Security Update

Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

My Lords, with the indulgence of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement made in another place earlier today relating to espionage. The Statement is as follows:

“With your permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a Statement regarding three arrests that took place this morning as part of a Counter Terrorism Policing investigation into suspected National Security Act offences. I can confirm that this relates to China. I can also confirm that this relates to foreign interference targeting UK democracy.

Mr Speaker, for reasons that you will understand, it would not be appropriate for me to comment on any aspect of what is now a live investigation. It is absolutely critical that we do not hamper the work of the police or prejudice any future legal processes by what we say in this House today. I would, however, point the House to what Counter Terrorism Policing has just said in its own statement: namely, that this morning, officers from Counter Terrorism Policing arrested three men as part of an investigation into suspected National Security Act 2023 offences. All three men were arrested on suspicion of assisting a foreign intelligence service, contrary to Section 3 of that Act. Of course, any decision as to whether to proceed with a prosecution will be a matter for the CPS.

The Government stand resolute in our resolve to counter foreign interference activity targeting the UK from any state actor. The Government have been consistent and unambiguous in our assessment that China presents a series of threats to the United Kingdom. We remain deeply concerned by an increased pattern of covert activity from Chinese state-linked actors targeting UK democracy. This involves attempts to obtain information on UK policy-making and interfere with our sovereign affairs.

From the November MI5 espionage alert warning about Chinese intelligence officers targeting individuals with access to sensitive information on Parliament and government to the attempted interference activities of Christine Lee in 2022, this Government will not tolerate it. I can confirm to the House that British officials have formally démarched Chinese counterparts in London and Beijing about these allegations to raise our strong concerns. However, as this is a live investigation, it would not be appropriate to comment further. But let me be clear: if there is proven evidence of attempts by China to interfere with UK sovereign affairs, we will impose severe consequences and hold all actors to account.

In the meantime, the Government are taking robust action to ensure that the UK’s democratic institutions and processes are a hard target for this activity. The National Security Act provides our intelligence agencies and law enforcement with the modern legal tools they need to deter, detect and disrupt the full range of state threats. The action that Counter Terrorism Policing has been able to take this morning is an example of that legislation working well. The political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme under the National Security Act also provides an essential framework for ensuring that those who seek to undermine our democracy are held to account.

I also continue to drive across government the delivery of our counter-political interference and espionage action plan, which I announced to Parliament on 18 November. This is being co-ordinated in strong partnership with the parliamentary security authorities. Our aim is to forge a cross-party and whole-of-society shield to safeguard UK democracy. This includes strengthening our legal defences, cutting off channels for interference, and supporting those on the front line of UK politics to recognise, resist and report the threat.

Members should have seen the guidance that the National Protective Security Authority and the National Cyber Security Centre published last year, on what to look out for in terms of malicious foreign targeting and some basic steps that Members can take to protect themselves. I urge all Members to read carefully through the guidance that was issued. If honourable Members experience any suspicious or out-of-the-ordinary interaction, whether in person or online, they should report it to the Parliamentary Security Department. The Government will continue to work in collaboration with the Parliament Security Department to set up a range of more tailored, bespoke briefings for those at greatest risk.

In January, I joined the director-general of MI5 and the chief executive of the NCSC to brief the chief executives of the UK political parties on the developing threat culture. I can confirm that officials are now focused on developing a programme of work to engage with the UK’s think tanks and non-profit sector to discuss the threats that they face from foreign interference. Our intent is to work with them to strengthen their resilience, ensuring that their hard-won reputations and networks are not exploited by our adversaries as platforms for covertly influencing UK public discourse and policy-making.

In February, we introduced the Representation of the People Bill, which will further strengthen safeguards against foreign interference through political funding. Our proposed Bill includes introducing tougher rules for donor recipients to conduct risk assessments before accepting donations, as well as increasing the powers of the Electoral Commission to ensure that it has the tools necessary to fulfil its duties.

The Government eagerly await the report of Philip Rycroft, following his independent review of regulations and safeguards against foreign financial interference in UK politics. The review was commissioned to rigorously test the financial safeguards we currently have in place and will specifically consider safeguards against illicit funding streams, including the use of crypto assets. The review’s findings will be delivered to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and me by the end of the month, and I can confirm that recommendations, where appropriate, will inform the Representation of the People Bill. We are also working on new powers to counter foreign interference, including a proscription-style tool to disrupt proxy organisations undermining our security.

It continues to be in our long-term strategic interest to engage with China. We are engaging with China confidently and pragmatically on areas where engagement is in the UK’s national interest, including climate, global health, trade and scientific research, but also illegal migration and serious organised crime, to name just a few. But let me be crystal clear: this is not a question of balancing economic and security considerations. We do not trade off security for economic access. Instead, by taking tough steps to keep us secure, we enable ourselves to co-operate in other areas.

We will always challenge any country, including China, that attempts to interfere with or undermine the integrity of our democratic institutions, and we will always prioritise UK national security. That is why the Prime Minister’s visit opened up a direct channel of communication to deliver in the national interest, enabling us to raise frank concerns about activities that impact our national security at the most senior levels of the Chinese system, including domestic security issues.

I assure Members of the House and the public at home that further steps can and absolutely will be taken to defend our democracy. The Government are steadfast in our commitment to disrupting and deterring China’s interference activity wherever it takes place. I commend this Statement to the House”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord and the noble Baroness for their contributions, the very tone of which demonstrates how serious these matters are. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for her congratulations on my appointment. My introduction to being a Minister has been a really easy 24 hours.

I hope I speak for all sides of the House when I say that these matters require us to put the protection of our democracy at the forefront—there is nothing more important. As noble Lords have rightly acknowledged, matters of interference, particularly those relating to Parliament and your Lordships’ House, are of the utmost importance to both Houses and the entire nation. They merit careful consideration by the Government, decisive action by Ministers and appropriate scrutiny by Parliament. It is right that the Opposition have the opportunity to scrutinise, to question Ministers in this House and the other place, and to be appropriately briefed on developments, which is why my colleague in the other place, the Security Minister, was on his feet at the Dispatch Box within an hour of the police statement today, and why I am here this evening.

The Government have not hesitated to acknowledge the threats China poses to the UK, from cyber espionage operations to foreign interference. The Government are taking robust action to ensure that the UK’s democratic institutions and processes are a hard target for this activity. We will continue to engage with China confidently and pragmatically in areas where engagement is in the UK’s national interests; however, we will never compromise on our national security.

Members of your Lordships’ House will appreciate the sensitivity of these issues. Protecting the operational integrity of our police and security services is of the utmost importance. To protect the live police investigation, noble Lords will understand that I am extremely limited in what I can say regarding the specific details of the active case. However, both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness raised a number of questions in their remarks and, while I must be circumspect to avoid any prejudice to legal proceedings, I will seek to address as many of the points that I can now—I will reflect on Hansard if I miss any—within the broader policy points. If I miss anything else, it is because I am unable to address those points, but I will revert to both noble Lords outside.

On the specifics that have been raised, I join the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, in thanking our national security staff. They are keeping us safe every single day. As we saw earlier this week with the Statement on Iran, 20 threats were safeguarded by our national security and, in this space, they are working to protect us. I am grateful for it.

A number of questions were asked and I hope that I will be able to answer them as they were asked. The noble Baroness, Lady Finn, asked about the steps that we can take as parliamentarians. In the last few minutes, the Lord Speaker has issued an email to all Members of your Lordships’ House reminding them of the security that is available. I urge noble Lords to look at the guidance that was issued last year and that has been reissued today about their own security. If your Lordships have any concerns about your work as parliamentarians or who is contacting you and why, please contact the Parliamentary Security Department.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finn, highlighted the fact that, because of the political nature of what is discussed, it may be about events here or elsewhere associated with different organisations. If anybody is approached by the organisation, I urge them to be fully supportive. I assure Members of your Lordships’ House, as I was challenged on, that the Government make a commitment, and I make it from this Dispatch Box, to work to deliver a prosecution with our independent prosecution service, if it makes that decision.

On the points raised on the Chinese embassy, the Government have been clear throughout that the planning decision was for the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government to make in an independent, quasi-judicial capacity. We are confident that the decision is lawful and it would be inappropriate for me to comment further at this time given the ongoing action.

With regard to China as a threat, which is fundamental to everything that we have been discussing, the Government fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security, from cyber attacks, foreign interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions to transnational repression of Hong Kongers. Yet we are also alive to the fact that China presents the UK with opportunities as the world’s second-largest economy and the UK’s third-largest trading partner. Not engaging is no choice at all. That is why the Prime Minister discussed a series of UK national security concerns with President Xi during his recent visit and agreed a new joint law enforcement pact to disrupt the supply of equipment used by people-trafficking gangs operating in the English Channel. We will therefore continue to develop a consistent and pragmatic approach to economic engagement without compromising on our national security, as every other member of the G7 rightly does.

On the FIRS, a genuinely important point that has been discussed many times in your Lordships’ House, no decision has yet been made in relation to specifying China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. I have made it clear multiple times to Parliament and to Members of your Lordships’ House that we are carefully looking at whether other countries should be added to the enhanced tier. We keep specifications on the enhanced tier under constant review to ensure that we are protecting the safety and interests of the UK. Any changes will be announced to Parliament in the usual way. Adding countries to the enhanced tier requires the consideration of a broad range of interests, including but not limited to security considerations. It is important that we get it right.

With regard to the comments on foreign interference from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, this is at the heart of why we are here. It is and always will be an absolute priority to protect the UK against foreign interference, and the UK has a strong record of responding robustly to state threats. Through the National Security Act 2023, the security services and law enforcement agencies have the tools that they need to deter, detect and disrupt modern-day state threats, as they have done today.

The Government are delivering the counter-political interference and espionage plan, which includes a protective security communications campaign. As part of this, the National Protective Security Authority published guidance for those working in democratic institutions in October last year. The plan also includes exploring how to strengthen legislation and regulation and work to degrade the use of proxies. There is also ongoing cross-government work to address academic interference, information threats and transnational repression.

I welcome the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, referenced the report on China. The work of the ISC is incredibly important in this space and I am grateful for the work of the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, who is taking on huge projects at this point. I appreciate what has been said about the China audit that was incorporated into the security and defence review. The noble Lord is right that there are some things that now need to follow on from the SDR and we continue to make sure that that happens. We need to have a national conversation about all the threats that we face so that people understand what is in front of them and they can protect themselves and protect us all at the same time.

The noble Lord made a very important point about think tanks and universities, some of which will be addressed in forthcoming legislation. I look forward to discussing it when we are looking at the Representation of the People Bill. We are also awaiting the recommendations of the Rycroft review, which will touch on some of these issues. The timing of the legislation is such that we seek to be able to incorporate some of his recommendations, if needed, in that legislation.

It is important—and noble Lords will appreciate this—that when I was last at this Dispatch Box talking about these issues I highlighted the fact that the vice-chancellors had all been invited to a meeting with the Security Minister for a proper briefing on how they needed to protect themselves. We are repeating that exercise with think tanks to make sure that they can also protect themselves in this space.

I have presented and did present at the tail-end of last year the counter-political interference and espionage action plan to help disrupt and deter spying from states such as China. It included removal of surveillance equipment, which has been done, and additional funding for new and bespoke sovereign IT capabilities. The plan also reminded every one of us, I hope, of our own responsibilities to protect both ourselves and each other, because there are people who wish us ill. We need to make sure that we strive together to deliver for the people of the United Kingdom and to protect this very important institution.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank the noble and gallant Lord. I believe I have all my fingers, but he is right—this is about how we engage, what issues are in our national interests, where we can co-operate and where we need to challenge. We appreciate that we have a £100 billion trading relationship with China, which means that there are tens of thousands of jobs in the United Kingdom dependent on our relationship. But, at the same time, we seek to do everything we can to protect ourselves. How we do that is a matter for ongoing discussion, but the Government have made a clear decision that engagement is key and, in areas of global diplomacy, more words are definitely better than fewer.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a director of the Free Speech Union. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, said that, because our universities are so financially dependent on China, there may be a risk of interference at the behest of the Chinese in academic freedom and free speech. The noble Lord recommended various measures to address that risk and the Minister also referred to various measures. But there is an additional measure, which would be to commence Section 9 of the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act, which requires universities to disclose to the Office for Students their foreign funding and then the Office for Students to monitor those universities to see if there is any interference in academic freedom or free speech as a consequence of that foreign funding.

We know that there are some examples of this. I can think of two off the top of my head, Michelle Shipworth and Laura Murphy, but there are numerous others. It was referred to in the recent report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which we discussed in this House last week. Will the Minister take this opportunity to set out a timetable for the commencement of Section 9 of the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Lord has campaigned actively on these issues through the Free Speech Union, as I did in my previous iteration at Index on Censorship—slightly different approaches and campaign tactics, but with the same aspiration to ensure academic freedom. Our universities —our cathedrals of challenge, engagement and thinking —are incredibly important. I know that the noble Lord has raised these issues directly with the Minister responsible and I will follow up on those conversations.

[Lord Walney (CB)]

My Lords, I add my congratulations to the newly promoted Minister. My noble friend richly deserves this.

If it is genuinely true that the Government make no trade-off between national security and economic access, what other reasons can there be not to place China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme now?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, who is also my friend whom I have known, I hate to say, for two decades—so this is all his fault. He raises a very important point about the foreign influence registration scheme. No decision has yet been made in relation to specifying China on the enhanced tier of FIRS, as I said earlier. Any changes to that position will come before Parliament in the usual way, but I promise noble Lords that their arguments in both your Lordships’ House and the other place have been heard.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

To follow up the point about universities made by the noble Lord, Lord Young, the Xinjiang province of China grows 20% of the world’s cotton. Since it became technically possible to check garments for where the cotton was grown, the laundering of that cotton by the Chinese—because they do not want to put “grown in China” on it—is massive. It was Sheffield Hallam University that produced the report by Dr Murphy on the laundering of cotton, which has been used once or twice in this House. It is a trade issue as well. They are hiding what they are growing because they know there will be reactions against it, and therefore there is every reason to develop these situations, as far as the universities are concerned.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend, who had a Question on this specific issue last year. It encouraged me to check where my clothes are made when buying them, which has made shopping on Vinted a challenge. He is right about some of the things that may or may not have been happening in Xinjiang province and what that means for the wider supply chain. I will have to get an update for him on where we currently are, but given that he raised the issue of Sheffield Hallam, I again place on record my thanks to my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, whose name is on the institution that was targeted in the way that we are all aware of.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister spoke about taking tough steps and the seriousness of this. Can I press her further on the location of the Chinese embassy? I know that she attempted to answer the question from my noble friend Lady Finn, but why has the decision been made? Surely this is one occasion on which the decision to allow the location should be rethought.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I believe the noble Viscount was present when I presented the Statement on the national security element of the Chinese embassy. I and other Minister have repeatedly come before your Lordships’ House to make clear the Government’s line. Given events, I repeat that the Government have been clear throughout that the planning decision was for the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government to make, in an independent, quasi-judicial capacity. We are confident that the decision is lawful, and it would be inappropriate to comment any further at this time.

[Lord Evans of Rainow (Con)]

My Lords, further to the excellent question from the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, the Chinese make British Army uniforms. On the point about the content of those uniforms, can the Minister let the House know why the Chinese are making British Army uniforms?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I did not see the question going there. The noble Lord is aware of my commitment to the Armed Forces and that I consider myself to be part of the extended military family as an honorary captain in the Royal Navy. He raises a very important point about MoD procurement. I will have to revert to him about when the contract was signed, because I think it pre-dates this Government.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, some years ago, while in China with a British university, somebody happened to mention to our hosts that I had been the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation for the UK. The following morning, the audience had increased from a desultory dozen to about 150.

The point I wish to make to the Minister, whom I also congratulate, is that we have managed to avoid a lot of terrorism incidents by having a methodology to ensure that at all times we are not only vigilant but carrying out training in which many echelons in our public life and society are required to participate. Can we now consider creating a sort of Prevent-type training for those who may be at risk of the attention of the Chinese Government and others to become involved in forms of espionage, which start in a very subtle way and into which people can be drawn all too easily?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for his congratulations. I cannot believe there were not already 150 people signed up to listen to him. He is right that, in this space and everywhere else, we need a clear methodology and process to make sure that there are not knee-jerk reactions to anything and that the right people receive training in the right way. Counterterrorism police already offer training on the issues of transnational repression to all police forces to make sure they have the skill sets available to them. On the further detail, I will consider the noble Lord’s suggestion and discuss it with other Ministers.

[Baroness May of Maidenhead (Con)]

My Lords, I also congratulate the Minister on her appointment, but can I upbraid her? She referenced in one of the answers that there had been an agreement between the UK Government and the Chinese Government in relation to law enforcement on people-trafficking gangs trafficking people across the English Channel. People smuggling is different from people trafficking, and I urge the Government to be precise in their language.

In relation to the new legislation that the Government are bringing forward on representation of the people, she referenced crypto assets. Given the use of crypto- currencies by organised criminal gangs and hostile state actors, will she guarantee to this House that the Government will bring forward very robust proposals in that legislation, in relation to the use of cryptocurrencies by political parties and in our electoral processes?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her question. She is right about the precise language. I will go back and reflect on my pack, and make sure that is fed back to everybody. She raises an important point about crypto assets. That is why we have asked Philip Rycroft to undertake a review to make recommendations in this space, among others. When we have his report, I look forward to discussing its details with the noble Baroness and Members of your Lordships’ House, and how we will take it forward.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, a few months ago the CPS dropped the charges involving spying on Parliament against Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry. At the time, most legal experts took the view that this was a staggering decision. Does this not send a signal to China and other foreign actors that they can try it on, and try to find individuals to infiltrate and spy on Parliament? After this trial collapsed, I recall the Minister saying at the Dispatch Box that there would be some report back and lessons learned, so have we got anywhere with those?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord. I do not remember saying that, but I will reflect on the Hansard and see whether I promised to report back. If I did, I apologise and will seek to deliver that. Noble Lords will remember from our extensive discussions on the collapse of that case that its prosecution was being sought under the 1911 Official Secrets Act. One of the things the police were very clear about is that the arrests made today were under the revised legislation that Members of your Lordships’ House brought forward: the National Security Act, which we would hope has a slightly more updated framework than something that is over 100 years old.

[Baroness Foster of Oxton (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, made a very pertinent point about the amount of trade we do with China, which none of us in this House is naive about. Therefore, we have to take decisions in the round. Notwithstanding that, it is not that long ago that we realised how dependent and reliant we were: when Covid struck, and we were trying to get hold of protective clothing and other things the medical profession needed for the people of this country.

This is not a party-political point, but the lesson learned was that we always need to be very careful to determine who our friends are. It is important to recognise that, when we need something that involves an element of national security, such as during the Covid outbreak, we must ensure we are trading and doing deals with countries that are reliable friends. Does the Minister agree that it would be quite useful to have the Government’s update on that issue now?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her two points. First, on the point relating to Covid, the Covid public inquiry is under way and its recommendations will come forward in due course. I look forward to debating those with Members of your Lordships’ House, because it is a project overseen by the Cabinet Office. The fundamental point, which is important for every Member of your Lordships’ House but also for the Government, is to make sure that discussions about our sovereign capabilities and what we are able to provide, both in the defence space and more broadly, are always considered when we are looking at matters of national security.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, it must be clear to all that China is not interested solely in this country; it will be interested in many other countries, too. Is the Minister confident that the exchange of information on such material between the appropriate channels is and continues to be sound?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble and gallant Lord raises an important point. We are spending £170 million on sovereign encrypted technology to make sure we can talk to each other, and I hope with our allies, regarding interoperability and safe and secure environments. He also raises a genuinely fundamental point, which I touched on with regard to the China audit. One of the reasons the audit was not published in full was our commitments through Five Eyes, which is why it was a summary—as is normal when we are discussing such issues—as part of the SDR.