Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

Labour believes that new nuclear has an important supporting role to play in the energy mix, alongside the decisive shift to renewables that we need to deliver the climate transition and secure our energy security. As set out by the Climate Change Committee, we need all the low-carbon power sources at our disposal to deliver the rapid and fair transition that is required.

I am sorry that the Minister, in presenting the Bill, has chosen the partisan knockabout route, rather than giving it the serious consideration that it deserves. If we want to go down that path, we can reflect on the decade of dither and delay on the Government’s part, with mixed messages from the Conservative Government on new nuclear. The result is that, after 10 years, we have one half-finished nuclear plant, which is funded by a mechanism that, as the Minister himself accepts, is quite disastrous in terms of future prices. The record of this Conservative Government on new nuclear is frankly very poor. At last we have a Bill that might rectify some of that poor performance over the last 10 years. We need to support the need to finance new nuclear. We will scrutinise this Bill to guarantee fairness for bill payers, including protecting consumers against any potential cost overruns, protecting the poorest households, and scrutinising the balance between public spending and bill payers.

It is welcome that at long last we are coming to the key issue in nuclear power, which is how we build the power stations that we seek to place in the mix of low-carbon energy for the future. We know how not to do it, as I mentioned. We have already seen from the passage of building Hinkley C, and the disappearance of many nuclear projects and programmes, that the model that the Government have long stood for—that power stations should be built entirely by the private sector, and that private-sector security can be bought by price mechanisms that grossly inflate the cost of energy to the customer in the end—is highly flawed.

We are facing a last-chance saloon for new nuclear build that requires us to throw away those principles and start again, because most of the programme of new nuclear power stations that the Government have been envisaging over the past 10 years has been washed away. As late as 2018, there were possibly three consortia actively pursuing an interest in building five new nuclear power stations. These have progressively fallen by the wayside. Consortia have fallen apart, companies with an interest in financing projects have pulled out, and we are now left with one proto-consortium—effectively just EDF—building Hinkley C and with active plans to build a new power station at Sizewell. It is not only an active interest. Sizewell is designed to be effectively a clone of the plant that is currently being built so that it can start to build as Hinkley completes its construction phase and the workforce currently undertaking construction at Hinkley can transfer to the building of its clone at Sizewell.

We ought to add two other factors that will have a substantial bearing on how we proceed with building plants—or in this instance, a plant, because that is all we have under consideration right now. First, the consortium proposing to build Sizewell is not exactly champing at the bit to finance it. EDF has effectively mortgaged itself to the hilt in financing 65% of Hinkley C and has stated unequivocally that it is not about to do the same with Sizewell C. Secondly, we still have the arrangement in place concluded by the then Chancellor George Osborne to arrange a fast track into the heart of our nuclear programme for the China National Nuclear Corporation via a Secretary of State’s investment agreement to help fund Hinkley C power station to the tune of 35% of the upfront capital; 20% of the second in the EDF consortium’s programme, Sizewell C; and the big prize for the Chinese—control of the financing, build and running of a third nuclear power station at Bradwell in Essex, which is now unlikely, to the point of impossible, to happen.

It is likely that the Chinese will not be able to get their hands on a real nuclear power station all of their own and they will not be investing into 20% of Sizewell—indeed, the Government seem to have set aside £1.7 billion in the Budget to buy out their interest in Sizewell C. Labour has long warned that the Government are playing a dangerous game when they outsource the funding of critical national infrastructure to foreign Governments. We are now seeing the results of a decade of Conservative Governments doing exactly that, and mostly failing to get anywhere. There we have it in terms of the UK’s nuclear programme for the foreseeable future—only one plant in prospect for a start before the late 2020s.

[John Redwood]

The shadow Minister is very thoughtful on these matters. How much standby capacity does he think we need to back up the wind and solar that will be the majority of our generation in due course?

[Dr Whitehead]

Interestingly, the Climate Change Committee, which has looked into this matter in great depth, considers that in the overall long-term future make-up of our energy mix, about 8 to 10 gigawatts of standby power—therm power—is likely to be required in the shape of new or existing nuclear power stations. That is about the size of the difference with an overwhelmingly renewable but variable economy, with elements of firm power backing it up.

I have mentioned that one plant only that would be included in the suggested 8 GW to 10 GW is in prospect for a start before the late 2020s, because every other proposal has fallen away. However, it is not financed and is probably not financeable by private capital. It is only part financeable by a state financer, with which we do not now want to do business. Let us be clear before we go any further: this Bill is about finding a formula to fund and build Sizewell C power station. Whatever its generic pretensions, that is the issue we should be concentrating on. Even so, getting that plant going would cover most of what the Climate Change Committee considers is the presence in the mix needed.

[Dr Dan Poulter (Central Suffolk and North Ipswich) (Con)]

Before the hon. Gentleman moves on from discussing the financing for Sizewell C, does he agree that it is important, when we are talking about financing, that the financing is not just in place for the build of the power station itself, but for the necessary infrastructure and mitigation measures for the local communities in the area, who will be suffering from construction traffic and the like for potentially a 12-year period?

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[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Gentleman is right to say that the build cost and financing of a nuclear power station has to include not just the obvious things that we think are associated with a nuclear power station, but all the other infrastructure around that nuclear power station and contributions to decommissioning costs. That is what we are talking about in terms of an overall financing package, and that is why a financing package has to last over the whole life, effectively, of that nuclear power station. I do not intend to move on from the financing of Sizewell C, because that is essentially what this Bill is all about. It is about all those things that the hon. Gentleman mentions, so far as that particular project is concerned.

This plant, if it goes forward—we hope it will go forward with something like this kind of financing—would cover a substantial part of what the Climate Change Committee considers necessary in the mix of low-carbon energy to drive power towards net zero by 2050. I have mentioned that it thinks about 8 GW to 10 GW of new nuclear power would be needed to complement a predominantly renewable power line-up so that firm power considerations are met, without being in such numbers that it puts the development of renewables into jeopardy. That 8 GW to 10 GW includes new nuclear power, but also the one existing power station that will probably last beyond the 2030s in Sizewell B.

Hinkley and Sizewell C together therefore would go a long way towards meeting that assessment by the end of the decade, with two 3.2 GW power stations with reactors in each, and the remaining Sizewell B power station continuing in action. It is not surprising then that we are talking about nuclear financing, which is pretty much all the Bill covers. Exam question: how do we finance an unfinanceable nuclear plant when we know we have got to do it because there is no other option? Even if we did decide to repeat the frankly disastrous device of providing a CfD for the plant at Hinkley, which is likely to produce power at twice market cost, it still would not work, because that does not solve the problem of getting investors into the plant for the lengthy period before production starts. There are ways in which nuclear finance can be sorted out.

[Jonathan Edwards]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the very considered manner in which he is presenting his case. Is there anything in his mind that would stop the UK Government using this new financing model for other technologies, such as the tidal lagoon in Swansea, or is it blatantly unfair that one technology has a very favourable financing scheme, while another technology that could provide many of the solutions that he seeks is stuck on contracts for difference?

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Member mentions tidal power. Of course, a regulated asset base system can be used for any sort of major infrastructure project—and indeed has been already, as I will come to. I do not see the discussion on that system as being about just nuclear power, but a method of funding a large infrastructure project that has certain requirements that must be met by continuous funding throughout its operation. He is right that infrastructure projects other than nuclear in the energy sector could and should be funded by that system.

The National Audit Office discussed those options when it reviewed the decision making and value for money that the CfD process for Hinkley entailed. The route adopted by the Government, after much internal wrangling and delay, is a regulated asset-based model that is essentially constructed along the lines that it has been used for already in capital projects such as Heathrow terminal 5 and the Thames Tideway project. That is, the whole project is part-funded by the proceeds of a levy on bills. The levy varies in size during different phases of the project and, in the latter phases of production, lowers or even goes negative if the project’s income exceeds the ceiling of allowable costs under RAB.

There are substantial advantages to the RAB model for making the project investable. It provides returns for investors as the project proceeds rather than at the end of it, as does the CfD model, which allows investment to be brought into the frame for the project from sources that might otherwise baulk at the timetable between investment and return. It also reduces the hurdle rate for investment in the project, thereby in theory substantially reducing the overall cost of financing the project and likely resulting in cheaper prices for the energy produced by the plant.

There are also substantial risks with RAB that need to be managed. It places the cost and risk of financing the project on the shoulders of customers, in this instance electricity bill payers, which adds to bill costs through a levy on their bills before anything has materialised. In the event of the plant not being completed, it lumbers them with bill costs without the benefit of the plant for which they have paid producing relatively cheaper electricity.

RAB also adds to the burden of bills unpredictably if the project overruns on cost or time—both of which, as we know, nuclear plant development is rather prone to. The extension of the construction period for a project, when the highest effect is felt on bills, lengthens that higher take period. An increase in cost may also cause revisions to be made to allowable costs ceilings, and hence cause heavier costs on bills.

We are in somewhat uncharted waters with a project such as Sizewell C because of its size, complexity, timescale and investment costs compared with the more modest sums and shorter timescales involved in existing RAB projects. Nuclear power stations elsewhere in the world have been funded along RAB lines, but have simply not been completed, which has left consumers with a huge bill and no benefit.

In short, we need to go into this kind of arrangement with a clear eye about the advantages and risks of a RAB model for nuclear. As far as we can, we should attempt to mitigate the risks and play up the advantages. It is workable, but only if the Government have a serious plan.

The Government have sought to alleviate at least some of the disadvantages by introducing to the Bill a special administrative regime for the project in the event of a failure of the company involved during construction. We will look carefully at those provisions, but they seem to be a useful commitment to ensure the robustness of the overall project, even if its prime developer fails to deliver. We also accept that provisions in the Bill on who may be involved in legacy and decommissioning costs will help to clarify the risks for security trustees and secured creditors.

There is much to agree with in the Bill, given the evident need to secure a mechanism that enables Sizewell C to be developed and come into production at a reasonably early date. There are measures to lower the overall cost of the project so it is investable and less price inefficient than its immediate predecessor, and to ensure that the project stays on track and delivers at the end of it. However, there are still many questions to be answered, particularly on the robustness of the RAB model under circumstances where the inevitable “optimism bias” of project costings—that candid acknowledgement comes from the Bill’s impact assessment—proves to be disadvantageous and costly to consumers who, after all, are supposed to be paying up for a benefit later on. It is important that we look at such matters carefully, with a clear eye on consumer protection, and do not just assume that the mechanism will milk customers for whatever it takes to produce an outcome in the end.

We need much greater clarity about the Government’s intentions on the difficult situation concerning Chinese investment in Sizewell. That may not be central to the Bill and the RAB model, but it is indirectly affected. The project’s overall shape will be affected by whether the Government take over the Chinese share, offer it to other investors or even calculate that RAB is a sufficiently powerful tool to enable investors easily to come in and scoop it up once the Secretary of State’s investment agreement provisions are untangled. We need to know in the Bill’s early stages what the Government will do about that and through what mechanisms.

As the Bill progresses, the Government can expect Labour’s overall support but also a proper, critical eye on aspects of the mechanisms they are adopting and a particular emphasis on protecting the people, who will either stand to benefit from a reliable power station producing needed energy at reasonable cost if it goes right or suffer grievously if it goes wrong. In other words, the customer must be first in our minds in taking such decisions, and we will stand up for them as the Bill progresses.

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[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

We now come to the wind-ups, but the shadow Minister is slightly detained.

[Dr Whitehead]

He’s gone to the loo, Mr Deputy Speaker.

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

He has, yes.

Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill (First sitting)

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

In that case, let us start with Her Majesty’s official Opposition, represented by Alan Whitehead.

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

Q Good morning. Could I start with the Sizewell C company, and could you let me know, from the point of view of the company that has been set up for the purpose of developing Sizewell C, how you view the emergence of the RAB—regulated asset base—model as a way of funding the project at Sizewell C in particular?

Julia Pyke: I think the emergence of the RAB model is very welcome. We obviously believe that the country very much needs nuclear, to support the growth of renewables and to produce electricity when the wind is not blowing and the sun is not shining. It is very important that we deliver nuclear in a way that reduces the cost to consumers to the greatest extent it can, and we believe that the RAB model is a way of doing that and enabling private finance.

A point that is not always made about the introduction of private finance is that if we want a nuclear fleet, which, you will not be surprised to hear, I believe would be a good thing, then always relying on taxpayer funding for that fleet is not necessarily going to promote the growth of a fleet, whereas getting nuclear on to a financeable footing means that the country can size the fleet to need rather than to the availability of taxpayer funding from time to time.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Mr Powell, Hitachi was very much involved with the Horizon consortium that pulled out of other nuclear plants a little while ago, which I believe was on the grounds that they could not sort out the financing of those projects. If the consortium had been offered in effect a RAB model to develop those projects, would you have had a different view?

David Powell: Just to make things clear, I represent GE Hitachi, which was helping with the technology supply for the project that Horizon and Hitachi was taking forward. Hitachi was one of the main participants in trying to push forward the project at Wylfa, and I think that one of the big issues was the project’s financing aspects. It takes considerable time and a lot of effort to build two large-scale reactors, and I think that the RAB model could have helped. Obviously that is history now, and we would have to go back and look at that, but I think it would have helped at least in being able to move forward with the project.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Mr Waite, Westinghouse is the owner of Springfields Fuels.

Michael Waite: That is correct.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q I think Springfields has a series of difficulties in the continuation of its nuclear fuel and nuclear rods business. What difference would the construction of Sizewell C make to its viability as a future supplier of nuclear fuel rods and associated activities for the UK market and, indeed, the international market?

Michael Waite: As you say, Springfields has been fuelling the majority of the UK’s nuclear fleet for almost 75 years. It is the exclusive supplier to the advanced gas-cooled reactor fleet, which will all have retired by the end of this decade. Whether Sizewell C moving forwards under a RAB would mean a supply of fuel from Springfields has yet to be determined. From a Westinghouse perspective, we see RAB as part of the solution for enabling further nuclear projects after Sizewell C. Certainly, the 2035 zero-carbon targets for the electricity generation sector require there to be further projects., If we could start a project at Wylfa and deliver our AP1000 technology under RAB, that would absolutely take its fuel from Springfields for the life of the facility and secure the life of the plant.

[Anthony Browne (South Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

Q I am interested in the allocation of risk between companies and consumers. Obviously, one of the problems with the contracts for difference model is that you bear the construction risk, the political risk and so on, whereas with the RAB model you do not. If there are cost overruns, is there a risk that the consumer ends up paying for it rather than you and that you do not have the right incentives to control costs?

Julia Pyke: The first thing I would say is that, of course, it is very important that the developer remains incentivised to minimise construction spend consistent with building safely and to time. The introduction of the RAB model will enable Sizewell to move ahead, so, primarily for consumers, not only will they need the electricity that Sizewell can produce but electricity bills will reduce when it comes on, because the alternatives to nuclear as the producer of electricity when the wind is not blowing and so on will cost more. Overall it will reduce consumer bills. It is, as you say, very important that we get the incentive regime right so that, although risk is shared with consumers, developers are always incentivised.

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[Alun Cairns]

Thank you.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Ms Pyke, you mentioned that you are basically responsible for getting the money in for Sizewell C. What hurdle rate do you anticipate that the investments will come in at as a result of RAB?

Julia Pyke: RAB is designed to attract low-cost capital, and the cost of capital will be set competitively. We anticipate a competition, which should drive down the cost of capital, between equity investors. We also anticipate that the cost of debt, which will actually be the majority cost of the project, will be set competitively. We do not have a hurdle rate, and deciding that hurdle rate will obviously be in part a matter for Government in terms of what will offer value for money. The Government’s impact assessment talks about example hurdle rates and we anticipate that the return will be somewhere in the region of the Thames Tideway tunnel rate, plus possibly some premium for it being nuclear, which is a novel asset class for private sector money in the UK.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q You have absolutely correctly drawn attention to the impact assessment, which as you know projects a number of hurdle rates that could transpire below the 9% that is effectively the implied rate for Hinkley C. The calculations for the difference between what would have happened with a CfD as opposed to RAB depend on what hurdle rate comes out as a result of that. I wonder if you are able to give us any better indication of the area the hurdle rate is likely to fall to as a result of RAB being applied to the investments you are seeking?

Julia Pyke: We think the relevant rates to look at are the rates that are currently determined by Ofgem for investors in the £200 billion of existing UK regulated assets. That is the range that we anticipate will be relevant.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Which is what?

Julia Pyke: As the Government have put in their impact assessment, you can run this at percentages over inflation that equate to the existing market in investing in RAB. I do not want to suggest a particular number—that would not be appropriate, because we are going to set the cost of capital competitively—but you can see the ranges that the Government have used, which they have based on the evidence of what is invested today in RAB assets.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Yes, but they have used that with what the impact assessment calls an “optimism bias assumption” behind it. What is your view of the optimism bias assumptions that you might have to make about the hurdle rate you are going to get? I am sorry you are not able to give even a range of percentages this morning.

Julia Pyke: Do you mean whether I think the Government have been overly optimistic in assessing the likely cost of capital to be derived through competition? Is that your question?

[Dr Whitehead]

Q No. I take it from the impact assessment that they are trying to price in, if at all possible, what they regard as the almost inevitable optimism bias in terms of initial figures. I am afraid it is a staple of nuclear calculations that there is usually a pretty optimistic bias in the initial calculations that the project will run exactly on cost calculations and exactly on time.

Julia Pyke: I think we are talking about two things here. There is optimism bias in relation to the outturn capital costs. The Government have taken a cautious approach to applying optimism bias to the capital costs, given that we are replicating the Hinkley design, using the experienced team, and we can see the savings made in unit 2 compared with unit 1. In relation to the cost of capital, it is entirely sensible for the Government to have based their calculations on the existing market of investment in regulated asset base industries in the UK. I do not think there is an optimism bias issue around their evaluation of existing investment rates.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q But you would perhaps conclude that at least you can go to a 6% hurdle rate, if not better?

Julia Pyke: I would conclude no such thing. What investors choose to bid will be a function of how attractive the product is to the equity, what else is available in the market—it will be a whole range of considerations, but essentially it will be in the area of the existing investments in regulated assets in the UK, which are publicly available.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q I think you would appreciate that the whole question of what RAB saves over a period of time depends on that hurdle rate?

Julia Pyke: Indeed, it does depend on the hurdle rate, but—

[Dr Whitehead]

But you are not able to help us this morning.

Julia Pyke: I do not think anybody is questioning the assumption that, in moving to a RAB from a contract for difference model, the cost of capital will come down, so it will save money compared with a contract for difference model.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q But we do not know how much?

Julia Pyke: We cannot know how much, because it will be set in the future through competition.

[The Chair]

Unless any other of our colleagues have a one-minute question, we are at 10.24 am and that very neatly brings us to the end of our time. [Interruption.] I am afraid we only have one minute, Alan; one yes or no question, perhaps?

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[The Chair]

Thank you all very much for being here. We will start with Her Majesty’s loyal Opposition and Dr Whitehead.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Good morning, everybody. I would like to start with Sue. As you will know, we have had quite a lot of dialogue about Springfields nuclear fuels, the role that Springfields nuclear fuels has played in providing fuel for the UK nuclear industry, and the role that it might play in the future. Could you briefly take us through, first, the problems that Springfields nuclear fuels has at the moment and, secondly, what role you consider it might play should the Sizewell C project go ahead?

Sue Ferns: Certainly. At the moment, Springfields nuclear fuels faces a bit of a crisis, primarily due to the earlier than expected rundown and closure of the AGR—advanced gas-cooled reactor—fleet, which has been its major component of fuel manufacture, not the only but the major one. The effect of that is that from January of next year it will be producing only 55 tonnes of AGR fuel, compared with a normal load of about 200 tonnes. That obviously has implications for the workforce and it means that that plant will be operating in deficit as from January of next year.

There have been protracted discussions over the course of the year. We have seen two rounds of redundancy notices issued to the skilled and specialist staff on the site, and there is a danger, in the face of continued uncertainty, that more of those specialist skills and expertise will be lost.

I should say that fuel manufacturing is the key function of Springfields nuclear fuels but there is also much wider expertise. It provides a range of other services to the nuclear industry and is seen as a key part of the UK’s nuclear expertise. We very much fear for the future and are in active discussions with the company and Government about that.

There is both a short-term and a longer-term challenge, and a longer-term opportunity. If more nuclear power stations are constructed in the UK, we can see a good fuel load for Springfields from about 10 years’ time onwards, but the problem is that unless we solve the short-term hiatus in fuel orders, those skills and expertise will be lost and will not be easily recovered, if at all. The opportunity is for Springfields, as it was recognised in the nuclear sector deal, to continue as a centre of nuclear excellence and expertise as our unique UK fuel manufacturing capability, able to provide fuel to reactors in the UK of all types, and potentially to plants in other parts of Europe as well.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Charlotte and Simon, you have been very involved in union representation at Hinkley Point C, and in the discussions on the transfer of skills and labour from Hinkley Point C, as it progresses, to the development of Sizewell C, as it progresses in its earlier stages. What is your view on the soundness of those possible arrangements, and what sort of saving to the project as a whole might arise from that doubling up of the workforce and skills between the two nuclear plants, and indeed the cloning of one nuclear plant with another in the Sizewell C model?

Charlotte Childs: The conversations that we have had with EDF in terms of building a nuclear supply chain, and the skills required to build both of those projects, and further projects, mean that the decision on the RAB funding model, hopefully leading towards a final investment decision in the near future, creates a really great opportunity for the timelines of those projects to line up, and for the skilled workforce who are needed at Hinkley Point to just about finish what they are doing there in time to move over to Sizewell. It creates certainty for the nuclear supply chain and for those who have gone through a training programme with Hinkley.

We have negotiated some industry-leading processes to ensure that people from the local area can go from low to no qualifications into qualified trades and apprenticeships. It creates an ongoing opportunity for those people and job security that we do not generally see in the construction sector. Time is of the essence. To maximise the benefit for the nuclear supply chain and drive down costs, because it is already in place, it is imperative that those decisions are made sooner rather than later.

Simon Coop: I reiterate those points. With regard to Hinkley Point C, it is really a no-brainer to adapt those transferrable skills and move them into Sizewell C in order to ensure that costs do not spiral out of control. There is a clear model already in use that we can learn from to move into Sizewell C. The timing of that transfer is of the essence in ensuring that we do not lose the skills from one project and that we develop and move them forward into Sizewell C. Urgency is needed to move that project forward as soon as possible in order to maintain the skills from Hinkley Point at Sizewell C. Any kind of developments have to be in line with industry standards, and we also have to make sure that any misgivings or fore learnings that we establish from Hinkley Point C are clearly ironed out as we move forward to Sizewell C. The replica gives us the opportunity not just to learn from what we have done but at Sizewell C to improve and iron out any problems that we have had to maximise value for money for all vested parties.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Is it your view that the present workforce in Hinkley understand that possible process, and that they have, in principle, a willingness to relocate should that sort of model go ahead in the development of Sizewell C?

Simon Coop: The UK workforce are absolutely flexible and they are highly skilled. In construction, the same key workers with the key skills have moved to projects. I do not see that being a major problem in future construction projects. As a result of talking to the company, there are already plans to transfer the operational skills at Hinkley Point B to Hinkley Point C. Those operational skills are currently transferring and people are keen to move on and use those skills at the Hinkley Point C project. There should be no difference in terms of transfer to future construction projects.

[Alan Brown]

Q My question is to Ms Childs. I got a letter from GMB Scotland asking me as a Scottish Member of Parliament to support new nuclear projects because of the jobs that they create. I certainly understand the value of jobs because I come from a constituency where we welcome new jobs, but does the £20 billion for Sizewell C give a good enough return on the jobs created? I would argue that that money could be used to create a manufacturing process or more jobs around the UK rather than that £20 billion being spent at one location. Have those types of discussions happened within the union?

Charlotte Childs: We are a member of that organisation, so the letter you received and the policy that we have set is based on a wide-ranging discussion with our members. In response to your suggestion about investment in manufacturing, it is not a this or that situation, is it? Scotland in particular has benefited greatly from the current nuclear civil generation, and the zero carbon generated by Torness and Hunterston B have contributed to southern Scotland consistently hitting the 2030 target, working alongside other renewables like wind to provide green energy. Without heavy investment in new nuclear projects we will not reach our net zero targets, and Scotland has set itself an even more ambitious target of 2045 to reach net zero. That simply will not be possible without having a consistent and reliable baseload that is net zero in its production of energy.

Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill (Second sitting)

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Thank you very much. Dr Alan Whitehead would like to ask a question.

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

Q60 Good afternoon, Richard. I will start the questioning by asking you to reflect on your consumer protection role at Citizens Advice and how you feel that the regulated asset base arrangement protects, or otherwise, consumers and their bills. For example, I know that you made a submission to the RAB consultation when it was under way, which made a number of points about how the customer might be best protected in a RAB situation of the size of Sizewell C and about the risks that might be run as a result of dealing with a project that has so many uncertainties in cost and timing. Could you expand on that for us?

Richard Hall: Yes, certainly, Alan. There are good reasons to think that a RAB model could reduce the cost of capital associated with bringing forward new nuclear projects, but it is important to be mindful that consumers are not simply exposed to the cost of capital; they are also exposed to the volume of capital. That is relevant in the case of nuclear because nuclear projects have a track record of coming in over budget and behind schedule.

If you look at the impact assessment that the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy published alongside the Bill, it highlights that, on average, new nuclear projects of the nth of a kind—not the first reactor of a particular model to be built, but an iteration of it—have come in 20% over budget within Europe and 100% over budget worldwide since 1990. It also highlights that nuclear projects within Europe have suffered construction time overruns averaging 40% following the final investment decision. The average is 90% on a worldwide basis since 1990. This matters to consumers because, under a RAB model, unlike a contracts for difference model, they are exposed to the cost overruns and to the time overruns if they occur in a different way.

Perhaps to unpack what we mean by that, I should point out that under the CfD model that was adopted for Hinkley Point C a price is guaranteed to the developer for every megawatt-hour of output it produces, and that is inflation-linked, but consumers do not become liable to start paying those costs until the plant is operational. Those costs are pay on delivery. Consumers are not expected to pay in advance of the plant being there. Under a RAB model, consumers would start paying towards the cost of the plant from the time the construction commenced. Indeed, the Bill as it is drafted allows for that. If there are construction cost overruns, consumers will essentially be paying for a benefit in terms of a production facility that is not actually being delivered yet. That is the point about construction time issues.

On cost overrun issues, while the strike price that was agreed for Hinkley Point C appears to some commentators to be quite high, it has the advantage to consumers of being, in effect, an all-in price. If the cost of the build project escalates over time, those escalating costs will have to be met, but they would be met by the developers; they would not be met by consumers. Essentially that risks sits with investors. Under the RAB model, however, it is likely that any cost escalations would be shared between the consumers and investors. At this stage, we do not know exactly how. The BEIS consultation from the autumn of 2019 suggested that it might look at putting in place mechanical sharing factors between the developer and consumer. That means if the construction were to run under or over budget, a proportion of the benefits or additional costs would be borne by the investors and the developers, but a proportion would also be borne by consumers. On that, it is important to be aware that although the developers have some control over construction because they are in control of the overall project, consumers do not have any control over the risk. Essentially, they are the passive recipient of the risks.

In a nutshell, the concern that we have is that if a project were to come in on budget, RAB looks like a very good model potentially, but there is a strong historical track record that suggests that projects may not come in on budget. Under the RAB model, consumers may be exposed to significant cost overruns as a consequence.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Thanks very much for that. I am sure you understand, having looked at the Bill, that the mechanism that is in place at the moment for the sort of overruns you mentioned is a revision of the allowable costs. That would be at the Secretary of State’s discretion to reformulate as far as RAB was concerned. That would then follow on into additional calculated costs for consumers as the RAB was re-costed according to the overruns. Do you have any thoughts about whether that is a good enough system for the protection of overall consumer interests, or are there ways that you might want to modify that to make sure that the allowable costs ceiling that was initially set out was, indeed, either shared by developers and consumers in future or might be considered for different methods of financing should it be breached?

Richard Hall:  There is a lot in that question. I will try to unpack it if I can—there was something about methods of financing, and something about cost caps too. Regarding cost caps, the Bill envisages that there would be a funding cap essentially—a point at which, if costs escalated significantly above the expected spend, the Secretary of State would be prompted to take a decision on what should happen with those additional costs. I do not believe that the face of the Bill actually stipulates what that materiality would be, and I think it also leaves that decision very much at the Secretary of State’s discretion, so there is the potential that they could simply acknowledge that there was a problem, but continue to put those costs on to consumer bills. That seems to be fairly vague: it leaves room for ambiguity on what a Secretary of State might do in that type of scenario in future.

A couple of things could be done to try to mitigate consumer costs. The first is that the sharing factors that are set out—they are not set out in the Bill; they are to be agreed between the Department and the developer, as to who bears the costs if there are significant cost overruns—should be slanted towards the developer facing most of those costs. Again, that is because consumers have no ability to control those costs whatsoever, whereas the developer does have the ability to control some of those costs. Effectively, that risk needs to be borne as much as possible by the developer. It should be borne in mind that, obviously, that creates some interactions with the cost of capital: effectively, the more you de-risk the developer, the more you reduce the cost of capital, but given that you are only doing that by pushing those risks on to consumers, we think it is probably better to ensure that the developers are subject to as sharp incentives as possible to build it on time.

Turning to the other areas that I think would be of assistance, the Bill envisages that the developer would have a right to appeal any decisions that Ofgem made on the price control that had been agreed for the developer. Intuitively, those appeals are only going to go in one direction—that is, if the developer feels that a settlement is not generous enough to it. It is hardly going to appeal if it feels a settlement is too generous. I notice that elsewhere, in terms of many aspects of energy governance, where appeals processes exist, they are bidirectional: they allow for someone to appeal that a settlement is too tough, but they also allow for people to appeal that a settlement is too weak. We think that type of approach should be followed here: if the developer has the right of appeal to basically ask for more money, other interested parties should have the right of appeal to argue that there should be less money, so there is bidirectional scrutiny and tension there.

A second area in which I think we could help to bear down on costs is that it is quite important that some form of independent third-party impact assessment is made of the key terms of any deal that is agreed under this Bill, and published before that agreement becomes legally binding. I would also like parliamentarians such as yourselves to have an opportunity to see the headline terms of any agreement and that independent third-party impact assessment, and to be able to scrutinise those costs before the agreement becomes legally binding. If that seems like it might be quite an unusual thing to do, because obviously Parliament does not micromanage individual infrastructure purchases, we would argue that it is justified in this case, because we are talking about building assets that will—even at the most conservative estimate—cost consumers tens of billions of pounds, and those costs will be recovered from consumers for potentially 50 or 60 years.

[Dr Whitehead]

Thank you.

[Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)]

Q Richard, you have spoken with great insight about the balance between the advantages of the RAB model and the risks that come with it for consumers, and also about how those consumers might be better protected. Will you give the Committee your take on what we have learned from those infrastructure projects that have benefited from a RAB funding model, such as Thames Tideway or Heathrow terminal 5? Was the peak of costs on consumers within the estimated range at the start of the project, leaving aside cost and time overruns? How accurately can you predict the peak cost for consumers and ensure that it comes within a set range, if—as may be the case—amendments to protect consumers are not ultimately adopted? How accurate is the forecasting of the total impact on consumer bills?

Richard Hall: On those two specific projects, Heathrow and Thames Tideway, I cannot give any insight. I am not particularly close to those individual cases. It is fair to note that in both cases the cost of capital brought forward by the model seems to have been low, in particular in the case of Thames Tideway. On nuclear, I simply go back to the point that there is a large base of literature looking at historical cost overruns and the extent to which things come in on budget. That tends to display fairly consistently that these types of projects are very likely to be subject to optimism bias at the time that they are procured—a belief that they will be cheaper than they actually will be.

In addition to the costs and dates I mentioned from the BEIS impact assessment suggesting the average levels of cost overruns, look at a couple of other examples from academia: Sovacool et al. looked at a global example of 180 new nuclear plants and found that 97% of them came in over budget and that the average cost overrun was 117%; and Flyvbjerg et al. found that in a sample of 194 nuclear plants, the median cost overrun was 68% and the median schedule or construction-time overrun was 40%. That is a fairly large sample set of projects, and the analysis tends to suggest considerable optimism bias for new nuclear—it tends to come in late and over budget.

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[The Chair]

I think this will be the last question to the witness.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Richard, you said earlier that under a CfD model, consumers do not pay anything regardless of overruns other than what they committed to pay through the CfD strike price, whereas in a RAB model, as we have discussed, they are committed to paying throughout the process and may well incur additional costs under a cost ceiling increase. In the impact assessment, it appears that the difference in the cost under a CfD model and under a RAB model was calculated on the basis of consumers paying in full for overruns through a CfD model. Do you agree that that is perhaps not an accurate way of putting it? If so, what sort of difference will that make to the suggestions of the savings between the two models put forward in the impact assessment?

Richard Hall: Yes, certainly. Paragraph 4.2 of the impact assessment sets out a range of tables showing what the estimated construction and financing costs would be for a Hinkley Point C-sized power station in a range of scenarios: under a CfD with 20% cost overruns, or with 100% overruns, or under the RAB model at various different costs of capital—

[The Chair]

Order. I am afraid that that brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank you very much, Mr Hall.

Examination of Witnesses

Chris Ball, Dawn James, Cameron Gilmour and Alan Woods gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Q Cameron, I see you nodding. Is there anything you want to add?

Cameron Gilmour: I am largely in agreement. I will reinforce Alan’s point about the need for certainty, where any developer or investor needs a programme. When we create a programme, whether it is gigawatt-sized or SMRs, we create that confidence, the continuity of resources, and then we start to see the efficiencies flow through in the programme as we deliver them, whether it is factory or site construction.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Mr Woods, you mentioned your timescale for the delivery of the first of their kind of SMRs, which I presume will be the 470 MW Rolls-Royce SMR. That, as a matter of interest, is well above the International Atomic Energy Agency definition of an SMR. Why did you chose that particular size to develop?

Alan Woods: We actually challenged the IAEA on its definition. The response we got was that, at the time it defined an SMR, that was halfway between what it classed as a medium reactor and a small reactor. There was no set rationale for why it classified, and it was many years ago, that 300 MW. The simple reason that ours is 470 MW is that we set a requirement on the design to be road transportable. Each module has to be transportable to site by road. That gives us maximum site flexibility. It also removes the need for expensive additional infrastructure, such as new port facilities or new roads, to get the parts in.

Having set the size for the biggest module to be road transportable, the biggest limitation across Europe is about a diameter of 4.5 metres for the biggest module. If we set that as the maximum size for our reactor pressure vessel, that gives us an internal diameter and an internal volume for that pressure vessel. Using conventional available fuel that is made today in the UK and elsewhere, that sets the power that we can get out of that pressure vessel, so we need to design around that power.

The objective that we had, which was set by the utility partners we have worked and continue to work with, was that they want the maximum power for the least capital cost. We are therefore delivering that within the constraint of road transportability.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Does the new reactor that that would involve have to go through the generic testing and approval process?

Alan Woods: Yes; all new plants that come to the UK have to go through the generic design assessment process. We put in our application to enter that process last week.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q How long do you estimate that process will take?

Alan Woods: Our next phase of the programme is for the next three and a half to four years, which will get us to the end of GDA step 2. That is the point at which we have completely de-risked it—not that we see any risk to going through the regulation, because as I said, this is proven technology power plant. We have already been working with the regulator for some time. At that point, we move to the final step, which is step 3, and that will take about another 18 months.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q That means your actual construction period at the end of that will be about four years.

Alan Woods: We would actually start building ahead of that, because the GDA process allows us to prioritise the longer-lead items, the critical items, up front. We validate those with the Office for Nuclear Regulation early, on the basis that we can then get a release to order to accelerate the manufacturing process. We can do some of that activity in parallel by the way that we sequence the assessment through the GDA activity.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q So it is just about possible by the early 2030s if all these things work together.

Alan Woods: No, it is eminently possible by the 2030s; it is very doable.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Mr Ball, you mentioned the availability of engineers and the possibility of transferring skills and expertise between sites to save costs and time. What timetable is likely to be best for that transition to take place in the best way between Hinkley C and Sizewell C? We have heard talk already about a window in which that needs to be done, so that you have the maximum engineering skills and capacity coming in at certain stages in the Sizewell C plant, and coming off the Hinkley C plant as it develops its own stages. What risk does that entail along the way if there is a delay in getting the latter stages of Hinkley C together? What overall window would that represent?

Chris Ball: If we work on the basis that Hinkley C is on line in let’s call it five years from now, we would have an issue if we held back over that time and thought that we then just move across. Naturally, within any project there is a phasing—there is a phasing of skills which means that we need to maintain a continuity almost at a lower level in terms of the breakdown of those skills. In my own organisation we currently have of the order of 600 people mobilised on Hinkley Point C. At this point in time, that is largely connected with civil engineering, civil design, design of structures, and that positions us quite clearly in a good position for future export markets. Those skills start to demobilise 12 months from now. Naturally in any major project such as this, civil engineering design is one of the earlier phases of the project. We will start to demobilise those skills 12 months from now, if not sooner, and you would probably say that we would demobilise three quarters of that skills base over the course of the subsequent 18 months. We are talking of a one year to two and a half year period over which we would be demobilising three quarters of our workforce, and taking skills out of the industry.

We would look at other neighbouring industries that have a demand on common skills bases to ensure that we maintain employment where possible, but it still represents a loss of capability from the industry that we may or may not be able to bring back in at some future point. That 12-month period from now is what is high on our mind.

[Dr Whitehead]

So that is the window, essentially?

Chris Ball: Yes.

[Virginia Crosbie]

Q If there was no RAB nuclear financing model, what would that mean for our energy security, delivering net zero by 2050 and our dependence on overseas investment?

Alan Woods: Chris made the point earlier that net zero is such an enormous challenge. We often think about decarbonisation in the context of the grid, but the grid in the UK in particular represents about 20% of the total energy we use. The rest of it is heat and transport. As we look to decarbonise heat and transport, there are not that many routes available, certainly in some of them. Hydrogen is one, synthetic fuels is one and of course more electrification, but the common denominator among all of those is that you need more clean electricity. The scale is enormous. We therefore welcome any financing mechanism that will help any industry, not just the nuclear industry, bring forward those clean technologies, because the reality is that we have to have them if we are going to meet net zero.

The implications if we are not innovative with how we approach financing both in nuclear but also in other industries mean that we become dependent on other sources of technologies—imported technologies financed from overseas, which bring with them the whole dependency on other nations for our critical energy infrastructure. Increasing that dependency puts our ability to meet net zero at more and more risk.

Chris Ball: I will take a step back here. Earlier, I mentioned that there is a need for about 9 GW a year of construction to take place each year for the next 30 years. We need to find a way of building everything we possibly can in a way that is most cost-effective for the consumer. In every single area, there will be challenges for us to overcome.

People talk about offshore wind at £40 per megawatt-hour strike price. Actually, when it comes to the last two offshore wind farms—one up in East Anglia and one in Hornsea—one was at about £120 and one at £140 a megawatt-hour initial strike price. I recognise that offshore wind prices have been coming down; that is because of consistent underpinning Government policy. We have to replicate that in each and every one of these areas.

Just because offshore wind prices have come down, does not mean that they will continue to do that; they will reach a plateau and companies will start to go to deeper waters and floating offshore wind prices will pick up. We are also judging things on an old-fashioned measure of the levelised cost of electricity, but for renewables we need to start building in the cost of energy storage as well. That does not come cheap. There is a lot of talk about hydrogen, but that requires a lot of power. For every electron that goes into generating hydrogen, we might get 0.3 electrons back out again; it is not a one for one. That is quite often lost in the debate. Actually, I am a supporter of all these technologies; what I am saying is that we need to look at how we manage those risks.

Net zero will not be achieved without nuclear. From an engineering perspective, the system requires firm power on the grid. The RAB model is a good way of driving forward large-scale nuclear for the benefit of the consumer. Look at the levelised cost of electricity at, let us say, £40 per megawatt-hour for wind, noting my earlier comment, and add the storage costs; if you compare that with nuclear and the RAB model, the prices are very similar. Obviously, Alan also knows the SMR nuclear market very well and would say that, yes, it is similar there.

It worries me that if we do not find a way of pushing all these technologies forward, including carbon capture and sequestration and the technical challenges around that, the risk of failure for the 2050 net zero system is very high.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Thank you very much for attending, all of you. Could Members please indicate to me whether they have any questions to the panel? Dr Alan Whitehead.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Good afternoon, Tom—I ought to explain that I have known Tom Greatrex for a very long time, and we go back a long way on a number of these issues. What was your reaction to the proposals that came forward about Chinese involvement in the nuclear programme, particularly in Sizewell C, and what views does the Nuclear Industry Association have about their continued involvement and its effect on Sizewell C funding overall?

Tom Greatrex: Apologies, but I missed part of the question; it cut off partway through, but I think I got the gist in relation to Chinese investment in UK nuclear. I think that is what you were asking about—is that correct?

[Dr Whitehead]

Yes, basically.

Tom Greatrex: You will recall, I am sure, the original arrangements that were made to facilitate Chinese investment in UK nuclear. China General Nuclear, who are currently the minority financial shareholder in Sizewell C, are also a member of the Nuclear Industry Association and have a potential project at Bradwell. In terms of technology, it is very clear that any reactor technology has to go through the same process to be approved, and that is done independently by the Office for Nuclear Regulation. I do not think there is any difference in the thoroughness of that approach, wherever the technology comes from.

However, making decisions on the larger geopolitical issues is, I am afraid, way above my current—or ever anticipated—pay grade. As far as I am concerned and as far as the industry is concerned, Chinese companies have significant expertise in nuclear capacity and have built quite a lot of nuclear capacity, working with different reactor designs in China. Whether, and to what extent, they should be involved in the UK is not really for me to express a view on.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q I presume the Nuclear Industry Association has been informed of the decisions that were reached in the recent Budget about funding that has been put aside in the Red Book—£1.7 billion for works leading to a financial closure of the Sizewell C plant. Did you have any input into the procurement of that £1.7 billion and what is your understanding of its purpose?

Tom Greatrex: In terms of that funding being available, for a number of years, the Nuclear Industry Association and companies that we represent have made representations to Government about the costs associated with large-scale projects prior to getting to final investment decision. Significant amounts of money were spent on projects that have not happened during that process, and that pre-development funding is something that needed to be considered.

As to what that announcement covers, we have asked Government for further information on that. At the moment the information we have is that that is funding that could be available to a range of different projects and opportunities, but nothing specific. In relation to what I think was your implied question, on whether this is instead of buying out the CGN stake in Sizewell, it has not been made clear to us that that is what it is for.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Forgive me for being a little surprised, but the Nuclear Industry Association does not know any more than the rest of us about what this funding is supposed to be for. Is that right?

Tom Greatrex: Yes, we have had the announcements and spoken to officials about the announcements, but we do not have any more detail than is currently available.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Not a happy state of affairs, is it?

Tom Greatrex: Well, I hope that there will be clarity on that and other aspects of what has been announced by the Government in recent announcements as we proceed.

[Anthony Browne]

Q I have a simple, open question for all three of you. You all run trade associations, effectively, and you will have gone through the Bill in detail and looked at what you like and do not like. Are there any gaps in it? Are there any things you think should be in there that are not in there? We heard earlier, for example, about how, if there are overruns, you allocate the risk between consumers and investors and construction companies. That is obviously not covered in this Bill, but what gaps do you think there are?

Tom Greatrex: The Bill sets out a framework for a mechanism that we as the industry welcome. We think it is very important to be able to facilitate development of new projects. There are levels of detail that are not covered in the primary legislation, and I think you have touched on some of those in relation to exactly how aspects of risk sharing will be undertaken and the role of the regulator, which will be Ofgem—the expertise available to that body, and the fact that transitioning into being able to undertake what is effectively a new role is going to be significantly important. I am not sure those would necessarily be in the primary legislation, but there are aspects of this where there will need to be further information and development before a regulated desktop-based model can be used for nuclear development.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Mr Schneider, are you able to tell us anything about the experience in the United States of using RAB arrangements for nuclear plant development? I am thinking in particular of the two plants in South Carolina that were abandoned a little while ago but which I understand were funded partly through the RAB process, by consumers in South Carolina. Would you advocate measures to ensure that nuclear plants actually get finished and do not dump on the customer, who has already put in their money, a load of the cost that is never realised because there is no output?

Mycle Schneider: Yes, I can briefly comment. I think you are referring to the V.C. Summer plant in South Carolina. It had a similar scheme to RAB, which basically allowed it to pass on cost overruns to electricity customers. Construction started in 2013. Westinghouse was the technology provider. The plants were supposed to come online in 2017. By 2017, the cost estimate had increased by 75%, and I believe that there were nine rate increases for ratepayers up to that point. Finally, in July 2017 the construction was abandoned. Obviously, this was one of the consequences of the fact that Westinghouse filed for bankruptcy, and one of the main reasons for that was the V.C. Summer AP1000 project.

It might be interesting for the Committee to spend some time studying this case because it also involved some very problematic criminal activity. The federal grand jury has charged the former senior vice-president of Westinghouse Electric Company, Jeffrey A. Benjamin, for his role in failing to report accurately the status of the construction of these nuclear sites. It is worth noting that he served as senior vice-president for new plans and major projects, and was therefore directly responsible for all new projects worldwide for Westinghouse during the period of the V.C. Summer project. He has been charged in a federal indictment with 16 felony counts,

“including conspiracy, wire fraud, securities fraud, and causing a publicly-traded company to keep a false record.”

That is a quote from the Justice Department. He is only one of four top managers who had criminal charges filed against them in this affair. The former chief executive officer of SCANA, the utility that was building the plant, pleaded guilty to federal felony charges and was sentenced to two years in jail, which will start in December. The case had major implications.

Obviously, the ratepayer is left with the ruins of concrete and steel, and with no kilowatt-hours. Apparently, reportedly this affair is not over. It has cost the ratepayers billions, and reportedly it will cost more over the 20 years to come.

[The Chair]

A number of Members want to ask questions, so could we keep them as short as possible?

Professor Thomas: I wanted to add that what marked out the Summer project and a similar project in Georgia from those in all other states of the United States was that they were allowed to recover money from consumers before completion of the plant. That is a central feature of the RAB proposal. The Summer experience shows clearly the folly of making consumers pay for a plant before it is complete.

We have to be careful with the idea that we need to take measures to prevent unfinished plants from being abandoned. We have a very good example in Britain in the Dungeness B plant: it took 24 years to get from start of construction to commercial operation, and over its 32 years of operating life, its availability was well below 50%. It is very clear that the plant should have been abandoned before it was completed.

[The Chair]

Doug, do you have any comments?

Doug Parr: I am not sure that I have much to add. I read that the Summer plant added 18% to bill payers’ bills in South Carolina at one point, which is obviously a very considerable amount. I am not saying that those numbers are translatable to the UK context. It chose to expose the consumer to those considerable risks.

The Government really need some kind of independent evidence base for their judgments if they are going to enter bilateral negotiations with a plant builder who, on the basis of the plant builder’s word, can expose consumers to very considerable risks; Dr Schneider alluded to that. We see that with the RAB mechanism, the Government have a bilateral negotiation mechanism, and those do not have a happy history in almost any sector, including for the various networks. I am not quite sure how you establish that.

One thing that has been missing from nuclear policy as it applies to renewables and other mechanisms, such as the capacity mechanism, is the element of competition. The information asymmetry is potentially very strong. It gives a lot of cards to the nuclear seller—the nuclear provider—without giving the Government any backstop with regard to understanding what is going on. When there is competition via a reverse auction of the kind that we find in renewables, you factor those risks out, but consistently over the years—decades, in fact—this kind of discipline has not been applied to nuclear policy. With the RAB-type mechanism, those risks potentially land on the bill payer, not the provider of nuclear stations.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q This question is for Stephen and Doug. In the Bill, there is a mechanism to put a special administration regime in place if the constructor of the project defaults or is unable to complete it at any stage. Is that mechanism sufficient to enable us to overcome the sort of issues that we have heard about with the American nuclear plants, or are there other things that need to be done, particularly in the light of what Doug said about the lack of independent assessment, at particular stages, of what ought to be done next, and how progress ought to be made?

Doug Parr: I am not sure that I am across the detail enough to give a good answer to that one, I’m afraid. I would need to come back to the Committee on that, if that is all right.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q Stephen, do you have any views on that?

Professor Thomas: I think the problem is not the need for a special administrative regime to rescue things if it all goes badly wrong in the construction phase. I think the problem is the RAB mechanism that is putting consumers’ money at risk, and if we look at the impact assessment, we are looking at a plant that will not be completed until something like 2037 to 2041, so I will be paying into this plant for quite a long time and I probably will not live long enough to see any power from it. The special administrative regime is a way to try to solve a problem that is better solved by simply not using this RAB mechanism.

[Anthony Browne]

Q If we are in an existential crisis of climate change—if it is the biggest threat that we face as a species—should we not use every tool in the toolbox to combat it? Why would you rule one of them out? That is a question for Doug Parr first, and then Mycle Schneider.

Doug Parr: I do not think I have ever made any secret of the fact that there are attendant risks that come with nuclear that do not apply to other forms of zero-carbon and low-carbon generation. What I would ask, in the light of the climate crisis—it is not an insignificant challenge that you have put there—is why UK Governments of all colours have continued to emphasise nuclear policy over and above other ways of cutting emissions. For example, the last time I saw figures on Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy civil servants and where they were working, there were more people working on nuclear than on renewables and clean building heat put together, so when it came to two of the big-ticket items that are going to be absolutely essential—lots of renewable power and lots of clean heat for buildings—there were fewer civil servants working on those than on nuclear.

Nuclear is a bit-part player in this. All sensible, cost-effective models show that nuclear will not be a big piece of the pie, in terms of delivering what we need to deliver, and there are considerable problems with delivering heat, as members of the Committee will know. There are some substantial issues with delivering the amount of renewable power that we need, yet what we have is a Bill for delivering nuclear, and more civil servants working on it than on other things. I emphasise that this is a distortion that has been in place over years, and it is becoming quite problematic, because every time people are working on nuclear and not working on these other things—not putting energy and money into other things—we lose our ability to deliver what we need to deliver.

Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill (Third sitting)

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 18th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. Please will you switch all your electronic devices to silent? No food or drink is permitted during sittings of the Committee, except for the water provided. I encourage Members to wear masks when they are not speaking. That is in line with Government guidance and that of the House of Commons Commission. Please give each other and members of staff space when seated, and when entering and leaving the room. Hansard colleagues will be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to [e-mail].

We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and it shows how selected amendments have been grouped together for the debate—there is one change. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same or a similar issue. Please note that decisions on amendments do not take place in the order in which they are debated, but in the order they appear on the amendment paper. The selection and grouping list shows the order of debates. Decisions on each amendment are taken when we come to the clause to which the amendment relates. Decisions on new clauses will be taken once we have completed consideration of the existing clauses of the Bill. Members wishing to press a grouped amendment or new clause to a Division should indicate when speaking to it that they wish to do so.

We will start with amendment 1 to clause 1, but first, Dr Whitehead, did you wish to talk about the change to the selection list?

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

Thank you, Ms Fovargue. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I want to say two things before we go into detailed line-by-line discussion: one is on the order in which we are debating the Bill—clause 1, clause 2 and so on. The other is to say to the Committee before we start that Her Majesty’s Opposition voted in favour of the Bill on Second Reading and, therefore, we hope that the amendments before us will be seen and discussed in that light, which is that they seek to strengthen the Bill and to address specific concerns that we have about elements, in particular the RAB—regulated asset base—process.

[The Chair]

Order. This should just be about the amendments and groupings; there can be no general statements about the Bill. Is everyone content to group amendments 1 and 2 together?

--- Later in debate ---

[Alan Brown]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairwomanship, Ms Fovargue. In my intervention, I wondered if the amendments would technically preclude EDF under the RAB scheme. I hoped that the amendments were a stalking horse for Labour to come round to our way of thinking regarding a new nuclear power station, but unfortunately, that does not seem to be the case.

That said, I support the amendments. It is crazy that decisions have not been made before now about excluding China General Nuclear from critical infrastructure. The UK Government probably acted on the back of the United States’s actions to remove Huawei from critical telecoms infrastructure, so it makes no sense that a Chinese state-operated nuclear company is allowed to participate and invest in and possibly, if it gets its way, construct a new power station at Bradwell. That makes no sense. I would like to hear what the Minister has say about that. In principle, I support the amendments, although, ideally, I would rather we were not doing new nuclear.

[Dr Whitehead]

Continuing briefly from my initial remarks, I want to make it clear that the amendments—and all our other amendments—are based on the idea that the Bill should be strengthened, not subverted in any way. I can assure the Committee that the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun’s hope that these two amendments are a stalking horse to remove EDF from the project is certainly not the intention. The intention is precisely to ensure that the nuclear programme in this country is sound, robust and integral to our security in all senses of the word.

We do not think the amendments will do anything other than put us in a much better position to ensure that the financing of nuclear is done on a clearer footing and on the basis that we know who is putting money into the project, in this instance Sizewell C. I concur with my hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich that effectively the Bill is pretty much about how Sizewell C gets going, comes to financial closure and gets into its construction period so that it produces electricity in good time for the grid.

It is important that the Committee thinks carefully right at the beginning of its proceedings about how we want to framework that nuclear financing; how we want to framework the arrangements which, after all, will be the umbrella under which we have all our other discussions in Committee. The framework that we have at the moment, particularly for Sizewell C, as my hon. Friend has set out, is a sequence of memorandums and a number of things further to memorandums, which appear to lock our nuclear development into an arrangement with the Chinese General Nuclear Power Corporation, which is very much an instrument of the Chinese state. Although companies have been set up—set up for the purpose of engaging in Hinkley—with one nominated director, given who those nominated directors are and how they go back to China it is very clear that those companies are centrally state-controlled, and are state-controlled vehicles for investment—just as we have stated in our amendment—for the promotion of that particular foreign power’s interests, in this instance in nuclear power.

Given those interests in nuclear power, it is important that we do not lose sight of the overall scheme of things in considering investment or otherwise in Sizewell C. It is important to understand that the deals, as it were, that were made between 2013 and 2016 were very much about that sequence of events leading from investment in a power station with a minority stake, with a reactor that would be built in France, within a framework of a company controlling that, that is a private company but has substantial state connections, but nevertheless is a very different model from what we are faced with regarding the CGN investment.

So there has been a sequence of events that starts with Hinkley C, with a minority stake, a French reactor and a French company with its own investment in the majority of the plant, and then a contract for difference at the end of it for production, moving to the second event in the sequence, which was envisaged at that time to be Sizewell C, with an undefined arrangement at the time for investment elsewhere in the plant, but a clear stake in that plant, beyond financial closure, of the Chinese General Nuclear Power Corporation, coming to 20%. And then would come the prize at the end of the sequence—certainly the prize for the Chinese Government—of the entry into European nuclear development for the first time of a Chinese reactor, the Hualong One. That would be the basis of a Bradwell nuclear plant. That reactor would separately go through a generic commissioning process; the initial moves towards that are being made. That reactor would then be at the core of the Bradwell plant, and Bradwell would be majority-owned, run, controlled and operated by the Chinese state nuclear corporation.

So, leading down the path of that sequence, Sizewell C being a stopping-post in that sequence and the end of it being Bradwell, is obviously the nuclear project that we are discussing at the moment. Therefore, the part-ownership of the nuclear company must be seen as integral to that overall process and that overall agreement; and if we do nothing and say nothing about that involvement, we are effectively condoning that whole sequence of agreements.

Those agreements were initially made in the form of a memorandum of understanding on civil nuclear collaboration in 2013, and effectively those stakes that I mentioned were set out then. George Osborne, the then Chancellor, stated that Chinese companies were taking a stake, including potential future majority stakes, in the development of the next generation of British nuclear power. So, it was pretty explicit, certainly from the UK Government side, what they thought that sequence was going to be about, and it was actually pretty similar to the idea that the Chinese had, as far as their involvement in nuclear was concerned.

That was followed, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the UK in 2015, by a “Statement of Cooperation in the Field of Civil Nuclear Energy”, which welcomed the minority investment and the proposal for a Chinese-led project at Bradwell B in Essex. What is less well known is that that was followed by a very lengthy document, “Secretary of State Investor Agreement”, which was primarily about investment by a number of parties, including CGN, in Hinkley but which also related to the whole sequence. It is arguable, therefore, that there is a substantial lock-on of Chinese involvement not just in 20% of Sizewell but in the whole sequence, as laid out in the various memorandums of understanding and the investment agreements undertaken between 2013 and 2016.

The question is: what are we going to do about it? The proposal is for a RAB scheme to cover the project’s investment costs. A decision will have to be made about how the RAB scheme will work and we will discuss the detail later, including how Ofgem will set out the allowable costs that form the backbone of a RAB agreement. Ofgem will have to assess the overall allowable ceiling for the project costs, particularly in its construction phase but also during its production phase. That will form the basis on which the money to meet those costs will be taken in from the general bill-paying public. The ceiling for those allowable costs will be determined to a considerable extent by how much investment is likely to be required and, therefore, how much of it will have to be underpinned by the RAB arrangement at the Sizewell plant. If a substantial part of the plant is to be financed by the China General Nuclear Power Corporation, then logically the allowable costs would relate to the rest of the required investment, rather than all of it. Crucially, the decisions and discussions that this Committee is going to enter into will be determined by what that 20% consists of.

The Red Book offers a tantalising clue as to what that might be. As my hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich said, a total of three lines focus on the £1.7 billion of new direct Government funding being made available, essentially for the Sizewell C project. He said that the Red Book is possibly wilfully obscure; it is certainly obscure, and for a number of reasons. All the Budget and spending review document has to say about the £1.7 billion Government funding is that it is being provided

“to take a final investment decision this Parliament, subject to value for money and approvals.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Hands]

To be fair, I also listened carefully to Sizewell C’s evidence, and the company will be as aware as we are that this is an active negotiation. I was not in any way surprised that Sizewell C’s representative did not wish to be drawn on the question of exactly where the £1.7 billion would be deployed. We have outlined in the Budget document the sorts of areas that would be in scope. None the less, this is an active financial negotiation.

[Dr Whitehead]

Does that mean that the evidence that was given to us in our session with Sizewell C was not correct, or was ill-informed? Or was it informed, but matters have moved on since then? Or was it—

[Mark Fletcher (Bolsover) (Con)]

Diplomatic.

[Dr Whitehead]

Was it, indeed, as the hon. Member for Bolsover suggests from a sedentary position, diplomatic? If so, was that diplomatic answer given after any sort of instigation from the Government, or was it just diplomatic on the basis that Sizewell C did not want to tell us?

[Greg Hands]

I do not think the hon. Gentleman is correct. It is not fair to conclude that the evidence from Sizewell C was incorrect, or that it was ill-informed in any other way. This is an active commercial negotiation. We have laid out the parameters of the £1.7 billion, and is in no way surprising that our negotiation partners may not wish to comment on what they think it is likely to be spent on. After all, it is taxpayers’ money, which will be deployed by this Government to move forward a nuclear project.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Hands]

As I have made clear, we think that the Bill adequately addresses these issues, particularly in combination with the National Security and Investment Act, so I do not see it as necessary for us to make any further clarification. Ultimately, the Bill is about bringing in more financial options for future nuclear power, not cutting them.

The hon. Member asked about Bradwell. To reiterate, that is not a decision for now. CGN does not have regulatory approval for its reactor, nor has it submitted any applications to build a nuclear plant in Essex. We are in negotiations for Sizewell C, as the most advanced nuclear project in the UK.

[Dr Whitehead]

I am afraid the Minister cannot have it both ways. Either the Bill is about financing Sizewell C or it is about financing nuclear power more generally, in which case Bradwell surely has to come into the equation. We could be committing today to a RAB model that could, in principle, help to fund Bradwell, if it goes ahead. It is part of the linked sequence that has already been agreed in heads of terms by the UK Government and the Chinese Government, effectively. He says that it is not a discussion for today, but that is true only if the Bill is just about Sizewell C, in which case his statement that the Bill is potentially about other things is not correct. Which is it?

Although the Bill is effectively about financing Sizewell C, it has implications elsewhere. The Minister says that it is not relevant because the Hualong reactor does not yet have generic approval. That is not a question of making a decision about the involvement of foreign powers or anything like that; whether the reactor gets generic approval for use in UK nuclear markets is just a technical issue. I presume that he would want the nuclear authority to take that line and to give approval, or not, on the technical merits of the Hualong reactor, not on who is running it. That is the issue, however, concerning Bradwell. It has nothing to do with generic commissioning or otherwise; it is a much bigger issue, and he needs to recognise that.

[Greg Hands]

The hon. Member is correct that this is about future nuclear projects, but I stress two things. The original question from the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich was about the future of Bradwell. I am reflecting on the specifics in relation to Bradwell. Of course, nuclear projects going forward are what the Bill is all about, but I will not comment on specific projects potentially going into a RAB process, because that, as we will discover later, is a properly defined process, set out with approvals from the Secretary of State after consultations. The Secretary of State will make essentially two determinations: will the project provide value for money, and is it sufficiently advanced? It would not be proper to comment on whether a specific project that we discuss today will have the ability in future to meet the two most important criteria laid out in the Bill.

Let me say a few extra things about amendment 2. The legislation gives the Secretary of State the power to designate a nuclear company and to modify the company’s licence subsequently to include RAB conditions. The Bill requires the Secretary of State to consider the two criteria that I just mentioned when deciding whether to designate a nuclear project. The two criteria are that the development of a project is sufficiently advanced to justify the designation and that the project is likely to result in value for money.

The amendments seek to include additional criteria for the Secretary of State to consider before designating a project. As I said, amendment 2 requires that a nuclear company may not be owned by a foreign power. I have already raised concerns about the unintended consequences of that for our ability to pursue new nuclear projects in this country.

--- Later in debate ---

Division 1

Ayes: 5

---

Labour: 4
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 8

---

Conservative: 8

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 2, page 2, line 14, at end insert—

“(c) the Secretary of State is of the opinion that the nuclear company is able to complete the nuclear project.”

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to give a view that a designated nuclear company is able to complete the project for which it is designated.

I am grateful to you, Ms Fovargue, for grouping amendment 3 on its own so that we can talk about it in its own right. Like the previous amendment, it seeks to add into the clause the designation of a nuclear company. We have not talked about the designation process, although I am sure we will.

The designation process is where a nuclear company that appears to have an interest in a plant, and has at least taken some steps to develop it beyond the conceptual state, is then given a preferential initial contract and a window—again, we will discuss the timescale of the window later—where it goes through the various processes of modifications of its licence to set itself up to take part in a RAB. It agrees to various things relating to the counterparty in the RAB process and agrees the initial ceiling for allowable costs for the project, which it has at the time of designation brought to a position where work can start to proceed. It is therefore on a track, but not in the RAB process at that point.

We attempted to put a third designation criterion in the clause a moment ago, which states that the designation criteria are that

“the development of the nuclear project is sufficiently advanced to justify the designation of the nuclear company”.

In other words, the project is more than just a drawing board idea. As I am sure the Minister will be painfully aware, we have had a plethora of nuclear projects in this country at various stages of advancement that have fallen by the wayside for various reasons. Some of them were relatively advanced and some were just concepts, but they were all reflected in the original planning documentation in, I think, 2011 in terms of consortia and sites and various other things that were given an overall green light in the planning process. The sites were not designated in the sense we are considering here, for nuclear development, but it is certainly true that a number of the projects suggested for those sites would not have passed the designation test before us today on the work having been done to advance the project.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alan Brown]

I understand where the hon. Gentleman is going, but where is the fall-back?. The Secretary of State is desperate to get a nuclear deal signed off, so he just signs it off: “Yes, I am of the opinion that this project will be completed.” Ten years down the line, it all falls apart and the project cannot be completed, a bit like the Californian example. What protection would the amendment introduce? It seems that the Secretary of State can just sign this off based on his opinion. If there are repercussions down the line, they do not come back on that Secretary of State.

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Member makes an important point, at least part of which we will discuss when we come to the procedures under which a potentially failed project might be rescued or transferred to other undertakings so that it can be delivered and completed, or if already operating, can continue to operate.

[Dr Jamie Wallis (Bridgend) (Con)]

In what circumstances is it conceivable that a nuclear project would be deemed not to have a realistic prospect of completion but at the same time to be value for money?

[Dr Whitehead]

It is quite possible that the Secretary of State could deem the first two criteria on the basis of work that the company had done to approach designation. However, unless the Secretary of State has in mind the whole picture at the point of designation—in the previous group of amendments, we touched on some of the things concerning the whole picture—it would be possible for him to conclude that, yes, on the basis of the work done so far, the particular mechanisms looked like they might produce, say, value-for-money electricity at a rate per kilowatt-hour that was compatible with market levels of electricity at that point or in the future or with value for money as far as other electricity production is concerned, but he might still not have a handle on whether the undertaking that the nuclear company was about to engage in was sound in the overall, as far as completion was concerned.

The hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun touched on an important lesson in that respect, which ought to be put before the Committee. He mentioned a case in California—it was not quite in California; it was a little way a way, although it began with the same letter. I am talking about the experience of a nuclear power plant in South Carolina in the United States. When I say the experience of a nuclear power plant in South Carolina, I do not mean that—because there is no nuclear plant in South Carolina; there are a bunch of a concrete foundings, walls and various other things that look like a nuclear power station, but it does not operate, it has never produced a single kilowatt of electricity and it remains abandoned.

More significantly, that project not only was abandoned but was commissioned precisely on the sort of criteria that are contained in the Bill. All those things were gone through by the South Carolina legislature, which put in place something remarkably similar to a RAB. Indeed, the bill payers of South Carolina were required to stump up money for the project as it progressed, and I am sure hon. Members will be interested to know just how much money went from the bill payers of South Carolina to that project and how much they got out of it as a result of introducing a RAB model in South Carolina. The answer is nothing. Some £9 billion of customers’ money went into the project, and they will continue to pay for that lump of concrete for the next 20 years in their bills because of the way in which the thing was constructed, all on the basis of agreements that looked pretty similar to what is in the Bill.

What South Carolina did not do was ask serious questions about the resilience of the various partners and companies involved in the project in the light of changing circumstances in terms of the construction of the project and the health of the companies involved. Among other things, costs went through the roof, the timescale increased substantially and one of the companies that was in charge of the project effectively went bust—it called for chapter 11 protection and was therefore unable to continue with the project. All those things could have been foreseen by the South Carolina legislature, but were not. The project went ahead, with the customers footing the bill, as various reviews subsequent to the collapse of the nuclear programme said, on the basis of something that was extremely unlikely to ever come to fruition as a nuclear power plant, not only because of the dodgy nature of the financing of the project but because it had completely unrealistic timescales—those involved expected to produce electricity within six years from the start of production and so on, none of which was properly overseen.

[Alan Brown]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman giving way once more; I am starting to feel like I am on a mission to annoy each contributor—apologies. He makes valid points, and I understand his concerns and what he is trying to do, but I still do not understand how the amendment would preclude such a scenario. Surely, as well as the amendment, the Secretary of State would need to look at a list of criteria, with their sign-off verifying what factors have been considered to reach the opinion that the project is viable. Otherwise, the Secretary of State could just say, “I think this project will be completed—let’s move on.”

[Dr Whitehead]

Yes, indeed. The hon. Gentleman is right, to the extent that the amendment does not actually guarantee the success of a project as a result of its placement in the designation clauses. Of course, it is not possible to do that, because changing circumstances can mean that projects cannot come to fruition. The difference the amendment would make is that the Secretary of State would be required to look at all those sorts of things in the overall scheme of things as far as the company and the prospects for success of a particular project are concerned, in such a way that he could form an opinion, which he would undoubtedly have to publish, that he was as satisfied as he could be, having done all that work, that the project had a very high prospect of being completed, and he would have to underwrite that.

One thing I did not say about the South Carolina project is that a lot of it is now the subject of legal action, and various state officials are being hauled up before the courts for their lack of diligence in actually looking at the overall circumstances of the project when they gave the go-ahead on a similar basis to that which we are discussing. If the Secretary of State had to sign off, on the basis of the amendment being in the Bill, that it was all okay and could go ahead, and it turned out that it was not okay and could not go ahead, under circumstances that could have been foreseen, he would then be liable. That is potentially quite an important concentration of the mind, ensuring that the work had been done, as much as it could be done—I accept that it would not be a perfect operation—to ensure that there was a reasonable or good prospect that the company involved could complete the project. That is all the amendment says. It would be an important addition to the designation process.

We need to be clear that, as much as we can do the work, we have done the work in getting the designation clearly marked on the basis that the company really can deliver a nuclear plant and produce electricity for customers. As I have said, we are engaged in a RAB process, which ultimately lands on the customers. We absolutely do not want to ever land the customers of the United Kingdom in the same position that the customers of South Carolina are in today, so far as a nuclear power plant is concerned.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Mark Fletcher.)

Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 18th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Greg Hands)]

Welcome back to the Chair, Ms Fovargue.

I believe that the intent of the amendment is already captured in the approvals framework for the regulated asset base. That includes the process for designating a project and then modifying its licence, and wider due diligence on the project. The Government simply would not allow a company to enter into a RAB revenue collection contract if there were cause to doubt the ability of the company to complete construction, a point made slightly more pithily by my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend in his intervention on the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Southampton, Test. We expect to say more about how the Secretary of State will make this judgment in our statement on the designation criteria, which we will publish in advance of any consultation on designation.

Before considering the matter of licences, let me return to the question asked earlier by the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun. Sizewell C does have a licence, as within the terms of clause 1(2). He said that he could not find the link to the licence on the Ofgem website, so I will commit to write to him, copied to the Committee, with that link.

Designation is very much the first step in the process of amending a developer’s licence to include the RAB conditions. At the point of designation, no commitments have been made; a project will be under development, and further negotiation is required between the developer and the Government. The process is open and transparent and includes consultation at several stages, meaning that a project will be designated only at an appropriate point.

Let me deal with the points raised about various RAB projects in the United States. It is not unreasonable to look at foreign experiences, but it is important to separate the experience of another country in developing and delivering a nuclear power plant from what part of that experience was due to a RAB model. There were several unique circumstances linked to the failure of the South Carolina Virgil C. Summer project, which was referred to, and the parent company, including—[Interruption.] I beg your pardon?

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

Sorry. I was just wondering to myself whether the Minister had looked all this up during lunchtime. If so, I congratulate him on doing so.

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention—I think it was an intervention—from a sedentary position. As the Energy Minister, I have to be aware of what is going on in the world of nuclear globally, so no, I did not look it up during lunchtime, actually; I have looked into this and other US plants. The failure of the Virgil C. Summer project—I think that is the one he was referring to—and the parent company included arrests and a conviction for fraud. There were also issues linked to design and supply chain immaturity, as well as a lack of experience with the construction of new nuclear projects. Those issues are pretty far removed from its status as a RAB project. I do not think those risks in South Carolina are applicable to the UK.

[Dr Whitehead]

I fully accept that the Minister did not look that up at lunchtime and that he is fully apprised of the circumstances surrounding the South Carolina project. However, does he not accept that the issues that he has mentioned as relevant to the failure of that project—it was entered into without proper consideration of a lot of things that, as he said, were at least in part responsible for its failure—are precisely the sorts of issues that we would expect him to take into account and sort out before deciding on the designation of a project in this country?

[Greg Hands]

Broadly speaking, the answer is yes. I think that all of those factors, if known at the time, would be considered when the Secretary of State makes the designation. That is the point. Of course they would be factors, were they to be known. I cannot put myself in the shoes of the governor of South Carolina—if indeed it was the governor of South Carolina who made the decision—but if he were or had been of the opinion that the project could not have been completed, he would surely not have made the designation at that time. I am slightly hesitant to stray into the politics of South Carolina, but doubtless the governor was of the opinion at that time that the project would have been completed. The hon. Gentleman uses South Carolina as an example, but I do not think that his amendment would have helped the governor make that decision.

This is not just a question of the factors, which are already covered in the Secretary of State’s determination of a RAB designation. The timing is also important. A project has to go through many stages and approvals post designation of a RAB. To include the hon. Gentleman’s additional definition at this stage might be premature, though I doubt it is needed at all, for the reasons pithily put by my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend about the chances of the person making the decision being of the view that the project might not be completed. If that were the case, I think it would be a highly material fact in determining whether to designate a RAB. I do not believe that this amendment is necessary in order to meet the laudable objectives that Opposition Members seek to achieve. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

I hear what the Minister says about the amendment, but I am not entirely convinced that he has made the case that he thinks he has made as to why this addition is not necessary for the designation process. After all, we are not talking here about a particularly adept and alert Minister in a particular Administration taking a decision on Sizewell C. As the Minister has said, this Bill is supposed to deal with decisions that might be taken under other circumstances, for other projects, at other times, with other Ministers, and possibly other Administrations. It is important that we put in legislation everything that we think could go wrong with a project and its designation process, so that the legislation is robust for the future.

On South Carolina, the Minister is right. The project failed as a result of a series of interlocking issues. Those issues were not necessarily associated with the RAB process, which is what we are considering in this Bill, but there were wider concerns that should have been apparent to legislators in South Carolina when the project was commissioned and went ahead. Many of the things that the Minister alluded to that occurred in South Carolina were not unforeseeable events. They were events that could have been analysed out at the time of the designation of the plant. Essentially the amendment seeks to address that issue.

We will not press this amendment to a vote—indeed, we will withdraw it—but we have put on the record our belief that the Secretary of State should have a very substantial hand in ensuring, as far as possible, that the project really can come to completion. I am sure that the Minister is with me on that and agrees that that should be the process by which we conduct designation.

Even if it is not explicitly in the Bill, the fact that the Minister has indicated that he thinks that a number of these issues can be covered within the designation elements is perhaps a step along the path to ensuring that these processes can be carried out properly. I do not wish to proceed with the amendment on that basis, but we need to do a proper job at the point of designation, for the protection of investors, for the project and for the customers who pay for it.

[Greg Hands]

Just to probe the hon. Gentleman on this, if I may, one of the criteria is whether the project is sufficiently developed to warrant a RAB. At what point does he think that the fact that the person making the decision might not necessarily think it would be completed would mean that they do not think it is sufficiently developed to start the process? Surely, if they did not think it was going to finish, they would not think it was ready to start either?

[Dr Whitehead]

The Minister puts that as a binary choice, but it is not because there are circumstances. That is essentially what happened in South Carolina. A number of people thought that it was a fine project that would go ahead; they put forward impossible timelines for the project to work on, there were very difficult financing arrangements and the RAB was placed on top of that. Yes, they may have thought that the project could come to completion, but it was not a very well-founded thought, and nor was it arrived at on the basis of the sort of diligence we should expect from the approach to a project the size of, say, Sizewell C.

The amendment’s intention is not to make the Secretary of State make a choice based on a potential view, when designating a project, that it might not be completed. He should do all that work, and indeed be publicly accountable for it, when ensuring that his view is as well founded as possible and that it will stand the test of time as the project progresses. There are points of landing between knowing whether a project is not going to be completed, and being sure that it is going to be completed. When making a designation, the Secretary of State should be held accountable for arriving at an informed position, which can be scrutinised in future, on whether it is reasonable and realistic to say that a project is likely to be completed. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Greg Hands]

This clause, through subsection (1), gives power to the Secretary of State to designate by notice a nuclear company to benefit from a RAB. The later provisions of this part mean that the designation power can only be exercised with appropriate protections and transparency of decision making. Subsection (3) sets out the criteria a company must meet to be eligible for designation: that the Secretary of State must be of the opinion that, as previously debated, the nuclear project is sufficiently advanced to justify the designation, and that designating the company in relation to the project is likely to result in value for money. In considering value for money, it is expected that the Secretary of State will take into account considerations such as the cost to consumers and the impact on our net zero obligations. As set out in clause 3, the Secretary of State will be obliged to publish details on the process that he will follow when assessing whether the criteria are met.

The eligibility criteria offer important protections for consumers and taxpayers. A company can have access to a RAB only when the Secretary of State is convinced that it is a good project and sufficiently advanced, and where the likelihood of cost overruns is remote. The Secretary of State will also need to consider whether using the RAB to fund the project is likely to represent value for money.

--- Later in debate ---

Designation: procedure

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 3, page 2, line 37, at end insert—

“(5) Prior to consulting persons under subsection (3)(g), the Secretary of State must publish a statement setting out why it is relevant to consult those persons.”

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to indicate the relevance of the people he is consulting on the designation of a nuclear company.

The amendment, and another couple that relate to clauses further down the order paper, need not detain us for long. They essentially seek to improve the effect of the text of the Bill and are not controversial.

Amendment 4 applies to clause 3, on page 2 and requires the Secretary of State to

“publish a statement setting out why it is relevant to consult those persons.”

That refers to the list of those people who are to be consulted upon the designation of a nuclear company. At the bottom of that list is the phrase

“such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”

I appreciate that is often seen in Bills and I am sure hon. Members have seen it in their time in other Committees, but I suggest that it is rather loose arrangement if we want to have a Bill that will stand the test of time. While it is a catch-all arrangement, one could almost ask why the other categories are listed. One might as well just put, “Those persons who the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”

Surely, where the Secretary of State is considering consulting other people, in addition to those listed, those people ought to be relevant to the designation of the nuclear company. As the Bill stands, it is just people

“the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

I am slightly confused about why the hon. Member seems to be suggesting that it is a bad thing for the Secretary of State to undertake more consultation. Surely more consultation is a good thing. Generally, the Opposition call for more transparency. If the Secretary of State feels that it is necessary to consult more people, I am not hugely convinced that there is a point to making him justify that.

[Dr Whitehead]

I hope that the hon. Member will forgive me if I have not made myself clear. I am certainly not saying that consultation is a bad thing or that there should be less of it; I am saying that the Bill appears to provide for consultation with all the people named in it and anybody else the Secretary of State feels like including. One may think that that is a good thing, but I would have thought that anyone else the Secretary of State feels like including ought to be relevant to the designation of the nuclear company. All the amendment asks is that, when and if the Secretary of State decides that people other than those who were already on the list be consulted, he publish a statement to say why the people he has selected for additional consultation are relevant to the issue in hand. Otherwise in principle it would be possible for the Secretary of State simply to choose a random number of people off the street and consult them. That would not serve the cause of further consultation and transparency.

[Kirsty Blackman]

May I check that an alternative amendment could have been to change the last word in subsection (3)(g) to “relevant” rather than “appropriate”, which would mean that the Secretary of State would be able to consult all the other people he considered to be relevant, rather than appropriate? Is that the direction in which the hon. Member is trying to go with his amendment?

[Dr Whitehead]

Indeed. The hon. Member has drafted her own, perhaps more succinct, amendment on the fly. I would welcome hon. Members tabling amendments if they feel that they can do it better, or more succinctly, than we can. She is right that it is a test of the relevance of the consultation process. Her suggestion does not quite cover the point because I would like the Secretary of State to say why those people are being consulted. Essentially, the amendment requires the Secretary of State to not just think that people are relevant but tell us why. It is not a big point, but I think that would improve the Bill a little were it to be accepted.

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Members for Southampton, Test and for Greenwich and Woolwich for amendment 4, which amends the clause governing the process by which the Secretary of State can designate a company. As part of the process, the Secretary of State must consult a named list of persons, including the authority, Ofgem, the Office for Nuclear Regulation and the relevant environment agency. The Secretary of State will also be able to consult, of course, such other persons as they deem appropriate at that time. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish the reasons for consulting those persons not named in the legislation.

Of course it is important for us to be transparent, and I welcome the intention of the amendment to increase transparency and accountability throughout the process, but it might help if I set out the intention of the consultation requirement in clause 3. The Government have agreed a set of persons that they feel must be consulted: the Office for Nuclear Regulation, Ofgem, the relevant environmental agencies and the devolved Administrations in the event that all or part of one of the plants be located in one of the devolved nations of the United Kingdom. The ones who must be consulted include the key regulatory bodies for nuclear generators in Great Britain.

Alongside that, for each designation, there may be other relevant parties that the Secretary of State thinks it is reasonable to consult to inform the draft reasons for designation. That sort of provision is standard practice. The clause is modelled closely on existing consultation obligations in the Energy Act 2013, which allows the Secretary of State to consult other persons without the requirement to publish a justification.

I do not seek to reject the amendment because of concerns about transparency. The designation process takes several important steps to ensure transparency, including the publication of a statement on how the designation criteria will be assessed and the publication of the designation notice.

The hon. Member for Southampton, Test says that those consulted ought to be relevant, but I think that the Secretary of State will consult only with those who ought to be relevant rather than, in the terms of the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, a random set of people off the street. The way that governmental processes work is that consultations are supposed to be with people who are relevant. I do not think that including a relatively unprecedented amendment to publish a statement about why it is relevant to consult those persons will help the transparency or the understanding of the decision made by the Secretary of State.

I hope that I have shown hon. Members that the legislation already takes the necessary steps to ensure transparency and that the amendment would go against the established precedent for this kind of provision, which has generally worked well for big Government infrastructure decisions. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Southampton, Test to withdraw the amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

I am certainly happy to withdraw the amendment, but in passing I mention that the Minister has drawn attention to the word “must” in clause 3(2), which precedes the people who the Secretary of State is listed as consulting. I am glad that he drew attention to that, because it may reflect on an amendment that I will move later concerning the words “may” and “must”. The Minister will know that a regular concern of mine is that legislation needs to be written in the right way concerning the imperatives on the Secretary of State rather than the allowances. We have made progress from that point of view.

Although this clause contains a fairly standard way of putting things, that may just mean that legislation has been slightly lax in the past, which may be considered less than satisfactory in future. I take the Minister’s point, however, that it is not an exceptional way of putting things, and I take his assurance that a question of relevance would be in the Secretary of State’s mind when he consulted anybody under such circumstances. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Greg Hands]

Let me lay out the purpose of clause 3, which is to set out the procedure that the Secretary of State must follow to designate a nuclear company for the purposes of the nuclear RAB model. The clause requires the Secretary of State to undertake various transparency and consultation obligations before a company is designated.

The clause sets out the process. By putting the process in the Bill, the Government are showing their commitment to transparency and openness when designating a company. Prior to the designation of any company, subsection (1) requires the Secretary of State to publish a statement setting out the procedure they expect to follow in determining whether to designate a nuclear company and how they expect to determine that the designation criteria are met.

The Government anticipate that a nuclear company with a generation licence, and which thinks that its project should be funded through a RAB, would approach the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State will then assess the project against the factors set out in the statement, before consulting expert bodies on the designation. That provides opportunities for those directly affected by the potential designation, or with special expertise relevant to the decision, to provide their views on the matter. That includes the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority, the governing body of Ofgem—I will refer to it generally as Ofgem in the course of this debate, for the sake of time—whose primary statutory duty is to protect the interests of consumers.

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[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Members for Kilmarnock and Loudoun and for Aberdeen North for their contributions on clause 3. I will try to deal with their points.

It is important to understand the different parts of the process and the transparency involved in the process. The rules are published first; then comes the rationale for the designation, which is consulted on. It is standard practice in a consultation, of course, to take into account the results or the responses made to the consultation. Perhaps the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun was trying to characterise it as superfluous or part of a process that would not add any additional information, but a Government consultation is there specifically to seek out and find more information. We then publish the final rationale for the designation. I hope that is helpful in setting out a little of the process involved.

The question about stating the length of the consultation is one that would be appropriate to the project itself. Let us not forget that we are trying to design a process here that would take into account a number of different possible future nuclear power stations. It would be difficult for us today to be prescriptive about the length of time that a consultation should take. We have set out those who we think must be consulted, and we have also left it open for the Secretary of State to consult other interested parties, which is quite reasonable considering that this legislation is supposed to encompass various forms of future nuclear power plants. We would be in danger of becoming too prescriptive about things such as the length of the consultation and the earlier amendment about stating reasons for particular people to be consulted.

[Dr Whitehead]

I do not want to be accused of trying to be too helpful to the Minister but, as I understand it, this part is about the designation of an existing nuclear company for the possibility of receiving RAB payments for a project it has not yet undertaken. That is it. It seems to me that what we are concentrating on in this part of the Bill—although not later on in the Bill—is just the designation process. I hope the Minister will agree that that is not the project or the RAB process itself, on which we would expect considerable transparency as it goes through, but not necessarily at this particular stage.

[Greg Hands]

The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point, and he is right that that is the purpose of this clause. None the less, the purpose of the clause is also to allow designation for a potential variety of timeframes within those projects, so it is still important not to be over-prescriptive, for example with the suggestion that we lay out today what the length of time for a consultation should be.

In terms of the costs, the whole purpose of the Bill is to reduce costs. The hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun is probing on the costs and what they actually mean, but the point is that this is a reduction in the costs that would otherwise be the case under a contract for difference model. That is ultimately getting to the heart of the Bill. I appreciate that he is against nuclear power, but he would surely have to recognise that the Bill is about reducing the costs of nuclear power. That is the purpose of the Bill. He says it is going to be very expensive—we acknowledge that it can be very expensive, and the purpose of the Bill is to make it less expensive.

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[Greg Hands]

I am not going to give way again, because I have set out clearly that the Secretary of State is ultimately accountable to Parliament, and Parliament would find a way of examining the reasons that he or she laid out under this clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Expiry of designation

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 4, page 3, line 24, leave out “5” and insert “4”.

This amendment shortens the maximum time allowed by the Secretary of State for the designation period of a nuclear company.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 6, in clause 4, page 3, line 33, leave out “5” and insert “4”.

This amendment shortens the maximum time allowed by the Secretary of State for the designation period of a nuclear company.

[Dr Whitehead]

The amendments are grouped because one follows directly from the other—amendment 6 is consequential on amendment 5. The previous debate about the designation process was helpful for discussion of this clause, because clause 4 looks at how long a designation may last once the process has started. That is important because the process can cease to have effect either on the expiry of the designation—that is, a company has been designated for moving along the path to eligibility for a RAB and various negotiations will take place as the company develops its plant—[Interruption.]

[Greg Hands]

The House has adjourned.

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[Dr Whitehead]

Hon. Members have such Pavlovian responses these days, automatically running out of the door whatever the circumstances.

The expiry date of a designation could well arrive because the company has received a designation, but has done nothing about it, or because the Government have got a designation through, but are a bit lax in pursuing the subsequent process. Alternatively, as the clause suggests, it could be because a project is under way, the revenue collection contract starts biting, investment is secured and the project goes ahead.

However, I am a little concerned that the expiry date is set at a period of five years, beginning on the date of the designation notice in question. As such, both the nuclear company and the Government have five years to get their act together on the RAB process, although that could lead to a going slow or delays. We already know that nuclear projects have a habit of running over time, sometimes due to construction issues and so on, but we do not want projects to be further delayed because people have not got themselves organised for a proper RAB process or because the Government cannot be bothered to get things going at a certain time and believe that they have five years to sort that out.

We have made the modest suggestion that that period should be four years; that might concentrate minds a little on moving from the process of hopefully being designated to the process of having a revenue collection contract and getting under way properly. There would not be that time to mess about between the two ends of the process, as might be the case under the five-year designation period.

I agree that we could pick any one of a number of different dates; the four-year period is just to suggest that we should concentrate minds a little. The amendment does not lay down the law: if the Government think it could be reconstructed in a different but more concentrated way, we would be happy with that. The amendment just suggests an indicative new date so that the point is borne in mind. I hope the Government will be able to accept it on that basis.

[Greg Hands]

Amendments 5 and 6 would seek to reduce the length of time a designation remains valid from five to four years and they would reduce the period for which the Secretary of State may extend the designation notice for a designated nuclear company to four years.

First, I thank the Opposition for their consideration of this matter. The hon. Member for Southampton, Test spoke to his amendment in a probing way—trying to get to the bottom of why the period should be five years rather than some other period. I am glad that the Opposition recognise the importance of the designation notice period and the fact that it should strike the right balance between providing enough time for the Government and the company to undertake all the processes necessary to inform a decision on licence modifications without leaving a designation in place for an unreasonable length of time. That is, as it were, the exam question here.

I believe that we have achieved that balance in the Bill. Currently, if negotiations on a project are successful and a relevant licensee nuclear company becomes party to a revenue collection contract, the power of the Secretary of State to modify its licence ceases, of course, outside some limited circumstances. That is vital to give investors confidence that the Secretary of State does not have an open-ended power to further amend the generation licence.

On the other hand, if negotiations are not successful after a project has been designated—the point here is to give enough time for those negotiations to be successful—it is necessary for the Secretary of State’s modification powers to lapse rather than continue indefinitely, so a sunset clause to the designation is also needed. That sits alongside the provisions in the Bill that revoke designation if the designation’s criteria or conditions are no longer met.

However, a decision to take a financial close on a nuclear power station may not happen overnight; robust processes must be followed, extensive due diligence must be carried out and there must be rigorous negotiations to ensure value for money for both the consumer and taxpayer. That is the case with many large infrastructure projects.

Take the negotiations at Hinkley Point C as an example: discussions and eventual negotiations on the project took a number of years to complete. I believe therefore that a five-year window is a reasonable period to expect negotiations to have run their course, recognising that a project for RAB must be suitably advanced to be designated in the first place—that goes back to the earlier debates. That window provides time for negotiations to achieve a successful outcome without providing the Secretary of State with licence modification powers for an inappropriate period. The ability to extend the designation presents a backstop provision that allows the designation to be continued when the designation criteria continue to be met and negotiations are ongoing—in other words, it builds a certain amount of flexibility with a positive decision to extend negotiations. It is therefore appropriate that the extension period should mirror the initial designation period.

I do not consider that the amendments would provide any enhancement to that rationale. I did not hear any specific argument for four years rather than five years, so I am minded to continue with five years. I consider the provisions within this clause, which will permit the Secretary of State to revoke a designation notice at any point if he considers that the criteria are no longer met, mitigates the risk that negotiations—or, indeed, the modification power—will continue for longer than they should. I therefore invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

As the Minister has said, the amendment was essentially a probing amendment to seek a little more clarification on why five years is considered to be the appropriate time. I am not sure that the Secretary of State has fully answered the question about the extent to which that might allow people not to get on with things as quickly as they might otherwise do, but I appreciate that in a complicated project such as those we are considering, there are processes that take quite a lot of time; it may well be that getting on for five years is the time necessary for such projects to be completed.

The overall point is that we want to make sure that, once designation has been undertaken, we move to the next stage as quickly as possible. I am sure that the Secretary of State would concur with that particular aim. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Greg Hands]

Clause 4 sets out the circumstances in which the designation of a nuclear company would expire. As set out in subsections (1) and (2) of the clause, the designation of a nuclear company will be limited to a period of five years from the date of the project designation. If a designation expires, the Secretary of State must publish the details of that fact under the provisions in subsection (5). However, the Secretary of State will have the power under subsection (3) to extend the designation period before the five-year period lapses.

Subsection (4) of the clause requires that prior to granting an extension for a maximum of five years, the Secretary of State would need to consult the company, the authority, the ONR, the relevant environment agency, and the devolved Governments if relevant. Before exercising that power, the Secretary of State would also need to continue to be satisfied that the criteria for designation are met. This would allow for any circumstances in which the negotiations with the designated company and engagement with the financial markets last beyond the five-year designation period, but the Secretary of State believes that the project both represents value for money and is sufficiently advanced to warrant a RAB.

The designation will also expire if the company enters into a contract with a revenue collection counterparty. That is to provide confidence to investors that once the RAB licence conditions have been inserted into the company’s electricity generation licence, the Secretary of State will no longer be able to modify that licence except in the limited circumstances set out in clauses 7 and 35 of the Bill. This is a proportionate approach that balances the need for investor certainty with the ability to flexibly apply the RAB model to individual projects. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

Revocation or lapse of designation

[Dr Whitehead]

I rise to speak to amendment 7, in clause 5, page 4, line 16, leave out “either” and insert “any”.

This amendment is consequential on amendments 2 and 3.

This amendment was tabled to deal with the possible eventuality that we would have three designation criteria in clause 2(3), rather than two, as is the case at the moment. We moved an amendment to try to place three criteria into that clause, which the Committee did not accept. The statement, therefore, that either of those two criteria are relevant stands as far as the Bill is concerned, and the word “either” should therefore not be replaced by “any”. On that basis, amendment 7 logically falls, so I have no wish to move the amendment.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Greg Hands]

Clause 5 provides the Secretary of State with the power to revoke the designation of a nuclear company and sets out the applicable circumstances and procedure for doing so, as well as the circumstances and procedure whereby a project designation could lapse. The revocation power is tightly constrained by subsection (1). It applies only where a nuclear company ceases to hold a generation licence in respect of the nuclear project for which it was designated or it no longer meets the designation criteria. It is important that only the right projects are able to benefit from a RAB where they are sufficiently advanced and likely to provide value for money.

As set out in subsection (2), revocation of a designation would follow a similar process to project designation. The Secretary of State must prepare draft reasons, consult the named persons and publish a revocation notice, where relevant; they can attach additional conditions to a designation notice, as set out in subsection (3). If a company fails to comply with the conditions set out in the designation notice, the Secretary of State will notify the company that it has failed to comply, which will result in the designation lapsing. Such a notice must be published by the Secretary of State under subsection (5).

Such a model is a common feature of similar RAB models. The procedures envisaged allow time for consideration and consultation before any decision to revoke is taken. Given that the ability to continue to meet any of the conditions attached to designation is within the control of the company, there is no consultation requirement for the Secretary of State before a designation lapses.

Taken together, these routes to ending a designation provide an important layer of protection for consumers before a designated company enters into a RAB. In essence, they allow for a designation to end in any circumstance where it is no longer appropriate for a company to benefit from a RAB before project funding begins.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Licence modifications: designated nuclear companies

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 6, page 5, line 3, at end insert—

“(2A) Prior to exercising the power under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must publish a statement setting out how the exercising of the power will facilitate investment in the design, construction and commissioning of nuclear energy generation projects.”

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to justify the exercise of a power to modify the electricity generation licence of a nuclear company.

The clause concerns modifications to the licences of companies that have entered into a designation with regard to the RAB process. It sets out a number of powers enabling the Secretary of State to make modifications to licences in order to square the designation process with the licence process. It occupies a lot of other areas, but would be particularly relevant to the licence as it applies to, say, the Sizewell C project.

Subsection (2) states that the Secretary of State is able to exercise the power under subsection (1)—to modify licences—

“only for the purpose of facilitating investment in the design, construction, commissioning and operation of nuclear energy generation projects”,

which restricts the powers of the Secretary of State to modify the licences, concentrating it in the field of the design, construction and operation of the nuclear project.

Hon. Members will notice that that restriction stops there—that is, the Secretary of State may exercise that power for that purpose, but no one else needs to know about it. The Secretary of State may consider doing that, or restricting himself or herself to that particular designation, and may consider that he or she has done that, but it is a completely opaque process.

This amendment seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State publishes a statement setting out how his decision does indeed facilitate investment in the design, construction, commissioning and operation of nuclear energy generation projects, so that when he is considering exercising that power, it is a publicly exercised power, and information on what he has done is in the public domain.

The publication of the statement does not restrict what the Secretary of State can do; it sheds a light on what they can do, and ensures that they are carrying out that particular power correctly, as laid out in the legislation. We think that would be a good, safe addition to the Bill. It does not fundamentally alter its direction, but sheds a little more light on the process as the directions of the Bill are undertaken.

[Greg Hands]

As the hon. Gentleman says, this amendment addresses the process for modifying a designated nuclear company’s licence, particularly which documents should be published before the power is exercised. We recognise that designating a nuclear company and subsequently modifying its licence is a significant decision. That is why the legislation lays out a clear process, which provides transparency and builds confidence in the decisions that the Secretary of State will make when exercising these powers. The process in the Bill is strongly based on existing licence modification powers; it is well precedented.

The amendment obliges the Secretary of State to publish a document setting out how the licence modification would facilitate investment in nuclear projects before modifications are made. I do not believe that is necessary. The Government have already set out a clear process and strong transparency provisions in the legislation. Currently, the Secretary of State is required to consult named persons prior to making any licence modifications, and must then publish the details of any modifications as soon as reasonably practicable after they are made, with material excluded only when necessary—for example, for purposes of commercial confidentiality or national security.

[Greg Hands]

The process is as described. It is based on a very good precedent on these sorts of licence modifications. This would not be the first Bill to come along to look at how to modify a licence, and we have based that entirely on existing precedents. There is nothing unusual in this process or this structure.

The approach of consultation followed by publication is well precedented, as I said, in other licence modification powers. We think that the amendment proposes an unnecessary additional process. Moreover, the consultation provisions will allow expert voices to input on whether the licence modifications are effective in facilitating investment, which, of course, is exactly the purpose of the clause. I therefore hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

We do not intend to press the amendment to a vote, but I will say that we think it is a good idea, which adds to the Bill’s transparency. The Minister has given examples where certain elements of that transparency would be facilitated by other components of the Bill, but I would note that most of those are post hoc rather than before the process. Nevertheless, I take some assurances from what the Minister has said about the proper transparency of the process, so we will not pursue that this afternoon. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 6, page 5, line 13, at end insert—

“(ba) the interests of existing and future consumers of electricity in relation to their prospects of recouping their contribution at the conclusion of the construction phase of the project;”.

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to have regard to the interests of electricity consumers in recovering the value of their contribution to the construction of a nuclear power plant.

We have now reached the point where we have the first consideration of the consumer in the Bill, in clause 6(4)(b), dealing with the licence modification arrangements. Hon. Members will note in subsection (4) the things that the Secretary of State must have regard to when exercising the power under subsection (1), subject to what we have just discussed about subsection (2) in terms of the design, construction, commissioning and operation of nuclear energy generation projects.

Subsection (4)(b) says that the Secretary of State must have regard to

“the interests of existing and future consumers of electricity, including their interests in relation to the cost and security of supply of electricity”.

I understand that to mean that the Secretary of State, in modifying licences, particularly in respect of a RAB agreement, must look at the interests of consumers with respect to the cost of electricity and the extent to which it may be produced at a better price as production develops in the years following the adoption of a RAB, and the extent to which security of supply to customers can be maintained.

What is lacking in that list of things that the Secretary of State must have regard to—along with many other things—as far as the consumer is concerned is a recognition that the consumer has an active interest as well as a passive interest in this process. If we are setting out to produce a RAB arrangement that effectively requires a levy on customers at all stages of the process—during development, construction and production—then the consumer surely has rather more of an interest in that process than just the passive interest in price and security that is suggested in subsection (4)(b).

For example, the consumer has a considerable interest in making sure that the cost to them is reasonable at all stages of the process, and that it does not simply set out to milk the consumer for the purpose of sorting out the project regardless of its vicissitudes. The consumer has a particular interest not only in the way that the RAB contract talks about the price of electricity, but in how it addresses the extent to which the consumer’s investment may be recouped as the RAB process comes to its conclusion and goes down its path.

Of course, in that context, the RAB arrangements that we are discussing have, during their latter stages, a two-way process. If the production of electricity goes above the ceiling of the allowable costs limit, then it is expected that the company producing the electricity, because the model is regulated, will restore money to the consumer in one way or another. If its production is under that allowable costs ceiling, however, it will take money from the consumer to allow that process to continue smoothly. Indeed, in the RAB consultation, we had a rather optimistic, smooth little curve down as the process comes to its end. I do not think that will quite be the reality as the RAB process goes on, but it is important.

[Alan Brown]

I share the hon. Gentleman’s concerns about protecting consumers from costs and so on. That is actually why we are against large-scale new nuclear. Can he explain a wee bit more about recouping costs? Recouping costs sounds like getting money back in terms of the asset, which does not make sense. The amendment also mentions recouping contributions

“at the conclusion of the construction phase of the project”.

That is effectively rent on a 60-year contract for the RAB, so I am not sure why it would be at the conclusion of the construction stage.

[Dr Whitehead]

It is at the conclusion of the construction stage because the construction stage gives way to a production stage. That is the point at which electricity is produced, when the customer—I am assuming we can describe the consumer and customer as an entity—or those acting on behalf of the customer can start to think about the extent to which some of that money may come back as a result of the way that production is carried out within the ceiling set for overall RAB programme costs.

There could be circumstances under which, as the RAB process comes to an end, the customer recoups—in lower bills, dividends and so on—a lot of the money that was put in. There will always be excessive production over the allowed costs level, so money will come back to the customer. We will see later in the Bill the methods by which that money might be restored to the customer. Yes, there is a real interest, post the construction phase, in recouping those costs.

A second issue for the consumer is the eventual outcome of the ownership of the plant at the end of the RAB period, as it goes into production. As it is a regulated asset base, by the end of the RAB period, the company that has undertaken the construction and run the production of the plant will have received all the money it should have received through the regulated asset base arrangement, and will have worked successfully as a result of the support that the RAB process provides.

Depending on how many years are set out for the RAB process to take place, if it reaches its end within the working life of the nuclear plant, the question then arises of who owns the nuclear plant at the end of that period. Does the consumer own it at the end of that period? If they do, that is a little bit like a mobile phone contract, whereby the consumer would expect the charges to reduce substantially after paying off the cost of the phone in their contract. Clearly, it is in the interests of customers to have an active involvement not just in spending their money wisely, but in recouping or changing it into a different form as the RAB process sets its course. Indeed, under those circumstances, the Secretary of State might need to consider the length of the RAB contract, and how far it goes into the operating life of the nuclear power station, to carry out the terms of the contract and to consider what arrangements might be made for life at the end of that contract.

I suggest that those are all things that the Secretary of State ought to have regard to over and above the passive involvement of consumers that is set out in subsection (4). That is why we tabled the amendment, which states that the Bill should take account of

“the interests of existing and future consumers of electricity in relation to their prospects of recouping their contribution at the conclusion of the construction phase of the project”.

That is an active consideration in the management of customers’ contracts, not just a passive one where the customer stands by and waits for the money to be deducted from their account to pay for these projects forever. The Secretary of State should have an active view on that in terms of how to get the best value for the customer from the project overall, over and above the best value for the project itself.

[Greg Hands]

Amendment 9 addresses how the interests of consumers, which are vital in this process, will be taken into account and what the consequences of that would be. In the Bill as currently drafted, the Secretary of State must have regard to a number of matters when modifying a designated company’s licence. That includes the UK’s net zero ambitions and the interests of existing and future consumers in relation to the future cost and security of electricity supply.

The amendment requires the Secretary of State also to have regard to the prospect of consumers recouping what I think the shadow Minister described as their “investment” at the end of the construction phase. I appreciate hon. Members’ enthusiasm for ensuring that consumers will benefit from any RAB project, and, in that sense, I welcomed their support on Second Reading. However, the amendment is not compatible with how the RAB model works.

The hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun got to the heart of this: the amendment would make RAB effectively inoperable. It treats consumers as investors, but they are not investors. Consumers will benefit from a new nuclear power station. He and I might disagree on whether that should have happened in the first place, but none the less, the benefit to consumers is in electricity rather than in a return on any investment.

Fundamentally, the amendment misunderstands how the RAB model will work. The RAB model will mean that consumers contribute to meeting project costs from the start of construction and reducing the cost of capital, which is the main driver of project costs. That is why we are seeking consumers’ contribution. What they get in return is a nuclear power station that produces low-cost, low-carbon electricity.

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[Dr Whitehead]

Let me say two things. First, if someone contributes in a penny fund to a co-operative society account of some description, that does not mean that they are not an investor; it just means that they are investing in a certain way and at a certain rate. The fact that the RAB arrangements will be passed on to customers’ bills and that there will be a known and determined amount of levy on those bills, which can be quantified, means that the customer is, in effect, adding an investment into the process on top of their bills. That is what I am trying to say, and I am sure that the Minister would agree that that is a form of investment in the process, even though the consumer is not a conscious investor in the way that a corporation might be. This is one of the problems of how we best protect the consumer interest in this process. Nevertheless, I suggest that that is a consumer investment in the overall process.

Secondly, I am sure that the Minister would agree that the RAB process continues after construction for a considerable time in the production period, as the RAB consultation set out. Therefore, that part of the process needs to be considered equally as an investment in the overall outcome of the project, as it is in the construction period. If he thinks that it is something different, he ought to explain why.

[The Chair]

Order. Interventions are getting very long. There will be an opportunity to respond at the end of this debate, Dr Whitehead.

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[Greg Hands]

Again, I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. The cost of different forms of power generation is a very interesting part of the energy debate. Obviously those costs move around and will be based on any number of factors, including global market prices and the cost of extracting and producing particular forms of energy. Nuclear’s advantage is its ability to provide a steady, constant baseload, which is not always the case with some of the other technologies the hon. Lady is comparing it with.

I hope I am not digressing too far, but when it comes to offshore wind, the UK has had enormous success. We have the world’s largest capacity. None the less, when the wind is not blowing and the sun is not shining, we have to have something else to provide that baseload. That is the purpose of nuclear power. The Bill is about making it more cost-effective and reasonable for consumers. That is the Government’s position.

I hope I have convinced hon. Members that this amendment would not achieve their goals of helping consumers. The concept of consumers investing in a plant and then recouping their money somehow is incompatible with the RAB model. There are mechanisms in place to give confidence that any RAB project will successfully lead to the means of delivering large amounts of stable, low-carbon energy to consumers. I hope the hon. Member will withdraw the amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

This really worries me. What does the Minister think consumers are doing in contributing to a RAB process? If the Minister does not think that that is in any way a form of investment in the plant and that consumers are just completely passive recipients—that they are good for whatever money is required to get the system through and should have no interest in the proceedings, other than being a milch cow for the process—I am afraid that we differ.

[Kirsty Blackman]

On that, consumers are investing in the significant profits for private companies that are in many cases not based in the UK. That seems to be the essence of the hon. Gentleman’s concerns and the reason he moved the amendment. Is that correct?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

Yes, indeed. This is perhaps a separate debate, but we have a position not just on this particular instance of nuclear power, but on similar arrangements that relate to the RIIO process for energy distribution and network companies, whereby they are enabled to charge an additional amount on bills in order to secure assets that they own and that consumers or the public do not. The consumers, however, are expected to pay for the privilege of having that piece of technology at their disposal subsequently, but the question of ownership never comes into it, because they pay collectively for someone else to have an asset to call its own. That is exactly the situation with the nuclear plant.

We therefore need to take the consumer rather more seriously than just being a passive contributor in the way often set out in such processes—“Oh well, the customer will pay an additional levy in the bill. As long as it doesn’t look too serious at any particular time, that’s okay.” Not only is that not okay, in particular for levies with no consequences if applied to customers, but it is not okay to have a cumulative set of levies that put a lot of money on electricity and gas bills over a period for particular purposes that the consumer has no hand in at all.

I agree that the concept of the consumer being a part investor in the process might sound a little odd to those who have a traditional view of an investor and how an investor works, it is nevertheless a real thing: the consumer is in effect investing in the success of the plant. The Secretary of State—the Minister; I have promoted him already—has set out how he sees the customer being involved in the process, but that completely ignores the proper interest and protection of the consumer and bill payer as far as the overall process is concerned.

The amendment would not make the RAB process impossible; it merely states that as part of that process—we will come to the debate about where allowable costs have been exceeded—yes, the customer invests in it, but the customer also has reasonable expectations of some quid pro quo for that investment. That ought to be looked after. The quid pro quo in this instance, as I set out—I am sure the Minister agrees that this takes place in the RAB process—is that in the production process, if there is an excess over the allowable costs of production, the fact that it is a regulated asset means that that money goes back to someone. In this instance, it should be the customer.

That is what I mean by the customers’ interests being protected in recouping their investment. The Minister surely cannot deny that that is part of, not instead of, the RAB process in the production period. That is actually set out in the notes that accompany the Bill. I am therefore a bit mystified as to how the Minister takes the position that he does, given what is in his own Bill and in the arrangements for RAB that he himself is putting forward. I see no reason why he should not accept the amendment if he has the customers’ interests at heart, because it does not detract from RAB; it adds to it by recognising who is paying the money, what their interests are and how they should be protected.

I will not press the amendment to a vote, but I want to record my disappointment in the Minister’s apparent lack of either understanding or empathy for the customer’s position. We are discussing a Bill in which the customer is central, because they are bankrolling a substantial part of the project as it goes forward. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Greg Hands]

I will try to speed up a little. As we know, the clause allows the Secretary of State to make the necessary licence modifications to apply a RAB model to a designated nuclear company. Subsection (2) clarifies that the effect of a licence modification is that the company would benefit from being able to receive an allowed revenue to construct, build, commission and operate a new nuclear power plant. Subsection (3) requires that the power be exercised only in relation to a nuclear company that is designated in accordance with the provisions of the Bill.

Licence modifications will not take effect unless the nuclear company whose licence has been modified subsequently enters into a revenue collection contract with a revenue collection counterparty, as set out in subsection (9). The modifications will be subject to negotiation between the Government and the nuclear company. It is therefore not possible to describe the exact modifications that would be required; however, subsection (5) highlights possible examples, such as the revenue that a company is allowed to receive, how that revenue is to be calculated, and the kinds of activities that may be undertaken by the company.

When making any modifications to a licence, subsection (4) requires the Secretary of State to take into account both our commitment to decarbonising the power sector and the interests of existing and future consumers with respect to the cost and supply of electricity. Alongside that, and to ensure that any RAB project is financeable, the Secretary of State, when making modifications under the clause, must have regard to the costs incurred in delivering the project and the need for the company to finance that activity. Together, those obligations will ensure that the modification powers are used so that the project contributes to a transition to a low-carbon, low-cost energy system.

As set out in subsection (3), the power to make modifications to a licence will last while the designation for a nuclear company is in effect. That is important to allow the Secretary of State to make modifications to the licence to take into account developments in negotiations and engagements with the financial market. When making any modifications in that period, the Secretary of State will need to continue to take account of the consultation that he undertook with all bodies named in clause 8. In addition to the modification of the designated nuclear company’s licence, subsections (7) and (8) allow him in very limited circumstances to modify the standard conditions of generation licences if necessary. The Secretary of State can make those modifications only if he considers it appropriate for consequential, supplementary or incidental purposes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Member for his contribution. The Government are satisfied that the amount of information included in the Bill is sufficient. Far be it from me to suggest that Members table amendments, but perhaps he might seek to do so if he wants to see more transparency and more information. I realise I was not quite right earlier in saying that the SNP had not tabled any amendments; I know that it has tabled some new clauses. If he wants additional publications, he might table some amendments on Report to be a little more precise about what additional information he thinks the Secretary of State should publish.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Licence modifications: relevant licensee nuclear companies

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 7, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“(3A) When exercising the power in subsection (1), the Secretary of State must not cause the excess of expenditure being incurred over the allowable revenue cap to lead to further charges upon revenue collection contracts.”

This amendment prevents the Secretary of State from allowing the levy of further consumer charges should an increase in allowable revenue be agreed following increases in costs or timescale of a nuclear project.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 12, in clause 7, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“(3A) When exercising the power in subsection (1), the Secretary of State must publish a statement setting out how an adjustment in the company’s allowed revenue is to be made without relying on revenue collection contracts.”

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to set out how an adjustment to allowed revenue, following an increase in costs or time, is to be provided for by means other than additional customer levies.

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[Dr Whitehead]

With these amendments, we get to the heart of the consumer interest in the Bill. They are closely related, so it is appropriate that they are grouped and spoken to together.

As I think hon. Members know, when the RAB process gets under way, one of the first things that will happen is that Ofgem will be required to draw up a programme of allowable revenue. That is the sum total of the amount that is considered to be within the RAB process. Much of the rest of the Bill is about how that allowable revenue is collected from customers, placed with the counterparty and allocated out to the nuclear company that undertakes the construction and subsequent production of a nuclear plant, and about the safeguards and concerns surrounding that process. The question of allowable revenue is crucial to the rest of the Bill.

Allowable revenue is made up of a number of building blocks. The return on capital must be assessed, as must depreciation, operating costs, the project’s taxation, grid costs, the funded decommissioning programme, incentives and other adjustments. Those all go into the pot of the allowable costs regime, which sets a ceiling for the amount of money that can be taken from the consumer, albeit that that is a contribution towards the process made by lots of people in small amounts on their bills over a period of time. It sets out the quantum of those contributions, and many adjustments can be made to how that works, in relation to the timescale of the process, the part of the allowable costs element that is placed into construction and the part that is placed into production. That is set out later in the Bill as part of the process of allocation from the counterparty body to the body that carries out nuclear construction and production.

As was mentioned earlier, it is not always the case that nuclear power plants are constructed exactly to cost and exactly to time. Indeed, if we look at the construction of nuclear power plants across the world, we find that all but one has run over time or over cost or both—in some instances by very large amounts. The allowable costs ceiling is therefore important for us to get a clear scope of what the customer will have to bear in this process. However, there is also a process in the Bill that allows that allowable costs ceiling to be raised, on the Secretary of State’s consideration, if the circumstances change. If the costs rise or the timescale slips, the Secretary of State can allow the allowable costs ceiling to be raised.

What that means in principle for the consumer is potential catastrophe, because the consumer thought they were in for a particular allowable costs ceiling that had been determined. We have heard already about the rather heroically optimistic cost assessments provided for in the Bill, and on that sort of allowable costs arrangement consumers would have about £1 put on their bills in the design phase, with a lot more—perhaps £10—on their bills in the construction phase. The amount would then taper down as production gets under way, with the possible payback of some money in the process. The overruns on construction costs or time costs could double or treble that amount, particularly during the construction period, in a way that the consumer would not have anticipated.

In the amendments, we suggest that the consumer should be in for the initial allowable costs ceiling estimate—and that is it. In circumstances where the Secretary of State is contemplating what should happen with the allowable costs ceiling, he should not cause any excessive expenditure simply to be plonked on to customers’ bills. At that point, if the costs or the timescale have changed, there are a number of options open to him as to how to deal with the new cost ceiling; that need not necessarily be done by simply raising the allowable costs ceiling. For example, it could be by adding a particular taxpayer’s investment to the project, or it could be by issuing nuclear bonds, which puts additional money into the company but does not impact on customer bills.

We are seeking to cap the RAB in terms of what the customer expectation of it is. That does not necessarily mean that the function of the RAB is determined by that cap; it just means that the exponential milking of the customer to fund the RAB does not take place and that the Secretary of State has recourse to other means and should publish, as amendment 12 says, what the plans would be in the event of an excess over the ceiling to make the project a success.

That is a very important part of the new deal as far as RAB is concerned. The customer is now being asked to invest, in the first instance, in the hope for a plant, well before the plant has been established; that is new—the CfD process is post the construction of the plant. They are being asked to underpin the expensive costs that are incurred during the construction period. They are also being asked to engage in a two-way process whereby, yes, they get cheaper bills but they are still potentially contributing to a RAB process as the production phase continues. So the very least we should expect on behalf of the customer is that they know what they are letting themselves in for at the time of the outcome of the project.

We are not talking about capping costs necessarily; we are talking about how those additional costs are paid for under the circumstances where they do rise. We obviously hope that, as the project progresses, those costs and timescales do not increase, but if they do we do not see that the customer needs to foot the additional bill; there needs to be other recourse. That is what we have put in these amendments, and should the Secretary of State consider in any way that the customer is an investor in this process, we hope he would consider that a reasonable way of dealing with the investment that the customer is undertaking in the process as a whole.

[Greg Hands]

I will speak for a little longer than I might ordinarily do, because this is an important question of consumer protection. I will try to deal with all the points raised by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test.

Amendment 11 would limit the ways in which the Secretary of State could exercise the powers under clause 7. As we know, clause 7 allows for a nuclear company’s allowed revenue to be increased should its financing cap be exceeded in construction, but only in certain circumstances and where a clear procedure is followed. The amendment seeks to prevent the Secretary of State from creating any additional recourse to consumer funding in the exercising of his or her powers under the clause. Amendment 12 proposes that the Secretary of State should be transparent about the funding of a nuclear RAB project were they prohibited from funding an extension to the allowed revenue through a revenue collection contract.

First, I draw the House’s attention to the remoteness of the scenario under which the Secretary of State may choose to exercise the power under clause 7. Under a RAB model, the licence would determine a risk-sharing mechanism, whereby construction cost overruns up to the agreed financing cap are shared between investors and consumers. We expect that any RAB structure will ensure that financial incentives are in place to ensure the company’s investors manage project costs and schedules. The financing cap will be based on robust risk analysis, including best-practice, reference-class modelling, and set at a level that is sufficiently remote that there is a very low chance that it would be reached.

However, in the event that the financing cap is reached, investors would not be obliged to provide the capital to complete the project and this risks considerable sunk costs to consumers if the project is discontinued. Given the size and importance of the project, the Government consider it crucial that there is a mechanism in place to allow the additional capital to be raised to ensure completion of the project, and that decisions to extend the project’s revenue rest with the Secretary of State.

I would emphasise at this point that any decision taken by the Secretary of State to adjust the allowed revenue is one that is subject to a robust process of scrutiny and transparency. The Secretary of State could exercise the power to extend the allowed revenue only following consultation with the licensee, the ONR and Ofgem, which, I remind the Committee, has as its primary statutory duty the need to protect the interests of existing and future consumers with respect to the cost and security of the supply of electricity.

In exercising the power, the Secretary of State must continue to have regard to those matters detailed in clause 6(4), which includes the interests of existing and future consumers with respect to the cost of supply of electricity. As is consistent with our approach across the Bill, we have sought to ensure a transparency process whereby the Secretary of State is required to publish a statement setting out the procedure to be followed when exercising this power. That is set out in subsection (6).

--- Later in debate ---

I would remind everybody that that provision is further strengthened by the Secretary of State consulting Ofgem. Ofgem has a statutory duty to protect consumers during the consideration of the application from investors before any decision is made. That will ensure that consumer interests are rightly protected as we maximise the likelihood that consumers will reap the benefits of the project they helped to build. That is the consumer protection embedded in this Bill. I therefore hope that hon. Members will respect the process that we have put in place, and I ask them not to press amendments 11 and 12.

[Dr Whitehead]

That is very disappointing. The Minister has effectively said that the customer has no say in this arrangement. He used the phrase “reduce the options to Ministers”; yes, this would reduce the options available to Ministers—it would make them think about how they should put forward other ways of covering a breach of the allowed expenditure without simply fleecing customers. The Minister may think that one of his options ought to be to fleece customers—that might be the universe he inhabits—but we do not think that should be the case. We think that the customer must have much clearer lines of protection, other than the very woolly things that the Minister has said that might cause the customer to be given some consideration in this process. For those reasons, we would like to divide on amendment 11.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Question negatived.

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 7, page 7, line 17, after “operations” insert

“and have generated power for placement onto the National Grid”.

This amendment amends the definition of the completion of construction of the nuclear project to include initial generation of power.

The amendment relates to statements made, for the purpose of licence modifications, about the completion of the construction of a nuclear project. Clause 7(5) states that completion of the project should be based on

“successful completion of such procedures and tests relating to the project as constitute, at the time they are undertaken, the usual industry standards and practices for nuclear energy generation projects in order to demonstrate that they are capable of commercial operations.”

I wonder whether hon. Members can spot what is missing from that subsection. This is not a quiz, and I think hon. Members have long gone to sleep—but in case not, the answer is that there is no suggestion in it that the nuclear power station actually has to produce anything. Construction could be regarded as complete provided that all the hoops have been jumped through, even if no button has actually been pressed. Presumably what one would regard as the original purpose of the whole operation is that it should produce some power that goes into people’s homes, buildings and so on.

The amendment simply says that not only must all those things be completed, but the project must do what it was originally supposed to do: generate power. As the amendment describes it, the project must

“have generated power for placement onto the National Grid”.

That seems a very modest amendment, but it would put right what I think is rather a serious omission in clause 7(5) with respect to the whole idea of what a nuclear power station is for. Surely we must agree that generating power is the purpose of a nuclear power station, and that completion must therefore be based on that purpose.

I cannot see any great reason why the amendment should not be accepted, but I am sure that the Minister has a very good argument why not.

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for moving his amendment. It is important that we consider that the scenario is remote; before allowing any project to have a RAB, we will obviously have conducted robust due diligence, using best practice benchmarking analysis to set the financing cap at a remote level. The project’s investors will be incentivised to control costs below that level and will be penalised for project overruns. We are clear that this power of modification should be exercisable only during the construction of the plant, and have sought to do this in clause 7(4). This determines that this power cannot be exercised at any point once construction has been completed. For the purposes of this clause, we have defined the construction phase in clause 7(5).

The amendment would provide further qualification to the definition of the end of a project’s construction phase. It seems to make it explicit that the purpose of the construction phase of the nuclear project is to build a plant that will contribute electricity to the national grid, and that might appear fair enough. However, the clause is intended to cover both the period of construction and the testing of the plant, to ensure that it can operate commercially to provide power. An early part of this testing is the connection of the plant to begin to provide power to the national grid. However, there is further testing that follows, to ensure that the plant can operate effectively throughout its life. We consider it appropriate that the option to increase funding to complete the project should run until all testing completes.

In a nutshell, I think the cut-off point proposed by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test is too early in the process. The point at which the power station connects to the national grid is not the point at which one can have 100% confidence in the project from there. Therefore, I thank the hon. Gentleman for his interest and concern, and of course we would not wish to see consumers being penalised, but unfortunately I think he strikes the wrong point in the process at which this clause would kick in. I urge him to withdraw the amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

I concede that I may not have fully understood all the various tests that are undertaken to usual industry standards, but nowhere in this clause does it say that those tests include the production of power. That is my central point. It is a bit like going into a car showroom and being shown a really nice vehicle. It has all the bells and whistles on it, and all the guarantees; it looks greats and the paint is really good. But when one asks to go for a test drive, the person in showrooms says, “I’m sorry, you can’t do that, Sir; it hasn’t got an engine in it.” Surely it must be about producing power. That ought to be explicitly in the Bill. That is my only point. If the Minister thinks that, concealed in all these various tests is the production of power, which does not seem to be the case to me, then maybe that is not needed on the face of the Bill. I think it would be rather good if it were on the face of the Bill.

[Dr Jamie Wallis (Bridgend) (Con)]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that we are in a very sorry place indeed if all the usual industry standards and practices for nuclear energy production do not actually include the production of energy?

[Dr Whitehead]

We would be in a sorry place, but that is effectively what the clause appears to state. It is all about the fact that it could produce energy, not that it does produce energy. Those are two potentially different things. The hon. Gentleman is right about the industry standards that set it all up to make sure that energy can be produced. I merely think it might be a good idea if we found out if it did produce that energy.

[Alan Brown]

I do not want to go on for too long but, further to the previous intervention, is it not the case that it can easily be argued that the EPR reactors currently being built are capable of generating electricity, but not one of the two EPRs under construction in Europe have started generating electricity for the grid? They are actually 10 years late, which underlines the point made by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Member makes a good point. We have a number of nuclear reactors in Europe that look like they can produce energy, and they are still standing there not producing energy, many years after they were supposed to do so.

We will not press the amendment to a vote. I am a little disappointed that the Minister did not take the opportunity to add to the Bill what I think an average person reading the Bill would think obvious, but I know we cannot get what we want all the time. He has put forward reasons why he thinks that point is covered elsewhere in the clause. It would have been good if it was more transparent and up front. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

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[Greg Hands]

The financing cap will be set out at the beginning of the project by the Secretary of State. It will be available to be scrutinised. The purpose of the power in the clause relates to what happens in the event that we approach the financing cap.

The clause would have relevance in the very unlikely situation that, during construction, the project is likely to breach its financing cap under a RAB. The financing cap is the point at which investors are no longer required to put money into the project. What happens then? The cap is set at a remote overrun threshold. This means that before committing to a company having a RAB, the Secretary of State should be confident that the prospect of costs hitting that threshold is really very unlikely. Under the RAB licence, mechanics will be in place to incentivise investors to minimise costs and schedule overruns, such as overrun penalties. That will ensure that the breach of the financing cap is a remote risk.

When deciding whether to exercise the powers, subsection (3) means that the Secretary of State will need to have regard to the achievement of carbon targets and the interests of consumers, and whether the company is able to finance its activities. Those are the same considerations as when deciding whether to amend the company’s licence to insert the RAB conditions in clause 6. Given the strategic importance of a new nuclear plant, and the wider considerations, such as our need to secure resilient low-carbon energy, it is more appropriate that such a decision is made by the Secretary of State in this instance.

The Secretary of State is also the most appropriate person to balance the interests of consumers, taxpayers and investors. It is not about putting additional burdens on consumers. The RAB is designed to protect consumers by giving them a more cost-effective nuclear power plant, as shown by the steps that we have taken in the Bill. That includes robust due diligence before the final investment decision to be confident that the project will be effectively managed, incentives on the project in construction, penalties for investors in any overrun scenario, and the option for the Government to step in if the project hits extreme overruns.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

Procedure etc relating to modifications under section 6 or 7

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 13, in clause 8, page 8, line 11, leave out from “power” to end of line.

This amendment strengthens the requirement on the Secretary of State to publish details of license modifications.

Ms Fovargue, as there are no amendments or objections to the clauses from this one to the end of part 1, I suggest that it might be possible to dispose of them collectively to get to the end of part 1 this afternoon. The Opposition would have no objection to that.

I will be brief. Amendment 13 simply says that if the Secretary of State is going to publish something, they should get on and publish it. As it stands, the clause states:

“The Secretary of State must publish details of any modifications made under a relevant power as soon as reasonably practicable after they are made.”

That is a weaselly dilution of the “must” at the start of the line—if the Secretary of State must publish details, they should just get on with it. Hon. Members will see that the following subsection states:

“If…the Secretary of State makes a modification…the Authority must…publish the modification.”

That does not have the little weasel phrase at the end, so why is that weasel phrase in subsection (5) and not subsection (6)?

[Alan Brown]

I do not want to be a pain, but does not deleting

“as soon as reasonably practicable after they are made”

make the timescale for the Secretary of State to publish open-ended? In a way, the amendment is not tightening the timescale but leaving it more open-ended.

[Dr Whitehead]

My concern in this clause is that the phrase

“as soon as reasonably practicable”

gives the opportunity for almost limitless delay to publication. If the Secretary of State must publish details of any modifications, he must, and if he does not, he can be called up under the terms of the Bill. If that weasel phrase is in it, however, the delay could last for a long time. I suggest that the amendment tightens it up by saying that it should be published and that is it.

[Alan Brown]

I realise that we are arguing over semantics, but perhaps it should be amended to be “must publish details of any modifications made under a relevant power once that modification has been made” to try to bring absolute clarity that it needs to be published right away.

[Dr Whitehead]

Yes, that might have been a good idea, but unfortunately it is not on the amendment paper this afternoon. My amendment is, so I hope the Minister will consider ensuring that subsections (5) and (6) are consistent, so that both modifications made under both are required to be published, full stop.

[Greg Hands]

Amendment 13 addresses how soon the Secretary of State should be obliged to publish the details of any modification made under the relevant powers, as already referred to. We think the clause already provides a clear and transparent process, which includes consulting the named parties before exercising these powers and modifications, and then publishing medications made

“as soon as reasonably practicable”

after the fact. Of course, publication can exempt matters that are commercially sensitive or that relate to national security.

The purpose of the amendment is to remove the obligation on the Secretary of State to publish the details of any modifications as soon as practicable after they are made. The Secretary of State would therefore not be subject to an express time obligation on when the details of the modifications must be published. I welcome the Opposition’s focus on ensuring transparency throughout the process of setting up a RAB for a project. We recognise that decisions to modify licences are important, and we believe it is necessary to provide a transparent decision-making process in legislation, as the Bill seeks to do.

I believe the amendment would reduce transparency, not increase it. I do not consider that it will help us to achieve the objective of a clear and transparent decision-making process. Removing the express obligation on the Secretary of State to publish details of any modifications as soon as reasonably practicable could result in uncertainty about when they should be published, which might cause the Secretary of State to unnecessarily delay the publication informing the public, stakeholders or industries of the modifications made. I hope that the hon. Members for Southampton, Test and for Greenwich and Woolwich will agree with that position; the amendment would reduce transparency, not increase it. I therefore ask that amendment 13 be withdrawn.

[Dr Whitehead]

I think we perhaps have a slight divergence of opinion here. We were seeking to simplify and create an imperative for publication by reducing the qualifications on that publication. The Minister has sought to suggest otherwise. We will have to disagree on that; however, we do not wish to push this to a vote this afternoon, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Expiry of modifications made under section 6

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 10 to 14 stand part.

Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 23rd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Greg Hands)]

Welcome back to the Chair, Ms Fovargue. For the benefit of colleagues, I will speak briefly on the clause, which introduces part 2 of the Bill, and what that is all about. The clause gives a power to the Secretary of State to make regulations about revenue collection contracts, which operate between a revenue collection counterparty and a designated nuclear company, referring back to part 1. Contracts will require the revenue collection counterparty to collect payments from Great Britain electricity suppliers and pass them to the licensee nuclear company so that it can receive its allowed revenue. Subject to consent being given, we expect the Low Carbon Contracts Company to take on the role of the counterparty.

Clauses 16 to 24 set out in further detail what the regulations may cover in relation to the contracts. They could include, for example, the duties of the counterparty, the amounts that electricity suppliers must pay and how the authority will enforce the contract. The legislation will enable payments to flow in the opposite direction if necessary, such as in circumstances where the nuclear company receives more than its allowed revenue. The regulations will ensure that the nuclear company can receive its allowed revenue in a consistent and stable flow. Importantly, the regulations throughout this part are based on existing regulations governing the revenue model under the contracts for difference regime, taking precedent from the Energy Act 2013. Regulations relating to clauses to 16 to 22 and the first regulations made under clauses 23 or 24 will be made using the affirmative procedure. They will therefore be subject to a greater level of scrutiny, as we know, as such statutory instruments must be approved by a resolution of both Houses of Parliament.

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Fovargue. Like the Minister, I would like to spend a moment announcing, as it were, this part of the Bill, which I hope we can get through in an orderly and suitably speedy fashion. It is however important to share an understanding of what we think this part is about. As the Minister said, it concerns the setting-up of revenue collection contracts; the setting-up of a counterparty to hold the revenue collected from suppliers to underpin action by the nuclear company in terms of construction; and, importantly, as he said—he seemed a little concerned when I mentioned this in our previous sitting—revenue collection and distribution during both the construction and production phases of a nuclear project.

My understanding is that during the production phase, the nature of the revenue collection changes. During the construction phase, within the overall allowable costs architecture, the nuclear company is likely to absorb whatever comes its way from the counterparty for the purposes of underpinning the construction costs of the nuclear plant. Obviously, there are debates to be held on that and further regulations to be put in place concerning how the revenue stream for a nuclear company is carried out and the requirements of the construction at various phases.

We have debated to some extent the instance whereby the allowable costs ceiling is breached because of rising costs, particularly during production; whether the regulator would have the opportunity to revisit the allowable costs ceiling; and what effect that would have on the run through the regulated asset base process to customer bills as a result of those recalculations. However, there are issues with what revenue stream goes into the nuclear company, and at what stage during construction, but that is within the overall costs ceiling, or should be, in the first instance.

During the production phase of a nuclear plant, the relationship between collection, distribution and re-disbursement becomes a little more complicated. I would be obliged if the Minister could shed a little light on some of the things that happen during the production process, which are still slightly unclear. That is important because, in the production process, the receipt of funding under the RAB process becomes a comparative issue. The company is making money and producing electricity, and one would expect that, as a result of the RAB model, the money that is being made by the company would sit within the parameters of what has been agreed for the regulated rate of return under the RAB model. If the company is making more money from its production of electricity than is allowed within the overall model’s parameters, that money starts coming back to the counterparty or, at least indirectly, through to customers.

Conversely, if the company is making less money from its production than is allowed within the RAB model for production purposes, money continues to come in under the allowable costs ceiling. The best explanation is given on page 21 of the consultation document on a RAB model for nuclear, which suggests:

“Suppliers could pass the cost of the payment obligation onto their consumers, as they do with other regulated costs and could likewise reimburse their consumers (as happens under a CfD) in periods where suppliers receive payments from the project company (e.g. when the Allowed Revenue is lower than the project company’s revenue from power sales). The design process would need to consider how these charges could be made in more detail, in consultation with suppliers and consumer representatives.”

That is essentially the model during the production phase: it is potentially a two-way process.

That issue reflects, at least to some extent, the amendments that we wish to discuss this afternoon —an understanding of how the money goes into the counterparty, what the counterparty does with the money, what the counterparty does when the money is held, and what the counterparty does if that money may not be needed, or money has been paid back into it by the nuclear company during the production phase. Consideration of how that happens, where that money goes and what sort of requirements one should place on that process are at the heart of some of our amendments.

I thought it important to check whether we have a shared understanding with the Minister of how the process works. Assuming that we do, we can discuss the amendments on the basis of that shared understanding of what this part of the Bill sets out to do. That is essentially a contribution to the clause stand part debate, but I hope that it clarifies how we will proceed with part 2 as a whole, and that it will be helpful to the Committee.

[Alan Brown (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Ms Fovargue. It was interesting that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test spoke about a shared understanding. I wish I had one; I do not think that the Bill is good enough to have any shared understanding of what it is about. Part 1 is clearly all about the definition of designating a nuclear company, and then a blank cheque in terms of defining costs. It seems to me that part 2 is all about how the blank cheque moneys are recouped in revenue collection.

I have one point to put to the Minister. Explanatory note 119 states:

“The terms of a revenue collection contract will be bilaterally negotiated between the Secretary of State and an eligible nuclear company to be designated under Part 1.”

Would he enlighten me on what expertise the Secretary of State has in negotiating a revenue collection contract for a new nuclear power station, how that will be undertaken in a transparent manner, and what options are available for scrutiny of that?

[Greg Hands]

I thank both hon. Gentlemen for their contributions. I will try to be as helpful as I can. Rather than setting any hares running, it is essentially a very similar process to how contracts for difference work under the Energy Act 2013. There is nothing essentially different here, other than the fact that it is about nuclear power generation and has the RAB model. What we are talking about in this part of the Bill is essentially the same process that is being used for contracts for difference under the 2013 Act. I am always slightly reluctant when an Opposition Member asks whether we have a shared understanding. It strikes me as often being slightly dangerous to give a blank cheque on that. My understanding of the process, and I think the Opposition would agree, is that it is essentially the same process that we have been using for contracts for difference through the collection company.

[Dr Whitehead]

I substantially agree that that is essentially how the process works, except that of course with CfDs the customer contribution does not change at all once the CfD has been implemented because there is a constant price. The difference is in the company getting the difference between the reference and the strike price, not what the customer pays for electricity bills or pays into the process itself.

[Greg Hands]

Here there will be a frequent resetting, which is likely to be twice yearly, in terms of the amount of money that has been collected, followed by a reconciliation at the end of the period, but a lot of the detail will be set out in the draft regulations. The hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun asked what expertise the Secretary of State has to negotiate such a deal. As I said, this has been a tried-and-tested methodology over the past eight years. When we say “the Secretary of State”, we mean that the individual who is the Secretary of State is the decision maker, but acts with the advice of a group of excellent officials at the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. That is the normal way in which any reference to a Secretary of State is made in primary legislation. As I say, the legislation is very much based on the Energy Act 2013 and how it looks at the contracts for difference regime.

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[Greg Hands]

The power in clause 16 will enable the Secretary of State to designate an eligible and consenting company or public authority to be the revenue collection counterparty for revenue collection contracts. As stated earlier, the Government intend that the Low Carbon Contracts Company should fill that role. The counterparty will be responsible for collecting payments from electricity suppliers and making payments to the relevant licensee nuclear company, as well as collecting any payments from the licensee and making payments back to electricity suppliers.

Unlike contracts for difference, the authority will be solely responsible for determining amounts to be paid to or by the revenue collection counterparty, and would be responsible for communicating that to the counterparty. That responsibility is facilitated by regulations making provision to require information to be shared by the authority, a revenue collection counterparty, and the national system operator under clause 23, on information and advice. The power to designate a counterparty will commence at the point of Royal Assent to support the Government’s aim of bringing at least one large-scale nuclear project to the point of final investment decision within this Parliament.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Duties of a revenue collection counterparty

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 17, page 14, line 31, leave out “may” and insert “must”.

Although I have set out some of the shared under- standings that I think necessary for the three amendments that we will move this afternoon, this is not one of them. Amendment 14 addresses the text of the Bill, and puts in place small question marks about what that text means for the Secretary of State’s responsibilities, particularly in relation to the duties of a revenue collection counterparty.

At the moment, clause 17(1) states:

“A revenue collection counterparty must act in accordance with…any direction given by the Secretary of State”

and

“any provision included in revenue regulations.”

That theme of “must” continues in subsection (4), which states:

“A revenue counterparty must exercise the functions conferred by or by virtue of this Part so as to ensure that it can meet its liabilities under any revenue collection contract”.

It is an imperative. And subsection (5) states:

“Revenue regulations must include such provision as the Secretary of State considers necessary so as to ensure that a revenue collection counterparty can meet its liabilities under any revenue collection contract to which it is a party.”

Clearly, those “musts” are imperatives for the revenue collection counterparty to undertake. It “must” act in accordance with directions given by the Secretary of State; it “must” ensure that it can meet its liabilities; and it “must” meet its liabilities under any revenue collection contract.

Then we go to subsection (2) and look at the provision for the regulations themselves, which logically should follow on from the imperatives that I have set out, but we see this statement:

“Revenue regulations may make provision”.

The regulations that carry out the imperatives of the other provisions of the clause do not appear to have the same imperative applied to them.

I appreciate that the word “may” in legislation is a perfectly reasonable and acceptable term where something can be done as part of a series of powers that perhaps a Secretary of State has. A Secretary of State may decide to do various things under those powers. Indeed, we get some enlightenment on that in subsection (3), which refers to the

“provision that may be made by virtue of subsection (2)”.

That is a proper use of the word “may”.

However, in this case, what the word “may” appears to suggest is that the regulations that follow from the imperatives do not have to make provision for these particular things; they “may” make provision. There is no direction from the senior Bill to secondary legislation to actually follow the imperatives in the Bill. If the regulations do not happen to make provision, they simply do not, because they “may” make provision; they do not have to do so. That appears to me to be not a very good way of ensuring that the things that should happen under this clause actually do happen.

I know that we are all good Members of the House—I am sure that if legislation suggested that we should do particular things, we would do them—but that is not quite the point. Legislation from this place is supposed to stand the test of time, cope with the vicissitudes of Administrations as they come and go, and ensure that what the legislation intended will actually be done, so either this legislation intends that these regulations do not have to be made or the word “may” is a little less than robust, hence the very modest and small amendment that we have suggested. It would replace the word “may” in subsection (2) with the word “must”, so that there was consistency throughout the clause. It would not be a major change to the Bill, but might strengthen it a little and give a little more certainty about its operation.

[Greg Hands]

As the hon. Gentleman outlined, the amendment addresses what the regulations relating to revenue collection contracts may or must contain. The amendment relates to the duties of the revenue collection counterparty in clause 17. The counterparty will be the body responsible for channelling funds between the designated nuclear company and suppliers. Currently, the Bill gives a discretionary power to make regulations that can ensure that the revenue collection counterparty, first, enters arrangements or offers to contract for the purpose of a revenue collection contract; secondly, must, may or may not do certain actions; and thirdly, undertakes or does not undertake actions specified in the regulations or the direction by the Secretary of State. The legislation further clarifies, for example, that the directions may cover, among other things, the enforcement, variation or exercise of right under a revenue collection contract. Amendment 14, moved by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, seeks to make it obligatory that the revenue collection contracts will cover these areas whenever they are made. I welcome the hon. Member’s engagement with the detail of the revenue collection regulations, which will play a key role in the functioning of the RAB. However, I do not believe that the approach suggested by the amendment improves our arrangements for the regulations.

First, it is the Government’s intention that the regulation made to establish the RAB revenue stream would likely contain all of the topics set out. Obliging them to be included would be unnecessarily restrictive at a point where we are still developing the structure of the regulations, which will be brought forward by the affirmative procedure in due course. It is therefore important that the power remains discretionary, to allow for sufficient flexibility as we progress the policy. Secondly, the amendment seeks to override the original intention of the clause, which was to provide an indicative, non-exhaustive list of what the regulations may cover. That approach is precedented by the Energy Act 2013, particularly in section 21, as well as in other clauses in this Bill. It is entirely regular to use the word “may” for things that we think will be likely to be included.

Finally, as currently drafted, the amendment appears to be in conflict with subsection (3), because the change from “may” to “must” is not reflected there—subsection (3) builds on the subsection that amendment 15 addresses. That leads to an inconsistency in drafting, where subsection (2) would state that the topics “must” be covered, whereas subsection (3) limits it to “may”. I welcome the hon. Member’s scrutiny of, and engagement with, the detail of the revenue provisions in part 2 of the Bill; I recognise the Opposition’s concerns around ensuring that regulation is sufficiently robust. However, I do not believe that the amendment is the way to achieve that, and I hope that hon. Members will withdraw it.

[Dr Whitehead]

I appreciate that this is a habitual piece of drafting in legislation, found not just in this Bill but in a number of others. One of my hopes with legislation has always been that a group of Members might be courageous enough on one occasion to say, “This is lax writing of legislation and we should not put up with it. We should have what it means included in the Bill.” I appreciate that the lax writing of the legislation may not be lax at all—it may be deliberately giving the Secretary of State a lot more leeway where things are not entirely sorted out. When we look at this clause, we can see that there already is, in subsection (2)(c), substantial leeway for the Secretary of State to take

“further powers to direct a revenue collection counterparty to do, or not to do, things specified in the regulations or the direction.”

That is pretty wide leeway for the Secretary of State to have in the Bill already.

What the “may” does in this subsection is to cast further uncertainty on what sort of things the Secretary of State may do. I am sure that the Secretary of State will actually want, on this occasion, a “must” for what is conferred on the Secretary of State with further powers. That is very helpful to the Secretary of State for precisely the reasons that the Minister outlined a moment ago. The “may” that is in subsection (3) is a different sense of the word “may”. How it would read fully is, “the provision that may well be made by virtue of subsection (2).” It is used in the conditional, whereas the “may” in subsection (2) is a dilution of the imperative. I am sure that the Minister will be pleased to know that that is the case, but I am afraid that it does not accord with what he had to say about the use of “may” and “must” in this provision.

I am not going to press the amendment to a Division, but I think we need to be more careful about how we draft our legislation overall, to make sure that it does what it says on the outside. I am sure this will not be the last opportunity to raise this issue in the Bill. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18

Direction to offer to contract

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[Greg Hands]

Clause 18 builds on clause 17. Subsection (1) explicitly gives the Secretary of State the power to direct a revenue collection counterparty to offer to contract with a designated nuclear company on terms specified in the direction. Those terms will be the outcome of negotiations between the Government and the project company. This power is again replicated from the contract for difference, namely section 10 of the Energy Act 2013, but has been adapted to account for the nature of the revenue collection contracts as a bespoke arrangement.

Regulations can set out the circumstances in which a direction to contract can or must be made, as well as the terms that may or must be attached to the direction. If the Secretary of State does not have the ability to specify when a contract should be offered under the legislation, there could be delays in the offering of a contract to a project company. That could damage investor confidence and slow progress on the project at a crucial time.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19

Supplier obligation

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 19, page 16, line 11, at end insert—

“(4A) Revenue regulations may make provision to prevent electricity suppliers from recovering the costs of paying a revenue collection counterparty from customers who qualify for the Warm Home Discount Scheme.”

This amendment would mean that electricity bill payers who qualify for the Warm Homes Discount scheme would not be liable for levies on their bills that pay into the RAB revenue collection fund.

Amendment 15 relates to the latter end of clause 19. Hon. Members will see that the clause suggests that revenue regulations may make provision for electricity suppliers to pay a revenue collection counterparty for a number of purposes, including

“to hold sums in reserve; to cover losses in the case of insolvency or default of an electricity supplier.”

According to our shared understanding of how the RAB would work, the regulations would require electricity suppliers to pay into a revenue collection counterparty for those purposes. Thereby, as the RAB consultation makes clear, if that company has been required to pay into the revenue collection counterparty, the company could make restitution for the money it had paid into the revenue collection counterparty by adjusting its bills to reflect that fact.

We are in exactly the same territory as contracts for difference, where there is a levy on customers and the supply company recovers the money that it has paid into the levy fund by passing that levy on to customers in their bills. We have a problem with placing additional levies on already sky-high bills, but that is how this arrangement will work. We question how that process will work. As hon. Members will also know, we currently have within our electricity supply arrangements a warm home discount scheme, which provides for a number of bill payers to get £140 off their bills each year if they qualify. There are some issues about the size of the company relating to that obligation but, in principle, pretty much all customers on a low income or a guaranteed credit element of pension credit will, or should, receive that warm home discount.

The energy company has to supply that discount to its customers. It may socialise the costs through its overall bills as a sort of secondary levy, but it gives a proportion of electricity customers a permanent reduction in their bills due to their particular circumstances, such as—as the discount suggests—particular fuel poverty-type issues in heating their homes and meeting their fuel bills.

The effect of a levy—in this instance, quite a substantial levy—to customers under these circumstances, particularly during the construction phase of a regulated asset base operation, would be to put, say, an extra £10 on the bill of someone who is already receiving a warm home discount, so that their fuel bills go up. A number of people would be placed in fuel poverty as a result of that difference, and therefore, ironically, it is quite possible that more people would be eligible for the warm home discount as a result.

When and if this levy comes on stream, we do not think that the process should include the supply company passing on that increase to those people who are already paying their bills but have a warm home discount. Those companies should not be able to recover the cost of payment into the revenue collection counterparty by passing it to those people receiving warm home discount. This would mean a socialisation of that cost to other bill payers, but the warm home discount would nevertheless remain at the right proportion of the bill, not diminish in value because that person was required to pay that levy to the energy company so that it could recoup its costs related to the revenue collection counterparty.

This is quite a simple amendment to try to return that warm home discount to the position that it would have been in before that levy was introduced. I would suggest that it is in line with what the Government intended for that warm home discount in the first place. Although other customers may pay a little more on their bills, it would maintain the relative billing position for the poorest and most vulnerable customers, including those in receipt of a guaranteed credit element of pension credit, helping those who have considerable difficulties in paying bills and are perhaps in fuel poverty as a result. We would like this power to ensure that energy companies do not incorporate those customers into the arrangements for collection and distribution of money coming into the revenue collection counterparty.

[Alan Brown]

I will just say a couple of things. I was listening to the arguments and if the amendment goes to a vote, I will be happy to support it and do anything I can to try to support the most vulnerable and not create any more fuel poverty. Listening to the arguments, they seem to confirm that the concept as a whole is a costly burden on consumers. As the shadow Minister said, it creates a levy that will put more people into fuel poverty. The levy will not just last for a few years; it starts with a construction period of 10 to 15 years in all likelihood and then a 60-year contract. Rather than tinkering at the edges, protecting some people and pushing other people into fuel poverty, the heart of the matter is that this is a costly white elephant exercise. That said, I would still support the amendment for what it aims to do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Hands]

The hon. Gentleman asks a fair question, which I would answer in a couple of ways. First, this issue is best considered in the round as part of the process we have outlined, with the consultation and decisions to be made next year. Secondly, the actual amount would depend very much on the nuclear project in question. What we have shown is that we believe the RAB model will make bills overall less expensive to the consumer by roughly £10 a year for an average dual-fuel bill payer, as the hon. Gentleman has rightly pointed out. However, that amount will ultimately depend on the size and scope of the nuclear plant that is proposed. I think a better way to deal with this issue is to deal with it in the round, in the way the Government are proposing. I stress that the RAB is designed to save consumers money over the life of the plant; that is one of the key reasons why we are proposing it.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Southampton, Test for tabling this carefully considered amendment and for raising the important issue of energy costs for low-income households. Nevertheless, I hope that I have shown both that the Government are already taking action to help this group and that this clause forms part of a wider conversation about how we transition our energy system away from fossil fuels in a way that is fair and affordable for all. I therefore hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

I am not sure that the Minister quite gets this. The warm home discount was introduced in 2011 and has been at the level of £140 since then, so the Government suggesting that it should be increased to £150 is not an action of unparalleled generosity: it actually just catches up with inflation over the period that the warm home discount has been in place. That discount has been decreasing in value in real terms over the years, so increasing it is simply a matter of reasonable housekeeping, rather than innate generosity.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way; apologies to my hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun for getting in first. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that, given the massive increases in energy prices that we have seen—way outstripping inflation—this increase does not touch the sides of what is needed?

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Member is absolutely right. I am sure that we could do some back-of-a-fag-packet calculations about what we are going to need from the warm home discount, given the rises that are likely to occur under the fuel price cap in the coming spring and over the next six months, but it will certainly be rather more than £10.

[Alan Brown]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that another odd aspect of the Minister’s argument is that raising the warm home discount to £150—an extra £10—is really significant and helps people, but an extra £10 on their bill is okay and something we do not need to worry about? The two cannot both be right.

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Member makes a very interesting point, which I was rather slower than him to get to. He is quite right: if this is going to be £1 a month during the construction phase, therefore adding only £10 to £12 to the bill per year, it is contradictory to say that one is insignificant while the other is very significant.

There is also the fact that £12 a year, or £10 a year or whatever, will affect different people’s bills in different ways, because the bill for a large family, or someone with a large house, will be higher in total, and the £12 nuclear levy will be a smaller proportion of it than for someone who is eligible for the warm home discount—perhaps a single pensioner living in a small house, with a lower bill but nevertheless without the wherewithal to pay it. That £12 would be a higher imposition on their bill than it would on other people’s bills.

I think we all agree that the warm home discount is an important actor in combating fuel poverty and ensuring that the most vulnerable people in our society as far as energy costs are concerned do not have it even worse than they do at the moment and are given some assistance with their bills. We all ought to be very mindful of that when we put levies on people’s bills. What the Minister says about who we do and do not put into fuel poverty when we change levies on fuel bills is true, but that is an argument for better indexation, not for continuing with the warm home discount in the way that we are.

I am sorry to say that we will have to divide the Committee, because we think that this is an important principle that ought to be upheld. We do not want to the effects of the levies, which of course may be much more than £12, depending on how the allowable costs ceiling goes, to directly affect the warm home discount, which we think is a very important part of the energy landscape and the battle to combat fuel poverty. We would like it to be on the record that we did not simply allow this to be brushed under the carpet, and therefore wish to vote on the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that I have again made my concerns about aspects of the Bill clear. There are genuinely unintended consequences that could flow from the operation of clause 19 and demanding collateral up front. As I said in my optimistic opening sentences, I look forward to the Minister accepting the amendment and saying, “Well done and thank you.”

[Dr Whitehead]

I am very sympathetic to the amendment, although I do not think that it will do exactly what the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun would like. It would be helpful to have some clarification from the Minister as to exactly how the payments will be organised by the revenue counterparty body.

Although those payments are up front, in that the electricity supply companies would be required to make a payment on behalf of the customer into the counterparty before the power station had been built, that does not mean that the payment would all be up front. It means that the payment would be staggered over a period, which might be the whole of the production period of the nuclear power plant, according to what was required at particular times of the construction, so that the counterparty had sufficient funds to meet those calls from its revenues at any one time, but did not have a large surplus against calls. The counterparty would therefore have to modulate and regulate its calls on the energy supply companies as the process of construction continued.

Presumably, then, a company’s health would not be set against an overall up-front payment in that instance. All companies would be required to pay into that levy arrangement regularly, so there would not be a greater demand on one company than another or a large amount of money demanded in one go. That is my understanding of how the system would work, but I appreciate what the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun said about the 23 companies that have gone bust recently. As the energy market stabilises, I think there will not be many companies to take a levy from in the first place. Those companies that are able to pay a levy will by and large be those that were in sufficiently robust health in the first instance to weather the storm of high gas prices and high energy costs—there are a number of other reasons why companies may or may not be reasonably robust but that is a debate for another day.

Overall, I do not think that the amendment does exactly what it is intended to do.

[Alan Brown]

I think I understand the point that the hon. Gentleman is making, but subsection (4) says:

“Revenue regulations may make provision to require electricity suppliers to provide financial collateral to a revenue collection counterparty (whether in cash, securities or any other form).”

I still read that as meaning that cash could be asked for to be paid up front.

[Dr Whitehead]

Indeed, and that is why we need better clarification from the Minister. Is there a distinction between cash up front in general—that is, one pays before getting any result from a nuclear plant that is being built—or cash up front in the sense of taking all the stuff in the agreed revenue allowance? Would that be taken either mostly up front, all in one go, or at level that an energy company would find unaffordable during particular elements of the process? There is still some uncertainty about exactly how that process would work.

I have a lot of sympathy with the argument of the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudon. If the revenue counterparty decided that it was going to take a very large amount of levy early in the process to have lots of money in the bank and to be able to cover any eventualities connected with the construction process, that would be a pretty unreasonable imposition on energy companies, particularly in the present circumstances. However, I think there are least implied elements of regulation in the Bill that would prevent that from easily happening, and I would be interested to hear whether the Minister thinks that is the case. If he does, where in the Bill is that, and which arrangements would be preferrable in terms of the revenue collection counterparty operating on a more equitable basis as the construction period progressed?

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Members for Kilmarnock and Loudoun and for Aberdeen North for tabling their amendment. Of course the Government welcome all Opposition parties tabling amendments; that does not necessarily mean that we will agree with the aforementioned amendments, but it is a useful process to test and probe the Bill, and I think our publics would like to see a process whereby all Opposition parties tabled amendments to test the Government’s proposition. I fully buy into that process, but I do not happen to agree with this amendment.

The amendment addresses how the interests of suppliers and their customers should be considered when making provision in regulations for the supplier to pay the revenue collection counterparty. It would also require the Secretary of State to have regard to the other liabilities of electricity suppliers—the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun talked with topicality about that—as well as to the impact that collateral requirements will have on a supplier’s operation. I thank the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Lady for ensuring that the Government consider the impact on suppliers and consumers when establishing the RAB revenue stream.

I reassure Members that the Government intend to act in a way that effectively manages the payment obligations on suppliers and, through them, consumers. We do not believe, however, that the amendment is the best way of ensuring that. First, the provision of collateral by electricity suppliers is a form of security that has been administered very successfully in the contract for difference regime. As I said on clause 15, the regime seeks to replicate that tried-and-tested regime, which has functioned effectively to bring investment into new energy projects for the last eight years.

We have been clear that in designing the RAB revenue stream we are seeking to replicate many of the provisions of contracts for difference to help to provide a familiar and workable framework for suppliers, but it is not just about supporting investment. We will protect suppliers from paying unreasonable amounts of collateral and ensure that overpayment of collateral is returned to suppliers.

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[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 16, in clause 19, page 17, line 2, at end insert—

“(10) Persistent non-payment of sums owed to the counterparty by an electricity supplier may be referred to OFGEM, which may in such circumstances place the electricity supplier’s licence under review.”

This amendment would allow cases of persistent non-payment of sums owed to the counterparty by an electricity supplier to be referred to OFGEM.

The amendment follows on quite well from our previous debate. Although the issue is not entirely certain, the collateral expected to be paid by energy supplier companies would be required in a measured way. The Secretary of State would make sure that the revenue collection counterparty did not try to scoop up huge funds in one go—not that I think that very likely—and would regulate the collateral so that it was more or less allied with the calls on it by the nuclear company at that stage.

If the revenue collection counterparty had a large pot of money sitting in its bank account at any stage, one would expect that money to be redistributed to the supplier companies from which it had been collected, and one would hope that in the end it would be redistributed back to customers. I think that there is still some way to go in deciding how exactly the regulation is to be set up, but I welcome the Minister’s statement that that is roughly how the Government assume the process will be undertaken. That being the case, there is then the question of what happens if supplier companies do not pay what the revenue collection counterparty has required of them, assuming that it is a reasonable payment. That leads on to some existing issues with how levies are collected by counterparties.

There has already been some mention of what happens with Ofgem’s collection of the renewables obligation, and of the collective obligations of energy companies to supply the right amount in buy-outs, renewables obligation payments or whatever. For those who think that the renewables obligation is done and dusted and that it came to an end in 2017, I should mention that it is still alive in a ghostly fashion and is collecting money until 2027, I think, so the obligations continue.

If one were being very unkind, one might say that a barometer of the health of some of the smaller energy companies that have recently been involved in the struggle to stay afloat has often been whether their renewables obligation payments were outstanding at the time of closure, which I think is the end of each October. There were reports from Ofgem, I think in September, that x number of companies had not paid their renewables obligation levies, and that if they did not do so by the closure date, it is conceivable that action would be taken—which could include, in the end, the removal of the company’s licence to operate.

One could say that that is what happened over the recent period, in that companies that knew they were in some difficulty with their renewables obligation payments at the end of October folded pretty soon afterwards because they were not going to pay them. That has had the unfortunate side effect that that non-payment has had to be socialised among other energy companies in order to ensure that the fund is the right amount to meet the renewables obligation certificates going around. Nevertheless, the regime appears to have a sanction relating to an energy company’s licence, so that we can ensure that payments are brought in, or that there is fairly swift closure relating to the outstanding amount, so we at least know roughly where we are regarding the payment pool at a future date.

As the Bill stands, that does not appear to be the procedure that will be adopted regarding levies into the revenue collection counterparty. Indeed, the Bill states that if payment is not received, collection will be a civil matter. In the amendment, we suggest that we adopt a similar procedure to that which is in place with Ofgem concerning non-payment of renewables obligation payments. In the case of persistent non-payment, a sanction should be available regarding the continuation of the company’s licence. The Minister may say that going through the civil courts is just as good. What concerned me about the arrangements in respect of renewables obligations was that some energy companies were borrowing their payments in order to stay in business. That is not what a healthy energy company should do, long term; it will not result in a secure landscape as regards collateral inputs to a counterparty.

A better way of proceeding would be to have in place the sort of regime that we have for the RO. The amendment would allow the Secretary of State to introduce that kind of arrangement, if he thought it a good idea for the stability of collateral payments. It gives him an extra option, and goes beyond the regime set out in the Bill, so that we can ensure that payments are properly levied, paid on time, and not resisted.

[Greg Hands]

As the hon. Gentleman outlined, amendment 16 addresses how the obligations of suppliers under revenue collection contracts should be enforced. Clause 19 deals with suppliers’ obligations in relation to the RAB. It lays out what the revenue collection regulations may provide for. This includes how the obligations placed on suppliers by RAB revenue collection contracts can be enforced by the revenue collection counterparty. The powers in clause 19 are supported by clause 22, entitled “Enforcement”, which states:

“regulations may make provision for”

obligations under revenue collection contracts to be enforced

“by the Authority as if they were relevant requirements…for the purposes of section 25 of the Electricity Act 1989.”

This means that a breach of such a contract can be treated as if it were a breach of a licence condition, and this allows the authority to obtain an order to secure compliance and impose financial penalties.

The amendment would set up a different enforcement route, outside the regulations, by allowing the revenue collection counterparty to refer suppliers who persistently fail to meet their obligations to the authority—that is, to Ofgem. Ofgem could then consider whether to remove a supplier’s licence. Of course, I welcome the Opposition’s focus on ensuring adequate protection from non-compliance. Creating strong enforcement procedures will be vital to give investors confidence that the RAB will function and that the project will receive the funds to which it is entitled. However, the amendment leaves out much of the detail necessary for a clear understanding and the smooth functioning of the enforcement procedure. For example, it does not clarify what should be classed as “Persistent non-payment”, or the process for referral. It also does not make clear what Ofgem would take into account when reviewing a supplier’s licence, or the process for appeal.

The hon. Gentleman feels that a supplier’s failure to make payments to the counterparty should have consequences for their licence, but those concerns are adequately addressed by clause 22, which states that the regulations may make provision to treat non-compliance as if it were a breach of a licence condition, and to allow the imposition of suitable penalties against suppliers through tried-and-tested, long-standing legislation. This will ensure compliance, and will mean that obligations under revenue collection contracts are met.

I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s constructive contributions, his proposing the amendment, and his recognition of the need for strong enforcement provisions, but I hope I have convinced all hon. Members of the appropriateness of the Government’s approach, which already treats non-compliance in the way that is suggested in the amendment, but in a far more watertight way, and that the hon. Gentleman therefore feels able to withdraw his amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

The Minister talks about taking action in a more watertight way, and suggests that we look at clause 22, which relates to clause 25, which relates to a series of clauses relating to the Electricity Act 1989. It is a sort of Marx brothers’ “A Day at the Races” form guide arrangement, whereby in order to understand a guide, a person needs another one, and so on endlessly—and they end up missing the race.

The Minister will be aware that there are a number of instances in which we are asked to go way back, via regulations, into Acts such as the Utilities Act 2000 and the Electricity Act, and we are reluctant to do that. Indeed, there are a couple of quite incomprehensible repeals at the end of the Bill, to which I might draw the Committee’s attention; one has to go through four or five stages before one can understand what on earth those are about.

In this instance, it is possibly true that we could, by regulation, apply the provisions of section 25 of the Electricity Act 1989 relating to licence modification or removal; but that provision is not in the Bill, but possibly applied by regulation. In the Bill there is one remedy, and one remedy only. The Minister may say, “Trust us; we may produce regulations that have the effect that I have suggested.” However, it probably would have been wiser for some of those things to be in the Bill. Of course, the amendment does not do all those things that the Minister mentioned. I fully accept that it is deficient from that point of view, because it does not mention the four or five other pieces of legislation that have to be taken into account, amended or consequentially changed. It merely allows us to make the point that these things ought to be in the Bill, so it is a probing amendment.

I hope that the Minister will think about whether there are better ways of getting those different forms of regulatory certainty than this extended process of referring to other pieces of legislation, which may become more or less opaque as one reads them. It would be much more straightforward for this provision to be in the Bill and clear for everyone to see. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20

Payments to electricity suppliers

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Greg Hands]

Clause 20 seeks to ensure that electricity suppliers can be reimbursed in cases where the counterparty has overcharged suppliers or overpaid a licensee nuclear company. The clause is similar to the approach in section 17 of the Energy Act 2013. It is proposed that suppliers will be charged their share of a RAB payment based on their expected market share. Where their actual market share is less than expected, reconciliation processes will be carried out and the revenue collection counterparty will repay them the difference.

Likewise, when the relevant nuclear licensee company’s forecasted market revenue exceeds its allowed revenue over a given period, the counterparty could be required to repay any overpayments to suppliers. Again, that would replicate the approach used in contracts for difference. Subsections (1) and (2) allow regulations to be made requiring the counterparty to make payments to suppliers in such instances. Regulations made will be subject to the affirmative procedure, given the effect they will have on electricity suppliers and other relevant bodies.

[Dr Whitehead]

I do not oppose the clause, but I want to ask the Minister about what it actually says. At first sight, it appears to say—this was the shared understanding that we established—that there were circumstances where a revenue collection counterparty could pay collateral back to electricity suppliers. We are not clear over how long a period the collateral might be repaid, or at what point it might be considered that there was sufficient additional collateral in the funds of the counterparty to warrant a repayment.

The funds might be held for quite a long time while consideration is given to whether the nuclear company is likely to overperform on its revenue generating activities in the production phase so consistently that the money can be safely restored to the supply company. The counterparty might hold the money over a considerable period, thinking there would be variations or fluctuations in the revenue stream obtained by the nuclear power company, and that the money might therefore need to be called on, if it dipped below the range implied by the overall allowed costs arrangements. There is that question of the likely length of the period over which repayments take place.

However, the second question, which is also quite important, is what would happen to that money once the counterparty had restored it to the electricity supplier. There is nothing in this clause that says anything other than, “That money is restored to the electricity supplier, and the electricity supplier is very pleased about that and puts the money in its bank account.”

However, the electricity supplier has collected that money from the customers—albeit at the direction of the counterparty—in the form of an additional levy placed on their bills. If the electricity supply company is getting that money back again, then as night follows day, the company should give that money back to the customers and not just hold it in its bank account. There is nothing in this clause to ensure that that happens. I would be interested to hear whether the Minister thinks that such a requirement ought to be added to the regulatory procedure that will be undertaken. He may want to go away and think about whether he can at least indicate to the Committee that it will be assumed, and probably will happen, that as long as the surplus funds can be distributed back to suppliers by the counterparty, they should be given back to the customers.

Essentially, we have a couple of questions, but we do not oppose this clause standing part. I am sure that the Minister will be able to reassure us about his intentions with regard to making this clause operate as well as it can.

[Greg Hands]

I will try to deal with the two questions that the hon. Gentleman raised. First, he asked whether the funds can be held for a long time, and about the period over which they can be held. Obviously, the regulations will be laid before Parliament in due course, and will be subject to the affirmative procedure. However, I point him to how the contract for difference regime works under the 2013 Act. My belief is that in this case, the reconciliation takes place after a period of months—that is probably the best way to describe it. It depends on what the hon. Gentleman means by somebody holding on to funds, or indeed having a shortfall of funds, for “quite a long time”, but we always have to strike the balance between what is operationally straightforward and what prevents somebody from holding on to funds, or from having a shortfall of funds over a period of time. However, the workings of the contract for difference regime might give the hon. Gentleman the most likely pointers as to what the regulations may look like; they will obviously be subject to consultation in due course anyway.

The hon. Gentleman also asked what happens to the money, and whether the supplier is obliged to return the money to the customer. He raises a fair point. The difficulty is that there is no obligation on the supplier to take the money for the RAB from the customer in the first place. The assumption is that the supplier will bill the customer for the cost of the RAB, but there is not an obligation to do so, so I am not sure that creating an obligation in this legislation to send back money the other way would be appropriate. Again, I refer the hon. Gentleman to the workings of the contract for difference under the 2013 Act.

[Greg Hands]

First, the whole process will be regulated by the authority—in this case Ofgem—which would have oversight. Secondly, that would also be a matter for the regulations that are to be published in due course. Thirdly, the frequent reconciliations would obviate risk of that happening in the way the hon. Gentleman describes.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21

Application of sums held by a revenue collection counterparty

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 17, in clause 21, page 17, line 34, leave out from ‘are’ to end of line and insert ‘not to be paid into the Consolidated Fund unless there is no other alternative.’

This amendment would require the Government to consider alternatives to the absorption into the consolidated fund of sums held by a revenue collection counterparty on behalf of energy bill payers.

Amendment 17 takes aim at a different part of the undergrowth we are dealing with in the often fairly complex arrangements related to the revenue collection counterparty and all that goes with it. In this instance, we have two subsections in italics because they include a Treasury implication. Clause 21(5) says:

“The provision that may be made by virtue of subsection (4) includes provisions that sums are to be paid, or not to be paid, into the Consolidated Fund.”

In that regard, subsection (4) states:

“Revenue regulations may make provision about the application of sums held by a revenue collection counterparty.”

Effectively, that subsection allows regulations to be made about the sums held by a revenue collection counterparty. We have already discussed how long they may be held for and the circumstances under which they may be paid back—[Interruption.] The Minister and his Whip are discussing when we will finish, I suspect. They must not worry; we will finish on time.

The clause adds a new dimension to the question of where the sums held by the revenue collection counterparty may go and, indeed, suggests where they might go, presumably, after the process outlined by the Minister. At a certain stage, the existence of surplus amounts held by the revenue collection counterparty is established and then there is an issue as to where that money goes. Clause 21(5) says that the money may be paid into the Consolidated Fund, which is the Treasury. It therefore gives rise to the idea that money could have been raised from customers and paid into the revenue collection counterparty by suppliers. Levies are raised on customers and possibly overpaid, as my hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich has just said. The money sits in the account of the revenue collection counterparty for a time and then, when the decision is made about what to do with the money, the Treasury nicks it. That is not right and it is not what should be done. As we have established, if there are surpluses in those funds, they should certainly be returned to the supplier and the supplier should make sure that they are returned to the customer.

As we have said on a number of occasions, the customer is at the heart of the process as they are funding it through their bills. They are not paying free money into the Treasury but paying into the process on a reasonable basis of allowed costs. If those allowed costs prove to be more than is required, the least they should reasonably expect is to get their money back.

There should be no talk of the Consolidated Fund in the Bill; I do not think it is right that it should be in the Bill. We have sought to suggest in the amendment that only if there are no other recourses for the payment of those funds should it even be considered that money go into the Consolidated Fund. I can conceivably imagine circumstances in which nothing else could be done with the money but put it into the Consolidated Fund, but it is a real squeeze for me to think that.

The Secretary of State must be able to think of better purposes for the money than for it to go in that direction. The amendment strengthens the Secretary of State’s ability to do that. I hope that the Secretary of State—the Minister; I am promoting him again—will be happy to accept it as a clear understanding of what we want to do with the money unless absolutely pressed to do otherwise.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Hands]

We will just have to agree to disagree. I think the amendment unnecessarily narrows the scope of the power in a way that we would not wish to see in terms of protection of the taxpayer. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Southampton, Test to withdraw it.

[Dr Whitehead]

I thought that this was the most reasonable amendment by far that we have tabled. I am sorry that the Minister has responded in the way that he has. He made the point that some money that had come from the taxpayer might be sitting in the funds of the revenue collection counterparty, and should therefore be paid out of it. That would actually be covered by the amendment, which would insert:

“not to be paid into the Consolidated Fund unless there is no other alternative.”

If someone were trying to pay back a loan that they effectively got from the Consolidated Fund in the first place, there is no alternative other than to pay it back to the Consolidated Fund, so the amendment would cover that. We want circumstances in which the Treasury—I am sure that the Minister does not particularly want to be a high-ranking Treasury Minister in the future—

[Greg Hands]

Again!

[Dr Whitehead]

Again—indeed. I think the Minister will know from his previous experience that the Treasury is not above, shall we say, treating all Government money as essentially its own. In circumstances in which the Treasury thinks that it can get hold of certain amounts of money, it may well do so. Obviously, the purpose of Bills is not to be written to keep the Treasury’s hands off money that it really should not have, but it might not be such a bad idea at least to put that in regulation so that it would be fairly hard for that to happen. As the amendment is drafted, however, it is not a prohibition; it just says that there needs to be a pretty good argument—the argument made by the Minister about the loan, for example—for that money to be paid into the Consolidated Fund. That, really, is all the amendment says, and I think that is a wholly better construction than what is in the Bill.

[The Chair]

Dr Whitehead, are you pressing the amendment to a vote?

[Dr Whitehead]

Given the circumstances, I think I will.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 23 to 30 stand part.

[Dr Whitehead]

The Labour party accepts that the clauses cover important technical matters relating to how the rest of this part of the Bill holds together, and we therefore have no objection to their being taken together.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 23 to 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Craig Whittaker.)

Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill (Sixth sitting)

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 25th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Greg Hands)]

May I welcome you to the Chair, Mr Gray? It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I will be brief.

Clause 31 is the first clause of part 3 of the Bill, which establishes a special administration regime for relevant licensee nuclear companies, or RLNCs. In the unlikely event that such a company becomes insolvent during the construction or operation of the power plant, the Secretary of State, or the authority—that is, Ofgem—with the Secretary of State’s permission, may apply to the courts for the appointment of a special administrator. The objective of the administrator would be to ensure that electricity generation commences, or continues, until it is unnecessary for the administration order to remain in force for that purpose.

The introduction of a special administration regime will reduce the risks of customers being deprived of the benefits of the building of a nuclear power plant using a regulated asset base model compared with normal insolvency proceedings. It also reduces the risk of requiring a replacement source of electricity generation, which may further increase the cost of electricity to consumers. The clause defines the relevant terms for this part, which are necessary for the effective functioning of the legislation. I therefore urge that the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for setting out what the clause is about. Hon. Members will recognise that the clause is deeply embedded with the rest of the clauses in this part of the Bill. Further clauses spell out in greater detail what clause 31 talks about. Hon. Members will also be aware that we have an amendment to the following clause to be discussed, which, were it to be agreed, would have implications for clause 31. Although we do not wish to oppose clause stand part, we would like it to be noted that when we discuss the amendment to the next clause we will refer back to clause 31 as one of the reasons why the amendment was tabled and the difference that might make to the whole part, should it be passed.

[The Chair]

Order. I am ready to be advised on this matter, but I suspect that if the Opposition believe that amendment 18 would have a consequence for this clause, it would have been necessary to table an amendment to this clause, or we would have to revisit this clause later. The Clerk advises that we cannot revisit. In other words, if we pass this clause stand part now, it will not be possible to amend it later. Let us cross this bridge when we come to it. That might be the sensible way forward.

[Dr Whitehead]

Mr Gray, if the amendment were to be passed, I do not think it would have an effect on clause 31. I merely raise the issue because we will be talking about all these issues in clause 32.

[The Chair]

That is fine.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32

Objective of a relevant licensee nuclear company administration

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 32, page 24, line 24, at end insert—

“(5A) In the event that a relevant licensee nuclear company cannot be rescued as a going concern, or if a transfer of the undertaking to a wholly owned subsidiary does not result in the establishment of a going concern, the Secretary of State must establish a Government-owned company into which the assets, liabilities and undertakings of the relevant licensee nuclear company may be transferred in order to allow electricity supply to be commenced or continued at the nuclear installation in respect of which the relevant nuclear licensee holds a nuclear licence.”

Where a failed company cannot be rescued as a going concern or successfully have its assets transferred to a subsidiary, this amendment would require the Government to establish a Government-owned company to allow operations to continue.

The amendment goes to the heart of this part of the Bill, which deals with a special administration regime for when a nuclear power plant cannot get to production levels—in other words, when the nuclear power plant is not completed at the point at which the company that is constructing it effectively goes bust—or is in production but the company that is responsible for the management and operation of it goes bust at that point. The special administration regime is put in place, as the Minister says, to protect the interests of the customer, in terms of the sums they have put into the whole arrangement through the counterparty. We discussed how that works in a previous sitting of the Committee.

We certainly welcome the setting out of the provision in part 3, because it is important in providing a backstop in case of failure, during either construction or production, of the company that is involved in doing it. That company will have gone through the process of designation, licence modification and so on, and is therefore deeply involved in the nuclear power station at that point. Although we welcome the provision, analysis of how the clause works suggests that there are potential deficiencies in the end outcome of the process that is set out. I say that partly because, as I am sure hon. Members will be interested to know, the clause is closely modelled on the special administration regime set out in the Energy Act 2011. Of course, the 2011 special administration regime is oddly pertinent this morning because of the collapse of Bulb Energy and the decision by the Secretary of State to invoke sections of the Energy Act to establish a special administration regime over and above the supply of last resort, which was previously the method used for assuring customers about their supply when energy companies went bust. On this occasion, the Energy Act has come to the rescue.

There are lots of questions about how the regime under the 2011 Act will work, but it is sufficient for us to note the closeness of the text and direction of part 3 of the Bill to sections 94 and 95 of the Energy Act. Hon. Members will have to take it on trust that the wording is so similar, but they are very welcome to go and look up the relevant piece of legislation. I have a copy in front of me, and if this were an undergraduate essay that I had to mark in a previous life, I would be immediately on the phone to the department to say that my student had been guilty of substantial plagiarism.

Of course, there is a substantial difference in the application of those two pieces of legislation. One is applied to a failed energy company, about which a number of things can be done fairly quickly, such as seeking to revive the failed energy company through a period of administration and then relaunching it at a later date, when circumstances have changed—in this instance, perhaps when the high fuel costs have abated and the company, with different set-ups, might be a going concern again. The options are to launch it as a going concern, to pass it on to other buyers—which is very possibly the case with Bulb Energy—or, as an extreme, to eventually close the company down and parcel out its customers to other companies. According to the 2011 legislation, there are a number of fairly obvious routes that end that period of administration.

That is not the case for a nuclear power station. It cannot be divided up; it is a huge, multibillion piece of investment on the books of the company, and in this case largely supported by its customers paying into the regulated asset base arrangement. The idea that a company might easily come along and say, “I know, we’ll take over the assets of this nuclear power station and run it ourselves” is a fairly unlikely proposition, as we have seen from events around the world. Nevertheless, the wording of the clause follows the 2011 wording closely enough to suggest that that would be relatively easy in the case of a nuclear power company failure.

As the Minister has already outlined on the previous clause, the court would make an order to the nuclear company to go into administration, and

“the affairs, business and property of the company are to be managed by a person appointed by the court”—

that is, an administrator. The objective, stated in this clause, is

“that electricity generation commences, or continues, at the nuclear installation in respect of which the relevant licensee nuclear company to which the administration relates holds a relevant licence”—

that is, generation continues under administration—or “that it becomes unnecessary” through two means that are set out in the next subsection:

“the rescue as a going concern of the company”

or transfers of that company that fall into the next subsection, whereby the company can be transferred to another company or two or more different companies.

As such, the path that would be followed in this instance is that an administration order would be made; the company would be kept running in the meantime; and the alternative outcomes would be that the company either becomes a going concern again as a result of administration, or is effectively sold to another company or two or more other companies. Failing that, this clause appears to suggest that that special administration continues forever. That is the conclusion one has to reach when reading these subsections.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Hands]

I thank hon. Members for their speeches for and against amendment 18. I remind the Committee that a relevant licensee nuclear company, or RLNC, is one that has had its licence modified under part 1, clause 6(1) of the Bill and has entered into a revenue collection contract. An RLNC administration order is made by the court in relation to an RLNC and directs that, while it is in force, the company is to be managed by a person appointed by the court. That is defined in part 3, clause 31(1), which we have just debated.

Amendment 18 addresses the course of action that the Government must take if an RLNC administration order is in force, but an RLNC cannot be rescued or a transfer envisaged by clause 32(4) effected, namely a transfer of the undertaking of the RLNC to a subsidiary that results in a going concern. The amendment seeks to ensure that, in this scenario, the plant will commence or continue electricity generation under public ownership. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to move the assets, liabilities and undertakings of the RLNC to a Government-owned company, even if a transfer envisaged by clause 32(3) to one or more companies would achieve the objective of the administration order. The amendment would put in place a new process. Although the amendment does not address who must make the assessment that the objective cannot be achieved by the means specified, it appears to limit the available options before the power plant is moved into public ownership.

First, obviously, I thank the hon. Members for Southampton, Test, and for Greenwich and Woolwich for their clear desire to ensure that a nuclear power station will commence or continue the generation of electricity—on the face of it, that seems a very reasonable objective—and for recognising that the special administration provisions add a valuable layer of protection in this area. Ultimately, that is why they are in the Bill. However, I do not consider it necessary to place a statutory requirement on the Government to take ownership of a plant in the unlikely event that a special administration fails in its objectives, because the provisions for the energy transfer scheme, applied by clause 33, already serve this purpose. The amendment may even inadvertently lengthen the period of an RLNC administration order, as one assumes that the Government-owned company would, for example, need to apply for a new nuclear site licence.

In the unlikely circumstance where rescue cannot be achieved and it is unnecessary for the administration order to remain in place, the Secretary of State—or the authority, Ofgem, with the consent of the Secretary of State—may apply to bring the administration order to an end. Once the administration has ended, the Secretary of State may prepare a nuclear transfer scheme, which would bring the plant under the control of a public body, or, for example, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. In such a scenario, it is envisaged that the plant would then be decommissioned and cleaned up. However, the Government would still retain the option to move the power plant into public ownership and, if deemed in the best interests of consumers and taxpayers, commence or continue the operation of the plant.

Let me say in response to comments made by the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun that there may be circumstances in which discontinuing the project and having it safely decommissioned is in the best interests of both consumers and taxpayers. That will ultimately be down to a value-for-money process that asks: what is the best deal here for consumers and taxpayers? The Office for Nuclear Regulation may have shut down the plant for safety reasons; there may have been an environmental or security incident, or maybe something else happened that meant that trying to make that plant commence or continue to generate electricity was not in the interests of consumers or taxpayers. It is important, then, that the Secretary of State retains discretion to act in whatever way will achieve the best outcome for consumers and taxpayers during the insolvency of a relevant licensee nuclear company.

I stress to the Committee that the likelihood of those scenarios is, of course, very remote, as indeed is the likelihood of a nuclear administrator ever being appointed. I thank the Opposition for their forward thinking and consideration of what would happen in such a scenario, but I hope that I have assured the Committee that it would not be sensible to tie the hands of the Government in such a way that they had to commit further taxpayer money to a project without being able to balance that against the merits of doing so. The amendment would create an automatic process, but the Bill provides sufficient flexibility to allow the Government to pursue the option that the amendment provides for if they consider such a decision to be in the best interests of consumers and taxpayers. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, to withdraw the amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

I thank the Minister for his consideration of the processes by which a power plant might need to be rescued and/or decommissioned and/or discontinued. I think he will recognise, however, that the circumstances in which he says ministerial discretion would need to be exercised are an unlikely part of an unlikely scenario of an unlikely future.

The Minister gave the example of an accident, or something else, closing the plant down, so that it would have to be decommissioned and could no longer produce power. That would need to be done anyway, even if the company was placed in Government hands, so I do not think that those circumstances affect the path I have set out relating to Government interest in a plant that could not be bought out of administration because it was a going concern, or because it had been sold to another company—unless the Minister has it in mind that the sale of a nuclear company to another company would be done on a peppercorn basis, in which case the nuclear plant would lose all the value that the bill payer had invested in it.

In any event—this is what concerns me about the intervention by the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun—the whole purpose of the RAB model is to produce a working nuclear plant that was invested in up front by members of the public and bill payers. That plant would then produce power as a reward for that up-front investment. If we easily closed a plant down because it was insolvent, we would be overthrowing the whole purpose of the RAB scheme, which is for the public to get something back, and we would be back to the instance that we talked about early on in Committee.

[Alan Brown]

The hon. Gentleman is right about the purpose of the RAB model, but would the unlikely event of insolvency not just confirm the failure of the RAB scheme? We should not keep throwing good money after bad in the event of such a failure.

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Member is right that in the event of an utter catastrophe, where the nuclear core does not work, the concrete casings are seriously deficient and the whole thing has to be closed down, we are in a scenario—this was sort of suggested by the Minister—where it would not be viable to continue the project. However, where it is in principle possible, electric power production in the plant should continue, because billions of pounds of customer payments will have been invested in the plant.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We have had a substantial debate on clause 32 already, so I will put the question on it.

Clause 32 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 33

Application of certain provisions of the Energy Act 2004

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dr Whitehead]

I have a brief question for the Minister on clause 33(7)(b), concerning the application of section 171(1) of the Energy Act 2004. It says:

“omit the definition of ‘non-GB company’.

I am slightly mystified as to why that is in the clause, because so far as I can see, the definition in section 171(1) of the 2004 Act of a non-GB company is perfectly reasonable and should continue to exist. Perhaps the Minister can shed some light on that.

[Greg Hands]

I have to confess that I am not able, at this moment, to shed light on subsection (7)(b) and why section 171 of the 2004 Act should be so amended. I pledge to write to the hon. Gentleman—I will copy in Committee members—to clarify why omission of that part of the 2004 Act is proposed.

[The Chair]

Is that acceptable, Dr Whitehead?

[Dr Whitehead]

Yes. I thank the Minister.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 34 to 42 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule

Minor and consequential provision

Question proposed, That the schedule be the schedule to the Bill.

[Dr Whitehead]

I suspect that the Minister may also want to write to me on this. Paragraph 4 deals with consequential repeals. I am familiar, as I am sure everybody is, with the works at the back of any Bill amending various Acts to bring them in line with the amendments made in the Bill, or in some instances repealing measures that are replaced by provisions in the Bill. I have no dispute with the way that various Acts are to be amended in the schedule.

However, the consequential repeals—I have tried to follow them through in the way I described to the Minister in our recent discussion on form guides—include repeals of section 6(10)(b) of the Smart Meters Act 2018 and section 11(2) of the Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Act 2018. These actually do the same sort of thing: delete sections of various Acts regarding licence modifications. Having looked through how these two provisions apply and why they are being repealed, I cannot see what on earth they have to do with nuclear energy financing. While I am sure that this would not have anything to do with somebody trying to put a couple of repeals in the back of a Bill even though they are not strictly in scope, I would like some assurance that these repeals are actually relevant to the forthcoming Act. If they are relevant, how? Why is it necessary to repeal two provisions that, on the face of it, do not appear to have anything to do with the Bill? I am sure the Minister will be happy to write to me to set out why that is the case.

[Greg Hands]

Yes, I think I will write to the hon. Gentleman, if I may. I am told that it is to remove a double label in the legislation, so it is purely a tidying up exercise. I will write to him, copied to members of the Committee, and for convenience I may combine it with the letter mentioned in the previous debate. It would be convenient for the Committee to have that letter well in time for Report, in case Committee members wish to consider following up with an amendment on Report.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule accordingly agreed to.

Clauses 43 to 45 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 1

Report on expected costs

“(1) Prior to exercising the power under section 6 (1), the Secretary of State must lay a report before Parliament.

(2) The report must set out—

(a) the expected overall capital cost of the prospective projects;

(b) the expected up-front cost of the prospective projects.” —(Alan Brown.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to set out (a) the overall capital cost; and (b) the expected up-front cost of the prospective projects prior to exercising the power under Clause 6 (1).

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Hands]

On a point of order, Mr Gray. I would like to thank you and Ms Fovargue for your excellent chairing of the Committee, getting us through this important process efficiently and effectively. This has been a very interesting debate on a very interesting Bill on a very interesting topic, which attracted broad interest across the House. I have to confess that this has none the less been a relatively uneventful Committee, but for connoisseurs of the topic, it will provide many future years of reading as to how nuclear financing was scrutinised by the House of Commons so effectively and in significant detail.

I thank the excellent witnesses whom we heard from last week and all members of the Committee for their constructive debate. That has allowed the Bill to go through significant scrutiny, and facilitated important discussions. I also thank the Whips—the Whips must always be thanked—on both sides for their efforts and their effective management of the time. I offer my thanks to the Clerks, the Hansard reporters, the Doorkeepers and, indeed, all the parliamentary staff, and to my excellent team of Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy officials, for the smooth proceedings and ensuring that we have all been well looked after and have finished with the Bill well scrutinised, but in good time. I look forward to the next stages of proceedings on the Bill and the continued insight from colleagues across the House.

[Dr Whitehead]

Further to that point of order, Mr Gray. I would like to associate myself with the Minister’s remarks about the passage of the Bill and with the thanks that are due to the many people who took part in its processes, from witnesses to hon. Members here today. A number of them were, I know, somewhat tested on occasion by the detail into which some amendments went. But overall, we have had good scrutiny of the Bill, facilitated by the courteous way in which the proceedings were conducted. I thank the Minister for those courtesies in how our debates proceeded, and I thank you, Mr Gray, for your excellent chairing of our proceedings.

[Alan Brown]

Further to that point of order, Mr Gray. In a similar vein, I thank yourself and Ms Fovargue for chairing the Committee. I especially thank the Clerks for all they have done, and for the assistance they have provided with drafting amendments and new clauses. I must admit, although the Minister has said that some were not relevant, I trust the Clerks’ judgment more than I trust the Minister. I do not mean that to be facetious.

Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Monday 10th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)]

I do not want to detain the House for too long. However, I want to say a few words as the Member of Parliament for Maldon, which contains Bradwell-on-Sea.

Bradwell had been the home of a nuclear power station since the early 1960s, and it safely generated power for nearly 40 years before being successfully decommissioned. I remain a strong supporter of nuclear power, and I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) that it is not a question of choosing between renewables and nuclear. We will need both if we are to achieve our ambitions, particularly our ambition to reduce carbon emissions.

The fact Bradwell has been the site of a nuclear power station for so long is probably the reason why it was chosen as one of the designated sites for new nuclear development. Of course, an agreement was reached between EDF and China General Nuclear Power Corporation whereby Hinkley Point and Sizewell would be majority owned and financed by EDF with some Chinese contribution, but Bradwell would be the site of a Chinese-designed and majority Chinese-financed reactor.

I visited China General Nuclear in Shenzhen when I was Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, when the attitude of the British Government was perhaps a little more friendly towards China than it is today. At that time the Government were keen to encourage investment in Bradwell, partly because it appeared to be the only way that we would be able to finance new nuclear, as the Chinese were the people who had the resources and the willingness to do so.

My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight referred to the concerns about Chinese technology, and my concern is not about the safety of Chinese technology. The Chinese reactor is now well advanced in the generic design assessment process, and it appears to be proceeding smoothly. I suspect it will be found to be safe, but there may be other reasons why the British Government are perhaps less keen on the idea of a Chinese-owned and designed nuclear power station in this country than they were five years ago. I fully appreciate and understand the reasons for that.

Bradwell is one of the few locations to be designated as appropriate for new nuclear, and the site is owned by CGN. If the Government decide it is not appropriate to build a Chinese reactor, I would still like to think Bradwell is a possible site for an alternative nuclear power station development. Whether or not the Government reach that decision on China, it is too early to say, and I am sure the Minister will not be in a position to say definitively this afternoon, but I would like to put it on record that Bradwell successfully hosted a nuclear power station for 40 years—Bradwell A—and I saw the benefits it brought to the local community. I would therefore still be positive about the possibility of Bradwell B, whoever designs and owns it.

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

I rise to speak to the amendments tabled on Report. You will be interested to know, Mr Deputy Speaker, that I would also like to talk about the Bill and its contents.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Order. Dr Whitehead, do you intend to keep your mask on?

[Dr Whitehead]

Sorry, no—I have a general habit of wearing a mask whenever possible.

The Bill essentially falls into three parts. Part 1 concerns the designation of a company for the receipt of regulated asset base payments. Part 2 concerns the collection and disbursement of funds through the regulated asset base arrangements. Part 3 sets out a special administration regime, should a nuclear power plant be unable to carry out its obligations arising from the institution of the regulated asset base arrangement.

The Bill, essentially, is trying to produce a method for funding and getting over the line one particular nuclear power plant: Sizewell C. That is the only plant that is developed enough to be able to generate by 2030. A substantial part of the Bill is not about the general future of nuclear, or the relationship with nuclear renewables; it is about how one plant is to be financed over the next period so that it can actually start producing energy, hopefully by the end of this decade or shortly thereafter.

The Labour party supports nuclear power for the future and is particularly concerned that, for example, the Climate Change Committee has indicated that some 8 GW of nuclear power might be put in the mix for low-carbon renewable power for the future. Sizewell C is an important part of that process—indeed, getting it going is long overdue. Perhaps I can put the record straight, because the previous Labour Government, as the 2007 nuclear White Paper and the strategic planning documents of 2009-10 show, laid the basis for the present number of sites to be considered and, therefore, for nuclear power going forward.

[Bob Seely]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right, but unfortunately we lost a decade, from 1997 to 2007, when nuclear was taken off the table. Because of the timescales, which he is well aware of, will he just accept—this is not necessarily party political—that losing that decade put us back and is costing us now?

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Member is quite right that prior to 2007 the Labour Government did not consider the development of nuclear power by state means to be an appropriate way forward, although they never suggested that the development of nuclear power by private means could not be countenanced. However, we have since had more than 10 years of Conservative-led Government, which has produced precisely no nuclear power plants. Indeed, there is one nuclear power plant in the pipeline, and we hope a nuclear power plant that can be financed by reasonable means. One of the problems with the previous plant, Hinkley Point C, which the present Government got off the ground, was the funding arrangements, with EDF supplying most of the capital for the plant and then a CfD for the plant at the end, which looks like it will be quite disastrous, with future electricity prices being completely uneconomic.

It is therefore important that we get a method for funding those nuclear plants, and particularly Sizewell C, that does not fall into those traps and is also secure for the future. That is the concern of our amendments 1 and 2. To put the record straight, anyone who looks at those amendments reasonably closely will see that amendment 1 defines what is stated in amendment 2, and that it is defined as

“means owned by a company controlled by a foreign state and operating for investment purposes.”

That does not include EDF. Let us be clear from the outset that EDF is not

“a company controlled by a foreign state.”

Although it is substantially owned by a foreign state, it is not operating for investment purposes, but for production purposes. Let us be clear about what the particular concern is for the future.

[Richard Graham]

Please correct me if I am wrong, but my understanding is that EDF is majority owned by the state. If the state required it to do certain things, I do not see how the company could say no. Could the hon. Gentleman confirm if that is his understanding?

[Dr Whitehead]

It is correct that EDF is owned by the French state, but it is not controlled by the French state and, as I say, it does not operate for investment purposes. The amendment specifically excludes that kind of company from its provisions, but, importantly, it includes companies such as the China General Nuclear Power Corporation, which is clearly owned and controlled by a foreign state and operates for investment purposes.

[Richard Graham]

This is incredibly important. The amendment states

“the nuclear company is not wholly or in part owned by a foreign power”.

Factually, that is the situation with EDF. I do not have a problem with it, but I am trying to explain to the hon. Gentleman that his amendment does not say what he has just said it does, and it is therefore inaccurate, even by what he is trying to achieve.

[Dr Whitehead]

I am afraid we will have to differ on that. Amendment 1 has been written on good advice, in terms of what EDF does and does not do in its operation, and, on the contrary, what a company such as the China General Nuclear Power Corporation does. There is a clear distinction between those two particular companies and organisations.

The amendments wish to draw attention to the fact that this is not an academic issue. As the right hon. Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale) mentioned earlier, we have an agreement in place at the moment whereby the Chinese state nuclear corporation has a 35% stake in Hinkley Point C, a 20% stake in Sizewell C, should it go ahead, and complete control of Bradwell, should that go ahead, with ownership of the site and operations, and with the installation of a Chinese reactor. That agreement has already been reached, so the issue in this Bill is that if the regulated asset base is going to be put in place to finance and bring about the control of a nuclear power plant by the Chinese Government over the next period, we think that that would be a retrograde step for the future of nuclear power in this country, for obvious reasons.

In Committee, we asked the Government whether they wished to make any statement about the future of the agreement that is currently in place, which was agreed between 2013 and 2016 and includes the Secretary of State’s investment agreement, and about future arrangements for nuclear power. We asked if they could they confirm that RAB would not be used as an instrument to extend those arrangements, as far as the Chinese Government are concerned. They have not said anything about that at all; I regret that. Hence we have brought these amendments to try to clarify what RAB will be used for, what the position is concerning the 20% of Sizewell C that looks to be owned by the Chinese Government in the future, and how that relates to RAB overall. Although it is not central to the RAB debate, it is an important element in that debate and needs clarification for the future.

We did not particularly want to table these amendments. If we had had a statement from the Government that they were not proceeding with Bradwell and were going to bring an end to the arrangements that are in place for Sizewell C at the moment, perhaps things might have been different, but we urgently need some clarification about their intentions in relation to RAB and Chinese involvement in UK civil nuclear power in future. That is what amendments 1 and 2 would achieve.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

I welcome these amendments because one of the concerns about RAB is that there are no safeguards, so the developer could run up costs and there would be nothing to stop them doing so. Therefore, if the Government do not accept the amendments, would it not be irresponsible to support the Bill on Third Reading?

[Dr Whitehead]

It would not be irresponsible to support the Bill on Third Reading, but it would be responsible of the Government to take a little more notice of these particular problems with the RAB process and possibly, as we move forward with its development, bring in mechanisms that can protect the bill-paying public in a rather better way than is suggested at the moment. That is essentially what the amendments do.

The arrangement for the RAB to be put into place is that a series of considerations are entered into to give an agreed expenditure cap for what is considered to be the proper use of the collection fund that will provide assistance to the company producing the new nuclear power plant. It can properly draw on that, up to a certain ceiling, from the general public. That is if everything goes well with the nuclear power plant, but of course that may not necessarily be the case. Of 176 nuclear power plants across the world, 175 went substantially over time and over budget, so we need to be very clear that we should not commit the general public to fund these proposals completely open-endedly. We are saying in these amendments that should there be a cost overrun or a time overrun, the Secretary of State should seek an increase in the agreed revenue ceiling without further recourse to customer funds. That may be by producing bonds or it may be by further state funding if that is the choice the Government wish to make, but they should not increase the ceiling for customers to pay exponentially at the same time.

These are very simple and straightforward amendments saying that, should there be such cost overruns or time overruns and there is a suggested further call on customer bills through RAB, the Secretary of State will have to think of something else to fund the system. Let us be clear that, with the RAB arrangements at the moment, it is suggested, I think very optimistically, there will be an increase of about £10 to £20 in customer bills. That is a really current topic at the moment, but a cost overrun would substantially increase such a levy on customer bills, and we just think that should not be part of the RAB arrangements for the future.

The third set of changes we wish to put in place are to part 3 of the Bill, which sets out what should happen and what arrangements should be in place if a company, despite all the investment from the public in the construction of a nuclear power plant, essentially goes bust. In this part, the Government have in effect lifted the provision in the Energy Act 2011 for a special administration regime. Again, that is rather current because it is precisely such a special administration regime that was used to rescue Bulb Energy when it went bust a little way ago. It was placed in such a regime under the 2011 Act—the wording is identical to that in this Bill—to allow it to continue trading for the time being, subject to the company being disposed of.

However, I would suggest that a nuclear power plant the size of Sizewell C, for example, is not remotely the same as an energy company the size of Bulb. It would be quite possible to dispose of Bulb or disperse its customers according to the special administration regime, but that would not be the case for a large nuclear power station. We are saying in amendment 5 that there should be an additional backstop so that, in the circumstances of a special administration regime, it would not be possible to pass the company on—to sell it on or to reintroduce it as a going concern through allocation to a subsidiary—and that the Government should have a plan to introduce a public company to take it over, provided it is working as a nuclear power station. That would not be the case—some Members may think the amendment means this—if the power station could not continue because the reactor head had exploded or the power plant was otherwise non-operational. If it is an operational power plant, we think that such a backstop should be available.

Hon. Members have mentioned what I think is the salutary case of the North Carolina energy plant that was conceived under RAB arrangements, or something very similar. Some $9 billion of customer money went into that plant, but the plant went bust, not because it was not operational, but because it was unfinanceable. Customers lost $9 billion of money, and there is no power station at the moment.

[John Redwood]

Is it not the case that, if the Government in power are faced with a big financial disaster from a very large project going horribly wrong and the company going bust, they will need flexibility to make the best decisions they can in the interests of the taxpayers and customers at the time, and it is quite difficult for us to pre-think that and embed it clearly in law?

[Dr Whitehead]

That is precisely why we wish to put in the Bill that there should be a direction in which the Government should go. Of course they should have flexibility in how they work, but we think this is an important backstop that will ensure customers do not lose their shirts in a company that goes bust after they have invested large amounts of money in its operation.

We will seek to divide the House on amendments 2 and 3 in the absence of any clear further Government commitments today in relation to. We may well be minded to support amendment 9, tabled by the SNP, should that also be put to a Division. However, I emphasise that we are happy to support the Bill overall. We want it to go through Third Reading, but we would like it to be strengthened as much as it can be by the addition of the amendments we have put forward today.

[The Minister for Energy, Clean Growth and Climate Change (Greg Hands)]

First, may I minute my condolences on the death of Jack Dromey? I shared his 12 years here and he made an enviable contribution to the House. Particular condolences to the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman).

I am thankful for the excellent contributions we have heard today, and over the past few weeks during the passage of the Bill through the House, from Members throughout the House. I will attempt to address all Members’ comments and explain why the Government do not believe that today’s amendments should be accepted.

I turn first to new clause 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Alan Brown) for the SNP, regarding the special administration regime, but before I deal with his amendments, let me reflect a little bit on the contribution by my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham). The SNP, as we know, is talking today about transparency, but its real agenda is a hardcore anti-civil nuclear power agenda. This comes, ironically, just a few days after the closure of the Hunterston power station, which had its life extended by two decades beyond what was predicted and provided 31 years—31 years—of zero-carbon electricity to every home in Scotland. The Bill would make things cheaper, but I do not think that the SNP has got Scotland’s best interests at heart here for Scottish electricity or Scottish consumers.

Nuclear power has been a massive success story in Scotland, which is what I hope the Bill will also enable. New clause 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun, would severely risk the effectiveness of the special administration regime by delaying the speed at which an administrator could access funding to continue a nuclear RAB project construction or a plant’s generation of electricity. That could result in significant sunk costs for consumers and is not in the public interest.

I will turn now to Labour amendments 1 and 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead), while responding to some of the points made in the debate. The hon. Member and I are aligned in our concern that foreign investment in our critical infrastructure should not come at the cost of national security. However, I want to be clear that the Bill is not about decisions on individual future projects; it is about widening the pool of potential investors and financing while reducing our reliance on state-owned developers to build new nuclear power stations. As the House is aware, we have committed to taking at least one project to final investment decision in this Parliament, subject to value for money and all relevant approvals. We are in active negotiations on the proposed project at Sizewell C. The hon. Member argued that the approval of Hinkley Point C would inexorably lead to the approval of other projects. That is simply not the case. Decisions on nuclear projects in this country are made on a case-by-case basis, and subject to a number of robust approvals from both Government and independent regulators.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

The Bill, as its title suggests, is about how to finance nuclear power. We know that the Climate Change Committee has indicated that some nuclear power is needed in the future as part of an overwhelmingly renewable energy mix. The Bill is therefore important in ensuring that we get at least the next, and only, nuclear power plant that can generate power by the early 2030s in place and developing, as the prospects of a new plant elsewhere seem bleak.

We welcome the arrangements that the Bill will make for financing nuclear power. We need to remember that there has been a 10-year hiatus, during a time of Conservative Government, in bringing forward any nuclear power, so the Bill is welcome, but overdue. We hope that with the RAB model in place, Sizewell C will be able to reach financial closure and go ahead.

We ought to understand both the advantages and possible problems of a RAB model, in the context of the people who will fund it from their bills. Although RAB has been used for other projects, a RAB model of the size and scale needed for Sizewell C has never been attempted. We urge the Government to be very careful about how they deploy the RAB model in terms of the customer interest, to not just regard customers as a milch cow for overruns or time delays in nuclear power for the future, and to ensure that the customer contribution is properly regarded as far as nuclear power development is concerned. We think the Government should pay closer attention to customer involvement in RAB, particularly because, on this occasion, the customer is funding the nuclear plant before, and not after, it develops. Careful stewardship and close custody of how that RAB model is used is vital.

The question of ownership of plant is important for UK national security. Although the Government have rejected our amendments about foreign influenced or owned investment in nuclear power in the future, we all know what that is actually about—the role of China and the Chinese state nuclear corporation, the China General Nuclear Power Corporation, in Sizewell C, and the possibility of them owning the nuclear power plant at Bradwell in the future. Despite the Government’s bluster, we know the arrangement is now in place for that development to succeed. Is that a wise way to go with nuclear power in the future, we ask?

We consider it imperative that the Government are clear about what they think about Chinese involvement in the very near future, and that they plot a clear course whereby this RAB investment is not the vehicle for the realisation of China’s developing and owning a nuclear plant in the UK, with all the security implications that has. I urge the Government to come forward at an early stage with clarity on what they consider to be the future for that arrangement. As the Secretary of State knows, that was not arranged on his watch, but in 2013 to 2016, before he was a Minister. I hope he will be able to cast an eye over the arrangement, with a view to the future that he has set out today.

With my party being in favour of nuclear power, I repeat the question asked by the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Alan Brown) about the £1.7 billion in the Red Book at the last Budget for the completion of the project. Is it about buying off China? Is it about developing this project? Is it about funding further nuclear power for the future? We have no clarity at all, as we have only one line on that investment, which is not good enough. We need much more clarity for the future.

The health and welfare of Springfields is vital to this development, as it could be and should be supplying nuclear fuel rods to the new plant, and we hope the Government will look carefully and sympathetically at the future of that company, because the delivery of British fuel rods to a British nuclear reactor is very important for the future. It is vital that the Government do not allow the company to slip away under their watch when its contribution could be so important to the future of nuclear power in the UK.

Overall, we see much to support in this Bill and believe that, properly executed, its provisions will be able to establish a viable way forward for UK nuclear power. We therefore wish to support its Third Reading.