Lord Pannick
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(1 day, 14 hours ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I stand to oppose the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and to suggest that it is vital that these clauses stand part of the Bill, because protest is strongest when it is open, accountable and proud. A movement that hides its face borrows the language of secrecy; a movement that stands unmasked invites public judgment and moral authority.
History teaches us that the most effective and morally persuasive movements were led openly. Emmeline Pankhurst marched into the public square and faced arrest and imprisonment without concealment, because the suffragette cause depended on moral clarity and public witness. Arthur Scargill led the miners in mass action, visible and unhidden, because solidarity is built on faces and names, not anonymity. Martin Luther King Jr stood on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial and in the streets of Birmingham with nothing to hide, because non-violence and moral authority require openness. Mahatma Gandhi led millions in acts of civil resistance with a visible, symbolic presence that made the movement impossible to ignore.
The Government’s own summary of the Bill is clear about the purpose of these measures. It refers to:
“A new criminal offence which prohibits the wearing or otherwise using of an item that conceals identity when in an area designated by police under the new provisions”.
That designation is constrained by a statutory trigger:
“A designation can only be made … when the police reasonably believe that a protest may or is taking place in that area, the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences and that a designation would prevent or control the commission of offences”.
These are targeted powers, aimed at preventing criminality while protecting lawful assembly. It is not about silencing dissent; it is about responsibility and transparency. The fact sheet also notes a practical enforcement tool:
“The bill also creates a new power for the police to require someone to remove a face covering during a protest”.
That power underlines the expectation that those who lead and speak for causes should be prepared to be seen and held to account.
I mentioned older historical protest leaders, but I can bring the Committee more up to date. Contemporary political figures continue to lead visibly. We all have tremendous respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who has led a few protests in the past. I have looked at about 50 absolutely magnificent photos of the noble Baroness protesting in Westminster and other areas. She has been at the forefront of various Green Party protests. She said that she had been protesting all her life, but I could not find any of her as a schoolgirl at the anti-Vietnam War or Aldermaston protests.
She has a varied repertoire: stop the police Bill; stop pension financing; outside the Royal Court of Justice with a banner saying “Neither Confirm Nor Deny”; stop fracking in Lancashire; stop dumping sewage, South West Water; renters’ rights; and many more—all with her trusty loudhailer. She also said that part of protest was to cause inconvenience and disruption. I suggest that the three of them on the green holding up a banner against Guantanamo Bay did not cause much inconvenience.
The serious point, as I tease the noble Baroness, is this: in every single photo, after her last 50 years of protest, she and her colleagues had their faces uncovered, demonstrating modern political leadership in public demonstrations. To all other organisations I say that, if the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, whom I admire as a conviction politician, can protest so frequently with her face uncovered, so can and should everyone else. So I say, “Go on, organisers: encourage openness, train you marshals and make sure your aims are clear”. To the police I say, “Use these powers proportionately and protect lawful assembly”. To the public I say, “Support the right to protest and expect those who lead to do so with courage and transparency”.
I conclude by saying that, when protest is unmasked, it persuades rather than intimidates; it invites debate rather than hiding behind anonymity. That is how movements achieve lasting change.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, that was a powerful speech, but it really is not the case that all protesters are in the position of Martin Luther King, Emmeline Pankhurst, Mahatma Gandhi and the noble Baroness herself. There are protesters who have good reason for wishing to conceal their identity. If I am a protester against the current regime in Tehran and join a protest in London in order to express my views, I will be genuinely and properly concerned that my identity being revealed may well lead to action being taken against my family and associates in Tehran, and I have a very good reason for not wanting to have my identity disclosed.
I am concerned that Clause 118(2) is too narrow. It provides a defence for a person who has concealed their identity: showing that the reason they are wearing a mask is for
“a purpose relating to the health of the person or others, the purposes of religious observance, or … a purpose relating to the person’s work”.
Those are the only defences. That does not cover the example I gave—I could give many other examples—of the protester concerned about what is going on in Tehran. So I suggest to the Minister that, although I do not support the wish of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, to remove these clauses, I do think she has a point about the narrow scope of the defences in the clause.
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made her point so ably that I was not tempted to speak, until I heard the counter-speech from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. It is simply ahistoric to suggest that the suffragettes—those protesters who everybody loves now but who were once incarcerated and tortured by the British state—
There are designations that we have set down in law and there are designations that are not set down in law, but the measure is a proportionate one that the police can undertake, and in the event of an individual knowing that that is happening, they can accordingly take their own measures and decide to either protest or not protest. That does not curtail the right to protest.
The measure does not ban face coverings at every protest. An individual can go to a protest; they can wear a face covering for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, has outlined, and only if the police believe that criminal actions could be taken is that area designated. Then it is a matter for the individual, and I believe a majority of peaceful, legitimate protests will not be captured by this legislation, and the police must take great—
Lord Pannick (CB)
The Minister is making a very powerful case but I ask him to focus on the defences which he has recognised. I do not understand why it is a defence for me to show that I wore a face mask because of my religion, but it is not a defence for me to prove, the onus being on me, that I wore a face mask because I was protesting against the Iranian regime and I have family in Iran.
I hear the point that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, makes. We have drawn a line in the defences. I come back to the principle that the power to be used by the police officer, not the Government, is to determine this in the event of suspected criminality occurring.
There may not be, in the case that the noble Lord has mentioned, the need for that designation, because the police may make a judgment, which is their judgment to make, that a protest outside the Iranian embassy, for example, would not lead to potential criminal activity. That is the judgment that we are making. That is the line that we have drawn. I see the point that he has made, but that is the defence that I can put to him today. Because—
My Lords, I cannot tell you how much energy and self-control it has taken to stay seated, with all these interventions and comments. First, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his very kind comments and the photographs, which have obviously brought back a lot of very nice, happy memories. I thank him for that. The other aspect to my having to exercise loads of self- control in staying sitting down is that I get very agitated —very irritated, in fact—and I scribble all over the papers I have in front of me, which sometimes makes it difficult to reply fully. I am going to do my best, and I beg the patience of the House in allowing me to go through all my scribbles.
I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Fox, and the noble Lords, Lord Strasburger and Lord Marks, for their support. I am very grateful. Obviously, this is a day that will go in my diary: the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, actually agreed with something I said. That is quite rare.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I did not necessarily agree that the Baroness, Lady Jones, should be mentioned in the same sentence as Martin Luther King and Emmeline Pankhurst—I just wanted to make that clear.
I thank the noble Lord. I would like to say, by the way, that I did go to Aldermaston, but my first real protest was in 1968 when I was 18. I went on a CND rally, and it was peaceful—at least, I think it was; I cannot remember.
It is not difficult to counter the arguments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. He talked about my being brave enough—perhaps he did not use the word “brave”—to go to protests without a mask, but, of course, I am a highly privileged white female and he is a highly privileged white male. It is not for us to say who might be vulnerable and who might not, and who might fear reprisals and who might not. Let us remember that there are people who live in fear of other people, and those people could easily be deterred from going to protests.
On the points from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and the Minister, the fact is that the police have enough powers already. If they really are requesting this, surely the Government should have a little bit more pragmatism about what they are passing. The fact that the Minister is so happy that two Tories are supporting him is something I honestly find quite shocking. If they are the only people he can rouse to support him in your Lordships’ House, that really says something—and I do not mean for any of you to stand up and support him: it is not necessary.
On the issue of the police getting confused, because the legislation at the moment is very confused—there is so much of it—
Lord Pannick (CB)
The amendments in this group are motivated by understandable concern about the decision of the Supreme Court in the Ziegler case, which is [2021] UKSC 23. The noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Faulks, made powerful submissions relating to that case.
The Committee may wish to be reminded that the Supreme Court reconsidered the statements made in Ziegler in the abortion services case, which was [2022] UKSC 32. Further guidance on the issues in Ziegler was given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, as the Lord Chief Justice in the Cuciurean case, which is [2022] 3 WLR 446. The Supreme Court said, in the abortion services case, that it is not for the jury or the magistrates in each individual case to assess whether the conduct of the defendant is protected by human rights law. That was the concern, as I understand it, of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester suggested that that is highly desirable, but that is not the law.
In the abortion services case, in paragraphs 63 to 66, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, who is the President of the Supreme Court, spoke for a seven person Supreme Court. It was an enlarged court because of the importance of the issue. He addressed the principles. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, said at paragraph 63:
“The first question was whether, in a case where the exercise of rights under articles 9 to 11 of the Convention is raised by the defendant to a criminal prosecution, there must always be an assessment of the proportionality of any interference with those rights on the facts of the individual case. The answer is no”.
In paragraph 64, he said:
“The second question was whether, where an offence is liable to give rise to an interference with the exercise of rights under articles 9, 10 or 11 of the Convention, it is necessary for the ingredients of the offence to include (or be interpreted as including) the absence of reasonable or lawful excuse in order for a conviction to be compatible with the Convention rights. The answer is no”.
Paragraph 65, says:
“The third question was whether it is possible for the ingredients of an offence in themselves to ensure the compatibility of a conviction with the Convention rights under articles 9, 10 and 11. The answer is yes”.
The position under the law is that the prosecution will say that Parliament has enacted a specific offence; that is the law of the land, and it is simply not open to the defendant to say that they are entitled to seek to overturn the ingredients of the offence by reference to convention rights. The law of the land is set out in the criminal offence. Therefore, respectfully, much of the criticism of Ziegler fails to recognise that the courts themselves have understood that Ziegler went too far, and that what Parliament has determined in relation to the law is the governing law—notwithstanding Articles 9 to 11 of the convention.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I have a couple of amendments in this group. First, I say to the right reverend Prelate that the peaceful religious processions that he had in mind, such as those at Easter, were not the sort of processions that the chief constable of Greater Manchester Police had in mind when he recently said something to the effect of him having seen an appalling increase in aggro and violence in demonstrations, and that:
“The intolerable has become normalised”.
That is quite different from the peaceful processions that the right reverend Prelate had in mind.
Before I turn to my amendments, I want to say how much I enjoyed the Minister’s winding-up speech in the previous debate. He was in absolutely top form, especially in his demolition of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I suspect that most of the best bits in his speech were not written by his officials; I shall treasure them. I hope that I do not become a victim of such a wonderful oration against me.
I have two amendments in this group. The first is quite small, simple and titchy, and the second is slightly more complicated.
Clause 122(2) says:
“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that they—
(a) had a good reason for climbing on the specified memorial,
(b) were the owner or occupier of the specified memorial, or
(c) had the consent of the owner or occupier”
to do so. My first amendment would delete the general excuse of having a “good reason”. The only defences left for a person charged with an offence under Clause 122 would be that they were the owner or occupier of the memorial or had the consent of the owner or occupier to climb on it. I wonder about “occupier”; I presume that that is to cover memorials that are not just statues but buildings, such as the Hall of Memory in Birmingham. I would be grateful for a slight elucidation on what is meant by the occupier of a memorial.
I turn to the proposed new clause in my Amendment 378B. It is simple in principle but looks a bit complicated. It simply reproduces the operative test, as well as the definition of “community”, in the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023 and would put them in the Bill, giving them primary law status. This would improve legal certainty and parliamentary scrutiny.
Many clauses in the Bill, and many of the amendments, speak of
“serious disruption to the life of the community”.
We may conclude from this that the disruption must be pretty serious indeed to qualify as “serious”. However, that is not the case since the previous Government passed the 2023 regulations, which defined and, some commentators would say, diluted the concept of serious disruption.
In plain terms, my proposed new clause would place in the Bill all the illustrative examples and interpretive tests introduced in the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations. As I suggested, those regulations make amendments to provisions in the Public Order Act 1986 concerning the meaning of the expression
“serious disruption to the life of the community”.
Section 12 of the Act gives the police the power to impose conditions on people organising and taking part in public processions. A senior police officer can exercise this power if they reasonably believe that a procession may result in
“serious disruption to the life of the community”.
Serious disruption to the life of the community is not defined in the Act itself, but Section 12(2A) sets out a non-exhaustive list of examples that may constitute serious disruption.
The 2023 regulations refine that list. The amendments to Section 12(2A) and (2B) of the Act also provide that, when considering whether a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption, a senior police officer must take into account the disruption that may occur regardless of whether the procession is held, as well as the disruption that may result from the procession, and may take into account the cumulative disruption that may be caused by more than one public procession or public assembly in the same area. The amendments also provide that the term “community” extends to anyone who may be affected by the public procession regardless of whether they live or work in the vicinity of the procession. They state that “disruption” is anything
“that is more than minor”,
in particular to
“the making of a journey”
or access to goods and services. The regulations define this as
“access to any essential goods or any essential service”,
including access to
“the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel … a system of communication … a place of worship … a transport facility … an educational institution, or … a service relating to health”.
That is what the regulations say in redefining
“serious disruption to the life of the community”
in the Act. Although my amendment looks complicated, it simply suggests that those regulations should be incorporated into the Bill as primary legislation. Transferring the regulations into the Bill would bring legal clarity—the police, courts and organisers would read the statutory test directly from the Act rather than a separate statutory instrument, reducing uncertainty about where the operative tests are located. It would mirror the stated purposes of the 2023 regulations to provide greater clarity. It would bring consistency of application—putting the tests in primary legislation would reduce the risk of interpretive divergence between different SIs or guidance and make the threshold for imposing conditions more visible to Parliament and the public. The cumulative effects would be preserved—the clause could, and should, reproduce the regulations’ treatment of cumulative effects so that multiple impacts are properly captured, as the regulations already contemplate cumulative assessment.
Of course, the Minister will say that embedding illustrative examples in primary law makes future policy adjustments harder and might require primary legislation and time to respond to unforeseen operational guidance. However, I suggest that retaining my proposed new clause, to secure clarity and parliamentary oversight but add a short delegated powers safeguard—a power to change it in future by regulations—would be perfectly okay.
I support Amendment 369A on pyrotechnics at protests tabled by my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower on the Front Bench, but it does not go far enough. I cannot think of any lawful excuse for possessing pyrotechnic articles while taking part in a protest. Protests are a vital part of our democratic life. They are a place for voices to be heard, grievances to be aired and change to be sought. But they are not a place for devices that can cause panic, injury or irreversible escalation. Pyrotechnics are designed to startle, burn, explode and smoke; they are not tools of peaceful persuasion. To allow a defence based on an honestly held political belief risks turning lawful protest into a dangerous theatre of risk and fear. Public safety must be paramount.
There are a few other things I could say about pyrotechnics at protests, but I will cut short my remarks in the interests of time. I see no justification whatever for anyone to have pyrotechnics at any protest or for there to be a lawful defence for it.
Lord Pannick (CB)
The Minister responded to the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, and their understandable concerns about the protests outside the Israeli-owned restaurant in Notting Hill by saying that this is a matter for the police. Have the Government no position on whether it is acceptable for people who are dining in an Israeli-owned restaurant to be subject to abuse and intimidation of the sort that we have seen on London streets?
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord Polak, in thanking my noble friend Lord Walney for all his hard work and leadership in seeking to secure a fairer balance in this context. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Hain, I positively welcome government Amendment 372, because it will ensure that the police must take account of cumulative disruption when exercising their power to impose conditions on public processions and assemblies.
The amendment will be, and is, particularly welcomed by synagogues and their members, whose access to and from Saturday prayers has been regularly disrupted by hostile, abusive and intimidating crowds of protesters. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester suggested that we should look at intention here, but whether that is the intention of the protestors, it is the effect, and it is very damaging to the right—and it is a right—of worship.
With great respect, the noble Lord, Lord Hain, should recognise that there are competing rights here. There is not just the right to protest but the right to go to a synagogue, to have access to a synagogue, to be able to leave a synagogue, and not to be deterred by hundreds of abusive protesters protesting in favour of a particular cause. The noble Lord made the point that cumulative protests may be very effective, and I am sure he is right about that in many contexts. However, the point of government Amendment 372 is not to stop protests or people expressing their view about matters of public policy. The question concerns where the protest takes place, and why it is necessary to go past the same synagogue with hundreds of people every Saturday, preventing those who wish to exercise their right of religious observance—and their right to get there and to leave—doing so peacefully and securely. Yes, protest, but you do not have to do it in the same place, along the same street, every week. The street has no significance for the protester, but it has a real significance for those who want to go to the synagogue.
The noble Lord, Lord Hain, says that the right to protest is not in conflict with the right to religious observance, and he is right. The problem arises, as here, where the protesters go along the same road each week. As I say, they do not have to go along that road; they can protest somewhere else, and that is what this amendment is concerned to achieve.
The amendment would reintroduce, with an improvement, the secondary legislation introduced by the previous Government which was held to be unlawful by the Court of Appeal in a case brought by Liberty. Contrary to what the noble Lord, Lord Hain, suggested, the secondary legislation was held unlawful by reason of matters other than cumulative disruption. The Court of Appeal did not say that the cumulative disruption provisions in the statutory instrument were unlawful. It said that other parts of the statutory instrument that sought to define the circumstances in which protest was unacceptable were unlawful, not those on cumulative disruption. Amendment 372 is an improvement on what the previous Government introduced because it imposes a duty on the police to have regard to cumulative disruption. The statutory instrument introduced by the previous Government merely conferred a discretion.
I turn to Amendments 373 to 378 from the Opposition Front Bench. I am grateful to the Opposition Front Bench for producing these amendments, which would vary the criteria in government Amendment 372 by focusing attention, for the purposes of cumulative disruption, not on the geographical area in which the public procession or assembly is repeatedly held but on whether the repeated procession or assembly concerns “the same subject matter”.
I recognise that these amendments are well motivated, but I do not support them. The vice of cumulative disruption is that it occurs repeatedly in the same geographical area—for example, in the same street near the synagogue—and causes disruption every Saturday. To focus on whether the repeated protests concern “the same subject matter” misses the point. I am also concerned that legislating with reference to the same subject matter will inevitably provoke disputes over how the police should apply such a criterion. Protesters would inevitably say that last week’s march was in support of Gaza, this week’s is against the Netanyahu Government and next week’s is against the policy of the Trump Administration. I am very doubtful that a specific reference to 50 metres, as proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain, would suffice. It all depends on the size of the protest and the nature of the premises, does it not? This is a context where police discretion is desirable.
Finally, I have added my name to Amendment 380, tabled by my noble friend Lord Walney, which would apply the duty to take account of cumulative disruption to the power to prohibit public processions. The same reasoning that justifies the Government’s wish to require cumulative disruption to be considered in relation to the power to impose conditions also justifies a duty to take account of cumulative disruption in relation to the power to ban a public procession.