Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 4th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, I do urge noble Lords to use some common sense. It is inconceivable, if this Bill is enacted, for the first few months—regardless of whether all the conditions of the treaty have been implemented—that Rwanda, under the full spotlight and glare of international publicity and the attention of the press, will not implement carefully and considerately or that it will refoule anyone that we send it.

The reason for having all the things in the treaty is for the period after the initial spotlight has been turned off and attention has waned. Then, it is important to have all those considerations in place; it is not initially. No one could really imagine that we will send someone out and within a few weeks they will be sent by Rwanda to some unsafe country. It will not happen. We know it will not.

But it is very important that we get this happening soon, and that we not only use common sense but are merciful, because the longer we delay, the more people will come across the Channel and the more people will die.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I wonder whether the Minister would care to comment on whether he agrees with the analysis from the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, of the status of this Bill we are debating. The noble Lord said it was inconceivable that there would be any refoulement and that it is okay to proceed without the various recommendations in place. In the longer term, they would need to be in place—because it was in the longer term, I think, that he was suggesting that there might be justification in the suspicions that have been raised. I think that was the point the noble Lord was making.

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for tabling these amendments and for his constructive communication before doing so. In Committee there was clear interest in developing a mechanism to ensure that the terms of the treaty are and continue to be adhered to. I hope the House will see that there is value in how he has integrated these ideas into these amendments. Amendments 4 and 7 together provide a clear framework for ensuring the ongoing safety of Rwanda, rooted in the terms of the treaty the Government have negotiated. I will not say any more, because the noble and learned Lord set out the terms of his amendments very clearly.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. The partnership between the UK and Rwanda is rooted in a shared commitment to develop new ways of managing flows of irregular migration by promoting durable solutions, thereby breaking the existing incentives that result in people embarking on perilous journeys to the UK. We saw again only last week how perilous those journeys are, as my noble friend Lord Hodgson noted. The UK and Rwanda share a vision on the need for the global community to provide better international protection for asylum seekers and refugees, emphasising the importance of effective and functioning systems and safeguards that provide protection to those in most need.

Noble Lords will know that Rwanda has a long history of supporting and integrating asylum seekers and refugees in the region, for example through its work with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to host the emergency transit mechanism. It has also been internationally recognised for its general safety and stability, strong governance, low corruption and gender equality. My noble friend Lord Hodgson noted this, and my noble friend Lady Meyer gave her very welcome perspective on her recent visit. I say gently to the noble Lord, Lord German, that I heard a great deal in her comments about structures and systems.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, has explained, these amendments seek to allow Parliament to deem Rwanda to be safe only so long as the arrangements provided for in the Rwanda treaty have been fully implemented and are being adhered to in practice. The UK Government and the Government of Rwanda have agreed and begun to implement assurances and commitments to strengthen Rwanda’s asylum system. In advance of agreeing the treaty, we worked with the Government of Rwanda to respond to the findings of the courts by evidencing Rwanda’s existing asylum procedures and practice in standard operating procedures relating to and reflecting the current refugee status determination and appeals process.

Amendment 7 imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to obtain a statement from the independent monitoring committee confirming that the objectives specified in Article 2 of the treaty have been secured. This is unnecessary; the Government will ratify the treaty in the UK only once we agree with Rwanda that all necessary implementation is in place for both countries to comply with the obligations under the treaty. We have assurances from the Government of Rwanda that the implementation of all measures in the treaty will be expedited, and we continue to work with the Rwandans on this. The legislation required for Rwanda to ratify the treaty passed the lower house of the Rwandan Parliament on 28 February and it will now go to the upper house, as my noble friend Lord Murray noted in the debate on the previous group. Once ratified, the treaty will become law in Rwanda. It follows that the Government of Rwanda would then be required to give effect to the terms of the treaty in accordance with its domestic law as well as international law.

The Bill’s provisions come into force when the treaty enters into force. The treaty enters into force when the parties have completed their internal procedures. These amendments therefore confuse the process for implementing the treaty with what is required for the Bill’s provisions to come into force. The Bill builds on the treaty between the UK and the Government of Rwanda signed on 5 December 2023. It reflects the strength of the Government of Rwanda’s protections and commitments given in the treaty to people transferred to Rwanda in accordance with the treaty. Alongside the evidence of changes in Rwanda since summer 2022, published this January, the treaty will enable Parliament to conclude that Rwanda is safe and the Bill provides Parliament with the opportunity to do so. I say to my noble friend Lord Deben that that is the truth.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord German (LD)]

No, we simply keep the Human Rights Act, which does the job we are seeking here. Naturally, of course, if the Government want to move and create a special group, as here—what they call “illegal migrants”—what about the other groups that might follow from it? It is very clear that there may well be an issue with protesters—groups that are not in vogue with the Government. It is a very dangerous precedent and this is a warning sign. Fundamentally, what we are seeing here is a chasing of short-term headlines that will have a significant consequence for people’s rights in this country.

Not content with arguments that they are having with the views of the ECHR and the UNHCR, the Government in the last seven days have now drawn swords with the United Nations Human Rights Council. Published last Friday, the council’s report said:

“Prohibiting courts and tribunals in the UK from applying and interpreting principles of domestic human rights law and international law would undermine the ability of the courts to protect all those under UK jurisdiction from violations of their human rights as provided under international law”.


It goes on to say that the Government should look at this matter again and the United Nations has offered to work with the UK Government on this matter. So, when he responds, will the noble Lord tell us whether the Government have read the United Nations Human Rights Council’s review and whether they are prepared to meet the council and discuss this matter further?

There is also a logical inconsistency in what the Government are doing; they cannot have it both ways. They want to rely on the international convention and jurisprudence in justifying the disapplication of the Human Rights Act, but they are then seeking to disapply the findings of that same court in relation to the same international convention with respect to the consideration of interim orders. You cannot have it both ways and the Government need to be clear on that matter.

All the comments that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, made about Amendment 17 are absolutely accurate, but one thing worries me completely and that is the part of the amendment that basically takes away every law that this country might apply in this direction—domestic law and common law. For goodness’ sake, with common law as interpreted by the courts, I do not know how you find which parts of it you want to disapply. You have to be specific in what you say if you want to disapply anything of this nature. Amendment 17 looks to me like a complete wiping out, blanking out and blindfolding of every single possible piece of legislation that might stand in the way of this Government’s view, and that absolutely must affect the balance of the rule of law in this country.

I look forward to seeing how the Government will deal with that amendment, but I suggest they might need to consider how they move forward with no further disapplication of the Human Rights Act.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak quite briefly. The amendments in this group again demonstrate the threat to the domestic rule of law posed by this Bill. This is not the first Bill that threatens the Human Rights Act in this way, but the fact that it now seems almost commonplace for the Government to strip back human rights legislation does not mean it should go without objection each and every time.

There is much to object to in this Bill and Clause 4 is no exception. Each cut to the Human Rights Act matters and each piece of domestic law cut away in search of a quick political gain matters as well. I hope the Government listen to the arguments put forward by my noble friends and see sense.

I have to say I found this relatively brief debate quite refreshing. The noble Lord, Lord Frost, was perfectly candid with the House, and for a layman it was much easier to understand the political differences between the view articulated by the noble Lord and the view on the other side of the House. It was much easier to understand that difference than when I try to decipher the words of the Ministers when they respond to these amendments. Nevertheless, I look forward to what the Minister has to say.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, has flung down the gauntlet and, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, I am happy to pick it up.

I am grateful to all who participated in this debate and sincerely echo the words of the noble Lord when he said that there was a refreshing quality to this short debate. I think that the House articulated some important points and contrasting positions were properly and clearly laid out for the consideration of the House.

My noble friend Lady Lawlor opened with the support of my noble friend Lord Frost and I begin by saying, as I said at an earlier stage in the handling of this Bill, that it is important to recognise, as my noble friend did, that the levels of illegal migration to this country, perhaps to the whole of western Europe and other comparatively prosperous parts of the world, are not only placing enormous strain on us economically but straining the fabric of society and straining perhaps also public confidence in the ability of our courts and democratic legislatures to address problems.

I am grateful to both my noble friends for their broad support for the aims and objectives of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Frost, put it clearly and accurately in constitutional terms when he repeated that this Parliament may legislate in contravention of international law and that it is a long-standing element of our constitution.

The noble Lord also correctly identified that the high price to be paid for any such step is a matter of reputation. Reputations of countries, as of people, may be easily lost. I echo what he said about how it is difficult to adapt international treaties drawn up at different times and in different circumstances. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, intervened on him; it seemed to me that he was not saying that he had had enough of international law but that he wished it to operate in its proper context.

Security of Elected Representatives

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Thursday 29th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. Does he agree that there is no place for anti-Semitism on Britain’s streets and that those who perpetrate that poison must face the full force of the law? As well as seeing a rise in hostility and threats towards MPs, we have also seen a rise in intimidation and threats directed at local councillors. Can the Minister set out what action is being taken to ensure that there is robust protection in place for councillors and elected mayors who represent their local communities?

The scenes that we saw play out in central London, near the Cenotaph, on Armistice weekend last year were unacceptable and wrong. Yet, instead of working with the police in the run-up to that highly charged weekend, the then Home Secretary chose to attack the police and inflame tensions. Does the Minister agree that that was an irresponsible way for a Home Secretary to behave and that it was right she was sacked?

The Government’s strategy on countering extremism is now eight years out of date and there are reports that work countering extremism has been dropped or fragmented across departments. What urgent action are the Government taking to address that gap, and when will they come forward with an updated strategy?

In June last year, the Home Office downgraded recording requirements for non-crime hate incidents, meaning that the personal details of people who perpetrate anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are currently not recorded by the police. This will limit the police’s ability to monitor and prevent escalation within communities and will potentially leave victims feeling less safe. Will the Government back the Labour Party’s plans to reinstate the full collection of personal data for people who engage in anti-Semitic or Islamophobic hate?

A week ago, a DLUHC Minister in the other place said that the Government are

“not intending to publish a hate crime strategy”.—[Official Report, 21/2/24; col. 599.]

This is despite the last strategy now being four years out of date. In the context of recording high levels of anti-Semitism and Islamophobic attacks, can the Minister explain why this work has been abandoned?

The theme of the Statement is preventive measures. We welcome it as far as it goes, but what about the causes of these increased tensions? As the Minister said when he quoted the Minister in the other place, Britain is a united kingdom, not a divided nation. We enjoy and have vigorous debate on many issues within Parliament as a whole; people look to Parliament to air the most difficult subjects in our country, both on these shores and beyond. What thought have the Government given to addressing the causes of the increased tensions that we are seeing on our streets while maintaining our traditions, democracy and free speech, not only in Parliament but beyond?

In conclusion, although the Statement focuses on elected representatives, we in this House are, of course, not elected. However, quite a number of colleagues in this House are high-profile. They have their own vulnerabilities because of the views that they express in this House and outside it. What can the Minister say about the enhanced protection measures for colleagues in this House?

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement to the House and note that this additional funding will be spent primarily in supporting MPs, councillors, police and crime commissioners, and mayors. I am particularly happy to hear that police forces around the country will be able to draw on a new fund to respond to heightened community tensions. However, we must not forget other front-line services staff who are also experiencing increased levels of violence and intimidation.

I was appalled to hear the Minister in the other place say that Members had told him that

“they feel they have to vote a certain way … because … a violent few … have made them fear for their safety, and the safety of their families”.

That elected MPs can be targeted in this way simply beggars belief. We also know that women, particularly women from ethnic minorities, are disproportionately targeted for abuse and intimidation. This has got to stop.

When I came into politics it was generally accepted that those who stood for election did it to help their communities and/or their country. The public are now much more sceptical about politicians of all parties, and the perception that politicians are “fair game” for abuse on social media has a pernicious and dangerous effect.

That a small but very vocal minority can get away with using online platforms to bully and intimidate is a matter not just for the Government but for the platforms themselves. Too often we hear them say that they will not tolerate this kind of thing, but they do little to stop it because their prime concern is to grow bigger than their rivals. This has a major effect not just on politicians but on their families.

I suspect that the Minister does not spend a lot of his time reading Liberal Democrat policy papers—

Windrush

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Thursday 29th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I too thank the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, for putting down this debate on what she calls the Home Office scandal. The theme in this debate has been to induce the Government to meet their commitments to the Windrush generation. I thank all noble Lords who, through this debate, have kept up the pressure on the Government to live up to their commitments. I would go so far as to say that this has been potentially an historic debate; it has been a strong debate that will resonate, and I hope it will resonate to make the Government act faster.

My noble friend Lord Rosser put down a Written Question, which was answered in February of this year, comparing the Windrush compensation rollout with the Horizon compensation rollout—a theme that has been picked up by a number of noble Lords. That was not to criticise the Horizon scheme but to highlight the problem of those seeking compensation through the Windrush scheme.

On 7 February 2024, my honourable friend Vicky Foxcroft asked Laura Farris, a Minister at the Home Office, what discussions she had had with the Secretary of State on the time taken to process claims to the Windrush compensation scheme. Responding, Ms Farris stated:

“As of December 2023, 91% of all claims either had received a final decision or were less than six months old. The Windrush scheme has reduced the time taken to allocate a … casework decision from 18 months to less than four months”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/2/24; col. 233]


I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that those figures are accurate.

Also, in November of last year, my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton asked the Government what the reasons were for the Home Office’s decision to disband the team responsible for the Windrush policy in the department and what assessment they had made of the

“likelihood that this decision will undermine their commitments to the Windrush Generation”.

The Minister, who is again in his place today, responded by saying that, given the “significant progress” that the department had made since 2020, its response to the lessons learned review had been “embedded into everyday activities”. The noble Lord, Lord Bourne, described that as “baloney”—that is not a word that I would use myself; nevertheless, it is fair to say that he was sceptical about the response from his noble friend. The Minister also said that the

“embedded approach will better sustain the improvements made so far, and thereby our commitments to the Windrush generation and their descendants”.

Additionally, he noted that the teams working on the Windrush scheme and compensation scheme would “remain in place”, with there being

“no plans to close either scheme”.—[Official Report, 28/11/24; col. 1009.]

I look forward to the Minister updating the House on how they are planning to work at pace—a phrase we often hear in this House—to move towards a resolution on more of the cases.

In July 2023, the House debated the 75th anniversary of the arrival of the Windrush generation. The noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, led the debate, and she acknowledged that some progress had been made, but she urged the Government to redouble their efforts to ensure that appropriate funds are distributed.

As noble Lords will know, there is a long history to this scandal Suffice it to say that, on 16 April 2018, the then Home Secretary, Amber Rudd, apologised to the Windrush generation from the Dispatch Box in the other place. The following day, the then Prime Minister, Theresa May, also apologised to Caribbean leaders at a meeting in Downing Street. The then Home Secretary then went on to outline several actions that the Government were taking to address the issues faced by the Windrush generation. The actions included: first, conducting reviews of historical Caribbean cases that the Home Office wrongly actioned for either deportation or removal; secondly, establishing a Windrush scheme to issue confirmation of status documents and, in some cases, the granting of British citizenship free of charge for applicants; thirdly, creating a Windrush task force to assist individuals who may be eligible under the Windrush scheme; and, finally, establishing a Windrush compensation scheme. How is all that going?

I would be grateful if the Minister can correct any of the following figures—various have been cited, but I have some more. First, in 2023, more than 2,000 victims received zero payment, despite the Government accepting that they are victims. The noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, raised the issue of the loss of future earnings, and that should be part of the calculation. If it were part of the calculation, would the Government revisit those zero-payment decisions for those 2,000 victims? That happened despite the Government guaranteeing that all those eligible would receive full compensation in 2020. Can the Minister say whether there is any flexibility in revisiting those cases, or do the Government regard them as closed?

Secondly, as of January 2024, 1,932 people have received compensation so far, out of an estimated 15,700 victims. How long do the Government think that it will take to process the remaining claims?

A further point that a number of noble Lords have made is that the application process is still cumbersome and costly. There was talk about a 44-page document and other lengthy documents. There has been expert evidence from accountants and psychologists about what is needed to complete those forms. There is a strong case for some form of legal aid to help people do that. One of the organisations that has put this forward is the Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit. My noble friend Lord Davies gave figures for a very high refusal rate, and spoke about pension compensation. Will the Minister comment on the points he raised? In addition to this, Human Rights Watch has recommended that, in the interim, independent oversight of the scheme should be guaranteed, with access to legal aid and the right of appeal to an independent tribunal. In fact, Human Rights Watch also recommended that the whole scheme should be independent and not run by the Home Office itself. Do the Government agree with those recommendations?

Comparisons have been made with the Horizon compensation scheme and the public consciousness of a historic injustice which is acknowledged by the British state. I have no doubt that the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, and other noble Lords who have taken part in today’s debate will continue to ensure that the Government follow through on their commitments and that justice is done for the Windrush generation.

I comment on only a couple of many outstanding speeches. The noble Lord, Lord Hastings, said, “Let’s be fixers. Let’s just get it done”. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, spoke about the other scandals dealt with in the Victims and Prisoners Bill: the Horizon scandal, infected blood and Windrush. There is an impatience in all those scandals about how the Government are handling them. I acknowledge that it is complicated, but there is a sense of urgency which the Government need to follow through on. I also want to pay tribute to a particular journalist, Amelia Gentleman, who has done a lot of work exposing this scandal and really followed through on bringing it to public attention.

I want to conclude on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, about the new generation. I went to a London comprehensive school and so did my children. There is an absolute lack of understanding on behalf of my children and children generally who been brought up in London about the extent of racism that was common in previous generations. I see that as a sign of hope. It is in part because of the ongoing work done by the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, and others. While of course we urge the Government to do more, it is right to say that there is hope of an improving situation in racial tolerance in this country, which we should celebrate.

Shamima Begum

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 27th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am grateful that the noble Baroness brought up SIAC—the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. It ruled that the legislation should be construed as requiring the Secretary of State to seek prior representations from an individual, but that in Begum’s case the failure to do so did not change the outcome or invalidate the deprivation decision. The Court of Appeal has ruled that, in fact, the legislation does not require the Secretary of State to seek representations prior to making a deprivation decision. I take the noble Baroness’s point, but SIAC’s ruling was clear.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I wish to ask about the counter-extremism strategy. One in five people arrested for terrorism-related offences are now under 18, up from one in 25 in 2019. That is a worrying trend. The Government have failed to update their counter-extremism strategy for eight years now. Will they now commit to updating that cross-governmental strategy, with particular focus on preventing extremism in young people?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, we discussed that subject at some length last week, when talking about anti-Semitism, and of course the situation has evolved somewhat since then. I take the noble Lord’s points, but refer to some of the things that have been done and put in place by the Government on youth engagement and schools and education. For now, I will take his points back to the Home Office, but I cannot update him further.

Knife Crime: Violence Reduction Units

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 20th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Yes, again, the noble Baroness raises a very good point. She is right, of course, that London has particular problems in this area. The activities of certain violence reduction units have absolutely influenced the way that the whole programme has been established across England and Wales—and indeed taking a lot of the lead from Scotland.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, knife crime is up by 70% since 2015 and, according to the YMCA, youth services were cut by 71% in the decade after 2010. Does the noble Lord think these two statistics are linked? Does he also believe that, building on the work of the VRUs, local youth services should be introduced and backed in a way to try to prevent further knife crime?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

On the noble Lord’s latter point, I agree, which is one of the reasons the Home Office has invested £200 million in the youth endowment fund, to which I have already referred. As regards knife crime across the country, the rise is driven largely by the situation in London. For police-recorded offences involving knives or sharp instruments, there was a 5% increase year-on-year nationally, but the increase in London was 22%. If London was taken out of those figures, the natural trend would be a 1% reduction.

Computer Systems: Independent Testing

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Monday 12th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend raises a very good point. If I may, I will look into the specifics of her question and write to her.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, Article 40 of the French criminal procedure code provides for cybersecurity specialists who are acting in good faith and solely in the national interest to be protected from prosecution. Does the Minister believe that a similar provision would be suitable here?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, we are always interested in learning from the approaches taken by other countries and jurisdictions. We speak with our international counterparts, including all our major allies, to understand how they approach the issue of whether there should be defences to these types of offences. But the majority of our like-minded partners do not have statutory defences and are instead in favour of prosecutorial guidance. For example, the US Department of Justice introduced guidance for prosecutors on when to prosecute instances of potential breaches of its Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 29th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this is the third time in as many years that the Government have asked this House to consider legislation to stop boat journeys and to reform the asylum system—our third year of being presented with increasingly rushed, unworkable and inhumane solutions to the problem of small boats and asylum. There is a very real problem that needs fixing, but this Bill, like its predecessors, will not do so. The Opposition do not support the Bill or the schemes that underpin it. The record of votes cast at Second Reading in this place and Third Reading in the other place will attest to this.

However, the Bill completed all its stages in the House of Commons. Our role is not to undermine the will of the elected House, but nor is it to rush through legislation without due consideration. We must treat this Bill in the usual manner. We must scrutinise the details of these proposals and advise changes where we think the Government have got it wrong. We should not deny ourselves the opportunity to do so or our neighbours the chance to consider our work. In this spirit, we will not support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord German.

The Bill, as it stands, threatens the UK’s compliance with international law. I know that this point will be spoken on at length in further stages, so I will not dwell on it for too long here, and nor will I speak for very long on what the Bill demands of our domestic courts. When introducing the Bill, the Secretary of State claimed that

“the UK is a country that demonstrates to the whole world the importance of international law”.—[Official Report, Commons, 12/12/23; col. 748.]

Is this the message that the Bill sends to the world about the UK’s respect for international law? How will the decisions we make now be cited in future when other countries are asked to follow international law or to respect human rights? Is this the contribution we want to make?

What does the Bill say about our respect for our own courts? If the treaty fails, if refoulement happens, if there is a coup or if asylum seekers are shot at or killed, the Government say that British courts cannot consider those facts.

It is a large price to pay for what is ultimately a hugely limited scheme. The Government have stated that the Rwanda Government have made an initial provision to receive a few hundred people. To put this figure in context I say that, over the first nine months of 2023, 63,000 people claimed asylum. Therefore, this Bill and this plan, even if they somehow worked out in exactly the way the Government hope, would relocate only a small proportion of asylum cases. Can the Government confirm whether Rwanda can still receive only a “few hundred people”? Can they outline what is to happen to everyone else?

Given that the Illegal Migration Act—a majority of which has not yet been brought into force—rests on the use of third countries rather than returns to countries of origin, are we right to question what will happen to the 99% of people who will not be sent to Rwanda?

We still do not know the full cost of this scheme. The Government have been reluctant at every stage to divulge the cost of this flagship policy. In December, the Secretary of State appeared to indicate that around £400 million will have been sent to the Rwandan Government by 2027. Can the Minister confirm this figure? It is an extraordinary sum of money, but not the whole picture. According to the treaty, there are additional per-person costs of the scheme.

The economic impact assessment for the Illegal Migration Act was published only after considerable pressure from noble Lords from across this House. In this document, the Home Office was prepared to tell us that the average imagined cost of sending an asylum seeker to a third country would be £169,000. However, the details of the treaty suggest that these costs may be higher for sending someone to Rwanda. Before we begin to fully debate the details of this legislation and its role in the implementation of the Rwanda plan, will the Minister be clear about how much this plan is actually going to cost?

This Bill, whatever its impact, will not address the state that our asylum system is currently in. The UK deserves a managed asylum system that upholds strong border security and that can process claims fairly, accurately and quickly—a system that can return those with no claim to stay and help those who rightfully seek sanctuary. That is not our current asylum system. We have a backlog of 100,000 asylum claims waiting for a decision, 40,000 people who have yet to be removed from the UK, and up to 17,000 people whom the Government cannot account for.

The pace of decision-making is improving, but the backlog that has been permitted to develop will take time to fully clear and more work is needed. Nor will the Bill help us to negotiate returns agreements. Threats to our compliance with international law undermine our ability to establish returns agreements with other countries. Far from helping us, the Bill may greatly harm our ability to reform our asylum system.

The Government have repeatedly said that they are motivated by a desire to see the end of criminal smuggler gangs and to prevent boat crossings in the first place, yet this is now the third Bill that seeks to end small boat crossings without any measures to directly target the gang activity behind them. In fact, the latest police workforce statistics show a fall in the number of National Crime Agency officers, the law enforcement body responsible for fighting back against smuggling gangs. Between March and September 2023, their numbers fell by 343 personnel. Four hundred million pounds is just under half of the total budget this year for the NCA. Would the Government’s money not be better spent increasing the size of operations fighting against human traffickers, working with our European counterparts and going after the supply chains?

This Bill, and the deal behind it, will do nothing to stop boats coming to our shores. The Government’s plan hinges on the idea that the Rwanda scheme presents a deterrent effect, without presenting any evidence that this will be the case.

It is certainly difficult to imagine what deterrent effect a 1% or 2% chance of being sent to Rwanda would have. It is even more difficult to imagine why this would stop criminal traffickers; nor would the Bill present those fleeing conflict and persecution with safe alternatives to channel crossings. Last summer, the Government committed to publishing a report detailing existing and proposed additional safe and legal routes. A report has arrived, but it contains no proposals for creating safe routes for those seeking asylum. Can we assume, then, that the Government’s additional pledge to implement any proposed new routes by the end of this year is to be broken too? This was an issue raised repeatedly in both Houses during the passage of the then Illegal Migration Bill, and it is disappointing that the Government have not taken the request seriously.

If we are to truly address the challenge of migration, we must accept that we cannot do so alone. The Government are acting as though the challenges here are not related to those in other countries, particularly those of our European friends. The UK lacks the leadership needed to succeed in a world now marked by increasing conflict, the climate emergency, and the erosion of law and order, all of which fuel migration. We need an approach that restores the aid budgets, puts a renewed focus on conflict mitigation and resolution, and seeks international agreements and co-operation—an approach that is workable, strategic, humane and rooted in the conventions that we have signed.

I will conclude shortly, but I want to mention that one colleague—my noble friend Lord Dubs—is unable to join us today. He is in Berlin taking part in events to mark the anniversary of the Kindertransport, which began in late 1938. In June, it will be 85 years since he arrived in Britain, having been put on a train by his mother in Prague. Although we miss his contribution today, we can be reminded of what and whom we gain when we play our part in helping those who flee conflict and persecution, and we look forward to his return.

I hope the House will not be deterred from changing the Bill where it sees fit: it certainly needs our help. I hope too that the Government, rather than trying to communicate through press conference, engage with this House in good faith and through more conventional channels. We are faced with a deeply broken system and layers of bad legislation, which have only made things worse. I hope that the Government rethink this Bill, this plan and this approach to migration, but I fear we will be left without the change we need until we change the Government.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 23rd January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fox (LD)]

I shall be brief. Not for the first time, your Lordships are in debt to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for intervening on an issue that I think all of us failed to note. His request of the Minister is helpful, and I hope the Minister will be able to respond. There is an alternative process which I could suggest to the Minister—I have not had a chance to talk to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about this. If the Minister wanted to withdraw this amendment and bring it back at Third Reading, which is applicable in certain circumstances. I am sure we would be very flexible in permitting that as well.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we support the introduction of the Government’s amendments. I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Fox, said about the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and I look forward to the Government’s response on that point.

I would also be interested to hear what the Government have to say about my noble friend Lord West’s amendments. He has taken a keen interest in this part of the Bill, and I hope the Government will be able to answer the questions, in particular on data disclosure powers, as I think they can give a more detailed response to the expansion of disclosure powers to regulatory bodies than was given in the original legislation. It is also very likely to be further analysed and looked at as the Bill moves down to the other end of the Corridor. Nevertheless, we support the amendments as they are currently.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for this short debate and the scrutiny on these important issues. First, I will address Amendments 15 and 16 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, which seek to remove Clause 13 and the Schedule from the Bill. We have covered some of the same ground as we did in Committee, and I am afraid that much of my response will make similar points to those I made then. However, I can appreciate why he has raised the points he made about these provisions, and I hope that I can still provide him with assurance on why these measures are needed and proportionate.

As the Government have been clear, the purpose of Clause 13 is to ensure that bodies with regulatory or supervisory functions are not inhibited from performing the roles expected of them by Parliament. It restores their pre-existing statutory powers to acquire CD in support of those functions. When the IPA was passed in 2016—under the expert stewardship of the noble Lord’s fellow ISC member in the other place, the right honourable Member for South Holland and The Deepings—it made specific provision, at Section 61(7)(f) and (j) respectively, for the acquisition of CD for the purposes of taxation and oversight of financial services, markets and financial stability. The noble Lord and his fellow committee members have queried whether we are “unmaking” these measures in the 2016 Act through Clause 13 of the Bill. I would therefore like to put beyond doubt what has happened since then to lead us to this point of needing to refine rather than unmake these provisions.

Following the Tele2 and Watson judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2016, the Government took the opportunity to streamline the statute book, including but not limited to some changes in response to that judgment. This streamlining included the removal of the regulatory provisions contained in the IPA because, at that time, those public authorities with regulatory or supervisory functions were able to acquire the data they needed using their own information-gathering powers, and Section 12 of the IPA had not yet been commenced, removing many of those powers. The relevant data was outside of the provisions of the IPA at this time and therefore not considered to come within the definition of CD.

Since then, businesses have operated their services more and more online. This has meant that many have become, in part at least, telecommunications operators as defined by the IPA. As a consequence, growing amounts of the data that they collect—which regulatory and supervisory bodies would have previously been able to access using their own information-gathering powers—now fall within the IPA’s definition of CD. The effect of this is that public authorities are increasingly unable to acquire the CD that they need to perform their statutory civil or regulatory functions.

In summary, the IPA has been changed since it was commenced in 2016 to remove tax-related and financial stability-related powers to acquire CD and to introduce the serious crime threshold. Technology and society have moved on, with the result that more relevant data amounts to CD. Section 12 of the IPA has been commenced to remove general information powers. The combination of these changes has meant that public authorities are experiencing increased difficulty in carrying out their statutory functions. For example, the Financial Conduct Authority, His Majesty’s Revenue & Customs and the Treasury are all examples of public authorities that already have the power to acquire CD using a Part 3 request but that may be unable to do so in the exercise of some of their functions as a result of the issue I have just set out.

These bodies perform a range of vital statutory functions using CD, including tackling breaches of sanctions regimes, enforcing the minimum wage and providing oversight of banking and financial markets. Schedule 4 to the IPA provides a list of public authorities that can acquire CD under Part 3 of the Act. The new definition of public authorities inserted by this clause will apply in the context of the sharing of CD between public authorities. This will include government departments and their arm’s-length bodies, and executive agencies administering public services. While data sharing between government entities is covered under other legislation including the Data Protection Act and GDPR, or under separate data-sharing agreements, its sharing for legitimate purposes should not be discouraged or prevented by the IPA.

Clause 13 is needed to ensure that such bodies can continue to fulfil these existing statutory duties in the context of a world that takes place increasingly online. It strikes an appropriate balance between necessity and proportionality. In particular, I re-emphasise that it makes clear that the acquisition by these regulatory bodies should be only in support of their civil and regulatory functions, and not used in support of criminal prosecutions. Furthermore, the Government have retained the serious crime threshold that applies when acquiring CD for the purposes of a criminal prosecution.

The codes of practice will also provide additional safeguards and clarity on how this should work in practice. The Government published these in draft ahead of Committee to illustrate this. Any changes to the existing codes will be subject to statutory consultation before being made and will require approval from Parliament under the affirmative procedure. I am therefore confident that the changes will be subject to a high level of scrutiny. To be clear, this applies to a limited cadre of public authorities with the necessary statutory powers conferred on them by Parliament and only specifically when in support of regulatory and supervisory functions—it is not creating a way to circumvent the safeguards in the IPA. It ensures that the acquisition routes and associated strong oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner are reserved for those areas where it is most essential and has the most serious potential consequences in terms of criminal prosecutions.

I am happy to provide the reassurance—or I hope I am—that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, sought. I am grateful to him for his comments regarding government Amendment 14, for engaging with officials to work through the concerns they raised and for his generous comments about the officials.

Our view is that the amended Clause 12 will be narrower in scope than the original drafting, which carried a risk of permitting access beyond the “who” and “where” of an entity. I assure noble Lords that the codes of practice will set out the further safeguards and details on the practical effect of Clause 12 so that operational partners are clear on the lawful basis of CD acquisition. It is appropriate that the technical detail is set out in this way rather than in primary legislation. The codes of practice will be subject to a full public consultation and will be laid in Parliament under cover of an SI, via the affirmative procedure. I reassure the noble Lord that we will consult with partners and the regulators of the IPA to ensure that the high standards of the CD acquisition regime remain world leading. I am happy to continue this conversation, and for my officials to continue with the extensive engagement already undertaken with the users of the CD powers, to see whether any further refinement is needed.

Finally, I confirm that the intention behind the amendment is to include the type of subscriber data that is necessary to register for, or maintain access to, an online account or telecommunication service. Examples of such data would include name, address and email address. It is not intended to include all types of data that an individual might give a telecommunication service that is not necessary for the purpose of maintaining or initiating access to that service.

I turn to Amendments 17, 19 and 20 on internet connection records, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord West. Much of the argument I have heard relies on a perception that the new condition D is inherently more intrusive than the existing conditions B and C. I will set out why this is not the case.

The safeguards for the new condition D replicate the well-established and extensive safeguards already in place for CD authorisations. The authorisation process for CD varies according to the purpose for which the data is being sought and the type of CD to be acquired. This regime works effectively and has been considered by the Court of Appeal and found to be lawful.

The purpose of new condition D is to enable ICRs to be used for target detection, which is currently not possible under existing Part 3 authorisations. The level of appropriate oversight and safeguards is linked to the sensitivity of the data to be disclosed and the impact that disclosure may have on the subject of interest.

As I have said, the Government do not believe that condition D is inherently more intrusive than conditions B or C. Conditions B and C authorise “target development” work, and as such enable the applicant to request data on a known individual’s internet connections. As an example, this means that the NCA could request records of the connections a known subject of interest has made in a given time period, provided that request was judged to be both necessary and proportionate by the Office for Communications Data Authorisations. In comparison, condition A enables the requesting agency to request who or what device has made a specific connection to an internet service.

Similarly, condition D would enable an agency to request details about who has used one or more specified internet services in a specified timeframe, provided it was necessary and proportionate—for example, accessing a website that solely provides child sexual abuse imagery. The actual data returned with condition D will most likely constitute a list of IP addresses or customer names and addresses. No information concerning any wider browsing that those individuals may have conducted will be provided. Information about that wider activity would be available only under a further condition B or C authorisation. Condition D is therefore no more intrusive than conditions B and C in terms of what data is actually disclosed. As such, we see no benefit or logic to imposing a different authorisation route for condition D when the existing safeguards have proven sufficient in terms of ICRs applications under conditions A, B and C.

I use this opportunity to remind all noble Lords of the importance of this new condition D and how it will support investigations into some of the most serious crimes, as well as supporting the critical work against both state and cyber threats. ICRs could be used to detect foreign state cyber activity. For examples, ICRs could be used to illuminate connections between overseas state actors and likely compromised UK infra- structure. We understand that these actors have an intent to target UK-based individuals and organisations, including government and critical national infrastructure, from within UK infrastructure, which we typically would not see. The ICR data returned from TOs would be highly indicative of the extent of malicious infrastructure and could assist with victim exposure. Furthermore, improved access to ICR data would enable the National Cyber Security Centre to detect such activity more effectively and in turn inform incident management and victims of compromises. Using data to flag suspicious behaviour in this way can lead to action to protect potential UK victims of foreign espionage and attacks.

I now turn specifically to the ability of the intelligence agencies and the NCA to internally authorise condition D applications. The intelligence agencies and the NCA must obtain approval from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for ICR applications for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, other than in urgent circumstances. In urgent circumstances, such as threat to life or serious harm to an individual, the intelligence agencies and the NCA are able to obtain CD authorisations from internal designated senior officers in the same way that police forces are. In practice, the volumes of non-urgent requests are such that the IPC delegates responsibility for the authorisation of ICR and other CD requests to the OCDA.

In terms of oversight, the IPC could, if he wished to, consider specific types of CD authorisations himself. The IPC also has the power to directly inspect any part of the CD regime. If he wishes to focus attention on condition D applications, he has the necessary powers to do so. The approach we have adopted for condition D authorisations is therefore consistent with the wider CD regime and gives the IPC flexibility in how he exercises his powers and resources.

As is also consistent with the wider CD regime, condition D applications relating to national security will be authorised by a designated senior officer within the intelligence agencies. The CD codes of practice state that the designated senior officer must be independent of the operation and not in the line management chain of the applicant. This independence is declared within each application, and each designated senior officer completes training prior to taking up this role. Furthermore, each agency has one or more single point of contact officer, accredited by the Home Office and the College of Policing, who facilitates lawful acquisition of CD.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I will move Amendment 21 and speak to the other amendments in this group in my name.

Amendment 21 specifies that the enforcement of retention notices applies only to UK recipients of such notices. It is one of a suite of amendments in this group that return to the issue of extra-territoriality— I see the Minister blow out his cheeks at the prospect. Amendments 22, 25, 28 and 31 are similarly directed and each largely seeks to limit extra-territoriality by ensuring that operators can make changes to their services for users outside UK jurisdiction.

The reason for tabling the amendments, the others of which I will not move, is that there remains a huge gulf of understanding between the tech companies and the Government when it comes to the interpretation of the Bill with respect to its territorial reach. I am again presenting the Minister with a golden opportunity to set out in clear language the territorial ambitions that the Government have for this Bill. I believe there is some element of miscommunication going on here, though I am not sure in which direction. I hope that the Minister can dispel that.

Clearly, we have international tech companies that are incorporated in another country with subsidiaries all around the world and data residing in many different domains—companies that offer services to customers all over the world. In essence, we need to understand what would happen as a result of this Bill if such a business proposed to change a global service that is used by consumers all over the world, including in the UK. How do the Government use this Bill to deal with such situations? I am looking forward to the response.

Amendments 23, 24, 29 and 30 would raise the threshold for calling in a change from “negative effect” to “substantially limit”. Again, this increases the bar before the Government can start the process. Negative effect is a very low bar which will catch almost everything. It is not in the interests of the authorities to have everything coming through. There needs to be some sense of funnel. This is an opportunity for the Minister to define what negative effect is and what it is not, because it is a very low bar. He would be wise to take our advice and look at the language there, certainly when it comes to the code coming later.

Moving on, my Amendment 27 is a retread of an amendment I tabled in Committee, and it was there as a placeholder. I am pleased to see that it is unnecessary, as government Amendments 26 and 32 very much embrace the spirit of what I was seeking to achieve in that amendment. I thank the Minister for responding, and therefore will not be speaking to or indeed moving Amendment 27.

I now turn to Amendment 35. Currently, while there is a requirement for the Secretary of State to consult the operator before giving notice, there is no requirement on the Secretary of State to consult ahead of making regulations that will specify what “relevant change” includes, and therefore what needs to be notified. My Amendment 35 therefore introduces a requirement for pre-legislative consultation on the definition of “relevant change”. The amendment specifies that the Secretary of State must consult the Technical Advisory Board. There is a precedent for consultation with this board in Section 253(6) of the 2016 Act. As your Lordships know, the Technical Advisory Board is comprised of independent and industry representatives; the amendment also specifies a wider range of consultees.

The amendment then requires the Secretary of State to have regard to the impact on users, including on their privacy and on operators’ ability to innovate. Again, there is precedent for this in the 2016 Act. Such considerations must be taken into account when a public authority is deciding whether to issue a TCN or NSN, or where a judicial commissioner approves a DRN. As such, we feel it is worth while also to consider these factors when legislating for a “relevant change”, because delaying a critical security update could negatively impact users and operators. In a sense, all we are asking for is consultation. We are not asking to change the law, and this gives the Government a power to abide by that consultation or not. But we feel that this is an important definition, and it needs to be more widely consulted on.

I hope the Minister will agree, but in the event that he declines, I will be moving Amendment 35. I beg to move Amendment 21.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we have had much welcome interaction from stakeholders on the issues summarised in this group, as well as some useful briefings from the Home Office and the noble Lord’s team, for which we are grateful.

As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has just said, there appears to be a gulf in both position and understanding between the Government and the tech companies, both on the principle of the notice and its details, which is, in a sense, frustrating scrutiny of the Bill. I understand that there is a disagreement about the introduction of notification notices in general. It is right that we look at the details to ensure that the process takes place in a way that reflects the realities of international law, and the need of the intelligence services to maintain levels of data access and the necessary safeguards.

Concerns raised by stakeholders keep striking at the same places: how this notice would work with access agreements with other countries; why there is no double lock on the notification notice, despite the clear impact it would have on tech companies’ activities; and why the definition of telecoms operator is perhaps in reality wider than the Government intend.

We will not be supporting Amendment 35, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, although we understand the intent behind it. We encourage the Government to keep talking to stakeholders, and we believe that this part of the Bill will benefit from further discussion in the other place.

Immigration Act 2014 (Residential Accommodation) (Maximum Penalty) Order 2023

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 16th January 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord German (LD)]

I repeat the question I ended with: what is the evidence that this policy has had the desired impact on deterrence since it was introduced in 2014? Last week, I spent some time with a third-sector body that provides support for those with the right to remain in the United Kingdom. I heard direct evidence that, in the competition for rented accommodation, landlords are opting to choose a tenant where there is no need to go through the right to rent checking process and risk a fine. They are opting for someone who can provide the simplest proof of their right to rent. Increasing penalties by so much increases this risk of outlying those who are from a different category of people. It is particularly hurtful because it impacts very much on the bottom end of the rented market sector.

Paragraphs 22, 24 and 43 of the economic note are very instructive to understanding the strength of the evidence. Paragraph 22 says that there is “uncertainty”, paragraph 24 talks about “limited certainty”, and paragraph 43 says that “limited evidence” is available. Is that evidence available?

Secondly, what enforcement action is there against employers and landlords who discriminate against potential employees or potential renters on the basis of nationality or any other protected characteristic? How often has that enforcement been used? In the current housing crisis, where there are many renters for each rental property, to what extent is this policy increasing the barriers for the non-white British population legally in the United Kingdom to access housing?

The Home Office’s equality impact assessment associated with the instruments says:

“Any indirect impact is the result of an employer or landlord choosing to discriminate for which a remedy is likely to be available to the individual under the Equality Act 2010”.


Recently, I saw a sign in a rental agency in east London that said simply “no DWP”. Those of us with long memories will remember signs that said, “No Irish, no blacks”. Given the difficulty of providing proof, what data is there, if any, on the number of people who have used the Equality Act remedy? How will the Home Office keep the impact of this policy on race under review, as it states it will do in its equality impact assessment?

Finally, paragraph 25 of the economic note talks about familiarisation and says, basically, “We don’t need to do anything to inform employers or landlords about this because it’s just a small change and they already know about it”. But given the size of this particular increase in fines, it means there is a case, because we do not have the evidence, for ensuring that those who rent or offer jobs understand the importance of non-discrimination in this whole process.

Creating a hostile environment for those who have been granted leave to remain and who want to contribute to our economy is not an outcome that I would support. I hope the Minister would agree.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, on the draft immigration order for employment of adults subject to immigration control, the Labour Party supports the principle of preventing those with no legal right to reside in the UK undertaking paid employment here and implementing penalties that act as real deterrents for employers who deliberately break the law, so we will support the increasing of the penalties from £15,000 to £45,000 per worker for a first offence. However, given the potential impact on employers, the lack of consultation with businesses, especially small businesses, is disappointing. We would argue that it demonstrates, yet again, the lack of a clear, thought-out strategy towards immigration and tackling illegal work.

The draft order on residential accommodation would increase from £3,000 to £20,000 the maximum penalty for renting a property to someone who does not have the right to rent in the UK. Again, there has been a lack of consultation. I repeat the point made by the noble Lord, Lord German: there are known unintended consequences of right-to-rent checks and penalties for breaches. Landlords are keen to avoid large penalties and might discriminate against British nationals and lawful migrants who have the right to rent but who, perhaps because of their race or nationality, face discrimination and difficulty in getting those rentals. The noble Lord asked how this is monitored: is it done through the Equality Act, which is the remedy for landlords who are discriminating against legal people trying to rent? What are the Government doing to monitor this situation and what levels of enforcement are there against landlords who illegally discriminate against particular groups of people?

Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) Order 2024

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 16th January 2024 Grand Committee

Those are the three points that I hope the Minister can cover in his response: monitoring the prevalence of the synthetic opioids in the instrument; how treatment services will be adapted to cope with people presenting as users of these new controlled substances; and the very specific point around prescribing and, in particular, paramedic prescribing of controlled substances.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we too welcome the amendments in this instrument. I will start with two specific questions and then make some more general comments.

First, beyond adding the specific substances which the Minister referred to in his speech and in the document, what more are the Government doing to address the risks posed to our communities from drugs more generally? The second question is about a particular drug, xylazine, a non-opioid veterinary anaesthetic that is being used in combination with synthetic opioids to devastating effect. I understand that the Minister for Crime wrote to the ACMD in June to ask it to consider the harms of this drug and that he is still waiting for a response. How long should the Minister for Crime expect to wait before he gets either action or a response to his letter about this drug?

Those are my two particular questions. More generally, I want to use the same structure as the noble Lord, Lord Allan. The first question he asked was about monitoring the prevalence and usage of synthetic opioids. As I mentioned in other speeches, including in the King’s Speech debate, I travelled to North America in the summer and went to Portland, Oregon. I also went to Seattle in Washington state. I was shocked by the amount of drug use on the streets. I saw hundreds if not thousands of people sleeping rough on the streets of those two cities. I saw people shooting up in front of me in the middle of those cities—and I had young children with me. It was a truly shocking sight.

While I was there, I visited a court that dealt with drug issues. I also had breakfast with a district attorney who is an elected prosecutor. We spoke about the way their current drug policy is working. What was interesting and depressing to me was the uniform agreement across the political spectrum that it was a disaster, yet they did not agree on the solution to that disaster; there was an ongoing political debate on it. The district attorney also said to me—it is relevant to this debate—that there is a strong suspicion, or belief, that synthetic opioids are getting into prescribed drugs. He told me that he had gone on holiday to Mexico but had forgotten some of his normal prescription drugs, so he had to go and buy the drugs while in Mexico. He became aware that synthetic opioids are illegitimately getting into prescribed drugs. This is a very worrying development; it is all over the internet in that part of the world. It is something that we should be aware of as a possible problem over here as well. It really is a huge issue. I am sure that the Minister is aware of it, but it would be good to hear what is being done to monitor the scale of this problem, which is potentially coming our way.

The second point made by the noble Lord, Lord Allan, was about treatment services and more drugs being brought into scope. I am quite worried about the experiments being carried out in Glasgow. I suppose that would be a good question for the Minister to answer: what monitoring are the UK Government doing on the experiments being done around drug treatment centres in Glasgow? I will leave it there.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their contributions to this short debate. I take on board the personal experience of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in the States; his observations are obviously extremely interesting. Perhaps it is worth pointing out that just under half of all drug poisoning deaths registered in this country in 2022 already involved an opiate of some sort. The noble Lord made some acute points; of course, the Government remain aware of the situation overseas and continue to monitor that as much as they monitor the situation here.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked me a specific question about xylazine. The ACMD is independent, so I cannot comment on its timeframes, but we are hoping for its response on this particular drug in early 2024. Obviously, we will come back to this as and when we have its response.

The noble Lord, Lord Allan, asked about monitoring and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, backed that up. As I said, UK agencies are highly alert to the threat from synthetic drugs, including synthetic opioids such as fentanyl as well as synthetic cannabinoids and benzo- diazepines, which have been linked to drug-related deaths in this country. Along with law enforcement partners, the UK Government stand ready to respond to the threat from synthetic drugs. They have established a cross-government task force to monitor that threat and to lead and co-ordinate the government response to the risk from these synthetic opioids in the UK. The aim of the task force is to consider evidence-based policy; programmatic and legislative decisions in response to the level of risk; and the nature of synthetic opioids. Members of the task force include the Home Office, the Office for Health Improvement and Disparities, the Ministry of Justice, the National Crime Agency, HM Prison and Probation Service, Border Force and the police.

Through the UK’s drugs strategy, which was published in December 2021, we are implementing an end-to-end plan to disrupt the supply of all drugs at every stage of the supply chain from a source to the street. As part of that strategy, we have provided additional resources to the international networks of the NCA and the Home Office in key source and transit countries; this is for them to work with other Governments in identifying and disrupting cartels that seek to exploit the UK, as well as to seize drugs before and during their journey to the UK and the EU.

Also outlined in the strategy, we have increased the availability of naloxone, including naloxone nasal spray, to prevent drug-related deaths, and have committed to supporting local provision of a broader range of medicines, including newer medicines such as long-acting buprenorphine injection. We believe firmly in the importance of engaging with experts and delivery partners to respond swiftly to the evidence of emerging drug threats, including learning from international partners through international fora such as the US-led Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

On the health situation that was brought up by both noble Lords, FRANK, the Government’s free drugs advice service, contains information on synthetic opioids, synthetic cannabinoids and benzodiazepines, which will be updated to reflect the changes when this legislation comes into force. The Department for Education has also worked with the Office for Health Improvement and Disparities to make sure that good-quality teaching resources are available for teachers providing drug, alcohol and tobacco education, and lesson plans on drugs, alcohol and tobacco are available on the PSHE Association website.

We are of course concerned that banning these substances will discourage people from access to treatment services, but the Government’s drugs strategy, From Harm to Hope, published in December 2021, is clear about the Government’s ambition to achieve stigma-free treatment, providing the full, positive impact of treatment services for those seeking help. But, noting the potential harms associated with misuse of these substances, we believe it is necessary to take action to restrict access to these drugs and reduce their misuse. Through the drugs strategy, we are investing more than £2.8 billion over three years to support people through treatment and recovery, which includes support for those who have used a range of drugs and suffered various health harms.

Of course, key to all this is reducing the demand for drugs. We are committed to reversing the rising trend of drug use in society, to protect vulnerable people from harm and exploitation. It enables us to keep our communities safe and we must therefore reduce the demand for drugs, which fuel violence and exploitative criminal markets. Around 3 million people in England and Wales report using drugs each year, putting themselves at risk and driving a violent and exploitative supply chain, including through so-called recreational drug use. Through programmes announced as part of the drugs strategy, such as drug testing on arrest, and our plans to roll out pilots to change behaviour and attitudes towards drug use, we will provide the powers and access to appropriate interventions and support. We also know that we need to step up action in addressing the visible forms of drug use within our communities, so we will work with our enforcement partners to see what more we can do to tackle this, while ensuring that those who need treatment and support are diverted into the appropriate services.

The noble Lord, Lord Allan, asked a very specific question about remimazolam. There are no known established legitimate uses for any of these substances except remimazolam. The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that that in particular remains available for legitimate and lawful purposes, so in line with the recommendations from the ACMD, remimazolam will be placed in part 1 of Schedule 4 to the 2001 regulations, as I said in my opening remarks. That will enable lawful access in healthcare settings, subject to the requirements of the 2001 regulations. The remaining 19 substances will be placed in Schedule 1, as I mentioned, and access will therefore be permitted only under a Home Office-controlled drug licence. That will ensure that organisations can still lawfully undertake research with these substances, should they choose to do so.

On the specific question about paramedics, that is a Department for Health situation: it would have to request that paramedics be able to prescribe or use this drug in the appropriate way. I hope that answers the questions that I have been asked and, again, I thank both noble Lords for their participation in this debate. These are dangerous substances with the potential to cause significant harm, and they should therefore be subject to the strict controls under the 1971 Act. With that, I commend this order to the Committee.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I specifically asked about the Glasgow drug consumption rooms and whether there is a UK oversight of the way they are operating, rather than just a Scottish Government oversight.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

With apologies, I forgot that question and, as it happens, I also do not know the answer—so I will have to find out and write to the noble Lord.