Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Friday 21st November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I do not like this Bill, but I am here, like many other Members of this House, to agree on amendments that will make this a better Bill, and I hope it will be effective.

When my father died, the family nanny, who had also been his housekeeper, needed somewhere to live, and my brothers and I paid for her to live in a very nice care home, where she was entirely happy, until I went to see her. On each occasion, she said to me, “I shouldn’t be alive. I ought to die. It is not right that you and your brothers are having to pay for me”. I have this direct knowledge. She was perfectly happy when I was not there and, of course, we continued to look after her until she died.

But the Bill, once it is passed, is absolutely certain to be enlarged in all sorts of ways, as happened with other Bills in other countries once they became law. There are various reasons why it would be a good thing to enlarge it. For example, it seems to me bitterly unfair that those with locked-in syndromes such as motor neurone disease would be extremely unlikely to benefit from the Bill in the last six months, because many—those I have known—have been unable to do anything themselves in the last six months. The word “encouragement” is absolutely crucial. It does not have to be coercion. It does not have to be abuse. It could be nice people listening to a loved one and realising that they are saying, “I ought to die”, and consequently saying, “Yes, why not?” That would be extremely unjust.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, there is a profound irony in this group of amendments, because the Bill introduces far greater protection for vulnerable patients than exists under current law. Terminally ill people are currently vulnerable to all sorts of pressures from family members and others who may have their own agendas in seeking to persuade the patient not to continue with their treatment, to die or just to give up on life. The Bill introduces in statutory form a whole range of new statutory protections that simply do not exist in the standard cases of vulnerable people being encouraged not to continue with their treatment.

We see that in Clause 1(2), which summarises what the Act provides in some detail. Steps are to be taken, and they are taken under the Bill, to establish that the person concerned

“has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and … has made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it”.

Those seem to me to be very strong and very appropriate protections. The idea that we should proscribe encouragement will inevitably lead to the family members and friends of the person concerned, the person in the terminally ill condition, being worried that, if they discuss this difficult, important subject with their loved one or friend, they will be vulnerable to all sorts of sanctions under the law. That, I would have thought, is the last thing that we want. The application of these principles—and they are the right principles in Clauses 1 and 2—will inevitably depend on the facts and the circumstances of the individual case, so I, for my part, do not see the need for any of these amendments.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I am not a lawyer, and it is dangerous to follow the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but I think on this occasion he is mistaken. The fact that this kind of protection is not there until this Bill does not actually mean anything—perhaps it should have been there in any case—but, if we are going to have this protection, it needs to be proper protection.

I say to those who, at least today, live a privileged life that they ought to remember that there are many people in this country who, for the first time, are within touching distance of large sums of money, because the housing situation means that there are many old people who have houses of a value that those families have never seen ever before—grandma’s £200,000. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that, as somebody who was a Member of Parliament for 40 years and works now in a community, that this is a very real fact, and we just have to accept that some people in this House are a long way away from those people. I was brought up in a slum parish by a clergyman. I have spent my life trying to deal with the very people we are talking about. I think these amendments are crucially important, because we are talking about circumstances which we are about to change deeply.

The fact is that the Bill itself changes the way in which we think about old age and infirmity. I desperately want people to know that they are always valuable and always got something to give, even at the end of life. This Bill removes that. If we are going to have it— I hope we will not, but if we are going to—we must make sure that people are protected not just from coercion but from encouragement, which I am afraid is sometimes driven by a sort of misunderstanding of what we can give. I can see people who will say, “You know that your grandson is in some real difficulty. You have a last opportunity to do something worthwhile. If you die now, your house will save his marriage, will save his firm and will look after his future”. That is what will happen. We, who are in happier circumstances, should just remember that we have a deep responsibility for those people.

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[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group. I am a research director at Politeia, a think tank that has commissioned a great deal of work from lawyers and academics, including on this subject, but I speak in my own capacity as a historian. I associate myself with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths of Burry Port, and the right reverend Prelate, who reminded us that we are part of a whole society and not just one person against another.

I support these amendments because they aim to tighten this Private Member’s Bill and prevent it being unsafe by prohibiting inducement to assisted suicide by those who, for whatever reason—we have heard about the reasons—seek to induce, encourage, advise or influence another to take his or her own life. My Amendment 57A would prohibit someone from planting the idea in the person’s head and getting them to consider suicide as an acceptable or even necessary course of action, so inducing them to choose an assisted suicide, which he or she might not otherwise have considered as an option. Given that the planting of such an idea could be done in a number of ways, directly or indirectly, under the Bill as it stands, and given the gravity and irrevocability of the decision to end your own life, the safeguard is needed.

Let me illustrate this with a possible conversation between someone suffering from cancer, whose diagnosis indicates that he or she has no more than six months to live and is in a state of shock and misery and depressed at the idea that nothing can be done, and a relative, friend or person such as a doctor, social carer, social services provider or someone else in a professional position. The person talks about the diagnosis and their feelings to the other party, who might reply: “Have you considered an assisted death?”, “I know someone who didn’t want to go through with the whole thing until the bitter end, and the doctor was very supportive” or “Others find it very helpful to plan an assisted death; it’s straightforward and can all be prepared for. The family can be with you at the time and you just doze off”. None of these possibilities is ruled out by the Bill as it stands—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

What is the difference between that conversation and the conversation that happens every day, in tragic personal circumstances, where the relative or friend says to the dying person, “Have you considered giving up your chemotherapy”?

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for the intervention but, if he will permit me, I would like to finish. We can imagine many different sorts of conversation. If noble Lords would like to hear more examples, I am sure they will ask for them.

None of these possibilities is ruled out by the Bill as it stands. They would not be considered an instance of coercion or pressure. Nor will it be possible when this Bill becomes law to investigate with due legal process whether someone has been instrumental in inducing a person to assisted suicide, provided they are covered by the terms of the Bill. Clause 34 outlaws dishonesty, coercion and pressure, and Clause 35 the destruction of documentation or the falsification of what purports to be a declaration, but the Bill does not address other means of inducing someone to opt for assisted dying. Under Clause 32, criminal liability for providing assistance will be removed from the Suicide Act 1961; as will civil liability under Clause 33, which stipulates that

“providing assistance to a person to end their own life in accordance with this Act”

or assisting a person to end their life while performing a function under the Act does not of itself give rise to any civil liability.

Moreover, the Coroners and Justice Act 2009—the duty to investigate certain deaths—will be amended so that the reference to unnatural deaths does not include a death caused by the self-administration by the deceased of an approved substance within the meaning of this Bill. Similar changes will be made in respect of arrangements for medical certificates under the new regulations and for Schedule 1 on suspension of investigations. These changes mean that there will be no effective way of investigating improper behaviour after an assisted death has taken place. The Bill already, in effect, recognises this problem by making absence of coercion and pressure a condition for eligibility for someone to be given assistance to die under its provisions. It opens the possibility to object to an assisted suicide going forward on the grounds that the person about to die has been coerced or pressured.

Furthermore, Clause 10(2) gives the first doctor—the co-ordinating doctor—the duty of ascertaining that the person concerned has not been coerced or pressured. We have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and others who have great professional experience in looking after people with terminal and other grave illnesses how difficult it is to establish coercion. It is often very difficult to establish coercion. It is true that the Bill wants to establish coercion—or so it alleges—but, as has been argued, the grounds are too narrowly defined.

A person in a poor mental state, because of their terminal diagnosis, is especially likely to be open to suggestions from other people, especially figures of authority such as their doctor, or their own family, whom they want to believe are thinking only of them. If we want to be sure that the decision to have assistance to die is genuinely their own, it is not enough just to rule out coercion or pressure. We need also to outlaw subtler, more insidious, but no less effective forms of persuasion. There is a danger that, if the Bill includes, as it does now, just a prohibition on coercion and pressure, the inference will be drawn that any form of encouragement or inducement, so long as it is not coercion or pressure, is allowed. Surely that is not what the proponents of the Bill would want.

The noble and learned Lord the sponsor and his co-sponsor are putting forward the Bill under the banner of giving dying people more choice over what happens to them, and providing greater freedom. Surely, in pure consistency with this underlying purpose, they must be intent on ensuring that the irrevocable choice a person makes to undergo assisted suicide is genuinely that person’s free choice, and therefore must support the amendment I am proposing, and indeed the amendments that others are proposing.

I hope that we can go even further. If my amendment is adopted, a further provision could be added to Clause 10(2), making it the duty of the co-ordinating doctor to ascertain not just that there was not coercion or pressure but that the idea of assisted suicide was not suggested to the person by another party.

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[Lord Gove (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 52, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. I do so as the Government Chief Whip who helped ensure that the Serious Crime Act 2015 was placed on the statute book, and as the Justice Secretary who was responsible for some of its provisions thereafter.

I am hugely grateful to the noble Baroness for raising the vital question of domestic abuse and violence in the context of coercion. I do not believe that this has been suitably explored, canvassed or analysed before. I would be grateful for the reflections of the Bill’s sponsor on how we might protect some of the most vulnerable in our society.

I will respond very briefly to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who pointed out that there may well be inadequate protections for those people who are coerced or persuaded into declining treatment that might prolong their life at the end of their life. There may well be inadequate protection and a case for stronger protection but, as has been pointed out before, there is a world of difference between declining treatment that might preserve your life and having a lethal injection that will end your life. It is a point that the medical profession fully understands and one that should be firmly borne in mind.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

This is at the heart of the Bill. Is there really such a profound difference between an individual being able to say, “I’m going to stop chemotherapy” or “I’m going to stop eating because my life is intolerable”, and that person saying to the doctor, “I wish to have a potion that will have the same result”? There is a difference, but the main difference is that the person can die with dignity.

[Lord Gove (Con)]

I think there is a profound difference, but the noble Lord has made his point and I shall allow others to judge whether the narrowness of the distinction that he draws is appropriate.

On the whole question of domestic violence, the legislation that was introduced in 2015 specifically introduced the idea of coercive and controlling behaviour as an aspect of domestic violence: the idea that domestic violence need not require physical harm. It was an advance in the law that was brought forward by my friend Robert Buckland in that legislation. It was absolutely vital and it made us a world-leading jurisdiction in recognising the danger of this particular type of abuse and violence.

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[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

It might help noble Lords to know that we are being followed on Twitter. This issue—I am aiming to save time—of the Pannick dilemma has been commented on by Philip Murray, who is a law lecturer at Robinson College in Cambridge. He said the following, and we may wish to seek his advice:

“I find it astonishing that various Lords”—


forgive me for the embarrassment—

“including those who should know better (Lord Pannick …), keep conflating withdrawal of treatment and assisted suicide. The act/omission distinction has underpinned morality and law for millennia”.

I hope that either of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick or Lord Dobbs, will reach out to this gentleman to aid all noble Lords so we will not spend any further time on that dilemma.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, may I just say that other views are available in the legal community, including among many distinguished judges who I will not name. There are many law reports that question this distinction, not least for the reasons that have just been given.

[Lord Mackinlay of Richborough (Con)]

My Lords, the debate on this matter this morning has been enlightening from all sides, with many with many distinctive speeches that will stay with me, including that of the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, who brought a very personal account, though he is no longer in his place.

We are talking about concepts and words—whether it is encouragement, coercion or pressure. They are in a similar collective of words, and I worry that we are dancing with words a lot in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, brought the word “autonomy” to us this morning, which is very important. I know it has been described earlier in Committee and on the Floor here today. I would be significantly more encouraged and relieved if I could be absolutely sure that autonomy and freedom of action, freedom of movement, freedom of thought and of decision were clear, unambiguous and untainted. I cannot be assured by the Bill, as it stands, as it is weak on the coercion nature.

As I left the Chamber earlier—my wife had arrived— I thought back to the cases of Ruth Ellis and Derek Bentley, which were very significant as they stopped the death penalty in this country. It was a long time ago when the morality and thoughts of this country were in a very different place to today. One might talk about the deterrent effects of the death penalty—which is a whole different debate—but we were willing to put that aside because of the potential of getting things wrong, and we did not want miscarriages of justice. That was so powerful. However, here we are discussing this Bill with lots of suggestions on how we could strengthen the coercion measures and make sure that people are not being pushed towards an early death that they did not want. We are almost flippant about that because the unsaid words are, “They’re old and ill anyway, so they don’t really matter”.

In support of Amendment 58 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, my noble friend Lord Deben—with whom I do not always agree on everything—made a very powerful point. If you were to look at the bell curve of the wealth and status of us in this Committee, we are probably to the left of the public politically, but certainly to the right in terms of wealth and influence as a whole. There is a world of difference between how, if we were to face this, we would be treated—the voice we would have for ourselves and the way in which our families would know they have agency and power to speak—compared with others in society. It could be that the wealthy family would be in a different place, because they could afford the help at home and the support in a care home as necessary.

However, for those in the middle who perhaps have children who work away, which is increasingly likely in this country, the children are feeling guilty. There are lots of cases that have been talked about the real situation of how people feel. In cases of that type there may be no problem of wealth, but problems of support by children and others. The “I don’t want to be a burden” debate would be coming to the fore.

One of our Northern Ireland colleagues mentioned the issue of saying, “Do you know how much this costs the NHS?”. I will be exploring that in greater detail. I think Amendment 3 touched on having an independent person; I have laid amendments for another day examining whether the NHS should be part of this process at all.

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that I could be encouraged but I am not sure how we can overcome the facets and dimensions of autonomy and coercion, because people and families are complex. One’s situation in life is complex. Just as we were willing to change a major piece of criminal legislation on the back of two errors, we seem to be not so interested in looking after the vulnerable in this Bill. I wish I could advance an amendment that would satisfy me—a lot of these amendments would make me a little more satisfied—but, no matter what we do, I am tempted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, in saying that we need to look at this whole area of coercion and pressure all over again. It is absolutely apparent across this Committee that this is the sticking point for many of us, so please try to satisfy us.

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[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, this has clearly been a long debate, and I think for good reason. As one noble Lord said, coercion and pressure are a major concern for many people about the way the Bill is written. I will very briefly respond. I am well aware of the time, but a lot of points have been made. Noble Lords will all be relieved to know that I am not going to go through them all.

First, the word “encouragement” is taken from the Director of Public Prosecutions guidelines, and for good reason, because the Director of Public Prosecutions recognised the power of a person in authority over a person who is vulnerable. That is why it tends towards the prosecution of assistance coming from a person in authority. I would include doctors in that, but it was also thought to include prison staff, nurses and others employed in that role.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am sorry to interrupt. There have been a number of references to the DPP’s guidelines. For accuracy, will the noble Baroness accept that paragraph 45.5 of the guidelines says:

“A prosecution is less likely to be required if … the actions of the suspect may be characterised as reluctant encouragement … in the face of a determined wish on the part of the victim to commit suicide”?

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

For the sake of accuracy, I completely accept that. Perhaps the noble Lord might also see, while I am speaking, whether I am correct that the guidelines would tend towards prosecution if a person in authority was encouraging. That was my understanding.

I will raise a few points. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, absolutely hit the nail on the head when he pointed out that, if we had had a royal commission and went through the processes and so on fully, we might be in a different place now. One of the big problems we have encountered in looking at this Bill is what has been deemed to be in or out of scope. If you do not have the services available, you do not have true choice. That is a real problem, yet those of us who have tried to table amendments to bring specialist palliative care provision into scope to match and stay parallel with any developments in assisted dying services have repeatedly been told—I have checked, and it is in the Companion that we cannot extend scope—that this was deemed out of scope. Therefore, we feel a bit stuck about how we can make sure that people get the services they need.

The Minister pointed out something in the Bill that has been a concern to a lot of us: that the family do not have to be informed. Behind that is the concern about grief. Let us take a 19 year-old with an osteosarcoma with metastases. The parents have been looking after him from childhood through to all his treatment, doing all they can to enhance his quality of life. He says that he now wants to go for an assisted death, and he does not want his parents told. The first thing that the parents hear is a phone call to say that he is now dead, having had lethal drugs. They may be aware of a whole lot of issues that have been going on in that 19 year-old’s life, which they would have shared with those involved in his care. This is pretty close to some patients whom I have looked after, because someone developing into an adult when terminally ill is very difficult, as are the transition issues.

There is another aspect to that. Having spoken to and heard from people who have a relative who has gone for euthanasia—it is usually euthanasia rather than assisted suicide—they often feel devastated that their love was not enough to support the person. They feel that they have failed, and they ask why they could not have helped the person find ways forward or access the services they need. I will quote from the commission chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, with Demos, on the lack of services. It states:

“The Commission does not accept that any of these forms of pressure could be a legitimate motivation for a terminally ill individual to seek an assisted death. Therefore, it is essential that any future system should contain safeguards designed to ensure, as much as possible, that any decision to seek an assisted suicide is a genuinely voluntary and autonomous choice, not influenced by another person’s wishes, or by constrained social circumstances, such as lack of access to adequate end of life care and support”.


The motivation behind many of the amendments discussed today has been precisely to deal with that problem.

I will address two more things, beginning with the concept of how sure someone has to be. The civil standard of proof of 51% seems remarkably low when determining the eligibility of someone having lethal drugs. The implication in the debate in the other place was that the doctor should not ask the person, “Why is it that you want to end your life?” Yet in clinical practice, whenever patients say, “I’ve had enough; I do not want to go on”, you answer that with one question, another question and then another question. It feels like an onion: you take layer after layer off, and you find out what is happening. You find many remediable aspects to their situation—they might often seem trivial to some people, but they have been wearing the patient down.

I am horrified, frankly, whenever I hear of inadequate care and of people not getting the pain relief that they need. Morphine does not kill you; it is a good drug for pain relief, given appropriately in the right dose at the right time for the right reason. That is what prescribing analgesia is about. That is completely different to giving a massive overdose of lethal drugs—and, as we know, not all the ones in the world have been fully assessed.