Investigatory Powers Commissioner (Oversight Functions) Regulations 2022

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Thursday 24th November 2022 Grand Committee

We note that these changes were made at the request of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and that greater public accountability will give him the ability to effectively discharge the IPC’s responsibilities. We therefore support them but it would be helpful if the Minister could clarify exactly what these principles, which apply to the Metropolitan Police and the National Crime Agency, are about. I look forward to his response.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak first to the Investigatory Powers (Covert Human Intelligence Sources and Interception: Codes of Practice) Regulations 2022. This SI updates the CHIS code of practice, following the 2021 Act, and the interception code of practice. We believe the first duty of any Government is to keep our country safe. The Labour Party recognises the importance of covert intelligence and the necessary, if at times uncomfortable, role of covert human intelligence sources and the contribution they make on our behalf.

The Labour Party supports the CHIS Act but, along with a number of Members from across the House, we pushed for additional safeguards with varying degrees of success. In particular, we pushed to limit the types of criminal conduct that could be authorised and for prior judicial oversight to be sought for an authorisation; we did so without success. However, the House was successful in adding some safeguards to the Bill by securing extra protection for children and young people and ensuring the notification of authorisations to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. I pay particular tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who played a leading role in securing these changes.

We support the regulations but I have a number of questions. The first concerns what the Explanatory Memorandum says about Section 72 of RIPA. It sets out the effect of the code. I will read out the further explanation:

“Failure to comply with the Code does not render that person liable in any criminal or civil proceedings. However, the Code is admissible in evidence in criminal and civil proceedings, and may be taken into account of any court”.


Can the Minister give any information on this? What would be the case if there was a failure to comply with the code? What could or would be the repercussions for those breaking the code?

Further, there is a requirement for public authorities

“to ensure that any criminal conduct to be authorised is compliant with the relevant Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998.”

How will that be impacted by the proposed Bill of Rights Bill? My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti also raised the prospect of rescinding the ECHR even though Dominic Raab repeatedly says that he does not want to do that. Nevertheless, doubts and scepticism persist.

On children, I note that most of the consultation responses focused on protecting children and vulnerable adults. I can see that the Government have reflected on those submissions. It is right that children are authorised as CHIS sources only in exceptional circumstances, and that the duty of care owed to the children in this context is taken extremely seriously.

I have received an extensive briefing from Just for Kids Law, as I am sure other noble Lords have. Although I want to make it clear that I do not agree with its central proposition that children should never be used for CHIS, it raised a number of valid questions that I will repeat for the Minister now. Specifically, paragraph 4.14 of the draft code refers to Articles 8 and 9 of the juveniles order. It is not clear what this refers to: the juveniles order has only six articles. It would assist if the Minister could clarify what is meant by this reference.

Secondly, there is a continued discrepancy between the code and the primary legislation. The juveniles order sets out the protections given to those aged under 18 who are used as a CHIS. It is referenced at paragraph 4.4 of the code of practice. The protections in the order now differ from the protections set out in the code of practice. Will the Government amend the order to reflect the new code of practice?

My third question is about the test for the appointment of an appropriate adult for a young person. A new test has been written—this goes to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—so can we have confirmation that the appropriateness of that test for appointing an appropriate adult for somebody aged under 18 or who is vulnerable will be kept under review? My experience of youth courts is that the guidance for appointing appropriate adults tends to be a bit rigid, so my view is that it needs to be reviewed to see whether it is being used appropriately in all circumstances.

My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti raised a couple of points. Specifically, as in the Justice briefing, the draft code of practice makes no mention of CHIS acting as agents.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I beg your pardon; what I meant was agents provocateurs.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

Right, so the point is about provoking others to commit criminal acts. What would be the view of that?

I remember the original debates when somebody—I am not sure whether it was the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—gave a very evocative example that hit home for me. It was of a 17 year-old girl being run as a prostitute by her older drug-dealing boyfriend. I understand that it was the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who gave that example and spoke about the appropriateness of engaging that girl to effect a conviction of her boyfriend. It was obviously an extremely difficult case but it illustrates the sensitivity and difficulty of the cases with which we are dealing.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick made another good point, which I will repeat. It was the question of whether the immunity that would be available to CHISs for some action would be retrospective, particularly in the context of women who have been in relationships with officers who were CHIS officers and may well be seeking compensation for those relationships. I would be interested to hear an answer from the Minister on that.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

On the point about agents provocateurs—that is, CHIS who are not just having to commit criminal acts to keep their cover but are perhaps actively encouraging others to commit crimes—the concern is not just about the 17 year-old girl in the prostitution example. There is a big concern here from the trade union movement and the protest movements that CHIS could be actively encouraging peaceful protest movements to tip into criminal acts. The concern is that the code should at least make it clear that that kind of agent provocateur behaviour would be unacceptable. Will the Minister consider adding that to the code?

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, if I might move on to the other SI with which we are dealing, we support the Investigatory Powers Commissioner (Oversight Functions) Regulations 2022. This SI provides the commissioner with oversight of compliance by members and civilian staff of the Metropolitan Police Force in relation to counterterrorism legislation, and officers of the National Crime Agency with guidance referred to as the Principles Relating to the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas and the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees. The regulations take two functions where the Investigatory Powers Commissioner currently exercises oversight on a non-statutory basis and places them on a statutory footing. This change has been requested by the IPC himself; I thank Sir Brian Leveson and his team for the work they do.

The National Security Bill has passed through the other place and will soon start here in the House of Lords. My honourable friend Holly Lynch has sought legal opinion on some of the provisions in this SI in relation to the oversight of GCHQ, in particular that the new regulations stipulate that the oversight functions of the commissioner include keeping under review the exercise of GCHQ processes for whether information about vulnerabilities in technology should be disclosed. I think the Minister made that clear in the other place so, on that basis, I welcome this extension of the oversight powers allocated to the commissioner. It is appropriate that these powers are put on a statutory footing.

Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) (Threshold Amount) Order 2022

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Thursday 24th November 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, again I thank the Minister for explaining this order. Raising the threshold from £250 to £1,000, the £250 limit being unchanged since 2005, seems quite a reasonable increase. I understand from the Explanatory Note that some organisations wanted the threshold to be raised to £3,000. I think The Home Office is right to limit the increase to £1,000. Law enforcement must focus its limited resources on transactions that are likely to be the result of money laundering. This order has the additional benefit of reducing the burden on commercial organisations, which can, in any event, report suspicious activity to law enforcement despite the changes in the limits in this order. Therefore, we support it.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we support this order as well. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick said, it seems a reasonable increase and some organisations would have gone to £3,000. However, there were other respondents to the consultation who were against the increase to £1,000; they wanted to keep it at the lower limit. Can the Minister say what their concerns were? Although I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that £1,000 seems reasonable, other people thought it should have stayed at its original level: does the Minister know why they thought that? He indicates that he does not know why—okay.

I have some of the same figures that the Minister quoted. The Explanatory Memorandum states that the volume of DAMLs is rising steeply and gave those figures. The question is: what percentage of those 105,000 referrals were over the new £1,000 threshold—what difference will increasing the threshold to £1,000 make?

On the further figures that the Minister quoted, he said that only 2% of all DAMLs were refused consent in 2019-20, of which only 1,062 progressed towards asset denial. The question is, of that 2%, how many of those DAMLs were for amounts over £1,000 and so would still be caught? Both those questions are about how much the amount of work will be reduced by increasing this limit, although we of course approve of the objective.

One of the main benefits suggested by the Government, with which we agree, is that this measure should free up law enforcement to pursue other activities. We welcome that in itself. We heard from the current Home Secretary’s predecessor that the National Crime Agency has been asked to make staffing cuts of up to 20%. Can the Minister say anything about whether that previous expectation is still in place or has now been ruled out?

The Explanatory Memorandum states:

“A full Impact Assessment has been published alongside the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, which considers the impact of the changes in this instrument.”


One of our key concerns about that Bill is its failure to tackle fraud and economic crime, with falling rates of enforcement and prosecution. I understand that this change is intended to reduce the number of ineffective DAMLs, but what action is being taken alongside that to try to increase the prosecution rate? It is a huge problem and it is very time-intensive to secure successful prosecutions—I understand that—so although we support this SI I would be grateful if the Minister could set out in a slightly broader context how he will try to increase the possibility of getting successful convictions.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their support. In answer to the detailed statistical questions from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, the National Crime Agency has yet to publish its report into 2020-21 or 2021-22. The details will be in there; I will be happy to share that report as soon as it is published, if that is acceptable.

The noble Lord also asked me about staffing at the National Crime Agency. I cannot answer his specific question and do not wish to stray there, but I can say that we are increasing capacity in law enforcement to analyse and act on suspicious activity report intelligence. That includes 75 additional officers in the UKFIU, which will almost double capacity. Some 45 of those officers are already in post, and the milestone for recruiting the remaining 30 is the end of this financial year, 2022-23. I will not go beyond that at the moment but we all share the noble Lord’s concerns, particularly about financial crime, which, as we know, is a pressing problem.

However, we should also salute the news stories I heard this morning about the Metropolitan Police apparently busting a fairly sizeable scamming organisation. Well done them; let us hope that that results in a large number of successful prosecutions.

I will stop there. Once again, I thank both noble Lords for their support. We believe that this intelligence is a critical tool in our ability to identify, disrupt and recover the hundreds of millions of pounds that underpin the most serious organised crime in the UK. That intelligence will be preserved through this adjustment and the requirement to submit intelligence-only SARs even when businesses are using the threshold exemption. Increasing the threshold is a measure supported by industry and law enforcement. I am sorry, I do not know who did not support the rise; I will try to find out.

Setting the threshold at a more appropriate level to reflect the current landscape is an important step towards improving the performance of the anti-money laundering system to better disrupt money laundering, terrorist financing and high-harm offences.

Public Order Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 22nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a wide-ranging debate that has re-run a lot of the points from Second Reading. I added my name to all the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, who ably introduced that group, which I of course agree with. She opened her speech by talking about the large majority in the other place, which we have heard about, but she made the additional point that each political party had a majority in favour of passing the amendment. She then went on to talk about the argument regarding a “reasonable excuse”, and she did not think that there could be an argument for harassing women seeking a legal service.

We also heard some figures, which the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has repeated, about there being only five PSPOs currently operating in the country but about 50 targeted clinics where there are regular protests. This creates a patchwork of provision, which a number of noble Lords have spoken about. So tactics have evolved, and there has been an increase in protests.

I want to mention one particular Conservative Minister, Victoria Atkins, who I always think is very perceptive and who has been an active defendant on domestic abuse issues in her previous roles in the Ministry of Justice. She supports this legislation. That has particular significance for me.

I also refer to my noble friend Lady Thornton, who made a central point: the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, try to address in a reasonable way the points raised at Second Reading—that was the spirit in which she put forward that suite of amendments. The vast majority of noble Lords who have spoken against them have not addressed any of the points that she made when she introduced them. I accept that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, is an exception to that, but the vast majority of other speakers did not acknowledge her points.

I turn briefly to the speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, in which she made the particularly telling point that many of the women going to seek an abortion may have been subject to coercive sex. For that reason, they may be particularly vulnerable to intimidation as they are going to get advice on whether and how to progress with an abortion. This was a perceptive comment, especially as it came from a nurse; it is something I recognise from the courts in London in which I sit as a magistrate. I also acknowledge her point that she wants a good resolution of these issues rather than a fast resolution.

The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, gave an absolutely excellent speech; I agreed with every word he said, which is quite unusual from these Benches. Nevertheless, he made a very good point about demonstrators, whom he comes across in other contexts where he would not dream of trying to limit their ability to protest. However, here we are of course talking about an individual, often in a vulnerable state, trying to access a legal service, and that changes the argument about whether demonstrators should be allowed to influence them. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, said, Clause 9 does not prevent anybody protesting against abortion; it only prevents them protesting against abortion within

“150 metres … of an abortion clinic”.

I will now pick up the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, on the argument regarding reasonable excuse. As he said, we have had a debate about reasonable excuse in other contexts—for example, in relation to the protests by Extinction Rebellion and the other protest groups which would use that argument for the types of protest they undertake. My understanding of his argument is that basically it is for Parliament itself to take a decision on this sort of thing, rather than pushing these decisions down to courts, judges and magistrates. That was a powerful argument against Amendment 80.

The other speech which resonated with me was that of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, which I am sure came from absolute front-line experience. He said that we are not talking about a discussion on abortion occurring as people—women, of course—try to receive these services; rather, it is a monologue and bullying which is meant to be intimidatory. He was absolutely right in pointing that out.

In conclusion, I will say something that is so obvious that nobody seems to have said it in this debate: the Government agree with, and accepted, Clause 9. I accept that there are debates about the wording, the compliance with the ECHR and all the rest, but clearly the Government believe that the situation has moved on since the 2018 review. They clearly believe that there is an advance in the tactics and the money deployed to intimidate women as they are trying to access these legal services. If the Government believe that, we should pay attention. It is not often from this Dispatch Box that I say that we need to listen to the Government because they have clearly taken a decision, but the response by the Minister will perhaps be the most important speech that we will hear in today’s debate.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

No pressure.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Blower (Lab)]

My Lords, not being a lawyer, I would never have dreamed of writing amendments of the technical nature of Amendments 114 and 115. None the less, having heard the speech of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and having discussed it with her before she made it, it is evident to me that these are vital amendments should Clause 17 stand part—which, of course, it absolutely should not. If there is any sense, as my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti has powerfully persuaded me there is, that Clause 17 is constitutionally dubious, that really should give the Government pause for thought. I genuinely believe that anyone—the person on the Clapham omnibus—who read this and found that the Government can substitute a prosecution for a private company at the public expense would, frankly, be rather appalled and find it very odd legislation.

Clause 17 (5) states:

“the Secretary of State must consult such persons (if any) as the Secretary of State considers appropriate, having regard to any persons who may also bring civil proceedings in relation to those activities.”

That just does not seem appropriate. Surely, the purpose of the law is to make sure that the onus for things lies in the proper place, and the onus for proceedings such as those conceivably envisaged here cannot possibly lie with the Government and the public. Amendments 114 and 115, in the name of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, at least tighten up the possibilities here. The Secretary of State would be required to publish a range of things, as she has already said, including

“the reasons for any decision not to consult, the results of any consultation, any representations made to the Secretary of State as to a proposed exercise of the power, an assessment of why other parties should not finance their own proceedings”.

It seems to me that we are allowing the Secretary of State to do something which, if I had just read this myself and come to a view on it, I would have considered to be ultra vires, if that is the correct term, because this is not something we should be spending public money on. Amendments 114 and 115 would go some way towards tightening up Clause 17, but as other noble Lords have said, those of us who have read this in detail and given it some consideration genuinely believe that it should not stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 145 in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker is a probing amendment which would require the Secretary of State to review the use of injunctions for protest-related activity. This is to probe how injunctions are used, what their effects are, how they interact with police powers and responsibilities, and the problems facing their use, such as securing them within a reasonable timescale. The purpose of the amendment is for the Secretary of State to set out a review of injunctions in the widest sense.

We also heard from my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti about her Amendments 114 and 115, which would create safeguards against corruption and abuse. They would require the Secretary of State to publish the reasons for any decision not to consult, the results of any consultation, any representations made to the Secretary of State as to a proposed exercise of the power, an assessment of why other parties should not finance their own proceedings and assessments of why any proceedings have been brought by the Secretary of State at public expense rather than by private companies. Such publication would occur each time an exercise of the power is considered and annually on an aggregate basis so that we can look at the overall effect.

My noble friend Lady Blower, who like me is not a lawyer, expressed incredulity about the situation, which I share. As a layman, it seems to me that the Clause 17 provisions give the Home Secretary powers to bring civil proceedings against protesters at public expense. This is a surprising set of circumstances, and my noble friend’s amendments are trying to get the Government to justify that on a continual basis, which seems entirely reasonable.

Amendments 110, 111 and 112 are also in this group. This clause provides that the Secretary of State can use new injunction powers where they reasonably believe the conditions under the clause are met. These amendments would delete “reasonably believes” and strengthen it to

“has reasonable grounds for suspecting”.

Amendment 113 would provide that the Secretary of State may bring civil proceedings under this clause only if it is not reasonable or practicable for a party directly impacted by the activity to do so.

I move on to Amendment 114. The clause provides that, before bringing proceedings under it, the Secretary of State must consult “such persons (if any)” that they consider appropriate. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish the reasons if they do not consult, the outcome of any consultation, representations made to the Secretary of State and a reason why the Secretary of State should bring the proceedings at public expense, rather than another party.

As the Minister has heard, there is substantial scepticism about many aspects of Clause 17. There are a number of amendments here seeking to probe the Government’s intentions, and we may well return to this at a later stage. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, recently we have seen protestors blocking key national infrastructure, potentially causing delays to the supply of goods and services. Clause 17 provides a Secretary of State with a specific mechanism to apply for an injunction in civil proceedings where it is in the public interest to do so, and where the effect of the activity is to cause serious disruption to key national infrastructure, or to access to essential goods or services, or to have a serious, adverse impact on the public.

Contrary to the speeches that we have heard from noble Lords opposite, there is no constitutional dubiety about such a measure. This provision will support better co-ordination between government, law enforcement, local authorities and private landowners in responding to serious disruptive behaviour. You may say, contrary to that which the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, said earlier, that these provisions mean that the hypothetical man on the Clapham omnibus might actually make it to Clapham, rather than being delayed by roadblocks caused impermissibly by protestors.

The proposal does not affect the right of local authorities or private landowners to apply for an injunction themselves, but gives a Secretary of State an additional route to act—urgently in some cases—where the potential impact is serious and widespread, and where there is a clear public interest to intervene. I seek to reassure noble Lords who have raised concerns regarding this measure that it will ultimately be a matter for the courts and our judges to consider whether or not to grant an injunction application. All that this provision does is simply to allow a Secretary of State to bring a claim and to apply for an injunction; ultimately, the decision on whether or not the injunction is made is one for the judge. As we always would, there would be careful consideration of any such application made by a Secretary of State, and that would involve careful consideration of the evidence provided by the Secretary of State in support of an application for an injunction. This is the ultimate legal safeguard on the use of the powers in Clauses 17 and 18.

As to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, I again reiterate that this measure provides an additional mechanism for a Secretary of State to intervene. This device would be most beneficial where protest activity targets multiple sites, and transcends local boundaries and the property of multiple entities. In such circumstances the potential impact would clearly be widespread, and the clear public interest would therefore be that injunctive proceedings are taken by the Secretary of State, rather than a series of separate private entities. It is not in every scenario that the Secretary of State’s power to seek an injunction would be utilised, and there is no doubt that the prevailing situation would remain, and businesses would have a major role to play in obtaining their own injunctions.

Turning to Clause 18, where an injunction has been granted by a court, with a power of arrest attached, the powers will support the police in taking action earlier to respond to those who engage in disruptive and dangerous forms of protest. Enabling the court to attach a power of arrest to such injunctions is key to allowing the police to act more quickly to prevent the disruption escalating. Where there is no ability for a power of arrest to be attached to the injunction, the applicant may be able to apply to the court for an arrest warrant where they believe that the perpetrator has breached the provisions of an injunction, as is the case for injunctions secured by private entities and natural persons. However, this creates an additional step in the process of enforcement which can affect the pace at which disruptive behaviour can be curtailed. As such, the power of arrest provision in Clause 18 can prove to be a highly important tool in the available responses to prevent serious disruption happening in the first place.

Public Order Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

My Lords, the extent to which there are gaps in our current legislation that require filling by this legislation is a substantial question. I, for one, will listen very carefully to what the Minister has to say about this, because it seems to me that it is incumbent on the Government to point out what those gaps and loopholes are, and where those gaps and loopholes are being exploited. If the reality is that we have sufficient legislation in place but it is simply not being rigorously applied, that is no argument at all for new legislation: it is an argument for the current legislation to be properly applied. I am absolutely confident that we have legislation to deal with people who climb up on to motorway gantries and cause 50,000 or 60,000 cars to be blocked from travelling around the M25. With respect, I defy the Government to argue with any persuasive force that we do not have legislation to deal with that.

So far as the point made by the noble Lord on the recent Supreme Court judgment in Ziegler is concerned, that reasoning would of course apply to every clause in this legislation. All that the court was saying was that when individuals are arrested for an offence in circumstances where they are exercising their Article 10 free expression rights, a proportionate examination has to be undertaken by the court as to whether the inconvenience, for example, that they are causing is so minimal that it is overwhelmed by their Article 10 rights to protest and that they should therefore be allowed to do so. Of course that is right and it would apply to every clause in the Bill. If the disruption is significant, it will almost always, in my judgment, overcome any Article 10 defence. But I ask, particularly in respect of the offence of locking on: where are the gaps that the Government say exist that need filling by this clause and subsequent clauses in the Bill?

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall open by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for setting the scene and the background to this group of amendments. I agree with the way that he set out the history of this group of amendments. I also thank my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti for the way she set out her amendments and commented on the other amendments. I agree with her assessment that the Bill, as drafted, is vague and broad—and that it is vague and broad in a dangerous way. I agree with those central points.

Throughout the Bill, a number of clauses state that it is a defence for a person charged with an offence under the clause to

“prove that they had a reasonable excuse”

for their actions. As we have heard, the JCHR flagged this as a reverse of the burden of proof, so that rather than the prosecution having to prove that a person’s actions were done without a reasonable excuse and so were unlawful, it is for the defendant to prove, after they have been charged, that they had a reasonable excuse for their actions. This is in contrast to an offence such as obstruction of the highway, which we have just heard about, where the prosecution must prove that the defendant did not have lawful authority or excuse for their actions. For the new locking-on offence, the burden of proof would be on the defendant to show that he or she had a reasonable excuse.

Such a reverse burden of proof may be inconsistent not only with Articles 10 and 11 but with the presumption of innocence—a central principle of criminal justice and an aspect of Article 6 of the ECHR and the right to a fair trial. This is because requiring the defendant to prove something, even on the balance of probabilities, may result in a conviction despite there being an element of doubt, and it is hard to see why a reverse burden is necessary or appropriate in this case. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, gave the example of a bladed article and the reverse burden of proof in that context. It is of course a defence I am very familiar with as a sitting magistrate in London. It is of course right that the court will take its own view on whether the reverse burden of proof is reasonable in these circumstances.

I agree with the point made by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti that the better situation is that a police officer, when considering whether to charge, at that point takes into account whether there is a reasonable excuse, rather than it being subsequently resolved in a court case—although I also acknowledge the legal point made by the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Anderson, that it is not always simple to distinguish between the two. Nevertheless, the point is that the police officer should take into account a potential reasonable excuse defence before deciding whether to charge.

To summarise this debate, two noble Lords made points that I thought were particularly resonant. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, asked whether this was speciality legislation for ever more exotic offences that can be extremely annoying to the general public. As many noble Lords have said in this debate, there is existing legislation to deal with those offences, and there is scepticism that the police are feeling able to use the legislation that is already within their power. The noble Lord, Lord McDonald, challenged the Minister to give examples of the gaps in the existing laws: in fact, he defied the Minister to go ahead and give those examples.

I also want to comment briefly on my noble friend Lady Blower’s speech on Amendment 60, which of course I agreed with. I also agreed with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, that in the case of industrial action it should not be a reasonable excuse. The offences should never be charged in the first place. It is the same point, in a sense, that the potential use of a reasonable excuse should be taken into account right at the beginning of the process rather than once you get to a court case.

Although the amendments focus on particular detailed provisions in this Bill, I think a challenge has been laid down to the Minister to give examples and to say why this is necessary when we have a plethora of laws which are being used. The demonstrators on the M25 have moved on partly because of the sentences that have been given to them, so what is the necessity of pursuing this legislation?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, to which I have listened carefully. Before I turn to the specific amendments in the group, I shall start by setting out the case for Clauses 1 to 8 and why I disagree with the general thrust of many of the amendments that we are going to discuss today that seek to make these offences less effective.

Before I do that, I shall go on to a couple of general points. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said that this House had already rejected these measures, but one of the main criticisms that noble Lords made during the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill was that the measures had not been debated in the House of Commons. The elected House has now had an opportunity to scrutinise this legislation and vote on the Government’s proposals and has supported its move into the House of Lords.

A number of noble Lords mentioned compatibility with the ECHR. I reaffirm that it is the Government’s view that the measures in this Bill are compatible with the ECHR, namely the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association. However, these rights are not absolute. They do not extend to wreaking havoc on the lives of others. Of course, however, as with all existing public order powers, the police will absolutely need to act compatibly with the human rights of protesters when using those powers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Blower (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti is unable to be in her place for this group, which affords me the opportunity to speak to Amendment 23, which would include in the Bill a definition of “serious disruption”—a single definition, in contradistinction to the ideas proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.

Much turns on this phrase; it appears a grand total of 132 times, acting as a core component to several new and extremely broad criminal offences. As things stand, the consequence of “causing or contributing to” serious disruption of varying kinds could result in a prison sentence, unlimited fines or a variety of conditions imposed through what many are calling protest banning orders, including GPS ankle tagging, bans on internet usage, prohibitions on associating with certain people and, again, imprisonment—yet, as we all now know, nowhere in the Bill is “serious disruption” defined.

The former Minister, Kit Malthouse MP, claimed at Second Reading in the other place that

“the phrase ‘serious disruption to the community’ has been in use in the law since 1986 and is therefore a well-defined term in the courts, which of course is where the test would be applied under the legislation.”—[Official Report, Commons, 23/5/22; col. 106.]

I am afraid that I do not think that explanation suffices. The test to which the former Minister refers is that set out in the Public Order Act 1986, which is now almost four decades old. It relates to the imposition of conditions on public procession, assemblies and one-person protests. This Bill is very much wider, and that framework does not necessarily neatly map on to what is before the House today.

I add that it is surprising that the Government should be content to allow legal uncertainty and let the courts, through lengthy and expensive litigation, rather than through Parliament, set the parameters of what actions they wish to criminalise. The lack of a definition of serious disruption in the Bill is an obvious and, in my view, critical deficiency and one which Members on all sides of this House and those in the other place have identified on several occasions.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights remarked in its report:

“It is unclear who or what would need to be seriously disrupted, what level of disruption is needed before it becomes serious and how these questions are meant to be determined by protesters and police officers on the ground—or even the courts.”


At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, made apt reference to both the Joint Committee report and the evidence to the other place from West Midlands Police, who called for

“as much precision … as possible”—[Official Report, Commons, Public Order Bill Committee, 9/6/22; col. 58.]

in defining serious disruption. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who has much experience of police operations in response to protests through his time as Metropolitan Police Commissioner echoed this call for clarity. In another place, Sir Charles Walker condemned the overall thrust of the Bill, no doubt worsened by this vague and all-encompassing term, calling it “unconservative”.

Therefore, it was heartening to hear at Second Reading the Minister recognise the House’s “strength of feeling” on this issue and that

“a clear definition could bring benefits”.—[Official Report, 1/11/22; col. 204.]

This amendment would deliver such benefits, giving legal certainty and precision to what are otherwise vague and, frankly, highly draconian offences. It does so by clarifying that before the Bill’s offences are engaged, significant harm must be caused to persons, property or, per the Public Order Act 1986, the life of the community. It sets the bar at an appropriately high level, stating that “significant harm” must be

“more than mere inconvenience, irritation or annoyance”.

The example of people joining arms to walk down the street has already been given, so I will not repeat that. Under the amendment’s proposed definition, these ordinary everyday behaviours would be rendered safe from undue criminalisation. The definition also requires that significant harm must be

“of a kind that strictly necessitates interference with the rights and freedoms curtailed by proportionate exercise of a power, or prosecution for an offence, provided for under this Act.”

We have seen the police exercise existing powers inappropriately and disproportionately—I will not go into the case of Charlotte Lynch yet again, but it is one such.

This amendment is designed to prevent the future misuse of any new offences and powers created. Its benefits are threefold, giving guidance to the police in exercising their powers; safety to the public, who should be free to enjoy their right to protest free from prosecution; and clarity to the courts when they must interpret the law.

The criminal law acts as a powerful and coercive tool by which dividing lines are set between conduct Parliament has deemed acceptable or unacceptable. As the former senior Law Lord and eminent jurist, Lord Bingham, posited in the 2003 case, R v H and the Secretary of State for the Home Department, its purpose is

“to proscribe, and by punishing to deter, conduct regarded as sufficiently damaging to the interests of society”.

Clear definitions are therefore indispensable, for without them, how is the public expected to understand what is proscribed, from what they are being deterred or what Parliament has concluded is sufficiently damaging to the interests of society?

I strongly believe that the Bill should be voted down in its entirety. It represents a dangerous and authoritarian boost to the state’s power to curtail the vital right to protest peacefully. However, this amendment’s definition would go some way to remedying one of the Bill’s many critical flaws. I therefore commend it to the House.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in my name and the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker. This debate has been about the threshold for committing an offence, the meaning of the phrase “serious disruption”, which is not defined in the Bill, and the need for the intent of an offence for an offence to be committed. The key overarching issue is the drafting of good law and not broad, poorly defined offences and powers which the police then have to try to navigate.

I turn first to Amendment 3, as drafted and recommended by the JCHR. It would change that threshold to causing serious disruption to the life of the community. This is supported by the National Police Chiefs’ Council, which in its written evidence stated

“In addition, we believe using the definition of ‘serious disruption to the community’ may be preferable to ‘two or more people, or an organisation’, as the former is more widely understood and will allow more effective application consistent with human rights legislation.”


In the Commons Committee stage, the Minister, Kit Malthouse, referenced disruption to the life of the community as the threshold for the offence of locking on. He said that some behaviour

“would not necessarily cause serious disruption to the life of the community, and would therefore not necessarily constitute an offence under the Bill.”—[Official Report, Commons, Public Order Bill Committee, 14/6/22; col. 93.]

So it seems that the Minister already agrees that there may be a more appropriate threshold.

Moving on to Amendment 17, this is a JCHR recommendation that goes hand-in-hand with Amendment 3 to provide a definition of serious disruption to the life of the community in the Bill. I recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has jumped ship and is supporting the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. I reserve my judgment; I may do the same at a later stage but, for the moment, I will press ahead with Amendment 17. It is one option, as drafted by the JCHR. It replicates the definition eventually added by the Government to the PCSC Act but, as we have heard, this group contains multiple possibilities for how the necessary level of disruption could be appropriately and clearly defined.

Turning again to the evidence submitted by the National Police Chiefs’ Council, it has requested clarity to allow it to respond operationally, saying:

“Within public order legislation ‘serious disorder, serious damage to property and serious disruption to the life of the community or intimidation of others’ is a key phrase. The elements of serious disorder, serious damage and intimidation are accepted and clear. However, the term ‘serious disruption’ has been subject to much discussion and debate. Within any new legislation we would welcome clarity or guidance about the threshold and interpretation of this to allow operational commanders to best apply their operational responses.”


This amendment is about clarity, as well as passing laws that can be easily understood by both the public and the police.

Amendment 23, spoken to very powerfully by my noble friends Lady Blower and Lord Hain, would provide a definition of serious disruption as actions

“causing significant harm to persons, property or the life of the community.”

It specifies that serious harm must mean

“more than mere inconvenience, irritation or annoyance”

and be action

“of a kind that strictly necessitates interference with the rights and freedoms curtailed by proportionate exercise of a power, or prosecution for an offence”

provided here. I support that amendment as well.

Amendment 54 is again a JCHR recommendation. It adds, first, a threshold of causing serious disruption, and secondly, a requirement that there was an intent to cause serious disruption to the offence of obstructing major transport works. The JCHR said that

“there is no requirement that the offending conduct could be capable of causing significant disruption and there is no requirement that these actions be carried out with any particular intention of causing obstruction or disruption. This means that inadvertent actions could result in arrest or even a criminal penalty.”

Across this group of amendments, the question of intent is integral to the debates that we have been having. The question of whether it is intended or reckless is really key to these debates. Can the Minister say something more about what recklessness covers? It is a phrase that is used in many other aspects of law, but how will the police be expected to prove that a person has been acting recklessly or not?

Public Order Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I look around in vain for anyone else who wants to speak. I agree with the principles that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has just spoken about. Amendment 13, in my name, is based on a recommendation from the Joint Committee on Human Rights. In its report on the Bill, the committee points out that the offence of locking on under Clause 1 is punishable with—as she just said—

“up to 51 weeks in prison.”

The committee states that:

“This sanction is significantly harsher than the maximum penalties that, until recently, applied to existing ‘protest-related’ non-violent offences such as obstructing the highway (level 3 fine) or aggravated trespass (3 months imprisonment).”


The committee notes that there is likely to be a low hurdle for prosecution—again, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, just said. The amendment therefore questions whether the length of potential imprisonment —51 weeks—is proportionate to the offence that is committed. Amendment 13 suggests that this should be reduced to a three-month maximum sentence.

The remaining amendments in my name in this group relate to the level of fine that can be issued to a person who commits an offence under Clauses 1 to 7. They are similar to amendments that I tabled to the corresponding clauses of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill—now an Act—when it was previously debated in this House. However, given the nature of the debate at that stage—in particular, in Committee, we started discussing those clauses at 11.45 pm—I believe that there is merit in discussing this issue again in this Committee.

Under Clauses 1 to 7, a person convicted of an offence may be liable to “a fine”. However, the Bill does not specify what the maximum level of such a fine should be. For each of these new offences, our amendments ask the simple question: is an unlimited fine proportionate for such an offence? In particular, is it proportionate that a person convicted of the offence of being equipped for locking on, for example, should be subjected to an unlimited fine? The Minister may argue that the level of fine suggested in our amendments is too low. At this point, they are simply probing amendments designed to make the principled point that an unlimited fine may be disproportionate for a number of the offences contained in the Bill. Finally, it would also be of benefit to the Committee if the Minister could set out how they intend fines to be applied consistently for these offences, if there is no upper limit as to the fine that can be imposed.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I will be extremely brief. I want to reiterate the final two points that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made. I speak as a sitting magistrate in London. I occasionally have to deal with unlimited fines, but it is far more straightforward as a magistrate, when you have a level set and an example of what the maximum fine might be for whatever offence one is dealing with at the time. For most offences that we deal with, levels are indeed set; we are given the parameters, if you like, of what would be appropriate. I was going to make the same point as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick: if one wants some form of consistency across the country for these types of offences, it would be useful to have some level of guidance, perhaps setting a level of fine that may be appropriate.

The other point I want to make, which is slightly outside the scope of these amendments, is about the power of the court to set compensation. I have been in a case dealing with relatively minor offences, but the level of potential compensation was absolutely astronomical when we were talking about disrupting train services and things such as that. The level of compensation is a judicial decision but, certainly in my experience, the level of compensation can potentially eclipse the maximum level of any fine the court may give. I do not know whether the Minister is able to say something more about appropriate levels of fines—and appropriate levels of compensation.

Football Spectators (Relevant Offences) Regulations 2022

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Thursday 3rd November 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these regulations. It will be well known that Liberal Democrats feel that drug misuse should be treated as a health issue rather than a criminal issue, but we draw the line where drug misuse leads to disorder or anti-social behaviour. Clearly, in this situation, drug taking at football matches is fuelling the disorder.

Do not get me wrong: cocaine is an extremely dangerous drug, and in my own professional experience I have seen people—healthy young men—die very quickly of heart attack from having excess cocaine in their systems. But here, we are talking about reckless and aggressive behaviour, as the Minister said. I do not attend football matches and I do not take cocaine, so I have to take other people’s word for the impact that taking cocaine in those sorts of environments has in terms of causing reckless and aggressive behaviour. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester, who has a wealth of experience of soccer issues, for his very helpful and informative speech about the record on this issue, particularly the report of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey.

I am not sure about traces of cocaine on toilet cisterns. I think there were similar findings in the House of Commons, so we have to be very careful in drawing conclusions as to whether that is an indication of the prevalence of drug-taking. However, it seems absolutely ridiculous that football supporters can be banned for alcohol-related disorder and not for disorder related to the taking or supplying of cocaine at football matches. We therefore wholeheartedly support the regulations.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for introducing this statutory instrument, which we support. I declare an interest as a sitting magistrate who has fairly regularly put in place football banning orders for various reasons. As the noble Lord said, this is about adding the possession or supply of class A drugs at football matches as a reason for giving a football banning order.

We welcome the work that the police have done with the football authorities to reduce violence and drug-fuelled behaviour at games, although I note the figures that the Minister and my noble friend Lord Faulkner gave about the deteriorating situation in recent years. As my noble friend said, it used to be so much worse back in the 1990s.

When was this matter first raised? Was it really as a result of the European final that it came starkly to the attention of Ministers, or were there concerns before that? Also, is there any evidence of similar concerns or problems with other major sports, such as cricket or rugby? Obviously we are talking about football banning orders, but how wide does this problem go?

Has there been any wider work done on why these problems seem to be worsening? Is it because of drug use, or are there other problems behind it? Is this being investigated by the Home Office? Is it that drugs are more generally available? There has been an increase in drug-related deaths in England and Wales in recent years, and we know that communities and children’s lives are being blighted by county lines gangs. What is being done to tackle the supply of drugs reaching fans and to ensure that police forces have the resources to support specialist drug enforcement teams and take action on recognising child criminal exploitation?

A football match should be a safe, accessible, enjoyable experience for fans of all ages, so what wider work is being done by the Home Office to encourage safe and positive environments for sports fans? We of course support the statutory instrument, but my questions go a bit wider, to other sports and to how this impacts on drug policy as a whole. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken and particularly note the widespread support for this measure, which is as it should be. I am sure we all agree that there is no place for class A drugs or the disorder they give rise to at football matches. This simple, practical measure to tighten the law will ensure that the football banning order regime properly encompasses those who commit drug offences related to football. I take particular note of the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on the dangers of cocaine misuse.

I will try to address some of the specific points that your Lordships raised. The noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, quoted the statistics; I will go into a little more detail on those. Official statistics for the 2021-22 season show that there were 2,198 football-related arrests, which is a substantial increase—59%—on the last complete pre-Covid season. It is important to note that football-related arrests had previously been on a long-term down trend, reducing by some 50% since the 2010-11 season to record lows. Last season’s arrests total was comparable with the 2013-14 season. There were also 170 dedicated football officer-related incidents of supporter drug use during the 2021-22 season.

The noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, also referred to the Channel 4 documentary on Italia 90. I have not seen it—I am still mentally scarred by our loss to Germany, of course—but I will definitely watch it.

Alcohol Licensing (Coronavirus) (Regulatory Easements) (Amendment) Regulations 2022

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Thursday 3rd November 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for introducing these regulations. I understand that many people were very concerned about going to on-licensed premises—going to the pub—because of their concerns about catching coronavirus. My personal experience of socialising in central London—very limited, because I am always here doing work—is that most restaurants and pubs seem to be very busy. I am not sure whether the Minister can tell the Committee whether that is universal or a phenomenon just in central London, but that is my experience.

My understanding of the previous regulations is that they were to try to compensate pubs that had only an on-licence for that lack of trade so that people who were anxious about catching Covid could instead get their alcohol to take away—they could take it home or even, when the weather was more clement than it has been for the last few days, drink it outside. The only thing I would ask is this. Why do the Government think that that particular Covid support, which is what these regulations are about, should continue? What evidence is there that people are still nervous about socialising in an enclosed space and that it is therefore necessary for on-licensed premises to be able to sell to people to take away?

If this provision is simply for other reasons—the noble Lord mentioned increased energy prices having an impact on on-licensed premises in particular, but there is also the cost of living crisis, with people feeling that they cannot socialise as much as they did in the past because of the pressure on household budgets—why not have an alternative measure? The noble Lord talked about consultation on more permanent measures, but, bearing in mind that the police say that there has been no adverse impact on giving on-licensed premises the ability to sell alcohol to take away, why has a permanent change not been brought forward, rather than what appears to be the rather spurious extension of coronavirus-specific regulations that we have before us?

I appreciate that civil servants, particularly in the Home Office, have been very busy with other things in recent months, and it may be that the easy route was simply to extend the coronavirus regulations, but we need to move on from the impact of the pandemic and the virus and be more honest. If we think that this is a good thing in the long term, we should have a permanent change in the law. I know the Minister said a consultation is being conducted on it. That would be more honest than extending coronavirus regulations that, by this time, should have come to an end.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

One of my principal questions was going to be whether this is the easy route, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, put it, and whether there is a long-term review of the law. It may be appropriate to keep the changes in some cases and not in others, so I would be grateful if the Minister will respond to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

We support this change. We have been told that, as far as the NPCC is concerned, there has been no increase in anti-social behaviour as a result of these measures. Did the consultation go beyond the NPCC? Were local police forces consulted? Are there variations in different parts of the country?

I too have experience of occasionally going to social events in central London, and it is true that the bars and restaurants seem to be extremely busy. However, in other parts of the country or other parts of London, many restaurants and pubs are shut because of the impact of the pandemic, as well as changing habits. How much variation across the country have the Government seen? Is this blanket approach appropriate and how should it be looked at over the longer term? Does the Minister have any updated information on the impact of Covid on the hospitality sector and its recovery? One reads extensively of the hospitality sector still struggling because, in spite of our experiences in central London, the numbers are not back to where they were, and this is proving a problem.

Have any local authorities raised any concerns about extending these changes? Are there any extra costs or burdens on local authorities? Finally, were any local communities consulted? Did they have views on the extension of these licences?

The central question is that asked by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about how this temporary change, which we approve of, fits into a wider review of provisions that were brought in during the pandemic, some of which may continue while others do not.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords who contributed. I am thankful for their general support for this measure and their recognition that we should be looking to support our hospitality industry, which has suffered a tumultuous few years and continues to feel the after-effects of the pandemic; I will come on to that in a second.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, questioned the fact that this a temporary measure and asked why it is not being made permanent, since it extends the off-sales provision only until next September. Let me go into some detail regarding what has happened since the pandemic.

Public Order Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 1st November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, opened by pointing out that there has been no unqualified support for this Bill and, in fact, the vast majority of speakers have expressed their strong opposition to it. Looking at recent examples of protest, we have seen problematic actions such as protesters pouring milk out on to super- market floors during a cost of living crisis, leaving the mess for cleaners to sort out, but we have to balance that against the bravery of girls and women protesting in Iran for access to basic rights and fundamental change in their society.

I believe we need to see this debate in the round. Protest covers a range of behaviour. We need to get the balance right between the democratic right to protest and the ability of vital services to run, and we do not believe the Bill does that. We do not believe the Bill will be effective at what the Government claim to want to achieve. It includes powers that range from vague to extremely problematic.

On existing law, throwing a tin of soup at a publicly accessible work of art is already an offence—those demonstrators were charged with criminal damage—so how is the Bill relevant to that behaviour? In what way will it impact or deter it? The answer to managing protests surely cannot be to continuously introduce ever more draconian layers of laws on top of each other. Surely it is to use existing law well and to ensure proper training and support for police forces, which have to tackle genuinely problematic and illegal behaviour.

I ask the Government to provide, on the record, clear details of existing protest laws, what activity is already criminal and what existing powers the police have. It would be helpful for the Government to provide a complete list and make this available to the whole House. I was attracted by the view from the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, that maybe the Government should move to some consolidation of all these existing powers.

The Government claim that one of the aims of the Bill is as a deterrent, but is there not a risk that the people who worry about it will be local campaign groups wanting to use their voice against, say, a local library closure or the cutting down of local woods? They are the people who may be deterred, but it will not deter, for example, the Just Stop Oil protesters. As we heard from the Minister, there were 650 arrests in October alone, but of course they are seeking to get arrested as part of their campaign. They are knowingly breaking the law. In what way will the provisions in the Bill change that behaviour?

Another concern is an overreach of powers. Key concerns are the suspicionless stop and search powers and the serious violence reduction orders. Suspicionless stop and search equates peaceful protest with powers currently used for terrorism and serious violent crime. It targets peaceful protesters and passers-by. If a protest is occurring in a town centre, the Bill gives the police the right to stop and search any member of the British public, without any grounds for doing so, as they walk through their local town centre. Hard cases make bad law. The Bill is not confined to the actions of a small number of protesters. It impacts on basic rights of the British people, and these are powers that should be taken out of the Bill.

Many of the powers in the Bill are vaguely drafted, with low thresholds. Again, hard cases are not an excuse to pass bad laws and hope that they will be well interpreted. This House will carefully scrutinise the language and the thresholds in the Bill and will expect powers to be clearly defined and necessary. We do not believe the Bill currently meets this test.

I turn to abortion buffer zones. In a free vote, the Commons voted on a cross-party basis to add Clause 9 to the Bill. As the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, pointed out, this included a majority in the governing party. The aim is to prevent the kind of behaviour we have seen where both patients and staff have been subjected to harassment and intimidation when they access medical care or go to work. I pay tribute to colleagues on all sides who have worked on this issue for years. I understand that the Government are raising some concerns about the drafting of the clause. On the Labour Front Bench we look forward to working with the Minister on a cross-party basis to support Clause 9 and ensure that it delivers the protections intended.

I return to stop and search. There are various powers to stop and search a person where you have a reasonable suspicion that they are carrying prohibited items: offensive weapons, fireworks, drugs and other items. There are also specific stop and search powers related to terrorism. We have heard about the 1994 Act Section 60 stop and search without suspicion, which is related to terrorism. We have heard a number of noble Lords equating this power with the new powers sought in the Bill. The extension of stop and search in the Bill equates peaceful protest with measures currently used against violent crime and terrorism. We believe this is problematic, and we will oppose suspicionless stop and search as the Bill gets to later stages of its consideration by this House.

I was interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe, said about making sure that people are properly informed when they are in an area where there is likely to be suspicionless stop and search. That was an interesting point that we may well seek to take forward. A number of noble Lords—the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—pointed out the racial inequality likely to result from further stop and search powers. I thought that was a powerful point too.

I turn to tunnelling. These powers are new in the Bill, in that they were not considered by the House in the PCSC Bill, and we will want to look at them carefully. I understand the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Blair, about the difficulty of tunnelling.

Further, the Labour team in the House of Commons raised the issue of injunctions, as the Government may be seeking injunctions and politicising making them on certain individuals. It was interesting that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, raised this as a possible problem. It seems to me undesirable for politicians to get involved in this sort of decision-making, which should rightly rest with the police.

We believe the Government have a responsibility to protect our historic rights to peaceful protest and to safeguard our national infrastructure, including our NHS, from dangerous and seriously disruptive protests. This Bill fails on both counts. It is too widely drawn and targets peaceful protesters and passers-by. It also fails to include the sensible measures that councils, the police, businesses and the NHS need to prevent dangerous and seriously disruptive protests. The Labour Party is clear that in a democracy freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and the historic rights to protest run alongside the rights of people to go about their daily lives. It is in this spirit that we look forward to scrutinising the Bill.

Public Spaces Protection Orders

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Thursday 27th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Well, I have read the Manifesto report to which the noble Baroness refers—all 48 pages of it. I am afraid that I did not necessarily agree with all the conclusions, some of which required—shall we say?—a bout of syllogistic gymnastics to arrive at. I did look at some of the named councils’ websites and found limited public outrage—maybe I was looking in the wrong place. However, I do think that no one should be terrorised in the way described by the noble Baroness.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, Members of the House of Commons voted in a free vote last week to provide nationwide protection for medical premises providing abortion from disruptive and harassing protests and behaviour. Rather than requiring each locality to apply for an individual public space protection order, will the Minister work with Members across the House to ensure that the provision is supported as the Public Order Bill makes its way through this House?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am very happy to commit to the noble Lord to do that. Indeed, such discussions are ongoing.

Republic of Ireland: British Passports

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Wednesday 26th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I too welcome the Minister to his new position. I know that he is also a local councillor at Gedling Borough Council, so he will be well used to the cut and thrust of debate across the Chamber.

We are sympathetic to the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hay. We too believe that the Government seem unnecessarily inflexible on this matter. I shall also speak relatively briefly on some of the points raised today and in the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee. That cross-party committee, chaired of course by the Conservative Party, recommended, first, that the naturalisation fee charged to Irish applicants who wish to naturalise as British citizens be abolished altogether. Secondly, it recommended that the requirement for Irish citizens to pass a “Life in the UK” test be waived. Thirdly, it recommended that attendance at the citizenship ceremony should be optional.

Could the Minister explain to the House why each of those recommendations in turn is not being accepted by the Government, and why the Government have not taken the generality of the recommendations forward? On the question of the fee, which is £1,300, how much is the actual administrative cost to the Home Office and how much is a fee on top of that? What is the actual administrative cost of processing the applications? On the “Life in the UK” test, is there a point at which the Minister considers that it may not be necessary—after 20, 30 or 40 years? Surely, at some point that test would not be necessary. How many people do the Government estimate will be impacted? We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Rogan, that it may be 40,000, a figure the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, also referred to. Could the Minister confirm the figure?

Finally, in the Westminster Hall debate earlier this month, on 18 October, Steve Baker, the House of Commons Minister, who I understand is still in his place —I certainly welcome that—said that he would reflect on the issues raised. What does that reflection look like in practice? What further discussions have been had by Northern Ireland Ministers, and with which stakeholders, since the issue was raised in Parliament?

For some people this is a minor matter, but for the people concerned it is extremely important. An expression of good will could have ramifications on other, far more important matters, if I can put it like that, such as the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill that we were talking about last night. There is an opportunity here for a gesture of good will, and I hope that the Government will take up that opportunity.