a dependency of the colony of Mauritius”.

Being on all fours is central to being part of the same territorial integrity, for the reasons set out by the UN resolutions set out in Amendment 23.

The absence of complete equality of citizenship demonstrates not the negation of colonialism but its presence. This, however, was completely absent, as demonstrated by the failure of the constitution of the colony of Mauritius to make provision for the election of representatives of the Chagos Islands to the Mauritian Legislative Council. All this sets out the very clear imperative for our voting in support of Amendment 32.

This takes me neatly to Amendment 25. The Mauritius treaty implies that the Chagossians want to be part of Mauritius, such that the change in the territorial integrity of the Chagos Islands back to pre-November 1965 days, when the islands were a dependency of Mauritius, is the right and proper thing to do. There are, however, four major difficulties with this. In the first instance, as a dependency of Mauritius rather than a full part of Mauritius, the Chagossians were, even at the happiest time of the relationship with Mauritius—

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Leong) (Lab)]

Could I ask the noble Lord to wind up, please?

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

In the second instance, this difficulty was greatly compounded by the willingness of the Mauritian Cabinet of Ministers to accept £3 million in 1965 to become a party to the forced removal of the Chagossians, agreeing to receive them from the Chagos Islands. Had they been part of the same people civically, this would have been unthinkable, and they would have fought for the rights of their brothers and sisters—not allowing citizens to be subject to this indignity.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I endorse the comments of my noble friend Lord Callanan on the amendments in this group. I raised specific concerns about defence and security in Committee, and I have considerable sympathy with the remarks of my noble friends Lord Lilley and Lord Leicester on their amendments. I accept that the Minister has acted in good faith in repeating the advice that he has been given.

After the Committee debate on these defence and security issues, I read Hansard and the Pelindaba treaty with care. It seems that, as my noble friend Lord Lilley indicated, once UK sovereignty over the base is relinquished in consequence of this treaty, that sovereignty transmits to Mauritius and the base is then subject to whatever international agreements Mauritius has entered into. There are restrictive consequences for the base from the Pelindaba treaty, but my concern is slightly broader than that of my noble friend Lord Lilley. If, in the eyes of the other signatories to the Pelindaba treaty, Mauritius is deemed to be in breach, all the other signatories have a locus to raise an objection and deploy international law. That cannot be addressed unless this treaty is renegotiated to retain sovereignty of the base in the hands of the UK, and I wish to place on the record that that is my opinion and understanding of the position.

The Minister rightly does not wish to be drawn into discussing sensitive operational issues relative to the base, and I agree with that. However, before stage 3, I ask him to ask his officials to draft him a letter to be placed in the Library, explaining how the renunciation of sovereignty of the base by the UK and the acquisition of that sovereignty by Mauritius, then governed by the Pelindaba treaty, is compatible with free and unrestricted usage of the base by the US, the UK and our allies.

The Minister has been placed in an impossible position by his Prime Minister: this treaty was negotiated on a basis far removed from the harsh reality of the world we live in. Defence and security seem to have become incidental sacrifices to the worship at the high altar of heady diplomacy and international jurisprudence. It should never have proceeded as it did and, for that, I do not blame either of the Ministers sitting opposite, but I want the Minister to explain how the Government will fix it.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I wish to make some comments on Amendment 22 in my name, and I will seek not to transgress my time in relation to this one.

In Committee, the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Callanan, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, pointed out the difficulty arising from the fact that while the Mauritius treaty makes provision for the leasing of Diego Garcia by the United Kingdom, this does not change the fact that in the event that the Mauritius treaty is ratified, Diego Garcia would come under the sovereignty of Mauritius.

This is problematic for two reasons at least. First, the Republic of Mauritius is a signatory to the Pelindaba treaty, which means that no nuclear weapons can be held in the territory over which it is sovereign. Secondly, Article 7 of the Mauritius treaty expressly states:

“Each Party confirms that none of its existing international obligations or arrangements now in force or effect between it and any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, and that nothing in this Agreement shall affect the status of existing international obligations or arrangements except as expressly provided for in this Agreement”.


Can the Minister confirm—I know the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, has already made reference to this—that the Government have discussed this matter in its entirety with the Government of the United States and that they have confirmation from the US that they have secured their solemn pledge that no nuclear submarines or other nuclear weapons will be able to be taken to Diego Garcia if sovereignty is transferred?

I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say on that point. But I very gently say that while of course he must not discuss operational matters, this cannot be pushed as an excuse for dodging questions about compliance with international law. Any attempt to deploy that stratagem, to the point of avoiding the demonstration of compliance with international law when non-compliance is feared, would form a deeply troubling precedent.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to get up for the first time on Report and address your Lordships on this important group dealing with security matters. I will try to come to some of the points that have been raised.

I will come to the point about the letter that the noble Baroness raised, but I will start with the challenge that she put at the end to explain how the Government are dealing with the position on the treaty from a security point of view. This answers some of the questions that have been asked, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and I will not go into some of the operational points that have been made by him and others. However, on the security matters, I can say that if your Lordships look at the expressions of support for the security aspects of this treaty, all our major international allies and partners have supported the security arrangements. That is a fairly significant point for us to make and a fairly important point for the House to recognise.

To answer the noble Baroness, the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and the noble Earl, Lord Leicester: President Trump expressed support for the Diego Garcia arrangements within the treaty. US Secretary Hegseth said:

“Diego Garcia is a vital military base for the US. The UK’s (very important) deal with Mauritius secures the operational capabilities of the base and key US national security interests in the region. We are confident the base is protected for many years ahead”.


That was not me but the US.