Crime and Policing Bill

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Report (3rd Day) (Continued)

18:43

Debate on Amendment 334A resumed.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, I will contribute briefly on this group. In general, the amendment produced by my noble friend the Minister is to be applauded. It is massive and detailed—but this is one of the issues. We are on Report in the House of Lords. The House of Commons will never get the chance to discuss this. When the Lords amendments go back, the Commons will have an hour, or two hours at most, for the Bill, without any amendments, so there is a real issue about our procedures.

It is not the first time this has happened. It is a regular occurrence that when we get massive changes at the end of a Bill—

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

Is my noble friend aware that they actually had an extensive debate on this matter in the Commons?

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

This amendment has just turned up here. It is for this House; it was not dealt with in the Commons. That is why we are debating it. It is a brand-new amendment. It is extensive—two or three pages.

I know I am a bit out of date, having been here so long since I left the other place, but the Commons will not have the chance to debate this amendment, simply because of the procedure for dealing with Lords amendments. So, while I agree in general with what my noble friend the Minister has brought forward, let us not kid ourselves. At the end of the day, the Commons has the last word on everything—but it does not have all the detailed words on everything. So, we have to be really careful in the way we scrutinise something that turns up here at the last minute and cannot be looked at again in the other place. If we start a Bill in this place, it is different, but we did not. We therefore have to be careful about what we are doing.

My other point is that, in general, I agree with the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Young. I am not in favour of discrimination against anybody on any grounds whatsoever, but he raised the point, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that in general, the discrimination on misgendering is basically anti-women, because they will be the majority who might have the complaint. There is no question about that. Therefore, the issue should not be left nor criminalised. It may be that my noble friend the Minister has a perfectly straightforward answer. I certainly hope he has, because although I do not propose to vote for any of the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Young, he has raised a very fair point. Again, there will be no chance to discuss this in the Commons, so we need to have a bit more of the detail here in this House.

[Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a paid adviser to the Metropolitan Police. My understanding is that the Government’s amendments simply create a legal level playing field, with deterrents currently available on the grounds of race and religion being extended to other protected characteristics. It is far more serious if you are targeted for attack because you are a member of a vulnerable group than if you are attacked at random, and the law should reflect that.

There has been debate today about free speech and non-crime hate incidents, but these provisions are about actual crimes targeted at vulnerable people. I completely agree with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and those of the Minister.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the way he introduced these amendments. As he said, this is a government manifesto commitment, and it was evident in the pride with which he moved this amendment. However, I agree with concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and others—that it is regrettable that we are seeing the drafting of this provision at this late stage in this House. We have had long debates on the principle as the Bill has gone through, but in this particularly vexed area of the law, the devil really is in the detail, so it is regrettable that we are coming to it fairly late.

In his introduction, the Minister said with clear passion that he wants to level up the protections afforded to people under the law when it comes to hate crime. My concerns are slightly different from some that have been expressed so far in the paused debate: that this amendment as drafted in fact treats some groups of people differently from others and leaves a bit of levelling up still to do.

In part, that is because of the slightly uneasy settlement that we have because of the Equality Act 2010, which, as a Bill, went through Parliament in wash-up. I think it is ripe for a bit of post-legislative scrutiny; it is often prayed in aid in all directions without people fully understanding it. It used to be a bugbear of mine in government when people came to me with a submission talking about people with protected characteristics. I would say, “But that’s everybody”—anyone with an age, a race or a sex has protected characteristics. There is no such person as a person with no protected characteristics. But the way the Equality Act 2010 describes and applies them is not wholly equal, and when it comes to this area of the law, that causes some problems.

We all have a sexual orientation. Section 12 of the Equality Act defines that for us. We may choose different terms ourselves, but it tells us that we are attracted to “the opposite sex”, “the same sex” or members “of either sex”. Accordingly, that is reflected in the amendments that the Government have brought forward vis-à-vis hate crime and hostility on the basis of sexual orientation.

We all have a race or a religion. Again, the descriptions in proposed new subsection (6) talk about

“references to a racial group”,

which could apply to Black people, white people, Asian people, Welsh people—everybody is covered by that provision. In proposed new subsection (6)(b), the

“references to a religious group”

talk explicitly of a “lack of religious belief”. It does not matter whether you are an adherent to a certain religion, you are covered by that. The difficulty in this area comes when we start to apply it to disability or to people’s gender reassignment status, and that is where we start to see the problem in the descriptions in the government amendment. Proposed new subsection (3)(b) talks about

“hostility towards persons who have a disability or … hostility towards persons who are transgender”.

Does that mean that an offence committed against somebody on the basis that they are, for instance, deaf, could be treated as an aggravated offence, but that an offence committed against somebody on the basis that they were a hearing person could not be? I would be grateful if the Minister could explain whether that is the case and whether that is really what the Government are seeking to achieve here.

Similarly, when proposed new subsection 3(b)(v) specifies

“hostility towards persons who are transgender”,

and we have seen many horrible examples of crimes that are aggravated on that basis, does that mean that an offence committed against somebody on the basis that they are transgender, or presumed to be so, could be treated as aggravated, but an offence committed against somebody on the basis that they are cisgender—that they are not transgender—could not be? Again, it would be useful to have the clarification.

I am aware that both of those examples are less numerous and, arguably, far less likely to occur, but they are not implausible, and they should not be neglected by laws that we pass in the name of equality. I know this is a difficult area of the law when it comes to drafting—I think that lies behind some of the delay that the Government have had in bringing forward this amendment—but surely it would be possible to avoid these lacunae by stating, for instance, “a disability or lack of disability” or “a person who is transgender or who is not”. Surely that would allow this to be applied in other ways.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. Can he give a practical example of when there has ever been a relevant criminal offence committed against a person because they are not deaf?

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I cannot—not as a lawyer; I cannot refer to case law on this—but I would not rely on past example alone. If we are passing laws that seek to apply equality, we should seek to apply it on the basis of somebody’s disability status, whether they are disabled or not. It is not implausible—though I accept it is far less likely and far less numerous in past occurrence—for that to be the case. In some of the other areas in the heated debates that we see, it is not as implausible as many of us would like to assume. If it is possible to tighten this up in the drafting, I think it would do the job the Government are seeking to do in a complete way.

That would not prevent the Government fulfilling their manifesto commitment for delivering protections to trans people and disabled people; it would simply ensure that everybody was treated in this area of the law on the basis of protected characteristics in the same way. At the moment, there are greater protections for everybody of every conceivable sexual orientation and people of either sex, but there are not on each of the areas set out in the Equality Act. More pertinently, it would avoid fuelling what is already a very unhelpful public discourse about two-tier policing and laws, or some of the more charged debates that we have in the darker corners of the internet or from the more far-fetched foreign critics who have been mentioned previously.

On Amendment 336 from my noble friends Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, while it is understandable that they are probing this area, I do not think that their amendment is warranted. It probes the question of whether protections for transgender people should apply to people who are “proposing to undergo” a process of gender reassignment. In fact, Section 2 of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, which has been the law of the land for 22 years, requires somebody applying for a gender recognition certificate to undergo that process to have

“lived in the acquired gender throughout the period of two years”

preceding their application. Signalling an intention to propose to go through that process is an important part of the law as it stands, and therefore Amendment 336 is not needed.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, for raising the issue about someone who was not deaf. Unfortunately, he has forgotten that the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 set out exactly why people with disabilities were disadvantaged in society—and, frankly, still are. That is why some people—whether we are talking about someone who is deaf, someone who is in a wheelchair, someone without sight or someone with severe autism—need some support to have equality. That is not what these amendments seek to do. What these amendments seek to do is to say that someone who is disabled should now be included with other people as someone who can be targeted simply because of their disability. I want to give two brief illustrations to explain why it is important.

Two years ago, a man launched a racist tirade at passengers on a packed London train. He started shouting extreme racist abuse at a woman in her 70s, using language that I could not possibly repeat in your Lordships’ House. When passengers tried to intervene and support this elderly lady, they were then shouted at and attacked and became scared. Indeed, one person left the train. The police were able to use aggravated charges because the words he used to describe her were clearly racist. She was chosen because of the colour of her skin. It was not because she was just sitting there.

Contrast that with last autumn when comedian Rosie Jones was attacked on a train from Brighton to London Victoria. She was hit with a wine bottle—luckily, it was only plastic; she said that only a comedian could do that. She was hit only because of her cerebral palsy and probably, she thinks, because she is well known to be LGBT. At the moment, those people could not be considered for an aggravated sentence—and that is what these amendments seek to do. That is the point. Therefore, I have no problem whatever in saying that we should support these amendments.

I have reported in your Lordships’ House before that people have said to me on a train, when I have been commuting in the rush hour, “Why are you taking up space? People like you don’t work”. That is not an aggravated offence. But when someone tried to kick me on a platform because they felt I should not be there because I was in a wheelchair and in her way, that would have been an aggravated offence if they had caught her.

I am really struggling with all these debates going on at the moment. Yesterday, the leader of the Conservative Party made a big announcement about getting rid of equalities, and everyone is talking about identifiers. I do not have an identifier; I am disabled—and sometimes people take it out on me. I can live with most of it, but sometimes it goes beyond the right place. Frankly, members of our judicial system should be able to make up their minds about whether it is an aggravated offence. That is the subject of the amendments we are debating today.

19:00

[Lord Shinkwin (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. That she spoke as powerfully as she did—and I hope to echo some of her words—draws attention to the fact that so few of us in this House have a severe disability and therefore look at these issues from first-hand experience.

I was not intending to speak on these amendments—Amendment 334 in particular—and I obviously let my Chief Whip know, but I have listened very carefully to the debate and, as I say, I come at this from a purely personal experience. The noble Baroness mentioned the Disability Discrimination Act, which, of course, your Lordships’ House passed about 30 years ago. It was so exciting, because it was meant to herald a new dawn of non-discrimination and equality. Thirty years later, discrimination on grounds of disability is rife—and I know that because I experience it several times a day, day in and day out. It may be low-level abuse—smirks, nudging as I go past, laughter—but the effect it has on a person’s self-esteem and morale, when they are having to cope with so many other challenges in life, cannot really be described. It has to be felt to be believed.

I simply say to the House that this is a new development. I referred to the Disability Discrimination Act coming in 30 years ago this year. I was on the National Disability Council, advising the Government on its implementation, so we were developing codes of practice 30 years ago, almost to the day. I would say that the law is inadequate and needs this amendment. It needs to be updated for this simple reason: the message needs to go out from your Lordships’ House that the sort of behaviour the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has described, and the case studies she has shared with the House, are completely unacceptable. I do not believe a single member of your Lordships’ House would disagree with that. They are completely unacceptable. This amendment sends that message. Notwithstanding my personal support for the wonderful work that the Free Speech Union and my noble friend Lord Young of Acton do, I support this amendment.

[Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green (CB)]

My Lords, I want to acknowledge and thank the Minister for the introduction of this amendment. It is a vast improvement on the amendment laid in the other place. We discussed it at Second Reading and in Committee, and it is great to see it on Report.

However much we might like to reconsider the wording of the Gender Recognition Act, the way in which we consider hate crime, and the Equality Act, that is not what this amendment does. We can talk about the GRA, we can talk about hate crime and we can talk about the Equality Act, but that is not what this is about. This is about extending to disability and LGBT people and sex aggravated offences that already exist for race and religion and belief. That was a recommendation made by the Law Commission in 2021, which feels like a different country was indeed only five years ago.

What aggravated offences do that is different from increased sentencing is very specific. First, it leads to stronger sentences and a higher maximum penalty. However, in order to do that, hostility must be proven as part of the offence itself and not just considered at sentencing, so you need significantly stronger evidence than you currently do. For those who are concerned about the lacklustre way in which people are accused of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity, that will have to be put through a much more rigorous process to be tested before this kicks in. You also get a longer time to report because it is considered in the Crown Court, which gives victims more time to report and gives the police more time to investigate. Therefore, again, there is a much stronger need for substantive evidence before those cases can be considered and people can be found guilty. It is changing in the sentencing, but the nature in which that investigation takes place will be much more rigorous than the current provision that is made on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. That increased sentencing was introduced circa 2020—forgive me, but I do not know exactly when—as an easier way of kind of levelling up the law, because this was too tricky to do then. This is now about just levelling up.

The world feels more hostile. This amendment demonstrates that the Government, and indeed this House, take that very seriously. It incentivises people to provide better evidence of crime. A tweet misgendering would, I think, not likely pass muster, but misgendering while you kick someone’s head in possibly might be an aggravating factor in sentencing, and that feels quite reasonable.

I would say that being counted matters—these crimes being counted matters. I said at Second Reading and in Committee that, when the hate crime law did not exist for people like me, I presumed that the crimes I was experiencing were an okay thing to experience. When Governments from both sides—I say that as a loving Cross-Bencher of all of you—have introduced legislation that protects me, that makes me feel more like I belong in this country. This amendment therefore signals that, as a member of the lesbian, gay, bi and trans community in this country, I am protected from hate crime and that will be taken seriously. I can report it and the police will do their job to find substantive evidence if it exists. If it does not exist, they should send me on my way. This does not give us an opportunity to unpick that, but I absolutely welcome this amendment.

[Lord Herbert of South Downs (Con)]

My Lords, I draw attention to my entry in the register of interests. I chair the College of Policing, but I am not speaking in that capacity, nor have I spoken to policing colleagues about this matter.

I want to make a couple of observations about the debate that we have had. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green, whose comments I agreed with entirely. The issue that she was seeking to draw attention to was in response to the argument that we have heard that there is no need for the provisions that the Government have set out because the courts can apply a sentencing uplift already for crimes involving hostility to gay or disabled people. Yes, they can, but for the reasons the noble Baroness explained, we are talking about a separate architecture of aggravated offences, which are stand-alone criminal charges, and which are therefore investigated as such from the outset and recorded separately. That sends a much more potent signal about the seriousness of these crimes. These aggravated offences also extend the statutory time limit for cases to be submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service, which the regime of mere sentencing uplift does not. That potentially provides additional protection for victims.

I have a concern with the arguments that are being advanced about the Government’s proposal. If, for instance, the issue is that police time will be wasted by this change in the law and that it is the wrong use of resources, that is an argument for the existing aggravated offences to be swept away. The principled argument to take, and one that would be advanced by my noble friend Lord Moynihan, who is nodding vigorously, would be to say that if aggravated offences are wrong, a waste of time and do not matter—I think they matter a great deal for the reasons that the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt, set out—then we should sweep them away for offences in relation to religious hatred or racial hatred, because those also are protected characteristics under the Equality Act and this architecture is worthless because it corrodes free speech, and so on.

Make that argument if that is what you believe. However, the reverse argument was put by the Law Commission. Extending this protection for some offences to some groups but not others—to groups that are already recognised as being worthy of protection by the criminal law because of their vulnerability, because they are minority groups—creates a “significant disparity” and causes significant injustice and confusion. A Law Commission report, hundreds of pages long, examined these issues in depth and concluded that there should be an extension.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

That is the second or third time that the 2021 report of the Law Commission of England and Wales has been referred to in this debate. To clarify, that report clearly and strongly recommended not including sex as a protected, aggravated characteristic in the charging or sentencing regime. It set out some extremely good reasons for why sex should not be included from a clearly feminist point of view. By all means, cite the Law Commission’s recommendations to support the inclusion of the other three aggravators that the Government want to add to the charging regime, but it was explicitly not recommended that sex be added as an aggravator.

[Lord Herbert of South Downs (Con)]

But my argument was against the proposal that these offences in their entirety should be rejected by this House—that the Government’s proposal in its entirety should be rejected by this House. I was not engaging with my noble friend’s argument. I have some sympathy with his point, and in particular that merely misgendering someone should not become a criminal offence. It might be a thoroughly unpleasant thing to do but whether it should be an aggravated offence is worthy of discussion. My concern is that we may be getting ourselves into the position of opposing an amendment that makes an aggravated offence in relation to disabled people, as well as to LGBT people, and we reject that and yet we do not for the other offences.

There is also a danger of attempting to trivialise this matter and a confusion with the debate on non-crime hate incidents. We will come to that. I have taken the strong position that we need a much higher bar in relation to those incidents and that the whole regime needs sweeping away. We will come to that. However, we are not talking about that. We are talking about potentially very serious criminal offences. We are talking about GBH and criminal damage, and are saying that where those offences are motivated by hostility against a group, it does not make sense that the offence can be aggravated in relation to racial or religious hostility but not in relation to disabled people or to LGBT people.

That is the argument. We are not talking about whether people should be able to say disagreeable things on Twitter. This is not the moment for that debate. We are talking about serious offences and whether they should be aggravated, which would result in a more serious penalty and would send a signal to wider society.

There has been a quite concerning increase in hate crimes in relation to LGBT people, particularly transgender people. I have taken for some time a position, which finds me out of step with most of the groups in the LGBT lobby, that there is a very legitimate discussion to have about how women’s rights are affected by transgender rights and that there needs to be a recalibration of the law and the movement’s positions on this. I happen to take that position. However, I know that the way in which this debate is being conducted outside of this Chamber is resulting in an increase in hate against transgender people. That is deeply concerning. It is vilifying people because of ideological positions that are being taken. It is particularly wrong when people in positions of responsibility start using this debate for political purposes.

I have great concern about the climate in which this debate is being—

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I want to clarify or come back on a couple of things.

[Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)]

It is not allowed on Report. You are allowed to ask a question.

19:15

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I will ask a question then. I understand that the noble Lord says that this has been trivialised into just Twitter or non-crime hate incidents. However, hate crime law very often involves speech. Therefore, it is not just a question of GBH and so on. Also, one of the reasons why it has not been possible to make a principled objection to the whole shebang, which I am opposed to, is because of how the amendments have been laid out. It has been quite difficult to break them down in the way that is suggested. Would the noble Lord therefore accept that, for those of us who are worried, it should not have been handled in this way and that the way in which the amendment arrived here does not facilitate the best scrutiny that, as he has indicated, we should give?

[Lord Herbert of South Downs (Con)]

I am grateful for the noble Baroness’s intervention. This issue merits further and deeper discussion, which is a matter for the Government to address. Yes, of course, the whole principle of aggravated offences and hate crime is that it may involve an infringement upon free speech. The judgment that we must make is whether it is legitimate that it does because of the seriousness of the offences. As I have said, it is very important that we do not allow the criminal law and the police to intrude into the trivial.

The point that I was making is that there is a danger of giving the impression that this is only about disagreeable things that are said on Twitter. It is not. We are talking about offences at the more serious end of the spectrum as well: offences which, when committed against people simply because of their characteristics, because they happen to be members of a particular group, make them more serious. We should be sending that signal to society and protecting the victims. If we do not take that position, and if we think that the whole regime of aggravated offences is wrong, let us take an honest position and say that we will not have them for racial offences or religious offences either. That is not the position, as I understand it, of our Front Bench, which is why I cannot support noble Lords in opposing the Government’s amendment.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

My Lords, those of your Lordships who were in Committee will recollect that, as my noble friend Lord Herbert suggested, I tabled an amendment seeking to remove all aggravating hate crimes.

One of the points that I thought that I made quite well was to show the utter incoherence of aggravators at the time. One law had a few protected characteristics, another had others, some had lots, some had a few. I thought that I had made a point there. It is as if the Minister has said, “Hold my beer; okay, if you feel that it is incoherent, we’ll just put all the protected characteristics into as many laws as we can and we will make it more rational”. I agree that that is the effect of this amendment. Like my noble friend, I am against all aggravator laws. I do not propose to make the earlier speech but I will rehearse very quickly some of the major points.

It is quite a difficult stance to make. The Minister was extremely eloquent in saying why he felt that this amendment should pass and received a huge amount of support from the Benches behind him. It is a difficult argument to make but I will explain why I think that this amendment is bad and why aggravation of hate crimes is poor.

I am going to make four points. First, they are clogging up the courts. All state resources are limited. Choices have to be made. If you put aggravation of a crime as an additional reason for prosecuting that crime, the police will be far more reluctant not to prosecute. You will not get the old-fashioned bobbying. We are not talking about trivial crimes. We are talking about serious crimes, and those can already be prosecuted.

In the old days, a policeman could say, “Come on, chaps, break it up. Don’t do that”. But if someone had said, “You Black bastard”, or whatever—I hate to even say that phrase—the police would find it very difficult not to prosecute. It increases the time of the courts. But in fact, there is a better way than criminalising this, which is just to let society work it out.

My noble friend said that transgender crime was on the increase. I have just looked it up on the AI, and apparently it is not. We know that hate crime against gays and lesbians has massively declined as society has come to accept that it is a perfectly natural thing and that it is something to just ignore or accept, but it is not something to criminalise.

My second point is that this—

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. He keeps talking about hate crimes, but this is not about hate crimes. This is about offences already on the books in which a judiciary is asked to look at whether it has been aggravated because of the individual’s characteristics. It is not about hate crimes.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. I was just about to get on to that in my second point, which is that the whole idea of an aggravated crime increasingly weaponises and politicises the concept of hate.

In the previous debate, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, made some very affecting comments. I was able to talk with her about the incident that she also mentioned this evening outside the Chamber. Over the years, my very long-standing and noble friend Lord Shinkwin has told me some very harrowing things that have happened to him. The disabled protected characteristic having an aggravated crime is possibly the most difficult of these to speak against.

But whatever that protected class is, it is exactly the point that the noble Baroness was making. This is an aggravator to a crime that exists. If the crime is committed, it does not matter why it was committed; it can still be prosecuted. If it cannot be prosecuted, you cannot prosecute the aggravated aspect of it either. Weaponising hate and making it into a thing ignores the fact that these are merely aggravator laws. They are not laws that in and of themselves create a crime; they merely aggravate an existing crime. That has received very little attention in the debate this evening.

Thirdly, it further creates and promotes the concept of society as identity groups. I have the view that we are all human beings and the way to have a coherent and well working society is for us all to work together, whereas with aggravated crimes, people with one or another protected characteristic are encouraged to say, “I’ve been discriminated against. They are the things against me. These people are hateful”, instead of saying, “Let’s all join together and just stop crime”.

I would like to lean on two actors who I very much respect and think of as very thoughtful people: Denzel Washington and Morgan Freeman. They have both been quoted on numerous occasions as saying, “How do you stop hate crime? How do you stop racial hatred? The answer is you stop talking about it”. If they believe that, and I happen to agree with them, what is it about what they say that noble Lords disagree with?

My final point is on this idea of looking into people’s minds. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, talked about a case where the difference between committing a bad crime and committing it because you dislike the gender or whatever it was of the individual was a wrap on the knuckles or going to jail for six weeks. How do you know exactly what was in that person’s mind? Was it just an off-the-cuff remark, or was it some deep hatred that deserved society’s censure? You do not know. Queen Elizabeth I said, “I do not want to look into men’s souls”. It has been a fundamental part of British jurisprudence since the 17th century—I do not know why the noble Baroness thinks that is funny; it is fundamental to the way we conduct our society.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. Will he accept that there is no question of a court looking into someone’s soul? The aggravation has to be proved. It has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt by what the person has said, or what they have done, and the circumstances of the case. That is a matter for the judge.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

The noble Lord evinces the certainty that comes from a lifetime in the courts. Those of us who sit outside those courts are maybe a little less certain of the courts’ ability to reach such a fine state of discernment.

I will wrap up; it is getting late.

[A noble Lord]

Yes.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

At least I had this debate in Committee, my Lords, which the Government failed to do with this amendment, so I should have the right to reply to it. The amendment goes beyond what is valuable and on to what is political and dysfunctional. I urge the House not to support it.

[Lord Cashman (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly, because the one thing I agree on with the previous speaker is that it is late. I was not going to speak, but the amendment directly affects me. It affects the kind of country I want to remain living in. I have to say to your Lordships that I wake up most mornings wondering why our country has become so mean and why hate is so promoted and why hate crime is rising. I speak because I am a member of the LGBT community. I have had bricks through my window in the past. Sadly, if it were done now, it would be properly prosecuted.

A civilised society has nothing to fear from the way it protects minorities, particularly vulnerable, dehumanised and misrepresented minorities. Indeed, I would argue, looking at past legislation that has made my life better in so many ways, that the way we treat minorities is the litmus test of any decent, civilised country. Therefore, I urge your Lordships to get into the Content Lobby behind the Government and support this vital and necessary government amendment.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate on this group. It is a very large group with a number of significant amendments.

As a preliminary, my Amendments 346 and 348, and government Amendment 347, are about an issue relating to emergency workers which we on these Benches have been highly critical of throughout proceedings on the Bill in relation to trying to leave out the clauses that create new criminal offences relating to abuse towards emergency workers. We have stated our opposition to those in Committee, and I do not seek to repeat those points today.

My main concern today is government Amendment 334 and its consequentials. The broad thrust of my argument is around, first, the lateness with which the amendment has appeared, and secondly, the overlap with the sentencing regime.

We are very disappointed that the Government have brought forward such a significant amendment at this late stage in the Bill’s proceedings. We have not had the ability to discuss it in Committee, and the Government are now asking us to accept an amendment for the first time which has not been adequately scrutinised. We have had several general debates about some of the issues raised, but tonight we have had a two-hour debate where lots of different points and arguments have been made, and we now have to decide not only whether the intent behind the amendment is sound but whether the Government’s drafting of it is workable. That is a tall order, given that this is our first—and if the Government have their way, our last—debate on the amendment. In my view, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, is absolutely right.

19:30

The Official Opposition wrote to the Minister on this point, asking for this amendment to be debated under Committee rules, but that was rejected. I listened very carefully to the Minister when he referred to it as a manifesto commitment, but if it is a manifesto policy then that is all the more reason for there to be a fully worked up drafting of this provision and for it to have appeared earlier.

I turn to the substance of the amendment. We believe that it falls short. Our principal concern is that there is already a significant amount of law relating to aggravators and hostility based on differing characteristics. I should be clear: I do not take issue at all with the adding of the extra protected characteristics; I take issue with the duplication of legislation that already exists. This is an area of law that has grown into an expansive body—a panoply—of legislation, reaching across multiple statutes. We have Parts III and 3A of the Public Order Act 1986; Sections 28 to 33 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998; the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006; Sections 240 and 241 of the Armed Forces Act 2006; the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023—although I appreciate that has not yet been commenced; and Section 3 of the Football (Offences) Act 1991. Most significantly, we have Section 66 of the Sentencing Act 2020, a law that was passed by the previous Government and to which I will return in a moment.

Several of my noble friends, including my noble friends Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, Lord Young of Acton and Lady Cash, have spoken powerfully about the issues of free speech today. I do not intend to add to their powerful speeches on this issue. My central argument is that the Government are proposing to add even more to the statute book in relation to aggravation.

Section 66 of the Sentencing Act states that any offence can be aggravated by hostility based on race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity. In fact, that section mandates judges to

“state in open court that the offence is so aggravated”.

That plainly goes to the issue of sentencing. When the Minister introduced the amendment—I listened very carefully to what he said, and I have great respect for him—he said that the rationale was around sentencing. If that is where the government amendment is aimed then, for the same reasons, Section 66 of the Sentencing Act already provides that ability for the courts, when it comes to sentencing and the seriousness of the offence, to deal with convicted criminals by using aggravations based on hostility based on protected characteristics. With one exception, which I will come to, all offences and all characteristics that relate to this amendment can already be treated as aggravated by hostility by the court when it comes to sentencing. For those reasons, in our view, the amendment is simply not needed.

The exception is sex, which does not appear in Section 66 of the 2020 Act. On that—I think this has already been mentioned—in 2021 the Law Commission made strong arguments about why sex should not be included as an aggravating factor. That is not a debate that we have time to get into now, but it is a very difficult one about certain cases of violence against women and girls not effectively being caught. That is the perfect example of why we need more time to debate this. For those reasons, these Benches do not believe that the Government’s proposals are sound.

We have some specific points on the other amendments. First, these Benches think it should be made plain that the definition of sex in these amendments means biological sex. If transgender identity is covered separately then hostility based on sex must have the meaning of sex meaning biological sex. That is addressed in my Amendments 337, 350 to 352 and 356.

Secondly, on Amendment 334A from my noble friend Lord Young of Acton, I very much hope that the Government can indeed give him an assurance around the issues of misgendering that he spoke about.

In addition, we have Amendments 335 and 354, which intend to remove the provisions around association, for the reason that proposed new subsection 6(c) states that membership of

“a racial or religious group, includes association with members of that group”.

The difficulty we see here is that if someone insults another for being friends with a person of a particular racial group, that would be considered a racially aggravated offence even though that person is not themself a member of that racial group.

Lastly, I listened to my noble friend, Lord Parkinson, on Amendment 336. Having heard him, I do not intend to take that amendment further.

In conclusion, as I said, we already have a huge number of laws, especially Section 66 of the Sentencing Act, that allow for offences to be aggravated by hostility towards a person based on their protected characteristics when it comes to sentencing. We do not believe that this opinion should stand part of the Bill. We accept that the amendment is based on an explicit manifesto commitment and we respect the Government’s mandate, although we disagree with the amendment, but it is not acceptable for the Government to bring forward an amendment drafted in this way at such a late stage. Unless it is withdrawn, we will vote against it.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the comments of noble Lords and noble Baronesses. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for her kind comments at the beginning—if I blush, that is the reason why. I appreciate them.

I hope that this debate will be undertaken in a way that respects different views, but there is a significant difference of opinion between noble Lords who support this amendment and those who do not. That is fair, proper and right. This House and the House of Commons are places to debate those issues, and I will try to do so in as friendly and constructive a way as possible while sticking to my firm principles that the Government’s amendment is the right thing to do.

I am grateful for the support of my noble friend Lord Cashman; the noble Lords, Lord Shinkwin, Lord Herbert of South Downs, Lord Paddick and Lord Pannick; from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton; and the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green. I think that that spread of opinion from the Cross Benches, the Liberal Democrat Benches, the Government Benches and, indeed, the Conservative Benches shows that this is a real issue that needs to be addressed.

I noted that the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, has argued again today. He did so in Committee. I accept his view as his view. He wanted, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs, to row back on all aggravated factors in his amendment. He accepts that. I have no argument about his right to do so, but I do about my position on where I accept it. There is a real debate between us.

I say again to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, and other noble Lords who have raised this issue that this amendment is not about non-crime hate incidents or offensive tweets; it is about serious offences such as actual bodily harm, public order offences, harassment, stalking and criminal damage where a prison sentence would be given by a judge on conviction. If the judge, having heard the evidence of the prosecution and witnesses in that trial, believes that the harassment, stalking or actual bodily harm was generated not just by two people meeting in a pub and having a fight but by somebody turning up in that pub, having a fight and suffering actual bodily harm because the individual was a different colour, race, religion or sex—or because they dressed in a transgender way, because that is what they chose and that is the way they live their life—that is something that, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, put his finger on, a judge should take into account when giving a sentence of up to the maximum potential sentence under the law.

That is because the law will say that it was not just an argument or stalking offence or harassment because of a general factor; it will say that the principal direction of that harassment, stalking or grievous bodily harm was because of a transgender characteristic, disability characteristic, racial characteristic or misogyny. I draw a line in the sand on this and say that this House, the Government and Parliament should stand up for those people who face that kind of activity. That is a reasonable position to take.

The amendments strengthen support and protection for victims. No one will go down for a tweet or a non-crime hate incident under this; they will go down because they committed a serious offence, and they will get an aggravated sentence because they did it for a reason that this society should not tolerate.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

If I could clarify—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

No.

[A noble Lord]

It has to be a question though.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I am about to ask a question.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

It is Report.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I am asking a question; is that allowed on Report? I want just to clarify: when the Minister says a tweet versus a serious offence such as a public order offence or harassment, will he accept that that can be a speech crime? I have never mentioned tweets. It is serious if you get sent to prison for a speech crime. That is why there is concern about speech.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We are going to have a whole debate at some point in the next couple of weeks on non-crime hate incidents involving the type of issues that we are debating. I am putting the case for the Government. That is my view, it is what we are saying, and I have had support from people who have been political opponents in the past, people who I share political views with, opposition parties and Cross-Benchers. That is a reasonable coalition that has said that this is the right thing to do.

Genuine points have been raised about the tabling of this amendment at this late stage on Report. I say three things in response to that. First, this is a manifesto commitment. Secondly, the Law Commission report in 2022 developed this. It is a complex area of criminal law and has been a long time in gestation. Had we been able to draft an amendment that met the objectives we set then I would have tabled it in Committee, but we have drafted and tabled it now after a long period of gestation.

I also say to noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Rooker, that it was announced at Second Reading in the House of Commons that we would bring this amendment forward. In Committee in the House of Commons, an amendment was tabled from the Back Benches by Rachel Taylor, MP for North Warwickshire and Bedworth, to meet the Labour Government’s manifesto commitment. The House of Commons debated that amendment and the Government said they accepted it in principle but needed to look at it in the context of the Law Commission and its drafting. After a full debate in the Commons, we accepted the amendment and have brought it back.

At Second Reading in this House, I took great pride in saying that we would bring the amendment back. With all due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, he tabled an amendment in Committee that would sweep away every aspect of race and other protected characteristics. That is his view. In my argument against that view during the discussion we had in Committee, I said to him and to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, that I would table an amendment on Report and that we would debate it. We have had two and a quarter hours on this debate so far today. We may have a Division on it, on which I hope to get support from other colleagues. But I say to all noble Lords that this is an important issue.

The amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, would, in essence, water down that proposal. The amendments in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Davies of Gower, would water down that proposal. The amendments seeking to strike out the offences in Clauses 122 and 124 of threatening emergency workers would mean that individuals could abuse emergency workers on a racial basis. That is simply not acceptable to me, the Labour Government, the Liberal Democrats, Members of the Conservative Back Benches and the Cross Benches. It might be a legitimate view, and I will not deride that view, but is not one I will ever share. I say to my noble friends: join me in that Lobby—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

It is the Lobby over there.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti reminds me that I have been in this House for just under two years now and have voted only once in the Lobby on that side of the Chamber.

Tonight, I ask my noble friends and anybody else who wishes to join me to vote for this amendment, because it does what the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green, said: it says to people who have protected characteristics, “Society is on your side”, and if you are picked out because of that characteristic, we will make sure that the people who pick you out pay a penalty for that if the judge in that trial determines that, having had a guilty verdict, your motivation was one that attacked protected characteristics. If it is good enough for people who are Jewish, Muslim or Black, it should be good enough for trans, disabled and other people. That is why I take great pleasure in asking my noble friends to join me in this Lobby any moment now to vote for this amendment. I hope that all noble Lords who support the principle will do so.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

I thank the Minister for his response and, on the basis that I have understood him correctly that none of these amendments or the Government’s intention of commencing the new Clause 4B of the Public Order Act is intended to encourage the police to investigate misgendering on social media—I can see the Minister is nodding—I am happy to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 334A (to Amendment 334) withdrawn.

Amendments 335 to 337 (to Amendment 334) not moved.

19:48

Division 2

Amendment 334 agreed.

Ayes: 213

Noes: 145

20:00

Amendment 338

Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

338: After Clause 121, insert the following new Clause—
“Domestic abuse protection orders(1) The Domestic Abuse Act 2021 is amended as follows.(2) In section 35 (provision that may be made by orders), after subsection (5) insert—“(5A) A domestic abuse protection order may require P to participate in an assessment to determine whether P should be required to participate in a programme of activities.(5B) A domestic abuse protection order may provide that if, following an assessment required under subsection (5A), the person carrying out the assessment determines that P should participate in a programme of activities, then P is required to participate in that programme of activities.”.(3) In section 36 (further provision about requirements that may be imposed by orders), omit subsections (2) to (7).(4) In section 44 (variation and discharge of orders), after subsection (3) insert—“(3A) A magistrates’ court may of its own motion vary a domestic abuse protection order made by a magistrates’ court acting in the local justice area in which that court acts.(3B) The Crown Court may of its own motion vary a domestic abuse protection order made by the Crown Court.””Member's explanatory statement
This new clause adds participation in an assessment and programme of activities as examples of requirements that a domestic abuse protection order may include, and allows the criminal courts to vary domestic abuse protection orders of their own motion.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 338 responds directly to what we have learnt from the domestic abuse protection order—DAPO—pilot, which is currently rolled out across Greater Manchester, Cleveland, North Wales and the London boroughs of Croydon, Bromley and Sutton.

We know that positive requirements such as behaviour change or substance misuse interventions are vital tools in tackling perpetrator behaviour, but the current legislation makes it extremely difficult for criminal courts to impose these requirements quickly, particularly in police-led cases where hearings must take place within 48 hours of a domestic abuse protection notice being issued. The changes we are bringing forward will remove those barriers and ensure that victims receive stronger, enforceable protection at the very first hearing.

The change will allow criminal courts to require a perpetrator to attend a suitability assessment as part of the original order, and if the assessment shows that a programme is appropriate, that requirement will apply automatically without the need for further hearings. These amendments are not needed in the civil and family courts as those jurisdictions already impose an assessment requirement as part of a DAPO. We are also removing the need to identify and name a programme provider up front for all courts—one of the key issues raised by operational partners in the piloting areas. Instead, we will set out the role of the responsible person in statutory guidance to ensure flexibility for local delivery.

Finally, we are also closing a gap in the legislation by giving criminal courts the power to vary a DAPO of their own motion, bringing them into line with the civil and family courts. Together, these changes will streamline the process of imposing a positive requirement condition in a DAPO, reduce unnecessary adjournments and ensure that victims of domestic abuse benefit from quicker, more consistent and more effective protection across all court jurisdictions. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the Minister and from these Benches we support the changes set out in her Amendment 338. My Amendment 361A says that if

“there is reasonable suspicion that a death by suicide has been preceded by a history of domestic abuse committed against the person by another person, the relevant police force must investigate that suicide as if it were a potential homicide”.

My honourable friend Marie Goldman MP has talked with a number of domestic abuse campaigners who have become increasingly concerned that police and CPS procedural policy should include this presumption, because sometimes it is missed. Pragna Patel from Project Resist launched a Suicide is Homicide campaign last year, and the group Advocacy After Fatal Domestic Abuse has been calling for this for many, many years. Frank Mullane, its chief executive, said to the Guardian that doing this would guard against evidence being destroyed or lost,

“for example where police have returned the victims’ phones and laptops”,

after an assumption of suicide has been made, thus losing key evidence that might be needed at a later date.

On Monday, the Scottish courts convicted a man of killing his wife after she took her own life. There was a history of domestic abuse right from when they first got together, which included his choking her. There was considerable evidence that he had continued to coerce and pressure her, which eventually forced her, very regrettably, to take her own life. This news from Scotland is good, and I am very grateful for the discussions with the Minister, but I hope she will look favourably on this and reassure your Lordships’ House that the Government will consider putting it into practice.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I want briefly to thank the Government for Amendment 338. I know the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and her team are extremely grateful that they have been listened to—this is something they have wanted for some time—so I would just like to say a big thank you for that. On Amendment 361A from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, I understand the reasons for it, and I hope the Minister will be able to give an encouraging response. As far as Amendment 409C is concerned, I cannot see the Government accepting that. The reasoning behind it is right, but I cannot see it being practical or effective.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Government and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for their amendments in this group. I do, however, have some concerns about the Government’s Amendment 338. We on these Benches believe that domestic abuse protection orders are a very important civil tool; indeed, they were introduced under the previous Conservative Administration. However, they are not, and should never become, a substitute for proper criminal justice consequences. Amendment 338 will expand orders to include mandatory participation in assessments and activity programmes. With respect, I do not believe that the answer to domestic abuse lies in programme participation; it lies in firm sentencing and, where appropriate, immediate custody.

I raise these concerns in the wider context of the Government’s sentencing policy. During the passage of the Sentencing Bill, this House divided at Report on a Conservative amendment that sought to exempt domestic abuse offences from the new rebuttable presumption against short custodial sentences of 12 months or less. Noble Lords on these Benches, in particular my noble and learned friend Lord Keen, argued that domestic abusers should not benefit from an assumption in favour of suspension. When the issue was pressed to a vote, the Government resisted that exemption.

Noble Lords are therefore now faced with an uncomfortable contradiction. The Minister will no doubt say the Government are determined to be tough on violence against women and girls; yet, when given the opportunity to ensure that domestic abusers would not fall within an automatic presumption against immediate custody, they declined. Against that backdrop, it is difficult to accept that expanding programme requirements within civil protection orders represents a meaningful, tough stance against domestic abuse. Real deterrence requires certainty of punishment.

Turning briefly to Amendment 361A, I have sympathy with its intention. Where suicide may have followed a history of domestic abuse, investigation must be rigorous and sensitive. However, requiring all such cases to be investigated as if they were homicides raises practical and legal concerns. Police investigations must follow clear evidential thresholds, and homicide procedures carry significant procedural and resource implications. A rigid statutory instruction risks unintended consequences and may not in practice deliver better outcomes. It is for officers and detectives who arrive at the scene of a crime to determine, on the basis of the available evidence, how to investigate that death. Prescribing in law how to advance an investigation in specific circumstances is not an appropriate course of action.

In conclusion, I am not persuaded that expanding the scope of domestic abuse protection orders is a legislative solution to the problems women and girls face daily. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I genuinely thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, who is not in her place, for Amendment 361A. As I find is so often the case with the noble Baronesses, there is very little between us on the principles involved. The Government agree that it is vital that police officers understand the link between domestic abuse and suicide; the only issue is how it is most effectively to be achieved.

There are three reasons that the Government cannot support the noble Baroness’s amendment. The first is that this is about the effective enforcement of police standards and, in our view, primary legislation is not the right place for this to sit. The second is a concern that it would not work, because there are no consequences contained within the amendment for not doing what the amendment requires one to do. If police forces are not inclined to do it anyway then an amendment that does not have any consequences is unlikely to make a difference.

The third and real reason is that, as we say, we are already on it. I will explain why we say that. The Government are already taking steps to improve police responses to suicides, including for cases where victims have taken their own life following domestic abuse. First, last year, the College of Policing published new national guidance for officers which highlights the importance of considering any history of domestic abuse and applying “professional curiosity” at the scene of these deaths. Secondly, the Home Office is working with the police to monitor the implementation of this new guidance, and has since commissioned five deep dives with select police forces to examine how the police are responding to suicides and unexplained deaths that follow domestic abuse. Thirdly, the Tackling Violence Against Women and Girls Strategy, published in December 2025, sets out that the senior investigating officer training programme for police officers will, going forward, cover deaths that follow domestic abuse, including suicides.

Fourthly, the Government are continuing to build the evidence base on suicides that follow domestic abuse through funding research developed by the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s domestic homicide project in order to capture information on these deaths from all 43 police forces in England and Wales and identify how the response can be improved. Fifthly, the Home Office is working with the domestic homicide project to explore the possibility of expanding the project’s scope in future years to encompass all suicides that occur in the context of violence against women and girls. This will enable deeper analysis and a more comprehensive understanding of every suicide resulting from these forms of violence and abuse.

Lastly, in relation to the criminal law, the previous Lord Chancellor asked the Law Commission to undertake a review of homicide law, including the use of manslaughter offences where abuse may have driven someone to suicide. Its final report is scheduled for publication in 2028. I know that your Lordships have expressed concerns before about this particular review, but this is the Law Commission’s own time frame and it is a serious piece of work.

I completely understand and acknowledge the impact that these deaths have on families; it is absolutely devastating. Supporting them is central to the Government’s approach. That is why the Home Office funds the organisation Advocacy After Fatal Domestic Abuse to provide specialist support to families bereaved by suicide following domestic abuse. The Government are clear that the police must respond effectively and comprehensively to suicides following domestic abuse, and the programme of work that we are already undertaking will ensure that they have the knowledge and the tools with which to do so. In the light of the Government’s ongoing work, I hope that the noble Baroness will be content not to press her amendment.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, for supporting government Amendment 338 today. With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, we are not here to re-debate the Sentencing Act all over again. The point is that this is only one tool in the toolbox of domestic abuse protection orders, and many of the other tools are much more punitive in nature. We have to remember that some of these people will go on to have other relationships in the future, and we want them to stop doing this. We want to make sure that these things are effective. The use of DAPOs is being evaluated by an independent research organisation. With that in mind, this is an important change. I am grateful that it has been welcomed by your Lordships, and I commend the amendment to the House.

Amendment 338 agreed.

Amendment 339

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

339: After Clause 121, insert the following new Clause—
“Guidance about honour-based abuse(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance about honour-based abuse to such public authorities as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.(2) Guidance under this section may include guidance about—(a) the prevention of honour-based abuse;(b) the identification of honour-based abuse;(c) the collection and sharing of information about honour-based abuse;(d) how public authorities should work together in relation to honour-based abuse.(3) Before issuing guidance under this section the Secretary of State must consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.(4) A public authority to which guidance under this section is given must have regard to the guidance when exercising its public functions.(5) The Secretary of State must publish the guidance.(6) The Secretary of State may revise the guidance.(7) Subsections (3) to (6) apply to any revised guidance, except that subsection (3) does not apply if the Secretary of State considers that the revisions are not substantial.(8) In this section “public authority” means a person exercising public functions, other than a court or tribunal.” Member's explanatory statement
This amendment confers a power on the Secretary of State to issue guidance to public authorities about honour-based abuse.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, in Committee—and I am grateful for the comments made at the time—the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, and others urged the Government to grasp the opportunity afforded by this Bill to deliver on the Government’s commitment to introduce statutory guidance to assist front-line practitioners in tackling honour-based abuse by supporting a statutory definition of such abuse. I am pleased to say that we agree that this is not an opportunity to be missed. The Government have tabled Amendments 339 and 340 in response to comments in Committee to deliver on the Government’s commitment.

Amendment 339 introduces a power for the Secretary of State to issue multi-agency statutory guidance on honour-based abuse. This guidance will sit alongside the statutory definition, operationalising it by clearly setting out expectations on prevention, identification, information sharing and multi-agency working across policing, health, education, social care and other safeguarding partners. Public authorities will be required to have regard to this guidance, meaning that professionals must factor it in to how they carry out their existing duties and safeguarding responsibilities.

20:15

Amendment 340 introduces for the very first time a statutory definition of honour-based abuse for specific use in connection with the multi-agency statutory guidance. While we are not introducing a specific criminal offence, this definition provides a clear and shared reference point to support professionals in recognising honour-based abuse and responding consistently and appropriately, ensuring that victims are identified earlier and protected more effectively.

I am grateful for the meetings that my noble friend Lady Levitt has had, particularly with the noble Baroness. I was able to attend some of those meetings, and I hope that we have moved a considerable way towards assisting the objectives that the noble Baroness set out in her rightful pressing of the Government in Committee, and indeed outside of the Chamber.

To be completely clear, this definition must cover situations where multiple perpetrators carry out the abuse. We know this is often a core aspect of how honour-based abuse manifests itself, and engagement with specialist sector organisations highlighted the importance of capturing this element.

These amendments, I believe—I hope that the House will share this view—deliver on the Government’s Violence Against Women and Girls Strategy commitment to introduce multi-agency statutory guidance and an accompanying statutory definition of honour-based abuse. These measures will provide a necessary framework to improve professional understanding, enable earlier and more consistent safeguarding, and bring coherence to how agencies respond to cases, ensuring that victims and those at risk get the best possible support.

I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, has Amendment 340A in this group, which seeks to further clarify the definition of honour-based abuse. If the House will allow me, I will listen to her comments, and to any other contributions, and will respond in winding up. For now, I commend to the House these amendments, which entirely originate from pressure in Committee. I beg to move.

[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Government for tabling their Amendments 339 and 340, and thank all noble Lords who supported this call in Committee.

These amendments respond to a campaign from Karma Nirvana and 60 other specialist violence against women and girls organisations, along with survivors and their families, calling on the Government to introduce the statutory definition of honour-based abuse. That campaign was established in memory of Fawziyah Javed, whose case demonstrates the tragic consequences of failing to identify honour-based abuse. Despite multiple calls for help, including two police visits just days before her murder, the abuse she endured was never recognised as honour-based abuse. Crucially, professionals failed to identify the multi-perpetrator nature of the abuse, which involved not only her partner but members of his family. Sadly, Fawziyah’s case is not isolated. Again and again, inquiries and serious case reviews show that, when honour-based abuse is not recognised early, victims are left unprotected, escalation is missed, and all those involved in abuse are not held to account.

The hope is that this definition, supported by clear guidance, will enable front-line professionals to identify, understand and respond to honour-based abuse before tragedies occur, and, crucially, to recognise all perpetrators involved. While this progress in the Bill is welcome, the Government’s chosen approach does not explicitly recognise the specific multi-perpetrator nature of honour-based abuse—an omission with real safeguarding consequences. The current wording risks being read as referring to only one additional perpetrator. Honour-based abuse, however, commonly involves multiple family or community members acting collectively, often across households and generations. Failing to reflect this reality in the Bill risks embedding the very misunderstanding that the definition seeks to correct.

My Amendment 340A would address this by making a simple and proportionate change to subsection (2) of the Government’s amendment. It would clarify that honour-based abuse can involve a person or persons, ensuring that statutory language reflects operational reality. It would align the law with the lived experience of victims, the expertise of specialist services and existing safeguarding practice. It is a modest change with major consequences for victim safety.

I am grateful for the engagement of Ministers and officials on this issue. I anticipate that the Minister may argue in response that this amendment is unnecessary because Section 6 of the Interpretation Act 1978 provides that

“words in the singular include the plural”—

I acknowledge that. However, this principle does not translate effectively in safeguarding practice. I appreciate that this issue will be made explicit in the guidance, and I am grateful for the Minister’s reassurances on that point, but we are concerned that legislation may be read literally, and that the harm of relying on “person” is therefore not theoretical. Focusing on a single actor risks professionals misunderstanding the collective nature of the threat and failing to safeguard against a wider group. That is precisely the gap that has led to missed risks and preventable deaths.

I very much hope that the Minister can accept my amendment or perhaps commit to coming back at Third Reading with the Government’s own version. If he cannot, please can he explain two things? First, what is the legal risk or harm of including the words “or persons”? The safeguarding risks of not including them are clear and substantial. Secondly, why have other areas of the criminal law, such as legislation on harassment, organised crime, gangs, affray and riot, been able to use explicit plural language, yet this Bill has not? In each of those contexts, Parliament has recognised the need for clarity where multiple actors are inherent to the offence. Honour-based abuse is no different; indeed, it is a textbook example of collective harm.

In closing, I am very grateful to the Government for taking this significant step forward. I pay tribute to the many survivors of honour-based abuse, and to the families of those who have been killed. Despite unimaginable trauma, they have fought for this definition so that others may be protected. They are following this debate closely, and their message is clear: honour-based abuse is collective abuse; if the law does not say this plainly, professionals may not act on it. I very much hope that the Minister recognises the strength of feeling, the weight of evidence and the safeguarding imperative, and accepts this small but vital amendment that will materially improve professional understanding and, most importantly, save lives.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, that it is not merely that, under the Interpretation Act, “person” includes “persons” unless the context requires otherwise—which I do not think it does here. I hope that the Minister will make it clear that the object of his amendment is indeed to cover cases where there is more than one person. If the Minister can say that that is the Government’s objective, the courts will have regard to that if there is any ambiguity at all, which I do not think there is.

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate the Government on bringing forward these amendments. However, reading Amendment 340 as it is written, in the context of our treatment of Lord Mandelson in this House, I cannot see how we are not guilty of honour-based abuse. We are a community that considers that a person has dishonoured us; we have subjected them to economic abuse and greatly restricted their access to money and income. How does it not apply? How would it not apply to a part of a community deciding to ostracise people who have been involved with a grooming gang? There is nothing in this definition that exempts “abuse” directed at people who have done serious wrong.

[Baroness Verma (Con)]

My Lords, I completely support my noble friend. I have worked in this area for over three decades and know the communities well. Sadly, unless it is very clear that those community members will be punished in the same way as the perpetrator—in many cases, there are many perpetrators —this will not be effective. Clarity needs to be put into legislation, so I wholeheartedly support my noble friend.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, this has echoes of previous legislation that has passed through your Lordships’ House. In the three or four years before the Domestic Abuse Act became law, if you had asked people to define domestic abuse, I think you would have had a range of interpretations, many of which would be somewhat wide of the mark compared with what is in the Act and is now generally understood by courts and police forces across the country.

We had a similar journey to go through when we talked about the appalling incidents of non-fatal strangulation, which, again, was a very strange term for many people to hear at the beginning. It takes a while for people to understand the concept and for there to be clarity on what it does and does not mean. For those who have been involved directly with honour-based abuse, including the extraordinary work that Karma Nirvana has done, and those who have been in this field for years, it is completely clear what honour-based abuse is. However, for many people who have not had direct exposure to that, including the people who may be asked to help, intervene and make judgments in these cases, it would be extraordinarily helpful for the definition to be as clear to a non-legal layman, who is trying to help and give support, as it would be to an experienced legal brain.

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My Lords, first, I want tribute to my noble friend Lady Sugg, who has brilliantly led this campaign. I also pay tribute to Payzee Mahmod, who I was fortunate to hear give evidence in the House on Monday on the whole issue of honour-based abuse. I would never dream of taking issue with my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on any legal matter at all, but he talked about the issue of ambiguity and the courts deciding. Why not just get it sorted out now, so that there is no ambiguity? That is why I support my noble friend Lady Sugg in getting the words in now. From what I heard on Monday, it is clear that this would accurately reflect the multi-perpetrator dynamics of the issue. It would provide clarity to professionals and strengthen the safeguarding responses, and it would deliver on the Government’s commitment to a robust definition. Getting it right now would stop any ambiguity, so I hope that the Minister will listen carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for leading on this, and for the excellent and clear speech that she just gave, as well as in the previous debate, which I read about in Hansard.

First, this is an example of a difficult area that people have steered clear of for many years, because they were frightened that, if they talked about it, they would be accused of racism. Secondly, it is not therefore understood, because it has not had public exposure in broader society. The fact that the Government have accepted these amendments will help raise the debate in a way that is not seen as in any way suspicious.

Whether it is clans, family structures or whatever, the multi-perpetrator point is well made, very important and not understood. My only reservation—I do not even know whether I have it—is that I have been very involved in, and concerned about, joint enterprise law, where not one perpetrator but a group of perpetrators was found guilty. That has led to a huge number of miscarriages of justice—there was recently a debate in the House on it. The danger of everyone in the vicinity being drawn in, and guilt by association in any way, makes me nervous. We must ensure that we are not criminalising people who are part of the family and maybe looked away, but who are not necessarily perpetrators. It would be very helpful if that could be cleared up. In general, however, the clearer that we in this House can explain the law, rather than waiting for the court to interpret us—that point was well made—the better.

Secondly, for those involved in the earlier debate on misogyny, women and so on, which was rather fractious, I regard this as heroic work in fighting crime against women and misogyny. Anyone involved in tabling these amendments and persuading the Government to adopt them deserves to be highly commended, because this is what lawmaking should be, rather than signalling one’s disapproval.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, as the Minister said in his introduction, as a result of the earlier amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, the Government have now brought forward much-needed statutory guidance, together with a clear statutory definition of this pervasive yet often overlooked form of abuse. Both are vital tools for front-line professionals. Without them, warning signs go unseen, cases slip through the cracks and victims remain dangerously exposed.

20:30

A statutory definition makes that guidance workable, enabling earlier identification and better data, which we need if we are to understand and address patterns of risk. It is also a vital stepping stone towards recognising honour-based abuse as an aggravating factor in sentencing —a change strongly backed by specialist “by and for” organisations, brought together by Southall Black Sisters and previously supported by the Government’s Safeguarding Minister.

Before turning to the noble Baroness’s latest amendment, I acknowledge the huge amount of difficulty around language. Some survivors feel that the term “honour-based abuse” echoes the excuse used by abusers and places shame on the victim rather than the perpetrators. The Freedom Charity is campaigning to replace it with “dishonour abuse”, flipping the narrative forward towards a more accurate, survivor-centred term. Although I see the power of that shift and hope it gains traction in the future, the term “honour-based abuse” is now widely understood in law and practice, so I shall use it today for clarity. Naming and defining this abuse does not legitimise it, of course, and no single phrase will capture every survivor’s experience. How could it? But this definition has been developed with survivors and specialists and is a serious attempt to reflect lived reality, not to tidy it up for legal convenience. That is why it is so important that we get the detail right now while the statute is being framed.

Amendment 340A from the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, goes to the heart of how honour-based abuse actually operates. It confirms that the offence can involve multiple perpetrators, not just a single individual, and it explicitly covers situations where one person causes others to act abusively towards the victim—a ringleader orchestrating a group response, sometimes across generations and across borders. The murder of Banaz Mahmod is an example. Police believe that around 50 men were involved in that murder. Survivors and practitioners tell us that this pattern is common and that using the singular word “person” risks confusion in complex cases.

Amendment 340A suggests a modest drafting change, but one with real practical impact for victims, police, prosecutors and safeguarding partners. It would help to ensure that data reflects the true scale of honour-based abuse and that multi-agency responses are based on an accurate understanding of how these crimes are organised. We strongly support all three amendments and urge the Minister to accept Amendment 340A in particular.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for bringing forward these amendments. I thank my noble friend Lady Sugg for her determined and tireless work on honour-based abuse. I know that the Government had intended to bring forward a statutory definition at some point, but it is purely down to her efforts during the passage of this Bill that we are discussing it today, and she fully deserves the commendation she has received this evening.

I will not repeat the points of my noble friend’s speech but simply reiterate that we plainly welcome the introduction of a statutory definition. I hope it will help in getting justice for the most vulnerable members of our society. I also offer my support to her amendment, which aims to provide legal clarity and remove ambiguity about the nature of honour-based abuse. It can take a wide array of forms, but a common trend among them is that it is often committed by families and community groups. My noble friend is, I think, simply seeking clarity on the Government’s new provisions so as to provide explicit confirmation of the position.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for her Amendment 340A, which has had the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Verma, the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and to some extent the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I understand where she is coming from and I will try to explain where we are and how we can interpret her point.

On the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and Lord Mandelson, formerly of this Chamber, I do not think that now is the appropriate time for me to comment on that—first because a number of potential legal cases are going on, and secondly because I do not conflate anything that will or will not face Lord Mandelson with the horrors that people have faced with honour-based abuse. The noble Lord has made his point, but I will not respond to it today.

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

I merely chose it as an example that we would all be aware of. It seems to me that the clause as drafted catches a lot of people who should not be caught by it. I will write to the noble Lord, if he will allow that.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am always happy to have letters—or, potentially, one of those newfangled things, an email—from Members of this House. If the noble Lord wishes to send something through, I shall happily examine it with my colleagues.

The contributions in relation to the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, rightly emphasise the need for clarity and to ensure a proper definition that covers situations where multiple people are involved in perpetrating abuse. I completely agree that the definition must reflect both the survivor experience and capture multiple perpetrator contexts. However, I put the caveat to her that we have to be careful that what appears a straightforward change to the wording does not create drafting ambiguity in itself or add complexity that would hinder practitioners. As I stated in my opening comments, as drafted this amendment covers a situation where there is more than one perpetrator. I am happy to put on the record that the Government will also make that clear in the Explanatory Notes and the statutory guidance, to be published in due course, so that front-line practitioners understand without doubt that honour-based abuse can be carried out by multiple perpetrators. Again, I hope that that goes to the point made by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Russell of Liverpool.

I understand and recognise the noble Baroness’s point but, again, the Home Office wants fully to consider the impact of the amendment. However, I hope the statement I have given from the Dispatch Box—which, again, for ease of practice, is that front-line practitioners can understand without doubt that honour-based abuse can be carried out by multiple perpetrators—is clear. I hope that, with that commitment, these government amendments will ensure that we have a significant milestone in strengthening the Government’s response to honour-based abuse, but more importantly that the public authorities have the tools, guidance, understanding and clarity they need to ensure that we provide a better overall multi-agency, victim-centred response.

I thank the noble Baroness for her amendments. A number of noble Lords have referenced organisations outside Parliament that have campaigned long and hard. I pay tribute to them and share their objectives. I hope with those comments that the amendments that I have tabled can be moved—

[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for that response, and it is great to hear that the Home Office is considering how this might impact the legislation. However, I do not think I have heard exactly what harm this might do or why it is allowed in other legislation but not in this. I therefore wonder whether the noble Lord might consider bringing it back at Third Reading, if the Home Office is able to find a way to get the provision concerning multiple perpetrators into the Bill.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I always try to be as clear as I can from this Dispatch Box, when I can. I simply say to the noble Baroness that the Government would not want to table any amendments to the Bill at Third Reading. We want to try to ensure that the discussions we have had are complete and that Third Reading is a relatively straightforward procedure. So I cannot offer her that comfort, and I might as well tell her that now. But I am also saying, notwithstanding the points she has made, and in the light of the guidance we are going to produce, that I hope the interpretation I have given, which I think reflects the view of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is one she can accept. I shall move my amendments, but I also ask her in due course not to press hers.

Amendment 339 agreed.

Amendment 340

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

340: After Clause 121, insert the following new Clause—
“Meaning of “honour-based abuse”(1) For the purposes of section (Guidance about honour-based abuse) “honour-based abuse” occurs where—(a) a person (“A”) engages in abusive behaviour towards another person (“B”) who is a member of A’s family or is a relevant connection of A, and(b) A is motivated wholly or partly by A’s perception that B has behaved, is behaving or may behave in a way which—(i) shames or dishonours A, B, A’s family, B’s family or A’s community, and(ii) does not comply with the accepted norms of behaviour in A’s community.(2) The reference to A engaging in abusive behaviour towards B includes A causing another person to engage in abusive behaviour towards B.(3) A person’s behaviour may be behaviour “towards” B despite the fact that it consists of conduct directed at another person (for example, B’s child).(4) Behaviour is “abusive” if it consists of—(a) physical or sexual abuse,(b) violent or threatening behaviour,(c) controlling or coercive behaviour,(d) economic abuse (see subsection (5)),(e) spiritual abuse,(f) psychological or emotional abuse, or(g) other abuse,and it does not matter whether the behaviour consists of a single incident or a course of conduct.(5) “Economic abuse” means any behaviour that has a substantial adverse effect on B’s ability to—(a) acquire, use or maintain money or other property, or(b) obtain goods or services.(6) A person is a member of another person’s family if any of the following applies—(a) they are relatives,(b) they are, or have been, married to each other,(c) they are, or have been, civil partners of each other,(d) they have agreed to marry one another (whether or not the agreement has been terminated),(e) they have entered into a civil partnership agreement (whether or not the agreement has been terminated),(f) they are, or have been, in an intimate relationship with each other, or (g) they each have, or there has been a time when they each have had, a parental relationship in relation to the same child,(and references to a person’s family are to be read accordingly).(7) A person is a relevant connection of another person if they are friends or acquaintances who are known to each other in person.(8) For the purposes of subsection (6)(g) a person has a parental relationship in relation to a child if—(a) the person is a parent of the child, or(b) the person has parental responsibility for the child.(9) In this section—“child” means a person under the age of 18 years;“civil partnership agreement” has the meaning given by section 73 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004;“parental responsibility” has the same meaning as in the Children Act 1989 (see section 3 of that Act);“relative” has the meaning given by section 63(1) of the Family Law Act 1996.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause defines “honour-based abuse” for the purposes of my new clause (Guidance about honour based abuse), inserted after clause 121.

Amendment 340A (as an amendment to Amendment 340) not moved.

Amendment 340 agreed.

Amendments 341 to 344A not moved.

Clause 122: Threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour towards emergency workers

Amendment 345

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

345: Clause 122, page 168, line 12, leave out “racially or religiously hostile towards E” and insert “hostile towards E, within the meaning of section 124(3)”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 124, page 169, line 20.

Amendment 345 agreed.

Amendment 346 not moved.

Clause 123: Threatening or abusive behaviour likely to harass, alarm or distress emergency workers

Amendment 347

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

347: Clause 123, page 169, line 2, leave out “racially or religiously hostile towards E” and insert “hostile towards E, within the meaning of section 124(3)”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 124, page 169, line 20.

Amendment 347 agreed.

Amendment 348 not moved.

Clause 124: Interpretation of sections 122 and 123

Amendment 348A not moved.

Amendment 349

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

349: Clause 124, page 169, line 20, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
“(3) The conduct of a person (“D”) is hostile towards another person (“E”) if—(a) at the time of that conduct, or immediately before or after that time, D demonstrates towards E hostility based on—(i) E’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group,(ii) E’s membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group,(iii) a disability (or presumed disability) of E,(iv) the sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation) of E,(v) E being (or being presumed to be) transgender, or(vi) the sex (or presumed sex) of E, or(b) D’s conduct is motivated (wholly or partly) by—(i) hostility towards members of a racial group based on their membership of that group,(ii) hostility towards members of a religious group based on their membership of that group,(iii) hostility towards persons who have a disability or a particular disability,(iv) hostility towards persons who are of a particular sexual orientation,(v) hostility towards persons who are transgender, or(vi) hostility towards persons who are of a particular sex.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment expands the kinds of hostility relevant to an offence under clauses 122 and 123 to include hostility related to disability, sexual orientation, transgender identity and sex.

Amendments 350 to 352 (to Amendment 349) not moved.

Amendment 349 agreed.

Amendment 353

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

353: Clause 124, page 169, line 30, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
“(5) In subsection (3)—(a) references to a racial group are to a group of persons defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins;(b) references to a religious group are to a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief;(c) “membership”, in relation to a racial or religious group, includes association with members of that group;(d) “disability” means any physical or mental impairment;(e) references to being transgender include references to being transsexual, or undergoing, proposing to undergo or having undergone a process or part of a process of gender reassignment;(f) “presumed” means presumed by D.” Member's explanatory statement
This amendment defines terms used in my amendment to clause 124, page 169, line 20.

Amendments 354 to 356 (to Amendment 353) not moved.

Amendment 353 agreed.

Amendment 357 not moved.

Amendment 358

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

358: After Clause 124, insert the following new Clause—
“Controlling or coercive behaviour by persons providing psychotherapy or counselling services(1) A person (“A”) commits an offence if—(a) A is a person providing or purporting to provide psychotherapy or counselling services to another person (“B”),(b) A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards B that is controlling or coercive,(c) the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and(d) A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will or may have a serious effect on B.(2) A’s behaviour has a “serious effect” on B if—(a) it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against B, or(b) it causes B psychological harm which has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities.(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(d) A “ought to know” that which a reasonable person in possession of the same information would know.(4) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for A to show that—(a) in engaging in the behaviour in question, A believed that he or she was acting in B’s best interests, and(b) the behaviour was in all the circumstances reasonable.(5) A is to be taken to have shown the facts mentioned in subsection (4) if—(a) sufficient evidence of the facts is adduced to raise an issue with respect to them, and(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.(6) The defence in subsection (4) is not available to A in relation to behaviour that causes B to fear that violence will be used against B.(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine, or both;(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or a fine, or both.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour by providing psychotherapy or counselling services.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 358 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Doocey. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, who co-signed an amendment in the same terms in Committee and spoke to it, is unfortunately unable to be here this evening but is fully behind the amendment, on which he has campaigned for many years. We bring this amendment back on Report because we regard it as very important that the predatory behaviour of quack psychotherapists and counsellors, at which this amendment is aimed, is criminalised as quickly as possible.

I stress that no one, at any stage since I and others started campaigning on this issue, has expressed the view that this abuse of clients by quack psychotherapists or counsellors is not wicked behaviour that ought to be outlawed by the criminal law. This amendment is aimed at those who claim to be psychotherapists or counsellors and effectively secure clients—I could say “ensnare clients”—and are then guilty of coercive or controlling behaviour towards them. These clients are usually young people—but not always, as I think the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, will point out. They are, however, invariably extremely troubled. Typically, but again not always, the psychotherapists or counsellors then suborn their clients into believing that their parents or other family members have been guilty of abusive behaviour towards them, which, they assert, explains their present emotional and psychological difficulties.

20:45

The results are that these quacks, for that is what they are, then effectively take over the lives of their clients, charging them substantial fees and, by a process of transference and often by the implantation of false memories, inducing what is known as false memory syndrome, inculcate a dependency in the clients upon the so-called therapist. The result, intended and actual, is the alienation of the clients from their families, frequently lasting for years and, sadly, often permanent, with the so-called therapists effectively taking over their vulnerable clients’ lives. In Committee I reminded Members, as did the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that such behaviour is criminal in countries such as France, Belgium and Luxembourg, but not yet here.

I am grateful to the Minister for organising a meeting for me with Minister Karin Smyth of the Department of Health and Social Care. However, although we had an interesting discussion, the Minister was unable to help with the issue that this amendment addresses. Minister Smyth reinforced the point made in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, that the Government are considering the question of regulation in a number of areas of healthcare. The position of psychotherapists, however, is that they practise in a space that is entirely unregulated, except that there are a number of voluntary registers accredited by the Professional Standards Authority. Indeed, the question of the regulation of psychotherapists is important and needs to be addressed. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and my noble friend Lord Alderdice, with all their relevant experience in government and in practice, have been arguing this case for years. Minister Smyth was happy to discuss the issue of regulation with me, but it became clear that the Government have no current plans to proceed with the compulsory regulation of psychotherapists in any case, so for today’s debate, the issue of regulation is a red herring.

This amendment aims to criminalise conduct that everyone who has considered the issue agrees is abusive and ought to attract a criminal sanction. The only reason the last Conservative Government gave for not accepting my amendment to the Domestic Abuse Bill, now Act, in the terms I now propose, was that they wished to confine the concept of controlling and coercive behaviour in that Bill to abuse within family relationships. But this is a Crime and Policing Bill. Its Long Title includes the words:

“To make provision about … offences against people”

and

“the criminal exploitation of persons”.

No Bill could be more apt for the inclusion of this offence. In Committee the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, expressed the view that the proposed offence might be too broad, first because it referred to the concept of psychological harm and secondly because it set a test for the applicability of the proposed defence, under our proposed new subsection (4), of whether the behaviour of the defendant

“was in all the circumstances reasonable”.

I said in response to the noble Lord that I would consider his points, and I have done so. As to the first issue, that of psychological harm, I contend that the question whether controlling or coercive behaviour has caused psychological harm is no different in kind from the question whether an assault has occasioned actual bodily harm. That is the basis for a charge of assault occasioning ABH, which is an offence tried every day by juries and magistrates in the context of assault and is easily understood. There would, I suggest, be no greater difficulty for juries, judges—if it should come to that—or magistrates in identifying psychological harm than there is in identifying actual bodily harm, with the assistance of such evidence as may be necessary.

As to the test in proposed new subsection (4) of our amendment, whether the behaviour of the defendant

“was in all the circumstances reasonable”,

that is precisely the language used in Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 in the context of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship. Indeed, our amendment is modelled on that section almost precisely. Our proposed new subsection (4) is in exactly the same terms as the defence under subsection (8) of that section.

Parliament has already chosen to use identical language in the context of a defence to a charge of controlling or coercive behaviour, so we say that nothing can be criticised in the drafting of this new offence. No one has suggested any reason for not making this behaviour by quack psychotherapists or counsellors criminal. There is ample evidence that this behaviour is not uncommon. Regulation of psychotherapists, while not strictly relevant to today’s debate, is a long way off anyway. There is here a genuine and serious wrong that needs addressing. I beg to move.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support this amendment, which would have been avoided if we had been able to have proper regulation of psychotherapy professionals. The problem is that the voluntary registration through the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy, the UK Council for Psychotherapy or the National Counselling & Psychotherapy Society requires people to be appropriately trained and have ethical standards. But if there is a serious complaint against them and they are removed from there, they can still carry on seeing clients and practising in a completely unethical way. There is absolutely no recourse for people who are seriously harmed by whatever activities are undertaken.

There are times in people’s lives when they are particularly vulnerable. One of those is when they are bereaved. Some older people, when they are bereaved, may be in what you could call that pre-dementia phase of being particularly emotionally vulnerable. They may have people who recommend in good faith that they go to see somebody who has some counselling label up, but who then goes on to exploit them tremendously to create dependency, charge huge fees and make the person emotionally dependent on them, which results in coercive behaviour to carry on seeing this person and carry on handing over money. They may also, in the process, implant the idea that their family are being unsupportive and that the best thing they could do would be to cut off contact with their family.

I have seen this first hand, when a family, who were well-meaning and wanting to provide support, had the most awful acrimonious correspondence sent to them by the person who was being advised for their own good in their counselling to have no contact whatever with these family members, and the counselling service that this person was accessing drained many thousands of pounds from their personal account. The problem is that, at the moment, there is no recourse for the public. They can complain and try to take a legal process against the person, but they are very vulnerable people. This amendment would provide a route to having some control, if you like, over some of these quack practitioners who should not be out there, putting up nameplates and calling themselves counsellors.

It is worth remembering that, particularly in primary care, we have talking therapies that have very good outcomes, such as cognitive behavioural therapy, delivered by people who are properly trained, subject to ethical standards and have appropriate diplomas. They provide non-judgmental, confidential, professional assistance and guidance to help people find a solution to their problems. It has become popular in primary care and in the community, but the backlash against it is that an unsuspecting person and their friends may not realise, or have any way of knowing, that somebody who claims to be a counsellor is completely bogus.

In 2024, Alastair Campbell campaigned hard against this, and there was a very good article in the i newspaper about it—I do not think it is advertising for me to name the paper. I recall the discussions we had about trying to get the registration of professionals, so that those who are providing a valuable service can carry on doing so and are not tainted in the minds of the public by those who are completely bogus. This amendment seems to be essential to protect the public.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned the reservations which I expressed in Committee. I have thought further about this matter since Committee. Indeed, the purpose of the gap between Committee and Report is precisely so that all noble Lords—not only noble Lords on the Cross Benches and Back Benches but Ministers—can reflect on what was said in Committee.

I have looked in particular at the provision which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned, Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which creates an offence of:

“Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship”.


It uses, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, rightly said, the same concepts that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, seeks to implement in the law in the present context. It seems to me that there is a very close analogy between that existing criminal offence and the present context, which is not in the same intimate or family relationship but in the relationship between the psychotherapist or counsellor and the patient.

For my part, I cannot see why the mischief—and it is a mischief—which the amendment seeks to identify should not be a criminal offence. Why should it be that persons who carry out conduct that is defined in this provision should not be subject to the criminal law? Regulation is important, but it is not the answer. The mischief defined in Amendment 358 should be a criminal offence. I have changed my mind.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for bringing his amendment back on Report, and commend him for his continued championing of this issue. Regrettably, these Benches cannot endorse his amendment. We acknowledge that there is plainly a gap in the current law that is causing an issue within the counselling and psychotherapy sector, but are less sure that the amendment as drafted would best serve victims and help them get redress.

As has just been said, the amendment would introduce an offence modelled on Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which itself introduced the offence of controlling and coercive behaviour by intimate relations or family members. Like the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I understand the parallel with this, but I believe that they are fundamentally different in nature, with counselling and psychotherapy being a relationship with a client and a provider in a different setting.

21:00

That said, I acknowledge the need for work to be done in this area. In Committee, I referenced the most recent large-scale study of counselling coercion and noted the lack of justice received by victims. There is a weakness in the complaints process, and part of that may be due to an absence in legislative means. If the problem is malign psychotherapists, perhaps more thorough oversight would prevent these individuals entering the profession in the first place. If the issue is complaints, perhaps creating a new offence is not as necessary as reforming the procedure by which clients are made aware of the current means of redress.

To conclude, I wholly understand the position of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and I am sorry that we are not able to support it. I look forward to hearing from the Minister.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for setting out his amendment on the issue of controlling or coercive behaviour by psychotherapists and counsellors. I fully understand the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, in support of it. I am pleased in some ways—and in other ways I am not—that the noble Lord has managed to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to back his cause. However, while I accept that there are concerns in this area, I am sort of with the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, on this one.

The amendment seeks to create an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour for psychotherapists and counsellors providing services to clients, mimicking a similar offence in the domestic abuse context. I understand the need for that, as explained by the noble Lord, and I fully recognise that those who seek psychotherapy and counselling services may be vulnerable. As the noble Lord knows, psychotherapists and counsellors are not statutorily regulated professions in the UK. However, there are other safeguards in place for the public to acquire such services with confidence.

As my noble friend Lord Hunt of King’s Heath said in Committee, this is a complex area where there is an overlap of roles and titles. It is difficult to differentiate between and reach agreement on defining what these specific roles are, be it psychotherapist, counsellor, therapist, well-being coach, talking therapist, mental health practitioner, lifestyle mentor, family coach or spiritual healer—the list could go on.

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, touched on, regulation is not always the answer. Quack and unscrupulous practitioners can, as has been described today and during previous debates, easily refer to themselves as something slightly different to avoid any proposed new offence, and regulation does not define the scope of practice.

In Committee, I heard the request for the noble Lord and supporters of the amendment to meet the relevant Minister at the Department of Health. I was pleased to facilitate that discussion, which I know took place on Monday—though there still appears to be a gap between the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and my colleague Karin Smyth MP.

The amendment as it stands is intended to protect vulnerable people from rogue practitioners who call themselves psychotherapists or counsellors, but it does not include a legal definition of counselling or psychotherapy services. I respectfully submit that the amendment is not the right route to take, in the light of that issue.

As I and my honourable friend the Health Minister in the Commons have said, the Government are focused on managing the underlying risks. We are ready to work with sector partners to commission a formal assessment of the oversight of such therapies in order to understand current risks as well as the effectiveness of existing safeguards and whether they need to be strengthened to protect the public better. As I mentioned in Committee—I will repeat it again for the noble Lord—if the Government are satisfied that the conditions for the regulation of a profession are met then they can take action through secondary legislation under existing powers in the Health Act 1999 to make changes and to bring into effect criminal offences relating to a person’s registration with a professional regulator.

I openly and honestly say to the noble Lord that we cannot accept the amendment, but I hope that there is some comfort from both the meeting and the direction of travel that I have set out on behalf of my colleagues in the Department of Health and Social Care. I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I regret that I am not content to withdraw my amendment.

First, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for highlighting how the opinions of the public may be affected, and the fact that the reputations of psychotherapy and counselling services, which are of value and honestly provided, may be tainted by the dishonest quacks who have absolutely no right to be practising—as a matter not just of regulation but of plain, honest practice—because they are there to take money from innocent clients. My view is that the definition of

“providing or purporting to provide psychotherapy or counselling services”

is wide enough to catch those quacks.

Secondly, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for reconsidering the opinions he expressed in Committee. That is what the gap between Committee and Report is for—to give us all a chance to think—and I am grateful to him for his change of mind and his support for the amendment.

I simply did not understand the objections of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel. I understood the Minister’s objections when he talked about regulation, but he does not seem to have taken on board my point—which is central to all this—that regulation for the purposes of a new criminal offence is simply a red herring. What is important here is creating a criminal offence to catch dishonest people who are quacks, who are taking advantage of vulnerable people by coercive and controlling behaviour, and who ought to be punished for doing so. Others also ought to be deterred from doing so.

With some regret in view of the hour, I do not wish to withdraw the amendment; I wish to test the opinion of the House.

21:07

Division 3

Amendment 358 disagreed.

Ayes: 52

Noes: 146

21:19

Amendment 359

Moved by

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

359: After Clause 124, insert the following new Clause—
“Assault of public-facing worker(1) A person who assaults a public-facing worker at work commits an offence under this section.(2) For the purposes of this section—“public-facing worker at work” means a person who is providing a service or facilitating a transaction to the public in a public building or space, on public transport, or in a commercial property which is accessible to the public to buy or receive such services;“worker” includes an unpaid employee.(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or to a fine (or both).(4) In subsection (3) “the maximum term for summary offences” means—(a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (alteration of penalties for certain summary offences: England and Wales) comes into force, six months;(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.(5) In section 40(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (power to join in indictment count for common assault etc) after paragraph (ac) insert—“(ad) an offence under section (Assault of a public-facing worker) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (assault of public-facing worker).””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would expand the provisions of Clauses 38 and 39 (assault of a retail worker) to include all public-facing workers.

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 359 and will also speak to Amendment 361, both of which are in my name. I am hugely grateful to my co-signatories, the noble Lords, Lord Hendy and Lord Hogan-Howe, and my noble friend Lady Harding, and I thank them for their support. I am also grateful to the Minister for meeting me and his noble friend Lord Hendy. I am only sorry that at that meeting we were unable to persuade him of our case, and I hope I can do a better job tonight.

My amendments replicate Clauses 38 and 39, which introduce a new stand-alone offence of assault against retail workers, but simply expand that offence to include all public-facing workers. I am bringing these amendments forward because the Government’s decision to make the new stand-alone offence exclusively for retail workers is based on arbitrary factors that make little sense, risks making matters worse for employers and employees alike and does not help address the cause of increased violence and disorder in public places and spaces, which causes us all so much angst. In a moment I will explain briefly how my amendments help to address the latter, but let me start with what is wrong with the Government’s approach and how my amendments can help put it right.

As we all know, the crime of assault applies equally to anyone who is a victim of it. No one is not covered by existing law. But four years ago, we introduced an aggravated offence of assault against all public-facing workers via the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act because violence and threats of violence to workers across all industries—retail, transport, hospitality, finance and more—were rising at a worrying rate. Now this Government argue that they are introducing a new crime of assault against only retail workers because violent abuse in shops continues to rise and because those workers are charged with upholding retail laws such as those involving age verification.

Of course it is horrific that some retail workers experience violence at work. They do not deserve that, and we all want it to stop. That is why I support Clauses 38 and 39. But other public-facing workers are experiencing increasing violence too. Many of these workers are also responsible for upholding laws and are required to take action when a member of the public flouts them, which they increasingly do. The most obvious example is transport workers and the scourge of fare dodging, but bar staff also routinely need to seek age verification.

The Institute of Customer Service—I declare my interest as the vice-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Customer Service—has been tracking abuse against all public-facing workers for almost six years. Its most recent survey data from 15,000 responses shows that 42% of customer-facing workers experienced abuse in the preceding six months.

The problem that the Government have highlighted as one they need to fix is not affecting retail workers exclusively. Indeed, some of the worst cases of violence in a public place are against utility workers doing essential work on streets. Yet the Government’s approach even excludes those who work in bank branches, post offices and other outlets on high streets or in retail parks. What makes matters worse is that those workers fear they will not be treated equally if they are a victim of crime because they will fall outside the definition of a retail worker.

We need good people in these front-line jobs who are doing great work to want to stay in these jobs. But the Government’s arbitrary dividing line means we are in danger of losing them. That is not just bad for those workers: it is bad for customers, and it is bad for business. Sick leave associated with abuse and violence experienced at work is estimated to cost the economy at least £1 billion every year.

I must say at this point that we must not lose sight that, thankfully, most public-facing workers are not at risk of assault. Indeed, it is really important to make clear that customers are not the enemy, and we must not create an environment where, even unintentionally, they are made to feel like they are. We do not need more signs telling us not to be rude or abusive, but we do need a new approach. Alongside a better response from the police when crimes do occur, if we are to prevent violence against workers and any criminal conduct in public places becoming normalised, we must work together to discourage low-level disorder and disrespect for shared services and public property when we see signs of it taking root on our high streets, public transport or anywhere else. But that requires leadership from the people in charge of those public spaces and places. Most often, they are not the workers who are the highest paid.

It is not easy to uphold the shared standards and social norms that keep public spaces safe and orderly for everyone’s benefit, which is why those who are out there at work every day upholding the law and doing their best to maintain the common bonds that underpin a strong society do not just deserve our thanks: they need our strong backing for the leadership they are expected to give—and we need them to give—if we are to tackle disorder, which blights our communities. That is what my amendments seek to provide.

Excluding some workers from the cover of this new stand-alone offence risks disincentivising those excluded at a time when we need them most. Business leaders, workers and the wider public support these amendments. I hope that the members of unions and the former leaders of unions who occupy the Benches opposite will also support them. I hope the Minister accepts them. If he does not, I will seek to divide the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

My Lords, I am pleased to support Amendments 359 and 361 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell of Beeston. On the basis of those amendments, I will not advance the amendment I proposed in Committee for a stand-alone offence for transport workers. My amendment sought to give transport workers equivalent protection to that to be extended to retail workers by the Government in Clauses 38 and 39, but the noble Baroness’s amendments cover transport workers, retail workers and, as she mentioned, many more categories of workers who face the public and are exposed to the risk of violent attack by individuals apparently aggrieved by a worker doing what he or she is paid to do.

In proposing these more widely drafted amendments, there is no intention to diminish the coverage the Government are already offering retail workers. If there is some perceived shortfall in the scope of our amendments compared with that of Clauses 38 and 39 for retail workers, I for one would be very happy if the Government instructed parliamentary counsel to close that gap in drafting.

I thank my noble friend the Minister for meeting with the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, and me to discuss the amendments, notwithstanding that, as she says, he was not persuaded by us. With respect, I am likewise not persuaded by my noble friend’s justification for restricting the scope of the offence under discussion to retail workers only. The commitment given in the Labour manifesto would be equally fulfilled by adoption of our amendments in place of Clauses 38 and 39. Retail workers would have, and must still have, their manifesto protection. In any event, though it may result in duplication, our amendments do not involve a request to remove Clauses 38 and 39. That is not their purpose.

As to the argument that the wider amendment is not necessary, I point out that even if that were legally correct, the adoption of Clauses 38 and 39 and the rejection of the wider amendment put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, sends a particular message both to the workers in question and the public, as she pointed out. She mentioned violence against various categories of public-facing workers, and I gave figures for violence against transport workers at an earlier stage of the debate. I will not repeat those, but the House should know that the situation is getting worse. For example, British Transport Police figures for the period April to November 2025 showed a 21% increase in incidents involving violence against staff compared to the previous year, which itself showed a similar increase on the year before that. The stabbings at Huntingdon in November 2025 bring the point home.

21:30

According to a survey of more than 6,000 RMT public transport worker members in summer 2025, nearly two-thirds had experienced workplace violence in the past year and nearly all of those had experienced it multiple times. Some 70% thought that violence had increased in the past year. It is intolerable that these workers, who serve the public, go to work each day with the thought that that day they might be the victim of violent assault or even death.

As with retail workers, enforcement is a key part of the role of many front-line transport workers, including in relation to fares, ticketing, railway by-laws and age-restricted items such as alcohol. These enforcement requirements undoubtedly make public transport workers more at risk of violence and abuse. For instance, according to the RMT survey, the most common event initiating violence against them, cited by nearly two-thirds of members, was staff seeking to deal with fare evasion and underpayment for tickets.

In evidence submitted to the Bill Committee in the Commons, the British Transport Police set out its support for creating a stand-alone offence of assaulting a public transport worker and highlighted the disparity that would arise if the Government legislated to afford additional protection to retail workers but not transport workers—and, by the same token, other workers too. They said:

“This Bill seeks to introduce a new specific offence of assault of retail worker. It should be noted that if these provisions become law, this will create significant inequality in the legal response on BTP jurisdiction. At a station, the two types of workers could be working in close proximity to each other, however if both are assaulted, the law will offer a greater level of protection to the retail worker than to the transport worker. This disparity is wrong.”

The BTP evidence to the committee also pointed out that the existing statutory provision for aggravation of assault of a public-facing worker is

“not currently sufficient to provide transport workers with adequate protection.”

In closing, I point out that in Scotland, largely as a result of the RMT pushing for a stand-alone offence and action to be taken regarding assaults on the railway, last year the Scottish Government convened a working group with the rail unions, ScotRail, BTP, Transport Scotland and the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service on enforcement powers on the railway. The terms of reference specifically included looking at the need for additional legal protections similar to the retail workers legislation, which is already a specific offence in Scotland, and the group’s recommendations, which included exploring the scope for primary legislation —i.e. a stand-alone offence. The Scottish Government recently accepted the group’s recommendations in full. The logic applies equally to all public-facing workers.

If my noble friend is unable to agree to amend the Bill in line with the amendments, will he at least agree to setting up working groups in public transport and other public-facing sectors, in line with the approach taken in Scotland, to examine how measures to protect workers from violence can be improved, including through new legislation? The situation is indeed desperate.

[Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Con)]

My Lords, given the hour, I shall be brief. I support my noble friend Lady Stowell in the two amendments that she has so ably introduced, and I have been delighted to add my name to both of them.

I have worked all my life in consumer services: for 20-odd years in retailing, but then in telecoms and in the National Health Service, and, today, in hospitality—in horse racing. I should declare my interest as the chair or senior steward of the Jockey Club, given that we have the Cheltenham Festival next week, where we will have thousands of people in front-line, consumer-facing service roles at the racecourse.

I have not engaged in the Bill until this stage, so I apologise for that, but I am speaking to and have put my name to these amendments because I am bemused by the Government’s failure to support public-facing workers in all these other industries. I grew up in retailing and I love retailing, but if you have ever sat in a GP surgery with a receptionist, as I have, and watched them do their job, you will know that it is no different from being at the customer service desk at Tesco, which I have also done, dealing with the ups and downs of everyday life with the customers, the consumers, the citizens you are serving. We should be protecting them and treating them in exactly the same way. As the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, has said, that is true for transport, finance, telecoms, energy and water. We should not exclude the hundreds of thousands, millions, of people who provide us with these essential services. We learned during Covid how important these essential front-line, customer service-facing roles are, and it breaks my heart, five years after the pandemic, to see a Government who say they support working people not supporting many front-line working people.

It is not just front-line working people who want us to protect them; their bosses do too. The CEOs of businesses in all the sectors I have just mentioned know that it is good business to protect them. Some 42% of front-line workers, according to the Institute of Customer Service, have experienced abuse in the last six months, as my noble friend Lady Stowell has said; 37% say they have considered leaving their role because of that hostility; and more than 25% have taken sick leave as a result. That costs productivity in our public services and it costs economic growth in our private sector. The chief executives of all these organisations know that, and they want us to make sure that we treat all those workers with the same respect that the Bill, at the moment, treats retail workers only, which is why I support these amendments.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment because it is trying to achieve consistency in law. At the moment, the law protects a retail worker more, when in fact those who provide services are doing exactly the same thing. Broadly, they deal with the public and they are trying to get rules enforced. They are just trying to make sure that things work well.

My reading of the present advice on providing protection to retail workers is that they are protected if they provide goods, but not if they provide services. The consequence of that is that people who, for example, work in betting shops, theatres and cinemas do not receive the same protection that they would receive if they were providing that same retail worker service and also providing goods, and that seems inconsistent. Then there is the further group of workers that the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, referred to: people who work in transport, such as taxi drivers. All of them face people who are often affected by drink or drugs, for example, and have to challenge bad behaviour, but they do not receive this protection. That seems odd. I find it odd that the Government do not want to protect that group of workers in the same way. For reasons of consistency, and because the workers I have described—those who work in betting offices, for example, where you get some pretty bad behaviour at times—deserve that protection, they ought to be included.

My final point is that although the present legislation excludes wholesale workers—should I name the companies? Perhaps not—you only get access to some of these wholesale or, I would say, retail sites by joining a club; you do not pay any money. I think we all know the ones I am talking about, where you get access to better prices merely by joining the club. Apparently, that is not retail. I think it is pretty much like retail. They still get bad behaviour on these sites. For all those reasons, I think this amendment regarding public-facing workers is a good idea and I encourage the Government to support it for the sake of consistency for those who provide services to us.

[Baroness O’Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)]

My Lords, I will be very brief, partly to remind all noble Lords that the shop workers’ union, USDAW, under Joanne Thomas, the current leader, Paddy Lillis before her and, indeed, John Hannett—the noble Lord, Lord Hannett—has campaigned for years for freedom from fear for a predominantly female workforce facing violence at work. As we have heard, that got a lot worse through Covid. At the time, USDAW was pressing for legislation; nobody listened. I have to commend the Government for listening to the campaign from the grass roots all the way up to the top of USDAW for that protection for workers in that industry.

Having said that, I have looked at the very latest figures from the Health and Safety Executive and from the Labour Force Survey, which show that public-facing workers across a number of industries, sectors and jobs disproportionately face violence at work. More than that, I have heard it from workers themselves. Bus workers, transport workers and hospitality workers have been spat at, assaulted and threatened. I also alight on transport workers, because they too perform a significant act of public service in the work they do. They often face real threats and real assaults because of the job that they do.

I share my noble friend Lord Hendy’s hope that, even if the Government cannot support this amendment, my noble friend the Minister could at least commit to talk to colleagues in the relevant departments to get us around the table to look at a real strategy for prevention of violence and enforcement of the laws we have. Many workers still feel unsafe going to work to earn a living and no worker should face that threat at work.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, we strongly support the creation of a specific offence of assaulting a retail worker. It sends an important signal to those working in shops at a time when shop theft has surged and the risks to staff have grown. But if this measure applies only to those who work in shops, we risk sending an unintended message to other front-line staff that they somehow count for less.

The Minister previously gave three reasons for rejecting the noble Baroness’s amendment in Committee. First, he said that the case is especially strong for shop workers because they enforce age-restricted sales and are on the front line of theft. We agree that shop workers are at particular risk—that is why we support these clauses—but many other public-facing workers also enforce rules, refuse service and challenge bad behaviour. They too attract anger and sometimes violence.

Secondly, the Minister said that a narrow definition of retail worker is needed for legal clarity, while suggesting that some hospitality workers might be covered by the definition of retail premises in Clause 38. In practice, that causes new uncertainty. It is hard to justify protection for a worker in a café inside a supermarket but not for one in a café next door to a supermarket.

21:45

Thirdly, the Minister pointed to the 2022 Act, which makes it an aggravated offence to assault someone providing a public service or performing a public duty, and suggested that this makes the amendment unnecessary. But the fact that abuse of public-facing workers is continuing, despite the 2022 Act, shows that that measure alone has not stopped abuse and threats becoming routine for many on the front line. If we now create a stand-alone offence only for one group of public-facing workers, we risk weakening rather than reinforcing these existing protections. Safety at work goes to the heart of social cohesion, and of the basic conditions for economic growth. If we want people to keep filling these roles, we must do everything we reasonably can to protect them.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston for moving Amendment 359. I know that she has been pursuing it with tenacity. This amendment and Amendment 361 relate to the Government’s proposal to create a specific, stand-alone offence of assaulting a retail worker at work. I want to be clear from the outset that it is already an offence to assault a retail worker, because it is an offence to assault any person, full stop. That is the law. I do not believe that criminal law should treat anyone differently based simply on whether they are a retail worker. I fully recognise that retail workers face an appalling level of abuse and violence in the course of their jobs, but to say that the creation of a new, specific criminal offence of assaulting a retail worker will stop assaults on retail workers is, frankly, for the birds.

What will stop these assaults, or at least reduce them, is the police stepping up enforcement, and the Government stopping the release of criminals and handing anyone convicted of these offences suspended sentences. However, the Government clearly believe that creating this new offence will reduce violence against retail workers. If we are to take their logic to its conclusion, why would we not extend the offence to cover all public-facing workers? Does the Minister believe that transport drivers, as mentioned by my noble friend Lady Stowell and endorsed by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, are of lesser value than retail workers? If the Government believe that this new offence will work then why do they not believe it will work for other public-facing workers?

My noble friend’s amendment exposes the absurdity of the Government’s position. They argue that violence against retail workers is a significant problem that needs to be tackled, which is absolutely correct, but then propose a solution that they refuse to extend to other workers who also face significant levels of violence at work. There is simply no logic to the Government’s approach. Either they believe that creating a new offence for specific groups of people will reduce violence against them or they do not. They cannot argue both. I would prefer that we did not have any new offences that outlawed things that are already outlawed and that we did not legislate to criminalise actions towards specific groups of people but not others. That would be my preference, but if we are to do these things, then we must take them to their logical conclusion. For that reason, I support the amendments from my noble friend.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her amendment, and for the opportunity to discuss it with her and with the organisations she brought in for face-to-face discussions with us. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Hendy for his contribution and for our meeting.

I declare my membership of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, which I joined 47 years ago and which sponsored me as a Member of Parliament. I put that on the record. I must also say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that I understand that he would prefer to have no offence. I understand that because when, as a Member of Parliament in the House of Commons, I tabled amendments to put these types of offences down, the then Government rejected them. I therefore understand where he is coming from, because that is consistent with the position of previous Conservative Governments.

In this case, we have a Labour manifesto commitment endorsed by the electorate. My noble friend Lady O’Grady mentioned USDAW. I pay tribute to that union, which has collected evidence and, through three general secretaries, including my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton, campaigned strongly for an offence against retail workers. The Labour Party listened to that in opposition and put in its manifesto—I cannot claim credit for this, because I was out of Parliament at the time—a commitment to legislate for that offence, which appears in the Bill before the House today.

I have heard the comments from the noble Lord, Hogan-Howe and the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, and others, and from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, on why they think that the bespoke offence against assaulting a retail worker should be extended to all public-facing workers. Along with proposing a new broader offence of assault against public-facing workers, the noble Baroness has tabled an amendment that would place a duty on courts to make a criminal order in the event of a conviction.

I hate to disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, but I repeat the arguments that I put to her in Committee and elsewhere. Public-facing workers such as those mentioned by my noble friend, the noble Lady Baroness, Lady Harding, and others, are covered under existing legislation, such as the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which includes a range of violent offences, such as actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm. Further, the provisions of Section 156 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which was introduced by the previous Conservative Government, makes it a statutory aggravating factor of assault against any public-facing worker. That offence means that if someone, having been charged with the serious offence of assault and having gone through a trial, is deemed to have committed assault against public-facing workers, the court has the power to add aggravating factors to that sentence. That covers every type of worker that has been mentioned by noble Lords today. The aggravating factor applies in cases of assault where an offence is committed against those public service workers performing a public duty or providing a service to the public. That is an important factor.

Noble Lords have asked why there is a specific offence against retail workers that is additional to the aggravating offence. That is a reasonable question to ask. In clauses that have been mentioned there is provision for additional prison sentence capacity, criminal restriction orders and an unlimited fine for this stand-alone offence. Retail workers are still covered by Section 156 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, so why have we put that extra power in place?

The reason for this—and why I declared an interest—is that USDAW has, to my knowledge, for 17 or 18 years campaigned regularly for this in the Freedom From Fear Campaign. It has done so under the three general secretaries that my noble friend Lady O’Grady mentioned, and it has done so for a purpose—one that the Government share. Retail workers are fundamentally on the front line of upholding the laws passed by both Houses of Parliament on a range of matters. It is a retail worker who stops illegal sales of cigarettes, it is a retail worker who stops illegal sales of alcohol, it is a retail worker who stops an illegal sale of a knife, it is a retail worker who stops an illegal sale of a solvent, and it is a retail worker who protects the community by upholding all the laws on those issues that we have passed in this House and in the House of Commons. That is why USDAW campaigned for the specific offence, and it is why the Labour Party in government has been pleased to support the creation of that offence by putting it in the Bill.

That goes even further to the appalling shop theft situation. I do not call it shoplifting—it is shop theft. There has been a continued rise in shop theft over many years, and it is the retail worker who is on the front line saying, “Put that back”, calling the police and taking action in the shop. The Co-op, Tesco, Sainsbury’s and a whole range of retail organisations have campaigned for this, alongside USDAW, over many years. It has been thought through and there is an evidence base. It is a manifesto commitment, and we are trying to introduce that extra offence. I do not wish to see a train operative or members of customer services, as the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, mentioned, attacked with a knife. This is covered by common assault legislation from 1861 and by the 2022 Act as an aggravating offence. But the Government have put forward a stand-alone offence for shop workers for the reasons I have outlined.

Does that potentially create an anomaly? Let us discuss that and reflect on that view. But the manifesto commitment is clear, and we are delivering on that manifesto commitment. This is an important issue, based on evidence and campaigning by a range of bodies—retail organisations and trade unions—and it has my support. Therefore, I cannot support the noble Baroness—I have told her that—or my noble friend.

That is not to say that the Government accept that attacks on those members of staff are a normal part of what they should face. We are committed to driving down assaults and to enforcing, with the courts, the legislation on the statute book. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, asked what the Government are doing to reduce the attacks in the first place. This Government are rebuilding the police force—13,000 neighbourhood police officers—and have put in place, with this Bill, changes in shop theft legislation. This Government are focusing on retail crime in hotspots and on making sure that we drive it down. We will ensure that the police forces have retail crime as a major priority.

In the last 14 years before July 2024, police numbers fell, neighbourhood policing fell and the focus on the high street fell. It was not a Labour Government but a Conservative Government who did that. They refused the legislation on assaults on shop workers that I proposed in the House of Commons, they refused to take action on shop theft on high streets and they refused to stand up for the workforce. With due respect, I will not take lessons today from the Conservative Front Bench.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

May I check whether my assertion is accurate or whether I am wrong? Would someone enforcing an age limit in a betting office not be protected by the retail workers’ protection but someone enforcing an age restriction in an off-licence would be? It seems to me that the distinction is simply between providing a service and providing a good. If I am wrong in that, I withdraw my comment, but I am not sure that the Minister has said I am.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We have clearly defined in the Bill what we believe a retail worker is. I accept that there are areas of interpretation for the courts, such as, for example—we have discussed this with colleagues outside the House—whether a post office is covered by the retail worker provision. Somebody might walk into a post office to buy Christmas cards or birthday cards and go to the post office counter—is that a retail worker? Those are areas where there may be some interpretation, but we have identified this as tightly as we can. It is a straightforward clause that defines a retail worker. I commend it, given that there has been a considerable amount of work by the Home Office in drafting the amendment, after a considerable amount of work by retail organisations and trade unions to develop the campaign.

I go back to my point that all attacks on all staff are unacceptable. Other areas are covered, but the reasons I mentioned on the specific provision of upholding legislation are why we have put in a specific offence against retail workers. That is why I commend those clauses to the House. I ask the noble Baroness—although I understand that she cannot do this—at least not to push her amendment to a vote.

[Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)]

Before the Minister sits down, I think there was appetite among many of us to see the beginnings of a strategy for each sector that we know is facing rising violence. I know that that is not within the gift of the Minister, but a request to talk to Ministers and get people around the table in those sectors so that we can deal at a strategic level with the causes of violence, as well as big issues such as resources for enforcement, would go a long way to give comfort to people that this is the beginning of a conversation about how we deal with violence against working people.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As I said to the House, I do not support, encourage or condone any violence against anybody under any circumstances. The public-facing workers are covered by two pieces of legislation; we are adding a specific offence for retail workers, for the reasons I have outlined. I have met personally with a range of bodies that the noble Baroness has brought before us. I understand that my noble friend Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill has met organisations and met and discussed issues with my noble friend Lord Hendy, who is here today, and will continue to do so. However, this campaign on the clauses in the Bill has been a long time in gestation—it has taken 15 and 16 years to get where we are today—and I want to get them over the line, so I cannot accept the amendments that the noble Baroness has introduced. I ask her to withdraw her amendment but if she puts it to the vote, I shall have to ask my noble friends to join me in voting against it.

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)]

My Lords, the hour is late. I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in support of my amendments—indeed, I do not think that any noble Lord apart from the Minister has spoken against them. I just say to him that nothing in my amendments dilutes or diminishes what he has brought forward in Clauses 38 and 39. His manifesto commitment is still being met; all the work that he pays tribute to USDAW for doing over many years all stands. Nothing of what he is so proud to have brought forward in the Bill will be changed by us voting for my amendments tonight. My amendments would address the illogical way, as we have heard in the debate tonight, in which the Government are determined to tackle a problem that expands way beyond retail workers. I am afraid that I am not going to withdraw my amendment—I would like to test the opinion of the House.

22:02

Division 4

Amendment 359 disagreed.

Ayes: 129

Noes: 132

22:12

Amendment 360

Moved by

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough]

360: After Clause 124, insert the following new Clause—
“Offences of causing harassment, alarm or distress: amendments(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.(2) In section 4A (intentional harassment, alarm or distress) omit “, alarm” in each place where it occurs (including the heading) and omit “, alarmed” in subsection.(3) In section 5 (harassment, alarm or distress) omit “, alarm” in each place where it occurs (including the heading).”

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I am returning to a theme I raised in Committee in moving my Amendment 360. Amendment 360 is straightforward: it would remove the word “alarm” from Sections 4, 8 and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. In Handyside v the United Kingdom, the Strasbourg court reminded us that freedom of expression protects ideas that “offend, shock or disturb”. This concept was reinforced in the oft-quoted dictum of Lord Justice Sedley, which I will not repeat tonight, which I sometimes think should be turned into a poster campaign by the police and CPS.

In a democracy, robust debate—political, religious and philosophical—will sometimes unsettle people, it may even alarm them, but that should not be a matter for criminal law. Section 4A currently criminalises

“threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour”

that causes

“harassment, alarm or distress”

where there is deemed to have been an intention to cause harassment, alarm and distress. In Section 5, the test is “threatening or abusive words” that are deemed likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress.

Alarm is inherently subjective, often momentary, and is too easily confused with discomfort. It is an emotion. This is a dangerously low threshold for prosecuting people over words, especially in today’s political climate where so many people have been implicitly trained to respond to hearing challenging opinions by talking about how hurt their feelings are. I watched the video of Nick Timothy MP documenting Islamists outside the infamous Maccabi v Aston Villa match, and Islamists persuaded officers to move on Mr Timothy by complaining about him talking to them.

We saw a similar attempt more recently on the streets of Whitechapel, where a crowd of men tried to get police to arrest a Christian street preacher in what they regard as some kind of “ethnic enclave” where preaching the gospel is prohibited. Thankfully, in that case, we saw a marvellously brave and sensible female police officer face them all down and defend free speech.

22:15

Then there was the disgraceful prosecution of Hamit Coskun, under Section 5, for burning a Koran when we all know that there is not a chance he would ever have been prosecuted for burning a bible, and nor should he be. That brave officer in Whitechapel seems to be the exception, which is why she has been so widely praised. Too often, “harassment, alarm or distress” has proven a temptingly low threshold for police and prosecutors, resulting in overreach—something that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who tonight is sadly not in her place, spoke to from her long experience when she supported my amendment in Committee.

My noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel also kindly supported this amendment, citing case law that showed how elastic this concept has become. We all know the sort of absurdity and chilling effect that follows when the focus shifts from what was said and intended to how a complainant says they felt. The Minister argued, fairly, that removing “alarm” might reduce the ability to intervene early—for example, with a drunken individual causing upset on late night train. However, when conduct is genuinely menacing, it will ordinarily amount to harassment, or perhaps distress, although I will come back to that shortly. Where appropriate, other offences exist for threats, intimidation and violence. The common-law offence of breach of the peace exists to help police control these kinds of situations by giving them a power to arrest and release.

I do not accept that we need this additional malleable concept, one that has drifted far beyond what Parliament intended to keep the public safe. Indeed, the Minister noted that these provisions were introduced under Mrs Thatcher’s Government in 1986. That is precisely the point: language has not stood still. In the decades since, academic and political activism has increasingly elevated “hurt feelings” into a right not be offended. Too often, police and prosecutors under pressure take allegations of alarm far too seriously. Words like “alarm”, and sometimes even “distress”, now risk being interpreted through a modern lens that is much more censorious than Parliament ever intended.

Since Committee, I have been reflecting on whether we should look again not only at “alarm” but also “distress”, and perhaps even the residual role of “insulting” in this area. However, for now, this amendment still focuses on alarm. It is a simple, moderate change which we could make right now to try to address the problem I am trying to highlight.

Last time, the Minister referred to the review being carried out by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. I look forward to its conclusions. The noble Lord is widely respected as a former Director of Public Prosecutions—sensible on both protecting the public and the proper scope of free speech. However, the very fact that such a review is needed underlines the concern that the law is currently too broad, vague and easily misapplied.

In conclusion, I ask the Government to think again. Removing “alarm” would send a clear signal that speech which merely offends, shocks or unsettles is part of the rough and tumble of living in a free society, the currency of the marketplace of ideas, and not a criminal offence. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, for bringing this amendment back, because I had some thoughts on this after the debate we had in Committee. Having read English at university, I went back to the definition of “alarm” and started to look at the definition used in the Public Order Act. There are components of causing alarm, particularly in the Public Order Act, which the noble Lord wants to amend. The levels at which charging happens use different definitions of alarm, which are quite interesting for these purposes.

The definition of alarm in this context is to create a state of apprehension, fear or panic in a person, often accompanied by a sense of immediate danger or worry that something unpleasant is going to happen to them. There is a key difference in usage. Section 4A of the Public Order Act details using “threatening, abusive or insulting” conduct with

“intent to cause … harassment, alarm or distress”,

and, on likelihood, using threatening or abusive conduct that is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress, without necessarily intending to.

The issue I take with the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, is that he says it is all just about how you are feeling, but the point is that the definitions at the different levels within the Public Order Act, at least semantically, seem to show that it is more than that, because you need to identify what has triggered that sense of alarm. It is a range, as we have discussed in previous debates. Because his amendment wants to remove “alarm” from intentional harassment, alarm or distress, it falls at the higher level that I have just described. I wonder whether he might reconsider it in that light, because when the 1986 Act went through it was clearly very well thought through.

Interestingly, the OED definition:

“To make (a person) feel suddenly frightened or in danger; to strike or fill with fear”,


says that more recently it has been seen in a slightly weakened use. However, the WordWeb online dictionary says:

“Experiencing a sudden sense of danger”.


In a lot of dictionaries I have looked up, there is the repeated use of it as not just how you feel but a panic response to danger, a heightened level. Therefore, certainly in my books, it should stay with harassment as well, because they are both more serious than just feeling a bit worried about something, which is what the noble Lord described.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough’s amendment, which would remove the word “alarm” from the relevant sections of the Public Order Act. I entirely support his aims. Alarm is not an emotion that should be policed, if emotions should be policed at all. The Act in question has been used for the unprecedented policing of speech that we have seen recently, for which Sections 4A and 5 have been largely responsible, and any measure that weakens the effect of this law is welcome. So, although I am sceptical that he will, I hope the Minister will accept this amendment.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am afraid I cannot accept the amendment, and I will explain why to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. I am grateful to him for bringing it forward. We will therefore have another opportunity to look at the offences in the Public Order Act 1986 and to reflect on the balance we must continue to strike between free expression and ensuring public safety.

The Government remain firmly committed to protecting freedom of speech. The ability to voice strong and at times uncomfortable views is fundamental to democratic life. However, as I set out in Committee, the ability to intervene early is an important tool for police to protect both the public and those involved, a point that I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Jackson, will accept. The definitions in the 1986 Act, passed by a previous Conservative Government, including the words “alarm” and “distress”, are there so that there can be early intervention and examination, and so that people who feel “alarm” and “distress” can have that support.

The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, has also referred to the review of public order and hate crime legislation led by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. Government has given it the task of examining the threshold definitions of public order legislation, which are needed to protect the public, while ensuring that we do exactly what I know the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, wants to do: ensure that we do not have undue interference in freedom of expression. The review is expected to conclude in the spring—it is a flexible definition, as we know, but it will be in the spring—and the Government will carefully consider its recommendations before determining whether legislative change is necessary.

I cannot commit to where we are on that because we have not seen the outcome of the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald. Given the circumstances —and given that the Act is now 40 years old and has stood the test of time from Mrs Thatcher’s Government to those of John Major, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, however many Conservative Prime Ministers held the office between 2010 and 2024, and my right honourable friend the current Prime Minister—it strikes me that it is a sound piece of legislation. It has stood the test of a number of Prime Ministers and Governments. With the review pending, I hope that we can examine and look at all those issues. With those comments, I hope the noble Lord is content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

It gives me inordinate pleasure—it warms the cockles of my heart—to listen to the Minister praising the legislation of the late Baroness Thatcher in her pomp. We do not often get that, but we should be grateful for small mercies.

We have had a short and interesting debate. I take in good faith the comments of both the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. Her contribution was very thoughtful in really drilling down into what the word “alarm” means. I think the debate we had in Committee was about the consistent nature of a criminal offence. That is harassment and distress: if someone harasses or threatens someone on a consistent basis. It is different from a momentary issue that might arise.

I say that because we have seen too many examples of where individual police officers, who may not have had appropriate training and education in interpreting these pieces of legislation from the 1980s, have, in my opinion, overreached. That has a very corrosive impact on the faith and trust that the public have in the police force. It leads them to believe that there is such a thing as two-tier policing, which is not good for any of us.

I take on faith what the Minister said. I look forward to what I think will be a very comprehensive and thorough piece of work by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. On that basis, we will no doubt return to this specific issue and piece of legislation. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 360 withdrawn.

Amendments 361 to 361B not moved.

Clause 129: Sections 127 and 128: meaning of “SIM farm” etc

Amendments 362 to 364

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

362: Clause 129, page 173, line 35, leave out from “means” to end of line 37 and insert—
“(a) a device which is capable of using five or more SIM cards simultaneously or interchangeably, for a purpose mentioned in subsection (1A), or(b) an article specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.(1A) The purposes are—”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment allows the Secretary of State to specify different articles as SIM farms in regulations.

363: Clause 129, page 174, line 1, at end insert
“, or
(b) an article specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment allows the Secretary of State to specify different articles as SIM cards in regulations.

364: Clause 129, page 174, line 5, leave out subsection (4) and insert—
“(4) Regulations under subsection (1) may specify only articles which the Secretary of State considers are capable of being used for a purpose mentioned in subsection (1A) in a way which is a similar to a device within subsection (1)(a).(4A) Regulations under subsection (2) may specify only articles which the Secretary of State considers have a similar function to removable physical subscriber identity modules.(4B) “Article” includes information in electronic form. (4C) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must consult such persons appearing to the Secretary of State to be likely to be affected by the regulations as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the Secretary of State’s power to make regulations amending clause 129 and inserts a restriction on the kind of articles that may be specified by the new powers inserted by my amendments to clause 129, page 173 line 35 and page 174 line 1. It also requires the Secretary of State to consult before exercising those powers.

Amendments 362 to 364 agreed.

Clause 132: Sections 130 and 131: specified articles and supplementary provision

Amendment 365

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

365: Clause 132, page 175, line 24, leave out from “that” to “by” in line 26 and insert “it is made or adapted for use in perpetrating fraud”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment restricts the kind of articles that the Secretary of State may specify under clause 132.

Amendment 365 agreed.

Amendment 366

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

366: After Clause 132, insert the following new Clause—
“Digital identity theft(1) A person commits an offence of digital identity theft if—(a) the person obtains, or attempts to obtain, personal or sensitive information relating to an individual, including but not limited to passwords, identification numbers, credit card numbers, national insurance numbers, biometric data, or other unique digital identifiers, and(b) the person intends to use this personal or sensitive information to impersonate that individual, or to enable another person to impersonate that individual, with the purpose of carrying out any transaction, activity, or communication in their name without their consent or lawful authority.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)—(a) “personal or sensitive information” refers to any data, whether digital, physical, or otherwise, that can be used to identify, authenticate, or impersonate an individual;(b) “obtains” includes acquiring, accessing, collecting, or otherwise coming into possession of such information.(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine, or both;(b) on conviction on indictment in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine, or both.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates an offence of digital identity theft.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 366 also stands in the name of my noble friend Lady Doocey. I have been a persistent—or is it insistent?—advocate for a specific offence of digital identity theft for many years. There is currently no criminal offence of identity theft in England and Wales—none. A fraudster can harvest your biometric data, clone your digital identity and impersonate you across multiple platforms, and at the moment of those acts they have committed no specific crime. The law does not intervene until after the damage is done.

22:30

I am indebted to Bennett Arron, a creative performer I met some years ago, who spent months attempting to recover his stolen identity. He eventually tracked down the perpetrator himself and gave his name and address to the police. Nothing was done. His explanation for why is instructive and damning in equal measure:

“one of the reasons the police did nothing was because they didn’t know how to charge him with what he had done to me”.

That is the direct operational consequence of this legislative gap. Our police are not equipped, our victims are not protected, and criminals know it. In Committee, the Minister suggested that this issue is subject to consideration within the Government’s ongoing review of fraud offences. While I welcome the work of the Fisher review, we have been waiting for consideration for far too long.

It is also worth noting that the UK is now an international outlier. The United States enacted a specific federal identity theft offence in 1998—nearly three decades ago—with aggravated penalties for the most serious cases. Canada and Australia have followed suit. The message we are sending is not a comfortable one, but if you wish to commit identity theft, England and Wales is an accommodating jurisdiction. Current fraud legislation is fundamentally reactive. It requires law enforcement to prove financial loss or a specific intent to defraud after a transaction has taken place, but digital identity theft is the foundational crime. In the digital age, our identity is our most sensitive asset. If an individual obtains your unique digital identifiers or biometrics with the intent to impersonate you, the violation of the digital self is complete at that moment, and we should not have to wait for a citizen’s bank account to be emptied or their credit rating destroyed before the law deems an intervention necessary.

The House of Lords Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee report, so ably chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, back in 2022, highlighted this significant gap with clarity:

“Identity theft is often a predicate action to the criminal offence of fraud, as well as other offences including organised crime and terrorism, but it is not a criminal offence”.

The report’s conclusions were equally direct:

“Identity theft is a fundamental component of fraud and is routinely used by fraudsters to steal money from legitimate individuals and organisations yet it remains out of scope of criminal offences”.

The committee’s recommendation could not have been clearer:

“The Government should consult on the introduction of legislation to create a specific criminal offence of identity theft. Alternatively, the Sentencing Council should consider including identity theft as a serious aggravating factor in cases of fraud”.

The Government appear to be sitting on their hands, and that is just not good enough. Cifas data makes the scale of this problem quite plain. Total National Fraud Database cases hit 421,000 in 2024, up 13% from 2023, driven by surges in account takeovers, to 76%. Identity fraud was dominant at 59% of cases at over 249,000, so this is not a niche or emerging problem. Identity fraud is the dominant form of fraud in this country, and we have left its foundational act—digital identity theft—entirely outside the criminal law.

Furthermore, we must recognise that this threat has evolved enormously even since that Fraud Act report. With the rise of generative AI and high-quality deepfakes, impersonation has become a uniquely digital weapon of remarkable sophistication. A criminal can now wear a citizen’s face and speak with their voice to commit crimes or cause profound personal distress. This is no longer a theoretical risk: it is happening now at scale. This amendment creates a stand-alone offence that reflects this new reality, targeting the act of impersonation itself—the transactional communication carried out in another’s name without consent.

I would appreciate specific clarity from the Minister on the following. On the timeline, can the Minister provide a firm date for the formal publication of the detailed recommendations of the Fisher review? On non-financial harm, do the Government accept that a structural gap exists where impersonation occurs without immediate demonstrable financial loss, yet causes profound personal distress and a violation of privacy?

On point of entry, does the Minister agree that providing the police with the tools to stop fraudsters at the moment of identity theft, rather than only after the damage is done, is a more effective and humane approach than trying to pick up the pieces after the fact?

I believe we must fill this gap now to protect the digital integrity of our citizens, to give the police the tools that they need and to send a clear signal that England and Wales will no longer be the easy jurisdiction of choice for identity criminals. I beg to move.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has got to the nub of an issue that seems to fall between a rock and a hard place. One of the issues that we face in terms of the crime survey, which is now being used by the Government as the primary way of deciding police resources, is fraud. Without doubt, the increasing use of digital identity will be the source of more fraud if we are not careful.

The Government seem to be in a predicament about whether to press ahead with digital ID more generally. We saw the resignation of a Minister at the weekend over their dubious ways of trying to challenge the credentials of a journalist assessing the organisation Labour Together. The Government have reappointed a Minister to undertake this task of establishing a digital identity card, which I am led to believe there will be a consultation announcement on within the next week. I hope that the Government are listening to the noble Lord by getting ahead of the issues that could come about with the mass spreading of digital identity.

I am very grateful to Nationwide, which rang to alert me to a fraud that was happening. I had used my card when I was abroad representing Parliament at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and suddenly it was being used in a number of places to secure money. That is a reminder, as we move to this digital approach to money, with cash evaporating, that the last Government did a lot to try to protect cash and to make sure that it was still being used on a widespread basis, and I appreciate that. However, it would be useful to get a sense of what the Government are doing to tackle this very real threat of digital identity theft.

This is particularly pertinent because of the 10-year NHS plan—never mind the 10-year NHS cancer plan—regarding how much is being put into the hands of government. With artificial intelligence understandably being introduced to increase productivity and the deployment of public services, somebody’s identity is precious, and the validity and protection of digital identity can become an extraordinary challenge to somebody’s integrity.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, has set out a number of issues in a great deal of detail in Amendment 366, with the proposed new subsection (2)(b) defining what “obtains” would mean. I think it would be helpful to the Committee to understand what protections are in place or being planned by the Government not to mandate the use of initial identity but regarding what their desire is. Again, I understand the desire of the use for government, but what is good for government is also good for general commercial practice.

It would be helpful to get an understanding of why the Government are resisting the amendment—if the noble Lord tests the opinion of the House, I will vote with him in that Division—and a sense of where they believe they have sufficient protections in making this case. We have discussed identity, fake imagery and deepfakes quite a lot during the passage of this Bill. I seem to recall in the last general election that the now Prime Minister was, all of a sudden, in the middle of a deepfake situation, with comments attributed to him that were not made.

We can go further with how technology has advanced in that regard, but where would this go if we started using digital identity to register for elections? Where is this going when it is about accessing cash, frankly, from the Government? I know from running the DWP for three years that, unfortunately, people seem very determined to try to commit fraud to get money to which they are not entitled. But as we continue to try to use AI as a force for good, what are the Government doing to try to stop it being used as a force for bad?

I do not wish to labour the point, but the noble Lord has really hit on something. There is a gap. There is a desire by the Government to do this good, but I think the amendment would plug the gap very well. There are so many instances in this Bill and other Bills which are coming before the House where the Government want all sorts of powers just in case. This is not a “just in case”; this is a “waiting to happen”. It is happening now, so what are we doing to address it?

I go back to the fact that 40% of crime is due to fraud. Two-thirds of that is digital, online fraud. This is affecting not just people in this Chamber but people right across this country, and that is something that I hope the Government will consider carefully. If there was a vote, I would certainly support the amendment to make sure that the Government take note and actually get something done about this. I support the noble Lord’s amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for bringing back his amendment on Report. His Majesty’s loyal Opposition retain our support for his measures, and I thank him for continuing his campaign.

I understand that the Minister refrained from supporting the amendment in Committee for fear of unnecessary duplication of legislation. I gently urge him that this provides an opportunity for the opposite. It is common practice across Governments to use new legislation to amalgamate old pieces of legislation into a single draft. This seems the perfect time to do so with digital identity theft.

There is an array of Acts that creates a puzzle from which a digital identity theft offence appears, but it is somewhat distorted, if not fragmented. At least five Acts cover areas of digital identity theft; a wide purview is by no means a bad thing, but they were all designed for a different age. Just reading out the years of our primary Acts demonstrates this: 1968, 1990, 2006 and 2010. Even the Data Protection Act 2018, the most recent application, is for an era without AI.

It is not worth repeating the statistics that we have heard throughout the course of the Bill. A simple fact will suffice: 60% of all fraud cases are identity fraud, and the recent increase has been driven by the internet and artificial intelligence. The Government talk about being ahead of the curve on AI safety and online regulation. That is commendable, but to claim one thing and then refuse to act on it is not. I hope the Minister can at least acknowledge the scale of digital identity theft and its growing prevalence. If he cannot support it now, I hope that he will commit to look into it in the future.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for returning to this important matter. As I set out previously, although digital identity theft is not a stand-alone offence, the behaviour the noble Lord highlights is already captured by existing legislation. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, predicted some of the response that I would give; it has not changed hugely since Committee. This includes the misuse of personal sensitive identifiable information. The Fraud Act 2006 criminalises the use of another person’s identity with the intention to gain or to cause loss. Unauthorised access to personal data, including biometric information, is covered under the Computer Misuse Act 1990.

I fully recognise the concerns raised, which is why the Government are already taking clear action. The new Report Fraud service has replaced Action Fraud, giving victims improved reporting tools and providing police with stronger intelligence and better support pathways. A full review of police skills has been completed and its recommendations will be reflected in the upcoming fraud strategy, which the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will be pleased to know will be published imminently.

22:45

In addition, each police force in England and Wales is now assessed on its fraud response as part of His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary’s police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy—PEEL—inspection framework. This will help ensure forces continue to develop the skills needed to respond to modern threats.

As the noble Lord is aware from his contribution and our earlier discussions, the Home Office has asked Jonathan Fisher KC to undertake an independent review into disclosure and fraud offences. Part 1, on disclosure regime reform, is complete. Part 2, which recently concluded, examined whether current fraud offences and their penalties remain effective. The Government will carefully consider the report and its findings and respond in due course. Furthermore, as I said, the forthcoming fraud strategy, which will be published very shortly, will address emerging fraud risks, including identifying identity theft.

The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, asked some specific questions about what the police are doing at the moment. To build on my earlier response, the College of Policing currently provides training focusing on investigative skills, including digital investigations. There is also a training package, which is available to all forces, to increase skills and awareness of digital investigations and intelligence. Also, the Home Office and the College of Policing have reviewed the training offered to police officers for fraud, including digital skills, and will implement the findings of the fraud review to improve the training.

In addition, the Government are refreshing the strategic policing requirement to reflect the seriousness of the fraud threat and ensure all forces prioritise their response. The updated SPR will guide police and crime commissioners, strengthen collaboration with national fraud capabilities, and include digital skills training to equip officers for modern challenges. To that extent, we have already recruited around 400 new specialist investigators to join the national fraud squad, led by the National Crime Agency’s National Economic Crime Centre and City of London Police, with more recruitment following in the year, to disrupt these crimes by taking—as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, set out—a proactive, intelligence-led approach to identifying and disrupting the most serious fraudsters, domestically and overseas, jointly with the Government and industry, so that victims do not experience fraud in the first place. We absolutely agree with the point that he made.

There were also comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, around the rising concerns about deepfakes and AI. Of course, a major concern is generative AI’s ability to produce deepfakes that mimic trusted people and organisations. To address this, the Home Office is working with DSIT, the Alan Turing Institute and other departments to develop a strong framework for detecting deepfake media, including fraudulent documents and synthetic audio.

At the start of the year, in January, we hosted LIVE’26, the deepfake detection challenge, supported by Microsoft and other government partners. This initiative brings technical experts together to understand emerging threats and ensure detection tools remain effective. The Home Office will continue to evaluate new techniques to help protect the public from harmful and deceptive content.

Lastly, the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, spent a fair amount of her contribution talking about the impact of the Government’s digital ID plans. To be clear, we are designing the new national digital ID as something people will want to get, rather than something that they must have. There will be no legal obligation for people to have or present the national digital ID. I gently say that she ranged quite widely, including on elements that we possibly covered in another piece of legislation, the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Act, earlier in the Session.

I assure your Lordships’ House that Parliament will have the opportunity to fully scrutinise legislation introducing national digital ID. The system is expected to be rolled out by the end of this Parliament, and that will be the opportunity to consider these issues around digital ID in the round, also informed by some of the other actions I have talked about, including the forthcoming fraud strategy.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

I am actually very pro-digital ID, as long as it is not mandatory, but one of the things to improve take-up is the fear that people will have fraud committed against them. This amendment introduces an offence not necessarily to reduce the likelihood of that, but to provide potential weapons that can be used against criminal forces. That is why I am so keen on this amendment.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

While I understand the point the noble Baroness is making, I do not want to presage the content of the fraud strategy, which will be upon us really quite soon, or indeed what is in the legislation that will introduce national digital ID. I absolutely take the point that some people want to encourage digital ID because it gives security of identity in a digital form for deployment in a number of different areas, whether claiming a benefit, voting or whatever use it may offer—I will stop there because my expertise on digital ID does not extend much further. All I will say is that, given the comments I have already made about the Fisher review and the forthcoming fraud strategy, which will address emerging fraud risks, including identity theft, I hope that the noble Lord is content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and very much appreciate what she had to say. In particular, I thought the phrase “precious digital identity” was extremely important, as well as her reference to deepfakes. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for his support. As he rightly identified, I said 59% and he rounded it up to 60%. That is the figure for the percentage of identity fraud in our landscape.

The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, said that the Government need to answer what they are planning to do. The Minister threw the kitchen sink at that question but did not really answer it. We have police training in AI and digital, but I am not sure what I am expected to understand when he starts off by saying there is perfectly adequate criminal law on this, but then tells me that they will look very carefully at this as part of the Fisher review. Which one is the answer that I should take from the Minister—that he is taking it seriously or that he is not?

We seem to keep getting the same answer. The Minister starts off by saying that there is enough criminal law to cover this—completely contradictory to the Fraud Act Select Committee—and on the other hand he says that the review will consider this very carefully. That is a series of mixed messages, quite apart from the fact that the police will prioritise their response to digital crime. How will they prioritise their response to digital crime without the tools they need—i.e. a proper criminal offence of digital identity theft?

There is some confusion on the part of the Government. I still think they have not taken this seriously, and our citizens will suffer as a result, particularly in the age of AI, which both the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, were clear about.

If I wanted to talk to the Chief Whip or the government roster at this time of night, or if we were in prime time, I might push it to a vote. But I will not; I will withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 366 withdrawn.

Amendment 367

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

367: After Clause 132, insert the following new Clause—
“Defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990(1) The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is amended as follows.(2) In section 1, after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime, or(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.”(3) In section 3, after subsection (5) insert—“(5A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime, or(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment creates defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 367 is also in the name of my noble friend Lady Doocey, and there is rather better news on this amendment as a result of conversations with the Minister. I warmly welcome the significant movement the Government have made in this area. This is reflected both in the recent policy paper on introducing statutory defences into the Computer Misuse Act, which they have shared with me, and in the constructive meeting I recently held with the noble Lord, Lord Katz, for which I thank him.

The principle we have long championed, that a cyber security researcher’s intent and motivation should be a relevant factor in law, has finally been acknowledged. As the industry has told us for decades, the 1990 Act is a relic of a different era. It was drafted when only 0.5% of people used the internet. It is now being asked to govern a world of generative AI and industrialised cyber warfare. Its current blanket prohibition on unauthorised access makes no distinction between a malicious hacker and a white-hat security researcher. Under current law, our cyber defenders are forced to operate with one hand tied behind their backs, fearing prosecution for the very activities that keep our national infrastructure resilient. This is not just a legal anomaly; it is a direct threat to UK resilience.

However, while the policy paper is a major step forward, we must ensure that it results in robust statutory protection, not just a vague promise of prosecutorial discretion. Reliance on the good faith of prosecutors is not a long-term solution for an industry that requires absolute legal certainty. Our amendment would provide that framework—a defence where actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime or justified in the public interest.

I ask the Minister to address some of the following critical concerns arising from the Government’s own policy paper. Because of the time of night, I am going to abbreviate it to give him the headings and write to him subsequently. First, the accreditation bottleneck is a national security risk. The whole question of having to have chartered-level UK Cyber Security Council accreditation will create a bottleneck. The definition of “suitably qualified” suggests that only those with membership of professional bodies such as the UK Cyber Security Council will be valid, but will it recognise in due course that those with established industry experience, who may not hold formal academic credentials, will also qualify? The “no supervision” rule is operationally unworkable, and the scope of non-intrusive activity seems somewhat random.

The vulnerability duty creates a legal trap. The paper requires a researcher who discovers a vulnerability to make all reasonable efforts to report it to the system owner as soon as practicable, but the paper itself acknowledges the difficulty of identifying system owners.

The bug bounty market is under threat. The paper prohibits permitted persons from requesting or demanding payment for reporting a discovered vulnerability. The global bug bounty market, where organisations invite researchers to find and responsibly disclose flaws in exchange for payments, is worth hundreds of millions of pounds and is a cornerstone of modern cyber defence. The paper’s drafting risks chilling this entire ecosystem.

Then we have statutory versus non-statutory protections. The paper acknowledges that reliance on the good faith of prosecutors is not a solution. Can the Minister commit to placing these defences in the Bill during this Session? If not, what vehicle do the Government envisage? Could the upcoming Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill accommodate this reform? We need a clear answer on the legislative timetable.

The paper does not seem to cover the public sector—the National Cyber Security Centre itself—yet the proposed defence appears directed entirely at privately accredited individuals. That is a question that needs answering.

We cannot allow technological development to race ahead of democratic deliberation. Our cyber security professionals need the clarity of the law to protect the UK in 2026 and beyond. I very much hope that this is a moment of genuine policy momentum, so let us produce legislation that is workable, inclusive and legally certain. I am very hopeful that the Minister will continue the dialogue over this policy paper. I beg to move.

23:00

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I started using a computer before 1990. I was one of those children who started using the BBC Micro—one of the best things the BBC ever produced. Indeed, I learned how to code—admittedly only in BASIC, but sufficient in the days when the internet had not even been created—to start working out how to use data in the computer system.

Unlike the previous amendment, I cannot say to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, nor indeed to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that I would support them if they were to call a Division on this amendment. I completely agree with proposed subsections 2A(a) and 5A(a) that

“the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime”

but not this latter bit that they have lumped into it, saying that

“the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest”.

I am a great believer in the public interest, but I find that it is being used now to try to justify too many things, including not releasing information from government. In fact, it would be contrary to the public interest, for example, to release information on some of the Bills that we are debating, not just today but at other times during this Parliament.

Let us just try to get a sense of what is going on with the Computer Misuse Act. Why was it introduced? It was introduced to stop manipulation. At what point does manipulation using computers become justifiable in the public interest? For some, that might be a whistleblower caveat. From what the noble Lord set out, I am not quite sure why this is the defining element. I am conscious that the Government may want to automate even more, so what is the balance with what is there to prevent crimes and similar? I appreciate that we do not want bureaucracy and legislation to get in the way of generally trying to stop harm, but what is the impact of the other elements of the noble Lord’s amendments? They could actually deploy harm while still trying to justify it in the public interest.

I appreciate there is sometimes a resistance to old legislation, but old legislation is not necessarily stuck in its time. There are many other Acts that go back hundreds of years that are still perfectly valid because the principles are the same. I would be concerned if we walked into allowing this amendment to go through without testing the opinion of the House to try to assess precisely what actions the noble Lord is trying to allow by making a case for the defence that something be done in public interest. That is why I express my concerns tonight.

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak against Amendment 367. I have the gravest concerns about it. I am not going to echo everything my noble friend Lady Coffey said, but it amounts to a hackers’ charter. I take security and IT security very seriously. I am responsible for IT security in my business. We are in a sensitive industry—we are involved in global trade—never more so than today, when ammonia and natural gas are under global pressure as part of a war. You have to take these things seriously.

When I joined your Lordships’ House two years ago, there was a briefing and I was pleased that I was one of a handful of Peers and MPs who had a password manager. Every password I have is at least 16 characters—they are random and not one is repeated. You have to take this stuff seriously—no pet names, not using your wife’s name or possibly a wedding anniversary. Using a VPN is important as well.

No matter what precautions you take, however, someone is always going to have a go. What this amendment does is give the malevolent hacker a free pass to get through: a ready defence. It is not just that. We need to recognise that technology is changing all the time. All the things I may do with passwords are not enough. Even using face, voice, biometrics and two-factor authentication, cloned SIM cards or using public wifi to intercept signals are important ways in which even the most diligent and careful person can have their data compromised. There are people who want to abuse your privacy or insult your business. We can simply create a crime, but we must take a huge number of steps to avoid jeopardy or giving them a “get out of jail free” card.

In my view, this amendment would mean that, if somebody finds something, they get off, but if they do not find anything then they are guilty. All those years ago when I was at school, we were taught about trial by ordeal. If you gripped a red hot iron bar and you got blisters, you were guilty; if a lady was put on the ducking stool and she drowned, she was probably innocent. This is the sort of perverse outcome that this amendment would provide.

Further, it denies how technology is changing in so far as AI is concerned. In our minds, we have a spotty teenager hacking away at their computer, perhaps late into the night while playing Fortnite on the other screen. What this amendment does is give an opportunity for AI, mechanisation, and the industrialisation and automation of structured hacks on a phishing expedition—a mass insult or mass trolling to try to scrape as much as they possibly can. The public interest is in the eye of the beholder, and because there is no pure definition that is challengeable, and so one would have to go to the law or ask international lawyers what amounts to a statement of the law, we are going to get in a muddle.

I cannot support Amendment 367, not just because I think it is naïve, in so far as it is thinking about the individual at home, but because it fails to understand the way that technology is changing so rapidly—the industrialisation, AI and so forth, and the volume attacks. We cannot give a perverse incentive that allows those people with malevolent intent to get off while individuals, business and the economy, at home and abroad, are under attack.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for bringing back this amendment on Report. As was our position in Committee, we recognise the need to update the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and bring it in line with the online reality in which we now live, 36 years after the Act.

I am grateful that, in Committee, the Minister acknowledged the need for the Government to examine the pro-innovation regulation of technologies review by the noble Lord, Lord Vallance, and come to their own conclusions. He was right then that it is entirely reasonable to expect cyber security to be updated with the growth in internet use and the corresponding growth in cyber attacks.

Little more needs to be said, other than that we support the intentions of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I hope that the Minister will be able to update the House on the changes to the Act that the Home Office has considered.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I am once again grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his amendment and for returning to this very important subject. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for contributing to this short but vital debate. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for taking the time last week to meet with myself and officials to discuss this issue.

Cyber security professionals play a crucial role in protecting the UK’s digital systems. I support the intention behind this amendment; we broadly agree on the benefits of introducing a statutory defence. That is why we have been developing a limited defence to the offence of unauthorised access to computer material, provided for in Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act, that will allow trusted cyber security researchers to spot and report vulnerabilities in a responsible manner.

We have made significant progress in shaping a proposal, but some details, including ensuring adequate safeguards, still need refinement. To date, we have briefed over 100 industry and expert stakeholders, including both cyber security firms and system owners, to finalise the approach. Engagement to date has revealed strong support for reform, alongside clear calls to ensure that the defence is workable for a range of cyber security researchers. We will provide a further update once that work is complete.

The noble Lord, Lord Fuller, said that the principle of a limited statutory defence risks creating a hacker’s charter. I stress that we are working with the whole industry—including, of course, the system owners—to develop a nuanced approach that is future-proofed and allows for responsible work in this area.

I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that the Government intend to legislate for a statutory defence against Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act once this work has been completed and when parliamentary time allows. We are not quite there yet, so this Bill is not the right vehicle, but we are committed to delivering a solution that is proportionate and practical for both researchers and law enforcement. Like his colleague on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench—the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon—did earlier, the noble Lord tempts me to somehow forecast what might be in a future King’s Speech. I cannot be that precise.

As a possible response, the noble Lord mooted the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, which will be a carry-over Motion. I am not going to get into the detail of that tonight, but I am very keen that we stay in communication. The noble Lord has asked some complex questions. He is going to write to me, and I am very happy to respond in kind. In light of the progress we made at the meeting we had last week, and the progress we were making on developing a proposal that has acceptance across the industry and is future-proofed and nuanced—we are, of course, very keen to continue the dialogue—I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

The Minister just said that he will exchange correspondence with the noble Lord. Will he make sure that that is copied to everybody who is participating in this debate?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

Yes.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his response, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and noble Lord, Lord Fuller, for their contributions. As the Minister says, this defence is at the behest of the cyber security industry. That is a very important point. This is not just a group of hackers who have decided that they need to cover their tracks; this has long been demanded by the cyber security industry. I very much hope that when the industry sees the policy paper produced by the Government, it will see that the movement towards a defence is constructive and particular and does not have the kind of loopholes that it fears.

I thank the Minister for his reassurances about future legislation. I am obviously in very good company with my noble friend in providing temptation for the Minister about the King’s Speech. We look forward to the future legislative opportunities that the Minister has described. In the meantime, I withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 367 withdrawn.

Amendment 368

Moved by

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough]

368: After Clause 132, insert the following new Clause—
“Consumer cloud-based service provider access restrictions: lost or stolen devices(1) A provider of consumer cloud-based services referred to in subsection (7)(a) that are accessed from a device must, upon receiving verified notification from a relevant person that a device has been lost or stolen, take reasonable and timely steps aimed at preventing any person who is not the device owner from accessing the provider’s consumer cloud-based services from that device, in order to discourage, where possible, the resale of devices obtained unlawfully.(2) In subsection (1) “relevant person” means— (a) a consumer who is the device owner,(b) a person that is a legitimate seller of the device, or(c) a relevant authority.(3) The provider must, so far as it is technically possible for the provider to do so in accordance with the technical standards referred to in subsection (7)(a), block access to the provider’s consumer cloud-based services from the device identified in the relevant verified notification.(4) The provider must inform, as soon as practically possible, the National Crime Agency and the police service in the area in which the theft or loss of the device was first reported.(5) Providers must, subject to appropriate safeguards, establish a process for relevant persons to appeal or reverse a block on a device in cases of error, fraud, or device recovery.(6) A provider shall not be liable for any loss or damage suffered in consequence of any action taken under this section.(7) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for—(a) the technical standards required to enforce the steps outlined in subsections (1) and (3),(b) the categories of consumer cloud-based services in relation to which providers will be required to take the steps outlined in subsections (1) and (3),(c) the implementation timeline for providers, and(d) sanctions for non-compliance.(8) In this section—“consumer” has the meaning given by section 2(3) of the Consumer Rights Act 2015;“consumer cloud-based service” means a digital service which—(a) is a cloud computing service (as defined in the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 (S.I. 2018/506)),(b) is supplied directly to consumers in the United Kingdom, and(c) is used by those consumers solely for personal use.“device” means a mobile telephone device with an IMEI number;“device owner” means—(a) a person that—(i) is a consumer in the United Kingdom,(ii) has purchased a device through a contract or transfer of ownership of the device, or(b) a legal person that can demonstrate legitimate ownership through supply chain documentation.“legitimate seller” means—(a) a manufacturer or trader of the device,(b) an online marketplace provider or legal person that sells the device, or(c) a trader operating on an online marketplace provided they can trace the origin of the device.“provider” means a person who enters into a contract directly with a consumer in the United Kingdom for the provision of consumer cloud-based services;“verified notification” means a written notification that a device has been lost or stolen, which includes all of the following information—(a) details of the relevant device that has been lost or stolen, including its IMEI number,(b) evidence demonstrating that the person who has submitted the notification is a relevant person, such as proof of purchase or supply chain documentation, and(c) any other information that the provider reasonably requires in order for it to comply with its obligations under this section.”

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, occasionally there are measures brought before this House that will hugely benefit people, that will be positive and that people of all political persuasions can support in the sometimes fractious fulcrum of Parliament. This is such a measure, and I am disappointed that the likelihood is that the Government will set their face against this proposal.

I commend to the Minister the excellent letter sent by Commander James Conway of the Metropolitan Police on 11 July to Dame Chi Onwurah, the chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, as part of its investigation and inquiry into mobile phone theft and designing out mobile phone theft as far as is practicable. It is an excellent letter, and I will return to it at the end of my remarks.

23:15

I also draw to the attention of the Minister the letter from Dame Chi Onwurah of 23 October to his colleague, the right honourable Member for Birmingham Ladywood, the Home Secretary, which made some interesting points. In quite robust language between two members of the same party, it made some serious challenges to the Government to move on from a process of honeyed words and lots of summits with tech companies, and actually to take action to ameliorate and tackle head-on this significant problem that affects thousands of people every year.

Amendment 368 is in my name, and I am grateful to have the support once again of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, who kindly moved a similar amendment on my behalf in Committee when I had overseas commitments. I look forward to hearing from her if she is able to contribute tonight. I am also indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, with all the experience and expertise that he brings from his time as the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis.

This is an incredibly important and timely amendment. New figures released in February show that 587,498 phones were stolen in London, excluding the City, between 2017 and February 2024, with just 13,998 of them being recovered. There were 71,391 recorded mobile phone thefts in London last year. Although this was 12% lower than the 81,365 in 2024, Assistant Commissioner Matt Twist admitted that the numbers were “too high”. In 2024 the cost of phone theft in London to members of the public and insurance companies was estimated by the police to be £50 million, while the phones themselves had a street value of approximately £20 million.

Although the police now use drones and electric bikes to catch these thieves, which is having a minor impact, this is not enough on its own. Assistant Commissioner Twist has called on the phone providers to make it harder to reprogramme them. Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Mark Rowley has also urged the phone manufacturers to

“do more to stop criminals being able to reset, reuse or resell stolen phones”.

That is what this amendment would force them to do.

According to written evidence submitted by the Met Police to the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, with an analysis of an industry sample of 4,000 Apple devices stolen in London in 2023, 78% of them were connected to an overseas network. Most of the devices stolen in the UK were sold to an overseas market to be used around the world. The vast majority are not being taken for parts. Some 22% were in Algeria and 16% were in China—the two most common locations of stolen devices.

This means that, to curb mobile phone thefts, deterrents must be put in place to stop these phones functioning overseas. The current technical controls that exist are not enough. The Global System for Mobile Communications Association, GSMA, has a service called CEIR—I apologise for the acronyms—the central equipment identity register for dealing with stolen devices. If a network provider is notified of a lost or stolen device, they can share the connection IMEI number using CEIR—I know that it is late, but please bear with me.

However, there are some problems. Only 10% of the 1,200 global network providers subscribe to CEIR, and there is particularly poor coverage in Africa, China, the Far East and South America. This aligns with the fact that we know that most common locations for stolen Apple devices were in Africa and China. It is also possible for criminals to get round IMEI network blocks. A solution which disables the phones themselves is required, as this would not be bypassed by shipping stolen devices out of Europe.

Amendment 368 would create a regulatory framework that will ensure that mobile phone manufacturers must employ cloud-based blocking and IMEI-linked device locks to render stolen phones unusable. The phones will be functionally useless, unable to access call services, and would not even work as wifi devices. While criminal gangs typically wipe and reset smartphones to sell them as legitimate used devices, cloud-based blocking prevents the device from activating with a new user account, closing this loophole.

While this amendment is similar to the one that I brought forward in Committee, there are some key differences. First, it would narrow the definition of cloud computing, focusing on services provided specifically to consumers for personal use at a device level, such as operating systems. Secondly, it would permit the Secretary of State to specify which services are in scope to allow flexibility as technology and the threat landscape evolves. These adjustments deal with some responses made in Committee.

The new amendment also includes protection for devices which are stolen in transit, be that from a supplier or while in the process of being delivered to a customer. It would protect members of the public who have bought phones from online retailers and the retailers themselves. It would benefit both members of the public and many of the companies that drive our economy. Legitimate second-hand buyers also gain confidence, knowing that industry-wide standards prevent stolen devices entering the market.

The Home Secretary has publicly stated that tackling mobile phone theft is a priority, and the last Home Secretary urged phone manufacturing companies, including Apple, Google and Samsung, to work with the police to make phones worthless to criminals. This amendment has had cross-party support in Committee and now on Report. It is what members of the police forces and stakeholders have called for and would be a central part of the solution to an issue which the Government have recognised is a significant problem. This is an amendment which it should be in everyone’s interest to support.

I finish with the words of Dame Chi Onwurah in her letter to the Home Secretary of 23 October 2025:

“We would support a robust stance on this issue from the government, and a commitment from you in your role as Home Secretary to continue this work. Technology to deter phone theft is available, and we have yet to hear a convincing reason why, with co-operation on all sides, the available solutions shouldn’t be used to disincentivise phone theft and disrupt the market in stolen devices. We will keep a close eye on the next phone theft summit, and what emerges from it, and may revisit the issue with the firms concerned”.

She finishes with the following questions, which I put to the Minister:

“Will you continue your predecessor’s work in treating phone theft as a priority issue? Do you support the Met’s ask and will you request that Apple and Google implement cloud-based blocking? When will the next summit take place, and what will its format be?”

This important amendment has drawn support both outside Parliament, from technical experts, police services and Labour politicians, and from Members of this House and the other place. For that reason, I really think it is incumbent on the Minister to engage with the issue and give us some good news. I hope that he will have some positive news for us, because his Government would gain great kudos from this initiative, but at this stage I do not care who delivers it. It is the right thing to do and I hope that, in that vein, he is able to address the issues I have raised tonight.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Jackson. I was delighted to move the amendment in Committee in his absence and to attract so much cross-party support. We also had the support of the police, of the esteemed former Met Commissioner, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who I am glad to see in his place, and, as we have heard, from Dame Chi Onwurah, a very distinguished Labour MP.

As it is so late, I rise to say only that I agree entirely with my noble friend. The sight of distressed people in the Apple store, some from abroad, having to buy new phones and trying to get back into their accounts, affected me profoundly. It made me determined to change the incentive structure, both for criminals and indeed for retailers, which actually benefit from emergency sales of mobile phones. Given the degree of concern expressed across the Committee, at a much more civilised time, and the changes that my noble friend Lord Jackson has made to the amendment to try to meet any concerns, I very much look forward to a positive response from the Minister and to getting after this ghastly criminal operation.

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 368 in support of my noble friend Lord Jackson, because losing your phone is not just inconvenient. When your device is stolen, a crime has been committed, and operators have a responsibility to take a much more leading role in disincentivising the opportunities to steal, to make it a lot easier to reunite people with a phone that might have been lost and to discourage the black market in stolen goods.

It is a late hour, but I hope to tell a little uplifting story about my experiences today, because today I found a phone on the Tube as I got off at Westminster. It turns out that the gentleman sitting next to me, who had got off at Victoria on the way from Fulham, had left it behind. I am an honest chap. I had a look: it was a pink case with two phone numbers inside. I called them and there was no answer, but I texted them and, by and by, there was a response. To cut a long story short, the phone was reunited with the owner—perhaps, as I have the phone number now, I might send them the YouTube clip and possibly the Hansard as well. The phone was deposited at Westminster Tube with TfL staff, who were really good. They were actually really interested and keen to help this poor, unfortunate chap.

But what if someone had not been quite so honest? What if that phone number was not tucked inside the pink case? How would it have been secured and returned? I did not expect to talk to this group, but my experience today shows how important this amendment is. The man in the street should not rely just on the kindness of strangers. The phone companies should not make it harder to reunite; we should prevent the perverse incentives.

But there is another point. The phone is no longer just a phone. It is not just a device to doomscroll on late at night. It is not just a device to play “Candy Crush”. The phone is now a token—part of our security infrastructure and part of the devices that secure our economy. I do not believe that this has been fully understood. I got locked out of my parliamentary account the other day, and because I had left my phone behind, I could not do my work, neither my commercial work nor the work associated with this House. I do not think that the penny has quite dropped with the operators to recognise that they are now part of the security infrastructure of our economy. It is not just the inconvenience of losing a phone and queuing up, as my noble friend says, in the Apple store to replace it; this is part of the technological infrastructure of our nation. Technology has moved on, and the phone companies must do so too.

23:30

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I rise briefly to support this amendment. This country has been good at reducing fires. It has done it by designing things and places not to burn. We have never had the same determination about designing things not to be stolen. This is all about preventing crime by design. The secondary feature is that people do not tend to steal things that have no value. There are a lot of negatives, but fundamentally, if it has value, people will steal it. They do not steal it to deprive you of it but to sell it, often to fund their drug habit. This amendment is all about taking the value out of the stolen phone.

There is some success at the moment, in that some of these phones cannot be reactivated on UK systems, but as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, they are getting activated abroad. It is hard to stop them going abroad; very small portable devices put in containers are hard to discover. Although it was mentioned that the Met and others are having good success with drones and chasing, I guarantee that one day somebody will get badly hurt—either one of the people being chased or one of the cops. Chasing is, inevitably, dangerous. This is about stopping the chase and stopping the crime.

The 70,000 crimes mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, will be a bare minimum. Many people do not bother reporting them. There is no need to report them for many people. Sometimes they lose them in embarrassing situations, and they certainly do not report it then. We are talking about a large amount of crime that can have something done to prevent it.

My final points are these. There is no incentive at the moment for the phone companies to stop this crime, because when you lose your phone or have it stolen, you buy another one from them. The £50 million-worth of phones that the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, mentioned means £50 million more for the providers of the phones. So why would they stop it? All they have is more business coming through the door. The business model is not helpful to preventing crime.

It is a common-sense measure. It is well thought out. The amendment looks like it will work, given its extent and comprehensiveness, and nobody has a better idea; or, if they have, I have not heard it. This does not cost the Government anything. It will possibly cost the manufacturers, but it will be marginal to the costs and profits they have already. It is a really good idea. It helps the police a bit, but it mainly helps the victims as it reduces their number. It means that you can walk down the street, come out of the Tube, take your phone out and not have somebody whip it out of your hand.

My final point is that it is not just about theft. Often people are injured when their phone is taken—it is violence as well as theft. Particularly with vulnerable victims, nobody knows where it will end. It can end up with a murder or a very serious crime. If we can do something about this, it will have an impact. It is achievable, and I recommend that the Government, if they do not accept the amendment, try to find a way to do it in the future.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 368 from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, on which he has campaigned so strongly. It addresses a crime that has become a blight on our streets: the industrialised theft of mobile devices. We must remove the profit motive from street crime. If a phone is useless the moment it is stolen, the thefts will stop. California proved it and the technology exists; the only thing missing is the will to legislate. I urge the Minister to move beyond collaboration and accept the amendment.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with that proposal.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

It is the Government who have kept their Back-Benchers here at this time of night and kept the debate going. I am allowed to speak, am I not? The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, sprang up before me. But for all the Back-Benchers complaining about people debating this important issue, it was the Government’s decision to keep the debate going to this point, and some of that is to prevent a Division on the matter.

I am trying to understand—a question that my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, put so eloquently—why the Government are not accepting this amendment. They have given every indication that they will not. I appreciate that losing a mobile phone may be inconvenient, but the number one issue is the impact on tourism in London. It is why Sadiq Khan has painted up and down Oxford Street the words, “Don’t stand here”—because you might be attacked for your phone. It is ridiculous that, in our capital, the Mayor of London is painting these signs. It is all over the Tube as well that you might get your phone pinched. Yet the Government, for some reason, do not seem prepared to get tough with the mobile phone companies and prevent, as a former Metropolitan Commissioner has pointed out, a pretty lucrative business model which could be addressed—not just the thefts but the physical incidents that are happening, principally, though not only, in our capital—by taking forward my noble friend’s amendment.

It worries me that there is a risk of getting tribal on this, when we do not need to. Does the Minister want to intervene? I think she just said something from a sedentary position. I see she does not want to intervene. Does somebody else want to intervene? Was that the noble Lord, Lord Forbes? Does he want to intervene, with his experience of Newcastle? No, he does not want to intervene.

This is affecting not only citizens but tourists, and that has a massive impact on the attraction of our capital. The Government should be taking this issue a lot more seriously than they seem to be and trying to stop a crime that is one of the principal causes, in crime survey statistics, of people being frightened to go out and about on the streets of our capital city.

I am somewhat disappointed that this debate is happening close to midnight. I am conscious that Government Back-Benchers do not want to be here, and I can see that the Opposition Back-Benchers do not want to be here, but I do, because I care about people in our communities.

I appreciate that my noble friend will not want to test the opinion of the House tonight, but we must find a way to tackle this issue for the sake of everybody. Parliament must listen to the concerns of people across this country, and those trying to visit this country, and tackle something that has become so pernicious that it is a genuine threat to the prosperity of the many businesses that rely on people coming to this country and going out to enjoy themselves.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lord Jackson for his amendment regarding cloud-based services and access restrictions for lost or stolen devices. As my noble friend said, a similar amendment to the one before us was presented in Committee, during which it was pleasing to see Cross-Bench support from noble Lords on this proposed solution to an increasing problem.

Mobile phone theft is now a high-volume and high-impact crime. It is particularly prevalent in urban areas, obviously, and can often cause distress to its victims, as well as financial loss. Rather than simply creating new offences or imposing more severe punishments, we must address the current incentives that sustain the criminal market for stolen mobile devices. As was our position in Committee, we must act to remove the profit motive that fuels this behaviour in the first instance.

Amendment 368 in the name of my noble friend Lord Jackson seeks to achieve that precise goal. By requiring providers to take reasonable and timely steps to block access to services once the device is verified as lost or stolen, stolen phones would no doubt be less valuable on the resale market. This would result in the substantial removal of the economic rewards that drive organised and individual phone theft. The blocking of access to cloud synchronisation and authentication services would plainly strip stolen devices of much of their value to criminals. Quite bluntly, this proposal has the potential, as we have heard from other noble Lords, to undermine the business model of those stealing phones.

The amendment would also build on important safeguards. It would require a verified notification, a mechanism for appeals or reversal in cases of error or fraud, and an obligation to notify both the National Crime Agency and local police forces, thereby strengthening intelligence. Of course we must recognise that any operational mandate of this kind must be technically feasible and proportionate—the Secretary of State must therefore set appropriate standards and timelines through regulation—but the principle behind my noble friend’s amendment is vital. If smartphones lose value as criminal commodities, the incentive to steal them will be reduced. We on these Benches give this amendment our fullest support, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Once again, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, for tabling this amendment. I begin by saying to the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, in particular, but also to the noble Lords, Lord Fuller, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, that this Government take mobile phone theft seriously. That is why we have measures in the Bill to take it seriously, and why my right honourable friend the Home Secretary convened a mobile phone summit for the first time last year. That is also why we encouraged the Met to undertake its conference next week on mobile phone theft.

That is also why, in figures I can give to the noble Baroness, over the past year—the first year of this Labour Government—mobile phone thefts in London have fallen by 10,000, a reduction of 12.3% from the previous Government’s performance. It is a real and important issue. We are trying to tackle it and are improving on the performance from the time when she was Deputy Prime Minister. I just leave that with her to have a think about that, even at this late hour.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

So will the Minister accept my noble friend’s amendment?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will come on to that in a moment, if I may. I accept the principle of the work the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, is bringing forward, but I do not accept it in the context that the noble Baroness put it: that we are doing nothing. We are doing quite a lot. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, which is the important thing—

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

I did not say that the Minister was doing nothing.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Baroness did, actually. She said that nothing was happening under this Government. Every Member on this side of the House heard her say that.

The hour is late so I will go to the nub of the issue, which is the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. Law enforcement partners—the police and the Home Office—are taking robust action to drive down instances of mobile phone theft. We have delivered the most comprehensive, intelligence-led response to mobile phone theft, and Operation Reckoning, supported by the Home Office through the Metropolitan Police Service, is tracking down criminal gangs on this issue, going to the point the noble Baroness did not mention.

I agree that we need to take action to make sure the companies that design these devices provide services, play their part and do absolutely everything they can to ensure that a stolen mobile phone is not a valuable commodity and therefore not worth stealing, which was the very point the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, mentioned. Law enforcement partners—all of us in the law enforcement sector—are currently working in collaboration with technology companies and partners, including phone manufacturers, to look at the technical solutions, which, I must say to the noble Baroness, is something that the previous Government did not do. The Home Office is supporting this important work, and I thank everybody involved for their constructive engagement.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, in particular, that it is our preferred approach to allow this collaborative work between mobile phone manufacturers, mobile phone operators, law enforcement partners and the Home Office to continue, so that we find a positive solution to this problem, rather than accepting the amendment before us today and mandating a specific, untested solution through legislation. It does not mean that we will not do this—we want to try to do it—but we have to make sure that we do it in a way that works, is sustainable and is in partnership with the mobile phone authorities. The approach we are taking will reduce the risk of legislation not achieving the desired output.

I want to be clear to the noble Lord that we are working on that now. If it does not work, and if we find blockages and we do not make progress, we reserve the right to look at any and all options. At the moment I cannot accept his amendment, because it would mandate us to do something, but we are already trying to work on this to make sure that what we do works. We are doing that in partnership with all those authorities. At the same time, we are doing practical stuff by tracking down people and putting more police on the beat, including the 13,000 neighbourhood police officers that we are introducing over the next few years. We are also ensuring that we take action through the Bill on tracking mobile phones and giving police superintendents more action. That is a positive programme of action. However, I cannot accept the noble Lord’s amendment and I ask him to withdraw it. If he does not withdraw it, I will ask my noble friends to vote against it.

23:45

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I had hoped the tone of this debate was going to be a bit more productive, collaborative and consensual. I just wish that the noble Lord would sometimes bite his lip on this. Frankly, we had a consensus, but he had to go into partisan, party-political mode, attacking the previous Conservative Government.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am a fairly gentle soul, but if the noble Baroness provokes this Government by saying that they are taking no action, then this Government will fight back and explain what action they are taking.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Let me talk in detail about something I remember.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Yes, I will. I do not want the noble Baroness opposite heckling. She has not been here for most of the debate. If she does not want to take part in an erudite, interesting debate on this issue, she could probably go elsewhere.

This is an important issue about people. The reason I got involved in this is because—as you do—I got into a discussion with a taxi driver. The taxi driver told me about picking up an American tourist, who was in floods of tears because her dream trip to London had been utterly ruined by phone theft. She was bereft and distraught. I then began to look at the excellent work that the Science, Innovation and Technology Select Committee had done. The fact of the matter is that there is no substance to the Minister’s assertion that the technical solutions are misplaced, not in place or not ready—they are. A number of the tech companies, such as Samsung and Google, have confirmed to the Select Committee that they are in place and that there is a technical solution to it.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My noble friend is making a valid point. The reason I made the point I did earlier is because I understand that the Back-Benchers are irritated at being here at this time of night debating such an important issue.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

Well, that seems to be the case. My concern is that we hear about collaboration, but here is a tool that the Government can readily deploy, with the backing of Parliament, in order to strengthen their hand, and not wait for more time. I am conscious that all sides of the House want this to end. However, I have to say that the attitude so far has been that it is inconvenient to discuss this important matter.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I concur with the spirit of my noble friend’s observation.

I have given the Minister plaudits in the past for doing a very difficult job on marshalling the Bill through the House—his diligence, his hard work, his commitment to the Bill. We support many of the aspects of the Bill, and we believe his heart is basically in the right place. What frustrates us—he must understand this—is seeing that his own senior Back-Bencher, who chairs a Select Committee, is robustly critical of a senior politician such as the Home Secretary for her inaction, while bringing forward technical solutions in a non-partisan way with a multi-party Select Committee. I find it quite difficult to understand why the Government should not accept it, because, at the end of the day, the Government would get the credit from the people of this country for doing that.

However, I accept that the Minister feels constrained. I take him at his word that he will continue a proper, thorough dialogue with the tech companies, based on empirical data and facts, and talk to senior police officers—people who know about building out crime and designing out crime. I hope that a future Bill will be tabled and that the Government will feel confident enough to include a clause incorporating what we have discussed.

We are discussing this at 11.50 pm because some earlier amendments were debated at significantly greater length than we expected. I would have pressed this to a vote but, notwithstanding everything that has been said, I hope that the Minister will reconsider and talk to his colleagues. This is a very good proposal. It is not a Tory proposal or a Labour proposal, but a proposal that will help people. As my noble friend Lady Coffey said, it will do a lot for tourism and put us where we ought to be: as a pre-eminent technological superpower, doing something to change things for the better.

On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 368 withdrawn.

Consideration on Report adjourned.