Tackling Spiking

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 19th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, yesterday’s Statement on tackling spiking was welcome. It said that 5,000 cases of spiking had been reported last year—as it very realistically said, this is likely to be just the tip of the iceberg. As it also said, spiking is not just the spiking of drinks but by needles and sometimes of food. It is a prevalent problem that needs tackling.

The danger is to everybody, but it is particularly to young women in nightclubs and bars. There is very often a sexual motive to those who perpetrate spiking. The other point the Statement made, which is worth saying, is that it is often a trigger to secondary offending as a result of the spiking itself.

I have spoken to a number of young people about this and every one of them knows about spiking. They either know it through their own experience or that of close personal friends. Everybody who I have spoken to says it is an issue for undergraduates at universities, for example. They have all got their story to tell about spiking.

As a magistrate, I have dealt with spiking a few times over the last few years. However, on reflection, I have mainly dealt with cases where it is not the perpetrator who is in front of me in the court, but a defendant who claims their alleged criminal activity is because of the spiking. That is something for the court to try and disentangle, but from my own experience that is what I have actually seen in court. It must be quite difficult to bring these cases to court.

The other point worth making, which I am sure the noble Lord will be well aware of, is that the vast majority of young people who have experienced this do not report it to the police. They do that for a variety of reasons, but that is a common thread from what they have said to me.

In the Statement, the Government said that they are going to bring forward amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill that will modernise the language of the Offences against the Person Act 1861—clearly, that is welcome—and that there will be additional funding, which will be provided to the police to run spiking intensification weeks. The other undertaking within the statement is that the Security Industry Authority, the regulator of the UK’s private security industry, has committed to introducing spiking training for door supervisors as part of its existing licence-linked qualifications. One question for the Minister is: what responsibilities do nightclub owners have to try and stamp out spiking from their premises?

A further commitment of the Government is that they will support the police rolling out their spiking reporting and advice tool to improve the quality of data. We of course welcome these announcements as far as they go, but they are long overdue. I have had correspondence with the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, when she was a Home Office Minister, on exactly this matter, so I know that the Government are seized of the issue. Can the Minister say something about how much longer he expects it to be before the legislative changes which may be proposed are made, and how much longer it will be before any funding support which may be provided to the police will be made and get off the ground?

I conclude on a slightly different note. I am very conscious of the limits of changing the law. Of course, we must change the law to make sure there is adequate punishment and to recognise spiking in its many manifestations, but really, the best defence is information. As I said, young people are aware of this but are not necessarily aware of the best ways of defending themselves against spiking. It may be the responsibility of universities, and maybe also of police forces, but also of the Government to make sure that the right information is made available to young people to try to reduce this crime.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for this Statement about understanding and tackling spiking, and indeed for the document which accompanies it. It is good that the Government are making a series of proposals. If I pick up where the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, finished, on the change of the law, that is a useful clarification because if the law—even though it is there—is not being used by the criminal justice system, it is failing. I hope we will all be able to get behind that amendment when it comes through in the Criminal Justice Bill.

When I read the report, my heart sank. There are some good points, and I will come on to those in a minute. However, there is very little emphasis on tackling the prevalence of behaviour by perpetrators. There is a mention at the very end of the recommendations in the document that prevalence will be part of trying to highlight spiking, including

“increased arrests, detections, and prevention activity taking place”.

However, that prevention activity is unlikely to change the mindset of a young man—it is usually a young man—going out with some drugs that he wishes to use to spike somebody’s drink or even to use a needle. It always worries me that victims are the ones who need to read up and learn about how they can best protect themselves, while nothing is done to attempt to change the culture of the behaviour of the perpetrator. It seems to me that that is a big issue. Can the Minister say what is planned on this? For example, are there advertising schemes? We must get the perpetrators to think that it is absolutely unacceptable even to think about it—but I am struggling to see that.

Having been a health spokesperson, I am interested in the research into the capability of existing test kits. I know that most of the current test kits involve using a urine sample, which is impractical at the time: you can find out only afterwards if you have one of those tests. If it is the equivalent of the lateral flow test that was developed during the Covid pandemic, it would be enormously useful—but 150,000 will not go very far. I note the wording in the document is very careful in talking about the plan “to begin research”, but we ought to put some urgency on this. If there are 5,000 cases a year that we are aware of, they are putting a considerable burden on not only the victims but the entire criminal justice system. It seems that this should be a bigger priority for prevention.

My final point is on the training programme. Noble Lords will know that I go on and on about training programmes in relation to victims and the criminal justice system. They are really helpful for upskilling staff in the night-time economy. I declare an interest that one of my children works in the night-time industry, as a security guard. I know that she would welcome some training to accompany the other training that she has on safeguarding and other matters; it would be extremely helpful. It would be useful for particular sectors that work very much with young people—universities and further education providers—as well as the night-time industry.

My real concern is that we need to get to the people who think that it is acceptable to perpetrate this crime. I do not see any of that in the Statement.

Refugees: Homelessness

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Wednesday 13th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Yes, I think so, because the refugee will have been processed under a legacy asylum case and will therefore have been in that accommodation for a very long time—over a year. They would have had ample time to learn English and embed themselves to some extent into British society. An extra month is perfectly generous.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, some of those in Home Office asylum care will be under 18. How confident is the Minister that none of those under-18s will ever be made homeless and that they will find their way into some form of social care provided by local authorities?

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 11th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I will make a brief comment on two aspects of Clause 14 which have been developed today and which were considered in my report. Amendments 23 and 25 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, would restrict the changes relating to internet connection records in Clause 14 to the intelligence services only. The noble Lord correctly noticed that, while I support the use of ICRs for the new target detection purpose in condition D1, I mentioned at paragraph 4.18 of my report that it would be

“open to Parliament to require further safeguards”

and suggested that those safeguards include

“making the extra condition available only to UKIC”—

in other words, the intelligence services—

“at least in the first instance”.

I pointed out a range of safeguards that already apply to ICRs. These are fully set out in the draft addition to section 9 of the code of practice that was helpfully provided in advance of these debates. I also pointed out, by way of mitigation to my proposal that only UKIC should have access, that

“working arrangements … could facilitate the use of UKIC powers in the service of NCA or CTP in particular”.

That is as much as I am told I can say on working arrangements, though noble Lords may be able to use their imaginations.

Clause 14, instead of going for this workaround, opted to give the NCA, though not counterterrorism policing, its own direct access to the new power. It is certainly true that the NCA has primary responsibility for many of the crimes where the new power may prove most useful—in particular, child sexual abuse, where it has strong potential. I will listen to what the Minister says about that, but I think there is no great division of opinion between us on this issue. We are really debating different mechanisms by which the NCA might get access to this material, and although it is not precisely what I suggested, I have no objection to the more direct route taken in the Bill.

I turn to Amendments 21, 24 and 26 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, which would introduce a requirement for requests by the intelligence services and the NCA to be independently authorised by the Office for Communications Data Authorisations. This would be an exceptional state of affairs for communications data requests by the intelligence agencies. Existing ICR requests are internally authorised and some of those, in particular under condition B and C, will be arguably, as I said in my report, as intrusive as requests under the new condition.

However, the noble Lord has emphasised the undoubted intrusiveness of the new condition and I know from my own correspondence with the ISC that, very much to its credit, it has looked at this issue in considerable detail. Furthermore, I raised the possibility of independent authorisation for such requests in my report. While I said that the full double-lock procedure would be disproportionately burdensome, independent authorisation by OCDA, which is not a possibility on which I commented expressly, sounds as though it could be a more manageable proposition. I have some sympathy with Amendments, 21, 24 and 26. They raise an important issue on any view, and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about them.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the three previous speakers in the short debate on this group. There are no opposition amendments in it, so I shall set out some more general questions that arise out of the amendments spoken to.

Why have the Government brought forward the widening powers to obtain communications data when the original Bill did the opposite? Can the Government provide an exhaustive list of the bodies that will be able to use these communications data collection powers? Why are they not in the Bill or the Explanatory Notes? Giving bodies such powers during any criminal investigation appears out of step with the rest of the Bill, which covers investigatory powers for national security or serious crime reasons. Why is this power so broad as to cover any criminal investigation? Given that the double lock exists for most of the powers in the Bill, why have the Government given wide-ranging powers for intelligence authorities and the NCA to self-authorise accessing internet connection records while undertaking subject discovery work? How does this compare to the powers for conditions A, B and C, which cover access to ICRs, for more restrictive purposes? Finally, what will the role of the IPC and the ISC be in monitoring how the new powers are used?

I was particularly interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said when he was commenting on the two other speakers in this short group. I, too, will listen with great interest to what the Minister has to say on this, but this is all done in the spirit of exploration, as my noble friend Lord Coaker said. I look forward to the Minister's comments.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this group. I will first speak to Amendment 20, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, which would amend Clause 11. I want first to make it clear that Clause 11 does not enable any new activity under the Investigatory Powers Act but places into primary legislation the existing position set out at paragraph 15.11 of the Communications Data Code of Practice.

Paragraph 15.11 clearly sets out that it is not an offence to obtain communications data where it is made publicly or commercially available by the telecommunications operator or postal operator or otherwise, where that body freely consents to its disclosure. In such circumstances, the consent of the operator provides the lawful authority for the obtaining of the data on which public authorities can rely. Making this position explicit within primary legislation will provide clarity that acquiring communications data in this way will amount to lawful authority for the purposes of the offence in Section 11. As such, there will be no doubt that acquiring communications data in this way means that an offence will not be committed in such circumstances.

The purpose of new subsection (3A)(e) is not permitting so-called surveillance, as the noble Lord’s amendment asserts. Rather, it is about clarifying the basis for lawful access to material which has already been published and should not require additional authority for its disclosure by a telecommunications operator, with the consent of that operator, to a public authority. I can assure noble Lords that telecommunications and postal operators will still need to satisfy themselves that any communications data disclosure is in accordance with the Data Protection Act, and any subsequent processing by public authorities must also be compliant.

The inclusion of this paragraph in the definition of “lawful authority” in the IPA will provide reassurance to public authorities on the basis for which they have lawful authority to acquire communications data where this authority falls outside the IPA itself. Inserting a definition of lawful authority does not remove the offence of knowing or recklessly obtaining communications data without lawful authority; it is still possible to commit this offence if the disclosure by the telecommunications operator is not lawful or if the public authority knowingly or recklessly acquires the communications data without lawful authority. The inclusion of this definition of lawful authority will encourage public authorities to ensure that they have lawful authority before they acquire communications data. I therefore respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

I turn to Clause 13 and the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord West, to remove this provision and the associated schedule from the Bill. The purpose of Clause 13 is to ensure that bodies with regulatory or supervisory functions are not inhibited in performing the roles expected of them by Parliament. It restores their important pre-existing statutory powers to acquire communications data in support of those functions. When the IPA was passed in 2016, it made specific provision, at Section 61(7)(f) and (j), for acquisition of communications data for the purposes of taxation and oversight of financial services, markets and financial stability.

As a result of the Tele2 and Watson judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2016, a number of changes were then made to the IPA. Crucially, not all the changes made at that time were a direct response to the judgment itself, but instead the opportunity was taken to streamline the statute book. This included the removal of the regulatory provisions contained in the IPA because, at that time, those public authorities with regulatory or supervisory functions were able to acquire the data they needed using their own information-gathering powers. At that point, much of the relevant data fell outside the definition of communications data and therefore outside the provisions of the IPA. However, as businesses increasingly move their services online, so many have become, in part at least, telecommunications operators under the definition in the IPA. Therefore, more of the data they collect, and which regulatory and supervisory bodies would have previously been able to access using their own information-gathering powers, now falls within the IPA’s definition of communications data, and regulatory and supervisory bodies are, inadvertently, unable to acquire it.

The Financial Conduct Authority, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and Border Force are all examples of public authorities in Schedule 4 to the IPA and already have the power to acquire communications data using a Part 3 request. However, many of the matters that these bodies regulate or supervise fall short of serious crime, as defined in the Investigatory Powers Act at both Section 263(1) and Section 86(2A), which means that they are unable to acquire a Part 3 authorisation to get the data they need to perform the statutory functions expected of them.

The UK is not alone on this issue; European colleagues have identified similar issues for their equivalent bodies with regulatory and supervisory functions. The functions these bodies perform on behalf of the UK are simply too important to let this situation continue. They go to the heart of our safety in preventing terrorist funding, seeking to ensure financial stability, and the oversight of banking and financial markets, among other matters. For example, the Financial Conduct Authority has responsibility for supervising some 50,000 regulated firms to ensure they have systems and controls in place concerning the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017. Border Force has the responsibility of quickly identifying from the huge volumes of packages crossing our borders each day, those that may contain illegal items such as drugs, firearms and other illicit goods that present a risk to the UK. It is vitally important that these bodies are not inhibited in carrying out their core functions because of the way the world has changed since 2016.

The changes to the IPA brought about by Clause 13 strike an appropriate balance between necessity and proportionality, making clear as it does that the acquisition by these regulatory bodies should only be in support of their civil functions and not used in support of criminal prosecutions. Additional safeguards are provided for within codes of practice governing how this should work in practice. To be clear, this applies to a relatively small cadre of public authorities in support of specific regulatory and supervisory functions; it is not creating a way to circumvent the safeguards of the IPA. It instead ensures that the acquisition routes and associated strong oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner are reserved for those areas where it is most essential.

--- Later in debate ---

Finally, Amendment 34 is a further attempt to place some safeguards into Part 4. Our final amendment to this part would ensure that the decision by the Secretary of State to give notice requiring operators to notify them of system changes is approved by a judicial commissioner. As we know, judicial commissioners play a crucial role in providing the independent oversight of the decisions around notices and other authorisations in this Bill. The 2016 Act essentially ushered in that role. There does not appear to be any good reason why the same safeguards should not apply for notices issued under Clause 20. We have also suggested that such notices be time limited but can be renewed following approval, again from the judicial commissioner. This is an attempt to ensure that there are appropriate safeguards around the Secretary of State’s powers in this regard.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I will briefly speak to the five amendments in this group in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker. Amendments 35 and 37 would introduce a double-lock process to notices given under the notification of proposed changes to telecommunications services, bringing it in line with the procedure for the three existing types of notices that can be issued to telecommunications operators. Amendment 36 would add a further factor that the Secretary of State must consider when deciding to give a notice under this section, bringing this type of notice into line with the three existing types of notices that can be issued to telecommunications operators. Amendments 38 and 39, along with the others in my noble friend’s name, would introduce a potential double-lock process to the variation of notices given under the notification of proposed changes to telecommunications services, bringing it in line with the procedure for variation of the three existing types of notices that can be issued to telecommunications operators.

In introducing this group, the noble Lord, Lord Fox, set out very comprehensively the concerns of the various tech companies. I have read the same briefings that he has. He was right to see this as an opportunity for the Minister to address those concerns.

I have a few questions arising out of these amendments. First, why have the Government not included a double-lock structure of approval to this new type of notice, given that the three other types of notices that telecom companies can be issued have the same structure, along with many of the provisions in this Bill and the IPA? Further, why does it not have the same review structure as the other notices? What will companies be able to do to challenge this decision? New Section 258A states that companies must respond within “a reasonable time”. What would the Government consider a reasonable time to be in this regard? What assessment has been made of what other companies are doing to ensure they are aware of changes that would potentially impact national security? Finally, can the Government be more specific about the types of changes that would be considered relevant for this new notification of the proposed changes?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, once again, I thank noble Lords for their amendments and the points they have raised in this debate. I will do my very best to answer the questions that have been asked. Again, I am afraid I am going to do so in some detail.

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, has proposed removing Clause 16 from the Bill in its entirety. Clause 16 concerns the extraterritorial enforcement of retention notices. Under subsections (9) to (11) of Section 255 of the IPA, any technical capability notice—TCN—is already enforceable by civil proceedings against a person in the UK. Only TCNs that provide for interception and targeted communications data acquisition capabilities are enforceable against a person overseas. Section 95 of the IPA also provides that a data retention notice—DRN—is enforceable by civil proceedings against a person in the UK. DRNs already have extraterritorial applicability within the IPA, meaning that they can already be given to a person outside the UK. However, unlike TCNs, the current legislation does not permit the enforcement of a DRN against a person outside the UK.

Clause 16 therefore seeks to amend Sections 95 and 97 of the IPA to allow extraterritorial enforcement of DRNs to strengthen policy options and the legal levers available when addressing emerging technology, bringing them in line with TCNs. As technology advances, data is increasingly held overseas. The clause will ensure that, if required, there is a further legal lever to protect and maintain investigatory powers capabilities overseas. This will ensure that law enforcement and the intelligence agencies have access to the communications-related data that they need to tackle serious crime and protect national security. It will also ensure consistency across the regime.

Legal Migration

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 5th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, legal migration is important to the British economy, but it needs to be properly controlled and managed. In the past decade we have welcomed more than half a million people through humanitarian routes, principally from Ukraine, Hong Kong and Afghanistan. We in the Labour Party support these humanitarian routes, but the overall figures, which are way above these humanitarian routes, are out of control. People are understandably worried about housing, getting local GP appointments and access to public services when they can see that their communities are growing. The net migration figure stood at 672,000 last year, which is three times the amount at the 2019 general election. There has been a 65% increase in work migration visas this year, and this includes a 150% increase in health and care visas.

Yesterday’s announcement is an admission of the Government’s failure on the immigration system and the economy. The Prime Minister is now proposing policies he opposed six months ago and opposing policies he helped introduce. The Labour Party has said repeatedly that net migration should come down and called for action to scrap the unfair 20% wage discount, raise salary thresholds based on economic evidence, and bring in new training requirements linked to the immigration system as well as a proper workforce plan for social care. While the Government have been forced to abandon the unfair wage discount that they introduced, they are still failing to introduce more substantial reforms that link immigration to training and fair pay requirements in the UK, meaning that many sectors will continue to see rising numbers of work visas because of skills shortages. The Labour Party is also calling for a reformed and strengthened Migration Advisory Committee that could advise on the impact of all policies to ensure that the details are correct.

There has been a failure to invest in skills and apprenticeships. Some 160,000 fewer people have taken up apprenticeships under this Conservative Government. For engineering and manufacturing, apprenticeships have fallen by half while engineering visas have increased. The Government have resisted calls to link requirements for skills training to the immigration system, and the UK is failing to train and pay people in the UK properly, leading to a skills shortage and a low-wage economy that relies on migrant workers.

In addition to this, the asylum system is broken. As of October, the number of legacy asylum cases waiting over a year for a decision to be made stood at 32,109. There were, in addition, 85,000 cases under a year old that had not been dealt with; thus, the overall backlog has not been reduced.

The Home Office has now hit its target for the number of caseworkers working on asylum cases, reaching 2,500 full-time staff by the end of the summer. However, the turnover of staff rose between April and August 2023 to 36%, having previously dropped to 25%. This puts into question the level of expertise in the team and the quality of decisions being made.

Following changes to Immigration Rules, which make it easier to withdraw an application on behalf of an asylum applicant, the number of asylum withdrawals has risen to 17,000. In a recent Select Committee hearing, the Permanent Secretary stated that he did not know the whereabouts of these 17,000 people. It may be that the length of time that cases are being left before being processed allows people to abscond, or that details have become incorrect over time, particularly when they move address so frequently; or it may be that the Home Office is being stricter with its criteria for withdrawing cases.

I understand that the reason for the withdrawal is not noted. I ask the Minister: why is the reason for withdrawal not noted and does he believe that it should be? Either way, losing track of 17,000 asylum seekers is representative of the danger of allowing such a backlog to build up in the first place. Of course, legal immigration is important to our economy and, of course, we should meet our humanitarian obligations. But with net migration figures at 672,000 last year, with government policies that flip and flop, and local public services under pressure, it is inevitable that the voting public become sceptical and disillusioned. The Labour Party says there should be a longer-term plan for immigration for the economy and for our country.

I turn to a separate matter, which I received an email about today. I see that the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, is not in her place, so I will repeat the questions from Universities UK about the higher-education sector and how it may be affected. First, is the Minister able to outline timescales in terms of reference for the Migration Advisory Committee’s review of the graduate route visa?

Secondly, do any changes to the salary threshold and financial requirements for work and family visas apply to new entrants only and, if so, what is the situation for existing visa holders? Thirdly, can the Minister give clarification on what the new salary discount will be for roles listed on the immigration salary list if they are not part of the 20%?

Lastly, will the Government promote a clear message that international students are welcome in the UK, and that the Government remain committed to the international education strategy?

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, yesterday’s Statement to the other House was one where figures were plucked from the air; one must draw the conclusion that they are arbitrary, in the sense that they do not have any background in what one might call a forward workforce planning regime for the country as a whole. One would have expected that, if you were to do a workforce planning regime for the future, it would be timed, looking forward as to the requirements on our workforce in this country.

It is certainly the case that the Government are well aware of the length of time that it takes to train individuals and get people moving along that pipeline. It is also certainly the case that the issue of medium-salaried people has come out as one of the major concerns of the document put before us yesterday.

The Statement, when examined for the sorts of people that the country needs who are going to be excluded by the regime, includes such people as butchers, chefs, welders and joiners. It is quite clear to anyone who has been around this country looking at the hospitality and tourism sectors that there are significant shortages of people to fill those places. It is not infrequent that you see a sign for a chef outside a restaurant where they are short of staff. The question to which we need to address ourselves is: where is the forward planning behind the figures that have been put before us?

Equally, the regional pay disparities around the United Kingdom mean that the wage levels in London and the south-east of England are very different from those that you find in other parts of the country. The wage levels that we are being told about have a bit of a sniff for the London and the south-east but are damaging to other parts of the economy where wage levels are different. The correct form of workforce planning would have had all these issues under review.

The issue of social care visas is obviously one of a lack of investment in the past. The Migration Advisory Committee has previously said that the Government’s persistent underfunding of local authorities, which of course fund adult social care, is the most important factor in the staffing crisis. The Government now say in the Statement that care workers without families will ensure that we have enough people to meet the demands of our caring services.

Equally, we are assured that the CQC will now oversee all this information, but there are problems for the CQC because its inspections do not actively address the working conditions and well-being of care workers. In that sense, the independent regulation of health and adult social care contains significant oversight gaps. How is the CQC going to ensure that those are fulfilled for those filling these vital posts from our immigration system?

I have questions about the impact upon companies in the sectors that are most impacted by the Statement. This comes on the back of last night’s discussion in this House. The Minister at that time did not recognise where I got my figures from: it was paragraph 12.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum for the regulations on fees that we were talking about last night. It says, and the words are quite clear, that there will be a significant impact on companies—these are the Government’s words—of

“tens of millions of pounds”.

On top of that, companies are now having to think whether they can afford to pay these amounts of money in order to recruit. A failure to recruit sufficiently for a company to operate means that the UK company itself might be in danger of not being able to continue to operate, and so UK workers might be affected by that decision. It is worth understanding what training and workforce plan is behind the migration strategy.

I have what might be thought of as a cheeky question, but it is one that worries me considerably, regarding the ability of British citizens to bring their partner to the United Kingdom to live with them, and with their children if they have any. I had a think about this and it was clear to me that a significant number of current government Ministers have partners from another country —we can all think of examples of that. My question is: what number of our population have partners from another country, given that £38,700 is a large figure for someone to be able to bring their partner to this country to live with them?

The danger here is that, in that development of a partnership between two people, the British citizen could think, “I can’t bring my partner to this country, so I will go to their country instead”. If they decide that, we might lose some of the vital people whom we need for our country, especially remembering that we are heading towards a time in our society where, for every elderly person, we will have only two people of working age. There is a big change coming, and we need to be prepared for it.

Have the Government assessed how these restrictions to legal migration will impact the numbers on overstaying visit visas? How many British citizens will be driven out of the country to live with their partners and children elsewhere in the world, as in the question I just addressed? Will the restrictions apply to workers who are already sponsored? Sometimes people have to renew and, when they do, will the restrictions that apply in this new Statement apply to them when they renew their work permissions in this country? Will an existing migrant worker’s salary have to rise in order to extend their visa? Finally, have the Government considered the disproportionate impact that the increase in family visa requirements will have on British citizens who live outside the south of England and London, because of the wage disparities around the rest of the United Kingdom?

That is a range of questions which we need to have answered, but the context of it all is: what is the plan? Is it merely a decision to have an arbitrary number which looks good to the public—or looks good in an election manifesto—rather than one which faces the problems which our economy, and our future as a country, will be needing?

Asylum Seekers: Deportation from France

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Monday 4th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I think it would be wise for me to restate what the Prime Minister has said, which is that he is taking

“the extraordinary step of introducing emergency legislation”.

He made that point on 15 November. He went on to say that he does not believe that

“anyone thinks the founding aim of the European Convention on Human Rights was to stop a sovereign Parliament removing illegal migrants to a country deemed to be safe in Parliamentary statute and binding international law. I do not believe we are alone in that interpretation”.

So I say to my noble friend that I look forward to informed discussion on the recent French decision.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I have a simple question for the Minister: have either the new Home Secretary or the new Foreign Secretary met the French Interior Minister?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am afraid I do not know.

Windrush Generation

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 28th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I said in my earlier answer, and as stated by the former Home Secretary following the final meeting of the Windrush working group, we are proud of what has been achieved so far but our commitment does not end here. We will continue with unwavering focus to see further improvements so that all those affected receive compensation. I hope it will reassure my noble friend to know that, in its last meeting, there were productive discussions on topics such as an update on future engagement and outreach with the Windrush community. Since February 2023, the Windrush compensation scheme engagement team has attended more than 19 events nationwide, including in the West Midlands, Bristol, Nottinghamshire, Yorkshire, Lancashire, Oxfordshire, Northamptonshire, Bedfordshire and London. I hope that gives my noble friend some of the reassurance he seeks.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, how many have actually received compensation, how many are waiting for compensation and how many have died while waiting for it? What is the time estimate for clearing the backlog?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, as of September 2023, over £71 million has been paid across 1,932 claims. Over 75% of claims have received a final decision. As I mentioned in an earlier answer, the time to allocate a claim for substantive casework consideration has dropped from 18 months to under five months. To be clear, that five-month period includes all essential eligibility checks and a preliminary assessment to make an initial payment of £10,000 wherever possible. I will have to write to the noble Lord on his more detailed questions.

Justification Decision (Scientific Age Imaging) Regulations 2023

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Monday 27th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord German (LD)]

The information provided by the Council of Europe, which of course does not reflect the notifications we have received from the Government, describes the legal cases which have been taken against the proposals made by some of those states and which have in fact been found to be in contravention of the very convention I am talking about.

Secondly:

“Age assessment should not take place without the child’s and their guardian’s informed consent”.


How will that consent be provided and how is it meant to be independent?

Thirdly:

“Children undergoing age assessment have a right to be informed of their rights during the procedure, the purpose, steps and duration of the procedure, and to be assisted by a legal representative and/or guardian”.


What steps are the Government taking to provide that support for these children, so we are clear about it?

In conclusion, “sub-optimal” is the word provided by our Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. Everything that has been said about what we have in this House today suggests that it is below optimal.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I will discard most of my speech because all the points I was going to make have been made articulately. We will support the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, if she chooses to test the opinion of the House and I thank her for the thoroughness with which she introduced her amendment to the Motion. I agree with her that this SI is not yet ready to be put on the statute book.

The Minister set out the figures, which have been repeated a number of times as the debate has progressed. A number of questions were put to him about the issue of consent, the state of the European Convention on Human Rights, and answering the questions put by the Children’s Commissioner and other bodies which have expressed their extreme concern about the measures being put forward by the Government.

The noble Lord, Lord Murray, just intervened, giving examples of European countries which do some form of tested age assessment. However, this is of course a contested area in many European countries; we are not unique in this being a politically contested issue.

Noble Lords also made a point about the review mechanism that the Government propose to put in place so that, as this progresses—if indeed it does progress—the Government can keep an open mind about how effective it is and whether further changes in assessment methods need to be made. However, I want to conclude on a different point which no other noble Lord has made, and to talk slightly wider than the SIs themselves.

Last May, with my noble friend Lord Coaker, I visited the old RAF Manston airfield and the landing site, Western Jet Foil, in Dover harbour. I repeat my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Murray, for facilitating that visit. What became apparent to me then is that all the political debate, including today’s debate, is about the vast majority of young men who are potentially claiming to be under 18, and the impact that has on them. That is the totality of the political debate. However, there is another group of young men, which was drawn to my attention, who appear to the officials to be under 18 but are claiming to be adults. They are doing that because they want to work, either legally or illegally. Many of them will have started working in their home countries when they were 14, and they will have had a few years work under their belt and are coming here to better their prospects.

What tracking is there of those young men? I have raised this issue with the noble Lord, Lord Murray, and as far as I am aware, there is no tracking of them. Whether they are more likely to abscond once they go into the adult system or whether the Home Office tracks them at all, it is a significant, not an insignificant cohort. It was drawn to my attention when I made that visit and I will be very interested to hear the noble Lord’s answer, maybe by letter, on how those young men are tracked.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this interesting and insightful debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her regret amendment, which I will obviously refute, because the introduction of scientific methods of age assessment is an innovative approach for the UK. It is entirely right that the Government take action to disincentivise individuals from deliberately misrepresenting their age in order to game the system, as well as to safeguard and promote the welfare of genuine children, who have a need to access children’s services. Scientific methods provide additional evidence and create a more consistent system, and there is nothing inhumane about those objectives. I hope that noble Lords will consider each regulation on its merits, and I will do my best to answer all the questions. If I miss any, I will endeavour to write.

The question of accuracy has come up. Determining the age of a young person is an inherently difficult task. The Home Office is aware that there is no current single age-assessment method, scientific or not, that can determine an individual’s age with precision. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord German, there is a risk of harm to both the age-disputed individual and to the public interest through misclassifying children as adults, or adults as children, which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, referred to—I will come back to this. That is why the UK Government are taking steps to improve the robustness of the age-assessment process. Scientific age assessment will be completed alongside the current Merton-compliant age assessment, and the age-assessment process will remain a holistic assessment. The well-being of the individual will continue to be at the forefront. I am happy to say categorically to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, that scientific methods will not replace, but will be used alongside, Merton. The noble Lord, Lord Winston, asked me how accurate these methods are. For X-rays, I do not know—I will find out—but for teeth X-rays it is two years either side. I will come back to this in more detail in a second.

On international comparators, to which my noble friend referred, the Home Office believes that the negative credibility inference in respect of someone’s claimed age is necessary, logical and proportionate where a person refuses to undergo a scientific age assessment without good reason. It is important to note that negative consequences, such as automatic assumptions, are applied with variations by a number of ECHR signatories, including the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The UK is an outlier as one of the very few European countries that do not currently employ scientific methods such as X-rays as part of age assessments.

On our plans for operationalisation, the Home Office wants to specify these methods as soon as possible to pave the way for the introduction of scientific age assessments. The increasing number of age-disputed young people presents safeguarding challenges and puts additional pressure on children’s services, which should be accessed only by genuine children. This is a new and complex process that the Government need to get right. The full plans for integrating scientific age assessments into the existing processes will be set out in good time, and full guidance and assessments will be provided. For now, the Home Office has welcomed the report from the Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee and is making clear steps to proceed with the recommendations and consider others.

Consent was raised by a number of noble Lords, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Lister, the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London. To address the concerns regarding consent, I assure all that no X-ray or MRI image can or will be taken without informed consent from the individual. The Home Office will ensure that the individual has capacity, fully understands the process and is communicated to in a child-friendly and clear way. Interpreters will be available to assist with understanding information, and documents will be translated into a language the individual understands. If the individual refuses to consent to a scientific age assessment, they will continue to proceed with the current Merton-compliant age assessment. Those who are clearly children will be identified as part of the initial age assessment and not included in the cohort for an age assessment.

It is the Home Office’s policy to refer individuals for an age assessment only when there is some doubt about their age—specifically, where that individual’s physical appearance and demeanour do not very strongly suggest that they are significantly over 18. This threshold is set purposefully high to ensure that individuals can be given the benefit of the doubt. As a result, only those whose ages are in genuine doubt would be referred for this scientific age assessment.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 20th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I think the whole House will be grateful for the noble Baroness’s intervention speaking in the gap. I thank the Minister for facilitating the briefings which we have had and will have in the coming days on the Bill.

The Bill makes changes to the 2016 Act, as we have heard. The 2016 Act provides a framework for the use of investigatory powers by the security and intelligence agencies, law enforcement and other public authorities. They include the power to obtain and retain communications. It also created the post of Investigatory Powers Commissioner and includes a number of safeguards for the use of such investigatory powers, including a two-stage procedure for obtaining authorisations. Many of the powers in the 2016 Act were pre-existing, as we have heard, and already being used by intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The Government stated that one of the intentions behind introducing the 2016 Act was to bring together and build on the statutory powers already available. The Government explained that the Act was also required to replace emergency legislation passed in 2014, the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act, which was subject to a sunset clause.

I agreed with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, about the desirability of developing some sort of living instrument and a consolidation Bill to try to bring these pieces of legislation together.

The Bill before us proposes changes which include the creation of a new condition for the use of internet connection records to aid target detection, introducing a less stringent regulatory regime for the retention and examination of bulk personal datasets where individuals have little or no expectation of privacy, and a new notification requirement that can be issued to selected telecommunications operators, requiring them to inform the Government of proposed changes to their products and services that could negatively impact the current ability of agencies to lawfully access data.

I was going to say something about the contributions of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, to the review of this legislation. My understanding is that all the noble Lord’s recommendations have been accepted by the Government, and I too express the Opposition Front Bench’s gratitude for the work he has done on this.

The Bill is a relatively short Bill of six parts, 31 clauses, and two schedules. I was going to step through its various elements, but I will not do that because it has been adequately covered by speakers earlier in this debate.

Like other noble Lords, I have received emails from industry and advocacy groups raising concerns about the Bill. On 7 November, a Financial Times piece reported that firms, including Apple and Meta, have signalled that they may withdraw from the UK market if they can no longer offer end-to-end encryption to their customers. I will quote from the concluding paragraph of a letter I received from Apple:

“The Home Office’s proposals to expand the IPA’s extraterritorial reach and to grant itself the power to pre-clear and block emerging security technologies constitute a serious and direct threat to data security and information privacy. To ensure that individuals have the tools to respond to the ever-increasing threats to information security, the Home Office’s proposal should be rejected”.


The piece, which I am sure we all received, then went on to explain their concerns about providing what they refer to as a back door into end-to-end encryption, and how that undermines the firms’ business model and the security of many other groups operating elsewhere in the world. It is right that we take the points raised by these commercial providers seriously, and maybe we will address them as the Bill progresses.

Similarly, online privacy advocacy groups such as Open Rights Group and Big Brother Watch have expressed their concerns, and we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, today. It is worth saying that I agreed with every word of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, when he said that he and I live in a different country from that spoken about by the noble Lord and the noble Baroness. We need to consider the concerns being addressed in the Bill, but also the wider context that other countries and other very large companies have access to bulk datasets—maybe not our bulk datasets—and are using that data in ways that we need to understand and pre-empt, if they are working against our national interest.

I conclude by talking about my own experience as an engineer, which is relevant to the debate we have just had. It used to be my working life to deal with very large datasets, make predictions based on them, and inform management about those predictions. One of my experiences was that it is very easy to mislead oneself because one is analysing large amounts of data. One needs to be realistic and at the same time see the possibilities of these extremely large datasets. It is a huge challenge. Huge amounts of data are used just to process them, and the maths and the imagination behind it is developing as we speak. The Bill in front of us now is a relatively modest step in the road, and we need to keep reviewing the processes available to us and reviewing the legislation to try to underpin them.

Certificate of Sponsorship: Foreign Health and Care Workers

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Monday 13th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The Home Office is aware that abuses exist. I reassure the noble Lord that the sponsor licence system places clear and binding requirements and obligations on employers looking to recruit. The Department of Health and Social Care has published guidance on applying for jobs from abroad, as part of a wider effort to address its concerns about exploitive recruitment and employment practices. That guidance helps prospective overseas candidates to make informed decisions when seeking health or social care jobs in the United Kingdom, including information on how to avoid exploitation and where to report concerns.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister has acknowledged that abuses exist in this sector. In a previous answer, he seemed sympathetic to a social care workforce plan and to agree that there should be some sort of fair pay agreement. What is his ministry doing to implement these things? Is he consulting his colleagues in the health and social care sectors to bring the workforce plan into being?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

There is no workforce plan in process. As I say, the communication between the Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care and other relevant government departments is a close one. The function that the Home Office can perform is to set the minimum floor for the sum that these workers must be paid, which, as I said earlier, is £20,960, reflecting an hourly salary of more than the living wage. That is an important mechanism to achieve the objective that the noble Lord outlined.

Pakistan: Evacuation of Afghans

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Thursday 9th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, in response to the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban, the UK rightfully offered resettlement to those who had shown support and loyalty to British aims. For many who have made it here—some have come in small boats—this means being put into hotels and potentially facing homelessness. Reportedly, others who have been granted resettlement in Britain are stuck in Pakistan, facing deportation back into the hands of the Taliban. I have a number of questions for the Minister. Why have there been such delays in settling people under the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme? Has he confirmed whether any of those about to be expelled from Pakistan to Afghanistan are eligible for the ACRS? What assurances has he received from the Pakistani Government that those eligible for the ACRS will be allowed to remain in Pakistan until chartered flights can be completed? Finally, what measures is he taking to ensure that our asylum backlog is cleared and that suitable accommodation is secured for those applicants?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

The noble Lord is right: the Government have reacted decisively and swiftly to relocate people to safety in the United Kingdom following the collapse of Afghanistan the year before last. The Government remain committed to relocating eligible Afghans and their families under the ARAP scheme and the ACRS—we continue to honour this promise. The Government’s policy was to ensure that eligible Afghan families had secured accommodation in the UK before travel was facilitated for their relocation but, as a result of changing conditions on the ground, we are changing that policy. The Ministry of Defence has worked hard to stand up a total of over 700 service family accommodations for mixed purposes, or transitory and settled accommodation. I pay tribute to my friend in the other place, the Minister for Armed Forces, for his work on this. Our new plans will see approximately 2,800 ARAP-entitled personnel move from Pakistan to the UK by the end of December 2023.

The answer to the question on deportations is: not as far as we are aware. On conversations with the authorities in Pakistan, the British high commission is obviously monitoring the situation closely and is in frequent contact with the Pakistani authorities to ensure that no eligible ARAP or ACRS individuals are negatively affected while they await relocation to the UK—we are seeking assurances to that effect. On 27 October, the Foreign Secretary received assurances from Foreign Minister Jilani that they would be safe.

The noble Lord asked about the backlog. We referred to this in the humble Address debate yesterday to some extent. I will not go over old ground but, as he knows, we have increased the recruitment of decision-makers and committed to dealing with the backlog by the end of the year.