Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 2026

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 10th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I strongly agree with the noble Lord’s analysis. The NPT is an essential cornerstone of global security. I suggest that in many ways it has been particularly successful. I was looking at the figures earlier on. In 1986, there were an estimated 70,300 nuclear warheads, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and the most recent figure I could find was 12,241. Although there are challenges, as the noble Lord points out, we have managed in many ways to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to ensure that, as far as possible, the architecture of the post-war world remains the same. However, the noble Lord is right to point out the challenges, and this country, along with our allies and friends, will do all we can to ensure that the NPT remains successful and that all three pillars are pursued.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

I endorse the Minister’s comments about the tragic loss of Lance Corporal Hooley and express sympathy to the lance corporal’s family and friends. What analysis have the Government made of the likely impact on non-proliferation efforts of the wholly inadequate response of the international community to Russia’s violation of the Budapest memorandum through its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its subsequent war of aggression in Ukraine?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble and gallant Lord for his comments, and I should have thanked the noble Baroness for associating herself with the remarks that I made about the tragic death of our serviceman. The lesson I think we should learn as a country is that it is important for us to reassert and re-establish the principle of deterrence. Part of preventing war is actually preparing for war. The whole success of the deterrent is the fact that the nuclear deterrent is there—the theory of deterrence. I think what happened following the Budapest arrangements, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons there, is perhaps a lesson for us that sometimes a position of strength allows you to negotiate and pursue peace more effectively than in the alternative way.

Strategic Defence Review 2025

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 8th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble Lord is absolutely right: it is an important matter and a radical proposal, and it is to do with the new threats we face as a country. We cannot any longer simply carry on as we always have done, so the proposals in this strategic defence review are radical and serious, and we intend to deliver them. One way that we intend to do that is to start to talk to the population of this country about the need for us all to wake up to the threat we face. That will require many of the actions that the noble Lord pointed out, and we intend to come forward with proposals in due course.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, recent surveys suggest that there is weak to no openness among Generation Z to engage with defence or security issues. Going further on what the Minister has just said about talking to people, does he agree that any whole-of-society approach to defence must, as a precursor, require the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces more widely to reconnect with societal attitudes in this country, particularly among young people? If he does agree, can he say in more detail how the Government intend to go about this?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I agree very much with the noble and gallant Lord’s points. As he said, the reconnection between the military and the civilian population is crucial. The one positive thing I would say is that, just a few weeks ago, like many noble Lords, I was at the remembrance events, where up and down the country tens of thousands of young people were remembering the sacrifice made in the past. They were Scouts, Guides, cadets and Reserve Forces—all of those. That is not a solution to the problem, but it points the way forward. It is one thing we should celebrate, as well as looking at the challenges we still face. The noble and gallant Lord will also know that we look to extend and expand the reserve and cadet forces. That will take some doing, but we are determined to do it.

Ukraine

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 31st October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, it is extraordinarily difficult for most people in this country to get an accurate feel for what is really happening in Ukraine. Where are we after three and a half years of intense combat? All estimates of territorial gains and casualties must of course be treated with caution, as there are no completely reliable or definitive sources, but conservative judgment suggests that the Russian offensive of 2025 netted something like an additional 0.4% of Ukrainian territory. Average Russian daily advances in sectors such as Kharkiv have been smaller than those that the British Army achieved at the Battle of the Somme in 1916, and they have taken no objectives of strategic significance—although Pokrovsk now seems to be under serious threat. All of this at a cost of just under, or perhaps well over, 100,000 Russian dead. Total Russian casualties since March 2022 probably now number around 1 million. The number of dead is likely to be approaching a quarter of a million and, importantly, more than 5,000 officers have been killed, a significant proportion of whom were the lieutenants and captains who provide the critical tactical leadership in a Russian army that lacks a strong non-commissioned officer cadre.

It is just as hard to estimate Ukrainian losses, but military deaths since March 2022 may come close to 100,000. This is significantly fewer than the number of Russian casualties, but of course the Ukrainian population is commensurately smaller. I have not so far mentioned civilian deaths, the damage caused by indiscriminate attacks on civilian infrastructure, the kidnapping of Ukrainian children and the vast quantity of Russian military equipment that has so far been destroyed. The sum total of devastation and human misery is appalling, and it is little surprise that people want it to end.

I focus on the horrific statistics of the war because they carry another, different message: even if there is a ceasefire at or around the then existing battlefield positions, it will not be peace. Peace occurs when there is a political settlement that gives both sides sufficient stake in maintaining the post-conflict status quo rather than seeking to overturn it. That will not be the case with such a ceasefire. Ukraine cannot in the long term accept the loss of a significant part of its territory and citizens as a consequence of the naked aggression that has killed so many of its people and devastated the country. Putin will not accept a situation that so signally fails to achieve his strategic objective at such a horrendous cost.

At the least, the war would for a time move back into the grey zone. We will be faced with the modern equivalent of the inner German border of the Cold War running across Ukraine, with armed camps on either side. The Russians will certainly not demilitarise, and the inward investment so necessary to the reconstruction of Ukraine will not be made if there is inadequate capacity there to deter or defend against further Russian aggression. More widely, Russia’s attempts to destabilise and undermine NATO will continue, and it will rearm as rapidly as possible in order to threaten western security and attempt to isolate Ukraine. We will at best have an armed pause, not peace.

Meanwhile, the events of the past few years will have driven another nail into the coffin of nuclear non-proliferation, if they have not already sounded its death knell. Which state in possession of nuclear weapons would now be mad enough to give them up, having seen how the international community has treated the deal that Ukraine struck in Budapest in 1994? We must be clear-eyed about the likely future. It will be perilous. It will require strength and resolution if we are to avoid, or at least contain, the dangers it poses. NATO must continue to rebuild its deterrent posture. Members of the alliance, including the UK, must match their rhetoric on defence with the commensurate investment—and that investment must be made urgently, not at some indeterminate point in the future, which seems to be the current plan of His Majesty’s Government.

Those who advocate a rapid negotiated end to the fighting must recognise that it would not be the end of the war. Those who imagine that it would mean a return to business as usual must understand that the long-term context for European strategy has fundamentally changed because of the events of 2022. Facing the consequences squarely will be difficult and expensive; failing to do so would be catastrophic.

Undersea Cables: National Security Threat

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 27th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

We certainly should develop one, and we are developing one. My noble friend is right to highlight that. We are undertaking a number of actions including surveillance aircraft from Lossiemouth, the ship “Proteus” looking at how it protects underwater assets, and the Royal Navy ship “Stirling Castle” looking at how it might operate drones from its deck to secure underwater pipelines, data cables and so on. We are doing a lot, but my noble friend is right to point out the importance of this.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, Ireland is a crucial hub for undersea infrastructure crossing the Atlantic, but it lacks the capabilities to defend against and be resilient to the destruction of that infrastructure. Moreover, its individual tailored partnership programme with NATO is coming increasingly under threat with recent political shifts in Irish leadership. What assessment have the Government made of the UK’s vulnerabilities to Ireland’s position, and what plans do they have for developing a resilience strategy in that regard in future?

Strategic Defence Review 2025

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 18th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I too congratulate the authors of this thoughtful review, and the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, on his eloquent and powerful presentation of it today. The key arguments it makes are compelling, and the recommendations are, in the main, well judged. There are, of course, points of detail that are open to debate, and these will no doubt be the subject of further scrutiny as the Government develop their policy in response to the conclusions.

In the limited time available today, I want to focus on the issue that threatens to undermine the effectiveness of the whole review: the Government’s unwillingness to face up to the urgency of the financial consequences. The authors were, of course, constrained throughout by the financial assumptions they were given, but, even so, their analysis demonstrates clearly that we face a quantitative as well as qualitative challenge. NATO has since agreed that these can be addressed successfully only by its members committing 3.5% of GDP to defence, and the Prime Minister has agreed that the UK will meet this target by 2035. However, the Government’s current proposition is that defence spending will be increased to 2.5%, or perhaps 2.6% of GDP, by 2027, and anything in the eight years beyond that remains vague and uncertain. In an answer to me at the Dispatch Box just last week, the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, confirmed that an increase to 3% of GDP remains only an aspiration and a matter for the next Parliament and that any further increases are for the Parliament after next; that is, around 2034 and beyond.

This is wholly unrealistic for a number of reasons. The first, of course, is the urgency of the need. On current assumptions, only about 3% of the total defence funding for the remainder of this Parliament will be available to fund the crucial capabilities identified in the review. On that basis, many of the proposed improvements will not be made until well into the 2030s, including the remediation of some of our current, very serious vulnerabilities.

The second reason is the need to build up the scale of defence orders over a number of years, matching them to the necessary growth in industrial capacity. If this is not done, if industry is faced with a sudden cascade of orders in the 2030s, the consequence will be a dramatic increase in defence inflation, seriously undermining the value of any budget increases. We have already seen this damaging phenomenon as a consequence of the demands of the war in Ukraine.

Finally, there is the wider fiscal position. There are only three ways of paying for an increase in the defence budget: taxation, borrowing or a reallocation of public expenditure. Increases in taxation, which look inevitable, are likely to be consumed almost entirely in sustaining the viability of the economy overall. This is already challenging given the high and volatile cost of servicing the national debt, so the scope for further borrowing looks very limited.

That leaves a reappraisal of public expenditure. We were spending 4% of GDP on defence in the early 1990s. By 2024, that had reduced to 2.3%, although accounting changes over the interim period mean that it would be more like 2.1% in 1990s terms. By 2023, health and social security accounted for about 41% of total managed public expenditure, while defence took just 4.8%. That latter share would need to increase to about 7.2% to bring the defence budget up to 3.5% of GDP. This would equate to a 5% reduction in total health and social security spending. Considering the scale of the challenge and the difficulty of the various options, it is clear that the kind of restructuring I believe is necessary could not be carried out quickly, so the process needs to start soon if we are to be anywhere near 3.5% of GDP for defence by 2035. As yet, however, there is no sign of any urgency on any side of the political divide on addressing this crucial matter. This is surely the key issue for public policy and debate over the coming months because unless it is resolved, and resolved quickly, the excellent work that has gone into this review will be wasted and the country will be left ill prepared for the risks it will face in this complex and dangerous world.

Afghanistan

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 16th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords—

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for his question. My understanding—and there are better lawyers in here than I—is that the Ministers would have believed themselves to be subject to the injunction and the super-injunction, and that would constrain what they would or would not be able to say. But now that we have gone to the High Court to say that we believe the time is right for that super-injunction to be lifted, and the court has agreed with us, we are able to debate and discuss the very points that my noble friend has raised. No doubt these are the questions that, over the coming days, weeks and months, I and others will be asked to account for—quite rightly.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, it has been stated again and again that the person responsible for the loss of data thought that the spreadsheet contained a small number of names, whereas it actually contained a very large number of names. Surely this is irrelevant. It is the fact that it was used on a non-departmental system, not the number of names, that constitutes the breach. This has been presented as an individual failing, but one cannot help but notice that it seems to have originated in the same part of the Ministry of Defence which contemporaneously was making some rather questionable judgments and decisions about the so-called Triples, which must raise questions in people’s minds about the overall degree of supervision and direction of that part of the Ministry of Defence. Can the Minister reassure the House that this is being looked at in that wider context?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble and gallant Lord for this important question, which the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith and Lady Goldie, also asked, as to how on earth this could have happened. First of all, it was really important to ascertain whether there was any criminal or malign intent. The previous Government were quite right to refer that to the police for investigation. As I have already said, the police found that there was no evidence of any criminal or malign intent. Alongside that, it was referred to the Information Commissioner’s Office. The answer to the noble and gallant Lord’s question is the whole of the statement that the Information Commissioner’s Office made yesterday about its investigation into what happened, and into the way in which the Ministry of Defence has changed many of the processes that it had in place and its management arrangements to ensure as far as possible that we would not see that again. The importance of that is the independence of the Information Commissioner’s Office looking at what the MoD was doing, rather than the MoD marking its own homework.

UK Weapons Systems

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 1st July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am going to either pass or fail this exam. As it stands, we have 41 F35Bs, and by March 2026 we should have 48. That is what is called the first procurement phase. The F35As will be brought within the second procurement phase, which will take the whole F35 programme from 48 to 75. That is an additional 27 aircraft, of which 12 will be F35As and 15 will be F35Bs. I will give a further answer in response to the noble Lord, Lord West, by saying that they will form part of an operational group. The F35As will go to that group, which will free up the F35Bs that are currently doing that training exercise with them. So the carrier and others will always have the full complement of F35Bs that they need.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the security of this country against major threats in high-intensity warfare is based on our membership of NATO, and that within NATO we rely upon many of our partners to provide crucial capabilities —not least, for example, a number of strategic capabilities that at the moment only the Americans provide? So, in terms of warfighting, to be too nice on the point of purely national capabilities does not make sense.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I agree with what the noble and gallant Lord has just said. It is an important point to make, and I should have made it to the noble Lord from the Liberal Benches: of course our alliances matter and are important. We have a shared interest in the geopolitical threats that we face, and the noble and gallant Lord is quite right to point that out. I say again, as I often do from this Dispatch Box, that the US is our prime ally. The US is our most important ally. It is the ally that we depend on to work with to guarantee our security in Europe and across the globe. We should celebrate the closeness of that relationship, as we should celebrate the closeness of our relationships with all our friends and allies in Europe and beyond.

80th Anniversary of Victory in Europe and Victory over Japan

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 9th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the commemoration of VE Day this week was a particularly poignant one, since it was probably the last major landmark at which we will see significant numbers of veterans. When the last human link to the Second World War is gone, there is a danger that the trauma of that time will move from being a lived community experience to a dry historical fact. If we allow that to happen, the lessons of history become weakened, and we increase the risk of repeating past mistakes. Remembrance is thus crucial to our understanding of not just the past but the present, and the perils of the future. Much of this week has been about remembering the courses and conduct of the war. However, important though that is, we must go further.

One of my regrets about the centenary commemorations of the First World War is that they largely ended with the anniversary of November 1918, marking the end of the fighting. We would have done well to reflect much more than we did on the diplomatic and political failures of 1919 onwards, which set the conditions for the subsequent catastrophe that unfolded in the 1930s and 1940s.

The aftermath of the Second World War was very different. The effort that went into reconstructing societies, rebuilding political trust and creating an international order formed the context in which we have lived our lives ever since. That is the legacy of the Second World War generation, but that legacy is now at risk. Aggressive war is once more being waged in Europe. Meanwhile, the umbrella of American might under which we have sheltered for so long is looking, to say the least, somewhat leaky. We in Europe have for years neglected our own military power, relying on others to make up the deficit. Now we are being measured by events and found wanting, as we were in the 1930s.

NATO protected our societies through the long, testing years of the Cold War and it remains the best, indeed the only, credible instrument for ensuring our future security. But it is a different NATO from the one we have been used to. It is a NATO that must recognise the substantial shift of American power from Europe to the Indo-Pacific, a shift that will continue whoever occupies the White House. It is a NATO in which European members must shoulder a much greater share of the burden for their own security than they have done for many years.

There is growing acceptance of this truth, but we still fail to accept the consequences. The first is the need for us in Europe, particularly those with the larger economies, to spend much more on defence. By much more, I do not mean marginal increases but something in the order of twice what we currently spend. The second consequence is the need for a way of funding, developing, procuring and operating the strategic military capabilities for which we have for too long been over-reliant on the United States. It cannot be NATO, because not all members of the alliance are European. It cannot be the EU, because not all members of the EU are in NATO and not all European members of NATO are in the EU.

The Brussels-based think tank, Bruegel, recently published a paper proposing a different solution: a European defence mechanism. This would be a procurement agency that would in specified areas plan, fund and potentially own strategic enablers, which could then be committed to NATO. It would be achieved through an intergovernmental treaty along the lines of that which set up the European stability mechanism in response to Covid. Importantly, it would enable the UK to engage in the improvement of European defence capabilities as an equal partner, not as an adjunct to the EU—with all the limitations that come with such a status. This is the kind of innovative thinking we so desperately need in response to the serious challenges we face, and I commend it to the Minister.

This is a particularly appropriate moment to consider such matters. This week we commemorate the efforts and sacrifices of those who served this country, and European security more widely, throughout the Second World War. Yet there could surely be no better act of commemoration than safeguarding their legacy for future generations by ensuring the continued defence of the freedoms for which so many of them, like Sergeant Coaker, paid such a bitter price.

Future Defence Capability

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 26th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The Chagos deal is extremely important for our own security and that of the US. When the deal is finalised, it will be put before Parliament with the costings and then Parliament can debate it. The future of the base at Diego Garcia, which is crucial to us and our allies, is secured, and that is the important point of any deal that is finalised.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister said the ministry will put “NATO first”. NATO, through SACEUR, has defined the force structure it believes necessary if the alliance is to deter Russian aggression. It has also set out the contribution it wishes the UK to make to that force structure. What action has the Ministry of Defence taken to cost NATO’s request, and how does it compare to our currently available military capabilities?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My understanding is that discussions have taken place between ourselves and NATO and SACEUR about the capabilities that they would expect from us. We are currently looking at both the cost and our ability to provide the capabilities. It is my understanding that those negotiations are still under way. If that is incorrect, I will write to the noble and gallant Lord.

Armed Forces Commissioner Bill

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 24th March 2025 Grand Committee

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to join you all this afternoon on day two of Committee on the Bill. I should explain that last Wednesday, consideration of an important non-defence Bill in the Chamber precluded me from attending Grand Committee, so it is a particular pleasure to be able to be here this afternoon.

In speaking to Amendment 13, in my name, I will speak to the other amendments in the group. At Second Reading, I raised the extent to which, with reference to access to premises, powers seem to have leached away from the Secretary of State and transferred excessively to the commissioner. I am absolutely satisfied that this is for no malign reason at all—it is just a consequence of drafting. I was encouraged by other contributions at Second Reading that I had support for my concerns.

The amendments in my name, Amendments 13, 14 and 15, simply attempt to restore control to the Secretary of State. I freely admit that I may not have found the perfect solution to this, but I thought it would be helpful to have a debate, so that the noble Lord the Minister can understand the spectrum of views.

Without amendment, under the Bill the commissioner can, in the United Kingdom, access MoD premises without the Secretary of State being aware. That is not acceptable, and it raises two issues. As a matter of principle, is that really the position we want to put the Secretary of State for Defence into? Just think of the wide range of premises within the MoD, some at the top levels of security protection. Much more practically, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, pointed out at Second Reading, it is not only the location of the premises which matters but the activity taking place within them. As he observed, a base commander has overall responsibility for security, and I am afraid that entirely predictable is a clash of wills between the commissioner who seeks entry to a premises, and the base commander who says, “No, I am denying entry”. That is not sustainable.

My amendments may be clumsy, but I have restored power to the Secretary of State, who must have notice of intended access and must then inform the commanding officer of the relevant premises of the commissioner’s intended visit. I have provided for seven days’ notice, unless evidence is in danger of being lost or there is continuing risk to personnel using the premises. But in that event the commissioner must still intimate in writing to the Secretary of State why he is not giving notice; then, at least the Secretary of State will have some idea of what is going on.

The important lens through which to look at this is defence and security and the rightful overall authority of the Secretary of State, and I feel that the Bill has not got that balance quite right.

I look forward to the debate, and particularly to the response from the noble Lord the Minister, who may very well want to take away what he hears today and reflect upon these contributions. I beg to move.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I share the concern, expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, that lies behind the amendments, although these particular ones do not in fact capture, in my view, the solution to the problem.

The problem is that the nature of classified locations varies. There will be some sites to which the Armed Forces commissioner would not, presumably, be denied access entirely. However, many sites have large areas that will be, and should be, open to the commissioner, but within which there are particular discrete locations where classified activity is conducted, to which he or she should not be admitted.

The Minister of Defence and the Secretary of State may well draw up a list, as was intended, of classified locations. Although the list will be classified and therefore will not be in secondary legislation, as the Minister has pointed out, it will deny the commissioner access to those sites. But the problem with lists is that they are seldom comprehensive and seldom up to date. We are talking about a very large span of estate with a very large spread of activities. The idea that such a list can be kept up to the minute will involve, first, a huge bureaucratic effort and, secondly, will almost certainly be doomed to failure.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, pointed out, it is the responsibility of local commanders to ensure that national security is preserved and that classified information is not available to those who should not have access to it. Therefore, it seems to me that there is only one sensible answer to this conundrum: for the Bill to provide commanding officers with the power in the last resort to deny the commissioner access to specific locations on the grounds that they contain classified activities or classified material. The commanding officer should of course then be required to justify themselves through the chain of command to the Secretary of State. But if we do not provide them with that backstop authority, we are, frankly, hanging local commanders out to dry with the legislation as it now stands.

These amendments do not provide the solution that I see as necessary, but can the Minister undertake today to take away these very real and important concerns and consider how they might be addressed before we get to Report? I repeat what I have said earlier: I entirely understand that such conflicts are likely to be very rare. The commissioner is going to be engaged in looking at service accommodation and other general conditions of service, so most of the time they will not be seeking access to such sites. But it is entirely conceivable that he or she will need such access, particularly if they are considering thematic issues to do with working conditions—and just once is once too many when it comes to national security. I ask the Minister to reflect on this, and perhaps we can have some discussions outside Committee before we get to Report.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I shall speak very briefly to this set of amendments, really to provide some balance, because I feel that we should hear both sides of the argument. The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, in introducing these amendments, said that the commissioner should not be visiting without the Secretary of State being aware, and I entirely agree with that. Obviously, the Secretary of State is the person with political responsibility, who needs to know what is going on and whether the commissioner has identified a potential problem. However, not being aware is not the same as having seven days’ notice. There is a very large gap between those two things.

What we have just heard from the noble and gallant Lord about the commanding officer having the right to deny access is, I am aware, not directly in line with these amendments. However, on day one in Committee we talked about how the ombudsman, as structured, has not worked and has not had sufficient powers. We have to be careful to make sure that we are not putting a commissioner in the same position here. We have to be realistic: there may be a systemic issue, such as those we talked about on the previous day in Committee, and a concern about the treatment of female service people. We might hope that a commander would always want that issue to be exposed and understood, but we cannot guarantee that, and it is really important that we do not disempower the commissioner with changes to this Bill before they are even created and put in place.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, back to her place today; I know she was busy elsewhere in the House of Lords on our first day. It is welcome to see her here. Both she and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, asked about the opportunity to discuss the points that have been made, and we can of course meet between Committee and Report to do so. I can promise the meeting, but I cannot promise the outcome. To be frank, as noble Lords will know, that is how we in this House conduct business, improve legislation and achieve the objective that we all want: the commissioner being effective and having the appropriate powers to do the task they undertake.

As noble Lords know, I like to make some general remarks before making formal points; I hope that is helpful to the Committee. I understand the noble Baroness’s point about the balance between the powers of the Secretary of State and of the commissioner, and I will say something about that. We have tried very hard to balance those powers. I also hear the point made by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, about the importance of national security. There may be elements of a particular base that one would expect the commissioner to be precluded from visiting for national security reasons, even if it is not the whole base; there is also the role of the commanding officer to consider.

On the question of intention, if we take the example of a normal decision of the commissioner to visit a base, the noble Baroness and the noble and gallant Lord will see that there is a requirement in the Bill for the commissioner to notify the Secretary of State that they are visiting a particular base:

“If the Commissioner proposes to exercise the power under subsection (1), the Commissioner must give the Secretary of State notice of the proposal within such period before exercising the power as the Commissioner considers appropriate”.


The noble Baroness’s amendment would require that that happen at least seven days before the commissioner intends to exercise the power. The expectation would be that the Secretary of State would then tell the commanding officer that such a visit was to take place.

However, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, pointed out, under the Bill a confidential list will be drawn up saying where the Secretary of State believes it inappropriate for the commissioner to visit because of national security reasons. That will be shared with the commissioner, although it will remain confidential. But we will take up the point made by the noble and gallant Lord about how that will work with a base only a small part of which may be subject to national security concerns.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

The Minister said that, ordinarily, the commissioner will give notice to the Secretary of State. But equally—this comes back to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle—we know that, in order to be truly effective, in some circumstances the Armed Forces commissioner will need to give little or no notice. That is fine because that helps the effectiveness of the commissioner, but a commanding officer is then exposed to the possibility of the commissioner wanting access to a site to which he or she should not properly be allowed access, because of national security. So, in proposing that the commanding officer have a backstop ability to deny access, we are seeking to improve the power and authority of the commissioner, because that then reduces the need for undue notice on their behalf.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Norwich for putting his name to my Amendment 16.

At Second Reading, I expressed my concern about the position of Jaysley Beck, who tragically took her own life in 2021. The coroner had recently published his findings, which made for grim reading. Since Jaysley’s death, many far-reaching changes and improvements have been made; I know that because the former Secretary of State Ben Wallace drove them through and, as a Minister, I supported him in every way I could. There is encouraging evidence that these changes are yielding results. For example, a number of instructors have been summarily dismissed for inappropriate sexual relationships with students, and I believe that there have been other dismissals of personnel from the Armed Forces for inappropriate behaviour.

What was always much more difficult to assess was whether women were fearful to make a complaint in the first place for fear of prejudicing their careers. All the procedures, processes and structures in the world do not work if a scared woman feels unable to make the complaint in the first place. That, sadly, was the case for Jaysley Beck. I am concerned that women in our Armed Forces still feel inhibited from raising unacceptable behaviour. That cannot be tolerated; we need to plug that gap. We have to find a way of giving them a safe space so that they or their friends can let someone know what is going on.

This proposal seems to dovetail perfectly with the creation of an Armed Forces commissioner and the ethos of that office. If whistleblowing cannot be accommodated within his independent office, I do not know where it can be. The amendment provides for the commissioner’s functions in the Bill to include investigating

“any concern raised by a whistleblower”.

I have tried to keep it as simple as possible. I am told that the virtue of whistleblowing is twofold. First, it provides that safe—and currently missing—space for someone to raise a concern. Secondly, it makes it more obvious more quickly if a problem is emerging in relation to a particular location or individual because, where there is a problem, concerns are likely to emerge in a cluster pattern.

If we can plug this hole, using the creation of the new Armed Forces commissioner to such powerful effect, what a positive message that would be for the MoD. To have, under one umbrella, real action to support and help our Armed Forces women would be a striking, tangible piece of support. I feel very passionately about this: it is the missing piece of the jigsaw and I hope the Minister feels able to respond with some encouragement. I alert him that I am not giving up on this; I have got my teeth into it, and I will be back on Report. I beg to move.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I will be very brief. I will reiterate to the Minister concerns I raised about an earlier amendment on recruits and their training. It is absolutely the case that in a military organisation, training must be tough and realistic—and, at times, discipline must be hard—if we are to have an effective fighting force. That means that there is a very clear risk that people could overstep the bounds. The risk is greater in that kind of environment than in most others; therefore, we have to be particularly vigilant in a military environment to guard against that.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 17 is in the name of my noble friend Lady Goldie, and I have signed it. I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Norwich for his support for it.

Amendment 17 would require the commissioner to include their view of the impact of general service welfare issues on recruitment and retention in any report published under new Section 340LA: “general service welfare investigations”. This amendment delivers a vital expansion of the requirements set out in the Bill as drafted. Currently, the Bill requires reports published under new Section 340LA only to list the individual findings of an investigation and the reasons for the commissioner’s findings.

Recruitment and retention are one of the most significant, if not the greatest, challenges that our Armed Forces face today. Frequent reports of poor-quality accommodation and shocking welfare issues are having an impact on service personnel well-being, and welfare issues are often cited by those personnel leaving our Armed Forces as a reason for their decision to leave, as I know only too well. The damaging publicity that these welfare issues cause is surely also having a detrimental effect on the number of people who are coming forward to start a career in our Armed Forces. The latest figures show that 12,850 people joined the Regular Forces last calendar year and that 14,830 people left, meaning a net decrease in the size of the Regular Forces of 1,980.

If the new Armed Forces commissioner is to be effective in resolving welfare issues—and, in so doing, contributing to the strength of our Armed Forces—they must put recruitment and retention both front and centre. Given that new Section 340LA grants the commissioner the discretion to produce the report or not, we feel that this additional duty to address recruitment and retention in those reports is not an overburdensome requirement. Ensuring recruitment and retention are addressed is of sufficient importance to warrant inclusion in these reports. I beg to move.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I agree with much of what the noble Earl said, but this seems a rather strange amendment. In my view, it is axiomatic that the work of the Armed Forces commissioner, and the issues that he or she addresses, may have an effect on recruitment and retention in every instance—so that goes without saying—but I am not at all clear how the Armed Forces commissioner will determine whether they have an actual effect. It does not seem to be something that the Armed Forces commissioner can practically fulfil in the sense of the noble Earl’s amendment. I entirely endorse the sentiment behind it, but I simply do not see that it adds anything to the Bill.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, in the absence of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, I feel it might be useful if I made some comments on her Amendment 18. I have not discussed this with her so, for the avoidance of doubt, I am in no way speaking for her.

This is an interesting and useful amendment to discuss, particularly in Committee. Clause 4(3) says that, after the commissioner has conducted an inquiry, they are required to offer a report. The amendment proposes that the commissioner should make an annual report on the work done to improve the welfare of service personnel and public awareness of the issues. The idea of an annual report is interesting. I am not entirely wedded to the word “annual”—