Oral Answers to Questions

Matthew Offord Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

There has been a discussion between the Ukrainian Government and ourselves and a number of other European Governments and the United States about various types of assistance, including non-lethal military assistance, and there was agreement among those different allied Governments to supply help to Ukraine. We think that the training will enable the Ukrainian army to operate more effectively than it has been able to do up until now, and that that offer of training would have been justified irrespective of the Russian intervention in the east.

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

Recent reports emerging from Iran say the regime has been secretly enriching uranium since 2008 at an underground plant in suburban Tehran named as Lavizan-3. What assessment has the Foreign Secretary made of this concerning news, and does he agree that no deal should be signed with Iran until the International Atomic Energy Agency has unfettered access to all the nuclear programme?

Palestine

Matthew Offord Excerpts

Monday 1st December 2014 Westminster Hall

[Alistair Burt]

There is a need for bravery at some stage and courage among the leaders to do things and face off their own people. Sooner or later they have to do that. Who knows whether unilateral action taken in concert with each other might be part of that. I do not know. Until the leaders are prepared to break the deadlock, we will get nowhere.

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Alistair Burt]

No, I will not, because I have had two interventions and I want to conclude. The debate is about what the UK should do, which all colleagues have addressed. The first thing is to never give up. A former Israeli Prime Minister told me a couple of weeks ago that a two-state solution is not a gift from Israel to the Palestinians; it is Israel’s security. The UK should therefore remain solidly behind efforts to restart direct talks and pull no punches with either state about the need for urgency. It should remain unequivocally for a two-state solution and be increasingly sharp with those whose actions and words tend against it. The status quo will not hold. It is not a problem to be managed; it must be concluded.

Secondly, the UK should urge Arab states, which currently need a revival of this issue as an acute item on their agenda like a hole in the head and which fear the possibility of its being used as a recruiter for jihad, to press heavily on the Palestinians. Although there has been some criticism of Israel for the failure of this year’s talks, President Abbas played his part, too. Hamas must end the war, and it must find no justification or support for its current position, but Israel should recognise the reality of the impact of this summer’s attacks on Gaza, whatever the justification, and ensure that there is no repeat.

Finally, despite provocation and despite the UK being urged to do even more, we should recognise the reality of our position. We are a supporter, including financially, of the development of a Palestinian state and friend of the security of the state of Israel. We must constantly encourage both and avoid making things worse by precipitate action or extreme statements.

However, the UK Parliament is entitled to take positions that it believes protect the two-state solution or signal its belief in doing so. I did not support the recent motion, as I still believe in and support the UK Government’s position that recognition should come at the end of negotiations, but the vote deserved to be taken seriously. Reactions in Israel were instructive, with the Government of the state of Israel mostly reflective, but with one or two Ministers lurching in the wrong direction and suggesting that vote supported terrorism. It did not. As David Aaronovitch recently said in The Jewish Chronicle, he might have voted for the motion himself, because it at least keeps the two-state solution alive—wise words.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Michael McCann (East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard.

There are people in this Chamber who know far more than I do about the history of the part of the world we are debating, but I have read a few books and listened carefully to what everyone says, and I can guarantee one thing: the history of that conflicted part of the world does not mean that we can blame one side for all the ills that have taken place there over the years. There will be a lot of pain for both sides in moving towards a two-state solution, but almost everyone who has contributed to today’s debate recognises that that is what is required.

There are those who argue for a one-state solution. Let us be honest: there are those who argue for a greater Israel, but there are also those who argue for a greater Palestine. I have heard people who are in the Chamber today say, “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free.” We know what that means, as well. A single state cannot bring peace, as it would ultimately undermine the national goals of one of the two competing national movements. Two states for two peoples is the only realistic hope.

The deadlock and the conditions that have existed for years are not the only obstacles to peace, but they guarantee that with each passing year the problem becomes more difficult to resolve, with more settlements, more refugees, more people drawn to terror, more victims, more resentment and more hate. Hon. Members should be assured that I condemn Israeli settlements in the west bank and the blockade of Gaza, and I believe the Israelis should end the occupation. The lurch to the right in Israeli politics makes that aim more difficult to achieve, but does not make it impossible.

I do not need to be prompted to say that, with the same vigour, passion and determination, I condemn Hamas, whose unrevoked 1988 charter rejects peace and promotes the killing of Jews. I condemn the use of Palestinians as cannon fodder every time Hamas decides to use innocent people as a means of achieving its political ends. I condemn the politicians who condemn terrorism publicly but then send letters of praise to the families of those who have died in the pursuit of terrorism, and I despair about the lack of political courage on the Palestinian side that prevents the final mile to peace being walked.

[Dr Offord]

Will the hon. Gentleman also condemn the accusations that the Palestinian Authority is paying salaries to convicted terrorists? [Interruption.]

[Mr McCann]

Somebody said from a sedentary position, “No, it’s not,” but actually, it is. I am a member of the International Development Committee, and the Palestinian Authority Finance Minister confirmed that to us at a meeting, at which other Members were present. He wants to stop it because he cannot afford it and wants to spend the money on doing things that are constructive, rather than on paying high-scale salaries to those who have committed the most heinous of crimes and are in prison. I condemn all those actions.

My next point is the crucial one for those who would take umbrage at me for questioning the courage of the Palestinian leadership in moving forward. Arguably, the closest we have got to peace was the 2000 Camp David summit. Bill Clinton, Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak brokered a deal that covered all of the problems: security, borders, refugees, the right of return and, most crucially, Jerusalem. Once again, it was an Israeli Labour politician, Ehud Barak, who put his head above the parapet for peace. The deal was rejected—this is widely accepted—by Yasser Arafat, and that was the precursor to the second intifada. In March this year, when I was visiting the Occupied Palestinian Territories with the IDC, we met the PLO negotiation team. After talking about the desire for peace, which I accept was absolutely sincere, I said to the PLO negotiator in private, “If the Clinton deal was put back on the table with 2014 prices, would you accept it?” Answer came there none. That is a very interesting position for someone who is supposed to desire peace.

Since 1987, there have been 410 early-day motions, 157 debates and 13,348 contributions by Members.

Iran (UK Foreign Policy)

Matthew Offord Excerpts

Thursday 6th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Sir Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

I am grateful to the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) and my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon) for securing this debate. I was delighted that the right hon. Gentleman, with whom I have disagreed over the years, although I have the highest regard for his intellect and his tone and approach to foreign affairs, started with the context in which we have to look at Iran, because that is incredibly important.

In a way, I see Iran almost as two nations, which are sometimes contradictory. Iranians are sophisticated and proud people—they do not want to be humiliated—and it is important to remember that they are Persians, not Arabs. Yet there is quite a strong liberal streak inside Iranian society. One very good example of that is the widespread acceptance of family planning. Iran has the most effective family planning regime in the world. In 1979, Khomeini wanted to expand the population of Iran to fight Iraq, but was told he did not have the infrastructure to support an expanding population. So a complete U-turn was done and Iran has stabilised its population growth, without any of the draconian methods that China, for example, has had to impose. Tehran university has more female undergraduates than male undergraduates at the moment, so there are indications that a young, youthful, well-educated society is on the way up, which may yet change the face of Iran. I am pleased to say that the Prime Minister was able to meet President Rouhani at the United Nations the other day and supported the conventional thinking that we need to keep the dialogue going. On the other hand, as the right hon. Member for Blackburn has said, Iran has the most appalling human rights record, with child executions, political prisoners, the presidential candidates from 2009 still under house arrest and almost non-existent press freedom.

Iran is a foreign policy nightmare: its support for President Assad in Syria, through Hezbollah funding and the positioning of the revolutionary guard in Syria, is causing immense difficulties; it is undermining the Government of Bahrain by support for the Shi’a minority there; it openly supports, and is funding, Hamas in its criticism of and aggression towards Israel; it is running a complex network of weapons-smuggling routes into Gaza, through Egypt, with the sole intention of attacking Israel—it is in defiance of four UN Security Council resolutions on that; it has engaged in the funding of and support for attacks on Israeli diplomats around the world; and its antipathy towards Saudi Arabia is legendary, although this goes both ways. I will return to that point in a minute.

Iran’s nuclear ambitions have serious implications for a number of different factions and groupings around the country. For the EU and the west, there is an impact on our security if the Iranians have a nuclear capability. There will also be economic consequences, with a loss of stability in the middle east. Israel is rightly concerned about Iran’s ambitions. The regional consequences are also serious, with Saudi Arabia now developing its own nuclear research programmes, as is Jordan—surprisingly. That just shows the nervousness in the region.

Iran has a complex and cumbersome structure of government, and one often asks oneself, “Who is actually running the show?” The ultimate power lies with the Supreme Leader, who does not exercise his power in an authoritative, dictatorial way, but does so in a more consultative way, with occasional nudging, sometimes aggressively, as we have seen in the nuclear negotiations. Just to add to the complications, the Supreme Leader at the moment is ailing and, as he has to make difficult decisions about the negotiations, that is not helpful. On the other hand, we have the President, who is more the chief executive, but a strong one, and he is the head of the nuclear negotiations.

When President Rouhani was elected to office—to the surprise of many as he was the most moderate candidate—we all said that he was a man with whom we could do business. He is a moderate who suits the situation. But we must judge him by his actions, not his words, and reining in a few hotheads in the revolutionary guard is about all we have seen, and we are still waiting for the beef.

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

Is my right hon. Friend also aware that Ban Ki-moon’s annual report to the General Assembly in October highlighted the fact that President Rouhani was expected to be a very moderate leader, but in fact the number of executions, especially of juveniles, has increased? The expectation has not been borne out in his actions in the country.

[Sir Richard Ottaway]

Yes, I am aware of that comment. However, the interpretation that my hon. Friend puts on it may be slightly unfair to Rouhani who does not necessarily control the judicial system or the sentences that are being handed down. The question is: can we trust him?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

The House is sometimes criticised for not passing enough legislation and because the Government have allocated days for Backbench Business Committee business. This is a great example of a debate in which hon. Members can discuss a subject that we would not ordinarily discuss.

On 24 November 2013, it emerged that a deal had been reached between Iran and the five members of the UN Security Council—the UK, the US, France, China and Russia—plus Germany. The deal was the outcome of years of negotiations behind the scenes and a decade of public diplomacy following the revelations that there was a wide-scale uranium enrichment programme in Iran. The P5 plus 1 countries and Iran concluded an interim six-month agreement known as the joint plan of action, which was intended to restrain Iran’s nuclear programme in return for limited sanctions.

On 26 February this year, I led a Westminster Hall debate and raised the concerns of many people about the P5 plus 1 tacitly recognising Iran’s right to enrich uranium, which has been rejected by many people over the years. Another concern was relaxing some of the Iran sanctions. As we anticipate the final deal at the end of the month, it is worth highlighting those concerns and the red lines that I believe need to be contained in any such deal.

The first issue is the length of time for which the deal will last, and the second is the basis on which agreement will be struck on Iran’s past nuclear capability. Only by adhering to strict limits on the nuclear programme for an extended period of time can Iran build up confidence that its nuclear activities will not be used for military purposes. The P5 plus 1 must seek an enduring deal that will last a considerable time—at least 20 years and possibly 30—to ensure a substantive change in Iran’s strategic conduct.

Reports already published indicate that Iran is pushing for a so-called “sunset clause”—for a deal to last only five years as an absolute maximum, after which it would expect to be treated as a normal signatory to the non-proliferation treaty. I have some concerns about that. Such a deal would probably cover only President Rouhani’s term of office, and the next President, or the next President’s successor, may have a completely different view of the subject, just as Ahmadinejad did. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister said in July 2014 that if Iran accepts a limit on its nuclear activities

“it will only be for a specific time frame, and temporary”.

Reports that the P5 plus 1 and Iran may settle on a duration as short as five to 10 years will do little to relieve my suspicions over Iran’s long-term nuclear ambitions. It would be little more than a temporary reprieve of one of the world’s greatest security threats.

Iran must earn the right to be treated as a normal non-nuclear weapons state under the NPT through a tangible display of peaceful nuclear intentions for the duration of any long-term agreement. Indeed, the quarterly report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran’s nuclear programme, which is due imminently—perhaps even as early as tomorrow—is likely to say that Iran has still not provided the information it was supposed to have provided more than two months ago. Since Rouhani became President, Iran has promised to work with the IAEA, but it has failed to address specific areas of the agency’s inquiry. It has long been clear that the IAEA’s inquiry into the possible military dimensions of Iran’s programme will not be completed before the target date for a deal. I had hoped for more headway by that time. The deal would require a robust system of inspection of Iran’s future and past nuclear activities to verify that it would adhere to the terms of any agreement and not attempt to break out.

The need for strict verification mechanisms is a product of Iran’s nuclear programme having a clandestine history, and it warrants higher levels of accountability than would be acceptable for others. Only the verification of Iran’s nuclear-related activities and the apparatus to enforce it will determine the lasting success of any permanent nuclear agreement. As my hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy (Guto Bebb) said, without complete access to Iran’s full portfolio of declared and undeclared nuclear-related facilities, no amount of monitoring and inspection can provide the international community with true confidence that Iran does not possess a clandestine programme.

The second issue I wish to cover, which my hon. Friend also touched on, is the possible military dimension of a nuclear capability in Iran. One specific locale that is believed to be such a possible military dimension is the military base at Parchin, where the IAEA suspects Iran has attempted to develop a nuclear explosive device. IAEA inspectors have not been permitted to enter the site since 2005, but only a month ago a large explosion at the facility destroyed a number of buildings. The cause of the explosion is still not known. The IAEA has long suspected Iran of conducting tests there relating to the development of nuclear weapons, including on nuclear triggers and high explosives. In 2011, the organisation reported that

“such experiments would be strong indications of possible nuclear weapon development”.

Those suspicions have heightened in recent years, with satellite imagery indicating that Iran has undertaken a large-scale nuclear clean-up operation in the area—possible evidence of the removal of hazardous nuclear materials. Experts cite the removal of soil as recently as 2012 and subsequent asphalting of the specific place that the IAEA wants to inspect, as evidence of Iran’s efforts to hide potentially incriminating evidence of illicit nuclear-related experiments at Parchin.

Tehran rejects calls for access and claims it is a domestic military site that is used for research and development and the production of ammunition, rockets and high explosives. Even the White House acknowledges that Parchin is one of the issues Tehran has to address to achieve a comprehensive agreement. Despite such concern from around the world, Iranian officials have stated that they will only allow minimal and managed access to the site if and when Iran decides to accept the additional protocol.

This causes me two concerns. First, such resistance calls into question Iran’s claim that it is entering into these nuclear talks in good faith, and its overall acceptance of making its nuclear programme more transparent. Secondly, it raises concerns about a deal on Iran’s nuclear capabilities being adhered to and properly implemented. If there is no effective monitoring verification before a deal, how can we know if it is being complied with?

Finally, there are three points relating to the UK’s role in the process that I want to mention to the Minister. First, as a member of the P5 plus 1, the UK Government have played a leading role in the international community’s handling of the Iranian nuclear issue and I commend them for that. Secondly, I congratulate the Government on pressing Iran to respond to international concerns over its nuclear activities, and even unilaterally imposing an unprecedented series of sanctions against Iran for its continued non-compliance. Thirdly, the UK Government now stand to play a decisive part in shaping the terms of a final nuclear agreement with Iran. We must ensure that any such deal is the right deal. Indeed, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Sir Richard Ottaway) said, it not just any deal we need, but the right deal.

Palestine and Israel

Matthew Offord Excerpts

Monday 13th October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Straw]

It is the Palestinian Authority that is part of the negotiations, not Hamas. I believe that the fact of the Israelis’ intemperate reaction to the very prospect of the House passing this resolution is proof that it will make a difference. The only thing that the Israeli Government understand, under the present demeanour of Binyamin Netanyahu, is pressure. What the House will be doing this evening will be to add to the pressure on the Government of Israel. That is why they are so worried about this resolution passing. Were it just a gesture, as the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) implied, they would not be bothered at all. They are very worried indeed because they know that it will have an effect.

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his contribution, but does he not accept that this is a Back-Bench motion? This has no effect on Government policy, and it is just futile.

[Mr Straw]

We represent the electorate of the United Kingdom. I can tell the hon. Gentleman, having spent 13 years sitting on the Treasury Bench, that resolutions passed in the House, whether they emanate from Back Benches or Front Benches, make a difference, and this resolution will, if it is passed, make a difference.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

I had not anticipated being called to speak, so I am grateful to you, Madam Deputy Speaker.

The proposal for this House to recognise Palestinian statehood is not only premature, but misguided. An affirmative vote tonight would be nothing more than a propaganda victory for those who wish to bypass the mediation of the peace process in favour of international institutions such as the United Nations where the Palestinian Authority enjoy an automatic majority.

Three years ago President Abbas made it explicit that the attempt unilaterally to assert statehood through the UN was to ensure that it

“would pave the way for the internationalisation of the conflict as a legal matter, not only a political one. It would also pave the way for us”—

the Palestinian Authority—

“to pursue claims against Israel at the United Nations, human rights treaty bodies and the international Court of Justice.”

The Palestinian Authority are seeking to create opportunities for new diplomatic and legal fronts on the conflict with Israel that enable a distraction, an alternative and an escape route from the bilateral principle entailed in the Oslo accords and subsequent diplomatic frameworks.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

rose—

[Grahame M. Morris]

rose—

[Dr Offord]

I will not give way at the moment.

The proposers of this motion are aiding those efforts and turning their backs on the peace process. That is not a proposal that I can accept.

The middle east peace process is underpinned by several key documents—this has not been addressed tonight —that prohibit the unilateral diplomatic action this motion would allow and deem it to undermine the prospect of a negotiated settlement.

In 1993 the Palestine Liberation Organisation committed itself to a declaration that

“all outstanding issues relating to the permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.”

This was followed two years later by the Oslo II agreement, where the PLO said it would not take any step that would change the status of the Palestinian territories pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

rose—

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

rose—

[Dr Offord]

I will not give way at the moment.

That principle has a binding validity on all parties and has been subsequently reaffirmed as the only acceptable basis for a resolution.

[Crispin Blunt]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)]

Order. The hon. Gentleman is not giving way.

[Dr Offord]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.

That is also an agreement to which our Government of the United Kingdom, as part of the European Union and the Quartet, are a signatory. Therefore, this motion asks the UK Government to break their commitment to the peace process. That is not a proposal that I can accept.

A negotiated two-state agreement would also resolve others issues, including borders, security arrangements and recognition by all of Israel’s right to exist, but this motion would allow recognition of a Palestinian state that would not even recognise or even accept Israel’s 1967 borders. The former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), has called for the 1967 borders. If we had acceded to such requests in the past, the Golan heights would be in the hands of Syria or, in fact, ISIL nowadays, meaning that Israel would not be able to continue to exist, which I cannot accept.

Similarly, the concept that the 1948 armistice lines should become a border with a terror state is another irresponsible policy and something in which the Parliament of any liberal democracy should not be involved in any way. The battle that Britain and our allies are a part of is to stop the spread of fundamentalist Islamist control over the Levant—of which Israel is a part—and not to speed it along.

[Mr Straw]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. Is he aware that when I intervened on the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) I was careful with my language and spoke about any borders being based on 1967, not resolutions? That is no different from that which is contained in the final page of the road map, which was endorsed by the Government of Israel, among others.

[Dr Offord]

I am grateful for that clarification.

Recognition of Palestine appears attractive as it is considered to be the first step towards the internalisation and perceived legitimisation that could allow diplomatic and legal challenges to Israel through organisations that are perceived to be sympathetic to Palestinian grievances. The recognition of Palestine would produce significant setbacks for the existing peace process and is bound to elicit a retrenchment in the position of Israel when it has previously agreed statements that have produced land swaps for peace.

Most infamously, that occurred in 2005 when Israel undertook the unilateral move to withdraw from Gaza. Members all know what has happened since: more than 11,000 rockets have been fired from the Gaza strip into Israel by terrorists. Some 5 million Israelis are currently living under threat of rocket attacks, and more than 500,000 Israelis have less than 60 seconds to find shelter after a rocket is launched. That means that people in the biggest cities of Israel, including Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa, are all at risk.

On the other hand, negotiated peace deals, such as the Egypt and Israel peace treaty in 1979 and the Israel and Jordan peace treaty in 1994, are examples of land being relinquished in return for stable peace negotiations. The same did not occur at the Camp David negotiations in 2000. The proposal to establish an independent Palestinian state in virtually all of the west bank and Gaza, along with a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, was rejected because of the alternative condition that the Palestinian Authority declare an end to the conflict as part of the final agreement.

Consequently, the proposal for the recognition of Palestinian statehood without the fundamental aspects of final-status negotiations, coupled with a reciprocal agreement that relinquishes further claims over lands, property, settlements, the right to return and access to Jerusalem, is premature.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

My hon. Friend said that he had not intended to speak and he seems to be making up for that by reading, at great speed, from an Israeli Government handout. Could we at least establish these ground rules: those of us who support the motion are still firm friends of Israel and defend its right to security, but we also believe in justice for the Palestinian people?

[Dr Offord]

I am grateful for another helpful intervention, but I assure my hon. Friend that this is certainly not an Israeli Government press release. [Interruption.] I can hear another hon. Member chuntering away, but never mind.

It is vital that any peace is achieved through negotiation and mutual agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, not through unilateral moves or pre-emptive recognition. Formal progress in peace deals has only ever been achieved through bilateral talks, which remain the way forward for the peace process. No credible peace-building initiative has ever emerged from the UN General Assembly. Both the UK Government and the Conservative party have been clear that bilateral negotiations are the only path to a stable peace. I had understood that that was the Labour party’s policy, but its Members seem to have been whipped to vote for this motion because their leader cannot make up his own mind on Israel.

Members of Parliament should vote against any unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood while making it clear that they support the creation of a Palestinian state through direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. It is of great concern that the amendment tabled by the right hon. Member for Blackburn has been selected, because I felt that the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy (Guto Bebb) was more than adequate.

The diplomatic process, realities on the ground, international law and not least the UN system itself are likely to suffer serious negative consequences if Members accede to the Palestinian attempt to remove the search for a two-state solution from the established bilateral framework. It is vital that we send a clear message that such an approach, which the Palestinian leadership has pursued since 2010, is a dead end. At best it is a costly distraction and we should vote against this motion tonight.

Middle East and North Africa

Matthew Offord Excerpts

Thursday 17th July 2014 Westminster Hall

[Andrew Percy]

Hamas knew about the proposal sufficiently to reject it and then to fire 50 rockets in response to it, so I think that tells us all we need to know. And President Abbas seemed to know about it, because he stood up, quite rightly, and urged Hamas to accept it. This is a concern.

[Jim Sheridan in the Chair]

We must remember why we are in this situation and where we have got to. I understand the UK Government’s support for the unity Government. I understand their aims in doing so, and I understand that they have the best of intentions. It is a concern, however, that one of the unity Government’s constituent parties—although it is not actively serving in that Government, which is a technocratic one—does not recognise the state of Israel in its charter, and that it seeks not only the total destruction of Israel but, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire said in his opening speech, the destruction of Jewish people around the world. I cannot understand how we can possibly expect to move forward with the unity Government when some of the potential members will not sign up to the Quartet principles. I will not dwell on the subject, but I agree entirely with the points made by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Riverside).

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend acknowledge that actions in overseas territories, such as Palestinian territories and Israel, have implications for my constituents? The Community Security Trust has said that anti-Semitic attacks have doubled, and of the 50 attacks that have occurred in recent weeks, 30 have been directly attributed to the incidents in those territories. The insistence of Hamas and other organisations on making claims such as we are discussing ends in violence towards my constituents.

[Andrew Percy]

Indeed, and I am sorry to hear about that. There are many good people who support the Palestinian cause for just reasons, but we must be honest and say that some use the cause for more sinister ends. We have heard examples of those, and they are truly shocking. I have no doubt that everybody here, whatever their view on the conflict, would condemn such actions entirely.

I want to say a little about the Israeli response. It has saddened me that some have bandied about phrases regarding collective punishment and the proportionality of the response. It is incredibly sad that people have died on any side of the conflict, but we cannot conclude, because of the way Hamas acts and the fact that it puts more of its civilians in harm’s way, that Israel’s response must be disproportionate simply because more people have sadly died. Let us be honest about what is going on. Israel does not fire rockets from its civilian population. While we have been debating, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency has confirmed that one of its schools in Gaza has been used as a hiding place for rockets, and the agency is due to make a statement on that shortly. That tells us all we need to know about why there are such large numbers of civilian casualties.

Gaza

Matthew Offord Excerpts

Monday 14th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I agree that it is important to ease restrictions on Gaza. The Israeli restrictions on the movement of goods and people do tremendous damage to the economy and the living standards of the people of Gaza, and, in our view, that serves to strengthen, not weaken, Hamas in the long term. An improved economy is essential for the people of Gaza, including the children of Gaza, but it is also ultimately firmly in the security interests of Israel.

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

What assessment has the Foreign Secretary made of reports that Hamas is using Gaza’s largest hospital, Al-Shifa, as a command and control centre to direct rocket attacks?

[Mr Hague]

I do not have specific information about that, but the Israeli Government argue very strongly that civilian facilities are used in Gaza to shield rocket launches and military operations by Hamas, and there is a good deal of credibility in those assertions.

Israeli Teenagers (Abduction and Murder)

Matthew Offord Excerpts

Tuesday 1st July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Hugh Robertson]

Yes. In a sense it is a puzzle in two parts. The first thing is who was responsible for this crime. The Israelis are very clear about who they think is responsible. The Palestinian Authority have indicated that that view may be sensible. We need to find out who the perpetrators were, and then we need to find out what, if any, association they may have with the technocratic Government. At the moment, the technocratic Government are absolutely clear that they are fully signed up to the Quartet principles and that they are a non-violent Government and have no contact with Hamas. Indeed, talking to members of Fatah, it is clear that their relationship with Hamas has been desperate. They hate Hamas and regard it as being responsible for the splits that have occurred, so there is some small reason for hope.

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

Very little shocks me about what occurs in the middle east, but the depravity of the murder of these young men is beyond comprehension for many of my constituents and for me. The Minister asserted that no money from British taxpayers goes to Hamas, but he has now accepted the position of the International Development Committee that that might be the case. Will he put his efforts into facilitating a meeting of a cross-party delegation of MPs so that we can speak to the DFID Minister and present the evidence we have been talking about for many years already?

[Hugh Robertson]

I gave the answer that I did to an earlier question because I was assured, as I have been in the past, that there were no grounds for believing that. If a Select Committee of this House has uncovered evidence that firmly proves that that is not the case, that is a very serious issue. I can offer my hon. Friend a cast-iron guarantee that we will take that up. Indeed, the very fact that it has been found by a Select Committee will ensure that the Department responsible has to answer those questions.

Oral Answers to Questions

Matthew Offord Excerpts

Tuesday 8th April 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Jerusalem, as a shared capital, is part of what we believe is a characteristic of achieving a two-state solution, along with a solution based on 1967 borders, with agreed land swaps and with a just, fair and agreed settlement for refugees. It is vital that that possibility is kept open. That is why so many of us on all sides of the House have voiced such strong disapproval of settlements on occupied land, which are illegal. We make that point regularly to the Israelis—indeed, I will do so to an Israeli Minister this afternoon—and we urge them to take the opportunity of peace.

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

Last December, the Foreign Secretary said that the British Government have been

“clear to the Palestinians that there is no alternative to negotiations”

and that “we oppose unilateral measures”. What representation has he made to the Palestinian Authority following its return to unilateral actions last week, in violation of its commitment to abstain for the duration of direct peace talks?

[Mr Hague]

I called President Abbas last Thursday to repeat our view that the only chance of achieving a viable and sovereign Palestinian state is through negotiations. President Abbas assured me that he remains committed to negotiations, so we will continue to encourage him and Israeli leaders to make a success—even at this stage—of this opportunity.

Iran (Joint Plan of Action)

Matthew Offord Excerpts

Wednesday 26th February 2014 Westminster Hall

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve for the first time under your chairmanship of a Westminster Hall debate, Mr Williams. I am very grateful to have the opportunity. The issue of Iran and, indeed, of the whole middle east, is often shrouded in some secrecy, so, in the interest of transparency, I draw hon. Members’ attention to what I have submitted to the Register of Members’ Financial Interests in the past.

On 24 November last year, the world woke up to the news that a deal had been reached between the permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus one—the UK, the US, France, China, Russia and Germany—and Iran. A joint plan of action was the outcome of weeks of hard negotiation. The deal was revealed to be the fruit of years of US-Iran secret negotiations, alongside a decade of public Iranian diplomacy following the revelation of a wide-scale uranium enrichment programme. The P5 plus 1 countries and Iran concluded an interim six-month agreement, known as a joint plan of action, to restrain Iran’s nuclear programme, in exchange for limited sanctions relief. The deal is the interim first step towards a full agreement within six months to address comprehensively the international community’s long-held concerns that Iran’s nuclear programme is intended for military purposes. The agreement will be in effect for six months—it started on 20 January this year—during which time the P5 plus 1 powers will attempt to forge a conclusive, final-status agreement that will end the nuclear impasse.

We—or certainly I—have concerns about the agreement. I should start by saying that the interim nuclear agreement does not resolve international suspicions. It merely suspends some of the most immediately concerning aspects of Iran’s programme, pending a more comprehensive agreement. However, there are further serious concerns about the agreement. Some believe that it grants Iran exactly what it wanted—both a significant easing of sanctions and preservation of the most significant parts of its nuclear programme, including those with a military aspect. The agreement allows Iran to continue enriching uranium and retain all the centrifuges, and it is not required to dismantle the uncompleted heavy water research reactor at Arak, which has the potential to produce plutonium when completed. In effect, the agreement allows a plan B route for nuclear weapons in that country.

[Mr Lee Scott (Ilford North) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on obtaining the debate. Does he agree with me and share my concerns that Iran could use this as a way of increasing its military capability and increasing its alleged sponsorship of terrorism throughout the region?

[Dr Offord]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. That is certainly one of my significant concerns, and I will ask my right hon. Friend the Minister to comment on it when he sums up the debate.

It is also of great concern to me that the P5 plus 1 have tacitly recognised Iran’s right to enrich uranium, something that has been rejected by the international community for many years. In essence, the deal eases the pressure on Iran’s economy in return for minimal concessions that fail to curb the nuclear ambitions of the country. The interim deal has unravelled an internationally imposed sanctions regime that took years to enforce and was having the desired effect.

The ultimate objective is to prevent, on behalf of many countries, a nuclear-armed Iran. The repercussions of that could be disastrous, not least because Iran has threatened to destroy the state of Israel, but also because it remains the world’s leading financier of terrorism, and has the potential to provoke a major regional power struggle and arms race.

For the rulers of Iran, this is just another chapter in a dangerous game. Iran has a long history of exploiting international talks to buy time and further advance its nuclear programme, and the fear remains that this agreement is yet another example.

On Monday, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs updated the House on the progress of the E3 plus 3 and Iran talks. He reminded the House that the challenges to the success of the talks remain considerable and that a

“comprehensive solution must address all proliferation concerns related to Iran’s nuclear programme.”—[Official Report, 24 February 2014; Vol. 576, c. 29.]

[Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate. Does he agree that the fact that Iran continues to support terrorist activity—Hezbollah and Hamas—and to support attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan puts into perspective its so-called peaceful aspirations in the area?

[Dr Offord]

My hon. Friend, like my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford North (Mr Scott), has mentioned something that I hope to come on to in my speech. It remains a great concern that, while Iran is engaging in the process of reconciliation through the talks and the agreement, it is also engaging in activities not only in places such as Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, but in places such as Lebanon, combining forces with Hezbollah and others.

[Mr James Clappison (Hertsmere) (Con)]

I, too, congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate. Does he share my concern at the reports coming out of the area that only in recent days Iran has been stepping up its military and material support, and the provision of personnel, for the Bashar al-Assad regime? Would it not be strange for us to be granting new favours to the Iranian regime and helping it economically when it is supplying that terrible regime, which is slaughtering its own citizens?

[Dr Offord]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. That is another issue I intend to raise. The fact that we are seeking to allow a country greater economic freedoms that in turn allows it to support terror in others parts of the region is of great concern. That seems to act counter to the things that are being said by President Rouhani and others in that country.

[Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD)]

I, too, congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing the debate, which is very timely, but does he not accept that the purpose of a sanctions regime, most of which is still in place, is to incentivise a change in attitude? Have not we seen that change in attitude since the election of Hassan Rouhani as President of Iran, and should not that be encouraged, not least to encourage further negotiations and positive engagement on the subject of Syria?

[Dr Offord]

I genuinely thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He demonstrates that the interventions so far today have not been planted questions, because he has challenged me on what I am saying. I have to disagree with him. I cite as evidence the fact that the number of executions in Tehran and Iran in January last year was actually lower than the number of executions since the election of President Rouhani, which seems to indicate a more hard-line stance towards opposition in the country. In fact, the talks are more likely to disguise what is really going on there.

[Martin Horwood]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentlemen for giving way a second time so quickly, but that does not relate to the nature of the joint plan of action, which is precisely related to the nuclear programme. The commitments that Iran gave and the announcements that it made in that were very important. Surely he recognises that that represents progress of a kind, which should be encouraged.

[Dr Offord]

If I have not convinced the hon. Gentleman so far, I hope to do so later in my speech. I am not entirely convinced by what he says.

Let me return to the Foreign Secretary’s statement on Monday. What concerned me most was what he did not say. I hope that the Minister, in summing up the debate, can answer at least three specific concerns, including, first, how Iran’s nuclear programme, which includes a military dimension, will be addressed, as the interim agreement fails to address it. Secondly, I would be interested to learn what reassurances he can give that the final agreement will address the technical aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, including the dismantling of all existing advanced centrifuges that accelerate breakout time; whether the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors will be granted unfettered access to all Iran’s nuclear facilities, including those that are being operated secretly; and what will happen to Iran’s existing stockpile of 3.5% enriched uranium.

Thirdly, what assurances can the Government give that the interim agreement will not simply unravel the international sanctions that have been imposed and that took years to be introduced, giving rise to a perception in the country that Iran is being rewarded for coming to the negotiating table while continuing to inflame tensions in the whole middle east, specifically in Lebanon, Syria and Israel, and while procrastinating on the fundamental issue of advances in its nuclear programme?

Before we get to that point, I want to take a few moments to outline Iran’s nuclear programme and the problems I anticipate. It is widely believed that Iran’s nuclear programme has significantly advanced in the past five years. Continuing to defy international pressure and binding UN Security Council resolutions, Iran has actively enriched uranium to 20% fissile purity—a level that has no credible civilian purpose. Without any additional sanctions being imposed, Iran has been able to continue producing uranium enriched to 90% purity, which brings it closer to weapons grade. The most difficult and time-consuming part of the nuclear process is, therefore, already complete. The IAEA estimates that Iran now has 9,000 kg of low-enriched uranium, an amount that experts say could be enough for four bombs if it was refined to 90% fissile concentration.

Iran also possesses as many as 18,000 centrifuges, including more than 1,000 new models—the IR2m—which are far more efficient and can provide bomb-grade uranium two and a half times faster than the previous model. A heavy water reactor has been constructed outside the city of Arak, which offers the possibility of a new pathway to a bomb using plutonium once it goes online. That is in addition to the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, which was built in secret and discovered in 2002; the Fordow enrichment facility, which was also built illegally and confirmed to be in existence by Iran in 2009; the Parchin facility, to which the IAEA is seeking access after evidence emerged that Iran has tested nuclear triggers and high explosives that could be used in nuclear weapons; the Bushehr nuclear power station, which is operated with external assistance; and the Isfahan nuclear research facility, which has the capability to process uranium yellowcake into a gas for enrichment.

[Andrew Percy (Brigg and Goole) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate. I heard the comments of the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) regarding a change in behaviour. However, my hon. Friend has just mentioned the Arak heavy water facility, which is perfect for producing weapons-grade plutonium. On 6 February, I asked a question in the House, to which the Minister responded:

“we remain concerned that Iran intends to develop the facility to provide a plutonium route to a nuclear weapon. Iran has not clarified how it would use the plutonium produced”.—[Official Report, 6 February 2014; Vol. 575, c. 356W.]

Despite the interim deal, the fact remains that Ministers are concerned. We should adopt the position of the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, who has said that

“Iran has not earned the right to have the benefit of the doubt.”

[Dr Offord]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. He has asked a question, as identified by the House of Commons Library, on the effect of the P5 plus 1, Iran and the joint plan of action, and the continuing manufacture of new centrifuge devices. We know that the technology, which has many applications, continues to be used, but we do not know for what purpose. That remains a great concern, and I do not believe the joint plan of action addresses it.

On Iran’s agreement to freeze the enrichment and halt the production of uranium, Iran has halted the installation of new enrichment centrifuges and has ceased the installation of new components at the Arak reactor. It has allowed the IAEA to make inspections at Natanz, Arak and Fordow. I acknowledge that the regime has granted the international community some concessions. We must be aware, however, that in return, the P5 plus 1 agreed to provide £6 billion to £7 billion in sanctions relief, of which roughly £4.2 billion would be oil revenue frozen in foreign banks. The P5 plus 1 allow temporary relief on some sanctions, including trade in gold, precious metals, petrochemicals, auto parts and aircraft parts. The P5 plus 1 have also agreed not to impose new nuclear-related sanctions for six months during the agreement.

Although the interim accord interrupts Iran’s nuclear progress for the first time in nearly a decade, it requires Iran to make only a modest draw-down payment on the central problem. Iran has benefited from disproportionate sanctions relief in exchange for cosmetic concessions that it can do away with in a matter of weeks. It has been rewarded with sanctions relief despite remaining unbowed in its demand to continue uranium enrichment, which is the root of the international community’s concern. Most importantly, the deal fails to dismantle many of the military aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme. Without the requirement to dismantle a single centrifuge, Iran will remain a threshold military nuclear power. It will retain the capability to break across that line at any time it chooses.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend dispute the national intelligence estimates from the United States of 2007 and 2012, which directly contradict his proposition that Iran is on the verge of being able to break out in such a way? The United States national intelligence estimates are major pieces of work, and they are not done lightly. Does he dispute them?

[Dr Offord]

Yes, I dispute them. I am not a chemical engineer or a nuclear engineer, but on the basis of my research and the evidence I have read, I dispute those estimates and I maintain that Iran is on the verge of making a breakthrough. As the shadow Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Mr Alexander), said in the House on Monday, with as many as 10,000 centrifuges in operation already, Iran retains the capability to break out and produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon in as little as two months. The deal does not roll back the vast majority of the advances that Iran has made in the past five years, which have drastically shortened what nuclear experts call its “dash time” to a bomb—the minimum time that it would take to build a weapon if Iran’s Supreme Leader or military decided to pursue that path.

Most concerning of all, the world’s leading powers have tacitly recognised Iran’s right to enrichment, which has been the Islamic Republic’s key demand for many years. The interim agreement states that the permanent deal will involve

“a mutually defined enrichment program with mutually agreed parameters”,

but the deal abandons the demand made by the six United Nations resolutions that Iran must halt all enrichment. That may undermine confidence in global non-proliferation norms. Iranian state media carried boasts by, among others, President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Affairs Minister Javad Zarif that the US had caved in on its long-standing position and recognised Iran’s right to enrich. President Rouhani said:

“No matter what interpretations are given, Iran's right to enrichment has been recognised.”

He went on to say:

“"Do you know what the Geneva agreement is? It means the superpowers’ surrender to the great Iranian nation. The Geneva agreement means that the world accepts [Iran’s] civil nuclear technology, which we achieved through the efforts and the sacrifice of our young scientists”.

The agreement does not stop Iran enriching uranium to a low level of 3.5% or compel it to dismantle any of its existing centrifuges, which can be used for military purposes. Iran can continue to enrich uranium with its 10,190 operational IR1 centrifuges. They are in addition to 8,000 machines that have been installed but are inactive. Iran can also continue to build new centrifuges to replace those that wear out.

The situation has not been lost on the Iranian rulers. In January this year, President Rouhani said that there would be no destruction of existing centrifuges “under any circumstances.” Iran’s Foreign Affairs Minister said in December last year:

“The structure of our nuclear program has been maintained and the 20 percent enrichment can be resumed in less than 24 hours”.

A month later, he said:

“We did not agree to dismantle anything”.

In January, Iran’s Parliament introduced a Bill to step up enrichment to the threshold of 60% fissile purity. That would put Iran on the technical verge of 90% fissile purity, which is enough for the core of a nuclear bomb. At least 218 of the Iranian Parliament’s 290 members have expressed support for the measure. The Bill’s supporters say that uranium refined to 60% concentration would be used to fuel nuclear-powered submarines. Some analysts have speculated that the Iranian Government might be using Parliament as a bargaining tool in nuclear talks with the P5 plus 1, because they would have no choice but to obey such a Bill if the Parliament passed it.

The deal also leaves untouched Iran’s portfolio of 1,008 installed advanced IR2m centrifuges, which can speed up break-out times using 3.5% enriched uranium. This month, Iran revealed that it had developed a new generation of centrifuges that are 15 times more powerful than those currently in use, and Iranian officials have stated that the centrifuges do not violate the joint plan of action. Although enrichment using those machines has not started, the vast majority of them are fully installed and under vacuum, which means that Iran could quickly begin feeding natural uranium into those cascades and more than double its enrichment capacity.

Centrifuges are not the only concern. Iran is in the process of constructing a 40 MW heavy water research reactor, for which there is limited peaceful civilian purpose. When it is operational, that facility at Arak will be able to produce plutonium, which is one of two substances that can form the core of a nuclear weapon. Iran is not required to dismantle the incomplete heavy water research reactor or convert the plant into a light water reactor, which would be less useful for military purposes.

Under the joint plan of action, Iran agreed to freeze progress on the Arak heavy water research reactor and not to commission it or transfer fuel or heavy water to the site. It also agreed not to produce or test additional fuel or install remaining components. The interim deal does not explicitly prevent Iran from manufacturing components offsite for Arak’s nuclear reactor that could then be installed later. Iran claims that its purpose is only to make medical isotopes and conduct research, but western countries believe that it could also produce plutonium, which is the plan B route to producing a full nuclear weapon.

The one mechanism we held over Iran was the sanctions, but the interim deal has unravelled the internationally imposed sanction regime that has taken years to enforce. Sanctions were having the desired effect, so why did we take a step back from a method that was working and put trust in a state that has given us no reason to assume that that trust will be guarded? However limited, the relaxation of sanctions will relieve the pressure that has brought Iran to seek an agreement, by giving direct financial relief and indirectly restoring confidence in the Iranian economy.

Many nations and companies—as well as the Iranians themselves—have interpreted the recent agreement as the beginning of the end of the sanctions regime. It is likely that a number of countries will apply pressure to resume trade with Iran, including its former key trade partners, such as South Korea, Japan, India and China. Within weeks of the interim deal, Iran’s petrochemical sector alone had appreciated by $9 billion—that is a capital gain of almost 40%, generated entirely by a new market psychology that bets on the end of sanctions. On top of that, Iran is already making efforts to recapture its dominant role in OPEC.

All of that goes to ensure that the agreement is rewarding Iran despite the fact that its long history of clandestine nuclear activities, support for international terrorism and repeat calls for the destruction of Israel are cause for legitimate trepidation and scepticism over its intentions. Although President Rouhani’s negotiating team has reportedly been more constructive in talks, supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei has the final say on major issues, including national security and Iran’s nuclear programme. Most worryingly, Iran continues to support terrorism in the region. It is a leading sponsor of state terrorism, providing financial and material support to extremist Islamist terrorist groups across the middle east, including Hamas, Hezbollah and insurgencies against allied forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Iran agreed to the deal as part of a long history of exploiting international talks to buy time and further advance its nuclear programme. The six-month timetable to reach a final agreement could be extended by a further six months by mutual consent. President Rouhani has previously spoken of Iran buying time to advance its nuclear programme. In 2004, he gave a speech to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, in which he explained how he was playing for time during the nuclear talks he was conducting with the EU3. He said:

“While we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the [nuclear conversion] facility in Isfahan. By creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work there”.

Answers to the parliamentary questions I have asked provide little assurance that the IAEA will ensure that inspections take place. Iran has agreed to the IAEA conducting only limited inspections at the main enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz. Its history of deception about its nuclear projects requires higher levels of accountability. Iran is not required to provide unfettered access to its full portfolio of nuclear facilities, including many underground and undeclared sites where the USA, Europe and Israel believe that hidden enrichment facilities might exist. It is not possible to rule out the existence of secret nuclear sites in Iran without it agreeing to allow the IAEA to conduct snap inspections anywhere beyond declared atomic installations under the agency’s additional protocol regime.

Iran is still not required to grant IAEA inspectors access to the nuclear-related Parchin site, a suspected weapons-testing facility, but it is required to declare all facilities containing nuclear material under its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Under the joint statement on a framework for co-operation between Iran and the IAEA, Iran has agreed to give the IAEA information on the 16 sites designated for the construction of new nuclear power plants, clarification about its announcement about new enrichment facilities, and information about all new research reactors. Fully verifying and monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities will require a level of co-operation and information-sharing between the IAEA, the western powers and Iran that is probably unprecedented for one country’s nuclear programme.

The overt military actions of missile development are also of concern. The interim agreement does not include a promise by Iran to abstain from pursuing work on ballistic missiles or weaponisation. UN Security Council resolution 1929 requires Iran to cease activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

[Mr Clappison]

My hon. Friend is touching on a key issue. Does he agree that if we are to treat Iran’s protestations seriously, we must see progress being made on the ballistic missile programme?

[Dr Offord]

I agree with my hon. Friend. I am concerned about the fact that the agreement does not touch upon ballistic missiles and remains an opportunity for Iran to continue its programme—as President Rouhani said—in a calm environment, and to focus on its work and experimentation on such weaponry.

I am sure that your knowledge of ballistic missiles is better than mine, Mr Williams, but I can tell the Chamber that a nuclear weapons programme has three main components: the fuel, the warhead and the delivery system. Iran is free, in the coming six-month period of the interim deal, to continue with the missile and warhead-development activities to which my hon. Friend just referred. It has successfully test-fired two new domestically made missiles, including a long-range ballistic missile with radar-evading capabilities and a fragmentation warhead. It also test fired a laser-guided air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missile known as a Bina. The country already has long-range surface-to-surface Shahab missiles with a range of about 1,250 miles that are capable of reaching Israel and—indeed—US military bases in the middle east. The recent deal does not grant IAEA inspectors access to Iran’s Parchin military facility, which is a long-suspected location for nuclear-related weapons testing.

In conclusion, it is worth reiterating the questions that I would like the Minister to answer. Does he share my concern that limited processes and structures appear to be in place should Iran walk away from negotiations with the P5 plus 1 before a permanent nuclear deal is reached within the six-month period? Given its history of duplicity and procrastination over its nuclear programme, would the Minister agree that it is only right that there will be a degree of concern that Iran might abuse the interim deal merely to pocket the concessions and walk away?

A more receptive Iranian negotiating team is being welcomed internationally. However, Iran has not tempered its anti-Israel rhetoric, recently labelling Israel as the

“sinister, unclean, rabid dog of the region.”

Does the Minister understand why many of us think Israel should be concerned about the agreement? There are also concerns that the joint plan of action has green-lighted Iran’s right to enrich, or at least that it has done so according to Iranian interpretations. Iranian state media carried boasts by President Rouhani and his Foreign Minister that the international community had caved in. What assessment has the Minister made of such statements by Iran? Iran’s latest actions do not suggest that it is complying fully with the spirit of the joint plan of action.

Does the Minister share my concern that domestic production of advanced centrifuges, which further reduce break-out times, raises questions as to Iranian intentions? Under the joint plan of action, Iran retains its full portfolio of centrifuges. Would the Minister agree that any final agreement must seek to dismantle the bulk of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure? The interim agreement is undoubtedly asymmetrical in structure, with Iran merely freezing its programme while the international community chips away at sanctions. Does the Minister agree that that might influence whether Iran decides to abandon negotiations for a comprehensive deal over the next six months? Finally, does the Minister share my concern that the joint plan of action will result in billions of pounds of financial relief for Iran, enabling its continued ability to arm, fund and train its global terror network?

As the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) said, it is right that the P5 plus 1 strive for a deal that reduces the threat of a nuclear Iran, but we must not agree to measures that have the potential to expedite such a scenario. A bad deal is worse than no deal at all. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Dr Offord) on securing this debate. Iran is a topic that often needs a good airing. At this critical time, it is important that we give strong scrutiny to the Geneva accord agreed at the end of last year.

First, may I declare my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests? I am chairman of the all-party group on Iran and have been for the past eight years. I have twice visited Iran—including recently, three or four weeks ago. I have also visited on a number of occasions the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna at the United Nations.

We always have to go back to the beginning on Iran. We have to remember that the nuclear programme for Iran did not start last Tuesday or last year; in fact, it started in the mid-1960s, when the Shah was in charge—funded by the United States, ironically. General Electric came to its aid, to develop the first reactor in the heart of Tehran. Iran has had nuclear ambitions, whether civil or military, for decades. They have been part of its psyche. It lives in a rough neighbourhood; it has rivalries that we can, perhaps, only understand as having similar aspects to those in the cold war and with the Soviet Union; and it is surrounded by ethnically and religiously different economic and military rivals. That has often driven some of its insecurities.

The history of the nuclear programme is long and sporadic and it has jumped, depending on which country has helped Iran. The Russians helped it build a reactor in the past, the United States has done so and I suspect that the North Koreans have, too. Certainly, other members of the international community have stuck their oars in. That is why there is a rather illogical, sporadic and often bizarre civil nuclear programme.

Iran is not the only country in that region to have a civil nuclear programme. The United Arab Emirates is developing one right now, as we speak. Many middle east countries have sought to acquire nuclear technology. The most striking examples are India and Pakistan, which developed in total secrecy a nuclear weapons programme that ended up in actual nuclear weapons. We in the west either chose not to know or did not seem to know.

The process goes on. It is not new. It has, unfortunately, become entwined with the Iranian psyche and its view of itself in the world. However, let us remember that middle east politics is often as much about rhetoric as about action. Throughout the 1980s, for example, at the height of Ayatollah Khomeini’s rhetoric against the country of Israel, Israel sold Iran nearly half a billion dollars’ worth of arms. In fact, Israel broke the UN sanctions on arms embargo to Iran and Iraq in that period. It suited Israel at that stage to ignore the rhetoric and to side with Iran against Iraq, while the west was unfortunately supporting Iraq, by supplying it with some pretty dubious methods.

We have to go forward. In 2001, Iran helped the west bring down the Taliban. We might remember the Lion of Panjshir, Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was the west’s favoured leader of the Northern Alliance—the man who was going to liberate Afghanistan on our behalf. The irony was that he was Iran’s man in Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance helped America and Britain in their targeting and intelligence gathering against the Taliban.

Throughout these processes, Iran has stepped forward, sometimes against its nature, but sometimes for its own self-interest, and it has often been rewarded by immediate rejection. The “axis of evil” phrase was used discended on Iran, despite its assistance to the British and Americans in getting rid of the Taliban.

Trust is the problem in much of this, whether in respect of the nuclear programme, human rights or exporting terrorism. The Iranians’ knowledge of Britain’s poor behaviour towards it in the last centuries is better than mine. The Iranians understand that we supported the constitutional revolution in 1906 and then undermined it, when we removed the democratic constitutional revolution, to put in a Shah, and then we moved that Shah when he became too friendly with the Nazis. Then we moved their Prime Minister in the ’50s and put in another Shah. They understand that we—the United Kingdom—play power games and that we are not to be trusted, in the same way that we, quite rightly, have every reason not to trust Iran in the near future.

We have not trusted Iran on its nuclear programme. It has hidden things and has certainly done its best. There is proof that, in 2003 and 2002, it acquired from the AQ Khan network—not funded by Iran, but by one of its regional rivals—military plans for a weapons programme.

Trust is failing on both sides. That has been the real issue. I do not argue with my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon that, really, at the heart of the Geneva accord, the issue is about trying to fix this trust and to see what steps we can take to build together. We will have to stick our neck out to build that trust. That is the problem. I understand; if I was living in Israel right now, I would be worried about that. It is not me under direct threat from Iran. In fact, British national interests and British security are not threatened by Shi’a Islam, but by Salafist Sunnis emanating from al-Qaeda. They are the people who will blow up our trains and tube stations. That is nothing to do with Iran; that is to do with other major players in the region, who are either tacit or have yet to deal with that problem.

If I was in Israel, of course I would be worried and rightly so. But I also recognise that, within Israel, there is a split about the extent to which the Iranians are rational or irrational and how much Iran really wants to do nuclear damage or blow up Israel. Meir Dagan, the ex-head of Mossad—not a boy scout organisation—said on the record that Iran is rational and that he does not think it intends to go to that next step.

Nevertheless, the situation is real and we should look at the facts and the evidence as they are presented. The first things that I look at are the national intelligence estimates of the United States, the first of which, in 2007, was made under George Bush. The estimates are put together by the National Security Council, the CIA and the Pentagon. President Bush was not known as a dove on any areas in the middle east, but the national intelligence estimate produced at the time said, “We do not believe—we believe they did previously—that they are now on the verge of a break-out”. That is an important document. It was dismissed at the time by the hawks, but in 2012, under President Obama, another one appeared that effectively reaffirmed that national intelligence estimate.

[Dr Offord]

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s counter-view on some of these issues. It is easy to talk about organisations presenting reports. I have found the 2012 Institute for Science and International Security report, containing information from former weapons inspectors, who disagreed with Binyamin Netanyahu at the UN General Assembly in 2012 and felt that Iran would have a nuclear capability within months. It is okay to say that certain organisations say that is not possible. Equally, it is valid to say that other organisations contradict that point of view.

[Mr Wallace]

I register the point, but these are not national institutes. This is the CIA and the Pentagon—okay, they do not have the best track record on intelligence, but they never gave the benefit of the doubt to the doves; they always gave it to the hawks. These are major national institutions—Government organisations—that share intelligence with Israel and all the other allies that we have, so they are certainly serious. It is important to look at that fact.

We should not pass over the grand bargain offered by Iran in 2003. The grand bargain was something that every hon. Member in this Chamber would have signed up to tomorrow. It was an offer by Iran to suspend enrichment; to join the additional protocol, with further and more intrusive inspection than even Britain has under the non-proliferation treaty; and to demilitarise Hezbollah. It was even to have gone as far as to recognise Israel, which many countries in the middle east, which may be against Iran but are not necessarily allies, still do not recognise. They may help Israel, but they still have not taken the next step. That grand bargain was rejected out of hand by the White House.

People sitting now in Iran would say, “Hang on, we offered all this and this was all thrown away”. That goes back to the heart of the matter. The trail of trust has been full of missed opportunities on both sides. We really need to try to rebuild it. I commend this Government, the Obama Administration and the P5 plus 1 for sticking their necks out.

I do not mind who visits Iran. I have been to Iran, but I do not approve of what the Iranians do to Christians, Baha’is or other minorities. I condemn that absolutely, but I believe that visiting Iran does not mean supporting Iran. If people criticise or propose policy against a country, it is a good idea for them to take time to visit that country. That is important. I do not sit around and get involved in debates on Israel because I have not been there. One day I might decide to do so, mainly because it affects other middle east policy that I might want to discuss. Going there is important.

Beth Schlesinger (Custody of Children)

Matthew Offord Excerpts

Tuesday 14th January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Graham Stringer]

The father was basically asked to tell the mother what the children’s needs were and what was happening, but what actually happened was that he cancelled 50 of Beth’s visits. Rather than him looking after the children, Filipino nannies were hired to do that for 12 hours a day and at weekends, and to take them to and from the nursery. Beth became more and more worried about the children; Samuel had four teeth taken out without any medical reasons given and Benjamin had two teeth removed. Beth was not only worried about what was happening, as the visits were cancelled and the children were upset, but it became clear that in the court’s previous decision Judge Göttlicher had suppressed a report from the nursery which had shown, and expressed the view, that when the children were seeing the father they had been crying and screaming, and had been extremely distressed. Clearly, Judge Göttlicher had had that report but it was not used. Things went from bad to worse, in terms not only of access to the children, but finance. Mr Schlesinger stopped paying maintenance and, indeed, tried to demand that Beth paid maintenance. She was now given access only on two afternoons a week and three hours every second Sunday, which represents an extraordinary turnaround from the original situation.

In July 2013, the judge awarded full custody to the father. At this time, crucially, no assessment of the father, or of the father with the children, had taken place. Beth had been examined in German for the psychiatrist’s report that had recommended against her. She is not fluent in the language, and so her answers had been slow, which was counted as a mark towards her being considered mentally unstable. Some of the relationships involving Judge Konstanze Thau became clear, and not only the one with Mr Schlesinger; her husband worked in the same hospital as Dr Willinger. I do not usually believe in conspiracies, but in this case the decisions that were taken were so strange that one has to suspect that undue influence and conspiracy were taking place.

Beth has asked me to draw to the House’s attention a case of a similar custody issue, although much more extreme in many ways, that has been before the higher Austrian courts in the past week or so. It involved a neglected and filthy child—not the same as in the Schlesinger family’s case—that had been taken away from the mother, who was deemed to be inadequate. The higher courts in Austria said, in giving the child back to the mother, that a loving child’s bond is of “paramount consideration”. I agree with that, and that Austrian court got it right in a much more difficult case than this one. Court cases are always difficult to compare because they involve details that one does not know, but I think that that case highlights what has gone wrong in Beth’s case.

I want to thank a few people before I come to my conclusion on this case. I have been to see the Austrian ambassador about this matter. He was courteous and listened carefully before explaining the situation to me. The Minister has received a delegation consisting of me and my hon. Friend the Member for Bury South (Mr Lewis), and I am grateful to him for that. I know that he is familiar with the case and sympathetic, and I hope that he will listen to what are outrageous decisions from the Austrian courts and, even with all the difficulties that I have explained, take action on them.

I have great respect for the Austrian state. As a Minister I had regular meetings with Austrian Ministers. I like Austria, but the decision in Beth Alexander’s case is a blight on the Austrian judicial system and I hope that it will be put right. Brought to its bare bones, this case is about a violent father who has been violent towards the mother of his children and other members of the family and who has been given custody of two children. The children are clearly unhappy. They do not speak very well, and they are still in nappies beyond the age of four. He was given custody after exerting undue influence on the courts over a mother who is completely blameless. As a Member of this House for 16 years and a councillor for many years before, I have rarely come across a case of such injustice. Despite all those difficulties, I hope that the Minister, who has shown that he is interested and sympathetic, can be of help.

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

I want to put it formally on the record that I thank the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) for bringing this case to the House’s attention. I also speak on behalf of my constituent, Adrian Alexander, who is the brother of Beth Schlesinger. Adrian and I had cause to visit the ambassador at the Austrian embassy and we discussed the case with him. I came away with the feeling that even the ambassador was confused about some of the details, particularly about the recent judgment in which there was no recitation of the facts of the case. If we could at least establish what we are dealing with, we could seek some kind of resolution. As I have said, I want to place it formally on the record, on behalf of Beth’s family, that we thank the hon. Gentleman for bringing this matter to the House tonight.

[Graham Stringer]

As I explained to the House, we are not just talking about Beth’s family. There has been concern throughout the world. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his thanks.