Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 27th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

My Lords, I have received two requests to speak after the Minister, from the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Kennedy of Southwark.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, in fact the Minister answered my question in almost her final sentence. It was about the status of callouts when considering this data. Police callouts are available to family courts and to sentencing criminal courts in domestic abuse cases. My question was going to be about the availability of that information to DAPOs, but I think that the Minister answered it in the affirmative.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I did indeed.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 25th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, this is a solid piece of legislation and I hope that the process on which we are embarking will make it better. I remind the Committee that I sit as a family magistrate in London, so I regularly deal with all types of family-related cases, including parental alienation.

The noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, gave a heartfelt speech; I found it very moving. She has clearly endured the most difficult of circumstances. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, gave closely, carefully and well-argued support of the amendments to which she put her name.

In family courts, as everyone has acknowledged, you quite often hear allegations of parental alienation, and a normal scenario is different from what we heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer. A more normal scenario is that the parents are separated, the father has not seen the children for a while—too long—and he makes a private law application to see his children. The mother says there has been domestic abuse—or there have been allegations of domestic abuse—and the father makes a counter allegation, almost as a defence, saying that the mother is alienating the children against the father. That scenario is quite common. It is for the courts to try and sort it out, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, got it right when she said that both domestic abuse and parental alienation allegations can be either true or false. It is the job of the court process to sort that out.

I want to add two other observations. First, it is the duty of the court to get the best result for the child; we are not there to get a fair result for the parents. The question that we often ask ourselves is: “How do we get the voice of the child into the court?” One usual way of doing that is through Cafcass; there is an interview with a very experienced Cafcass officer who gives their view about what would be best for the child, and that view can be examined in the court. The way that Cafcass looks at these issues will be examined later in other amendments.

There is another way of doing it, which happens very rarely. I have not done it myself, but I have done it in public law cases, and that is where the child tells the court what they want. In the scenario where I was involved, a child was going to be taken into care by social services, and I have to say, it was extremely moving. The children whom I have done this for were well aware of the realities of the situation, and they were very aware that they were saying different things to the court—to me as the magistrate—than they had been saying to their parents. My experience is that children understand these situations; they can be toxic and extremely difficult, but nobody should underestimate children’s ability to understand the difficulty of their family situation.





I do not come down for or against these amendments, as such. It is a difficult situation. Other noble Lords made the point that there are many ways that parents can undermine and be unpleasant to each other that are not to the benefit of the children. One noble Baroness referred to the Bill as a potential Christmas tree of abusive relationships, and this does not help, because there are many varieties that one sees in court. Nevertheless, the central point I make to the Committee is that it is the court’s role to come up with the best solution for the child, not what is fair for the parents.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, first, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Meyer, who is right to highlight the protection of children. I acknowledge, empathise and sympathise with her terrible experience of parental abduction, which, as she said, led to her being alienated from her children for years. We know that domestic abuse has devastating consequences, not only for adult victims but for their children, which is why the Bill rightly recognises children as victims in their own right. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, pointed out, this is very much part of the court proceeding, as has also just been articulately outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. Some of the protections that have been outlined in the Bill, such as preventing cross-examination in courts, mitigate this in some ways.

I also agree with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, in questioning the judicial training that must support the outcome of such proceedings, whatever it is. We know that child arrangement cases involving domestic abuse or allegations of abuse often include allegations of alienating behaviours, where one parent seeks to undermine or frustrate the other parent’s relationship with their children, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, also outlined. These actions, as my noble friend highlights in her amendment, are often referred to as “parental alienation”.

My noble friend Lady Helic, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, pointed out how the term has so often been used to sidetrack from the issue of domestic abuse. She pointed out that the pro-contact culture of the courts quite often leads to the wrong decisions being made.

To answer my noble friend Lord Polak, there is no widely accepted definition, nor a commonly held framework, for parental alienation. Instead, views are wide-ranging: some focus on the parent’s behaviour, some focus on the child’s behaviour and others focus on the impact or outcome of the behaviour. For these and other reasons, I refer instead to “alienating behaviours”. That phrase is used in the guidance, as the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Bennett, point out. The guidance will be subject to consultation after Royal Assent. The beauty of the House of Lords is of course its scrutiny of Bills. To that end, we very much welcome views on how to deal with this issue.

Alienating behaviours can include a range of attitudes and actions. Some are subtle, such as drip-feeding negative views, while others are more obvious, such as deliberately flouting child arrangement orders. I am clear that these behaviours are wrong and problematic, but they are not limited to cases involving domestic abuse. They occur in the context of acrimonious separation and other high-conflict cases, as was pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. I have sympathy with my noble friend’s wish to address these behaviours, but I submit that the definition in Clause 1 for the purposes of the Bill is not the right context in which to do so.

Alienating behaviours should be considered primarily in terms of the impact on the child. Most noble Lords referred to that and to the potential emotional and psychological harm to the child that can result, for example, from repeatedly hearing negative views about a parent or being prevented from spending time with a parent. From the perspective of risk of harm to the child, the relevant legal framework is provided for in Section 1 of the Children Act 1989, together with the Section 31(9) definition of harm in that Act.

I accept that alienating behaviours can, in some circumstances, be indicators or manifestations that point to a wider pattern of psychological or emotional abuse. To be absolutely clear, I do not accept that alienating behaviours should be defined as domestic abuse in their own right. However, in circumstances where such behaviours are indicative of a wider pattern of emotional or psychological abuse, we can be confident that the Clause 1 definition already applies and renders the proposed amendment unnecessary.

Our approach in Clause 1 is to define domestic abuse by reference to different types of abusive behaviours and not by reference to the form in which those behaviours may be expressed or manifested. If we were to include within the Clause 1 definition a list of possible indicators under each type of abuse, we would risk appearing to give more weight to one form of behaviour and therefore creating a hierarchy of behaviours. Should a particular indicator or manifestation of psychological or emotional abuse not be listed, it may be deemed to be less serious or, worse, not a form of abuse at all.

The arena in which we can most effectively address alienating behaviours as potential indicators of a recognised type of domestic abuse is the statutory guidance under Clause 73, which has been published in draft. I have gone through how that will be consulted on. It has been created and continues to be edited in consultation with the sector. As I said earlier, we welcome further suggestions on how the guidance can be further strengthened, including in the area of alienating behaviours. Once the Bill is enacted, the Home Secretary will formally consult the domestic abuse commissioner and other key stakeholders before the guidance is promulgated.

I note the points by my noble friends Lady Gardner of Parkes and Lady Chisholm that the unintended consequences might be to swing the pendulum of this good Bill the other way. My noble friend Lady Newlove warns of parental alienation creating a loophole in which to perpetrate abuse. I give the final word to the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, who warns that, if these amendments are accepted, victims might be painted as abusers.

I hope that, in the light of this explanation and our commitment to address alienating behaviours in the statutory guidance, my noble friend Lady Meyer can withdraw her amendment.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 5th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I welcome the Bill and the opportunity it gives to improve the position of victims of domestic abuse, both in the community and in the family court process.

I remind the House that I sit as a criminal and family magistrate in London, and I served on the pre-legislative Joint Committee for this Bill in 2019.

I wish to make one point, which I will be pursuing at later stages of the Bill. At Report in the other place, the Government introduced Clause 64 to Part 5 of the Bill. This provides new measures to support victims of domestic abuse during court proceedings. The clause provides the court with the power to appoint a publicly funded, qualified legal representative in the interest of the party who is prohibited from cross-examining in person, and that party is usually the father. The Bill gives specific instances where cross-examination should be prohibited—that is, where there are previous convictions or cautions for domestic abuse-related offences.

The Bill goes further than this in that it allows family courts the power to prevent a party to proceedings cross-examining another party or a witness where it would either diminish the quality of the evidence given or cause significant distress for the person being cross-examined. So there is a wide discretion in the Bill for the courts to decide that the conditions are met whereby domestic abuse victims do not have to be cross-examined by the alleged perpetrator. The proposed situation would be very similar to the current one in criminal courts, where there is already a power to appoint a lawyer for the purposes of a cross-examination if it is in the interests of justice.

Obviously, I welcome this move. It is a step in the right direction, but it does not go far enough. The structure of family proceedings differs significantly from that of criminal proceedings. In criminal proceedings, the complainant and defendant will come together only once, at the trial itself, whereas in family proceedings there will be a number of hearings where both parties are in the court before the cross-examination process.

Under the Bill as currently worded, a lawyer may be appointed for a relatively small proportion of the overall legal process. This raises two principal problems: first, whether the advocate can do their job effectively if they are playing only a small part in the process; and secondly, and perhaps even more significantly, whether a litigant in person can navigate the rest of the court process. In my experience, litigants in person find it difficult to follow the instructions of the court and frequently fail to comply with all the elements of a court order. There are plenty of potential flashpoints in the whole process, not just at the cross-examination. Surely it would be better to appoint a lawyer for a larger part of the legal process, if not the whole process. I realise that this is a question of resources but, at the very least, there needs to be active monitoring to see how enhanced legal support will smooth the legal process and result in better outcomes for the children. The outcomes need, of course, to be fair and to protect victims of domestic abuse, but the primary objective of a family court is to reach the best result for the children.

I will support my noble friend Lord Rosser in other matters that he will raise, but I broadly support the wider aspirations of the Bill and I support other noble Lords who will be speaking on this as well.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 21st September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, congratulate the two maiden speakers. The noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, spoke about the importance of arts and sport in prisons, and I know from my experience that that is indeed an important aspect of the rehabilitation process. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester spoke about the experience of Manchester through the bombing and his expectations of the Bill with a particularly perceptive analysis, and I look forward to his contributions through its later stages.

The measures in the Bill build on recent emergency legislation. They are based on the Government’s conclusion that there are some terrorism offences where the maximum sentence available is too low for the gravity of the offence committed. Since 2000, the Government have enacted 11 different pieces of legislation, with a ratcheting up of the sentences and controls available to the courts. The Bill provides changes in the sentencing, release and monitoring of terrorism offenders.

We on the Opposition Benches will not be opposing this legislation, but the elephant in the room, which has been discussed although it is not part of the Bill, is the effectiveness of the de-radicalisation programmes and the Prevent programme: they are not working sufficiently.

The point was made by a number of speakers on this Bill that just adding extra time for the offenders to spend in custody will not solve any problems unless there are better-tailored programmes. It was made by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, the noble Lord, Lord Sheikh, and my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, who went on to make the important point that there needs to be full resourcing of deradicalisation programmes, as they are very resource heavy.

I have been contacted by two trade unions, the Prison Officers’ Association and the National Association of Probation Officers. Their members are on the front line and have to deal with the consequences of legislation. The POA makes a number of points—first, that this legislation will inevitably lead to an increase in the cohort of prisoners detained under the Terrorism Act; it is currently about 230 prisoners. Consideration will therefore need to be given to the headroom available in the long-term high-security estate, with the ability to separate Islamist and far-right terrorist offenders. What plans do the Government have to meet this expanded population?

The second question the POA has raised is the same point made by Peter Dawson, director of the Prison Reform Trust and a former prison governor, that denying prisoners hope will cause their good behaviour to deteriorate. This will potentially lead to an entrenchment of a sense of grievance, which can be dangerous for both prisoners and staff. This point has been made by many speakers in today’s debate. It also re-emphasises the point that it is mistaken to remove the Parole Board from considering certain types of terrorist offences. This too may enhance a sense of grievance with certain prisoners.

NAPO has raised points on how the proposed changes will affect its members, the probation officers. In particular it mentions MAPPA, the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements, which are briefly mentioned in the Bill. The Bill does not mention the agencies to be included within MAPPA, but clearly it would include enforcement agencies such as the police and the Prison and Probation Service. I and NAPO believe it very important that other agencies—such as mental health agencies, social services and NHS England—are included in this as well. The point is that all these agencies should be named and have a statutory obligation to work collectively. This is a point the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made and one we have seen in many other aspects of work in the Courts Service, not only in the context of this Bill.

The probation officers further referenced Clause 5 of the Bill, under which non-terrorist offences with a maximum sentence of more than two years can be found to have a terrorist connection and their perpetrators therefore sentenced under the Counter-Terrorism Act. The Bill does not define what a terrorist connection is—presumably this is for the court to decide—but I argue that, without some guidance or statutory definition, this could lead to a widening of the net and inconsistency in sentencing between cases.

On TPIMs, my right honourable friend David Lammy at Second Reading in the other place gave a succinct history lesson on the changes from control orders in 2005. We have had a similar history lesson today from a number of distinguished noble Lords. The central point made by my right honourable friend is that in a sense we are going full circle. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, supports the lowering of the standard of proof, and Jon Hall, the reviewer, has raised concerns about the removal of the two-year limit on TPIMs so that they could effectively be indefinite. This is something we wish to examine closely as the Bill progresses in this House.

A further point is that a balance needs to be struck. We are dealing with people who are not guilty of any offence but suspected of terrorist activity. The balance is between liberty and security, and the wider community—particularly the community from which the suspect comes—needs to see that what the Government are doing is proportionate and that people are not wrongly convicted.

I am not a lawyer, and maybe I do not give proper weight to the importance of particular definitions of proof, but for me the central point is that the safeguards need to be in place to protect innocent people while protecting the public from potential acts of terrorism. The public need to understand that this is the primary purpose of this legislation.

I am very aware that many speakers in today’s debate have been active in and following this type of terrorism legislation for many years, but in recent days I have spoken to many young people who are also following these debates. We need to remake the arguments for all the elements in this Bill. We need to convince young people that the legislation is proportionate and necessary and strikes the right balance between liberty and security.

In opening, my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer said that the detail of this Bill matters a lot. I agree. It is the role of this House to look at the detail and steer this Bill to a suitable conclusion.

Policing and Crime Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 16th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, Amendment 228C stands in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe of Idlicote. I apologise, as I have before, that I have had to dip in and out of the debates on this Bill, for reasons I think noble Lords will understand.

This amendment concerns the victims and witnesses of serious crime and its purpose is to prevent the disclosure of a victim’s identity to the accused when there has been a serious sexual assault and the accused is a stranger. The need for this amendment is best illustrated if I briefly recall a disturbing incident. About 30 months ago, a person, whom I shall call “M”, was followed by a stranger off a bus and subsequently attacked. There was an attempted rape and threats to kill her if she did not stop screaming. Fortunately, two off-duty police officers heard the screams and arrested the attacker. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, will recall that M gave harrowing evidence to a seminar that she chaired last month. M told Peers that, later at the police station, she was horrified to learn that her full name had been given to the assailant. He did plead guilty and was handed down a seven-year sentence but, understandably, M is now terrified that, on release, her assailant will find her and attack again. She contacted Voice4Victims, who worked out that he will be released on parole in July next year. M has changed her name, moved home and deleted her name from the electoral register, but she still fears that, by using the internet and social media, he will trace her.

She is not alone: other women have reported similar experiences. One woman reported dropping a case of sexual assault after learning that the attacker had been given her name. Another reported, “I am still scared every day that the guy who did this will be released and he has all my details”. That was also a case of attempted rape. She said that it would have been much safer for her if she just had not reported the attack. M has contacted the police and the Met have responded, saying:

“There is no specific policy or legislation which covers the issue of providing the name of a victim of rape to the suspect. Instead it is an operational decision taken by the officer in the case on a case-by-case basis”.

This came from the office of Commander Christine Jones. M has written to the police heads in all 32 London boroughs. What emerged is that there is no uniform policy at police stations. Most confirmed that, yes, they did disclose. Some said that they did not and that it was a matter for the court. Most were unsure. This situation is not satisfactory and is putting vulnerable female victims at risk. It is not a matter of the right of the accused knowing the accuser. As they are strangers, the use of initials or a single letter would be enough. At court, special measures can and are applied for, but by then it may be too late.

The amendment makes it clear beyond doubt that disclosure puts victims at risk—anonymity does not. The clause, which was drafted for me by Voice4Victims, stipulates that disclosure is prevented if it is reasonable to assume that disclosure would put the victim at further risk of harm. In determining the concept of “reasonable”, the police would take into account previous convictions, mental health issues and, indeed, access to IT. This should mean that in practice names are never given to perpetrators.

I hope that the Minister will recognise the serious circumstances which have led me to table this amendment. I hope that the Government will accept it today, but if for any reason there are technical difficulties with it, I would ask that they bring their own amendment at a later stage, so that this serious matter is properly addressed and victims are not caused additional and unnecessary distress, and potentially serious consequences, because of the current uncertainty as to the requirements of the law. I beg to move.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. I was sent the same briefing as him, so he has largely said the same as I was going to say. I just remind the Committee that I sit as a magistrate in central London and I deal, not with issues of this seriousness, but certainly with issues of harassment and others of that nature. There is one other factor that I want to add, on what I understand the legal position to be, which I took from the CPS website. If the police want to apply for anonymity for a victim and believe that they have proper grounds to do that, they can apply to a magistrates’ court but, indeed, I believe police officers can give that anonymity if they believe that there is a proper case for it. They have to reapply for anonymity when a trial happens, either at the magistrates’ court or at the Crown Court.

As the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, said so clearly, many of the police who were contacted about this issue simply did not know what the law was and they gave wrong advice to the young woman who was asking for advice. This is very worrying and is very likely to discourage other young women from coming forward. That is really the importance of this amendment.

[Baroness Howe of Idlicote (CB)]

My Lords, it certainly seems extraordinary that there is no policy for legislation determining whether to disclose the identity of a victim of serious sexual crime to the alleged stranger perpetrator. It seems to me that, while nothing is gained by disclosure in the police station, it could be very damaging to the victim. It is relatively easy, in today’s society, for anybody with access to the internet to trace and find the whereabouts of any person, just by having their name.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Howe of Idlicote]

My Lords, I want to add a few words of support for this amendment. Four years ago I was fully in support of the creation of the offence of stalking, which involves putting a person in fear of violence, serious alarm or distress. Although the maximum sentence is five years, there have been a number of disturbing and unduly lenient court sentences for perpetrators who had been stalking their victims for a decade or more.

I recently met Claire Waxman who has been referred to and who had been hounded by a relentless stalker for 13 years. Her case highlighted the struggle that stalking victims face in the criminal justice system. It was one of the key cases given as evidence in the stalking law reform and it took over a decade for her perpetrator to receive a substantial custodial sentence. In those years, Claire said, “I felt completely failed by the justice system for allowing my long-term stalker to receive suspended sentences or very short jail sentences. These sentences served little purpose as he continued his criminal behaviour each time. I strongly believe had we been able to refer this case to the Attorney-General for the Court of Appeal, he may have received the right sentence earlier on, saving me from years of unnecessary harm and distress”. I very much hope that the Government will see a way to support this amendment fully.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

My Lords, I also support this amendment, to which I have put my name.

As I mentioned in an earlier debate, I sit as a magistrate in central London for crime, youth and family matters. I have been a magistrate for just over 10 years and have seen a big change in the nature of crime which we deal with in London. While there is a decreasing overall amount of crime brought to courts in London, there is a rising proportion of crime related to domestic abuse. We all receive specialist training on that matter—we have specialist courts and are very careful about the way we deal with those matters in court. It is an ever increasing proportion of our workload, so I have given out many restraining orders and have also dealt with many breaches of restraining orders. When one gives a warning to somebody who has been given a restraining order, one can never really be too stark in explaining to the offender just how serious it is. Many times you get the impression that they do not appreciate the seriousness of their activities.

Even when a defendant has been acquitted and found not guilty, you can still put in place a restraining order if you believe it is suitable, and you still have to give a suitable warning for that restraining order being put in place. The amendment deals only with people who have been convicted, but restraining orders can be put in place when people are acquitted as well.

The purpose of this amendment is as a backstop to provide the ability to have higher sentences where the courts have put in place unduly lenient sentences. The maximum is five years, but very often there needs to be a facility and an ability to increase sentences if they are felt to be unduly lenient.

[Baroness Brinton]

My Lords, one of the major concerns is that stalking is not used as a charge often enough. It is still too easy to charge with the offence of harassment, rather than stalking. We really need to make sure that the criminal justice system recognises and understands stalking—that was the law reform in 2012 that we worked hard to achieve. However, it is also important to recognise that some cases of stalking are consistently appalling and are also coercive behaviour.

The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, referred to the case of Emily Maitlis’s stalker who had previous convictions, including breaches of restraining orders in 2008, 2010, 2013, 2014 and earlier this year. I am sorry to say that that is not uncommon behaviour with stalkers and there needs to be the facility for the courts to apply for more serious custodial sentences where orders are consistently breached—not least the way that the stalking and coercive behaviour continues. One of the problems we have heard time and again from victims of domestic violence, stalking and coercive behaviour is the way other courts are used—the civil courts or family courts that do not recognise restraining orders that have been held elsewhere. We heard of information, which had not been passed to the family courts, of one former stalker who had been trying to get in front of his ex-partner through the family courts. It is very necessary to have this limited use but essential tool available for the judiciary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, I will speak also to Amendments 231 and 231A in this group; all are also in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe. The amendments address issues related to digital crime review, surveillance and monitoring offences, and digital crime training and education. I am grateful to Harry Fletcher of the Digital-Trust for his assistance in drafting these amendments. First, they consolidate the numerous statutes that have been enacted over the last 30 years, a period that covers the huge expansion of illegal digital activity. Secondly, they aim to update the law to address the most recent online behaviour. Thirdly, they attempt to ensure that police officers are properly trained in respect of digital crime.

The growth in online crime has been truly immense. Two years ago the head of the College of Policing said on Radio 4 that half of all crime reported to front-line officers had a digital element. By now, it represents a majority of crime. More than 30 separate Acts of Parliament cover various aspects of this category of crime, from the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 to the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014. Inevitably, such a plethora of law lacks clarity and is confusing for the police in undertaking their responsibilities.

The Computer Misuse Act 1990 was originally intended to deal with hacking, unauthorised access, stealing data and circulating viruses. Yet between 1990 and 2006 there was on average just one conviction per month. Parliamentary Answers show that between 2007 and 2013 there was a slight improvement—the number of guilty outcomes increased to 1.5 each month across England and Wales. My amendments would place a duty on the Secretary of State to review and consolidate the existing legislation. In doing so, the Minister would of course consult the police and other relevant bodies.

Many online activities may not be covered by current statutes, however. The amendments clarify the situation. For example, use of a digital device to repeatedly locate, listen to or watch a person without legitimate purpose becomes a specified offence. Similarly, installing spyware without the user’s agreement would be an offence, as would taking multiple images of a person, unless it is in the public interest.

In a very timely report, published on 3 November, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary warned that some forces risk being overwhelmed by the volume of digital evidence being collected. It said that there was a significant shortfall in digital skills in the police and unacceptable delays in fulfilling basic tasks such as getting data off mobile phones. It also noted that some forces were not capable of dealing with the amount of digital evidence being gathered, especially in cases such as harassment, sexting and serious domestic abuse. This is a worrying state of affairs and supports the urgent need for comprehensive digital training for all police officers.

I now turn to the extent and type of digital crime. According to the Digital-Trust, digital abuse is rising steeply as a result of five identifiable factors. First, there is the increased use of technology at work and for social interaction and entertainment. Secondly, ever-increasing technological complexity results in increased risks. Thirdly, technology has become too intricate for victims to recognise the threats and know how to respond. Fourthly, surveillance technology has been consumerised and is available to abusers. Finally, the volume and speed of change makes it difficult for individuals, organisations and, indeed, the criminal justice system to react in a timely fashion.

Many types of behaviour are seen in digital abuse, including, first, unwanted communications by phone, text, emails, electronic messaging and social media; secondly, intimidation, including the posting of threats of physical violence and humiliating victims by posting explicit photographs; thirdly, grooming, using online information to groom a victim financially or sexually; and fourthly, surveillance, illegally accessing accounts or using computer technology to monitor movements, conversations and contacts. The phenomenal growth of online crime threatens to overwhelm those who may be expected to move against the perpetrators. There is a pressing need to step up action, and the authorities need the law to facilitate and support the initiatives which are now urgently needed. I beg to move.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

My Lords, I rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, who has made almost all the points I was going to make. I am very conscious that there has been a large and ongoing investment by government to address the changing nature of digital crime. Metropolitan Police officers now routinely wear body cameras, we have large investments in data collection and the presentation of data in courts, and the CPS is grappling with the changing nature of crime. This is a massive amount of investment, and a massive amount of data has to be handled to go through the court process properly.

I want to make a point that is slightly different from the one made by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. In my experience, digital is also changing the nature of crime in the domestic context. I have seen films of police officers going into houses where there is a domestic dispute. The situation is very stark and is seen immediately. I suggest that digital makes it much more likely that there is an early guilty plea in such cases. The whole context of crime is changing—not just digital crime but the way more traditional crimes are perceived and the likely conviction rates of those crimes. I support the amendment.

Modern Slavery Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Monday 1st December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I want to underline what the noble and learned Baroness has just said for a particular reason. The Government have been keen on saying that, in accepting the European arrest warrant, they want to make clear that they will not allow it to be used for offences committed in other countries which are not offences here. In those circumstances it is most important that we get the offences here right in parallel with what is an offence in another country. It is that point which I think the noble and learned Baroness has put her finger on and it is that which we have to get right.

I question the Government’s view on the restriction of the European arrest warrant. However, if they want to do that, they have to make sure that we do not find ourselves in a position where we have ill defined a particular offence so that it does not operate in the way we would like it to do in any complementary legislation in other countries. I hope that my noble friend will consider this suggestion very carefully, probably not at this moment, but between now and the next stage of the Bill, as it is worth trying to get this matter right.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I will comment on a slightly wider point and back up my noble friend on the definitions of trafficking and exploitation. She spoke about the benefits of having stronger definitions of trafficking and exploitation and referred to the comment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, that stronger definitions could lead to the prevention of trafficking and exploitation. I will add that a benefit of having clear and strong definitions is in the identification of trafficking. Here I am talking specifically about identification when one is in court.

As noble Lords may know, I sit as a magistrate in both adult and youth courts. I have sat in youth courts on quite a few occasions where a young person has been brought in for either pickpocketing or shoplifting and a man is sat at the back of the court who we are told is the young person’s uncle. We have received training on what to do when our suspicions are raised with regard to the status of the person sitting at the back of the court, who is there supposedly in the interests of the youth appearing before it.

I know that the YOTs, the probation service and the police have also received training on this matter. It is important that we have clear identification and that the courts can act quickly when they think this issue is being raised, because when one is actually going through the court process, one does not have very long to identify potential victims of either trafficking or exploitation. Therefore, it is important that this definition is as clear as possible and is well known by the various agencies that deal with young people—and not so young people—who may have been trafficked.

Serious Crime Bill [HL]

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, to a considerable extent I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, but want to go rather further. I thank the Government for, and indeed welcome, Clause 62 as far as it goes. I should like to give particular thanks to the previous Minister of Justice in the other place, Damian Green MP, who has always been open to listening to Action for Children, for which I am largely speaking; I am also speaking for the NSPCC. He has been extremely helpful in giving us an opportunity to put our points of view to him. It is largely due to his diligence that the clause is in the Bill, so I thank him very much.

Clause 62, as far as it goes, is good but does not go far enough. The purpose of my Amendment 40BZB—supported particularly by Action for Children, and warmly supported by the NSPCC—is to update and bring into the 21st century Section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. I have to tell noble Lords that 1933 was the year in which I was born, and it really is about time that we had 21st-century legislation. I am a relic of that period but the law should not be. I am supported in this amendment by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, whom I thank very much.

The purpose is to identify in criminal terms serious neglect and emotional abuse. “Neglect” is in the 1933 Act but does not include the effect of neglect on children and all sorts of emotional abuse that children suffer. Neglect is the most widespread and potentially most serious of all forms of abuse because it is, in itself, largely neglected. It is not seen. There are appalling stories where the police have identified a problem and discovered that they could not take any action by, for instance, threatening the family with some sort of criminal proceedings because the abuse and neglect that they see does not include the emotional abuse of things such as frozen awareness. Some noble Lords may know what I mean by that—for example, a child aged two sitting in a corner, not moving because of the way in which they have been treated. The police, who may come into a family, see and understand this but have to go away and tell the social workers, who may or may not take family proceedings in the magistrates’ court but are not obliged to do so. The police cannot warn the family that if they do not mend their ways they may become the subject of criminal proceedings.

The purpose of this updated legislation is not to put families in the criminal court but to try to push them, by a combination of threat and cajoling, into behaviour that will save the children who are in their care. My amendment, therefore, puts in modern wording such as,

“physically or emotionally ill-treats, physically or emotionally neglects”,

and removes altogether the words “unnecessary suffering”. I totally agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, that “unnecessary” should not be there, but “suffering” is not the word we use nowadays. In the Children Acts and other adoption and child-related legislation we talk about “serious harm”, “substantial harm” or some such phrase. One should get rid of “unnecessary suffering” and get this legislation to join the rest of legislation on children by using “serious harm”. As regards the criminal side of this matter, we then need to explain what “serious harm” means. Proposed new subsection (6) in my amendment sets that out.

It is with some hesitation that I do not entirely agree with the noble Baroness on proposed new subsection (6)(b). I have to say that having battled with the Minister in the other place over inserting “recklessly” instead of “wilfully”, and being told that there was a firm view against doing that, Action for Children, the NSPCC and I, together with some MPs from the Commons, believed that we should explain what “wilfully” means. That is why we have put in,

“that a person with responsibility for a child foresaw that an act or omission regarding that child would be likely to result in harm, but nonetheless unreasonably took that risk”.

That allows the word “wilful” to remain, since the Government seem to want it, but also explains it so that everyone—particularly the police, and indeed people who ill treat their children—understand exactly what it is about.

I very much hope that the Government will now listen to what is being said in this House, although they failed to do so in the other place. I very much urge that this should be looked at again.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 40BZC, which is in my name. I, too, welcome this clause. My amendment, which is promoted by the Children’s Society, finds a different way to address the same issues we have already debated in this group. As the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, said in her introduction, there are currently a number of inconsistencies in the law. My amendment finds a particular way to try to address them.

The amendment changes the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 to increase the age of a child victim of cruelty and/or neglect from under 16 to under 18. I argue that it is a simpler approach than some of the other amendments in the group. It would bring the criminal law into line with the rest of child protection legislation and would send a signal that 16 to 18 year- olds should be protected in the same way as children who are younger than 16.

The latest statistics, with which I was supplied by the Children’s Society, show that, in 2013, 14,290 children aged over 16 were children in need because of either abuse or neglect. A further 1,110 children aged over 16 were recognised as children at risk of significant harm and placed on a child protection plan. Of those, some 290 children had emotional abuse listed as the main category of their abuse.

As some members of the Committee will know, I sit in family court, youth court and adult court as a magistrate. I can clearly say that the most disturbing of those three jurisdictions is family court. You deal with some extremely vulnerable people—and some extremely vulnerable young people. It would be no surprise to anyone who works in either the youth or family jurisdiction that 16 and 17 year-olds are among the most vulnerable groups we deal with. I believe that they should be given the same protections as those aged under 16.

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

I rise to support the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on behalf of myself and my colleague, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Truro, who chairs the Children’s Society. The Serious Crime Bill rightly seeks to update the law on neglect of children. We welcome the Bill and the Government’s commitment to seeking to improve the response to victims of emotional neglect. The current law is outdated and inadequate. We also support the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss.

The UK is one of the only countries in the world that fails to recognise emotional neglect as the crime it is. It is to the Government’s credit that they seek to address that through the Bill. However, I believe that the Bill should go further and increase the age a child can be defined as a victim of cruelty and neglect from under 16 to under 18, which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, seeks to do through his amendment. By changing the law in this way we can, for the first time, offer protection to all children from cruelty and neglect.

I, too, am grateful to the Children’s Society for its briefing, and I shall offer a story that it gives of Jessica. Jessica was known to social services because of the neglect and abuse she experienced in her family. When she was 16 the relationship between her and her family deteriorated and she was forced to move out of her family home. In the next year and a half she experienced unsuccessful placements in a hostel and bed and breakfast accommodation. Experiences of neglect at home made it difficult for her to form meaningful relationships. During that time, starting with her first unsuccessful placement in a hostel, Jessica became a victim of sexual exploitation, started using drugs and developed mental health problems. Stories such as Jessica’s mean that we need to ensure that this measure applies to all children under 18.

This definition is the one enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. It is in the Children Act 1989, which governs what safeguarding responses children should receive if there are concerns about their well-being. The PACE codes of conduct for the police were amended last year so that all under-18s are treated as children. From a safeguarding point of view, children should be viewed as being under 18. Sixteen and 17 year-olds can be very vulnerable. The statistics mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, showed that. Yet they do not always get access to the services that younger children can receive. Professionals often see 16 and 17 year-old children as more resilient than younger children. They are often seen as more able to avoid abuse, or more grown-up and therefore more able to cope. It does not help that the criminal law aiming to deal with the perpetrators of child neglect does not cover 16 and 17 year-olds. This sends all the wrong signals that they are not as vulnerable as younger children.

The Government’s other reforms increasingly recognise that 16 and 17 year-olds are children. For example, they are not normally treated as adults under the benefits system. The position has recently been reinforced through the rules of the new universal credit system—a basic condition of entitlement for which is that the claimant is at least 18. That was debated in this House when the Welfare Reform Act 2012 went through Parliament. I would like to hear from the Minister why children aged 16 or over cannot be considered at risk of neglect and why the new law on emotional neglect should not apply to them.

Serious Crime Bill [HL]

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 8th July 2014 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

31: Clause 36, page 28, line 7, at end insert—
“( ) In section 97 (confiscation orders by magistrates’ courts), for subsection (1) substitute—
“(1) The Secretary of State shall by order make provision for enabling confiscation orders under Part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (confiscation: England and Wales) to be made by magistrates’ courts in England and Wales.””

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, my amendment is concerned with confiscation orders in magistrates’ courts. Under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, magistrates’ courts lost their power to make confiscation orders. They had previously had this power for appropriate offences under the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Magistrates continue to this day to have responsibility for the enforcement of confiscation orders.

Section 97 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 gave the Secretary of State power to make provision for magistrates’ courts in England and Wales to impose confiscation fines of up to £10,000. This would have to be done by means of an affirmative instrument. While Section 97 has been brought into force, it only gave the Secretary of State the power to make provision by order. In the intervening nine years, this has not happened. Given that magistrates used to have this power, and continue to play a role in the non-payment of confiscation orders, I can see no reason why this should not be taken forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, as the Proceeds of Crime Act currently operates, a confiscation order may only be made by the Crown Court. As a result, if someone is convicted of an offence in the magistrates’ court and the Bench considers the case is appropriate for a confiscation hearing, the matter must be referred to the Crown Court. This is clearly not the most effective use of resources for handling simple cases. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, notes, there is already legislation on the statute book that would enable the Home Secretary to modify Part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act so as to enable confiscation orders to be made in a magistrates’ court in cases where the criminal benefit did not exceed £10,000. The relevant legislation can be found in Section 97 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005.

I can fully understand the frustration of the noble Lord, as a sitting magistrate, in having to refer all confiscation cases to the Crown Court when it would be perfectly possible for straightforward cases to be dealt with in the magistrates’ court, subject to that £10,000 threshold. The noble Lord is all the more frustrated given that the legislation to allow magistrates’ courts to make confiscation orders has been on the statute book for almost 10 years, as he pointed out. The provision in Section 97 of the 2005 Act had, of course, already been on the statute book for five years when this Government came to office. Like the previous Administration, we judged that there were other priorities for improving the asset recovery regime and responding to serious and organised crime, including the setting up of the National Crime Agency. However, we are now working towards enabling magistrates’ courts to make confiscation orders, including putting in place the necessary judicial training from spring 2015.

Given that we are now actively working to implement a scheme empowering magistrates to make confiscation orders, I hope the noble Lord will agree that his amendment, which places a duty rather than a power on the Home Secretary to make such a scheme, is unnecessary. I would be happy to update the noble Lord in the autumn on progress in this area. On that note, I hope that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.

Turning to Amendments 31A and 31B, my noble friend Lady Hamwee indicated that her intention was not to remove the power to vary the £10,000 limit by order but simply to seek an assurance that there would be proper consultation before the order-making power was exercised.

Generally, our approach is that magistrates’ courts should be able to make confiscation orders only in less serious cases. However, there may be situations in which the defendant has been convicted in the magistrates’ court but is potentially liable to an order greater than £10,000. Such a case would still need to be sent to the Crown Court to be dealt with. The order-making power in the clause allows for the £10,000 threshold to be varied if the evidence following implementation shows that the limit is generally too low.

Once we have brought into effect the provisions allowing for confiscation orders to be made in magistrates’ courts, we will keep the arrangements under close review. I assure my noble friend that before any change is made we will consult with the senior judiciary, the Magistrates’ Association and other practitioners as to whether the £10,000 threshold can sensibly be raised.

I also remind my noble friend that this order-making power is subject to the affirmative procedure, so any change would need to be considered and approved by both Houses. I hope that with these comments I have been able to provide my noble friend with the assurance she is seeking.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for that answer. I think we got half a step forward. She said that there would be training in 2015 but could not quite go all the way and say when magistrates would actually receive these powers. Nevertheless, as I said, this was a probing amendment. I have got a little bit more information so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 31 withdrawn.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 14th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend the Minister for accepting the amendment suggested by my noble friend Lady Hamwee which excludes offences committed by young people and excludes minor offences as well. However, I share other noble Lords’ concerns about this additional sanction. As I said in Committee, in the aftermath of the riots a couple of years ago, the courts clearly showed how seriously they took offences committed during a riot—far more seriously than if those offences had been committed at some other time. It does not appear to be necessary to have a further sanction in order to deter rioters. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said that this is a power given to the courts. I am a great believer in the courts and in the fact that they will make the right decisions. But I fail to see why we need this power. I cannot think of circumstances where a court would allow such an order to be made. Therefore, I see this power as being superfluous.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to repeat a point I made briefly at Second Reading, following up on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about Wandsworth Borough Council. I, too, checked with serving councillors regarding what happened subsequent to the 2011 riots. It is my information that the council did not pursue the repossession of its property. Although it had the powers, the council decided that it was not in its interest or that of the tenants to pursue the matter. Therefore, I agree with the points that have been made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. One has to question the motivations of the Government for pursuing this legislative change when a council which sees itself as a flagship of the Conservative Party has not pursued the avenues that were open to it.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, and my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett, have already made a strong case for deleting Clause 91. The Government, of course, have put down amendments that make some changes to that clause, but do not address the basic objections, which have also been expressed for a second time by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, about the disproportionate impact of eviction on other members of the household who have not engaged in such riot-related behaviour. The Joint Committee on Human Rights was not moved by the references to judicial discretion, so clearly it did not rate very highly in its thinking as a safeguard. The Joint Committee also expressed the view that it was the job of criminal law, not civil law, to deter riot-related offences, and to administer sanctions when such offences were committed. As has been said, courts when sentencing, quite rightly, already take a much more serious view of offences committed as part of a riot, and under cover of a riot, as was shown by the sentences given to those convicted following the riots in 2011. Many people were sent straight to prison when they probably would not have been given such a sentence if the offence had not been committed in association with the riots.

Clause 91 does not just relate to offences in the locality in which the offender lives, but covers such offences anywhere in the United Kingdom. It is clearly seen as an additional punishment by the Government, and it is not related to the experience of victims in the locality in which the offender lives. The Government are seeking to make some amendments so that Clause 91 would not apply where under-18s are convicted of a riot-related offence or in respect of the most minor offences. However, that still means that, since Clause 91 relates to repossession where a person residing in the dwelling house has been convicted of a riot-related offence, the penalty of eviction affects everybody else in the house. People who are guilty of no crime, such as pensioners with a son or daughter living at home, or children whose older brother or sister, aged 18 or over, has been convicted, are the innocent victims of Clause 91.

It will certainly act as a deterrent to a member of a household reporting another member of the household to the police for rioting if they know that the effect of such action, which surely we should encourage not discourage, would be to find themselves evicted as a result, under the terms of the clause. Why do the Government take the view that riot-related offences justify repossession and eviction when they do not take that view over equally serious or more serious offences? In addition, why do they think that those who commit riot-related offences away from their own locality and who own their own home or live in a house that is owner-occupied should face no further penalty other than the sentence of the court for the crime that they have committed but that those who live in rented accommodation should not only receive and serve the sentence of the court for the riot-related crime that they have committed but face eviction from the house in which they live in their own locality, along with other members of the household, who could include the tenant, who have committed no riot-related offences—indeed, no offences at all—and will be made innocent victims of Clause 91? The Government say that the Bill is about victims, but this clause creates victims.

The amendment to delete Clause 91 is in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, and my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett. It is that amendment that we will support if a vote is called.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Monday 2nd December 2013 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

56J: Clause 94, page 66, line 10, at end insert—
“( ) Provisions should be put in place under a designated senior police officer to ensure scrutiny of decision making through a local scrutiny panel.
( ) The strategy and usage of cautions and out of court disposals should be reviewed by a local scrutiny panel on a regular basis.
( ) The use of cautions and out of court disposals for serious cases and repeat offenders should be particularly scrutinised.”

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a probing amendment, which seeks to put in place a scrutiny element in decision-making through a local scrutiny panel. I have taken the wording of the amendment from the recently published government document, Review of Simple Cautions, which was written by the College of Policing and the Government and was published in November this year.

Scrutiny is a method by which out-of-court disposals can be reviewed by magistrates, district judges, PCCs, the police, the probation service and YOTs. In London, I understand that MOPAC, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, would take the lead.

I understand that the necessary legislation is in place for scrutiny panels to be established and that a number of PCCs have already introduced some form of scrutiny panel. The prime purpose of these panels is of course to help the public maintain confidence in out-of-court disposals. I am moving this probing amendment because I believe that the rollout of scrutiny panels has been very patchy across the country. As far as I know, no scrutiny panels have been established in London, and I believe that that is a cause for concern.

It is worth reviewing the figures relating to the massive change in recorded crime that we have seen in recent years. In 2008, there was a maximum of 360,000 cautions. Currently, the number of cautions issued by the police is about 200,000, which represents a huge reduction. In London, in our youth courts over the past three years we have seen a halving of the number of cases brought to court. There are any number of explanations for this huge reduction in recorded crime, and I shall not go through all the possible ones. However, I will list some of them because I know that they have been widely debated in the press and elsewhere.

The first is that there is indeed a genuine reduction in the level of crime, which of course is to be welcomed. A second explanation that is commonly advanced is the cuts to the police service. A further explanation is the massaging of reported crime figures, as was alleged in the Public Administration Select Committee on 19 November. A further explanation is the removal of police targets for offences brought to justice. Another is that the police are concentrating resources on gang-related offences rather than specific drug-related ones: namely, possession with intent to supply. That explanation is specific to the London area.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for tabling his amendment. As he explained, it is probing in nature and seeks to establish a local panel to scrutinise the strategy and use of cautions and out of court disposals in particular. I listened carefully to the reasoning given for the reduction in crime; there were some interesting comments.

I draw your Lordships’ attention to the out of court disposals review that is currently taking place, in partnership between the Ministry of Justice and the police, and in conjunction with the Home Office, the Attorney General’s Office and the Crown Prosecution Service. The review will look at all out of court disposals currently used against adults and consider how they might be reformed. The aim is to ensure that out of court disposals are as effective, simple and transparent as possible. The review includes conditional cautions and community resolutions, both of which will be subject to the community remedy. This public consultation was launched on 14 November to seek the views and experiences of professionals, victims’ organisations and the public. The consultation will conclude on 9 January and the review as a whole will conclude later in the spring.

Two key themes of the review—picking up on a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby—are transparency and accountability. The consultation asks the public to consider whether they think there is more information about out of court disposals that should be shared; whether they are able to hold the police to account for the way that out of court disposals are used; and how they think that the Government can make the out of court disposal system more accountable.

In particular, the consultation asks for views on what sort of offences out of court disposals are appropriate for. I agree that the use of cautions for serious offences and repeat offenders requires careful consideration in each specific case. The Review of Simple Cautions, to which the noble Lord referred, has already been completed. The review made it clear that cautions should no longer be used for indictable only offences, and certain serious either-way offences, unless there are exceptional circumstances, and that those who persist in criminal activity should no longer expect to receive a caution. Those changes have been made to the guidance on simple cautions.

The out of court disposals review is also looking at this issue. Currently, the guidance for all out of court disposals indicates that they are available for all offenders, but are primarily intended to address first-time offending. The latest data, for 2012-13, show that 60% of those getting a caution—that is, either a simple or a conditional caution—have not received a previous caution.

On the issue of senior officer oversight, the simple cautions review recommended that there should be greater local accountability and scrutiny of decision-making. The review further recommended that each force should have a senior officer identified as responsible who would provide local leadership and accountability and who would make use of local scrutiny panels. We are considering that recommendation carefully as part of the wider out of court disposals review. There are clearly links between the matters considered in the simple cautions review and the out of court disposals review, and we will consider these alongside each other. Further, I assure the noble Lord that the issues he and others raised in this debate will be fed into the out of court disposals review.

The draft guidance on the community remedy signposts existing CPS guidance on the use of conditional cautions. The community remedy will work with any changes to conditional cautions or community resolutions that take place as a result of the review, but we need to be careful not to impose anything in the Bill or the guidance that will contradict or restrict any changes to those systems.

I will pick up a few points made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. He asked about the crimes for which the remedy might be used. They are low-level criminal damage, low-value theft, minor assault without injury and anti-social behaviour, and are currently set out on page 15 of the draft guidance. In addition, the noble Lord asked whether the offender could insist on prosecution. The answer is no. He asked whether the community remedy only applied to first-time offenders; I have already covered that particular issue. I was asked what records are kept. The police will keep records in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and will retain them if there is a specific police purpose. As I said, a much more detailed review will end in January of next year.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, indicated that this was a probing amendment. I hope by what I have said that that I have conveyed that there are broader issues to consider as well. We will undoubtedly return to this issue once the current review results are out. In the interim, I hope that the noble Lord is reassured both by my explanations and my commitment that the content of this debate will be included in that review, and that he will be minded to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, for that response to my amendment. I am pleased that there will be a further review of out of court proposals. Perhaps there should be a review of the scrutiny panels themselves? The purpose of my amendment is not to address a lack of legislation. The legislation has been in place for years: it is just that it has not been implemented.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

On that point, as I said in my response, one thing that the wider review is doing is talking directly to local players on the ground, including local police, to feed back on the effect. The noble Lord is quite right that legislation is available. What we need to see is practical implementation. We hope that the more detailed review will address those issues.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

Once again, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, for that explanation. I will make one last point. In London, where 25% of all crime in England and Wales takes place, as far as I am aware no scrutiny panels are in operation. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 56J withdrawn.